ML20136C953

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Safeguards SER Supporting Physical Security & Contingency Plan & Nuclear Training & Qualification Plan
ML20136C953
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Vogtle
Issue date: 10/10/1984
From:
NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML082840446 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-84-663 NUDOCS 8601040048
Download: ML20136C953 (10)
v • d • e


Text

h- -

..f._

4

'E*^

~ ' ~ ~ ~ ' '

7..

,s

.__3,2.

u - - - - -

p*,. w% m a -,- +egaw.p. - -

- --. qmm w.wmag nee - --...mwwww nonaw.

50-424/425 ENCLOSURE 2 1

'f

'. h a

-, i s

k SAFEGUARDS SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT 4

f

=.

' s VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT i

I i

-f. d p

1 L

'~

a z.

j e

=

~.

i, I

',, W d*

'?

v 1

I e

o pae I

e e g.-= TP{

w g gogoo4e 851127 ppm FOIA ppR 4

BELL 84-W

\\

.{-

1 i

,~

u 9

_w," r 7

m4 f g

--m

.- g

-'w

_.(;, _ r -

m

._.m_--_

1

).

.j.

.1. 0

. Introduction The Georgia Power' Company has filed a " Physical Security and Contingency Plan" and " Nuclear Training and Qualification i

P.l a n" with.the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Vogtle

~

.Electr.ic Gener,ating-Plant Unit 1 and 2.

This Safety. Evaluation Feport (SER) summarizes how the s

a,pplicant has provided for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR

~ ~ fart-73.

T6V SER".is composed of a bisic analysis that is

.1 I

available for public review, and a protected Appendix.

1 2.0 Physieal Security.Oroanization

_., a To satisfy the req'ui'rements of 10 CFR 73.IS(b) t'h e G e o r'g'i a Power Cospany'has'provided

~a' physical s e cu r i t y organization 4

f

~

t'h a t. i n c l u d e s a Nuclear, Security Shift Supervisor'kho is onsite

~

i at all tim'es sith the authority to direc't the physical p r o t e c t i o'n 'a'c t i v i t i e s.

To implement the commitments made l

in the physical security plan, nuclear training and qualification 1

i plane and the contingency plane written security procedures I

f specifying the dutie's of the secu'rity organization members

]I have been developed and are available for inspection.

a i

~

1 I

b c hr.

x.:. V A M Misawm

=

Km*,_ f

.m

=

.-... -,. -. -. ~

q l

i l

The training. program and critical security tasks and duties organization personnel are defined in.the for the security 1 :

[!

"Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 flu clea r Training and Qualification Plan" which meets the requirements 4

l

- o f.10- C FR P a rt 73, Appendix.B for the training, equipping

~

~

and requalification of the security ' organization members.

The physical security plan and the training program provide commitments that prect.ude the assignment of any individual il

~ ~ lo ade cu r {fy re' Lated duty o r t a s'k giri o r t o t h e individual be_ing trained, equipped and qualified to perform the assigned t

j duty in.accordance with the approved guard training and

.., a qualification. plan.

i 3.0' Physical Barriers M-

..g l

I'n meeting the r e q ui r e n e n t s o f 10 C F.h 73 d 5_( c ) the appl.icant-j j

has provided~(a protected _ area barrier.which meets the 3

i de finition,,in 10 C FR 73.T (f) (1).

A 20 foot wide isolation i

.l.

'i!

zone'is provided along both sides of the barrier, except at I,

i the plant entry and security building to permit observation I

.{

of activities at.the perimeter.. Isolation zones are kept clear of foliage, material., and structures, except for i tems Listed in the Accendix.

The staff has reviewed those locations and determined that I

the s e c u ri t y in e a s u'r e s 11 n p l.a c e are satisfactory and continue

~

3 to qeet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c).

Illumination of 0.2 foot-candles is maintained for the isolation zones, protected area barriers, and external i

portions of the protected area.

r-5

,a-h e F

'--Y

  • Y**#**

?

o 3.-

4.0 Identification of Vital Areas

,The Appendix *contains a discussion of the applica1t's vital area

~j j

p r o g r a'm and identifies those areas and items of equipment determined to be vital for protection parpcses.

Vital equipment

!]

i s located.Within vital areas which are located within the 3

protected, area and which' require passage through at least two

~

barri.ers, as defined in 10 CFR 73.2(f)(1) and (2), to gain accesstothevital, equi $ ment.

Vital area barriers are 1

_ _, separated from the protected area barrier.

~

j' The control room and central alarm station are provided with j

bullet-resistant walls, doors, ceilings and floors.

Based on

i

.)I these findi.ngs'and the. analysis set f or.;,h4 in.. paragraph Q f

  • s.

the Appe'ndix, the' staff has concluded that the applicant's m-program"for identification'a'nd protectio'n of vital equipment-i f

satisfies the regulatory intent.

However, this program is subject to on' site validation by the staff in the future,'and to su6sedue'nt changes if found to be necessary.

5.0 Access Reouirements i

In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d) aLL' points,.pf personnel and

)

4 vehicle access to the protected area are controlled.

The 1

individual responsible for controlling the final point of' access i nto the protected area is Located in a bullet-resistant structure.

As p a r.t of the access control program, vehicles i

I (except under emergenc'y conditions), personnel, packages, and materials entering the protected area are searched for

~l

+

m,Tei r

__r7

,u

.~N-

-m -

N-

v

..m h '

explosives',, firearms and i n c e n d i a ry ' d e vi c e's by electronic search, equipment and/or physical search.

j Vehicles admitted to the protected area, except Licensee a

I

.oesignated vehicles, are c'ontrolled by Fscorts when in operation.

Licensee designated vehicles are limited to on-site' station fun'ctions and' remain in the protected area except for operational maintenance, repair, security and emergency purposes. ' Positive control over the vehicles is maintained.by personnel authorized to use the vehicles or by the escort' personnel.

A picture badge / key c'ard system, utilizing enco,ded information, identifies individuals that I

j a re aut hori-zed, une s co r t ed a c ces s to prett&tet and vitalmrreas,

.j

s..

7l and is used to control access to these areas.

Individuals not authorized unescorted access are issued non picture badges 1

~~

.7.

  • t h a t fqd i c a t e. a n e s c o r t is required.

Access authorizations Limited to those' individuals who have a need for access are I

to perform their duties.

'l Unoccupied vital areas are Locked and alarmed.

During periods j

of refueling or major maintenance, access to t-he reactor containment is positively controlled by a member of the security org'anization to assure that only authorized individuals a'nd m'aterials arepermkttedtoenter.

In addition, j

aLL doors and. personnel / equipment hatches into the reactor t

containmsnt are Locked and alarmed.

Keys, Locks, il t w i.

F ~ ~

L

~_

~ _.

..5-l and related equipment are changed on an annual basis.

In j-

. addition, wh'en an individual's access authorization has been 1

-]

terminated due to the lack of reliability or. trustworthiness,

l

{

or for poor worn performance,

=g.

the keys," Locks, and related equipment t'o which that person had access are changed.

+

6.0-Detection Aids-In satisfying the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(e) the instalk.edintrusiondetectionsystemsat applicant has the p rote ct ed a te a b a rrie r, a t entrances to vital areas, and at I

atL emergency. exits.

Alarms from the intrusion detection 1

system annunciate within the continuously manned central a la rm s ta t i.on. and a s e conda ry a la r m s t e tto n -bo c a t e d w i t tr+n L

the protected area.

The central al. ara station is located

~

such that the interior of the station is'^not visible from'

}

.j outsidst.the. perimeter of the protected area.

In addition, y

j the central station is constructed so that walls, floors, s..

ceilings, doors, and windows are bullet resistant.

The alarm stations are located and designed in such a manner

.z.--

so a single act cannot interdict the ca'pability of calling for assistance or responding to alarms.

The central alarm station contains no other functions or duties that would j

interfere with-its alarm response function.

The intrusion

't detection system transmission lines 'and associated alarm y

e 4

4 O

O e

~

l

S,.._.m.,

t

} -

1 annunciati'oq hardware are self-checking and tamper-indicating.

g Alarm annunciators indicate the type of alarm and its location 3

l when activated.

An automatic indication of when the alarm l

system i s on stan'by power is provided in the central alarm d

.l i

station.

7.0' "communi c a tions'

~

l As required in 10 CFR 73.55(f) the applicant has provided for the c a p a,bi li t y of co'ntinuous communications between the central

- - -a nd, secondary alarm station operators, guards, and armed respo.1se personnel through the use of'a conventional telephone system, and a security radio system.

In addition-,

i di'rtet commun'ication with the local L KVf Nn f or c e m e nt authorities C.

j 4

is maintained through the use of a conventional teleph_one f

system and two-way VHF radio links.

Ali non portable t

communication L i n k's, e'x c e p t the conventional telephone system, are provided with an uninterruptable emergency power source.

l 8.0 Test and Maintenance Recuirements I

t In meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(g) the applicant i

has established a program for the testing and-maintenance of I

alL intrusion alarms, emergency alarms, communication equipment, i

physical barriers and other security related devices and I

equipment.

Equipment or devices that do not meet the design I

i performance criteria or have failed to otheruise operate will be compe'nsated for by appr;priate compensatory measures as defined'in the "Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Physical Security Plan and Contingency Plan" and in site

=-@-+*AW**m%,.,

m' g<mw99 "+ e **

WQ ey -

ppwga p 9-9, g

r__ _

~

7 l

.'7_

l l

i p r o c e du r e s'.,j,T h e compensatory measures defined in these plans wilL assure that th'e effectiveness of the security l

4 l

system is not reduced by failures or other contingencies j

affecting the operation of the security"reLated equipment or l

structures.

Intrusion detection systems are tested for

[

proper' performance'at the beginning and end of any period 1

I that they are used for security.

Such testing wiLL be f

conducted at least.o'nce every seven days.

i l

-.comm3nication systems for onsite communications are tested at thebeginnkng of each security shift.

Offsite communications I'

tested at,least ^

each day.

are once l l co$dydted--on.ce everrnt2

, Audits of,the security program are L

months by personnel independent of. site security n-1...

I managem'ent and supervision.

The audits,' f ocusing on the '

t v

l effectiveness of t'he physical protection provided by the

.j onsite security organization implementing the approved security program plans, include, but are not limited to:

a review o'f l

the security proc,edures and practices; system testing and

. :.. ~ --

l ma,i,ntenance programs; and local ~ Law enforcement assistance

! -l agreements.

A report is prepared documenting audit findings

! f

'1 and recommendations and is submitted to the plant management.

l l

,9. 0 Resoonse Recuirerents l

In meet.ing the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(h) the applicant i

has proVided for arded esponders immediately available~for l l' response duties on alL shifts consistent with the requirements of the regulations.

Considerations used in support of this t

l l

l l

k...*.

. %ge

-~,

--.-m.-

..--m.-.

_g.

t number are a',ttached (see Appendix).

In addition, Liai:on with. Local' law enforcement authorities to provide additional response support in the event of security events has been established and d.ocumented. _

r,-

]

The applicant's safeguards contingency plan for dealing with thefts, threats a~nd radiological sabotage events satisfies th'e requirements of.10.C.FR Part 73, Appendix C.

The plan i

identiffes appropriate security events which could initiate l

.~

a r a'di o lo g i c a l s a b o t a g e e.v e nt and identifies the applicant's

\\

' preplanning, response resources, safeguards contingency participants and coordination activities for each identifie'd

.,.a event.. Throug'h t, hts plan, upon the dethstion.9;f, abnormal l-

. presence or activities withi.n the prite h or vital areas, I

response activities using the available rssources, would be --

initiated

'The response activities and object.ives include

)

I the neut.rak.ization of the existing. threat by. requiring the response force members to interpose themselves between the f'rce j

adversary' and their objective, instructions to use o

t commensurate with that used by the adversary, and authority to request sufficient assistance from the Local Law enforcement authoriti.es to maintai,n control over the situation.

1 To assist in 'the a,ssessment/ response activities a closed cirquit television system, providing the capability to observe the entire protected area perimeter, isolation

+

f

r w-

- mm % - -

m-____.

p w_.,

l l: -

I

ones and 'a, majority of the protected area, i s provided to l 1

?

ly the s e.c u r i t y 6rganization'.

l j

10.0 Employee Screening Procram I

ll In meeting the requirements of 10 CFR'73'.55(a) to protect

<.l against the design basis threat as stated in 10 CFR 73.1 l ' *.

( a ) (1 ) (~i i ), the Georgia Power Company has provided an 1

l employee screening program.

Personnel who successfulLy k

complete the employe'e screening program or its equivalent I

-aay b,e-granted unes co rted a c ce s s to.p rot e ct ed and vital areas at the Vogtle Plant site.

AlL other personnel requiring access to'the site are escorted by persons author.ized and trained for escort duties a nd w h o -h gVe tucc.essfully w s.

j completed the employee screening programg_,The employee screeni$g program is based upon accepted industry standar8s

-r and includes.a.backgrobnd investigation, a psychological evaluation, and a continuing observation program. In addition, the $pplic nt may recognize the screening program of other nuclear utilities or contractors based upon a comparability re, view conducted by the Georgia Power Companyr The plan i

also provides for a." grandfather clause" exclusion which l,l!

allows recognition of a certain period of trustworthy I

service'with the utility or contractor, as being equivalent 4

y to the.overa.L.L employee screening pr'ogram. The staff has l 4 reviewe'd'the applica'nt's screening program against the accepted

!l l

{

industry' standards (ANSI N18.17 1973) and has determined that the program is acceptable.

s O - --

-~ 2

~'~-~~-'~~~~~~~~:.

-~~~~~w~~~~-~:-~~-~.~~~.--w.

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20136C953&oldid=4218794"