ML20136C973
| ML20136C973 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Vogtle |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1984 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082840446 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-663 NUDOCS 8601040058 | |
| Download: ML20136C973 (10) | |
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i SAFEGUARDS SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT t
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1.0 Intrc6.ction The Georgi ~a Power Ccmpany has filed with the fuclear Regulajory Cc: mission for t h e
'.'c s t l e Electric Cenerating Plant Unit, 1 and 2 the following security program plans.
"Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2, Physical o.
Se:urity and Contingency Plan", original submittat dated l
September 1, 1983, transnitted by letter dated August 29, 1953; second submittat dated March 1954, i
l l transmitted by letter da t e d Ma r c h 3 0, 1984; Amendment i
1, undated, trarscitted by letter dated July 31, 1984
""uclear Training and Ovalifi:ation Plan," undated, i
1 t r a n s m i t t 'e d_- by _ L e t t e r dated August 29. 1953,
- t. e v i s i o n 1
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,3 dated f arch 1954, transe.itted by tester dated P.a r c h 3 0,~
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1953".
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l I This Safety Evaluaticn Report (SER) ste ar:res h e w. the-a l
Licensee has provided fo? ceeting the recuire..tnts of 10 CFP.
Part 73. 1 The SER is :or;osed of a basic a.alysis
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available for public review, and a protected Accendir.
2.0- Physical Security Orcanization To satisfy the requirecents of 10 CFR 73.55(b) the Georgia Power Company has prowided a physical security organi:ation that includes a Pluclear Security Shift Supervisor who is onsite St all tir.es.ith the authority to direct the physical protection activities.
To implenent the commitments cade i n l
the physical security plan, nucte.r training and qualitication plan, and the contingency plan, writtcn security proc.dures specifying the duties of the security organi/ation rcabers I
have Leen developad and are avaitable for intpection.
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l The training program and critical security tasks and duties i
for'the security organi:ation pers:nnet are defined in the "Vogtte Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Nuclear Training and Qualification Plan" which meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B for the training, equipping j
r and requalification of the security organization neebers.
The physical security plan and the training program provide ccmmitments that p r e 'c t'u d'e ' t h e a s s i g n m e nt of any individual I
to a security.related duty or task prior to the individual I
being trai6e'd, equipped and qualified to perforn the assigned duty in accordance with the apprcved guard training a,d
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3.0 P h'y s i c a l' G a r r i e r s
.In meettng the re:;uirements of 10 CFh 73 55(c) the a p p 'L i e g n t,
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has provided a protect,ed area barrie*r whi W eeets the d e f ini t i on i n 1'O C F R. 73 2 ( f ) (1 ).
A 20foct wide isolation t
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the plant entry and security building to permit observation l
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i l of activities at the perimeter.
Isolation zones are kept clear of foliage; material, and structures, except for items l,
Listed in the 1.coendix.
The staff has re' viewed those locations and determined that l
L the security measures in' place are satisfactory and continue i
.. requirem,ents of 10 CFR 73.55(c).
L to meet.the Illumination of 0.2 foot-candles is maintained for the l
l isolation :enes, protected area barriers, and external l
portions of the protected area.
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i 4.0 Identification of vital sceas The A:sendir contains a discussion of the applicant's vital area program and identifies these areas and items of equip.9ent I
determined to be vital for protecticn purposes.
Vital equipment is located within vital areas which are located within the protected area and which require passage thr u;h at least two barriers, as defined in 10 C FR
- 73.2 (f) (1) and (2), to gain acces's to the vital equipnent.
Vital area barriers are separated from the protected area Larrier.
- The control-recm and central alarm station are provided with bullet-resistant walls, doors, ceilings and ftcors.
Eased on these findings,.and the analysis set forth in paragra;h C of t h e
- A c c e dd f r,' t h e s t a f f has c o n c lu d e d 7 fft tTe a p p l i : a nT*s, -
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program for identificatico and prete,cticj,of vital e;u_ipment
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satisfies the regulatory intent.
P o'. e v e rj this program is subject to onsite validation by the staff in the future, and to subsequent changes if found to be necessary.
z 5.0 Access Recuirerents In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d) atL points of personnel and vehicle access to the protected area are controlled.
The individual responsible for controlling the final point of 4
access into the protected area is Located in a butlet-resistant l
l structure.
As part of the access control program, vehicles (e s cept. ur der. eme rgency conditions), personnet, packages, and materials entering the protected area are searched for I
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explosives, firearms and incendiary devices by electrcnic i
search equipment and/or physical search.
Vehict'es admitted to the protected area, except Licensee t
designated vehicles, are controlled by escorts when in i
operation.
Licensee designated vehicles are limited to 1
i on-site station func'tions and remain in the protected area i
except for operat'icnal aintenance, repair, security and l
emergency purposes.
Positive control over the vehicles is t
j maintained by perscnnel authori:ed to use the vehicles or by i
j the escort. personnel.
A picture badge / Ley card system, utilizing encoded informatien, identifies individuals that l
i are authori:ed enescorted access to protected and vital areas,
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and is used to centrol access to these A:eas.. n d i v i :iu a l s Tio t 1
authoriz.ed unescorted access,are iss*ued,*"bn picture badges that indicate an escort is required.- A c c i s.s auth.ori:ations -
liEited t.o those individuals who have a need for access
... e to perform.their duties.
Unoccupied vital areas are locked and alarmed.
During periods of refueling or major maintenance, access to the reactor i
containment is positively controlled by a member of the j
security organization to assure that only authori:ed l
individuals and materials are permitted to enter.
In addition, all doors and personnet/ equipment hatches into the reactor e,
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containment are Locked.and alarmed.
Keys, Locks, i
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and related equipment are : hanged on an annual basis.
In ll addition,.when an individual's access authori":ation has been i
j terminated due to the lack of reliability or trustworthiness, I
or for poor work perfernance, the keys, locks, and related equipment to which that person had access are changed.
l 6.0 Detection Aids l
In satisfying the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(e) the l~
applicant has installed. intrusion detection systems at the j
protected area barrier, at entrances to vital areas, and at
~'all eEergenfy ex'its.
Alares from th*e intrusion detection
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system annunciate within the conti.uousLy nanned central alarm station and a secondary alarm station located within
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the protected. area.
The central alarm QLation,is loca.ted t
such that the interior of the
' station is-mot visible from outside the perimeter of the protected ar.ca.
In addition, l
the central s,tation is constructed so
.t. hat walts, floors, ceilings, doors, and windows are bullet resistant.
The alare stations are located and designed in such a manner so a 4 ingle act cannot interdict the capability of calling
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for assistance or, responding to alarms.
The centrat alarm station contains no othe.- functions or duties that would i
interfere with its alarm response function.
The intrusion l,
detection system' transmission Lines and associated alarm lll l
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annunciation hardware are seLf checking and ta ;er-indicating.
I Alarm annunciators indicate the type of alarm and its location w h e'n afe t i v a t s d.
An automatic indication of when the alarm I
system is on standby power is provided in the central alarm y
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station.
7.0 Co-munications As required in 10'CFR 73.55(f) the applicant has provided for the capability of centinuous communications between the central 1
i and secondary ~atarn station operators, guards, and armed response personnel through the use of a conventional telephone systen, and a security radio system.
In addition, i
direct communication with the local Law enforcement authorities
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is maintained through the use of a convaational telephone system and two-uay VHF radio. Link s.
- Al L non port able -
comnunication Links, except t h e c on ve n t i rm
- L t e L ep h on e. s y s t fF, Pr **a"ided,with an uninterruptable emergency power source.
8.0 Test and Maintenance Re6sirenents.
In meeting the requirements of>50 CFR 73.55(g) the applicant f
has' established a program for the testing and maintenance of I
alL intrusion alarms, emergency alarms, communication equipment, physical barriers and other. security related devices and i
i equipment.
Equipment or devices that do not meet the design i
performance criteria or have failed to otherwise operate wilL be compensated for,by appropriate compensatory measures as deft.ned in the "Vogtle Electric. Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Physical Security Plan and Contingency Plan" and in site 4
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procedures.
The com;ensatory measures, defined in'these i
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plans wilL assure that the effectiveness of the security l
I system lis not reduced by failures or other contingencies lj affecting the operation of the security related equipment or L. a structures.
Intrusion detection systems are tested for proper performance at the beginning and end of any period that they are used for security.
Such testing wiLL be 1
conducted at least once every seven days.
Com=unication systems for'onsite communications are tested at l
the beginni.ng of each security shift'.
Offsite connunications i
a r-e t e s t e d a t least once each day.
Audits of the* security program are conducted once every 12
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m o n t h s.by p e r.s'o nn.e l, i n d e p e n d e n t of sitelgecurity,
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managem,e,n and supervision.,The audits,=6 focusing on t-he effectiveness of the physical protectionrptovided,by the car!ks.'securltyorganizationimplementdng the approved security p r o g r,a m p l e.n s, include, but are not Limited to:
a review of s
j the security procedures and practices; system testing and maintenance programs; and local Law enforcement assistance l
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agreements.
A report is prepared documenting audit findings t
and recommendations and is submitted to the plant management.
l 9.0 Resoonse Recuirements In meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(h) the applicant
,has pro'videdfor a'rmed, responders immediateLy available for i
response duties on atL. shifts consistent with the requirements l'
of the regulations.
Considerations used in support of this t
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i number are attached (s ee Accendi x).
In addition, liaison l
with local law enforcement authorities to provide additional
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respo'nse support in the event of security events has been 1
established and documented.
The applicant's safeguards contingency plan for dealing with thefts, t.hreats and.. radiological sabotage events satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix C.
The plan identifies a p p r o p r i a't e' s'e c u r i t y events which could initiate a radiological sabotage event and identifies the applicant's 1
I p r e p t a nn i n g',' ' r e s p o n s e resources, safeguards contingency i!
l pa9ticipants'and coordination activities for each identified l
thedejption,ofabnoreg
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T,h r o u g h this plan, upon
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L presentie or activ'it'ies within the p r o t e c t e'd 'o r "v'i t a l i r e a s,"
responsi activities using'th'e available resources would be i
i ni t i a.t e d.
The respon.se activities and objective ~s i n c.l u d e I
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the neutr'aliiation of the existing threat by requiring the r e s p o~n s e' f B r c e m e mb e r s to interpose themselves between the t
i adversary and their objective, instructions to use force l
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commensurate with that used by the adversary, and authority to request suffi~cient assistance frem the local Law q
enforcement authoriti.es to maintain control.over the t
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situation.
To assist in the assessment / response activities a closed
. circuit. television' system, providing the capability to cbs'erve-the ' entire protected aria perimeter, isolation a
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,the security organi:1 tion.
i 10.0.Ecoleyee Screenin; Program In meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a) to protect
,a against the design basis threat as stated in 10 CFR 73.1 (a ) (1 ) (i i), the Geor'gia Power Company has provided an employee screening program.
Personnel who successfully complete the employe'e screening program or its equivalent may be granted unescorted access to protected and vital areas *at the Vogtle Plant site.
All other personnel' l
' requiring access to.the site are escorted by persons authorized and trained for'esecrt duties and who have successfully
.ga completed the employee screening progra$h -The-ecployee
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screening program is based upon a c c e'p t e ('i n d u s t r y standards and includes a background i nv e s t i g a ti o n, *~i p s y c ho.L o g i ce l j
evaluation, and a'conti$uing observation program. In addition, r
the.appH cant may recognize the screening program of other nucle 9r utilities or contractors based upon a comparability rifiew conducted by the Georgia Power Company.
The plan
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also provides for a " grandfather clause" exclusion which allows recognition of a certain period of trustworthy service with the utility or contractor, as being equivalent to the overall employee screening program. The staff has reviewedy the applicant's. screening program against the accepted industry standards (ANSI N18.17-1973) and has determined that the program is acceptable.
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