ML20136F213
| ML20136F213 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Vogtle |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1984 |
| From: | Parr O Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Adensam E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082840446 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-663 NUDOCS 8409270516 | |
| Download: ML20136F213 (1) | |
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k, UNITED STATES 3
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 r
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gu9 EMORANDUM FOR:
Elinor G. Adensam, Chief, Licensing Branch No. 4, Division of Licensing FROM:
Olan.D. Parr, Chief Auxiliary Systems Branch, Division of Systems Integration
SUBJECT:
DRAFT SER SCHEDULE FOR V0GTLE UNITS 1 & 2 The purpose of this memorandum is to infom you that the Auxiliary Systems Branch will not be able to meet your October 1,1984 date for the Vogtle Units 1 and 2 draft SER. The ASB Vogtle reviewer is currently working on SNUPPS and Femi 2 ' supplemental inputs which we feel have a high priority than the' Vogtle draft SER. Assuming no unexpected problems arise regarding the SNUPPS and Fermi 2 evaluations, we plan to provide you with a draft SER input for Vogtle by October 15, 1984.
If you would like to discuss this matter further please contact us.
Pa r,"Ch e Auxiliary Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration cc:
R. Bernero D. Eisenhut T. Novak M. Miller L. Rubenstein J. N. Wilson W. LeFave
Contact:
W. LeFave X29470 4
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UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
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- j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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Docket Nos. 50-424/425 NOV 191984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas:M."Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing, DL FROM:
Daniel R. Muller, Assistant Director for Radiation Protection, DSI
SUBJECT:
METB INPUT FOR SUPPLEMENT TO THE DRAFT SER FOR V0GTLE, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 PLANT NAME: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 LICENSING STAGE: OL DOCKETNUMBER(S):
50-424/425 RESPONSIBLE BRANCH: LB#4; M. Miller, LPM As requested in the August 24, 1984 memorandum from E. Adensam and discussed with M. Miller, enclo::ed is the Meteorology and Effluent Treatment Branch (METB) input for the supplement to the draft SER for Vogtle. The input addresses Section 15.7.3, which was not included in the METB draft SER input submitted in our October 11, 1984 memorandum.
If there are any questions concerning this submittal, please contact C. Nichols (x27634), Effluent Treatment Systems Section, METB.
Daniel R. Muller, Assistant Director for Radiation Protection Division of Systems Integration
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
R. Bernero W. Gamill E. Adensam M. Miller G. Staley C. Willis C. Nichols 206 7u-
v-METEOROLOGY AND EFFLUENT TREATMENT BRANCH INPUT FOR SUPPLEMENT TO THE SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-424/425 15.7.3 Postulated Radioactive Releases Due to Liquid-Containing Tank Failures The applicant's analysis of the failure of radioactive-liquid-waste tanks located outside the reactor containment that could result in releases of liquid containing radioactive materials to the environs is in FSAR Section 15.7.3. The NRC staff has reviewed the applicant's analysis and conducted an independent evaluation of this accident, in accordance with SRP 15.7.3.
The principal criteria governing acceptance in the NRC staff review are (1) GDC 60, as it relates to the radioactive waste management systems designed to control releases of radioactive materials to the environment, and (2) 10 CFR 20, as it relates to effluents to unrestricted areas.
Tanks and associated components containing radioactive liquids outside containment are considered acceptable, by the criteria of SRP 15.7.3, if failure does not result in radionuclide concentrations in excess of the limits in 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, Table II, Column 2, at the nearest potable water supply in an unrestricted area.
Vogtle, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, has several radioactive liquid waste processing and storage tanks that are encompassed by the review conducted under
2 SRP 15.7.3.
The applicant's analysis postulated the spill of 112,400 gallons of radioactive materials because of failure of the recycle holdup tank.
The accidental releases are assumed to spill from the recycle holdup tank into the auxiliary building, and then to move through postulated cracks in the auxiliary building airectly to groundwater and flow toward the Savannah River. The nearest downgradient drinking water source is the Savannah River. Using conservative groundwater parameters, the applicant's analysis concluded that the concentrations of any postulated accidental release of radioactive effluents from the recycle holdup tank would not exceed 10 CFR 20 limits at the nearest surface water intake.
The NRC staff's independent analysis (the hydrologic considerations of which appear in Section 2.4 above) showed that, with the realistic groundwater travel time of 338 years, all of the radionuclides from the Waste Evaporator Concentrate Holdup Tank (WECHT) would be less than the 10 CFR Part 20 requirements at the spring 2800 ft southeast of the Unit No. 1 containment. Using an ultra conservative groundwater travel time of 14.8 years, all of the radionuclides from the postulated failure of the WECHT, except Co-60, Cs-134, Cs-137, and Sr-90, would be less than 10 CFR Part 20 requirements at the spring. The staff considered the effects of sorption on the radionuclide travel time for the four critical nuclides and determined that they also would have concentrations at the spring that are
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small fractions of the 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. Moreover, the-nearest potable water supply in an unrestricted area is the Beauford/ Jasper County intake 112 river miles downstream.
Ignoring travel time and considering only the combined ground and river water dilution factor of about 140,000, all of the radionuclides from the WECHT postulated failure would have concentrations less than the 10 CFR Part 20 requirement at the Beauford/ Jasper County intake. Thus, considering both the radioactive decay due to travel in the groundwater and the effects of dilution in the ground and surface water, the concentrations of radionuclides from the postulated tank failure would not exceed the 10 CFR Part 20 requirements at the nearest potable water supply in an unrestricted area.
The scope of the review included the calculation of radionuclide concentrations in the applicable failed components based upon the expected fuel failure rate for the plant and the effect of site hydrology for those Systems that have not been provided with special design features to mitigate the effects of failures.
Radionuclide concentrations at the nearest potable water supply were found to be acceptable. The basis for acceptance has been that the NRC staff's review shows that the postulated failure of a tank and its associated l
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4 components would not result in radionuclide concentrations in excei's of the limits in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2, at the water 3ource noted above, when evaluated in accordance with SRP 15.7.3.
The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 60 with respect to the control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment by providing controls to reduce the potential impact of the failure of a radioactive liquid-containing tank and its associated components. Such a release will not result in concentrations exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2, in the unrestricted area.
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UNITED STATES
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- e WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 i
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- NOV 9 1984 1
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Docket Nos:
50-412, 50-456, 50-354, 50-546, 50-423 t
50-410, 50-440, 50-458, 50-443, 50-400,,
50-498, 50-424 I
MEMORANDUM FOR:
B. Joe Youngblood, Chief Licensing Branch No. I Albert Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 George Knighton, Chief L;icensing Branch No. 3 Elinor Adenson, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing
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FROM:
Vincent S. Noonan, Chief Equipment Qualification Branch Division of Engineering
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON i
CONTAINMENT PURGE AND VENT VALVE OPERABILITY THIII.E.4.2(6)
The attachments to this memo were part of the SQRT and PVORT request for additional information (attachments 4 and 5) previously made for the following plants:
Name of Plant Docket No.s Beaver Valley 2 506412.
Braidwood 1 5C 156-Hope Creek 1 5C 154-Marble Hill 1 5C
.546-Millstone 3 50 d23-1 Nine Mile Pofnt 2 50 010-Perry 1 50 440-River Bend 1 50 458-Seabrook 1 50.443-Shearon Harris 1
~5CL-400-South Texas 1
'5C 498-3 Vogtle 1 5C/424-i i i < w,!\\ y - Xf O
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2-The information sought on the demonstration of containment purge and vent valve operability should be provided as soon as possible. There is no need to wait until the SQRT and PVORT audits to submit the requested 1.nfortnation.
1 f5ubmittals on containment purge and vent valve operability made within one year prior to licensing generally result in a license condition. Please H request the applicants to address THI II.E.4.2(6) on an expedited basis, n
Vince&
G nt S. Noonan, Chief Equipment Qualification Branch Division of-Engineering ec-saa at+=rhad s
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ontact:
R. Wright x28209
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G. Bagchi B. Miller, BNL
'C. Miller, INEL D. Wagner A'. Vietti M. Miller L. Lazo N. Katambi J. Stefano J. Stevens E. Weinkam M. Hau'; hey V. Nurses
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Attachment #4 Operability Qualification of I
Purge and Vent Valves I
Demonstration of operability of the containment purge and vent valves 3
and the ability of these valves to close during a design basis accident is necessary to assure containment isolation.
This demonstration of operability is required by NUREG-0737, " Clarification of THI Action Plan Requirements," II.E.4.2 for containment purge and vent valves i
which are not sealed closed during operational conditions 1, 2, 3 and. 4.
1.
For each purge and vent valve covered in the scope of this review, the follow'ng documentation demonstrating compliance with the
" Guideline's Tor Demonstration of O Valves" (attached, Attachment #5) perability of Purge and Vent t
is to be submitted for staff review:
A.
Dynamic Torque Coefficient Test Reports (Butterfly valves only) - ' including a description of the test setup.
B.
Operability Demonstration or In-situ Test Reports (when used)
C.
Stress Reports
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D.
Seismic Reports for Valve Assembly (valve and operator) and associated parts.
E.
Sketch or description of each valve installation showing the following-(Butterfly valves only):
1.
direction of flow 2.
disc closure direction 3.
curved side of disc, upstream or downstream (asymetricdiscs) 4.
orientation and distance of elbows, tees, bends, etc.
within 20 pipe diameters of valve 5.
shaft orientation 6.
distance between valves F.
Demonstration that the maximum combined torque developed by the valve is below the actuator rating.
2.
The applicant should respond to the " Specific Valve Type Questions" (attached) which relate to his valve.
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4 2-6 3.
Analysis, if used, should be supported by tests which establish torque coefficients of.the valve at various angles. As torque coefficients in butterfly valves are dependent on disc shape aspect ratto? angle of closure flow direction and approach flow, these things should be accurately represented during tests.
Specifically, piping installations (upstream and downstream of the valve) during the test should be 'repre-sentative of actual field installations.
For example, non-symetric approach flow from an elbow upstream of a valve can result in fluid dynamic torques of. double the magnitude of those found for a valve with straight piping upstream and downstream.
4 In-situ tests, when performed on a representative valve, should be performed on a valve of each sinze/ type which is determined to represent the worst case load. Worst case flow direction, for example, should be consider,ed.
For two valves in series where the_ second valve is a butterfly valve, the effect of non-symetric flow from the first valve should be considered if the valves are within 15 pipe diameters of each other.
5.
If the applicant takes credit for closure time vs. the buildup of contain-ment pressure, he must demonstrate that the method is conservative with respect to the actual valve closure rate.
Actual valve closure rate is to be determined under both loaded and unloaded conditions and periodic inspection under tech. spec. requirements should be performed to assure closure rate does not increase with time or use.
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Specific Valve Type " Questions The following questions apply to specific valve types only and need to be answered only where applicable.
If not applicable, state s.o. -
- h. Torque Due To Containment Backpressure Effect (TCB)
For those ' air operated valves located inside containment, is the operator design of a type that can be affected by the containment pressure rise (backpressure effect) 1.e. where the containment
' pressure acts to reduce the operator torque capability due to TCB. Discuss the operator design with respect to the air vent and bleeds. Show how TCB was calculated (if applicable).
B.
Where air operated valve assemblies use accumulators as t5e fail-safe feature, describe the accumulator air system configuration and its.oper-ation. Discuss, active electrical. components in the accumulator system, and the basis used to determine their qualification for the environmental conditions experienced.
Is this system seismically designed? How is the allowable leakage from the accumulators determined and monitored. -
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C.
For valve assemblies requiring a seal pressur'ization system (inflatable
- main seal). describe the air pressurization system configuration and operation including means used to determine that valve closure an,d seal pressurization have taken place.
Discuss active electrical components in this system. and the basis used to determine their qualification for the -
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environmental condition experienced.
Is this system seismically designed?
D.
Where electric motor operators are used to close the valve has the minimum available voltage to the electric operator under both
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normal or emergency modes been determined and specified to the,,
operator manufacturer to assure the adequacy of the operator to stroke the valve at accident conditions with these lower limit voltages available? Does this reduced voltage operation result in any significant change in stroke timing? Describe the' emergency mode power source used.
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E.
Where electric motor and air operator units are equipped with handwheels, does their design provide for automatic re-engagement o'f the motor operator following the handwheel mode of operation?-
If not.'what steps are taken to preclude the possibility of the
. valve being left in the handwheel mode following some maintenance.
test etc. t,ype operation?
F.
For electric motor operated valves have the torques developed during operation been found,to be less than the t.orque y
limiting settings?
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1 Attachment #5 t
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GUIDELINES FOR DEMONSTRATION 0F OPERABILITY OF FURGE AND VENT VALVES
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O_PERABILITY In order to establish operability it must be shown that the valve actuator's torque capability has sufficient margin to overcome or resist the torques and/or y
i forces (i.e., fluid dynamic, bearing, seating, friction) that resist closure I
when stroking from the initial open position to full seated (bubble tight) in the time limit specified. This should be predicted on the pressure (s) i i
established in the containment following a design basis LOCA. Considerations j
which,should be addressed in assuring valve design adequacy include:
1.
Valve closure rate versus time - i.e., constant rate or other.
2.
Flow direction through valve; AP across valve.
-3.
Single valve closure (inside containment or outside containment valve)-
or simultaneous closure.
Establish worst case.
4... Containment back pressure effect on closing torque margins of air operated valve vehich vent pilot air inside containment.
5.
Adequacy of accumulator (when used) sizing and initial charge for valve closure requirements.
6.
For valve operators using torque limiting devices - are the settings of the devices compatible with the torques required to operate the valve during the design basis condition.
7.
The effect of the piping system (turns, branches) upstream and downstream
- of all valve installations.
8.
The effect of butterfly valve ~ disc and shaft orientation to the fluid '.
mixture egressing from the containment.
DEMONSTRATION Demonstration of the various aspects of operability of purge and vent valves cay be by analysis, bench testing, insitu testing or a combination of these means.
Purge and vent valve. structural elements (valve / actuator assembly) must be evaluated to have sufficient stress margins to withsta ::: loads imposed while valve closes during a design basis accident. Torsional shear, shear, bending, tension and compression loads / stresses should be considered. Seismic loading should be addressed.
Once valve closure and structural integrity are assured by analysis, testing or a suitable combination, a determination of the sealing integrity after i
closure ~and long term exposure to the containment environment should be evaluated. Emphasis should be directed at the effect of radiation and of
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the containment spray chemical solutions on seal material. Other aspects such as the effect on sealing from outside ambient temperatures and debris should be considered.
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2 The following considerations apply when testing is chosen as a means for demonstrating valve operability:
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Bench testing can be used to demonstrate suitability of the in-service valve by reason of its ~ traceability in design-to a test valve. The following factors should be considered when qualifying valves through bench testing.
1.
Whether~a valve was. qualified by testing of an identical valve assembly or by extrapolation of data from a similarly designed valve.
2.
Whether measures were taken to assure that piping upstream and down-stream and valve orientation are simulated.
WhetherthefoIlowingloadandenvironmentalfactorswereconsidered 3.
a.
Simulation of LOCA
- b.
Seismic loading
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c.
Temperature soak d.
Radiation exposure
'e. Chemical exposure d.
Debris B.
Bench testing of installed valves to demonstrate the suitability of the specific valve to perform its required function during the postulated design basis accident is acceptable.
1.
The factors listed in items A.2 and A.3 should be considered when taking this approach.
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In-Situ Testing in-situ testing of purge and vent valves may be performed to confirm the suitability of the valve under actual conditions. When performing such tests, the conditions (loading, environment) to which the valve (s) will be subjected during the test should simulate the design basis accident.
NOTE: Post test valve examination should be performed to establi h structural integrity of the key valve / actuator components.,
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