IR 05000528/1985033
| ML20138M659 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 10/16/1985 |
| From: | Andrew Hon, Miller L, Sorensen R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138M649 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.A.1.1, TASK-1.A.1.2, TASK-1.A.1.3, TASK-1.B.1.2, TASK-1.C.1, TASK-1.C.2, TASK-1.C.3, TASK-1.C.4, TASK-1.C.5, TASK-1.C.6, TASK-1.C.7, TASK-2.B.1, TASK-2.D.3, TASK-2.E.4.1, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-2.G.1, TASK-TM 50-528-85-33, 50-529-85-33, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8511040182 | |
| Download: ML20138M659 (15) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos. 50-528/85-33 and 50-529/85-33 Docket Nos. 50-528 and 50-529 License No. NPF-41 Construction Permit No. CPPR-142 Licensee: Arizona Nuclear Power Project
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P. O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection Conducted: September 16-27, 985 Inspector:
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L /,F. Mille r, IJ'r., Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 2 Summa ry:
Inspection on September 16-27, 1985 (Report Nos. 50-528/85-33 and 50-529/85-33)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of TMI Action Plan Items, NRC Bulletins and Circulars, licensee action on inspector identified items, Temporary Modifications, Preheating for Structural Welding, Calibration of Safety-Related Equipment, and Surveillance Testing, all in Unit 2, and Power Ascension Test Data Review in Unit 1.
NRC Inspection Procedures 25401B, 92701, 35744, 35745, 92703, 30703, 55156B, 72600B and TI2515/66 were covered during this inspection. The inspection of Units 1 and 2 involved 124 inspector hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
8511040182 851017 PDR ADOCK 05000528 l
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP)
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E. Van Brunt, Executive Vice President W. Ide. Director, Corporate QA/QC
- L. Souza, Assistant Director, Corporate QA/QC 0. Zeringue, Technical Support Manager J. Allen, Operations Manager
- C, Russo, Manager Quality Audits and Monitoring
- T.
Bradish, Quality Systems Supervisor
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- S.
Penick, Quality Monitoring Supervisor
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- J. Lo Cicero, ISEG Supervisor D. Hoppes, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
- R. Adney, Unit 2 Plant Superintendent
- Denotes those persons attending exit meetings of September 26, 1985.
The inspectors also talked with numerous other licensee, contractor l
and craft personnel.
2.
Implementation of Three Mile Island Lessons Learned at Unit 2 The inspector reviewed the below listed items which represent a portion of a comprehensive and integrated plan to improve safety following the events at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 in March, 1979.
(The item numbers are from Enclosure 2 of NUREG-0737).
(Closed) I. A.l.1 Shif t Technical Advisors (STAS)
i The licensee has implemented the requirement to provide STAS on shift as advisors to the operating staff. STA functions for plant emergencies were established in individual emergency procedures, and were consistent with the recommendations of this TMI item. Procedure 40AC-9ZZ02, Conduct of Shif t Operations, and the Technical Specifications, required one STA on the site, located within ten minutes of the control room, whenever a
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unit was in Modes 1-4.
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At the time of the inspection, a licensee representative stated that Palo
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Verde had ten qualified STAS.
Qualification as STA was established by successful completion of training l
in accordance with Procedure 82TR-9ZZ05 (STA Training). The inspector reviewed this procedure and reviewed a sample of the training records of two STAS to ensure that the required training had been completed. Also, college transcripts for these individuals were reviewed to ensure compliance with applicable educational guidelines.
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1 Based on this sample of two STAS, the inspector was satisfied that the provisions of this TMI Action Plan Item were being met by the licensee.
This item is closed.
I.A.I.3 Shift Manning i
This TMI item involves two different aspects:
1) Limiting Overtime, and Establishing a Minimum Shift Crew 1)
(0 pen) Limit Overtime The licensee has met the intent of this TMI item by incorporating the guidance for overtime of Generic Letter 82-12 into Procedure 10AC-0ZZ07, Overtime Limitations. These overtime limitations applied to plant personnel who performed safety-related activities, such as plant operators, radiation protection technicians, maintenance personnel, etc.
However, the above procedure allowed plant supervisory personnel to authorize deviation from established overtime limitations for special cases. The intent of this Action Plan item was to allow only the Plant Manager or his deputy or higher levels of management to authorize exceeding these established overtime limitations.
The licensee has committed to revise 10AC-0ZZ07 to allow only the Plant
Manager, Operations Manager, Technical Support Manager, Plant r
Services Manager and Maintenance Manager the authority to authorize exceeding the established overtime limitations. This was acceptable to the inspector, but this aspect will remain open until the revision to the procedure is approved and subsequently reviewed by j
the inspector.
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2)
(Closed) Minimun Shift Crew The Unit 2 Proof and Review Technical Specifications and Procedure 40AC-9ZZ02, Conduct of Shift Operations, required minimum shift operating crews of two Senior Reactor Operators (SR0s), two Reactor Operators (R0s), two' Auxiliary Operators (A0s), and one STA. This was consistent with the intent of this TMI Action Plan Item.
40AC-9ZZO2 also contained provisions for movement of control room personnel about the plant.
This aspect is closed.
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(Closed) I.B.I.2 Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG)
The inspector reviewed the implementation of the ISEG program at Palo Verde by interviewing personnel, inspecting records and reviewing applicable completed procedures. A licensee representative stated that the ISEG had ten individuals assigned to it at the time of the inspection. A sample of the employment records of three of these individuals showed that they met the recommended educational and experience criteria. The inspector also reviewed records of ISEG activities required by implementing procedures.
The inspector concluded
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that the ISEG organization established at Palo Verde met the intent of this Action Plan item.
This item is closed.
(0 pen) I. A.1.2 Shif t Supervisor's (SS) Administrative Duties The inspector reviewed Procedure 40AC-9ZZ02, Conduct of Shift Operations, that assigned the administrative responsibilities of the SS.
Twelve items were listed. These responsibilities appeared to the inspector to be reasonable and necessary. Additional administrative duties could only be assigned with the approval of the Unit Superintendent. The Vice-President, Nuclear Production, was required by ANPP Policy IP202.00.00 to review the administrative duties of the SS on an annual basis to ensure they were still appropriate. The inspector requested the licensee to provide evidence of this review, and was assured that this will be provided with this documentation during the next inspection.
This item will remain open until that time.
(Closed) I.C.1.1 Short Term Accident and Procedures Review (Small-Break LOCA)
The licensee has revised the SBLOCA emergency procedure, 42RO-22208, effective 9/2/85, to incorporate the new guidance contained in CEN-152, Rev. 02, CE Owner's Group Emergency Procedure Guidelines. This new guidance involved a new scheme for tripping Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs),
incorporation of Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation monitoring requirements, and revised criteria for restart of RCPs.
Revision of this procedure to incorporate CEN-152, Rev. 02 was a license condition for Unit 1.
This item is closed.
(Closed) I.C.2 Shift and Relief Turnover Procedures Procedure 40AC-9ZZ16, Shift Hanning, contained various shift turnover checklists that were to be used by the SS, Assistant SS, Reactor Operators (R0s) and Auxiliary Operators (A0s) as part of shift relief.
The content of these checklists appeared to meet the intent of this Action Plan item. The inspector verified that the SS, Assistant SS, and Ros were using their shif t turnover checklists.
As stated by a licensee representative the Unit Superintendent or Dayshif t Supervisor reviewed the checklists on a daily basis, which was required by procedure.
The inspector also verified that Radiation Protection Technicians and Radwaste Technicians were also using their versions of checklists which met the intent of this Action Plan Item.
This item is closed.
(0 pen) I.C.3 Shif t Supervisor's Responsibilities An APS memo to all PVNGS personnel dated 12/17/85 clearly established the command duties of the Unit 1 SS.
The licensee was in the process of l
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issuing a new memo, at the time of this inspection, which would apply to all three units.
The responsibility and authority of the SS was clearly established in Procedure 40AC-9ZZ02.
It directed the SS to remain in the control room until properly re.lieved to direct recovery operations during emergencies.
It appointed the Assistant Shift Supervisor to control room command functions during normal operations when the SS was temporarily absent from the control room. The procedure also specified who may relieve the SS, namely, only another licensed SRO.
The training lesson plan for licensed operators for this procedure included learning objectives which were to know what operator responsibilities were.
The licensee appeared to have met the intent of this TMI item. However, this item will remain open until the new corporate memo is issued and reviewed by the inspector.
(Closed) I.C.4 Control Room Access j
One of the responsibilities of the SS per procedure 40AC-9ZZ02 was to limit access to the controls area of the Control Room to certain specified individuals. Those individuals allowed access were consistent with the guidance of this TMI item. Also, procedure 40AC-92202 established the authority of the SS to d. rect persons to leave the control room if their presence interfered with safe plant operation. The inspector verified implementation of these controls by observing Control Room operations, and interviewing an on-shift SS.
This TMI item has been adequately implemented and is closed.
(Closed) 1.C.5 Feedback of Operating Experience This item dealt with distribution of pertinent operating experience to plant personnel.
The inspector observed that the ISEG disseminated operating experience from various sources to plant personnel.
It also directed pertinent information for operators and other personnel to the training department for incorporation into training and retraining programs.
Info rmation distributed to various PVNGS organizations for action was tracked as an open item until resolution. ANPP licensing distributed NRC Bulletins and Information Notices to various PVNGS organizations for action, which were also tracked.
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The inspector concluded that the provisions of this TM1 item have been met and thus, this item is closed.
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(Closed) I.C.6 Verification of Correct Performance of Operating Activities i
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This Action Plan Item dealt with the independent verification of certain activities performed on safety-related systems. This independent verification may be done by a second individual or by functional testing.
The inspector reviewed numerous administrative control procedures,
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surveillance tests, maintenance procedures, operating procedures and work orders to ascertain compliance with the guidance of this TMI item. The inspector was satisfied that independent verification criteria for operator activities had been implemented satisfactorily at Palo Verde.
This item is closed.
(Closed) I.C.7.1 NSSS Vendor Review of Procedures This item involved NSSS vendor review of low power test procedures for adequacy.
The inspector interviewed a licensee representative who stated that low power test procedures were originated by Combustion Engineering (CE), the NSSS vendor at Palo Verde.
In addition, a CE representative and an alternate were assigned to the Test Results Review Group (TRRG), an approved subcommittee of the Plant Review Board (PRB) which reviewed test procedures and test results and recommended approval to the Plant Manager. The CE member was a full voting member on procedure and results approval, and provided comments and recommendations accordingly.
Procedure 70AC-0ZZ17 (TRRG) prescribed the functioning of the TRRG.
Not all low power test procedures had yet been approved, however, the inspector was satisfied with the implementation of this TMI item concerning the low power test program.
This aspect of this TMI item is closed.
(0 pen) II.B.1 Reactor Coolant System Vents The inspector verified that a Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System (RCGVS) has been installed at Unit 2.
Field inspection, interview of a licensed operator, review of applicable P& ids, review of applicable operating and preoperational test procedures, and review of environmental qualification report summaries showed that the RCGVS installed in Unit 2 appeared to meet the guidelines of KUREG 0737. However, this item will remain open until two separate aspects have been addressed:
1)
Final approval of system preoperational test results by the rest Working Group (TWG).
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Inclusion of a Test Exception concerning the malfunctioning of one of the vent valves into the Master Tracking System (NTS), to be resolved prior to power operations.
(Closed) II.B.2. Plant Shielding
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This item involves licensee review of shielding design and upgrading of plant shielding as necessary to allow access to certain key areas by plant personnel during accident situations.
As documented in the Palo Verde Safety Evaluation Report (SER), the
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licensee performed a shielding design review and concluded that the existing plant design was adequate to allow access to vital areas after a LOCA with core damage. NRR found this response to be acceptable, as documented in the Palo Verde SER, and thus no shielding design modifications were necessary.
This item is closed.
{0 pen) II.D.3 Valve Position Indication for Pressurizer Safety Valves This Action Plan Item involved installation of direct indication of valve position on safety valves and PORVs.
Palo Verde has no PORVs. They have chosen to install an acoustic monitoring system downstream of the four pressurizer safety valves as direct indication of safety valve position However, this acoustic monitoring system had not yet been calibrated at the time of the inspection and per the Palo Verde SER, must be calibrated prior to fuel load. The inspector was informed that this would be accomplished per Procedure 36cT-9ZZ08.
This item will remain open pending completion of this calibration.
(Open) II.F.2 Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core. Cooling The inspector verified that the emergency procedures. for Unit ? contained guidance for the operators to verify adequate core cooling during accident conditions.
Periodic plant status checks were provided in each of the recovery operation procedures, where the following parameters were checked:
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Subcooling Margin 2)
Reactor Vessel Level 3)
Core Exit Thermocouples However, the preoperational tests for these systems have not yet been completed and will be performed in conjunction with the Qualified Safety Parameter Display System (QSPDS) preoperational test. The inspector interviewed a licensed RO to ensure that operators were trained to recognize inadequate core cooling. lie stated that they were, by using the above installed instrumentation, and other indications.
This item will remain open until the applicable preoperational tests are complete to demonstrate the operability of these systems.
Ilowever, the procedures portion of this TMI item is closed.
(Closed) II.G.1 Power Supplies for Pressurizer Relief Valves, Block Valves and Level Indicators The inspector reviewed applicable drawings for Unit 2 and inspected the Unit 2 control room to verify implementation of this TMI item.
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Two separate Class IE channels of pressurizer level instrumentation with remote indications in the control' room were provided in Unit 2.
These
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channels were powered from vital Motor Control Centers (HCCs) which could
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be supplied from Emergency Diesel Generators or f rom of fsite power. The j
inspector verified that these level indicators were installed in the
control room and were clearly labeled.
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Again, Palo Verde does not have PORVs or the associated block valves and j
thus, this portion of this TMI Action item is not applicable.
i This item is closed.
(Closed) II.K.1.5 Review of ESF Valves I
Procedural controls were in place at Palo Verde to control safety system
status and return of these systems to service af ter maintenance or
testing. Also, System Status Prints and System Status Files in the j
Control Room were used for controlling safety system status.
One of the controls relied upon was independent verification as a tool for maintaining positive control over safety system status.
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The inspector concluded that the licensee had adequately implemented the
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guidelines fo this TMI Action Plan item and it is therefore closed.
j (Closed) II.K.1.10 Operability Status of Safety Related Systems
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The inspector reviewed applicable administrative control procedures, i
maintenance procedures, surveillance test procedures, and work orders to i
ensure compliance with the guidelines of this Action Plant Item.
l Procedure 73AC-9ZZ04, Surveillance festing, specifically required j
verification in writing that redundant trains or channels not being
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tested were operable. The procedure also required verbal approval from
the SS or Assistant SS to commence surveillance tests.
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The inspector was satisfied with the licensee's implementation of this
TMI item.
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This item is closed.
1 (Open) II.E.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation and Flow l
Indication
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The inspector verified the licensee's implementation of this Action Item j
by inspecting the hardware installations and pre-operational testing of
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the system.
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The following safety grade indi,ators, per the licensee's commitment to TMI Action Plan, which was accepted by NRR, were verified by the i
inspector in the control room:
l Train A turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (AFP) discharge
j pressure indicator PI-18A.
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Train A Auxiliary feedwater flow indicators F1-40 and F1-41.
- Train B motor-driven AFP discharge pressure indicator PI-17A.
- Train B flow indicator FI-40 and FI-41.
- 4 channels of level indication for each steam generator.
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The system pre-operational test was completed as part of the integrated safeguards system test. The test results were still under review by the licensee. Thus, the inspector will review the test results during a future inspection in order to close this item.
(Closed) II.E.4.1 Dedicated Hydrogen Penetrations In response to this Action Item, the licensee committed to provide a containment penetration system for external hydrogen recombiner or purge system which are dedicated to that service only, and to revise procedures for the case of combustible gas control system following an accident.
This commitment was accepted by NRR.
During this inspection the inspector verified through field inspection that four dedicated hydrogen penetrations through the containment (two for the recombiner and two for the hydrogen analyzer) were installed.
The inspector also reviewed the operating procedure for containment hydrogen control and purge exhaust systems which was common to all units.
Based on the above inspection, the inspector considered this action item closed.
II.F.1 Addition Accident-Monitoring Instrumentation The following two sub-items were inspected against the licensee's commitments, which were accepted by NRR.
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(Closed) Containment Pressure Monitor The inspector verified through field inspection that the pressure indicators were installed in the Control Room. The innpcetor also reviewed a selected sample of the preoperational test packages for proper components and a functional check of this system. This review covered the licensee's review and approval of the test package, measurement and test equipment (H&TE) usage log and QC sign-off.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the operating and testing procedures for this instrument and found them adequate.
Based on the above, the inspector considered this sub-item closed.
(5)
(open) Containment Water Level Monitor The inspector verified through ficid inspection that the indicators for containment sump water level were installed in the control room.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the operating and testing
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procedures for this instrument and found them satisfactory.
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However, the test package was not yet approved by the licensee, j
pending resolution to a test exception encountered during
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preoperational test.
The inspector will review the completed test package in a future j
inspection to close this sub-item.
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3.
IE Bulletins (IEBs) and Circulars
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(Closed) IE Bulletin 84-03 " Refueling Cavity Water Scal" (also IE i
Information Notice 84-93 and T1 2515/66)
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I This Bulletin required the licensee to " evaluate the potential for and consequences of a refueling cavity water seal failure. Such j
evaluation should include consideration of:
gross seal failure; maximum leak rate due to failure of active components such as i
inflated seals; makeup capacity; time to cladding damage without j
operator action; potential effect on stored fuel in transfer; and
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emergency operating procedures."
The licensee responded to this Bulletin by contracting Combustion
Engineering to perform these evaluations.
Furthermore, the pneumatic seal was modified with transverse, embedded reinforcing I
pins.
The licensee submitted the evaluation, report ANPP-32542-EEVP, on j
May 1,1985 for all three units. The inspector reviewed this report
and found it acceptable, except for the lack of the installation and emergency procedures. The licensee committed to have the emergency operating procedure in place 90 days prior to the first scheduled
,l refueling outage for Unit 1, or before the pool seal use.
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During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the hydrostatic leak j
preoperational test report for the Unit 2 seal, and reviewed the seal installation procedure which was part of the reactor vessel i
disassembly and assembly procedure. Furthermore, the inspector
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verified through a field inspection that the seal installed in Unit
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2 had been modified with reinforcing pins and the low level alarm l
for the fuel pool had been installed, per the licensee's May 1, 1985 j
submittal.
i Based on the above evaluation, the inspector concluded that the l
licensee's response to this Bulletin for Unit 2 was satisfactory.
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The emergency procedure will be reviewed in conjunction with Unit 1 during a future inspection.
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No items of violation or deviation was identified for Unit 2.
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(Unresolved) lE Bulletin 84-03 " Refueling Cavity Water Scal" for Unit I
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Summary of previous responses and inspections:
In a letter ANPP-31121-EEVB dated November 14, 1984, the
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licensee requested an extension to resolve this Bulletin. The licensee justified that "the earliest possible unanticipated need for the fuel pool and the seal for Unit I could not result
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until we have achieved initial criticality.
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resolved this issue prior to that time."
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In a letter ANPP-EEVB/WJP/QFQ-32027 dated February 8, 1985, the j
licensee submitted an interim report to inform the NRC that
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"The seals are being reinforced with stainless steel pins in the elastomer seal flange." The licensee further informed the NRC that "The ANPP final response to IE Bulletin 84-03 will be submitted by April 30, 1985. This will allow us to complete the design moficiations and evaluations of the refueling cavity water seal design."
- During an inspection between April 8 and 19,1985, the I
inspector was shown a rubber seal with embedded reinforcing pins with the understanding that it would be installed in Unit
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In a letter ANPP-32542-EEVB, dated May 1,1985, the licensee informed the NRC that "the considerations of the 1&E Bulletin
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have been addressed" and "the pneumatic seal have been modified
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by the addition of the 3/16 inch diameter reinforcing pins in l
the top flange." The emergency operating procedures and the
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Operating, Inspection and Maintenance procedure would be in place 90 days prior to the first scheduled refueling outage for
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i Unit 1 or prior to any unscheduled use of the seals.
- Based on the above inspection and review of the licensee's
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response, the inspector closed this item in Inspection Report
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85-18 dated July 3, 1985 with the followup item of procedure review, when the procedures were in place according to the licensee's commitment.
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L Current Status
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On September 22, 1985, the inspector learned that the modified seal (which was in the warehouse during previous inspection) was not
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installed in Unit 1.
Instead, it was removed from the warehouse and being used for testing in Unit 3.
The seal in Urdt I had not been modified. A seal modification was on order for November 1985
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delivery, and to be installed in Unit I during the first refueling
In addition, whether the seal in Unit I was tagged to outage.
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identify its nonconformance with the current specification could not j
be verified during this inspection (the unit was in Mode 1),
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i This appears to be inconsistent with previous licensee commitments.
The licensee committed to send NRC an amen <! ment to the May 1,1985
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letter to:
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clarify the meaning of " modified" seal, b)
provide tagging status of the seal presently in Unit 1, j;
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provide controls in place to prevent inadvertent use of the i
unmodified seal in Unit 1, l
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determine the safety significance of the lack of a modified i
seal in Unit 1
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This item remains unresolved pending review of the licensee's response and future inspection (83-33-01).
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b)
(Closed for Unit 2) IE Circular 80-14 Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized Water System
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The one aspect of the licensee's actions remaining open concerning this Circular was the hanging of warning tags at various points in
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the demineralized water system where consumption of this water was possible. These tags warned against drinking this water, which was I
due to possible contamination from cross-connecting the
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demineralized water system with other potentially radioactive
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systems.
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l The inspector verified the hanging of the tags by inspecting an i
approximate 50% sample in Unit 2.
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j This Circular is closed for Unit 2.
4.
Licensee Action on Inspector Identified Items
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(Closed) Enforcement Item 50-529/84-04-01 Violation of Minimum
Cable Bend Radius
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Previous Inspection i
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The last remaining corrective action concerning this violation was
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for Bechtel Construction to answer Corrective Action Request (CAR)
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The CAR answer would explain whether or not power cables used in a control application still had to meet the minimum cable
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bend radius criteria and why. See Inspection Report 50-529/85-20, i
This Inspection
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The inspector reviewed the response to the CAR in question.
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stated that power cables used in a control application still must
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because of reduced current and voltage in control applications,
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l there was less concern about heat generation at the cable bend due
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i to 12R losses and subsequent deterioration in the insulation and j
jacket.
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The cable that the inspector discovered during a random sample with
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a cable bend radius less than the minimum had been retrained in a
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j craftsmanlike manner which provided an acceptable bend radius, i
This item is closed.
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b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-529/84-12-11 Upper Guide Structure (UGS) Site Process Sheet Dimension inconsistent with Drawings Previous Inspection The inspector identified instances of inconsistencies in dimension tolerances for the Unit 2 UGS. These inconsistencies were between the CE Site Process Sheets (SPS) and the applicable CE design drawing. Site Process Sheets were the documents used by CE to perform CE cognizar.t work.
Additional information was required on CE procedure preparation and review processes to assess the adequacy of the CE program for control of work per approved procedures.
See Inspection Report 50-529/84-12.
This Inspection The inconsistencies were pointed out to the applicable CE field engineer during the previous inspection and corrected on the spot.
ANPP QA evaluated this occurrence to be an isolated instance.
As a measure to avoid this and other problems with SPSs identified in the past, ANPP created a Site Process Sheet Review Group. This group was staffed by engineers and management from CE, Bechtel, and various ANPP organizations. The responsibilities of this group, meeting frequency, and approval authority were all established in APS Memo PVNGS-JH-H84-84, by authority of the ANPP Transition Manager.
The inspector was satisfied that this group provided the necessary review and approval function for CE SPSs to ensure that work performed was consistent with design requirements.
This item is closed.
5.
Preheating for Structural Welding (Work Observation)
The inspector observed preheating +.. ;hniques for welding of support columns IA-C and IB-C for Reactor Loalant Piping pipe whip restraints in Unit 2.
The inspector noted that resistance heaters were placed under insulation on the column in the area of welding.
The applicable procedure used was Welding Procedure Specification (WPS) P11B-A-Lh and was posted for reference in the general area. The welders the inspector interviewed stated they had been briefed by the field engineer before beginning work as to how to accomplish the work per the procedure.
Specified temperatures to be maintained were 225*F minimum for preheat and 350*F maximum for weld interpass. The individual welders verified these temperatures by periodically swiping the weld area with two different " temp sticks". One temp stick was made of material that melted at 225* and the other was made of material that melted at 350*.
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j Consequently one temp stick (225*) was verified to melt and the other l
(350') was verified not to melt.
Adjustments to the welding machine were
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i made accordingly. Thermocouples with remote indications on the welding
j machine were provided as backup temperature indication.
I The welders who the inspector interviewed appeared to be knowledgeable
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about the process being used and the procedure itself.
j No violations or deviations were identified, f
j 6.
Implementation of Temporary Modification Program in Unit 2 i
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The inspector selected four temporary modications associated with the two Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) to observe for proper installation and
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tracking. The inspector verified that Temporary Modification (T-mod)
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tags were hung where they were supposed to be on capped instrument air l
lines and DG governors for train A and train B.
The T-mods were properly j
tracked in the T-mod log.
However, one discrepancy was noted in that two
of the T-mod tags had the same log number assigned to them. This
appeared to the inspector to be a minor administrative oversight and the
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discrepancy was corrected in an expeditious manner.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Calibration of Safety-Related Instrumentation i
j The inspector reviewed the licensee's program, and implementation in Unit i
2, for calibration of safety-related instrumentation not specifically j
required by the Technical Specifications.
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The inspector chose various safety related instrumentation, such as l
Safety Injection Tank level, and verified that:
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j.
1)
Each instrument was included in a master calibration program 2)
Calibration procedures had been prepared and approved j
i 3)
Calibration of these instruments had been performed I
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The inspector verified that procedures, called facsimiles, were approved i
and scheduled automatically by the Station Information Management System
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(SIMS), a computer tracking system. Safety-related instruments were j
scheduled for calibration on two-year intervals and facsimiles were used
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for these calibrations repetitively. - Some calibrations of
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j instrumentation had already been performed at the time of this I
inspection. Others had not yet been performed by operations phase j
personnel because these instruments had recently been turned over from
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start-up and credit was taken for calibration by start-up personnel, However, all the instruments the inspector selected were scheduled for t
j calibration and had approved procedures available, i
i j
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Surveillance Testing i
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The inspector reviewed the implementation of the surveillance testing program in Unit 2.
While many of the procedures had been developed and approved, or were generic to all three units, many had not been written and approved at the time of the inspection.
In addition, Procedure 73AC-9ZZ24, Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Cross Reference, had not yet been approved. This procedure listed all surveillance requirements, frequency, applicable procedure and responsibility, and was used to implement the overall surveillance program.
Licensee representatives stated that the surveillance tracking group did not develop monthly schedules until after operations engineering had scheduled the surveillance tests for initial perfonnance prior to entering certain modes and the tests had been performed.
The inspector will examine this area further during his next inspection.
9.
(Closed) Data Review for Unit 1 Power Ascension Test at the 20% Power Plateau During a previous inspection (85-25) the inspector reviewed the licensee's test program and a sample of individual test packages.
The inspector noted some weakness in test data documentation. The licensee agreed to strengthen this area and the inspector would follow it as an open item (85-25-01).
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the meeting minutes of the Test Result Review Group (TRRG) and additional test packages.
It was evident that the licensee had strengthened the area of documentation.
Thus, the inspector considered this open item closed.
No item of violations or deviations was identified.
10.
Unresolved Item An unresolved item is a matter about which additional information is needed to determine whether the matter is a violation, a deviation, or an acceptable activity.
An unresolved item is discussed in paragraph 3 of this report.
11.
Exit Hecting The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 on September 26, 1985. The scope of the inspections and the inspectors' findings as noted in this report were discussed.
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