ML20147G474
| ML20147G474 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 02/14/1997 |
| From: | Kemper R WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | Fineman C, Hochreiter L, Huffman B IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY, NRC, WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20147G451 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9703280165 | |
| Download: ML20147G474 (34) | |
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FEB 181997 s
4L L) Brian A. Mc Intyre SHEE!T To:
Bill Huffman/L. Lois(NRC), Cliff Fineman(INEL), L. Hochreiter(PSU)
Subject:
Text to close some WCOBRAfrRAC CAD Discussion Items Date:
Febmary 14,1997 Pages:
/0 including this cover sheet.
COMMENTS:
Attached are responses which I believe will resolve many of the WC/T discussion items issued regarding WCAP-14171, Revision 1. The items which are closed by the attached, in accordance with our past telecons, are: la,1b,1f,lg,li,2a,2b,2c,2d,2e 2g,4,5,6,7a,7b,7c,7d, 8c,8d,8e,9b,9d,10e,12a,12b,12f. Please direct any comments about the attachment to the undersigned.
r m.
cc: B. Rarig, B. McIntyre or informal NRC correspondence file), E. Novendstern k
8OO ge M
From the desk of...
Robert Komper Advanced and WER Plant Safety Analysis Westinghouse PO Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15235 (412) 374 -4579 Fax: (412) 374-4011 9703280165 970321 PDR ADOCK 05POOOO3 E
i COMMENTS ON WESTINGHOUSE'S REPORT i
WCAP 14171, REV.1 WCOBRA/ TRAC APPLICABILITY TO AP600 LBLOCA l
NOTE: The questions are based on the review of information Westinghouse submitted in i
Reference 1.
I j
1.
The following questions relate to the AP600 Phenomena identification and Ranking
{
Table (PIRT) presented by Westinghouse in Section 2.1 of Reference 1. They also i
represent followup questions to item 8e in the May 17,1996, NRC letter, l
In several cases, Westinghouse stated that a lower ranking was given to a a.
certain phenomenon in the AP600 because of the low peak cladding i
i temperatures (PCTs) calculated for the plant. Examples include reflood heat transfer, entrainment/deontrainment in the core, and containment pressure. For j
these phenomena, and for others if Westinghouse makes similar arguments for i
them, clarify if (a) calculating these phenomena are important even if PCTs are i
Iow or (b) they are important because they contribute to the calculation of the i
lower PCTs. If Westinghouse answers yes to either a or b above, provide j
additional information to justify the lower AP600 ranking.
j E
The calculadon of these parameters is important to the calculation of the PCT. However, because of the lower kw/R redng of the AP600, better blowdown cooling, etc., one can have a larger allowable uncertainty in the calculadon of these phenomena. Therel\\ ore, they are ranked lower than for a N4 loop plant in which there is less margin available and l\\or which one can not tolerate a large uncertainty.
b.
' For containment pressure, refIcod heat transfer, and core entrainment/doentrainment, and for other phenomena if Westinghouse makes similar arguments about the lower AP600 PCTs for them, clarify if the INEL understanding is correct regarding the conservatism of the calculations or how the uncertainty is accounted for in the Westinghouse methodology:
(1) containment pressure: Westinghouse uses a lower bound containment pressure consistent with current conservative (Appendix K) analyses.
See Table 4.4-1, a bounded value is used similar to Appendix K.
(2) reflood heat transfer: Uncertainties in this area are included in the uncertainty methodoiogy.
Correct, uncertaindes are included in the uncertelnty methodology same as N4 plante.
/cm/444RMKwpf Page 1
} '.,
I i
!S (3) core entrainment/deontrainment: ECOBRA/ TRAC analyses are conservative in this area as discussed in Section 3.1.6 of the Revised i
Methodology Report (RMR). In addition, the uncertainty in core j
j-entrainment/deontrainment is covered in Westinghouse's overall heat l
transfer coefficient (HTC) multiplier methodology, which captures i
differences in local fluid conditions.
Correct, uncertainties are treated in the same fashion as 3/4 loop plants.
i 1
}
f.
On page 2 2, Westinghouse stated that core top down flow /CCF limit is addressed under the PIRT upper plenum component discussion. However, the l
PIRT does not rank upper plenum CCF drain / fallback while the upper head blowdown flow is ranked. Clarify if the upper head ranking is what j
i Westinghouse was referring to on page 2-2, or if Westinghouse was referring to l
the information on page 2-8 discussed in part d.
j The discussion of the CCFL is on page 2 6,4th paragraph. The j
l phenomena is not ranked since its eNects only occur momentarily at the l
end of blowdown as the Row transitions kom co current downRow to co-l current upRow during the reRood phase.
g.
Given the AP600 results in Section 2.2.3, clarify if the INEL is correct in j
interpreting that accumulator nitrogen discharge is not an large break loss-of-coolant accident (LBLOCA) issue with AP600 because the core quenches
{
before the accumulators empty. Clarify how much liquid is left in the AP600 j
accumulators at the end of the analysis discussed in Section 2.2.3 and how i
l long it would take for the accumulators to empty. If there is less than 20% of the accumulator liquid left at the end of the analysis (so that a change in plant l
design or the analysis could result in the accumulators emptying) or l
Westinghouse concludes accumulator nitrogen discharge is a LBLOCA issue for AP600, then provide the following information. On page 2-10, Westinghouse i
stated that the affects of nitrogen discharge after the accumulators empty were j
addressed in the Code Scaling, Applicability, and Uncertainty (CSAU) report.*
However, in the CSAU report, only the affects of dissolved non-condensibles j
were studied, not the large amounts of nitrogen discharged after the accumulators empty. Therefore, clarify this reference to the CSAU report or 2
provide the correct reference. Also, is accumulator nitrogen discharge addressed for AP600 in the same manner as for 3-/4-loop plants?
The PCT occurs before the accumulator is empty. ks the SSAR DECLG break analysis, the remaining accumulator inventory when the reNood PCT le reached, is about 60% of the Initial. The accumulators empty at 300 seconds which Is over 200 seconds sNet the PCT. Addressing the uncertelnty in the accumulator nitrogen discharge is not needed since the accumuistors are stillinjecting well aNor the PCT and inclusion of the uncertainty would not eMect the calculated PCT.
/cm/444RMKwpf Page 2
4 i
h.
In the call on November 25,1996, Westinghouse stated Discussion item 8b
{
from the May 17,1996, letter was discussed in the 4th paragraph of Section l
2.1. This paragraph, however, addresses downcomer behavior not upper i
i plenum CCF/faH back. Should Westinghouse have referred INEL to page 2 8, j
4th paragraph?
i t
l Yes.
1 i
1.
As a followup to Discussion Item 8d, May 17,1996, letter, i
i (2)
For core entrainment/deontrainment and reflood interfacial heat and l
mass transfer (as part of reflood heat transfer) see parts a and b above.
For core top down flow /CCF, upper plenum multidimensional flow / flow distribution (hot legs / core), and upper plenum CCF/ fall back see parts d l
and e above.
l See responses to parts a and b provided herein and to parte d and e when provided.
(3)
For core multidimensional flow in reflood, clarify the low Westinghouse ranking relative to the CSAU study and the LANL PIRT (see page 64 of the LANL report).'
This phenomenon is ranked lower than in the LANL PIRT. The L.ANL words on Page 64 are correct, however, we have a ditterent interpretation of the phenomena. The quench front is uniform, not 3D, across the ditterent powered bundles such that there can be Row crossRow into the hot assembly kom the adjacent assemblies below the quench kont as the water level moves up the core uniformly. This does not menn that there would be additional enirsinment as indicated by LANL Into the hot assembly. The presence of lower power assernbiles tends to reduce the total amount of entrainment and, therefore, that increases the inlet Mooding rate for a gravity reRood situation. This does not mean that there are strong 30 elfocts. WCOBRNTRAC captures the signlRcent 30 effects.
2.
These items relate to Table 2.12 and followup Item 8f (5/17/96 letter).
a.
Because of low PCTs, Westinghouse has a low ranking for cladding oxidation in its PIRT and did not discuss cladding oxidation in Table 2.12. The INEL agrees that the low cladding temperatures currently calculated by Westinghouse for the AP600 indicate this is not an important phenomenon for the AP600. For 3./4-loop plants, however, the uncertainty evaluation included the cladding oxidation uncertainty. Clarify if Westinghouse has removed cladding oxidation
/cm/444RMK.wpf Page 3
uncertainty from the AP600 uncertainty evaluation. If yes, will Westinghouse t
commit to including cladding oxidation uncertainty if plant design or analysis 1
changes result in calculated cladding temperatures that cause oxidation to be i
Importart?
[
l The calculated PCTs are significantly below the threshold for signlRcant zirchvater reaction which can inRuence the PCT. If the calculated PCT
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increases to where it can contribute to the overall PCT calculation the uncertainty in the oxidation calculation would have to be considered in I
the sarne linshion as the N4 loop plante. However, this is not anticipated l
to occur.
l b.
Gap conductance was not listed in Table 2.1-2. Based on the discussion on page 2-4, is the INEL correct in interpreting that this highly ranked phenomenon j
is covered under stored energy?
i l
Yes c.
Westinghouse stated decay heat uncertainty is addressed in the same manner as 3-/4-loop plants. However, the portion of the 3-/4-loop plant methodology j
that addressed decay heat was changed for application to AP600. Therefore, provide additional information to justify how the decay heat uncertainty is
{
addressed for the AP600 plant.
l Table 2.1-2 is incorrect As descdbed in Section 4.4, the use of tech j
spec /COLR peaking factors and 10t% core power resulte in equivalent or i
higher lineer heet rates than if the full best-estimate methodology were l
used. The queadons 12c response wlH give huther inl6rmation.
j d.
For rowet, Westinghouse stated the same approach for 3-/4-loop plants would j
be used to address the uncertainty. Clarify if Table 2.1-2 should also state that j
this approach is supplemented by the information in Section 4.1 i
Yes, reviewer is correct. A more conservsove approach wlH be used for l
the AP600, as discussed in Section 4.1.
4 l
e.
Westinghouse did not discuss the following highly ranked PIRT items in Table 2.1-2: core 3D flow and void generation / distribution, core flow 4
I reversal / stagnation, upper head blowdown flow and flow area, downcomer condensation, and direct vessel injection (DVI).
j Only the se and 9e are regarded as high. The table wiH be changed to reRect this.
g.
For hot wall effects in the downcomer and lower plenum, Westinghouse provided information different from that supplied for 3-/4-loop plants in Reference 5. Clarify the reasons for the differences.
Not wnH effecte are ranked the same for N4 loop plante and AP600.
/cm/444RMK.wpf Page 4 i
_ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _
! e.
l 4.
Westinghouse discussed pressurizer location in AP600 LBLOCA anah ses on page 2-4
/
- 32. The reference given to support the chosen location does not seem correct; i
therefore, provide the correct reference. Also, have any AP600 specific studies been j
performed to support the pressurizer location relative to the break? If yes, provide I
them for review. If not, justify why they are not needed.
)
The impact of pressurizer location relative to the break has been investigated in a sensidvity case. The location that is indicated in WCAP-14171, Revision 1 has 1
l been shown limiting. The rekronce provMed is incorrect; it shouM be
^
Reference 5.
l 5.
On page 2 33, Westinghouse stated that after 10 s vapor flows out of the core in the guide tube locations. Clarify this statement because Figure 2.2-34 shows vapor l
downflow after 10 s.
The last sentence on page 243 shouM read 'During this dme Interval, vapor i
Mows down into the core at the guide tube locations
- rather than 'up out of the core.-
j 6.
Westinghouse's discussion on the response of the low power rod in Figures 2.2-31 to l
2.2-33 on page 2-34 is confusing. First, Westinghouse indicates that the low power i
rod undergoes a small temperature excursion but later states that no initial temperature l
excursion in blowdown. Based on Figures 2.2-31 to 2.2-33, the later statement I
appears to be correct. Therefore, clarify the apparent inconsistency or correct the j
report.
i i
The text should read that the peripheral rod exhibits 'no significant initial
{
temperature excursion" during blowdown. Review of Figures 2.241 and 32 l
Indicates that at the 6.0 and 8.5 kot elevadons a small ternperature increase, on j
the neder of 10 degrees F, is predicted at the incepdon of blowdown.
7.
The following questions relate to the CCTF analysis in Section 3.1.
)
a.
Clarify the statement on page 3-8 that in the calculation the low power rods quench early at the lower elevations. Figures 3.1-16 to 20 show an earty j
quench calculated at all elevations.
l l
Mgures 3.1-16 through 3.140 indicate that WCOBRNTRAC predicts an earty quench of all hool rods modeled in the simuladon of CCTF Test 50 at all elevations. The lower elevations are emphasized bessuse the exceeding.y delayed quenching of the upper elevations ln this CCTF test le not importent relative to the AP600 large break LOCA event, in which the quenching of aN rods occurs within 100 seconds.
/cm/444RMKwpf Page 5
_.. -. ~.
i b.
Clarify the statement on page 3-9 that Figures 3.1-31 to 33 show the calculated
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quench front is 80 s too early. This is true for the high power rods, but the
)
quench fronts on the medium and low power rods are early by approximately
{
120 s.
4 l
The fact that WCOBRNTRAC predicts enely quenching of the uppermost l
elevations of the medium and low power rods in CCTF Test 50 is unimportant. As shown in Figure 2.2 26 of the report, all fuelin the AP600 j
core quenchen during the Mrst 100 seconds of the large break LOCA
}
transient. Therefore, the most significant comparison of quenching is for l
elevations between the bottom core elevation and the elevation for which WCOBRNTRAC predicts the maximum quench time. Within this elevation
\\
envelope, the code predicted quenching occurs within 80 seconds of the times observed in the CCTF Test 58 l\\or rods at each power level.
c.
Clarify if the first paragraph on page 3-10 should be deleted because it refers to j
the ECOBRA/ TRAC analysis in Rev. O of Reference 1.
i The first two sentences of the first paragraph on page 3-10 are artifacts of i
l WCAP-14171, Revision 0 and should be deleted.
i l
d.
Clarify if the references to Figures 3.1-41 and 3.1-41 A, Rev. O and Rev.1, respectively, in the fou.-th paragraph on page 3-10 should have been to Figures j
3.1-45 and 3.1-45A.
The fourth peregraph on page 3-10 contains a typographical error;
\\
referencen made to Figures 3.141 and 3.141A should Instead refer to l
Figures 3.145 and 3.145A, respectively.
j 8.
The following questions relate to the UPTF analysis in Section 3.2.
4 c.
In the discussion on page 3-81 on the LOFT lower plenum refill, provide comparisons between the Westinghouse ECOBRNTRAC results for LOFT Tests L2-2/2-3 and the test data for L2-2/2-3 already provided in Reference 1.
This is a followup to item 7, May 17,1996, letter.
The LOFT L.24 comparison shows that the lower plenum and core refill y
predicted by WCOBRNTRAC is conservative (page 341). Further l
documentation of this may be found in the WCOBRNTRAC j
' Compensating Errors
- Report, NTD NRC45 4506, for LOFT Test L2-3 i
(See Figure a10). Taken together, the L2 3 and L2 5 comparisons are 1
adequate to resolve that the code capably and conservatively predicto 1
AP600 lowerplenum filling.
i l
1 l
1 i
/cm/444RMK.wpf Page6 i
6 i
i *.,
l 1
i *,
d.
In response to RAI 440.348, Westinghouse provided a table comparing UPTF l
Test 21 test conditions to AP600 conditions. For the comparison in Reference i
1, the AP800 table was different from that provided in the RAI response.
Clarity the reasons for the differences.
The AP600 condidons in the WCAP-14171 Rev.1 Table are taken kom the 1
WCOBRNTRAC analysis presented in Chapter 2, which had not been perl6rmed at the time of the RAl440.348 response. The condition differences are not great and are a result of modeling more restrictive i
accumuistor conditions, specifically a hig.*wr water temperature and a i
lower injecdon Now (Refer to Table 2.2-2) which causes the ' Total ECC i
1 injecdon to Downcomer* and the maximum ECC water subcooling value to be somewhat reduced. The steam Nowrote from the core into the i
downcomer has a lower value because end of-bypass is delayed with these accumulator condidons.
Based on the information in Section 3.2.8, is the INEL correct in assuming that e.
j there is not sufficient data to develop a flooding curve for the CCTF and UPTF l
DVI tests directly from the test data and that other flooding correlations are not i
applicable for the reasons discussed in that section? This is a followup question to Discussion item 6a, May 17,1996, letter.
)
i Yes, the INEL Interpretation is correct.
l 9.
The following questions relate to Section 4.1.
b.
Is the T. Identified in Section 4.1 used in blowdown only or both blowdown and reflood?
The Tmin value identlRed in Section 4.1 is used during blowdown only.
d.
On page 4-4, Westinghouse discussed the temperature critorion used to screen the initial temperatures of the thermocouples used in the T. evaluation. The temperature given was an average T. based on bundle average data from the RMR analysis Justify whether it is appropriate to use this bundle average temperature T. to screen individual thermocouples as done in Section 4.1.
This approach is designed to be conservative sInce the only T/Cs that will be considered are those which are initially GREATER than the average.
/cm/444RMKwpf Page 7 1
l 1
l lS i
10.
The following questions relate to Section 4.2.
i e.
Clarify the meaning of the word saturated in Table 4.21 regarding inlet water j
temperatures for AP600, is Westinghouse implying that AP600 sees only j
saturated water inlet conditions during blowdown? If yes, clarify the temperature range relative to the pressure range which indicates some subcooling for the temperatures given.
l The word ' saturated
- Indicates that AP600 liquid conditions for blowdown cooling are saturated or are very nearly so. The pressure range shown in Table 4.21 should read 'approximately 250-1500 pela *.
j 12.
The following questions relate to Section 4.4.
l a.
Table 4.41: Has the Westinghouse grid deformation analysis been approved l
by the NRC7 if not, will Westinghouse commit to addressing grid deformation if l
the NRC review results in this becoming a concem for the AP6007 For mixed j
cores, how will Westinghouse address mixed cores if they are used in AP600 in j
the future?
i l
Since seismic loads are a site-specific parameter, it is dlNicult to assess i
their impact at this time. In the event fuel grid deformation becomes a i
concern for a proposed AP600 site, Westinghouse wlH address its impact l
on the large break LOCA analysis. If Westinghouse fuel of a dlWerent i
design or another vendor's fuelis placed into AP600 in the hature, an i
evaluation will be performed of the mbred core; the evaluation will I
consider any differences in the dimensions, hydraulic resistances and l
burnup effects between the fuel types to be loaded.
i l
b.
Westinghouse identified power shapes (PSs) 2,3,4 and 11 as the PSs it would i
evaluate from the RMR to determine the limiting PS for AP600. Justify the l
basis for selecting these PSs as the ones to study the AP600. Could the excellent blowdown cooling for the AP600 cause the limiting axial power shape (s) to change for AP600 relative to the 344 loop plants? Also, Westinghouse has an approach to identify limiting axial power shapes to meet Appendix K, item I.A. Does this approach have any applicability for AP6007 j
j Justify your answer.
1 i
The 3/4 loop power shapes were established to be bounding for all Westinghouse core designs, and they are bounding for AP600 as well. To further demonstrate the limiting nature of power shapes 2, 3, 4 and 11 for AP600, a bottom-skewed power shape case was also executed and shown to be non-limiting. Power shape 3 is the bounding shape and la appIled in all AP600 matrbt sensitMty cases. The power shape resuNs will be reported in the SSAR large break LOCA section.
km/444RMK.wpf Page8
l, ',
i i
i f.
Justify the basis for the choice of bounding accumulator conditions on page 4-l
- 14. Based on the CQD studies in Section 22, sometimes the limiting PCT was calculated when an accumulator condition other than those proposed for AP600 by Westinghouse was used. Are sensitivity studies needed? Justify your I
j answer.
i The AP600 la equipped with two large accumulators for large break LOCA
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)
mitigation. Because of the limited accumulator capacity which N4 loop
\\
plants possess, downcomer underRil and downcomer boIIIng during core reRood associated with a minimum In/Hal accumulator water volume can
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sometimes result in a more limiting PCT, These phenomena are unimportant for AP600; the significant phenomenon for AP600 reRood
{
PCTis the Ume required to reRIl the downcomer. A sensitivity case i
executed assuming the Technical SpeclRcation maximum gas pressure in j
i the accumulator has verified that bounding the accumulator Injection rate l
on the low end is indeed the conservative approach.
1 5
i i
i l
/cm/444RMK.wpf Page 9
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Westinghouse FAX COVER SHEET i RECIPIENT INFORMATION SENDER INFORMATION DATE: fedeuv/ 21 /917 NAME: J,y Q. TO: LOCATION: ENERGY CENTER - l) N Thouc4 EAST PHONE: FACSIMILE: PHONE: Office:e/jf.3 7V-52 so COMPANY: Facsimile: win: 284 4887 LLS Al#.C. outside: (412)374 4887 LOCATION: a Cover + Pages 1+/ The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmission, please call: WIN: 284 5125 (Janice) or Outside: (412)374 5125. COMMENTS: DtAslf %I3 /%4kE w oO 5HUvlo /2Caut.v2 IT2rm 7.b (T) or= y'oug l0/17l9(, f M fotT3 2(,(o b, l ^lLaxn? CTHeM. lkVM s uds/nN AfD SKETCH L3 SGQu t/2ay) j w e. g ik g
- y saww a smr.1 Aue supu/ Att HAdduM UhuYS. fuarna. C&me nrout pts $u phy A < A. Harm. sus U AJtTI WA00&ut$ 13 FCUud IA) 306SKD0U9.Y.l.2.2.
y1a wta c o in S5M 2ev.5 an 12 o m m ws am m~ nu. ce : L,nu <~ n [st - m e,~we scu us,ru sc d y met tu f LuwTW 14vitt1'UU JgAvNi SYb** ' f h
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- 9. Auxiliary Systems requiring close temperature control such.s the security area offices and the central alarm i
station. Hot water unit heaters are provided in the north air handling equipment room to maintain the area above 50'F. A humidifier is provided in the branch duct to the security areas to provide a minimum space relative humidity of 35 percent. Each non-Class IE battery room is provided with an individual exhaust system to prevent the buildup of hydrogen gas in the room. Each exhaust system consists of an exhaust fan, an i exhaust air duct and gravity back draft damper located in the fan discharge. Air supplied to the battery rooms by the air handling units is exhausted to atmosphere. Air from the rest rooms is exhausted to atmosphere by a separate exhaust fan. 9.4.2.2.1.4 MSIV Compartment HVAC Subsystem i The main steam isolation valve compartment HVAC subsystem serves the two mam steam isolation valve compartments in the auxiliary building that contain the main steam and feedwater lines routed between the containment and the turbine building. Each compartment is provided with separate heating and cooling equipment. j
- p.,. c o.-p. "
The main steam isolation valve comp ent HVAC subsystem consists of two 100 percent I capacity supply air handling units with en!y !cw cfncicacy finca ducted supply air distributionautomatic controls, and accessories for each main steam isolation valve compartment. L clm+(/ *> A sp.<< um4 I sue # f ne# air handling units are located directly within the space served. One unit in each compartment normally operates to maintain the temperature of the compartment. The air handling units can be connected to the standby power system, for investment protection, in the event of loss of the plant ac electrical system. 9.4.2.2.1.5 Mechanical Equipment Areas HVAC Subsystem The mechanical equipment areas HVAC subsystem serves the demineralized water deoxygenating room, boric acid batching / transfer rooms, and air handling equipment rooms in the south end of the annex building. De mechanical equipment areas HVAC subsystem consists of two 50 percent capacity air handling units, a ducted supply rad retum air system, automatic controls, and accessories. De air handling units are located in the lower south air handling unit equipment room on elevation 135'.3" of the annex building. 9.4.2.2.1.6 Valve / Piping Penetration Room HVAC System Tne valve / piping penetration room HVAC subsystem serves the valve / piping penetration room on elevation 100'-0" of the auxiliary building. The valve / piping penetration room HVAC Revision: 10 December 20,1996 9.4-18 [ W8Stingh00S8
- O.
' ;a I 's i FAX to DINO SCALETTI February 21,1997 CC: Sharon or Dino, please make copies for: Diane Jackson Ted Quay Don Lindgren Robin Nydes Bob Tupper Ed Cummins Bob Vijuk Brian McIntyre OPEN ITEMS FOR SSAR SECTION 3.2 This is a background package for the remaining open items for SSAR section 3.2 for your information. SSAR section 3.2 is of. interest because by our joint NRC/W schedule, the FSER for this section should be turned into Projects by the end of March. There are 11 Open Items with NRC j I Status of Action W. All 11 of these items still require some Westinghouse action. Thank you. f i i Jim Winters 412-374-5290 l I l l i n kP
p1 a APfiGO Open item Tracking System Database: Executive Summiry Date: 2/21/97 Selectioti: [nre st ctxlel="Actism W" And (DSER Sectionl like '3 2** Sosted by llem # hem DSLR Sectum/ Tule/thnptum Resp (W) NRC No Haanch Queumm Type Iktail Status Engineer Staus Status triterNo / Dme 562 NRR/LMEH 32.1-1 DSER4)I 11ndgren Actum W Actum W NSD-NRC-96-4841 Westmgtmusw simudd apply the pestinent quahty assurance requuemese Appendit H to 10 CFR 50 to all Seisnue Categtuy 11 SSCs. A conuturnwns to ilus ef fect should le added to Section 3 2.1 1.2 and Table 3 2-1 of the SSAR. Closed Stmenent added to senwinc Categtwy il requuenents for QA Actum W - De staff thes not agiec. De pertment QA requuenwnts of AppenJax H should tw appfwd to all Sennue Omegtuy 11 structures, systems, asmi etunponents This ctutunutnrnt should be added to SSAR Smmm 3 2.1 I.2 and Table 3 2-1. Resobed - See response in tester NSD NRC.964841, dated October 14.1996. Seisnue Category 11 QA will tw the same as the Q A for RTNSS. Actum W - The rewlutum of this assue is pending the staffs evaluasson of respamses to R Als 260 83 and 260 87. 56% NRR/EMEH 32.1-2 DSER OI Lumigren Confrm-N AdamW NSIL NRC-96-484I At a nunsmum, the new and spent fuel storage rats simiuk'l meet the apphcable quahty assurance requirements of Appenden H to 10 GR Part 50. n aalismui to beirig clasufied as Setsnue CWegtuy 1. Westmghoene simuskt a&l a note to Sheet 89 of Table 3 2-3 N the SSAR to reflect this pmatum. Cloct -The fuel ra L classificzion m Table 3 2 3 indicaes that they are Seismic Caegory 1. Sessnuc Caeptuy 1 is required to hase Apperuhn B QA propam A separate note is rust requued Actuun W - Smcc the new and spent fuel storage racks are classified as APbOI) Class D. a as possible that this cornutuiment nught be nuunicepreted stasi one cimsults SSAR Table 3 2-1. Accordmg to this table, APN10 Class D comguments do not have to meet either RG l.29 sessriue design requwenrnts av Appendas B. Table 3 2-1 shoukt te clanfed by a&hng a note to same thz ahtuungh the new and spent fuel storage racks are Class D, they are designed as Seismic Category 1. and meet the apphcable QA requirenrnts of Appendix B. N Resolveded - See respone in letter NSD-NRC-96-4841, dmed October 14.1996. Add requuement fin Appenshs B for sessnuc Category l Gass D etems Confrm-N - Subsectum 3 2.2 6 was revned an Revivon 10 to specif>cally state that Appernha H apples to Gass D seisnue Categiny I Actum W - The resolutam of this issue is pending the staffs es atuamm of resptmses to R Als 260 88 and 260 89 V Page. I Total Records: 11
.s--! I Al%00 Open Item Tracking System Database: Executive Summary Date: 2/21/97 Seleclimt: Inte si calel=' Action W' And (DSER Section) like '3.2* Sorted by item # I liens DSLRsed"m/ Tetk/lWnpum Resp (W) NRC I No tirait h Qin stum Type Iktml Status Engineer Samus Staus grote No / D.ne 564 NR R/EMI-It 3221 DSLR Of Landgren Chwed AammW i Westingimnase slumaki vesise Table 3 2-3 and other apphcable sections and PalDs of the SSAR to reflect the staffs pwnne on ECES classificatum l. f Chwed - AlW10 Class C hnes thm provale an ECCS functum mdi requue spot rahograph of the welds. This requirement aided to 3 2 23 in SSAR } revision 7. 3 Acuun W In a letter to Weumghouse dmed August 20.1996, this open nem was reputed by the staff as Irmg reudved flowever,leftwe this issue is ~ canadered resolved, the staff riecds the followmg int umakm and/tw clanficanus from Wessmgtmasse; .I
- a. The staff has identified the components and systems hsted Irlow as part of ECTS systems tha are classified as AIV10 Gass C( ASME Class 3).
In contanment refuehng waver storage tank (SSAR Fig 6 3-2) Accumulsor (SSAR Frg 6 3-1) f Accunnslass injection pipng to discharge check valve VO28 (SSAR Fig (6 3-1) l Contamnent recucut.atmg ppng and salves to IRWST mjeans check valve V-122 (SSAR Fig 6.3-1) i 1 Pipng from ist. 2nd & 3rd stage ADVs to IRWST. mclu&ng &pressurit.atim spargers (SSAR l'ig 51-5&63-2) W Wesunginusse is requested to venty in the SSAR. Sulwectum 3 2 2.5 thz all of the ahtne computents and systems and any inher Class 3 ECTS not f h4ed above are included in the comrmtment to randtun radiography for all ECCS. t b It appens that SSAR Subwctam 3 2.2 5 is the only plar in the SSAR thm contams the almve cannmanwns Since this cuetututnrnt is run samed in enhet Table 3 2-3 or apphcable PalDs. Im=w can the staff he assured tha n wdi he amplemented on all AlW10 pfarns? This swue wdi be discuswd dunng the ikcember 5 & 6.1996 niecting. Actmin W - In a letter to Westingimew d.sted August 20.1996, thn open stem was regmuted by the staff as tving resolved flowever. hefore this awae is i considered resof ted, the staf f needs the following inforinciemm.iid/su clairicantums in the SSAR. i a lhe stalf has miensifrd the conpuients and syseems hved triow as part of ER3 sy stems thm are claw 0ed as AlW N) Class C( ASME Claw 3) incetmanent refucimg waer setwage tanL (SSAR Hg. 6 3 2) Accumulattu (SSAR lig 6 31) i Accunnstator injectum ppng to discharge check salve V-028 (SSAR Hg 6.3 I) l Ctunanunent recumlarmg ppng and valves to in omtannent refuelmg water stinage tank (IRWST) mjectum thetk salve V-122 (SS AR bg 6 3-1) hpng from 14. 2nd & ' led stage autommic depressuniation valves ( ADV) to the IRWST,includmg depressuriraine spagen iSS AR bg 5.1 -5 & .612) Westmgtmiuw ts requested to venfy m the SSAR Sutwectum 3 2 25. that all of the above conpmeras and systens and any other Gass 3 ECES run hsted above are mcluded in the conunstnrnt to randiun rad ography for all ECCS. b it appears that SSAR Sulwecimui 3 2.2.5 as the only pixe in the SSAR that contams the almve cunuminetu Smce thn cimmuturnt is ruit stmed in [ enher Table 3.2-3 or applecable P&lDs. Inw can the staff he assured that a wdl be implemented on all AlWN) plants' i I Page: 2 Total Records: II i i
..~.- -., ~_ - -_ _....-.-.. ? .s Al%00 Opem item Tracking System Database: Executive Summary Date: 2/2137 _ Selection: Inte st code l='Actism W' And IDSER Sectismi ise '12*%.ed by item O 1 leem DSLR Section/ Tale /s.kwngwam R*T (W) NRC T pe Iktal Simus ' Enginen Status Status letter No. / thue Na Branth (An w m 3 3404 NRR/SPl.it 32 R At 4)I Undgren Actum W Actum W R Ale 410 295 NRC letter 8/15/1996. SSAR Table 3 2-3. Al%00 Classificatairii4 Mechanical and Huid Systems Ctunpunents, and Eqimpnent.
- a. Weumglanese needs to reuse Table 3 2 3 to prtwkle the classification of the followmg flunt syvems and their assocised generahmt equipment
- 1. Radadogically Centruited Area Ventileum System (VAS) -
2 Contennent Recirculatum Coolmg Syuem(VCS) 3 Ileahh lityucs and Ike Mathane Shop ilVAC system (VHS) 4 Radniactive Waste Huiktmg flVAC System (VRS)
- 5. Turtune Huddmg Ventilaine Syuem(VTS) i 6 Annet/Auuliary Nonradioateve Venidann Syuem(VXS)
- 7. Uquid Wasse Management System
- 8. Gascuus Waste Managenent System
- 9. Radisnm Mimetonng Syuem p
- 10. Man Steam Syuem 3-II. Omdensate Storage System
- 12. Reactor Conlant Pressure Houndary 4 RPCH) leakage Iksectne and Monatonng System t
p b In the previous version, these was a bu: anon
- coluna in the table, mhich is wwfut to the seviewer. It was teneved from the table in Revisum 8. Hnng the locatum infonnatnm beti to the table.
i ( I i + i Page 3 Total Rectirds: 11
~ AP600 0 pen item Tracking System Database: ExecutiveSumm ry Date: 2/2tN7 Selection: lnre si code]='Acnim W' And lDSER Section] hke '3.2" Sorled by item # hem DSER Sectuwif Tule/Desenpum 16p IW) NRC No Hrarsh Questum Type Detad Staus Engineer Status Samu$ tener No I Dee 3512 NRR!EMEH 32 RAl OI Lsmigren Cminn-N Actam W NSD-NRC%-4888 R Al 210 221 - SSAR Tatde 3 2-3, Sheet 28. Reactor System i 1 The infunn.snm reimive to thn system was revised catenuvely by Revision 8. De follt,meng requests for addrimunal anforinasmin apply to these chaviges: l a Accurdmg to SSAR, Sectani 3 9 4 2.2, the ctuarol rod dnve nrchanism (CRDM)lach lumasing and rud travel luiuung are part of the reactor coolant ' system (RCS) pessure boundsy and are designed to ASME Clas 1. Resisum 0 of this table in the SS AR contaned a ctwnmitment to this cnter a for these ; cannpturen llowever, en Revmon 8 these conpwents were deleted Dey should be akled to tius sectum of tie table unless they appear m some other ' settson r
- b. The respmse to Q210 72 agreed to change the clasuficarna Irmn Class D to Class C, and the pnnctgul constnactum code for the CRDM Camdmg I
Shnzd and the CRDM Sennue Supput Plate from AISC 690 to ASME, Sectum NF, in Resisam 8,these two ciwnpwients were &Ieted from this table and apparently replaced by RXS-MV-10. " Reactor Integrated llcal Package " which has AISCMO as the pnncipal construction csule. Table 3 2-3 simiuld, be revised by cunninning to the respose to Q210 72.
- c. Tag Number Itens Mi-21,22,23,26,27,53. 56,57, are all classfied as mm* snuc. Dese reator miernal nems should all be Scisnuc Category 11, tw a mMe should he added ftw each item to state that the future of these nems mill ruit degrale the functaming of safety 4elmed systems er compurras to an -
unarepable level d in Revision 8 the incure Instrunent Condun mas removed imm thn table. h slumid be enher replaced, or the tuses Itw its removal simmld he provided i M" It was clasufied as ASME Class I in Revisum I ofihn table. G~
- e. Provide the basis for the Cose Hanel Nonle to he Class D and non-seisnnc w hen the Cave Hanelis Cass H and Setsnue Categsry I i
Resadved. De pressure tumndary pais of the CRDM will te added to the reacttu system in Table 3 2-3 as Cass A nens f a i
- b. he CRDM coolmg shroud and the CRDM seismic support plate mill be added so the reactor system in Table 3 2-3 as Ciss C stena math ASME, Sutwettam NF as the pnnciple constructum code.
t
- c. De non-core suppwt nems in the reactor internal udt te changed to Scismic Categtwy II in Table 3 2-3 d The mcore instrunent ctmdun mill be ad&d to Table 3 2-3 as mcore guide tubes in the inctwe erwarunrntamm system De classsficanus is Oss A f
- c. The core banel noule is seisnuc Categswy 11 De function of the noule is to erect flow. It des me provale core supput and ers me hase to be
( safety related The Table 3 2-2 will be revised to include the seismic Category ll classificenn l Confinn N - Table 3 2-3 was revised in SSAR Resision 10 to aalress these issues [ Action W - Rese mm 10 to the SS AR, Table 3 24 prosules acceptable respmses to R AI 210 22 ta through J lloweser, the resemse to 210 221e n not accepable This putam of the RAl sequested the bases for the Cose Hanel Noule to be Class D and non mutuc when the Ctwe listel n Class !! and [ Seisnue Caegory I In a tener deed December 2,19%, the respmse to this request sames that the seisnue dassification of the noule would be changed to Caegory II, and the safety classificatum would remam as Class D tecause the noule does not provide core suppwt and does suu have to be safety-relmed. De staffs posaum es that the noule is an entegral part of the core banel (which is a safety 4elmed conement). and thereftwe should have the same safety and seismic clasuficatums as the banel Table 3 2-3 should he sevesed to change the naule to be AlWO Gass H and Sennue Cacgory I Therefore, OITS i 3512 remaans open 4186 NRR/liQMH 32I RAl4)I RTNSS/Kloes Actum W Actum W RAls 260 83 is it Westmglumse's posarnm that RP C.4 of Regulatwy Guide (RGl I.29 is mcongnaius mith the " concept of graded QA"? Also, please explam what Westmginwne's "conces of Gsaded QA"is and whe:e that concept is defined m the standard safety analyus seput (SSAR) 4117 NRR/IlQMH 321 RAI DI RTNSS/Kloes Action W Actam W R Al# 260 84 Empi.un how quahey assurance requirements fiw the regulattwy tremment of nonsafety systems, systems, and cansments t RTNSSI wha-h. i Westinghouse has dermed m letter NSD NRC 96-4670, deed March 26,1996, are also suf facient to satisfy the regulatory sequirements ftw see nue Category 11, as descnbed m RG I 2f,i e, "all activines affectmg the safety-related functums of those putmien of structuves, systenis, and ciwnsmeries covered uraler Regulatory lbsnions 2 and 3" of the RG? RhNSS/Nydes A61mui W Actam W 4118 NRR/llQMH 32.1 RA14)I R Al# 260 85 Please identify all RTNSS SSCs tha's would also sarnfy the functeonal and deugn cntena of those putums of structures, systens, and ctwnponents covered under Regulatory lbsitxms 2 and 3 of RG l 29. Page. 4 Total Records: 1i
V,- I AP600 0 pen Item Tracking System Database: Executive Sununat7 Date: 2/21/97 ' Selectinst: lnre st o4l='Actkm W' And [DSER Section]like '3.2** Sorted by item # t I5"n DSER Sectam/ Tnle/Ikwnpum Resp IW) NRC f No. Hranch Quevam T pe Iktail Staus Engineer Staus Staus letter No / Dme 4119 NRR/BlQMB 32t R Al OR RTNSS/Ny&s Aake W Adam W R Al# 260 86 Ilow would RTNSS QA requerenwnts as defined in NSIFNRC-964670 akiress meerf ace design rapirenrnts identified in RP C3.? i i i 4l21 NRR/IlQMH 32.1 RAIOl Kloes/Undgren Actum W Actam W R Al# 260 88 While the staff may agree ths
- industrial quainy assurance standards are camsistent wnh tie gmdehnes for NRC Qualny Group D*. n is mm I clear how you cuncluded thz such standards, unhout NRCendorwnent, satisfy the pro isams of Appendix B to 10 GR 50. Please clanfy.
[ 4122 NRRillQMH 32.1 RAI Of Lindgren Actum W Actim W p R Al# 260 89 SSAR Scomm 3 2.2 2. "Applicatkm of Classificatan." IV 3.2-5. states, m part. "Sansctures, syssents, and (i.irngymeries classaf~ied equipnreit l l' class A B, or C ur scivinc Csegory I are tusic componerds as & fined en 80 GR 21." Please clanfy how a *Hasic Coengxment" as defined in 10 CIV Pan '2I can also be classified as Equipment Class D, u & fined in SSAR Sectum 3 2.2.6 C i c t f i i i t i I { i i t i Page: 5 Total Records: 11 6 m.
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~ f VV t = RECIPIENT INFORMATION SENDER INFORMATION DATE: FGoe/ 2 /. /997 NAME:
- Ltw, TO:
LOCATION: ENERGY CENTER - 4 ,3b,ct /-/u,wd EAST PHONE: FACSIMILE: PHONE: office: gf g.3 g_ n g e COMPANY: Facsimile: win: 284 488/ LE'2 C outside: (412)374 4887 LOCATION: l Cover + Pages 1+/ i The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower. l Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmission, please call: WIN: 284 5125 (Janice) or Outside: (412)374 5125. i COMMENTS: O TrAcr-lGD 'S ou a Nair Tn/ A r-c ne e e,e, x <a. Cun a a n- / /2NLtw-f3ptgcey 7 [y-i TH i (AST 6Ni Lu i S t% T Jcu A tz G~ r <> l Yl l b LA /1) e} f [ k( N (U {Nf &$ j D TH i.s Dcwir mic e' i r's Sm Mv/ w e-ac p there cAa.. 1 (c'. k[ttT&tJ H AY L:3 (u e s'UT S Jh== 0
.~ 11 4 i INSERT 8.3-Y t A tray designed for a single class of cables shall contain only cables of the same class except that low voltage power cables may be maedrouted in raceways with high level signal and control cables if their respective sizes do not differ greatly and if they have compatible operating temperatures. When j this is done in trays, the power cable ampacity deu!d beis calculated as if all cables in the tray wereare power cable, : !:x p=::!ca : d g: cup! g : :ca c!!:d. Low voltage power cable and high 2 level signal and control cable will not be routed in common raceways if the fault current, within the ~ breaker or fuse clearing time, is sufficient to heat the insulation to the ignition _ point. i l 5 a i p l 1 i
VV We5110gn0US8 sm vvvcn onces amas d ) RECIPIENT INFORMATION SENDER INFORMATION DATE: l'66,2-m / z( /997 NAME: (,;,, (4,,g,,, l TO: LOCATION: ENERGY CENTER - /_)< / dc J Actesco EAST t PHONE: FACSIMILE: PHONE: Omce:d/g_f70-r2m COMPANY: Facsimile: win: 284 4887 /J Je!M C outside: (412)374 4887 ) LOCATION: a i Cover + Pages 1+3 The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmission, please call: WIN: 284 5125 (Janice) or Outside: (412)374 5125. COMMENTS: h ur Th u ie w vu ruev t v a n e t u t= nu, ii72 ne ~, aa,t z/re/p, e ra aca 1 a,at cnw to w w> m c u:co oc a ns 7 bin Lw tt C6 (M D l b 5'C N l $ 0 C O b'l O 4 LeM w F f fe M r ega y, s c{yD
- n. L a~en ~ _
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s. 1.12troduction and General Description of Plant Criteria Referenced AP600 Section Criteria Position Clariration/Sununary Description of Exceptions C.5.1.3 Conforms The construction and inspection requirements of AISC-1989 and ACI 318-89 are followed as nppropriate. C.5.2 Regulatory Guides 1.60 Exception Those portions of the radwaste systems that & l.61 Table i require seismic design by Regulatory Guide 1.143 ) are housed in the auxiliary building that is Seismic Category 1. Certain portions that do not require seismic design (for example, dry solid radwaste storage) are housed in the radwaste building, which is nonseismic. C.5.3 Conforms Shield structures, if used, will comply with Regulatory Guide 1.143, position C.5.2. 7 C6 ANSI N199-1976/ Conforms fThe goality assurance program, as outlined i~ ' n ANS-55.2 / Chapter l'Ntf the standard safety analysis report ( and applied to% radwaste. sysIems, meets the of 7Regufatory Guide 1.143, @g Epugf' ( requirements sition C.6. \\ s D s t tT I A t Reg. Guide 1.144 - Withdrawn Reg. Guide 1.145, Rev.1,11/82 Atrnospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants General N/A The atmospheric dispersion factors for use in determining potential accident consequences are selected to be repruentative of existing nuclear power plant sites and to bound the majority of them. Chapter 2 provides the interface criteria. Therefore, this regulatory guide is not applicable to AP600 design certification. Reg. Guide 1.146 - Withdrawn Reg. Guide 1.147. Rev. 8,11/90 - Inservice Inspection Code Case Acceptability ASME Section XI Division 1 General ASME Code, Section XI Conforms J (t-Revision: 9 [ Wtaini@wdS8 1 A-71 August 9,1996
A
- 11. Radioactive Waste Management The monitor is an extended range monitor that uses a gamma-sensitive ion chamber. He monitor range and principal isotopes are listed in Table 11.5-2.
Technical Support Center Area Monitor ne Technical Support Center is the location from which engineering support will be provided to the operators following a postulated accident. He Technical Support Center area radiation monitor (RAMS-JE-RE016) is located so that its readout is representative of the radiation to which the support personnel are exposed. A local readout, an audible alarm, and visual alarms are provided locally to alert personnel to increasing exposure rates. A local readout, an audible alarm, and visual alarms are provided outside of the room and are visible to personnel prior to entry. Indication and alarms are also provided in the main control room. ne monitor is a normal range monitor that uses a gamma sensitive Geiger-Mueller tube. De monitor range and principal isotopes are listed in Table 11.5-2, 11.5.6.3 Normal Range Area Monitors Normal range area radiation monitors are located in accordance with the location criteria given in subsection 11.5.6.1. A local readout, an audible alarm, and visual alarms are provided in each monitored area to alert operating personnel to increasing exposure rates. Visual alarms are provided outside of each monitored area so that they are visible to operating personnel I prior to entry. Indication and alarms are also provided in the main control room. He monitor detectors are gamma-sensitive Geiger-Mueller tubes. He monitors and their ranges are listed in Table 11.5-2. ,,v3 e tr ili-I]
- I v
9 11.5.6.4 Quality Assurance , r2 t-M" # ' N Guidance for the quality assurance program for design, procurement, fabrication and) l installation issues is outlined in Section 17.1. 11.5.7 Combined License Information ne Combined License applicant will develop an offsite dose calculation manual that contains the methodology and parameters used for calculation of offsite doses resulting from gaseous and liquid effluents. The Combined License applicant will address operational setpoints for the radiation monitors and address programs for monitoring and controlling the release of radioactive material to the environment, which eliminates the potential for unmonitored and uncontrolled release. ne offsite dose calculation manual will include planned discharge flow rates. ne Combined License applicant is responsible for the site-specific and program aspects of the process and effluent monitoring and sampling per Regulatory Guides 1.21 and 4.15. The Cornbined License applicant is responsible for addressing the 10 CFR 50, Appendix I guidelines for maximally exposed offsite individual doses and population doses via liquid and gaseous effluents. (~ Revision: 8 [ W851\\ngh0llet i1.5-17 June 19,1996
4 l \\ l 4 INSERT 1 A-71-1 The quality assurance program for design, fabrication, procurement, and installation of radwaste systems is in accordance with the overall quality assurance program described in Chapter 17, which meets the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.143, position C.6. INSERT 11.5-17-1 The quality assurance program for design, fabrication, procurement, and installation of the radiation monitoring system and radiation monitors from other systems is in accordance with the overall quality assurance program described in Chapter 17. l l ) l l l I I l I i l
VV W85110g00VS8 <m wvcn oncci emme \\, RECIPlENT INFORMATION SENDER INFORMATION DATE: Fc4%.m> e I (997 NAME: (,,, (jf,mg TO: LOCATION: ENERGY CENTER - hi,wE [Aruca EAST PHONE: FACSIMILE: PHONE: Office: gr2-pq. n yo COMPANY: Facsimile: win: 284 4887 /) 3 A//L (_ outside: (412)374 4887 LOCATION: Cover + Pages 1 + ~3 The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmission, please call: WIN: 284 5125 (Janice) or Outside: (412)374 5125. COMMENTS: Dr4tr ~f~gtS t,vMu J SH cu LD 12Esot us ilon la b ) k tea rt 10/t/96 le He 7. a. 7 o f II{taf9G Tutecou w 0175 E 2L'-l., Tr Sr % s i M c~ cc 48itn-nr.t/ teTzucw vss cvx ,w o w a r,ea rue c~4 s5a cn.w < > iw weu ",,,J.n ~,,u-9. 4-14. oTc 5 3M 860t3tro / t occ t ra u;F / /c ot. /%)w e/ou 17 wi ti tc r o gm msu-e s a m,aeo. L-3 (D*" ec r~ w Cu e n v.T /k 8v Li 1.jh /C LU ' rut ~La s [4 N N /4/In ) J e?i'ase C s,w :. r me
I* TABLE 6.5.1-1 Minimum instrumentation, readout, recording and alarm provisions for ESF atmosphere cleanup systems ) j
References:
ANSI N509 and Regulatory Guide 1.52 Continuously manned control panel (main control room or auxiliary control panel if 1 manning is a tech spec l Sensing location Local readout / alarm requirement) i f}} Unit inlet or outlet Flow rate (indication) Flow rate-(recorded indi-cation, high alarm and low alarm signals) Demister Pressure Drop (indica-tion) (optional high alarm signal) h Electric heater Status indication Space between heater and Temperature (indica-Temperature (indication, prefilter tion, high alarm and high alarm, low alarm, trip low alarm signals) alarm signals) h Prefilter Pressure drop (indica-tion, high alarm signal) h First HEPA (Pre-HEPA) Pressure drop (indica-Pressure drop (recorded tion, high alarm indication) signal) Space between Adsorber Temperature (two stage Temperature (indication, and second HEPA (Post-high alarm signal) two-stage high alarm signal) HEPA) Q Second HEPA (Post-HEPA) Pressure drop (indica-tion, high alarm signal) I h' Fan (Optional hand switch Hand switch, status and status indication) indication ('? ) Valve / damper operator (Optional status indi-Status indication cation) ) h Deluge valves Hand switch, status Hand switch, status indi-Indication cation j h System inlet to outlet Summation of pressure drop across total system, high alarm signal 6.5.1-5 Rev. 2 - July 1981 4
- =
- 9. Auxiliary Systems t.
l [ monitoring, and therefore requires no nuclear safety evaluation. Redundant safety-related isolation dampers are provided in the supply, retum, and exhaust ducts penetrating the main control room. Therefore, there are no single active failures which would prevent isolation of the main control room envelope. Redundant main control room supply air radiation monitors are provided. He nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system is designed so that safety-related systems, structures, or components are not damaged as a result of a seismic event. 9.4.1.4 Tests and Inspections ne nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system is designed to permit periodic inspection of system components. Each component is inspected prior to installation. Components of each system are accessible for periodic inspection during normal plant operation. A system air balance test and adjustment to design conditions is conducted in the course of the plant preoperational test program. Airflow rates are measured and balanced in accordance with the guidelines of SMACNA HVAC systems, Testing Adjusting and Balancing (Reference 19) except the supplemental air fultration units which are balanced in accordance with the I guidelines of ASME N510 (Reference 3). Instruments are calibrated during testing. Automatic controls are tested for actuation at the proper setpoints. Alarm functions are checked for operability, ne supplemental air filtration unit, HEPA filters, and charcoal adsorbers are field tested in accordance with ASME N510 to verify that these components do not exceed a maximum allowable bypass leakage rate. Used samples of charcoal adsorbent are periodically tested to verify a minimum charcoal efficiency of 90 percent in accordance with Regulatory ) Guide 1.140, except that test procedures and test frequency are conducted in accordance with ASME N510. l The ductwork for the supplemental air filtration subsystem and portions of the main control room / technical support center HVAC subsystem that maintain the integrity of the main control room / technical support center pressure boundary during conditions of abnormal airbome radioactivity are tested for leak tightness in accordance with ASME N510 Section 6. 9.4.1.5 Instrumentation Applications ne nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system is controlled by the plant control system except for the main control room isolation dampers, which are controlled by the protection and afety monitoring system. Refer to subsection 7.1.1 for a description of the plant control and plant safety and monitoring systems. Temperature controllers are provided in the rerum air ducts to control the room air temperatures within the predetermined ranges. Temperature indication and alarms for the main control room rerum air, Class IE electrical room retum air, air handling unit supply air, supplemental filtration unit inlet air and charcoal adsorbers are provided to inform plant operators of abnormal tem rature conditions. & rJu Dcut.c YAL M Q f, f & do Dmrw Redslon: 10 December 20,1996 9.4 14 W W85tkigh00$8
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- 9. Auxiliary Systems A
m .et Pressure differential indication and alarms are provided acro each filter bank (ex' cept charcoal filters) to inform plant operators when filter changeotitu.necess_aly Pre'ssure { differential indication and alanns are provided to control the main control room and monitor the technical suppon center ambient room pressure differentials with respect to surrounding i areas. w Radioactivity indication and alarms are provided to inform the main control room operators of gaseous, paniculate, and iodine radioactivity concentrations in the main control room supply air duct. See Section 11.5 for a description of the main control room supply air duct radiation monitors and their actuation functions. Smoke monitors are provided to detect smoke in the outside air intake duct to the main control room and the main control room and Class IE electrical room retum air ducts. Airflow indication and alarms are provided to monitor operation of the supply and exhaust fans. Relative humidity indication and alarms are provided to monitor the average relative humidity in the retum air from the main control room / technical suppon center areas and the inlet air to the supplemental air filtration unit charcoal fi (s. T .) Status indication is provided to monito s, caters and con ed dampers. 9.4.2 Annex / Auxiliary Buildings Nonradioactive HVAC System The annex / auxiliary buildings nonradioactive HVAC system serves the nonradioactive personnel and equipment areas, electrical equipment rooms, clean corridors, and demineralized water deoxygenating room in the annex building, and the main steam isolation valve companments, reactor trip switchgear rooms, and piping and electrical penetration areas in the auxiliary building. 9.4.2.1 Design Basis 9.4.2.1.1 Safety Design Basis The annex / auxiliary buildings nonradioactive HVAC system serves no safety-related function and therefore has no nuclear safety design basis. 9.4.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis The annex / auxiliary buildings nonradioactive HVAC system provides the following specific functic'ts: Provides conditioned air to maintain acceptable temperatures for equipment and personnel working in the area t Revision: 10 3 W85tiligh00$8 9.4-15 December 20,1996
I VV W85110gA0VS8 ' rw w v cn oncei emme l t RECIPIENT INFORMATION SENDER INFORMATION DATE: fEstv4u/ 2/ _ /997 NAME: 3,ggy TO: LOCATION: ENERGY CENTER - h/ME d /2c uco EAST PHONE: FACSIMILE: PHONE: Ome,afg_gq,ggg COMPANY: Facsimile: win: 284 4887 U I O/2 C outside: (412)374 4887 LOCATION: i Cover + Pages 1+ / l The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmission, please call: WIN: 284-5125 (Janice) or Outside: (412)374 5125. COMMENTS: DI ArlE~ THF3 ti1 % cup KHOULd h G ZLL v L~ lTm W 23')pom cu/z llf f( r nuwu la nca u n c a,.x in e<- r o a <~ w nte s nw m ,~7v u t fcv.,e,u I2 u~te,, we un m. g C c.~ e a w, T ris a,, et ce c,k ? l~oem ec. ,n \\ m c. a.- e I il n~a~ H v Tt rt w U Tr/Wb i (JA%S 4
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- 9. Ausili;ry Systems 9.3.1.2
System Description
9.3,1.2.1 General Description I Classifications of components and equipment in the compressed and instrument air system are given in Section 3.2. In accordance with NUREG-1275, instrument air quality meets the manufacturer's standards for pneumatic equipment supplied as a part of the plant. Intake filters for instrumer.t air, service air, and high-pressure air compressors remove particulates I 10 microns and larger. Instrument Air Subsystem loo % cpd i The instrument air subsystem consists of two parallel air supply trains discharging to a l common air distribution system. An air compressor, dryer, controls, and receiver comprise i one air supply train. The two compressor trains join to a single instrument air header i downstream of the receivers. I Provisions are made to temporarily cross connect the instrument and service air subsystems i I at the distribution header. The instrument air line to the containment is normally open; however, air now to the l 1 containment is monitored and a high Cow alarm is provided to indicate a possible instrument I air line rupture inside containment. Safety-related air-operated valves supplied by the system ) I are identified in Table 9.3.1-I. None of these valves require instrument air to perform their I i safety-related function. The valves with an active safety-related function fail in the safe position on loss of instrument air pressure. One instrument air compressor train, including its air dryer and associated equipment and controls, can be connected to each of the nonsafety-related onsite standby diesel generators. The compressors are cooled by water supplied from the component cooling water system I (CCS). Refer to subsection 9.1.2 for details. The instrument air subsystem is shown I schematically in Figure 9.3.1-1. Major system components are described in Table 9.3.1-2. Service Air Subsystem loo fa c *f
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I Two compressor trains are provided for the service air subsystem. These compressor trains I consist of identical equipment and share a common air receiver that feeds the service air distribution system. Cooling water to the service air compressors is supplied from the component cooling water system. Refer to subsection 9.2.2 for details. I I The service air line to containment is normally closed and is opened on an as-needed basis. The service air subsystem is shown schematically in Figure 9.3.1-1 and major system components are described in Table 9.3.1-3. Revision: 7 April 30,1996 9.3-2 3 Westingh0USS e
1 i FAX TO JOE SEBROSKY February 24,1997 cc: Dan McDermott Brian McIntyre l SSAR subsection 6.2.4 (SSAR revision 11) includes hydrogen igniter placement information that was requested j by the NRC to be placed into the SSAR during a meeting on August 13-14, 1996. A copy of what is in this subsection was faxed to NRC on 2/13/97 and 2/18/97. The location of each igniter was provided to the NRC during the August 13-14,1996 meeting. However, some of the locations have changed and two additional igniters have been provided since the August meeting. These changes are a result of NRC feedback during the August 1996 meeting and from an EPRI hydrogen igniter l expert's review comments. The purpose of this fax is to summarize the changes to assist the NRC's review of l SSAR subsection 6.2.4. I i Changes to igniter locations include Above the operating deck: l As a result of NRC feedback at the August 1996 meeting, igniters now provide coverage in the refueling cavity, and two igniters have been added to provide coverage within the IRWST. Reoriented location of numerous igniters to move them away from the containment shell. l Below the operating deck -- Some igniters were moved to place the igniters away from the containment = wall. Igniters up in the dome were eliminated. Coverage is still provided in the dome, but down lower around the 210 ft elevation area, to concentrate on burning hydrogen at the release point. Please call me if the staff has questions on igniter placements. Thanks. 'n Cynthia Haag l 412-374-4277 . O i I 1}}