IR 05000266/1987013
| ML20236L729 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/1987 |
| From: | Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236L656 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-87-13, 50-301-87-12, NUDOCS 8708100341 | |
| Download: ML20236L729 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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REGION III
. Reports No. 50-266/87013(DRP);-50-301/87012(DRP)
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Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company
231 West Michigan l
Milwaukee, WI 53203
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L Facility Name:
Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Two Creeks, Wisconsin
. Inspection Conducted:
June 1 through July 15, 1987
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. Inspectors:
R. L. Hague
R. J. Leemon l
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Approved By R#DeFayette, Chief 7//f/[r7 ReactorProjectsSection28 Date
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Inspection Summary u
Inspection'on June 1 through July 30, 1987 (Reports No. 50 "66/87013(DRP);
50-301/87012(DRP))
Xreas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection b of licensee action on previous inspection findings;y resident inspectors operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; organization and administration; licensee event report. follow-up and management meetings.
Results: Three violations were identified during the inspection period:
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Failure to. Properly Dispose of Solid Waste Paragraph 2; Failure to Provide anAdequateProcedure, Paragraph 3,andFailuretoFollowProcedures, Paragraph 4.
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DETAILS ly
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1.
Persons Cont' acted
- J. J. Zach,. Manager, PBNP
.T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent
- G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent, Operations
- J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent, EQRS l
W. J. Herrman, Superintendent, Maintenance and Construction
- D. F. Johnson, Superintendent, Health Physics R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor
- F. A. Flentje, Administrative Specialist
- J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer
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T. L. Fredrichs, Superintendent, Chemistry The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation, Maintenance, Health Physics, Chemistry and Instrument and Control Sections.
- Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
(Closed) 10 CFR Part 21
" Component Cooling Water System Potential i
Violation of Containment Isolation Capability" In July 1984, Westinghouse issued a 10 CFR 21 report on the )otential
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overpressurization of the Component Cooling Water System.
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overpressurization would occur if there was a leak in the Reactor Coolant
. Pump thermal barrier coupled with a failure of the valve used to isolate the component cooling water return line.
In this scenario, the surge tank vent valve would close automatically on a high radiation signal and the surge tank would go solid.
Pressure would increase to the relief valve setpoint of 100 psi.
This, added to the component cooling water pump shut-off head of 123 psig, would overpressurize downstream components.
The recommended immediate action was to remove the automatic closure feature of the surge tank vent valve with a long term recommendation to remove the relief valve or the relief valve internals.
The licensee approved and completed the modification on the surge tank vent valve, in j
. late Summer, 1984 and provided training to the operators on what action to take on gross inleakage to the Component Cooling Water System.
The licensee also initiated a modification request to reduce the relief valve setpoint and upgrade the component cooling heat exchangers to a 250 psi rating.
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In December 1984, the licensee issued Nonconformance Report 84-036,
pointing out that the modification to remove the automatic closure j
feature of the surge tank vent valve would make the Component Cooling Water System an "open" system while the FSAR, Section 5.2, describes the system as a " closed" system for containment integrity purposes.
The licensee informed Westinghouse of the problem with a recommended fix and suggested that Westinghouse revise the 10 CFR 21 report.
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February 1985, Westinghouse verbally committed to the licensee to revise the July 1984 10 CFR 21 report.
At this point, the licensee performed an engineering evaluation of.the components downstream of the. component cooling water pumps which showed that they could withstand the increased pressures with a' relief valve setpoint of 65 asi and the licensee.
reinstated the automatic closure feature of t1e surge tank vent valve.
In February 1986, Westinghouse verbally recommitted to the licensee to revise the 10 CFR 21 report.
Since this was not done, in May'1987, the licensee's Manager's Supervisory Staff requested that their Nuclear
'EngineeringSafetyReviewCommitteeconsiderfilinga10CFR21 report to outline the potential problem with Westinghouse s original recommended fix to the overpressurization problem.
In June 1987, Westinghouse notified the NRC that implementation of its original recommendations could have led to a violation of containment isolation requi~.ements.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (266/87006-01; 301/87006-01(RECS)):
To determine if licensee's practice of disposal of radioactively contaminated sewerage treatment plant sludge on licensee owned land is consistent with regulatory requirements. This matter was referred for resolution to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)'by memorandum (attached) dated March 20, 1987.
NRR's res)onse, given in a. memorandum dated July 2,1987 (attached)
concluded that tie licensee was in violation of 10 CFR 20.301 for failure to obtain approval for the method of disposal pursuant to 10 CFR 20.302.
This unresolved item is closed and the matter will be followed under Violation (266/87013-01; 301/87012-01(RECS)) as described in the Notice of Violation.
3.
Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707 and /1/10)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period of_ inspection.
During these discussions and observations, the inspectors-ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions,_
attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate.
The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors, by_ observation and direct interview, verified that ysical
security was being implemented in accordance with the station securi y plan.
j During the inspection period, the licensee made three emergency
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notification system reports regarding security events.
All of the events were properly compensated.
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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the period of inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions
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of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Vital Electrical, Emergency Diesel Generating, ServiceWater,ComponentCooling,SafetyInjection,andContainmentSpray systems to verify operability.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedures.
Between 8:40 a.m. and 8:52 a.m. on June 19, 1987, after completing a procedure to discharge the "B" waste hold up tank to Lake Michigan through special ion exchangers provided by Chem Nuclear, the licensee attempted to flush out the discharge path with clean reactor make up water.
The procedure called for flushing the line using the Unit 1 blender.
When the operator started the reactor make up water pump, Valve 1100 opened automatically.
This valve opening allowed letdown water to be mixed with the reactor make up water for the flush.
Approximately 160 gallons of Unit 1 reactor coolant was released to Lake Michigan.
The release was monitoredby2RE229 Unit 2servicewateroverboar$ monitor.
The highest lease was 3.85 x 10 micro ci/ml.
The tenminuteaverageforther$microci/mlbasedontheRadiological alarm setpoint is 2.43 x 10 Effluent Tegnical Specification for Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) of Co at the release point.
The licensee declared and secured from an unusual event at 9:22 a.m. and made the necessary notifications.
The licensee took grab samples at the discharge point as a backup.
After analyzing the actual activity of the primary cooling water that was discharged during.this event, the licensee determined that the cause of the alarm on the service water discharge monitor was due to the presence ofegrainednoblegases.
The analysis of the water discharged indicates a Co equivalent activity of less than 3% MPC.
The activity of the noble
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gases entrained in the discharged water was several magnitudes higher than the liquid activity.
Using the applicable formula for the noble gas release it was calculated that an individual in the vicinity of the This is 3% pier would have received a whole body exposure of.06 mrem.
discharge of the hourly exposure limit for an unrestricted area.
The licensee's calculations were verified and the licensee's analysis results were confirmed by the use of split samples sent to Region III i
for independent verification.
After reviewing the event in detail the inspectors determined that Procedure WMTP 11.30, which was being used to accomplish the discharge and flush, did not adequately address the unusual lineup which provides only one shut valve between the letdown system and the service water discharge and failed to caution the operator that starting the reactor make up water pump would automatically open that valve.
PBNP 7.2, Wisconsin Michigan Test Procedures, Part 2.3, WMTP format, Subsection 2.3.5, Precautions and Limitations, states, " Pertinent Technical Specifications, administrative controls, precautions on the effects a test may have on various systems, and any other precautions
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which may promote the safe and efficient execution of a test are listed."
The failure to alert the operator to the possible consequences of his actions is in violation of PBNP 7.2(266/87013-02;301/87012-02(DRP)).
On' July 2,1987, on'e of the two fuses in the Unit 1 "A" reactor. trip breaker closing circuit blew after closing the breaker during testing.
The fuse also supplies power to the-shunt-trip device and the breaker position indication lights.
A similar event had occurred for the other fuse on June 30 during.arotection system logic testing.
Because the fuses blew only after t1e closing coil was activated and not after the shunt trip device was actuated, the reactor trip breaker was operable.
An evaluation to determine the cause of the blown fuses is continuing and includes special testing incorporated into the routine testing of the trip breakers.
Both fuses in all reactor trip and bypass breakers for both
. units have been replaced and operators are verifying breaker position indication lights every shift.
This is an Open Item (266/87013-04; 301/87012-04).
On June 25, at 5:49 a.m., a steam generator level deviation alarm alerted operations personnel of a rapidly decreasing level in the "B" steam generator.
Load was manually run back to about 270 MWe net, and manual control was taken of the main feedwater regulating valve to control and restore steam generator level.
The level deviation was caused by an electrical fault in the main feedwater regulating valve controller.
Repairs were made tolthe controller, and the unit was returned to full power at 9:50 a.m.
No other violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels and Nuclear Instrumentation and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, the test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that remoul and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were-properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
On June 17, 1987, the inspectors independently verified the licensee's reactor cooling system leak rate calculations using NUREG-1107, RSCLK9:
Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Determination for PWRs, Software.
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' licensee's calculation indicated 0.1 gallon per minute total leakage and the inspectors calculation indicated.09 gallon per minute total leakage.
These results are statistically equivalent given the accuracy of the
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input parameters.
On June 24, 1987, while doing TS-1 (the biweekly 3D diesel generator surveillance test), the steps in the procedure were not followed, in that the isolation valves from the air start bottles were not opened
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prior to starting the diesel.
Therefore, the diesel did not start when given the start signal. 'There was an entry in the Duty Shift Supervisor's log reflecting this; however, no comment was made on-the surveillance test sheet relating to this problem.
The valves were opened and the test was satisfactorily completed. The personnel error was made during the surveillance test.
It was determined that the procedure was adequate and prior training was adequate.
There was no safety significance because the error was self disclosing during the remainder of the.
test.
This failure to follow procedures is a violation (266/87013-03; 301/87012-03 (DRP)).
On July 2, 1987, during the surveillance test (IT-04) it was reported to-the control room by an auxiliary operator that a high pitched squeal was coming from the residual heat removal pump (2P10A).
The pump was stopped and maintenance personnel were called into the plant to' evaluate the problem.
It was determined that the high, pitched squeal was noise from water flowing through the mini recirculation line and-is not unusual during this test.
The o)erator who was conducting this test was not familiar with-the flow sounds t1at he heard so he raised his concerns to the control room.
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This test was subsequently completed satisfactorily.
The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test activities:
TS-1 Emergency ~ Diesel Generator 3D Biweekly TS-72 Fire Pump Capacity Test TS-73 Fire Protection Control Valve Position Verification Valves (Monthly)g of Low Head Safety Injection Pumps and Inservice Testin IT-04 IT-40 InserviceTestingofSafetyInjectionValves(Quarterly)
IT-110 Inservice Test of Instrument Air Valves (Quarterly)
ICP-2.1 Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog - Unit 1 ICP-2,2'
Periodic Test Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels I through IV ICP-2.3 Periodic Test Reactor Protection System Logic ICP-2.11 Analog Rod Position Test ICP-2.12 Periodic Test Independent Overspeed Protection System No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
MonthlyMaintenanceObservation(62703]
i Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components
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listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were l
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using, approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were impleniented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
On July 7, 1987, the breaker for service water pump (i320) tripped while the pump was running.
The motor was inspected and it was found to have a fault in the windings.
The motor has been sent to Westinghouse for repair.
The plant has six service water pumps.
The technical specifications only require four service water pumps to be operable with both reactors critical (TS 15.3.3.D).
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Repair a leaking steam coupling on Unit l's steam driven auxiliary
feedwater pump (1P29)
Service water to auxiliary feedwater pump (P38A) motor operated
valve (MOV-4009)
Sticking relays were replaced in Unit l's "B" main feedwater
regulating valve controller No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
OrganizationandAdministration(36700)
The inspector ascertained that changes made to the licensee's onsite organization were in conformance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications and that the licensee's use of overtime was in conformance with regulatory requirements.
The inspection included verification that the licensee's onsite organization is functioning as described in the Technical Specifications, that personnel qualification levels are in conformance with applicable codes or standards, that lines of authority and responsibility are in conformance with Technical Specifications and that deviations from maximum overtime limits were authorized in accordance with procedures.
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The following organizational changes were made effective June 1, 1987:
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The title " Radiochemist" was changed to " Superintendent - Chemistry."
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A new position, " Superintendent - Health Physics" was created
reporting to the Superintendent - Technical Services at the tite.
A Corporate person was promoted to fill the position.
The Radwaste Supervisor reporting requirements will transfer from
the Chemistry group to the Health Physics group and will now report to the Superintendent - Health Physics.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Event Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
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action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
266/87001 - Manual Reactor Trip During E0L Testing.
The corrective actions were that Reactor Engineering Procedures will be changed and/or added to provide precautions and instruction to be followed when connecting the test equipment to the rod control cabinets.
A new Procedure REI 27.0 "Visicorder Setup for Rod Control System Testing" was written.
The possibility of modifying the test equipment to make connection errors less likely will be evaluated.
This is an open item (266/87013-05; 301/87012-05 (DRP)).
l No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Management Meetings (30702)
The Deputy Regional Administrator and members of the Regional Staff met June 18, 1987, in the Regional Office with representatives of Wisconsin Electric Power Company for an Enforcement Conference on recent radiological protection issues.
These issues are discussed in Inspection Reports No. 50-266/87011(DRSS) and No. 50-301/87010 (DRSS).
On July 1, 1987, the resident inspector attended a meeting of the Off-Site Safety Review Committee.
9.
Open Items Open Items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3 and 7.
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10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection eriodtosummarizethescopeandfindingsoftheinspectionac+ivities.
he licensee acknowledged the inspectors comments.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
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