ML20133C326

Responds to to President Clinton Expressing Concerns About NRC Oversight of Millstone & Haddam Neck Nuclear Plants & Forwards NRC Actions Addressing Comprehensive Lessons Learned from Millstone Exprience

ML20133C326
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone, Haddam Neck  File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	12/23/1996
From:	Miraglia F NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Limerick F, Limerick M AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
Shared Package
ML20133C330	List: ML20133C326 ML20133C334
References
NUDOCS 9701070129
Download: ML20133C326 (8)

Text

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} NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. enana annt

$g% December 23, 1996 Mr. Francis J. Limerick l Mrs. Mary Limerick 47 Strickland St.

Manchester, CT 06040

Dear Mr. Francis and Mrs. Mary Limerick:

I am responding to your letter of August 8,1996, to President Clinton, which was forwarded to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for review and appropriate action on October 18, 1996. In your letter, you expressed concern about the NRC's oversight of the Millstone and Haddam Neck nuclear plants and the impact of the plants being shut down upon the State of Connecticut.

Before addressing your concerns, I would like to provide some background on the situation leading to the shutdown of the three Millstone units. The decline in safety performance at the Millstone facility during the past several years has been recognized and documented by the NRC staff. Declining performance has been a matter of discussion in NRC systematic assessment of licensee ~ performance (SALP) reports and the subject of discussion at NRC senior management meetings. During the last several years, there have been numerous and significant enforcement actions taken against Northeast Utilities (NU) for noncompliance with NRC's requirements. Although the NRC staff has pursued issues regarding performance problems at Millstone, the extent of the I performance problems and the ineffectiveness of NU's actions to correct the problems were not fully recognized by the NRC until recently.

The decision to shut down the Millstone plants was made by NU. Millstone Unit 1 shut down in November 1995 for the normally scheduled refueling outage; Millstone Unit 2 shut down in February 1996 because of concerns about I excessive suction strainer hole sizes in the containment sump screens; and Millstone Unit 3 shut down in March 1996 because of inoperable containment isolation valves in the auxiliary feedwater system. As the NRC staff became aware of NU's failures to address long-standing safety concerns, the NRC staff acted to put in place requirements that must be addressed before the Millstone units are restarted (Enclosure 1 contains the specific actions the staff has taken to address issues related to the Millstone site).

, Currently, the NRC's attention is focused on two areas of NU performance:

corrective actions and employee concerns. Because of concerns about the history of programmatic weakness and failures to implement effective corrective actions in the area of design and configuration control, the NRC staff identified a need for an independent review to verify the adequacy of NU's efforts. This effort was announced during the Chairman's visit on August 6, 1996, to the Millstone site. Second, because of concerns about the handling of employees' concerns about safety at Millstone, a senior l Headquarters manager led an evaluation of the history of how NU and the NRC

, have handled employee concerns and allegations related to licensed activities j at Mil; stone. These two areas are further discussed in the enclosure.

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NU has designated a recovery organization for each of the Millstone units to focus attention on action needed for plant startup. NRC's" oversight ~of the ,

restart of the Millstone plants will consist of several major elements, including the issues that have contributed to the decline in performance at all three plants. Salient concerns include communications (employee concerns), the corrective action program, procedural adherence and procedure upgrades, work planning and control, and operational enhancements.

. Before the startup of each of the Millstone units, the NRC will perform an operational safety team inspection (OSTI), which will be tailored to the restart of each unit. The OSTI will cover self-assessments by NU, NU's implementation of its startup plan, control room observations during the  !

approach to criticality and power ascension, selected system readiness 1 inspections, and observation of management oversight. The NRC staff has met and will continue to meet with representatives of NU and the public regarding )

the major elements of this restart process.

Effective November 3,1996, the NRC formed a Special Projects Office to focus on oversight, inspection, and licensing actions associated with the Millstone and Haddam Neck sites. The Special Projects Office will make a recommendation regarding restart. The staff will inform the Comission of the staff's and NU's restart activities through Comission papers or comunications to the NRC's Executive Director for Operations. The Comission will then vote on whether to approve the restart of each Millstone unit.

The NRC acknowledges concern about the potential effect of NRC regulatory actions on NU and the public. The mission of the NRC, as provided in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from radiological consequences of the use of nuclear power. The NRC is dedicating resources to ensure prompt reviews and response to requests regarding licensing actions related to restart of any of the Millstone units. The NRC staff will recomend to the Comission the restart of each unit at the earliest opportunity consistent with this mission. '

Regarding Haddam Neck, on July 22, 1996, the plant commenced a shutdown required by the Technical Specifications when it was discovered that the containment air recirculation fan service water piping may exceed design loads ,

during certain accident scenarios. Because of hardware and programatic I concerns identified before and during this forced outage, NU determined that the concerns should be resolved before restarting the plant. Because of the significant concerns noted by the NRC and NU, on August 9, 1996, the NRC issued a request for information regarding NU's basis for continued operation of Haddam Neck. NU has responded partially to this latest request. However, based on an economic analysis, the owners of Haddam Neck have decided, and recently announced on December 4, 1996, that the Haddam Neck plant will be retired and will not be restarted. The cost of fixing the hardware and programatic concerns that were required to be corrected before startup of the plant were not a significant factor in this decision.

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1 Regarding your conenent on assignment of a full-time person at the plants, in ~

1977 the NRC initiated a program to station resident inspectors at each nuclear power plant under construction and in operation. The NRC later expanded the program to provide at least two resident inspectors at each of the 71 nuclear power plant sites (Millstone currently has 6 resident inspectors). By assigning resident inspectors to reactor sites, the NRC significantly increased the agency's onsite monitoring of the plants. This increased monitoring provides a greater opportunity to ensure plant safety by

observing the licensee's activities, verifying the licensee's compliance with l 1

NRC's requirements, and responding to operational events at the plant. In l l addition, engineers and specialists from the NRC regional office and

! Headquarters perform ' periodic and special inspections that supplement the '

residentinspector's;effortsinawidevarietyoftechnicaldisciplines.

Finally, the reliability of the U.S. bulk electric power system is the  :

responsibility of the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and its regional councils. The Connecticut area is under the Northeast Power  !

Coordinating Council (NPCC). These councils monitor and evaluate the power l situations in their regions based on the availability of all power generation including nuclear plants. If they identify reliability problems, actions are taken to address the situation such as was done in Connecticut last spring and I summer. However, in some limited situations such as very hot weather, the '

actions required to maintain critical portions of the electric system may get  ;

to the point where power to some customers is temporarily cut off.  !

The U.S. Department of Energy has been heavily involved in investigating recent power events in the west, and in their August 2, 1996, report to President Clinton stated that the " current system of voluntary self-regulation with respect to reliability remains the best overall scheme for ensuring reliability in the future."

I trust this information is responsive to your concerns.

Sincerely, 1

f -

P O g, Office FrankofJ.Nuclear MiragliReactor

, Jr., Acting Regulation Director Docket Nos. 50-213, 50-245, 50-336, 50-423

Enclosure:

NRC Actions Regarding Millstone l

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NRC ACTIONS ADDRESSING COMPREHENSIVE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MILLSTONE EXPERIENCE l

Millstone-Snecific Actions -

In January 1996, a senior NRC regional manager was assigned to oversee l NRC's monitoring of Millstone operations. Similarly, at NRC '

Headquarters, a senior manager was assigned licensing responsibility solely for the Northeast Utilities (NU) plants. Additionally, the NRC increased the number of resident inspectors at Millstone from five to six.

• A senior Headquarters manager led an evaluation of the history of how NU and the NRC have handled employee concerns and allegations related to licensed activities at Millstone. The review included indepth case studies of selected employee concerns and allegations to identify root causes, common patterns among cases, and lessons learned. An independent NRC review has concluded that the work environment and l

failures of NU management are primary reasons for the continuing l employee concern problems at Millstone. Concurrent with issuing the NRC l

team's report, the NRC has issued an order that directs NU to devise and implement a comprehensive plan for handling safety concerns raised by Millstone employees and for ensuring a work environment free of-l retaliation and discrimination. Further, the members of the independent third-party organization must not have had any direct previous involvement with activities at the Millstone station, and the technical l qualifications of the team members' must be approved by the NRC, along l with NU's oversight plan. The NRC staff will review the team's report I anu NU's response to the team's findings for restart issues as well as 1 l for potential enforcement actions. I

• A senior Headquarters manager is leading an evaluation of the NU layoffs in January 1996. The group is examining whether there is any evidence i to suggest that employees engaged in protected activities were likely to have been discharged for raising concerns. This review is ongoing.

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• On December 13, 1995, the NRC issued a letter to the licensee for Millstone Unit I requiring it to inform the NRC, pursuant to Section 50.54(f) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reaulations (10 CFR 50.54 (f)), of actions it would be taking at Millstone Unit I to ensure that future operation of that facility would be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the plant's operating license, the Commission's regulations, and the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR). On February 22, 1996, the licensee issued Adverse Condition l Report 7007, " Event Response Team Report," which describes in detail the underlying causes for numerous inaccuracies contained in the UFSAR for Millstone Unit 1. On March 7 and April 4, 1996, the NRC issued similar letters to the licensee requiring it to inform the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), of actions it would be taking at Millstone Units 2 and 3 to ensure that future operation of the facilities would be conducted in

! accordance with the terms and canditions of each plant's operating I license, the Commission's regulations, and each plant's UFSAR. i r

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. In February 1996, the NRC staff informed NU that a special team l

inspection would be conducted at Millstone to evaluate the methods and processes NU had used to handle degraded and potentially nonconforming plant conditions, including issues affecting the operability of plant equipment. This effort focused on Millstone Units 2 and 3 but was expanded to include the Haddam Neck plant. The team's report that addrerssed concerns pertaining to Haddam Neck was issued on July 31,

! 1996. The report for Millstone was issued on September 20, 1996, i

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• In January 1996, the NRC placed the Millstone facility on NRC's " Watch List" as a Category 2 facility. Plants in this category have been l identified as having weaknesses that warrant increased NRC attention.

The NRC staff based its actions on the numerous problems identified by both the NRC and the licensee, associated NRC enforcement actions, and the repeated failure of the licensee's corrective action programs to prevent recurrence of these problems. In June 1996, at the direction of the Comission, the staff informed NU that the Millstone site had been designated a Category 3 facility. Plants in this category have significant weaknesses that warrant keeping the plant shut down until the licensee can demonstrate to the NRC that adequate programs have been established and implemented to ensure substantial improvement. A Category 3 rating would also require the NRC staff to obtain the Comission's approval by vote before the plant can restart.

• To ensure that the NRC restart review efforts provide objective measures of restart readiness for each Millstone unit, the NRC staff will follow the process outlined in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, " Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval." This process will provide assurance that the Millstone units can meet NRC regulations and requirements. If the Comission approves restart, each unit will be placed on the Watch List in Category 2, where they will remain until they have demonstrated that satisfactory performance can be sustained.

• Because of concerns about the history of programatic weakness and failures to implement effective corrective actions in the area of design and configuration control, the NRC staff identified a need for an independent review to verify the adequacy of the licensee's efforts. On August 13, 1996, the licensee submitted its plan and comitment for an independent review. On August 14, 1996, the NRC staff issued the Confirmatory Order Establishing an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP), which confirmed the licensee's comitment to conduct this independent review for each of the Millstone units.

• The NRC has established a Special Projects Office within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to oversee inspection and licensing activities at the Millstone site. In addition to licensing and inspection activities, the Special Projects Office will be responsible for (1) oversight of the ICAVP, (2) oversight of NU's corrective actions related to safety issues involving employee concerns, and (3) inspections necessary to implement NRC's oversight of the plant's restart activities.

Generic Actions "

The staff reviewed the current licensing basis for the spent fuel pool decay heat removal system and the core offloading practices at all operating reactor facilities. On the basis of the information collected and reviewed, the specific actions taken by the licensees, and the commitments made during this review, the NRC staff concluded that the refueling operating practices are consistent with the licensing basis for the spent fuel pool decay heat removal systems at all plants, or l

will be consistent before the next refueling outage. However, in its survey, the staff determined that licensees of 9 sites (involving 15 units) needed to modify their licensing bases or plant practices to ensure that their refueling practices are clearly within the analytic bounds described in each facility's UFSAR. This finding indicates that these plants may have performed refueling operations that were inconsistent with their licensing basis. As a resuit, the staff is I evaluating the need for enforcement action, as appropriate, to address the instances of noncompliance with the UFSAR.

The staff is reviewing the adequacy of NRC's regulatory guidance for changes made to facilities and their operations to ensure that future ,

operations are conducted in accordance with regulations governing the  ;

changes made without prior staff approval. j The staff is conducting a broad-based review of program and inspection l guidance associated with oversight of the UFSAR, nonconforming  ;

conditions related to the UFSAR,10 CFR 50.59 evaluations, and licensee l corrective action verification. l 1

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l Regarding your comment on assignment of a full-time person at the plants, in 1977 the NRC' initiated a program to-station resident inspectors at each nuclear po'wer' plant under. construction and in operation. The NRC later exps.nded the program to-provide at least two resident inspectors at each of l the 71 nuclear power plant sites (Millstone currently has 6 resident

! inspectors). By assigning resident inspectors to reactor sites, the NRC l significantly increased the agency's onsite monitoring of the plants. This l increased monitoring provides a greater opportunity to ensure plant safety by l observing the licensee's activities, verifying the licensee's compliance with ,

l NRC's requirements,.and responding to operational events at the plant. In l addition, engineers and specialists from the NRC regional office and l l Headquarters perform periodic and special inspections that supplement the I resident inspector's efforts in a wide variety of technical disciplines.  !

Finally, the reliability of the U.S. bulk electric power system is the l responsibility of the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and l its regional councils. The Connecticut area is under the Northeast Power l Coordinating Council (NPCC). These councils monitor and evaluate the poner l situations in their regions based on the availability of all power generation i including nuclear plants. If they identify reliability problems, actions are l taken to address the situation such as was done in Connecticut last spring and i

summer. However, in some limited situations such as very hot weather, the l actions required to maintain critical portions of the electric system may get l to the point where power to some customers is temporarily cut off.

The U.S. Department of Energy has been heavily involved in investigating i

recent power events in the west, and in their August 2, 1996, report to President Clinton stated that the " current system of voluntary self-regulation with respect to reliability remains the best overall scheme for ensuring l reliability in the future."

1 trust this information is responsive to your concerns.

l Sincerely, l

[ original signed by F. Gillespie) l l

l l C Frank J. Miraglia, Jr., Acting Director l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l Docket Nos. 50-213, 50-245, i 50-336, 50-423 l

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Enclosure:

NRC Actions Regarding l Millstone

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DOCUMENT NAME: G:\ANDERSEN\ GREEN'.8'06 *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE**See attached.

Ta rot,elve a copy of this clocument, Indicate in the box: "C* = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure *N* = No copy 0FFICE SP0:PM l PD2-2:LA- l

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, NAME JAndersen* LBerry* BCalure JLM* PMcKee*

DATE 11 15 96 / g 0FFICE SP0:D- A NRR:DD (# \ ED0- OCM NAME BTravers* ' s fMiraglikf. ,f JTaylor* **

DATE 11/18/96 ll/20/96/'//hd2/02/96 12/23/96

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!FROMt DUE: 11/ 6'/96 '

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DOC DT: 08/09/96 l

g(, { gt[p FINAL REPLY:

Francis J. Limerick l Manchester, CT j ll4 )

TO President Clinton l

l FOR SIGNATURE OP : ** PRI **

CRC NO: 96-1096 I Miraglia l {

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! NORTHEAST UTILITIES PLANTS Taylor  !

Milhoan

! Thompson Blaha '

HMiller, RI DATE: 10/24/96

!ASSIGNEDTO: CONTACT:

NRR Miraglia

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIO S is.

Put EDO and Chairman on for concurrence. '

Chairman's Office to review response prior i to dispatch.

ACTION

! NRR RECEIVED: OCTOBER 24, 1996 NRR ACTION: DRPE:VARGA DUE TO NRR DIRECTOR'S OFFl"-

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET PAPER NUMBER: CRC-96-1096 LOGGING DATE: Oct 22 96 ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHOR: FRANCIS IMERICK AFFILIATION: CONNECTICUT l

l ADDRESSEE: PRESIDENT CLINTON i

LETTER DATE: Aug 8 96 FILE CODE:

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SUBJECT:

NORTHEAST UTILITIES PLANTS l ACTION: Direct Reply l DISTRIBUTION: CHAIRMAN SPECIAL HANDLING: SECY TO ACK CONSTITUENT:

NOTES: WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED 10/18/96 FM SUE

, SMITH CHAIRMAN SHOULD REVIEW PRIOR TO DISPATCH DATE DUE: Nov 6 96

SIGNATURE

. DATE SIGNED:

AFFILIATION:

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