IR 05000266/1987005

Insp Repts 50-266/87-05 & 50-301/87-05 on 860201-0331. Violation Noted:Failure to Keep Procedure OP-1D, Major, Black Plant Startup Current

ML20215G902
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	04/08/1987
From:	Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215G847	List: IR 05000266/1987005 ML20215G846 ML20215G865
References
50-266-87-05, 50-266-87-5, 50-301-87-05, 50-301-87-5, NUDOCS 8704170321
Download: ML20215G902 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lII Reports No. 50-266/87005(DRP); 50-301/87005(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan

! Milwaukee, WI 53203 Facility Name: Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Two Creeks, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: February 1, 1987 through March 31, 1987 Inspectors: R. L. Hague R. J. Leemon f,DeFayetthhh 'I L /l Approved By: hief g//[,7 Reactor Pro ects Section 2B Date Inspection Summary Inspection from February 1, 1987 through March 31, 1987 (Reports

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No. 50-266/8/005(DRP); 50-301/87005(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine una inspectoridentifiedproblems;nnouncedinspectionbyresidentinspectorsofoperationa licensee event report follow-up-andemergency)reparednessdrill.trainingandqualificationeffectiveness; Results: Of tie seven areas intpected, no violations or deviations were identified in six area One violation was identified in the remaining area (Paragraph 3).

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PDR ADOCK 05000266 j G pon

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j DETAILS

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l Persons Contacted

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• J. J. Zach, Manager, PBNP

'j T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent, Operations

• J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent, EQRS W. J. Herrman, Superintendent, Maintenance and Construction R. S. Bredvad, Health Physicist R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor i *F. A. Flentje Administrative Specialist l *J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer '

l The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation,

! Maintenance, Health Physics, and Instrument and Control Section ! * Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.

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l Licensee Action on previous Inspection Findings (92701) (92702) l 1  ;

(Closed)OpenItem(266/84-20-03;301/84-18-03): The licensee revised  ;

1 its procedures to require review of accuracy for measuring and test '

equipment.

l 1 (Closed)UnresolvedItem(266/83-21-27;301/83-20-27): The licensee j has revised its receipt inspection procedure to address the inspector's

concerns.

l (Closed)OpenItem(266/86015-02): The licensee provided the special j report on boraflex degradation to the NRC by letter to Mr. George Lear

dated February 11, 1987.

I (Closed)OpenItem(301/86020-01): The licensee prepared an engineering evaluation and determined that no snubber operability or safety questions

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exist on either uni '

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(Closed)UnresolvedItem(266/86002-01;301/86002-01): The licensee replaced the wires in question. Therefore justification for operability i

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is no longer require I (Closed)OpenItem(266/86002-03;301/86002-03): The licensee replaced -

the wires in question as schedule ,

(Closed)OpenItem(266/85016-01;301/85016-01): The licensee has i revised its procedure to alleviate the concer I (Closed)IEB86-01: This Bulletin is not applicable to pressurized water j reactor licensees.

l' (Closed) Regional Request: The inspectors investigated the licensee's

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use of unqualified Amp Splices. The results were provided to Region !!!.

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l' Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707 and 71710)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs

and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of

{ February and March 1987. During these discussions and observations, the

inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant

! conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt i action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of 1 selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the ;

station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the months of February and March 1987, the inspectors walked down the 1 accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Vital Electrical, i Diesel Generating, Component Cooling, Safety Injection, Containment Spray, Service Water and Fire Protection systems to verify operabilit '

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedures, i Unit 1 entered into stretch operation on March 1,1987. On March 31 a 1987, temperature reference had been lowered by 23 degrees F, and the l

I unit was at 90.5 percent of rated powe On March 7,1987, Unit 2 was taken off line for approximately 29 hours3.356481e-4 days <br />0.00806 hours <br />4.794974e-5 weeks <br />1.10345e-5 months <br /> to investigate a rattling noise in the "A" moisture separator reheate On investigation it was found that an internal deck plate weld had broken. The weld was repaired and the unit was back on line at 8:19 a.m. on March, 8 and was at full load by 9:55 p.m. the same day.

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During the operator licensing exams in February, the NRC examiner i

questioned why a control room ventilation fan that was inoperable was not logged in the station log as a major piece of equipment out of service as

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required by procedure. During a followup investigation, the resident inspectors determined that licensee personnel had followed their guidelines for not logging the fan out of service because it is not considered to be

Technical Specification relatei equipment. Further investigation revealed

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that the control room emergency ventilation fans are not powered from a vital bus and that they were taken credit for in the control room habitability study performed to satisfy Criterion 19 of 10 CFR 50, l Appendix A. This matter was referred to the Facilities Radiation Protection Section in Region III for resolution. This is considered an Unresolved Item (266/87005-01; 301/87005-01 (DRSS)).

During a review of licensee operating procedures, it was noted that Black Plant Startup, was inadequate in that several Procedure OP-1D,in Procedure OP-10 to other procedures were incorrect references made because the other procedures had been revised and referenced steps l were either nonexistent or significantly different from the step originally referenced. Additionally, in light of a Technical Specification change approved in July of 1986, performance of OP-10 as written would have involved operation of the plant in violation of TechnicalSpecification15.3.1.A.1.a.(1). Although in certain emergency situations a licensee may operate the plant in violation of Technical Specificationspursuantto10CFR50.54(X),ProcedureOP-10didnot reference required licensee actions to do s PBNP 2.1.2 states in part that "When neither use nor revisions of a procedure is accomplished within a two year period, then that procedure issubjectforreview..." Procedure OP-1D, Black Plant Startup was issued in 197 The procedure had not been used nor revised since original issue. The only evidence of any action on this )rocedure was a proposed revision in 1983 which was never sent to tie staff for approval. This failure to keep Procedure OP-10 current is in violation of P8NP 2. (266/87005-02;301/87005-02(DRP)).

Further inspection in this area revealed that this was an isolated cas All other procedures have been reviewed and kept current as require The licensee has cancelled procedure OP-10 in a Manacers Supervisory Staff Meeting. Justification for cancellation incluces verification that existing emergency operating procedures cover required actions for a total loss of AC power. No further corrective actions are deemed necessar One violation was identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels and Nuclear Instrumentation and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, the test irstrumentation was calibrated, that limiting, conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accortplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne _ _ _ _ _

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The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test activities:

ICP Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog - Long Form Units 1 and 2 ICP Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog - Short Form Units 1 and 2 ICP Reactor Protection Logic (Long Form)

ICP Power Range Axial Offset ICP 2.11 Analog Rod Position ICP 2.12 Independent Overspeed Protection System - Units 1 and 2 IT-20 Inservice Testing of Reactor Coolant Valves, Unit 1 IT-102 Inservice Testing of Common Auxiliary Feedwater Valves Units 1 and 2 IT-110 Inservice Test of Instrument Air Valves - Unit 1 TS-1 Emergency Diesel Generator 3D TS-4 Main Turbine Stop and Governor Valves - Unit 2 TS-32 Safety Valve Acoustic Monitoring - Subcooling Margin Computing System - Containment Purge Valve Position TS-70 Diesel Engine-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test TS-77 Smoke Detection System Integrity Test At 8:14 a.m. CST, on March while performing the shunt trip function part of the reactor17, 1987, ion system logic testing on Unit 2, protect the A reactor trip breaker did not open as required. Prior to this portion of the test, the undervoltage portion of the trip function testing was accomplished successfull The test procedure requires that the undervoltage trip function be tested first followed by the shunt trip function. The malfunction was caused by the failure of the shunt block push button contacts to make up when the button was released (this button is held in durin trip function). g This the undervoltage prevented the test trip coil andfrom is released to test the being energized shunt during the subsequent shunt trip functional test. The push button was replaced and the shunt trip function was tested satisfactoril The malfunctioning push button switch was returned to Westinghouse in Pittsburgh for evaluation. The switch was disassembled on March 27 in the presence of a representative of NRC's vendor branch and a representative from this licensee's I&C group. The conclusion reached was that the switch malfunction was a random failur On February 5 1987 an auxiliary operator noted that the pressure switch isolation valve used in the diesel fire pum) automatic start logic circuitry was not fully open as required. The Tecinical Specification test had been performed on February 2. The test required that the valve be momentarily shut and a drain opened to reduce pressure and auto start the pum). The drain is then shut and the isolation valve reopened and red loc (ed in the open position. When the test was concluded the ) ump was secured and it did not auto start again which indicates that tie pressure switch isolation valve was not fully closed in that the low pressure switch had reset. Upon discovery the auxiliary operator

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immediately returned the valve to the fully open position and re-redlocked the valve. Auxiliary operator error during performance of the Technical Specification test is evident,ined.however, inoperability cannot be determ the extentSpecification The Technical of the pumps requirement for one pump inoperable is to test the other pump dail As evidenced by the fact that the pressure switch reset during the test run, the licensee believes that there would have been enough flow past the valve to allow auto start on decreasing header pressure. The diesel fire pump is a backup for the normally operated electric fire pump. The auto start pressure switch for the electric pump is set at 95 lbs. decreasing and the setting for the diesel pump is 80 lbs. decreasin The licensee generated a non conformance report on this incident and completed corrective action of requiring double valve position verification for this type of valve on the six procedures which require cycling of pressure switch isolation valves. Corrective action was completed on March 24, 198 One violation was identified, however, the licensee has met the five criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V. A. for self identification and correction and therefore, will not be cited for this procedural violatio . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industr 4 codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications. y The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemente Workrequestswerereviewedtodeterminestatusofoutstandingjobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The licensee completed replacement of limitorque internal wires on May 9, 1986, for Unit 1 and on October 24, 1986, for Unit 2. These dates reflect the first refueling outage for each unit after the licensee was informed 1

, that the documentation it had for environmental qualification of the original wiring was inadequate. Although this determination was made by the NRC, after discussions with the NRC environmental qualification consultant at Sandia National Laboratory it was decided that there appeared to be no immediate NRC safety concern regarding the operability of the limitorque valve !

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The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

• Maintenance to the connector straps on Cell 53 of station battery 005 - Unit 1

• Annual overhaul of 3D diesel generator

• Auxiliary Feed Pump 1P-29 realignment - Unit 1

• Repaired seal leaks on Charging Pumps 2P2B and 2P2C

• Balanced the impeller on Component Cooling Water Pump 2P11B

• Containment spray pumas oil change

• Replace governor end Jearing on 2P29 auxiliary feed pump No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Report Followup (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine i that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.

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266/86005-00 Reactor Trip After loss of Red Instrument Bus 266/86006-00 Turbine Runback During White Bus Inverter Transfer '

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the alternate power source and install the static transfer switches. The switch would automatically transfer an instrument bus supply to the alternate power source upon loss of the normal supply. This would allow for isolation of the affected inverter and manual transfer of the instrument bus supply to the backup swing inverter without loss of instrument bus power. This is an OpenItem(266/87005-03(DRP)).

F i 301/86002-00 Misalignment of Shutdown Bank "B" Rods 301/86004-01 FailureofUnit2MainSteamIsolationValve(Supplement)

301/86005-01 Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate In Excess of Technical Specifications (Supplement)

b 301/87001-00 Steam Flow Minimum Degree of Redundance Not in Accordance With Technical Specifications No violations or deviations were identifie . Training and Qualification Effectiveness (41400 and 41701)

The training programs for non-licensed staff related to fire protection and performing Technical Specification testing were adequate to have greventedthepersonnelerrorthatoccurredwhileperformingTS-70, Diesel Engine-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test." This event is discussed in detailed in Paragraph . .

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On February 17, 1987, one Senior Reactor Operator license exam'and five Reactor Operator license exams were given. All six candidates passe No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Preparedness Drill (82301)

On March 18, 1987, the plant conducted a full-scale company emergency preparedness drill. The drill was designed to test and refine new security procedures as they relate to conventional radiological emergency preparedness. This was done by simulating a combined security emergency with a radiological emergency. The resident inspector participated in the drill and in the technical support center critique of the dril '

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No violations or deviations were identifie ,4 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during ,

the inspection is discussed in Paragraph . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector,-sad which involve some action i on the part of the NRC or licensee.or both. An open item disclosed during l the inspection is discussed in Paragiaph . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection periodtosummarizethesco)eandfindingsoftheins)ectionactivitie The licensee acknowledged tie inspectors comments. T1e inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspecturs during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar