ML20127D066

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Discusses Region III Followup on Allegation RIII-87-A-0042 Re Vital Equipment Tampering at Plant
ML20127D066
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/22/1988
From: Davis A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Malsch M, Jenny Murray, Taylor J
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO), NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
Shared Package
ML20127C592 List:
References
FOIA-92-252 NUDOCS 9301150083
Download: ML20127D066 (3)


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t MEMORANDUM FOR: James H. Taylor, Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations Martin G. Malsch, Deputy General Counsel for Licensing and Regulation, Office of the General Counsel James P. Murray, Deputy General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement, Office of the General Counsel FROM: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III

SUBJECT:

VITAL EQUIPMENT TAMPERING EVENT AT BIG ROCK POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Several issues requiring NRC management resolution have been identified through Region III followup on an equipment tampering allegation regarding the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant (BRP). That allegation is identified in the Allegation Management System as File No. RIII-87-A-0042.

On April 9,1987, Region III received an allegation concerning a valve en the liquid poison system. Allegedly the valve was tampered with and the BRP failed to report the tampering. Region III imediately confirmed the operability of the subject valve and initiated followup activities. Concurrently, the. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the NRC Office of Investigations (01) were notified. The Region III preliminary followup of the allegation was completed on June 22, 1987. At that time, we had circumstantial information indicating that the individual suspected by the licensee had in fact tampered with the valve, and no other tampering incidents have occurred since that individual

. was removed from the site. The FBI and 01 were again contacted. On July 29, 1987, the results of these activities led me to request-the Office of Investigations Region III Field Office (01:RIII) perform an investigation to conclusively determine what individual (s) tampered with the valve at BRP.

01:RIII coordinated with the FBI on this matter. In October 1987 the FBI on advice from the Department of Justice (D0J) declined investigation of the matter due to a lack of prosecutive merit. D0J did advise, however, that they would readdress their decision if an 01:RIII investigation disclosed evidence of willfulness.

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T Multiple Addressees 2 In late 1987, Conmissioner Robert's legal assistant questioned the authority of 01:RIII to perform the BRP investigation because there did not appear to be a potential civil violation; only criminal sanctions are prescribed in the Atomic Energy Act, Section 236b. , for this type of issue. The regulations at 10 CFR 73 deal only with " radiological sabotage," a term defined at 10 CFR 73.2(p) and apparently not met in this tampering event because there was no potential radiological hazard to members of the general public. This tampering could have resulted in additional radiation exposure to plant radiation workers. On January 27, 1988, 01:RIII administratively closed its investigation due to the restriction placed on their authority regarding criminal investigations.

This event raises four issues requiring resolution:

1. Does the phrase in 10 CFR 73.2(p), " endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation," include plant radiation workers?

If so, there may be basis for 01 investigation of this matter since a civil violation may have occurred.

2. If not, there appears to be a gap in our regulations concerning prohibition of equipment tampering. A memorandum dated April 1, 1988, was sent to James Partlow addressing this issue.

1 We have ;ome assurance through circumstantial information and a lack of recurrence of tampering that the individual responsible for the tampering has been identified and denied access to the facility. Nwever, this issue has not been thoroughly investigated and may warrenc further review to confirm that the proper individual (s) have been identified.

4. Once the responsible individual (s) has been identified, we have no mechanism to insure that the individual (s) will not resurface at another nuclear facility.

I and members of my staff are available to discuss and assist in resolution of these issues.

If you have any questions, please call me or Jack Grobe of my staff.

A. Bert Davis O Regional Administrator Enclpsur ConJalps SAFfGUA S .lHf0RMit9N

Enclosures:

See Attached List fponS 76tiodTh'Is/

Pase I decontfflied See Attached Distribution RIII RIII a sw RIII R RI{y aro /kst/jr W(r a BWson a

NIANJi s Pa@fiello Davis 4/77/88 4/b /88 4/yy/88 4/ p/88 4/M/88 4/ /88

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Multiple Addressee 3 List of Enclosures jnclosures:Memo dtd 7/29/87, 1.

A. B. Davis to E. T. Pawlik

2. Ltr dtd 9/4/87, J. A. Hind to F.W. Buckman (UNCLASSIFIED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION)

/3. Memo dtd 9/4/87 E. T. Pawlik to A. B. Davis

-4. Note dtd 10/13/87, J. Davidson to J. Creed (10 CFR 2.790 INFORMATION)

4. Memo dtd 10/15/o7, J. Davidson to Multiple Addressees

, (10 CFR 2.790 INFORMATION)

'6. Memo dtd 10/28/87, E. T. Pawlik to A. B. Davis M. Memo dtd 1/27/88, E. T. Pawlik to A. B. Davis

4. Memo dtd 2/5/88, J. A. Grobe to B. S. Mallett M. Memo dtd 4/1/88, C. E. Norelius to J. G. Partlow d.Memodtd4/1/88, B. S. Mallett to J. A. Grobe Distribution _:

cc w/ enclosures w/o UNCLASSIFIED SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION:

T. E. Murley, NRR J. G. Partlow, NRR J. Lieberman, OE L. J. Chandler, 0GC B. B. Hayes, 01 E. T. Pawlik, Rlll C. E. Norelius, R!ll B. S. Mallett, Rlli J. A. Grobe, Rill C. H. Weil, Rill Enc}c[u Contpl~% n SAFEGtlArt S ltdORMATIO Upon Sefaraflon Th

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