IR 05000266/1987022

Insp Repts 50-266/87-22 & 50-301/87-23 on 871101-1215.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Safety,Maint,Surveillance,Physical Security, Radiological Protection,Outages & Containment Integrity

ML20147D129
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	01/06/1988
From:	Defayette R, Hague R, Leemon R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20147D052	List: IR 05000266/1987022 ML20147D048
References
50-266-87-22, 50-301-87-23, NUDOCS 8801200069
Download: ML20147D129 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-266/87022(DRP); 50-301/87023(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. OPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan

. Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203 Facility Name: Point Beach Unit 1 and 2 Inspection At: Two Creeks, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: November 1, 1987 through December 15, 1987 Inspectors: R.L. Hague /7?"hfh 3"mr C/988 Date '

d R. J. Leemon fill Knua cy sl I 9 95 Date

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ff Approved By: R, eFayette, Chief / 0 <[

Reactor Projects Section 2B Datd /

Inspection Summary M oection on November 1, 1987 through December 15, 1987, (Reports No. 50-266/

87022 'DRP); 50-301/87023 (DRP))

Area', Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; physical security; radiological protection; outages, containment integrity, and licensee event report follow-u ,

Results: No violations or deviaticns were identifie !

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1. Persons Contacted

• J. J. Zach, Manager, PBNP .

T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent ,

G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent - Operations

• J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent - EQRS i W. J. Herrman, Superintendent - Maintenance & Construction D. F. Johnson, Superintendent - Health Physics

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R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor

• A. Flentje, Administrative Specialist

• J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer T. L. Fredrichs, Superintendent - Chemistry

The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation, i

' aintenance, d Health Physics, Chemistry and Instrument and Control Section * Denotes personnel attendint exit interview [

2. Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707 and 72710)

f The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs

ano conducted discussions with control room operators during the period j

) of inspection. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when

appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected r

emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to

! service of affected components. Tours of the Auxiliary, Turbine Buildings, '

and Unit 2 Containment were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,

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including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations

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and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment 2 in need of mainteriance.

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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions. During I the period of inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Vital Electrical, Diesel Generating,- '

Component Cooling, Safety Injection, and Containment Spray systems to verify operabilit _i

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These reviews and observations were conducted to ve*ify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirementu established under

Technical Specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedures.

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Unit 2 was placed on-line at 1:22 p.m., November 19, 1987, ending a seven week refueling outage. During power escalation on November 20, 1987, at 52% power, Rod C07 dropped into the core 13 inches at 7:49 a.m. and an additional 23 inches at 8:15 a.m. Both of these rod drops were coincident

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with automatic rod withdrawals. The operator noticed the misaligned rod at 8:40 a.m, and investigation revealed a blown fuse in the moveable gripper coil circui The fuse was replaced and an attempt to recover the rod was made. During this attempt the rod dropped to the bottom of the core resulting in a 20% turbine runback. Additional investigation disclosed a second blown fuse in the same circuit. The licensee performed tests to detect shorts, grounds, or abnormally high stepping current No faults were detected. The second fuse was replaced and the rod was restored to its bank positio The licensee made an Emergency Notification f < stem (ENS) notification, Event No.10725 and filed licensee event 4 m rt (LER) 301/87005. The inspectors will followup on corrective actions as outlined in the LE At 3:05 a.m. on November 21, 1987, with Unit 1 at 100% power a low pressurizer pressure alarm was received. This was followed by a reactor trip at 3:06 a.m. and a safety injection at 3t07 a.m, Primary system pressure decreased to 1400 psig. Continued safety injection and charging flow took the system solid and pressure was reestablished at 2000 psig by 3:22 a.m. The cause of the pressure transient was a failed open pressurizer spray valve. An investigation into the failure revealed two anomalie First a wire had become disconnected in the Foxboro controller for the "B" loop spray valve. This caused an instantaneous full open signal to be generated. Second the spray valve positioner pilot valve stuck in the full open position preventing the spray valve from closing on decreasing pressure. The controller wire was reconnected, the positioner pilot valve was replaced, and the system was tested satisfactoril During the pressure transient all safety systems functioned as require A total of 4450 gallons of corated water was injected into the syste The licensee made an ENS notification, Event No. 10736, declared an  !

unusual event at 3:31 a.m., and filed LER 266/87005. The inspectors will followup on corrective actions as outlined in the LE No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels and f

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Nuclear Instrumentation and verified that testing was performed in

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accordance with adequate procedures, the test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test )

results conformed with technical specifications and precedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne ,

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The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test activities:

ICP Safeguards System logic (Units 1 and 2) ,

ICP Intermediate Range Channels N35 and N36 (Unit 1)

ICP Power Range Axial Offset (Units 1 and 2)

ICP 2.14 Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation (Unit 1)

ICP 2.15 Reactor Protection System Logic ((Unit 2)

ICP 5.23 Rod Insertion Limit Control IT 235 Leak Test of Class 1 Components Following a Refueling Shutdown, Unit 2

IT 285 Inservice Testing of Main Steam Stop Valves (Cold

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Shut-down), Unit 2 TS 9 Control Room Ventilation and Heating Systems Checks TS 32 Safety Valve Acoustic Monitoring - Subcooling Margin Computing System - Containment Purge Valve Position TS 33 Containment Accident Fan-Cooler Units, Unit 1 TS 34 Containment Accident Fan-Cooler Units, Unit 2 TS 35 Local Leak Test of Containment Purge Valves, Unit 1 TS 36 Local Leak Test of Containment Purge Valves, Unit 2 With Unit 2 in refueling shutdown at 160' F and 302 psig, on November 11, 1987, instrument and control (I&C) technicians were calibrating safety '

injection accumulator level transmitters. During the calibration

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procedure, they requested that operations personnel equalize level between the accumulators which were at 730 psig. This is normally

] accomplished at power by opening the two make up valves off the discharge of the safety injection pumps. With the unit depressurized, this action placed accumulator pressure on the primary system through the safety injection discharge check valves. The low temperature overpressure protection system actuated and limited primary pressure to 455 psi When the alarm came in, the operators reshut the make up valves and

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system pressure returned to about 300 psig within 3 minutes. The Technical Specification pressure limit for this temperature is 520 psi Procedural changes are being considered at this tim The inspectors will followup on the licensee's corrective actions. This is considered an c;,en  ;

item (301/87023-02(DRP)). l

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On November 17, 1987, with Unit 1 at 100*' power I&C technicians were performing the shunt trip function part of the reactor protection system logic testing-on the "A" reactor trip breaker (RTB). The RTB did not open

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as required. During the subsequent investigation, it was determined that the cause of the failure was a malfunction of the shunt trip block push button, When the push button was released, it did not return to the full out position thereby preventing the switch contacts from making u The failure of the push button to return to the full out position was caused by a misalignment between the push button and the switch hold down ring. The licensee replaced the switch assembly and verified proper alignment on this push button and satisfactorily completed the testin It also verified alignment of hold down rings on other push buttons at the plant. This event is the subject of a draf'. information notice sent to headquarters for concurrenc No violations or deviations were it.entifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente I Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to ,

assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance !

which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

Rebuilding of Auxiliary Feed Valve AF-4020 Operator j

Replacing "A" Reactor Trip Breaker Shunt Block Push Button

Retubing the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers

Repairing Auxiliary Feed Pump 2P29 Bearing

Replacing Fuses for Unit Control Rod C-07

Replacing Bearing on 2P28B Main Feed Pump

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At 10:28 p.m. on December 3, 1987, with Unit 2 at 100% power, s high bearing temperature alarm was received on 2P288 main feed pump. Power was reduced to approximately 50% power for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. During this period maintenance personnel replaced the feed pump bearing. The pump was released for service at 8:33 a.m. on December 4 and the unit was back at full load by 10:20 During a review of a completed modification for replacement of solenoid valves in both units, the licensee discovered that extension wires which were installed on the solenoid valves did not have proper environmental qualification documentations. The licensee promptly reported the discrepancy and filed a justification for continued operation. The wires were replaced in Unit 2 prior to starting up from the refueling outage and the licensee has committed to replace the affected wires on Unit 1 at the next refueling outage on that unit, presently scheduled for April 8,198 This is considered an unresolved item pending further review by Region II (266/87022-01(DRP); 301/87023-01(DRP))

No violations or deviations were identifie . Physical Security (71881)

The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that physical security was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the security force compliment was as required by the security plan, that search equipment was operational, and that access control for personnel and packages was implemented in accordance with licensee procedure The inspectors verified that the protected and vital area barriers were being well maintained and, when required, appropriate compensatory measures were take At 12:45 a.m. cn November 6, 1987, the licensee declared an unusual event i due to abnormal aircraft activity in '.he vicinity of the sit The j duration of the activity was approxim tely one half hour between 11:15 and 11:45 p.m. on November 5, 1987. Subsequent investigation determined that I the aircraft were army helicopters on a training exercise. An army ;

spokesperson said that the helicopter crews did not realize that they were I flying over a nuclear power plant and would avoid the area in the future, i

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No violations or deviations were identifie i 6. Radiological Protection (71709)

During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that health physics supervisory personnel conducted plant tours and were aware of activities which may cause unusual radiological conditions. The inspectors verified that radiation work permits (RWP) contained required information and for selected RWPs the inspectors verified controls were being implemented as required at the work site. The inspectors observed personnel within radiation controlled areas and determined that personnel monitoring

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. equipment was properly worn and that the licensee's procedures for entry and exit were followed. The inspectors obscrved the posting of radiation "

9 areas, hot spots, contaminated areas, and labeling of containers holding radioactive material and verified postings using a calibrated beta gamma portable survey niet'er, ,

No violations or devir,tions were identifie l

7. Outages (60710,61715) - i On November 17, 1987, at 0:58 a.m .. Unit 2 went critical ending the refueling outage. The unit was taken off line on October 3, 1987. The major activities performed during the outage were replacement of the resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) manifolds in the primary system, i sleeving in the cold leg side of the steam generators, fuel inspection

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with newly purchased ultrasonic equipment in the refueling cavity, motor '

inspection and seal replacement for "A" reactor cooling pump, inspection i of secondary piping for wall thinning, installation of moisture

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p "separators, and replacement of two low pressure turbine rotors.

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Beginning of life physics testing was completed at 1:21 p.m. , November 17, l 1987. On November 18, the turbine was latched, and high vibration was experienced when operating at 1800 rpm. The turbine was successfully '

, rebalanced, and Unit 2 was placed on line at 1:22 p.m. November 19, 198 Prior to heating up the reactor coolant system above 200' F, the

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inspectors verified the establishment of containment integrity. This

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was accomplished by observing the proper positioning of all electrical i or mechanical barriers and isolation valves associated with at least ten i separate containment penetrations, witnessing the air lock local leak rate

test performed after final containment closure, and walking down a system

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designed to maintain containment integrit l The inspectors also witnessed all or part of the following refueling )

related surveillances: 1

1 IT-235 Leak Test of Class 1 Components Following a Refueling I Outage REI-2 Control Rod Worth, Boron Worth and Endpoint Measurement

. WMTP- Control Bank A Measurements

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Event Followup (92700)

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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and i review of records, the following licensee event report (LER) was reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate  !

corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent l

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recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical :

specifications. The followit:3 event was of minor safety significance and did not represent program deficiencia This report is close /87004 Degraded Steam Generator Tubes  ;

No violations or deviations were identifie ' Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. An unresolved item di: closed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph ,

10. Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which .

will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during t the inspection is discussed in Paragraph t 1 Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection period to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activitie ,

The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comrnents. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes '

as proprietar ,

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