ML20136E960
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[q NUCLE AR REGULAT ORY COMMISSION t
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20SSS
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i May 21,1984 l
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?i MEMORANDUM TOR: Elinor Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4, DL f!
FROM:
M. Srinivasan, Chief Power Systems Branch, DSI
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION - V0GTLE UNITS 1 AND 2 J
Plant Name: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Applicant: Georgia Power Company Docket Nos: 50-424/425 Licensing Stage: OL Project Manager:
M. Miller Systems Integration Branch: Power Systems PSB Reviewers:
J. Lazevnick/E. Tomlinson Review Status: Awaiting Information In our February 29, 1984 memorandum to you we s'ent a partial list of questions from J. Lazevnick who is the PSB electrical reviewer for i
Chapter 8 of the Vogtle FSAR. Enclosed are the remaining electrical questions from Mr. Lazevnick. This now completes PIB's requests for information with regard to our review of the Vogtle FSAR.
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M. Srinivasan, Chief Fower Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
L. Ilubenstein M. Miller J. E. Knight A. Ungaro J. Lazevnick E. Tomlinson
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Contact:
J. Lazevnick x29413
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m 4-ENCLOSURE 430-24 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT If
- UNITS 1 & 2
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. p 430.75 Regarding separation of electrical circuits:
l (SRP 8.3.1
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& 8.3.2) a.
FSAR section 7.1.2.2.1 paragraph A states that the design of the a
-protection system relies on the provisions of IEEE Standard 384-1974 relative to overcurrent devices to prevent malfunctions in one circuit from causing unacceptable influences on the functioning of the protection system. This implies that interrupting devices actuated only by fault current are used for 1 solation devices. This is not in accordance with position C.1 j.
of R.G.1.75.
If an analysis of this item was previously done and
.i approved by the staff please reference this. If not, provide s.!
results of an analysis justifying the use of these devices.
b.
In amendment 5 to FSAR section 8.3.1.4.3.A and B it is stated that the minimum separation distance between non-Class lE conduit and. Class IE open top cable trays is 1 inch. This is not in accordance with the. separation criteria of IEEE 384.
Therefore, provide results of an analysis supported by tests
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, justifying this separation distance or provide additional
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barriers.
I c.
FSAR.section 8.3.1.4.3.C.1, 2 and 3 describes the methods used to provide separation within panels and control boards where barriers are required. Demonstrate that the distances and materials used in each of these methods is adequate to preclude damage in a l
faulted circuit from propagating to the adjacent circuit for which the barrier is-intended.
d.
FSAR section B.3.1.4.3.D.1 and 2 describes the use of barriers in tray systems where vertical and horizontal separation l
cannot be maintained. Verify that, in accordance with IEEE 384, at least 1 inch separation is provided between the j
barrier and the cable tray located above or to the side of it.
j su. M-i In accordance with IEEE,and RG 1.75 verify that the cable o
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l spreading rooms do not contain high energy equipment such as
.switchgear, transformers, rotating equipment or pote'ntial sources of missiles or pipe whip. Also, verify that power cables are not j
routed through the cable spreading rooms or control room. Power cables inthese areas should be limited only to those which are necessary.to serve the areas.
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- I 430.76 FSAR Figure 8.3.1-8 does not show ths two 125 Vdc switchyard battery
'j (SRP control power supplies. Please provide an electrical one-line j
8.3.2) diagram of these two systems.
aj 430.77 The instrumentation provided for monitoring of the Class 1E
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Oi (SRP 125 Vdc power system in the control room does not include a 8.3.2) battery discharge alarm. The staff requires that such an. alarm be provided to alert the operator of a condition which is M
inadvertently allowing discharge of the battery. A battery de undervoltage alarm set at or above battery open circuit voltage may also be substituted for the discharge alarm. Verify that such i
an alarm will be provided for the Class 1E de power systems.
430.78 Provide the Class 1E battery chargers output current ratings so (SRP that the staff may verify the adequacy of their capacities.
8.3.2) 1 430.79 FSAR Tables 8.3.2-1, 2, 3, and 4 which provide the Class 1E battery
-l (SRP load recuirements show loads identified as " random load." Describe 8.3.2) what these loads consist of. Random loading is also listed for the
.l motor operated valves for the load requirements of Batteries A and j
B during the last minute of the load profile. Discuss the operation 1
of motor operated valves from these systems during the first minute I
of.the load profile.
4 430.80 FSAR Section 5.4.11.3 does not identify the source of power to the j
(NUREG pressurizer level indication instrument channels. In accordance
.0737) with position 4 of TMI Item II.G.1, describe how these instrument channels are powered from the vital buses and capable of being j
supplied power from either the onsite or the'offsite power sources.
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430.81 Regarding electrical equipment subject to containment flooding:
(SRP
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a) Amendment 3 to FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.10 states.that containment 8.3.2) building electrical penetrations are not qualified for
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submergence but would not be. damaged by faults due to flooding lj because their associated power circuits are either protected by l
redundant overcurrent devices or have fault currcnts at the e
penetration below the penetration damage level. While it's true l
that these circuits have redundant overcurrent devices, they are j
, intended to protect against the random fault as opposed to multiple faults which could potentially occur due to the common
'j mode flooding of the penetrations under LOCA conditions. We do
- y not consider it prudent to depend on a multiple number of
,j overcurrent protective devices to actuate in order to maintain o;
tontainment integrity. Also, for penetrations which carry multiple I: I circuits the penetration overcurrent damage (IZt) curve is based
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430-26
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,.J upon a fault in one circuit with the other circuits carrying i
.i their continuous full rated current.
If more than one circuit 1
is simultaneously faulted such as could occur during flooding 1'
of the penetration, damage could occur at a current less than 2
O that shown by the penetration I t curve, and, thus, the h
penetration may not be adequately protected. The simultaneously faulted circuits could also defeat the coordination between the penetration overcurrent devices and the upstream bus feeder overcurrent device, resulting in opening of the bus feeder breaker and subsequent loss of power to multiple Class lE loads.
The above concerns should be addressed or the penetrations qt.alified for submergence. Also address how power will be maintained to critical Class lE electrical loads inside.
D containment during or subsequent to a LOCA if their circuits are I
faulted by submergence of their associated penetrations.
j b) The FSAR also indicates that accumulator discharge valves.
HV8808A, B, C and D could be submerged following a LOCA. This
_t is found acceptable on the bases that the valves are positioned
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prior to startup, have power removed from the motor operator, and are not required to change position after a LOCA. Address L jl.
the consequences, if any, of submergence of the valve limi.t
<j switches with regard to loss of valve position indication, spurious valve position alarm actuation, and short circuiting of a
l the control power and valve indication circuits with. potential
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loss of their associated penetration or Class lE power supplies.
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' l 430.82 Recent experience with nuclear power plant Class lE motor-operated
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(SRP valve motors has snown that in some instances the motor winding on j
8.3.1 &
the valve operator could-fail when the valve is subjected to 8.3.2) frequent cycling. This is primarily due to the limited duty cycle of the motor. Provide the required-duty cycle of the following valves as it' relates to system mode of operation in various events:
1.
Steam supply valve to AFW pump turbine (if they are MOVS)
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2.
Auxiliary feed water flow control valves
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3.
RHR heat exchanger valves
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- 4., SI injection valves 5.
SI discharge valves 6.
Atmospheric dump valves (if. they are MOVS)
Q Demonstrate that the availability of the safety systems in the Vogtle design will not be comprised due to the limited duty cycle of the valve operator motors.
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