ML20127C689

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Provides Info Re Allegation RIII-87-A-0042, Valve Tampering at Big Rock Point, to Keep Staff Apprised of follow-up Contacts W/Alleger
ML20127C689
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/10/1987
From: Weil C
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Hind J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20127C592 List:
References
FOIA-92-252 NUDOCS 9301140303
Download: ML20127C689 (5)
v • d • e


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  • . . . ' . + yl)N 101937 MEMORANDUM FOR: Jack A. Hind, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards FROM: Charles H. Weil, Investigation and Compliance Specialist

SUBJECT:

ALLEGATION RE: VALVE TAMPERING AT BIG ROCK POINT (50-155)

( AMS NO. Rlll-87-A-0042)

Reference:

Memoranda Dated April 20 and 30, 1987, Same Subject The referenced memoranda forwarded an allegation of valve tampering and possible record falsification following the identification of the suspected tampering at the Big Rock Point Plant. On May 4, 1987, the alleger was interviewed by the Region -III Staf f and a transcript of that interview was made (Enclosure 1). The transcript was subsequently reviewed by the Region 111 Staff and certain corrections were noted (Enclosure 2).

Additionally, the Region 111 Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff reviewed the transcript and identified the following issues within the transcript:

1. Alleger's background (Tr 5).
2. Consumers Power Company did not report the alleged sabotage to the NRC (TR 9,14, 88).
3. Record f alsification (Tr 9, 37, 64).
4. Alarms and access to high radiation doors (Tr 14, 50)
5. Prior maintenance had stripped the threads on a valve lubrication plug (Tr 22).
6. Poor work planning caused ALARA concern (Tr 60).
7. Proper sized anti-contamination clothing was not available (Tr 64).
8. Threats made by the alleger against his supervisors (Tr 66).
9. Alleger's participation in plant graf fiti (Tr 72).
10. An "of f the record" concern (Tr 91). (Alsc, see Allegation No. Rlll-87-A-0082.)

The above information is provided in order to keep your staff apprised of follow-up contacts with the alleger.

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BRIErlNG PAPER BIG ROCK POINT VALVE TAMPERING e Allegation received by Rlli on April 9, 1987. Allegation in reference to valve (CV4050) included:

- Sabotage of valve not reported to NRC.

- Records pertaining to work performed on the valve were f alsified by CPCo to enable them to fabricate a case for firing the alleger.

  • SRI and G. Pirtle assigned to investigate the allegation.

- SRI initiated actions on April 10, 1987.

- Pirtle's onsite investigation initiated on April 20, 1987.

- Preliminary investigation completed on June 22, 1987.

  • Investigation actions in reference to valve CV4050 (poison control system) showed following chronology of events.

February 1. 1967 - Vaive was functional.

february 4, 1987 - Lube plug on-valve broken on, february 5-6, 1987- Alleger has verbal confrontation with supervisors. Also writes grafatti in RPR. Verbal confrontations and grafatti caused f rom having to end job earlier than expected because of reaching radiation exposure limits during the outage.

This angered the alleger. first workman works on lube plug '

of valve in the af ternoon or evening of february 6,1987.

Can't complete repair. Alleger works on valve late february 6 and early February 7, 1987. Completes work on lobe plug and notes possible crack in valve body. About midnight on f ebruary 6,1987, alleger overheard making a verbal threat to " drill through a valve disc".

February 7, 1987 - Valve checked by A0 a couple hours af ter alleger completes work. A0 overheard threat, does not report it to management.

A0 does not notice any irregularities during visual check of the valve. Alleger leaves site and Charlevioux area, the morning of February 7,1987.

- No known work performed on valve CV4050 between february 7 and 12, 1987.

February 12, 1987 - NDT team checks valve morning of February 12, 1987 in response to alleger's noted possible crack on valve body.

Can't perform ND1 because of liquid on the valve NOT notifies site maintenance.

- Maintenance determines valve leaking because of two loose nuts on valve packing gland. Nuts backed off to end of threads.

- Maintenance tightens nuts on valve packing gland.

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- NDT completes testing on valve body.p.a,:,Yefe'rminesvalvebodywas not cracked, february 13,1987 - A11eger's site access withdrawn based on verbal confrontation and grafatti. ,

february 20, 1987 - A11eger's employment terminated based on verbal. confrontation and grafatti. SRI advised of termination because of alleger's confrontations and grafatti, j March 18, 1987 - Employment termination challenged by grievance. Presidential  !

hearing held March 18, 1987, At that time licensee management-cites verbal confrontations, grafatti, and threat against the valve as grounds for termination. Also strongly implies that  ;

the alleger carried out a threat to damage a valve that could ,

impact on plant operations and jeopardize the plant operating license. Termination of alleger supported during Presidential Hearing, further appeal expected.

June 22, 1987 - HQ IAT notified of preliminary results, asked to coordinate with fbi to determine if they want to initiate a case or decline investigation.

June 26, 1987 - Detroit of fice of FBI notified of preliminary investigation results. Information provided to FBI agent for a referral report to Washington, D.C.

June 27, 1987 - Periodic contact with HQ IAT (J. Davidson) on FBI decision.

Latest contact disclosed that FBI /DOJ is still reviewing the.

case for possible investigation. J. Creed encouraging HQ IAT to encourage FBI initiation of a case.

  • Investigation " Preliminary" findings / conclusions.

- Valve CV4050 was tampered with between february 4 - 12, 1987 by person or persons unknown. Maintenance performed on the valve does not explain loose packing gland hold down plate,

- Valve would function if challenged but in a degraded mode.

Contamination of area would occur.

- Loose packing gland hold-down plate would have been detected during hydro-testing and start-up testing for the plant af ter the outage. ,

- Overheard verbal threat against the valve was not reported -

to management until february 19, 1987 (12 days after occurrence).

- Licensee failed to initiate an investigation of the event-(Actions were perfunctory). No one but plant manager was aware of all of the circumstances involving the incident.

Neither pWnt nor corporate security advised. Management preoccupied with adverse personnel action, failed to recognize the significance-of event.

- SRI not advised of degraded mode of valve and licensee's perspective presented at Presidential Hearing. __

- Licensee ill prepared to effectively cope with or respond to i future tampering events (lack of procedures for such events).

- Maintenance records pertaining to work performed on the valve were not falsified.

- Possible violation for not reporting valve tampering incident, a

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  • Proposed Actions

- Continue coordination with fBl. Try to get an early acceptance / declination-of FBI investigation.

- After fB1 determination, contact licensee, have exit meeting, and then have management meeting to address management weaknesses noted during the investigation.

- If FBI initiates case, coordinate with them to assure none of our actions will hinder their investigation.

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