ML20127D424

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Requests Investigation of Info Recieve That Unknown Individual(S) Tampered W/Valve on Liquid Poison Controls Sys of Plant & Licensee Failed to Rept Event & Falsified Records to Support Termination of Suspected Employee
ML20127D424
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/29/1987
From: Davis A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Pawlik E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20127C592 List:
References
FOIA-92-252 NUDOCS 9301150219
Download: ML20127D424 (7)
v • d • e


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MEMORANDUM FOR: Eugene 1. Pawlik, Director, Office of Investigations field Of fice, Region til IROM: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region 111

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SUBJEC1: REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION Consumers Power Company 50-155 licensee / Vendor /Appilcant Docket No.

BgRockPoint faciIily or Site Location A. Bert Davis M 2 9 OOI Regional Administrator Date A. Request What is the matter that is being requested for investigation (be as specific as possible regarding the underlying incident).

Region !!! received information that unknown individual (s) tampered with a valve on the liquid poison control system of the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant, further, the Consumers Power Company failed to report the event and falsified records in order to support the termination of the employee suspected of doing the tampering.

The Region 111 inspection disclosed that tampering had occurred; however, the valve in question was still operable but in a degraded state.

Therefore, the inspection concluded that the tampering incident was not reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71. The Region III inspection showed, that while the matter was not reportable to the NRC, the Consumers Power Company review of the matter was less than adequate.

The deficient Consumers Power Company review and evaluation of this tampering incident is being handled through a Management Meeting which will be conducted separately from the matter to be investigated.

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l Review of work related documents for the valve and interviews during the  !

Region 111 inspection showed the documents accurately addressed known  ;

work performed on the valve and their were no indication of record I falsification. The Region Ill inspection concluded:

The valve on the liquid poison controls system was tampered with '

by person / person (s) unknown. One person was suspected, but his involvement in the tampering could not be proven, or disproven.

  • The matter was not reported to the NRC, but as matter did not rise to the level where reporting was required under 10 CFR 73.71,  ;

However, the Consumers Power Company review of the matter was inadequate.

B. Puy ose of Investigation <

l. What wrongdoing is suspected; explain the basis for this view (be as specific as possible).

A valve in the liquid poison system, a safety related systein, was i tampered with at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant. Information was developed indicating that a Consumers Power employee may have loosened packing gland bolts on that valve following his notification of a pending job reassignment. Also that employee wrote graffiti on the walls of the plant in the general vicinity of the valve. In addition the employee was overheard making a verbal -threat to damage a valve in the plant. Region 111 has inspected the matter, after initial coordination with the FBI and OI: Rill, and determined that this employee is a logical suspect. However, the employee's culpability could not be proven, or disproven. -Further, the employee denied damaging the valve. The Office of Investigations is requested to coordinate an investigation of the matter, with the federal Bureau of Investigation to determine if an employee intentionally damaged the valve.

2. What are the potential regulatory requirements that may have been violated?

Section 236b of the Atomic Energy Act (Sabotage of Nuclear i facilities or fuel).

3. If no violation is suspected, what is the specific regulatory concern? - - - - -----:

See above.

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4. If allegations are involved, is there a view that the allegation  ;

occurred? Likely occurred x , not sure . If Likely, '

explain.

While someone did tamper with the valve in question, it is not readily apparent whether the accused person did the tampering or ,

some other person, who has yet to be identified. l C. Requestor's Priority

1. Is the priority of the investigation high, normal, or low?

Normal (Normal-0,-January 10, 1986 Staff Requirements. SECY-85-369)- .

The " Normal" priority is also based on information indicating the Federal Bureau of Investigation is considering an investigation of the matter.

2. What is the estimated date when the results of the investigation are needed?

January 1988.

3. What is the basis for the date and the impact of not meeting this-date? (For example, is there an immediate safety issue that must be addressed or are the results r.ecessary to resolve any ongoing regulatory issue and if so, what actions are dependent on the-outcome of the investigat;c. ')

The date was selected based ,,n the six month period described in the January 10, 1986 Staf f Uquirements Paper, SECY-85-369, _

" Threshold and Priorities for Conducting Investigations," No immediate' safety issue exists since the valve was repaired, the

, accused person has been denied access to the plant and no other tampering incidents have occurred since February 1987.

D. Contact 1, Staff members:

J. R. Creed, Chief, Safeguards and Security Section (FTS 388-5643)

G. L. Pirtle, Security Inspector (FTS 388-5640)

2. Allegers identification.with address and telephone number if not confidential. (Indicate if any confidential sources are involved and who may be contacted for the identifying details.)

Alleger's identity can be obtained from C. H. Weil, Region III Allegation Coordinator (FTS 388-5535).

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f. Other Relevant Information See the enclosed Briefing Paper.

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A. Bert avis Regional Administrator

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Enclosure:

Briefing Paper (CONTAINS MATERIAL EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER 10 CFR 2.790(a)(5)(7))

cc w/ enclosure:

T. H. Hurley, NRR R. M. Bernero, 14 MSS-J. M. Taylor, DEDROGR J. Lieberman, OE J. Goldberg, OGC P. 3. Hayes, 01 w-6JSu dy + w fuBLISA l y off7/[0 M tl

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BRIEFING PAPER 81G ROCK POINT VALVE TAMPERING

  • Allegation received by R111 on April 9, 1987. Allegation in reference to valve (CV4050) included:

- Sabotage of valve not reported to NRC. t

- Records pertaining to work performed on the valve were falsified by CPCo to enable them to fabricate a case for firing the alleger.

  • SRI and G. Pirtle assigned to investigate the allegation.

- SRI initiated actions on April 10, 1987.

- Pirtle's onsite investigation initiated on April 20, 1987.

- Preliminary investigation completed on June 22, 1987.

  • Investigation actions in reference to valve CV4050 (poison control. system) showed following chronology of events, feDruary 4, 29e/ - valve was functional.

February 4, 1987 - Lube plug on valve broken on.

F ebrua ry 5-6, 1987- A11eger has verbal confrontation with supervisors. Also writes grafatti in RPR. Verbal confrontations and grafatti caused from having to end job earlier than expected because of reaching radiation exposure limits during the. outage.

This angered the alleger. First workman works on lube plug of valve in the afternoon or evening of February 6, 1987.

Can't complete repair. A11eger works on valve late february 6 and early februar'y 7,1987. Completes work on lube plug and notes possible crack in valve body. About rnidnight on february 6,1987, alleger overheard making a verbal threat to " drill through a valve disc".

february 7, 1957 - Valve checked by A0 a couple hours af ter alleger corepletes work. A0 overheard threat,-does not report it to management.

A0 does not notice any irregularities during visual check of the valve. A11eger leaves site and Charlevioux area, the morning of February 7, 1987.

- No known work performed on valve CV4050 between february 7 and 12, 1987.

february 12, 1987 - NDI team checks valve morning of February 12, 1987 in response to alleger's noted possible crack on valve body.

Can't perform NOT because of liquid on the valve I;0T notifies site maintenance.

- Maintenance determines valve leaking because of two loose

, nuts on valve packing gland. Nuts backed off to end of I threads.

- Maintenance tightens nuts on valve packing gland.

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- NDT completes testing on valve body.

f*h d Determines valve body was not cracked, february 13,1987 - A11eger's site access withdrawn based on verbal confrontation and grafatti, february 20, 1987 - Alleger's employment terminated based on verbal confrontation and grafatti. SRI advised of termination because of alleger's confrontations and grafatti.

March 18, 1987 - Employment termination challenged by grievance. Presidential hearing held March 18, 1987. At that time licensee management cites verbal confrontations, grafatti, and threat against the valve as grounds for termination. Also strongly implies that the alleger carried out a threat to damage a valve that could impact on plant operations and jeopardize the plant operating license. Termination of alleger supported during Presidential Hearing. Further appeal expected.

June 22, 1987 - HQ IAT notified of preliminary results, asked to coordinate with TBI to determine if they want to initiate a case or decline investigation.

June 26, 1987 - Detroit of fice of FBI notified of preliminary investigation results. Information provided to FBI agent for a referral report to Washington, D.C.

June 27, 1987 - Periodic contact with HQ IAT (J. Davidson) on FBI decision.

Latest contact disclosed that FBI /DOJ is still reviewing the case for possible investigation. J. Creed encouraging HQ IAT to encouragc TEI initiation cf a case.

  • Investigation " Preliminary" findings / conclusions.

- Valve CV4050 was tampered with between February 8 - 12, 1987 by person or persons unknown. Maintenance performed on the valve does not explain loose packing gland hold down plate.

- Valve would function if challenged but in a degraded mode.

Contamination of area would occur.

- Loose packing gland hold-down plate would have been detected during hydro-testing and start-up testing for the plant af ter the outage.

- Overheard verbal threat against the valve was not reported to management until February 19, 1987 (12 days after occurrence).

- Licensee f ailed to initiate an investigation of the event

( Actions were perfunctory). No one but plant manager was aware of alj of the circumstances involving the incident.

Neither plant nor corporate security advised. Management preoccupied with adverse personnel action. Failed to recognize the significance of D ent.

- SRI not advised of degraded mode of valve and licensee's-perspective presented at Presidential Hearing.

- Licensee ill prepared to effectively cope with or respond to future tampering events (lack of procedures for such events).

- Haintenance records pertaining to work performed on the valve were not falsified.

- Possible violation for not reporting valve tampering incident.

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  • Proposed Actions

- Continue coordination with FBI. Try to get an early acceptance / declination of FBI investigation.

- Af ter FBI detennination, contact licensee, have exit meeting, and then have management meeting to address management weaknesses noted during the investigation.

- If FBI initiates case, coordinate with them to assure none of our actions will hinder their investigation.

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