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1 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 (Phase I)
Docket No. I50-424]
!.'50-425]
Author C. R. Shaber
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Principal Technical Investigator T. H. Stickley Published January 1984 EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76IDO 1570 FIN No. A6457
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7 ABSTRACT The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants, either operating or under construction, submit a response of compliancy with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." EG&G Idaho, Inc., has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the responses of those plants presently under construdtion.
This report contains EG&G's evaluation and recommendations for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 and 2.
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6 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit I and Unit 2 does not totally comply with the guidelines of NUREG-0612.
.In general, compliance information is insufficient in the-following areas:
Identifying the overhead heavy load han$ ling systems that must o
meet NUREG 0612.
o Methed of identifying Safe Load Paths, etc. Guidelir.e 1.
Preparation of procedures controlling heavy load handling o
operations.
o A basis for concluding that operator training, qualification and conduct meets requirements, f
Identification of, and confirmation for special lifting devices o
compliance.
o Regular sling selection for handling heavy loads.
A commitment for the program of subsequent crane inspection, o
testing, and maintenance.
o Crane design for auxiliary and miscellaneous hoists (not exempted).
The main report contains recommendations which will aid in bringing the above items into compliance with the appropriate guidclines.
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CONTENTS ABSTRACT.............................................................
11 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
111 1.
INTRODUCTION....................................................
I 1.1 Purpose of Review.........................................
I 1.2 Generic Background........................................
I 1.3 Pl a nt-Speci fi c Bac kground.................................
3 2.
EVALdATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS..................................
4 2.1. 0verview..................................................
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2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems......................
4 2.3 General Guidelines........................................
7 2.4 Interim Protection Measures...............................
16 3.
CONCLUDING
SUMMARY
19 3.1 App 1tcable Load-Handling Systems..........................
19 3.2 Guideline Recommendations.................................
19 3.3 Interim Protection........................................
23 3.4 Summary...................................................
23 4.
REFERENCES......................................................
24 TABLES 2.1 Nonexempt Heavy Load-Handling Systems...........................
6 3.1 NUREG-0612 Compliance Matrix....................................
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J CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 (PHASE I) 1.
INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose of Review This technical evaluation report documents the EG&G Idaho, Inc.,
review of general load-handling policy and procedures at Vogtle Electric Generating P' ant Unit 1 and Unit 2 (VEGP).
This evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing conformance to the general load-handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1], Section 5.1.1.
1.2 Generic Background Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to sestematically examine staff applicant criteria and the adequacy of a'!asures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the ;4fe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes to these measures.
This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [2], to all power reactor applicants, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel, The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of i
Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operatirg plants, although providing protection from l
certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.
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M In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two phase objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy.
The first pertion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load-handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed.
The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load-handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (a) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a 4
single-failure proof crane) or (b) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.
The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth and is summarized as follows:
Provide sufficient operator training, handling system o
design, load-handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system o
Define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent o
movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.
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Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612.
1.3 Plant-Specific Background On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to Georgia Power Company, the applicant for VEGP requesting that the applicant review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at VEGP, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines.
On October 4, 1983 Mr. Amarjit Singh, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Division of Systems Integration Washington, DC transmitted to Mr. T. H. Stickley of EG&G Idaho, a copy of Volume 19, Parts 9.0, 9.1 and 9.2 of the FSAR of the V0GTLE electric Generating Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2.
This document is to be evaluated by EG&G Idaho as a response to the NRC request.
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1 2.
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1 Overview The following sections summarize Georg'ia Power Company's FSAR coverage of heavy load handling at VEGP accompanied by EG&G's evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations to the applicant for bringing the facilities more completely into compliance with the intent of NUREG-0612.
Georgia Power Company's FSAR for the facilities does not differectiate betweer the two ur.its so it is assumed that both ur.its are of identical design.
The applicant has indicated the weight of a heavy load for these facilities (as defined in NUREG-0612, Article 1.2) as ~2000 pounds e.g.:
1600 pounds for one fuel assembly and 400 pounds for the tool.
2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems This section reviews the applicant's list of overhead handling systems which are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612 and a review of the justification for excluding overhead handling systems from the above mentioned list.
2.2.1 Scoce
" Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detail'ed structural analysis) and justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from your list by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."
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a A.
Summary of Applicant's Statements j
The applicant's FSAR coverage on overhead handling systems identified the cranes and hoists shown in Table 2.1 as those which handle heavy loads in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.
e.
The applicant's FSAR also references and excludes numerous other cranes in conjunction with the fifty items identified 1
in.the FSAR Table 9.1.5-2, that are handled as heavy laaos.
In addition, a number of material handling units are discussed and excluded as Light Load Handling Systems.
B.
EG&G Evaluation The information obtained from the FSAR provides the basis for the sixteen heavy loads listed in Table 2.1.
The exclusions as tabled in the FSAR generally, have a justification basis for each.
Among these are five given exclusion from consideration on a basis using an f-4 code which requires thct an evaluation be performed to determine the effect on safety e.g:
if exclusion is valid.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Since there is no information to the contrary, EG&G concludes that the applicant FSAR has included all applicable hoists and cranes in their list of handling systems which must comply with the requirements of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.
The hoists handling the five loads presently excluded, but requiring additional evaluation are:
Backflushable filters / hatch covers / resin charging o
tank
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s TABLE 2.1.
OVERHEAD HEAVY LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS NOT EXCLUDED FROM NUREG 0612 Identification Capacity
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Containment Butiding Polar Crane Main Hoist 475 Ton or 225 Ton Polar Crane Auxiliary Hoist
'- 50 Ton Radial Arm Stud Tensioner Hoist 2 Ton Monorail 2101R4011 2 Ton Wall Mounted Cantilever Jib Cranes 2101R4003 3 Ton 2101R4004 3 Ton 2101R4005 3 Ton 2101R4006 3 Ton Wall Mounted Cable Bridge Winch 2101R4007 3 Ten 2101R4008 3 Ton 2101R4009 3 Ton 2101R4010 3 Ton
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Fuel Building Cask Lifting Device dib A2109R4002 5 Ton Spent Fuel Cask Bridge Crane Main Hoist 125 Ton Auxiliary Hoist 15 Ton Monorail Hoist 2 Ton
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o RHR Heat Exchanger o
ESF chilled water chillers
.o Normal chilled water chillers Normal chilled water pump _s.
o The avaluations should be made and appropriate information for these hoist classification or exemption should be presented.
2.3 General Guidelines This section addresses the extent to which the applicable handling systems comply with the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article ~5.1.1.
EG&G's conclusions and recommendations are provided in summaries for each guideline.
The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads.
These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:
o Guideline 1--Safe Load Paths o
Guideline 2--Load-Handling Procedures Guideline.3--Crane Operator Training o
o Guideline 4--Special Lifting Devices Guideline 5--Lifting Devices (not specially designed) o Guideline 6--Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) o 7
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Guideline 7--Crane Design.
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These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and progrr.ms in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent-fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems.
The succeeding paragraphs address the guidelines individually.
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,2.3.1 Safe Load Paths fGuideline 1, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(1)]
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" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent-fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment.
The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact.
These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.
Deviations-from defined load paths should require written alternative pro:edures approved by the plant safety review committee."
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Summary of Apolicant's Statements t
A coded legend system is used on 33 drawings in the FSAR Figure 9.1.5-5 to provide the travel paths of hoists.
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Included are:
o Hand hoist with ceiling ring o
Hand hoist with floor mounted tripod o
Monorails and load path areas o
Jib crane and load path areas.
No discussion or' supplementary information for the safe load path is included.
.m u u B.
EG&G Evaluation -
i The information on the drawings represents only a start toward showing consistency with Guideline 1.
It is not 8
clear if the paths marked are the " Safe Load path" or a projection of the area the particular crane or hoist load could impact.
There is no indication that the paths are marked in the plant area, nor how they will be marked.
' There is no commitment to de' fine the safe l$ad paths in procedures.
The control method for deviations from a defined path is not given.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The Applicant should proceed from the data given on the 33 drawings to:
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c Identify the specific cranes not exempted tnat handle heavy loads 4
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Specify that Safe Load Paths are covered by procedure Describe the method or methods used to actually o
identify (mark on the floor) the safe load paths used at VEGp o
Specify handling method used for deviations.
d Load-Handling procedures [ Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, 2.3.2 Article-5.1.1(2)]
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" Procedures should be developed to cover load-handling operations for heavy loads-that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.
These procedures should include:
identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required befora movement of load; the steps and proper
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sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."
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Summary $fApolicant'sStatements
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The VEGP FSAR provides general descriptive coverage of equipment design and systems but the only statement relative to load handling procedure ts in 9.1.5.1.1F.
It states:
" Administrative controls applicable to OHLHS will be specified upon procedure development."
B.
EG&G Evaluation The statement from the FSAR makes no commitment and fails to supply information consistent with the NUREG 0612
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Guideline 2.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1) VEGP should initiate safe load handling procedures for heavy loads, that is consistent with Guideline 2.
(2) Special attention should be given to assure that procedures include those things specifically called for in Guideline 2.
2.3.3 Crane Operator Trainin) fGuideline 3, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(3)]
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" Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976,
' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [6]."
A.
' Summary of Apolicant's Statements The VEGP FSAR in 9.1.5.3 on Safety Evaluation subitem F states, "The OHLHS conforms with the applicable portions of code.s and standards involved for the,0HLHS design, operation, inspection, testing maintenance, operator training, qualification and conduct."
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.c-B.
EG&G Evaluation Although the inference of " conforms" in the statement
_ indicates Guideline 3, " Crane Operator Training" is in agreement or harmony with codes and standards there is no commitment or other information contained that is relative to this subject.
To show consistgacy with the guideline VEGP should' provide the premises or data from which judgments on conformance can be made.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Provide a positive statement or commitment showing the basis for a conclusion that the operator training qualification and conduct is in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2.
2.3Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI B30.2.</br></br>2.3" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process..4 Special Lifting Devices [ Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(4)1 "Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Mater 1als' [7].
This standard should apply to all special
. lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above.
For operating plants, certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard.
In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section'3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used.
This is in. lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (static load) or the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device."
A.
Summary of Aoplicant's Statements No statement is made, or specific identification of special Lifting Devices is provided.
In the FSAR Table 9.1.5-3 and 11
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- 9.1.5-4 one column heading is Lifting Devices.
In it there are five devices (4 identified by name) which appear to handle heavy loads.
These are:
Head Lifting Rig; Reactor Coolant Pump Lifting Sling, Internals Lifting Rig, Cask Lifting Device, and.a new fu'el shipping container device to be determined.
B.
EG&G Evaluation A more specific response to Guideline 4 is needed.
The limited data from the FSAR merely indicates the devices are being used in the two buildings covered in the specific tables. They may or may not be "Special Lifting Devices."
There is no information provided concerning compliance of design to ANSI N14.6, or that the design includes static and dynamic loading.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Specific information should be provided to o
Identify the "Special-Lifting Devices" which are used to handle heavy loads and which must meet NUREG 0612 o
Confirm that combined static and dynamic loads were used in special lifting device design o
Confirm that ANSI N14.6 requirements are met.
2.3.5 Lifting Devices (Not Scecially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(5)]
" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' [8].
However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in 12
terms-of the ' static load' which produces the maximum static and dynamic load.
Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."
A.
Summary of Applicant's Statements No statement is made. The FSAR dogs not address this subject.
B.
EG&G Evaluation The FSAR, as written is an inappropriate tool for the res'ponse to show compliance with NUREG 0612, Guideline 5.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Provide information to show:
o That slings used for handling heavy loads in accordance with NUREG 0612 are selected on the basis of adecuacy for combined static and maximum dynamic loads o
That slings are used in accordance with ANSI B30.9 o
That slings restricted for use with specific loads or cranes are clearly marked to show this use.
o Information for a suitable response must also address other devices used with the slings to make a complete lifting device.
e.g., shackles, turnbuckles, clevises...
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-Y 2.3.6 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) [ Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(6)]
"The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976,.' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the. exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use it less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment m.ty only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation.
ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections te be performed daily or monthly.
For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance L
should be performed prior to their use)."
A.
Summary of Applicant's Statements The VEGP FSAR states in 9.1.5.3F, "The OHLHS conforms with the applicable portions of codes and standards invoked for the OHLHS design, operation, inspection, testing, maintenance,...
B.
EG&G Evaluation The interpretation of " conforms," as discussed in 2.3.3 above, indicates an initial status of meetings codes and standards.
So, the initial inspection and test conformance is consistent with requirements. There is no commitment concerning the continuing inspection test and maintenance necessary to show consistency with the complete scope of Guideline 6.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Provide a commitment, approved procedure or other documentation to confirm consistency with an ongoing program of inspection, test and maintenance.
For jib and monorail units the guides of appropriate ANSI codes may be used in lieu of ANSI B30.2. The use frequency vs. daily and monthly inspections should be addressed.
See FSAR 9.1.5-1 and 2.
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2.3.7 Crane Design [ Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(7)]
"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric OverheadTravelingCranes'[9). An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."
A.
Summary of Applicant's Statements Comprehensive details are given on the design.and operating features of the Spent Fuel Cask Bridge Crane and Polar Crane.
In Summary the design meets:
CMAA 70, AISC, NFPA Vol. 5 Article 610 (1978) OSHA Section 1910.179 (1971) and ANSI B30.2 (1976).
In addition the Spent Fuel Cask Bridge Crane meets NUREG 0554 to qualify for single failure proof.
Design data for the other 11 hoists listed in Table.2.1 are not given.
In the FSAR 9.1.5.2.4 the miscellaneous hoists are stated to have adequate capacity to perform lifting of components-necessary for maintenance.
B.
EG&G Evaluation The Spent Fuel Cask Bridge Crane and Polar Crane are consistent with Guideline 7 design requirements.
Their auxiliary hoists and the SFCBC monorail if, as inferred in the FSAR Table 9.1.5-1 are designed to the same standard as the main hoist will also be consistent with Guideline 7.
The other hoists listed in Table 2.1 that handle heavy loads have insufficient information for valid review.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1) Confirm the design status of the two auxiliary and one monorail hoist on the large cranes.
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Provide suitable information to show proper design of the miscellaneous hoists listed in Table 2.1 so consistency with Guideline 7 can be established.
2.4 Interim Protection Measures
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The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that six measures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Articla 5.1, is complete.
Four of these six interim measures consist of general Guideline 1, Safe Load paths; Guideline 2, Load-Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance).
The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:
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o Heavy load technical specifications o
Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.
Applicant implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.
2.4.1 Interim protection Measure 1--Technical Soecifications
" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7, ' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWRs and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWRs, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until i
implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of
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Section 5.1.
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A.
Summary of Apolicant's Statements The Spent Fuel Cask Bridge Crane is single failure proof.
VEGP is not currently operational.
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3-o B.
EG&G Evaluation Data in the FSAR confirms that the Spent Fuel Cask Bridge Crane is Single Failure Proof.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations e.
VEGP is consistent with Interim protection Measure 1.
No recommendations.
2.4.2 Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5 - Administrative Controls
" Procedural or administrative measures [ including safe load paths, load-handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection]... can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 of
[NUREG-0612]."
~ A.
Summary of Applicant's Statements Summaries of applicant's statements are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6, respectively.
B.
EG&G Evaluations, Conclusions, and Recommendations EG&G evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, and 2.3.6.
2.4.3 Interim Protection Measure 6--Special Review for Heavy Loads Over the Core "Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as 17-
vessel internals or vessel inspection tools.
This special review should include the following for these loads:
(a) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (b) visual inspections of load-bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (c) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (d) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures."
A.
Summary'of Aoplicant's Statements This interim measure is not addressed in the FSAR.
B.
EG&G Evaluation The general comment indicating a conformance, as quoted in 2.3.3 and 2.3.6 above, for operator training and crane inspection infers a degree of compliance.
However, the FSAR makes no commitment and gives no indication of meeting these interim measures prior tc aperation.
C.
EG&G Conclusion Insufficient information is provided for a valid review.
Provide a specific statement indicating that the interim actions called for in Measure 6 are being taken.
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4 3.
CONCLUDING
SUMMARY
3.1 Applicable Load-Handling Systems The list of cranes and hoists. supplied by the applicant as being subject to the provisions of NUREG-0612 is apparently complete (see Section 2.2.1).
3.2 Guideline Recommendations Compliance with the seven NRC guidelines for heavy load handling (Section 2.3) are not satisfied at VEGP. This conclusion is represented in tabular form as Table 3.1.
Specific recommendations to aid in compliance with the intent of these guidelines are provided as follows:
Guideline Recommendation 1.
Section 2.3.1 a.
Proceed from the marked Safe Load Paths drawings to perform all of the requirements needed to show consistency with Guideline 1.
2.
Section 2.3.2 a.
Initiate the required Load Handling Procedures Heavy Load Handling procedures.
b.
Assure that all of the requirements of the guideline are included in the procedures.
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TAatt 3.1.
C3GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PL ANT t!!! 1 AMI 2 CIREG-0612 COMPLIANCE MATRIX Mg A
Guidelines I
2 3
4 5
6 7
rapacity Load Crane Special Rattnq)
Safe Load liaswiling Operator Lifting Lif ting Devices Cranes Inspection.
Crane Identification (tons Paths Procedures Iraining_
Dev ices
_No.pecial Design Test Maintenance Desten Contaisument Building P lar Crane Main iloist 475 or 225 I
NC I
I NC I
C Pslar Crane A xiliary Holst 50 I
NC I
I NC I
l Radial Ars Stud Tensioner lloist 2
1 NC I
I NC I
I Monorail 2101R40ll 2
i NC I
I NC I
I Wall mounted Cantllever Jih Cranes 210lR4003 3
i NC I
I NC I
I 210lR4004 3
i NC i
i NC i
1 210lR4005 3
i NC 1
I NC i
I g
2101R4006 3
I NC i
i NC I
I Wall mounted Cable Bridge Winch 210lR4007 3
I NC I
I NC I
I 210lR4008 3
I NC I
I NC i
I 210lR4009 1
1 NC I
1 NC I
I 2101st4010 3
i NC I
I NC i
i fuel Building I
Cuk Lif ting Device Jih A2109R4002 5
I NC I
I NC I
I Spext fuel Cask Bridge Crane Main iloist
.125 I
NC I
I NC I
C Aus tliary lloist 15 i
NC I
I NC I
I Monorail llo6st
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I NC I
I NC I
I C = Applicant action complies with MatEG-0612 Guideline.
NC = Applicant action does not comply with MREG-0612 resideline.
R = Applicant has proposed revisions /midifications designed to comply with NUREG-0612 Guideline.
I = Insuf f icient information provided by the applicant.
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.O t-Guideline Recommendation 3.
Section 2.3.3 a.
A positive statement Crane Operator Training or commitment is needed to confirm that crane operator training,
- e. qualification and conduct is consic tent with ANSI B30.2 Chapter 2-3.
4.
Section 2.3.4 Special Lifting Devices Provide a specific response to this guideline which identifies the special lifting devices, confirm that they are designed to ANSI N14.6 and design is based on static and dynamic loading.
5.
Section 2.3.5 Lifting Devices Provide information to show (not specially designed) that slings o
Are selected on the basis of static and dynamic loading o
That they are used in accordance with ANSI B30.9 o
That slings for specific loads or cranes are marked for that service.
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. )-
p r
Guideline Recommendation o
Provide data on other devices used with the slings.
6.
Section 2;3.6 Cranes (Inspection Provide information to show Testing'and Maintenance) consistency with an ongoing program of inspect'en test cnd 4
maintenance.
7.
Section 2.3.7 Crane Design Confirm the design status of the auxiliary hoists on the Spent Fuel Cask Brid'ge Crane and the Polar Crane. Also the monorail hoist on the SFCBC.
Provide information to show that the miscellaneous hoists handling heavy loads meet the requirements of Guideline 7.
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