ML20127C782
| ML20127C782 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1987 |
| From: | Weil C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Pawlik E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127C592 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-92-252 NUDOCS 9301140332 | |
| Download: ML20127C782 (1) | |
Text
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GL ( 4 ( L t V N it t #Notf. 40137 AUG 3 1987 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Eugene T. Pawlik, Director, Office of Investigations Field Of fice, Region !!!
FROM:
Charles H. Weil, Investigation and Compliance Specialist
SUBJECT:
INVESTIGATION OF VALVE TAMPERING INCIDENT AT BIG ROCK POINT (DOCKET NO 50-155)
( AMS NO, Rlll-87-A-0042)
Reference:
Memorandum dated July 29, 1987, A. Bert Davis to Eugene T. Pawlik The referenced memorandum requested the Office of Investigations to initiate an investigation into an alleged valve tarnpering incident at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant.
Enclosed for your information and use during the investigation is a memorandum in which the Region 111 staff discussed several s
inconsistencies in the information provided by the alleger to Region 111.
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Charles H. Weil Investigation and Compliance Specialist
Enclosure:
Memo did 7/30/87, G. L. Pirtle to B. A. Berson cc w/ enclosure:
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U. S. HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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Report tio. LO-155/87010(DR55)
Dociet tio. 50-155 License No. OPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 f acility fiane: Big Rock Point tiuclear Power Plant inspection At:
Big Rock Point Charlevoix, Michigan Inspection Conducted: April 9 through July 21, 1987 onsite and at the NRC Region 111 Office.
Panagement Meeting Conducted: August 6, 1987 in NRC Region 111 Office Type of Inspection:
Special Allegation Review Date of Previous Security Related Inspection:
May 26 through June 11, 1987
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Date Pesident inspector, Big Rock Point Reviewed By:
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Inspection Summary
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i Inspection on April 9 through August 6,1987-(Report No. 50-155/87010(DRSS))
i Areas fnspected:
Special inspection pertaining to alleged sabotage of a safety-related valve and the licensee's failure to report the sabotage to the NRC; alleged falsification of records pertaining to work performed:en the valve; and an employee allegedly wrongfully accused of writing threatening graf fiti within the plant.
Results: The allegations were not substantiated.
However, the inspection concluded that a valve was tampered with.
The tampering did not have the potential for a " radiological sabotage" event as defined in 10 CFR 73.2(p) and therefore did not require formal reporting under criteria contained in 10 CFR 73.7)(c).
The inspection did not disclose evidence of record falsification as alleged. Additionally, the inspection concluded that an identified plant employee had written threatening graffiti within the plant.
Several weaknesses were noted in the licensee's planning and capabilities to adequately resolve equipment tampering events.
They must be addressed and resolved by the licensee to assure adequate actions are taken for any future equipment tampering events.
Details of the weaknesses are included as an attachment to the inspection report and are considered as Unclassified-Safeguards Information until they are corrected.
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UN s...g DETAILS 1.
Key Persons Contacted
- 40. Hof fman, Plant Superintendent Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
- T. E1 ward, Plant Superintendent, CPCo 4R. Abel, Production and Performance Superintendent, CPCo 4W. Trubilowicz, Operations Superintendent, CPCo
- T. Bordine, Licensing Representative, CPCo
- B. Alexander, Technical Engineer and NRC Liaison Representative, CPCo
- H. Cooper, Corporate Security Director, CPCo
+S. Kiss, Corporate Property Protection Supervisor, CPCo
- J. Bradshaw, Site Property Protection Supervisor, CPCo
+1. Dugan, Site Property Protection Operations Supervisor, CPCo
+D. Kelly, Maintenance Supervisor, CPCo
+J. White, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor, Field Maintenance Services (FMS) - West, CPCo 4G. Root, FMS - West Supervisor, CPCo S. Guthrie, Senior Resident Inspector, US NRC, Region 111 In addition to the key personnel noted above,13 other personnel were interviewed in person or by telephone during the investigation of the allegations.
These personnel included a vendor representative for the valve manufacturer and a representative of the packing gland material vendor; personnel who physically worked on Valve CV4050 between-February 6-7, 1987; auxiliary operators who removed and restored the valve
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to service; shif t supervisor who prepared the work request for *.he valve; Radiation Chemistry personnel; and a Non-Destructive Test (NDT) technician that checked Valve CV 4050. The plus (+) denotes licensee management personnel interviewed in person or by telephone in reference to the allegations. Approximately 27 separate interviews were conducted during the investigation.
The asterisk (*) denotes those management personnel present during the Management Meeting conducted on August 6, 1987. During the investigation, the Plant Superintendent position was assumed by Mr. T. Elward.
Mr. D. Hoffman was the Plant Superintendent at the time the investigation was initiated. Names of personnel identified in the allegations are not included in the Report Details to protect their rights to personal privacy.
2.
Entrance and Exit Meeting (MC 30703) a.
On April 21, 1987, the Plant Superintendent was informed of the purpose of the inspection. The specific allegations were not identified to the licensee, but they were advised that the allegations pertained to activities which occurred durine the December 1986 - March 1987 plant refueling outage involving a safety-related valve and actions involving a Fuel Maintenance g..,.
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A single point of licensee contact to assist in providing documents and arranging for interviews was identified during the entrance meeting,
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b.
An exit reeting was held in conjunction with a Management Pecting conducted at the tiRC Region 111 office on August 6,1987.
The licensee representatives were advised of the three specific allegations and our tentative conclusions (refer to Section 3 for details),
perceived management weaknesses in the site management's response to the potential valve tampering event were discussed in detail and are addressed in the attachment to this report (refer to Section 4 for further information).
3.
Investigation - Allegation Review (lp 99014)
The f ollowing information, provided in the form of allegations, was reviewed by the inspectors as specifically noted below:
a.
Bad oround:
(Closed) Allegation No. Rlll-87-A-0042. The NRC kic Tlin~ TIT of fice received information on April 9,1987 involving g
three allegations. The allegations were:
(1) a safety-related valve was allegedly sabotaged and the event was not reported to the NRC; (2) work records pertaining to the valve were allegedly falsified, and (3) a plant employee was allegedly wrongly accused of writing threatening graffiti within the plant.
The licensee was contacted on April 9, 1987 and advised that we had e
received infornation that Valve CV 4050 was allegedly sabotaged.
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plant was scheduled for a short-term shutdown on April 10, 1987 to check on leakage within the Recirculating pump Room (RpR). The licensee stated that they would inspect Valve CV 4050 during the plant shutdown.
The inspection of the valve was completed on April 10, 1987 and no deficiencies were noted.
The Senior Residcnt inspector (SRI) initiated the inspection pertaining to the allegations on April 10, 1987 A Region based security specialist augmented the SRI's ongoing inspection with an onsite visit beginning on April 21, 1987. A subsequent onsite visit was conducted between May 5-8, 1987. All pertinent facts were gathered by July 21, 1987.
The licensee was contacted by telephone on July 21, 1987 and advised that a Management Meeting was requested for August 6, 1987 at the NRC Region 111 office to discuss the investigation results and management weaknesses noted during the investigation, b.
The specific allegations, NRC review actions, and conclusions are addressed below and in the attachment to this report.
(1) Allegation:
A safety-related valve (CV 4050) was sabotaged TnTebruary 1987 and the licensee failed to report the sabotage event to the NRC.
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NRC Review:
Interview results and record reviews showed the
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Ellowing chronology of events pertaining to Valve CV 4050
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within the Recirculating Pump Room:
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January 1, 1987 By personal observation, Valve CV 4050 was determined by an onsite maintenance supervisor to be free from any defects.
No deficiencies with the lubrication pipe or packing gland hold down plate were noted.
The person inspecting the valve was very confident.that loose nuts on the packing gland hold down plate or leakage from the valve would have been noticed by him.
February 4, 1987 Field Maintenance Service (FMS) workmen accidentally break lubrication pipe on Valve CV 4050 while standing on the valve trying to reach another valve at a higher elevation. This resulted in water spraying from the lubrication pipe area of the valve.
Maintenance request (No. 6) was prepared by shif t supervisor to have lubrication 91pe on valve CV 4050 replaced.
At 0020 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> (12:20 a.m.) site personnel initiated switching and tagging order to remove Valve CV 4050 from service.
February 5, 1987 FMS Supervisor enters the recirculating pump room between 1444 to 1459 hours0.0169 days <br />0.405 hours <br />0.00241 weeks <br />5.551495e-4 months <br /> (2:44 to 2:59 p.m.) to check valve for repairs.
Switching and tagging for Valve CV 4050 was completed by auxiliary operators.
Lubrication pipe was broken off to drain line so repairs could be initiated.
February 6, 1987 Entry into RPR was made by a FM$ repairman between 1047 to 1154 hours0.0134 days <br />0.321 hours <br />0.00191 weeks <br />4.39097e-4 months <br /> (10:47 to 11:54 a.m.) to start repair of lubrication pipe on Valve CV 4050.
Repairs did not stop leakage and followup repairs were needed and identified on Maintenance Request No. 6, and carried over to maintenance request No. 7.
This repairman stated during interviews that the valve was also leaking above the lubrication pipe (packing gland -
is located above lubrication-pipe) and that he told his supervisor about the Icakage.
The FMS supervisor did not recall being informed of the additional leak. -The
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(This discrepancy could not be. resolved during the investigation. Maintenance Request No. 6 does not indicate additional leakage on the valve.
" Leakage past plug" was noted on the maintenance request).
About 2057 hours0.0238 days <br />0.571 hours <br />0.0034 weeks <br />7.826885e-4 months <br /> (8:57 p.m.) a second FMS repairman enters RPR to initiate repairs on the lubrication pipe of Valve CV 4050.
He leaves the RPR about 2140 hours0.0248 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00354 weeks <br />8.1427e-4 months <br /> (9:40 p.m.).
About 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br /> (11 p.m.) two site employees overhear a verbal threat by the second repairman working on Valve CV 4050 that he was going to drill through a valve disc. Neither employee advised site management of the verbal threat.
About 2354 hours0.0272 days <br />0.654 hours <br />0.00389 weeks <br />8.95697e-4 months <br /> (11:54 p.rn.) the second repairman re-enters RPR to continue work on the lubrication pipe of Valve CV 4050.
february 7, 1987 About 0023 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> (12:23 a.m.) the second repairman completes work on the lubrication pipe of valve CV 4050.
The leak was stopped at the lubrication pipe and no other leakage s~
was noted. The second repairman describes, on maintenance request No. 7, the nature of work performed and notes on the maintenance request the discovery of a possible crack on the valve body.
About 0330 hours0.00382 days <br />0.0917 hours <br />5.456349e-4 weeks <br />1.25565e-4 months <br /> (3:30 a.m.) the lubrication pipe on Valve CV 4050 was checked by one of the two persons who overheard the threat (to drill through a valve disc) on February 6, 1987. No leakage or obvious defects were noted.
Between 0315 and 0420 hours0.00486 days <br />0.117 hours <br />6.944444e-4 weeks <br />1.5981e-4 months <br /> (3:15 to 4:20 a.m.) Valve CV 4050 was restored to service.
About 0420 hours0.00486 days <br />0.117 hours <br />6.944444e-4 weeks <br />1.5981e-4 months <br /> (4:20 a.m.), FMS Supervisor cleared tags on Valve CV 4050. No physical examination of the valve was required or performed to clear the tags.
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Other entries were made into RPR but not to work on Valve CV 4050. The tim?s in the RPR ranged from four-to seven minutes.
February 8, 1987 NoentriesweremadeintheRPk, Februa ry 9-11, 1987 Several entries were made by personnel into the RPR but not to work on Valve CV 4050.
Time in the RPR ranged from thr'ee minutes to-three hours.
February 12, 1987 About 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br /> (7:30 a.m.) Non-Destructive Test (NDT) person enters the RPR to check Valve CV 4050 for possible crack in valve body noted by the second FMS repairman on maintenance request No. 7.
The valve was too wet to perform the NDT.
About 0940 hours0.0109 days <br />0.261 hours <br />0.00155 weeks <br />3.5767e-4 months <br /> (9:40 a.m.) a site maintenance supervisor is advised of the wet valve an( notes that-the dampness was caused from leakage by two loose nuts on the valve packing gland hold down plate.
Nuts were approximately 3/8" from the-tightened position.
Two of the four stem connector nuts were also loose, but not; sufficient to-cause any leakage or concerns.
The loose-nuts were tightened (maintenance request No. 9).
Between approximately 1140 and 1300 hour0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />s-(11:40 a.m. to 1 p.m.) the NDT on Valve CV 4050 was completed (maintenance request No. 8).
Note:
Radiation Chemistry technicians accompanied all personnel entering the RPR but did not observe the specific work performed during the entire time the personnel were in the RPR.
A representative of the valve manufacturer, familiar with the Mode: 70-14-3 DET valve, was interviewed to determine if Valv-CV 4050 could function, if required, with a loose packing gland hold down plate and 9/16 inch drilled hole through the valve's lantern ring and/or lower valve stem. This scenario was used because the packing gland hold down plate was loose, and a threat _was made-against'the valve by the second repairman who worked on the valve on February 7, 1987. The threat to " drill through a valve disc" was not considered possible because disassembly of the valve would be required to reach the disc and the repairman was not_in the RPR long-enough to disassemble and reassemble the valve and complete his assigned task. ~ A damaged lanteen ring and/or lower valve stem was considered possible since these components could be reached with a
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long enough drill bit from the lubrication pipe on the valve (the
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drilling out the old lubrication pipe, redrilling the hole with a 9/16 inch drill, tap the new hole, and install a plug).,
Thevalvemanufacturerstatedthevalvewouldfunctionwithaloose
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packing gland and 9/16 inch hole drilled through the lantern ring and lower valve stem.
A representative of the packing material vendor, familiar with the packing gland material used in Valve CV 4050, was also interviewed to determine if leakage from the packing gland would occur immediately, or if a certain amount of time would have to elapse before the packing material became saturated and excess liquid would leak through the loose packing gland hold down plate.
In his judgement, leakage from the loose packing gland hold down plate would be immediate. Therefore, the leakage would occur as soon as the packing gland hold down plate was loosened if the line had pressure and fluid.
Additionally, the valve manufacturer and licensee maintenance supervisor were interviewed to determine if the packing gland hold down plate nuts could be loosened to the extent they were found because of vibratton or other operational parameters. They determined the loose nuts (to the extent they were found) would have had to be deliberately loosened.
Interviews of personnel during the inspection were also conducted to determine if Valve CV 4050 had any work performed which would require loosening or removal of the valve packing gland hold down plate.
The interviews also tried to determine if the packing gland hold down plate was loosened or removed by a workman while repairing the valve, or if an authorized person allowed the hold down plate to be loosened or removed and failed to document the decision. No work related reasons were confirmed to explain the loose packing gland hold down plate.
Interview results with the valve manufacturer, licensee maintenance representative, and resident inspector disclosed that the loose packing gland hold down plate, and drilling through the lantern ring and lower valve stem, would be self-disclosing during plant start-up testing prior to completion of the refueling outage.
==
Conclusions:==
The following conclusions were arrived at in reference to the loose packing gland hold down plate cover:
(a) The allegation of sabotage was not substantiated. However, tampering with the packing gland hnid platt can not be ruled out. No work performed-on Valve CV 4050 required the hold down plate to be removed and personnel working on-Valve CV 4050 denied loosening the nuts on the hold down plate.
In fact, Valve CV 4050 was not scheduled for
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maintenance. Maintenance became necessary only when the
[wA lubricating pipe was broke on February 4, 1987.
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results with the valve manufacturer representative and licensee maintenance supervisor concluded that.-the nuts on the hold down plate could not be loosened to the extent found because of vibration or other operational parameters.
Additionally, the inspection did not disclose any person who verbally authorized the hold down plate nut,s to be loosened for any reason.
Therefore, it is concluded that-the nuts on the pa6 ing gland hold down plate were deliberately loosened without authorization by person or persons unknown and the deliberate act occurred between January 1 and February 12, 1987, and possibly between January I and February 6,1987.
(b) Valve CV 4050 would function if challenged, even with the loose packing gland hold down plate and 9/16 inch hole drilled through the lantern ring and lower valve stem.
However, the valve's performance would be degraded and -
contamination of the area would occur. The loose hcid down plate would have been detected during full hydro
- testing of the system and plant startup testing (the plant was in a refueling outage during the time of the tampering event).
Because of these factors, there is no evidence of a
" radiological sabotage" potential as defined in 10 CFR 73.2(p) and therefore the incident did not rise to the level of reportability as an explicit or potential-threat as described in 10 CFR 73.71(c). The allegation that Valve CV 4050 was sabotaged and not reported to the NRC by the licensee was not substantiated since the event was not reportable under the criteria of 10 CFR 73.71(c).
(c) Significant weaknesses pertaining to the licensee's investigation of the event were noted and are addressed in the attachment to this report.
(2) Allegation: Work records, to include work orders / maintenance requests, and radiation exposure records, relating to work performed on Valve CV 4050 were falsified to show that additional _ work, other than the February 6-7, 1987' work, was performed on Valve CV 4050. The alleged falsification was allegedly motivated to " fabricate" a case against a plant employee. The implication was that unnecessary work was documented as being performed when the work had not been necessary or completed.
NRC Review: The inspectors reviewed work orders / maintenance requests, master scheduling maintenance plan for plant outage -
1 (February 8-15, 1987), control room logs, anu radiation exposure records pertaining to work performed on Valve CV 4050.
Additionally, the inspectors interviewed personnel who performed work on Valve CV 4050; the shift supervisor that prepared the i
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February 4,1987 maintenance request (No. 6); the licensee 4
maintenance supervisor that noted the defici_ency on February 12,-
,4 1987; radiation chemistry person present during the February _6-7, 1987 work on the valve by the second JMS repairman; auxiliary operators that removed and returned _
Valve CV 4050 to service; and the technician that. performed the NDT'on Valve CV 4050.
The record review and interview results showed that Valve CV 4050 was not scheduled for_ maintenance during the plant refueling outage which occurred during-December 1986 to March 1987. The' lubrication pipe on Valve CV 4050 was broken on February 4,1987, which necessitated unscheduled maintenance to repair the broken lubrication pipe. The record review and interview results also showed that the chronology described in Section 3.a.(1) above occurred in reference to Valve CV 4050. The work activities are summarized as follows:
(1) On February 4,1987, a maintenance request was prepared to repair the broken lubrication pipe. (2) On February 5, 1987, switching and tagging for-Valve CV 4050 was completed to isolate the valve for repairs.
(3) On February 6,1987, the first repairman-attempted to repair lubrication pipe on the valve but was unsuccessful. Another repairman attempted to repair the lubrication pipe and was successful. The work was-completed early on February 7,1987. The second repairman noted a possible crack on the valve body on maintenance request (No. 7); (4) NOT personnel followed up to check the possible crack in the body of the valve on February 12, 1987. The valve was too wet to perform NOT so maintenance request No. 8 was f
initiated. The valve was checked by a licensee maintenance supervisor and maintenance request No. -9 was initiated to adjust the' packing gland and tighten loose nuts on the valve.
==
Conclusion:==
The only authorized maintenance performed on Valve CV 4050 was on February 6-7 and 12,_1987 as described above.
The maintenance was required because-of an accidentally broken lubrication pipe on the valve. All authorized work on the valve was in response to repairmen instructions on maintenance requests Nos. 6, 7, and the followup check for a crack in the valve body annotated on maintenance request No. 7.
The inspectors concluded that maintenance as described in-maintenance requests 6, 7, 8 and_9 was necessary and adequately -
documented.
Therefore, the allegation perta_ining to falsified records for unnecessary and unperformed maintenance on
_ Valve CV_4050 was not substantiated.
(3) Allegation: A plant employee was wrongly accused of writing threatening graffiti within the plant.
NRC Review: The inspectors interviewed the person who was 4
accused of writing threatening graffiti within the plant; the licensee management representative who conducted an inquiry into
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Superintendent; and the_ Plant Superintendent.
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also reviewed internal correspondence dated February 13, 18, 19 and March 11-12, 1987 pertaining to the licensee's. investigation of graf fiti.
The interview results and document review showed that on February 9,1987 the Operations Supervisor noted a Jarge amount of graf fiti written in the area of the entryway to the Recirculating Pump Room (RPR).
The February 13, 1987 memorandum established that some of the graffiti were threats towards the Plant Superintendent and a FMS-West Maintenance Supervisor, or were obscene and would be considered as aberrant in nature. One of the graf fiti items that appeared most often was "D.
Hof fman Wait Until Next Outage" and was signed "High Dose '87." - This graffiti was also noted on the shield wall for the frisker at the Personnel Lock. The initials "RE" and "WTC" (assumed to be Vestern Travel Crew) were written near some of the graffiti; The licensee's investigation also concluded that the graffiti was written between February 6 and 9,1987.
As part of the licensee's investigation, photographs of one example of the graffiti and samples of an employee's handwriting were sent to a document examiner. The employee's first two initials were R. E.
The document examiner advised the licensee,
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by letter dated March 12, 1987, that the examination showed that the printing on the photographs and known printing of the employee were printed by the same person.
Based upon this information, and-verbal confrontations of a threatening nature s
which occurred on February 5, 1987 between the employee and a supervisor, the employee was terminated on February 20, 1987.
During an interview with the employee, he admitted to writing graf fiti at the frisking station by the RPR.
The graffiti stated "D. Hoffman Wait Until Next Outage." The employee also admitted to writing graffiti of a general nature-(comic remarks or drawings of a named co worker) in the RPR. The employee stated that he did not consider the graffiti as threatening but-was angry at the time becaus_e his Job at the site had terminated earlier than expected because he had received close to the administrative limit for quarterly radiation exposure (2,500 millirems). This resulted in the employee losing, in his judgement, up to $4,000 in pay.
Conc 1_ usion:
The allegation that a named plant employee was wrongly accused of writing threatening graf fiti within the plant-was not substantiated.
4.
Management Meeting (30702)
A management meeting was held on August 6, 1987 in the NRC Region III office, Glen Ellyn, Illinois.
Attendees included:
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Licensee Representatives:
T. Elward, Plant Superintendent, Consumers Power Comp ny (CPCo)
T. Bordine, Licensing Representative, General Office CPGo)
J. Bradshaw, Site Property Protection Supervisor (CPCo)
B. Alexander,TechnicalEngineer/NRCLiaison(CPCo)
H. Cooper, Security Director, General Office (CPCo) b.
NRC Region Ill Representatives:
J. Hind, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
- 1. Jackiw, Chief, Reactor Projects 2C C. Weil, Investigation and Compliance Specialist J. Creed, Chief. Safeguards Section G. Pirtle, Physical Security inspector D. Funk, Physical Security Inspector The licensee representatives were advised that the purpose of the management meeting was to discuss the specific allegations and tentative conclusions, and to discuss significant weaknesses noted during the investigation in reference to their management's inadequate response to a potential equipment tanpering event.
The allegations and tentative conclusions described in Section 3 of this report were discussed. Extensive discussions on the weaknesses noted during the inspection (described in the attachment to this report) were
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E also conducted.
The licensee representatives were advised that the inspection findings were subject to NRC Region 111 management review and the final inspection report would contain the formal perspective for the s
inspection results.
No written material pertaining to the inspection was left with the licensee representatives.
The licensee representatives presented a chronological sequence of events pertaining to verbal confrontations, written threats within the plant, the degraded mode of valve CV 4050, and personnel actions taken in reference to an employee allegedly involved in these activities. They expressed the position that they had taken appropriate actions in dealing with the incident since they cot,ld not confirm " intentional" tampering with the valve by any employee.
They also stated that they realized some improvements in response to future equipment tampering events were necessary and the Corporate Security Director's staff would be preparing a detailed procedure to address equipment tampering events. Additionally, 4
General Employee Training was being modified to more clearly define employee security responsibilities, and the Plant Superintendent was advising all employees by memorandum that he expects any threat against plant equipment to be reported to site management in a timely manner.
The representatives committed to increasing work force security awa renes s. The Corporate Security Director cocmitted to provide adequate investigative support for any future equipnent tampering events.
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The NRC staff advised the licensee representatives that the staff
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('T concluded that the management actions in reference to an employee's verbal confrontations with supervisors and writing threatening graffiti within the plant were adequate. However, plant management's actions-pertaining to the verbal threat against a valve and the subsequent degraded mode of the valve were inadequate. The lack of adequate aggressive actions was considered indicative of management's failure to perceive the significance of the event, and inadequate preplanning for such events. These management deficiencies were described as of significant concern to the Cornission.
They were advised that they would be requested to respond to the deficiencies noted in the attachment to this report.
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ATTACHMENT t,
DEFICIENCIES IN ADDRES$1NG EQUIPMENT TAMPERING EVENT.
"Ctl ns.
Although no violations of specific NRC requirements were noted during the inspection, the licensee's actions at the time of occurrence of the potential 4
equipment tampering event were inadequate. Deficiencies noted included:
(1) Neither the site nor corporate security departments were advised of the verbal threat to a valve and the subsequent degraded mode of Valve CV 4050 so they could determine if a reportable event was required under the criteria of 10 CFR 73.71(c).
Security was advised only of the verbal conf rontations and graffiti incidents involving a worker.
(2) A thorough investigation of the potential valve tampering event and the threat against the valve was not performed by the plant staff or the Field Maintenance Services-West (FMS-W) group.
Both agencies investigated the verbal confrontations and graf fiti incidents.
Each agency thought the other conducted an investigation of the potential valve tampering event.
(3) No effective procedures were in existence to address needed investigation of deliberate acts directed against plant equipment even though IE Information Notice 83-27, dated May 4,1983, identified the need for such procedures or guidelines. The IE Information Notice was sent to the site security section for information purposes about four years ago.
(4) The Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) was not advised of the threat against the valve or degraded mode of the valve even t hough the licensee later characterized the incident as having the poter tial of interrupting plant 4
1 operations and jeopardizing the company's license to operate a nuclear facility. The SRI was only advised that a person's site access was terminated because of verbal confrontations and writing graffiti. The SRI was not advised of the subsequent more significant licensee conclusions pertaining to the individual and the event.
(5) The verbal threat against the valve which occurred on February 6, 1987 was not immediately reported to the licensee's management by at least two personnel who heard the threats.
This represented the single greatest failure on the part of the plant staff.
(6) Management actions af ter the threat against the valve became known (February 19, 1967) were not aggressive. A walkdown of the poison control system on February 13, 1987 was completed prior to management knowledge of the threat and complete knowledge of the degraded mode of the valve. No subsequent check or inspection was conducted because of the incident.
Although the Plant Review Committee (PRC) reviewed the verbal confrontation and graffiti incidents, the investigation found no evidence that the threat against the valve and subsequent degraded mode of the valve was reviewed by the PRC. Additionally, the two technician's work was just routinely reviewed, no additional review actions were taken based
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on the threat or detected degraded mode of the valve.
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~. -..,': r g-t 'Nsu o:Rit5 d Q,,',( [ ' [W ATTACHMENT (7) Management's actions in reference to the valve incident indicated that management was not aware of the true significance of tampering with plant equipment. (Secticn 236.b of the Atomic Energy Act designates such an of fense as punishable by $10,000 fine, inprisonment for up -to ten years or both.) O h 99 g - w = -.... ....... m q 2 .}}