ML20126D138
| ML20126D138 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1980 |
| From: | Record D, Jacqwan Walker TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126D128 | List: |
| References | |
| EOI-2, NUDOCS 8004170231 | |
| Download: ML20126D138 (17) | |
Text
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! ,,, Sequoynh :~uclear Plant O,y - -
IC DISTRIBUTION Plant Master File EMERCENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION Superintendent '-
IU Ansistant Superintendent (Oper.)
10 Assistant Superintendent (!!a in t . )
E0I-2 Administrative Supervisor Maintenance Supervisor (M)
Assistant Maintenance Supervisor (1)
- 1. CSS OF SECONDARY C00LAST, flaintenance Supervisor (E)
. Assistant Maintenance Supervisor (E) i Maintenance Supervisor (I) l Results Supervisor l Units 1&2 1C Operations Supervisor Quality Assurance Supervisor Health Physics Public Safety Services Supv.
Chief Storekeeper Preop Test Program Coordina tor Outage Director ,
Chemical Engineer (Results) l Radiochem Laboratory ,
Instrument Shop l Reactor Engineer (Results)
Instrument Engineer (!Sint. (I))
Mechanical Engineer (Fesults)
Staff Industrial Engineer (Pl. Svs.)
1C Training Center Coordinator PS0 - Chichamauga En;grg Unit - SNP Prepared By: J. R. Walker Public Safety Services - SNP 1r Shift Engineer's Ofiice Revised By: Ja .R Walkcr 1C Unit Control Room QA&A Rep. - SNP Submitted By: g( )4(4-_v muf i
Health Physics Laboratory ;
Suppvisor IU Asst Dir NUC PR (Oper), 727 EB-C l 1U Nuclear Document Centrcl Unit, 606 E9-C PORC Review: d 3l/90 1p Superintendent, WBNP
\ bate! Superintendent, DF,N P A
g\ ( Superintendent, EENP 1" NEB, W9C174C-K l Approved By:
h t_ g ._A \ Lim Supv., NPHPS ROB, MS l Supe
- ntendent in NRC-IE:II 4 Power Security Officer', 620 CST 2-C I
\ _, Nuclear Materia]s Coordinater-1410 CUEE- l Late Approved! v S bk gTN D Manager. OP-QA&A Staff l I \ Ir Resident NRC Inspector - SNP in NSRS, 249A E3E-R 1r Technical Support Center Rev No. Date Revised Pages Rev. No. Date Revised Panes 7 2/9/80 All 1
8 2/14/80 5 l l
9 j/ /[$ 1 All 1 1
The last page of this instruction is Number 16 -
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E0I Units 1 & 2 Fage 1 of 1 '
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! PURPOSE 1
i l The objectives of these instructiona are ac follows:
i To establich stabilized reactor coolant ayate ani stea: enerr.tcr ccndi-1.
i tion: prior to plant cocidown.
l l 2. To minimize the energy release due to the break by isolation of the
]
break where poccible.
l 3 To prevent the F1R safety valves from lifting by dumping stem: frem all j steam generators to the main condenser when possible or to the atmos-j phere from the unaffected eteam generaters.
i i h. To isolate the auxiliary feedvater flew to the affected steam generator, l to maximize auxiliary feedvater flow to the intact steam generators, and i
minimize the energy release.
j 5 To borate the reactor coolant to establish and maintain reactor shut-down carcin.
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9 SQNP E01 Units 1&2 Page 1 of 8 Rev. 9 I. IMNEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS ;
Refer to section on Immediate Operator Acticas of E01-0, Immediate Actions and Diagnostics, if not already performed.
II. MANUAL ACTIONS:
Verify the actuation of steamline isolation. If not actuated, manually init-iate steamline isolation.
III. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS CAUTION: The diesels should not be operated at idle or minimum load for extended periods of time. If the diesels are shut down, ther should be prepared for restart.
NOTE: The process variables referred to in this Instruction are typically monitored by more than one instrumentation channel. The redundant channels should be checked for consistency while performing the stcps of this Instruction.
NOTE: The pressurizer water level indication should always be used in conjune-tion with other reactor coolant system indications to evaluate system i conditions and to initiate manual operator actions, i A. If reactor coolant pressure is above the low head safety injection pump shut-off head, manually reset safety injection so that safeguards equipment can be controlled by manual action. Ensure that containment isolation is maintained. Stop the low head safety injection pumps and l place in the standby mode and request performance of SI-268 to verify j P-4 contact position (failure of P-4 contacts will prevent reset of SI i signal).
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CAUTION: Whenever the wide range reactor coolant pressure decreases below l the low head safety injection shutoff head, the low head safety injection pumps should be manually restarted to deliver fluid to the reactor coolant system.
CAUTION: Automatic reinitiation of safety injection will not occur since the reactor-trip breakers are not reset.
CAUTION: Subsequent to this Step, should loss of offsite power occur, manual action (e.g. , manual safety injection initiation) will be required to load the safeguards equipment onto the diesel powered emergency 1 busses. '
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- 3. Step n11 reacter coolent punps after high head safety injeccion pump operation has been verified and when the vide range reactor ecclant precaure decre'acer to 1530 PSIG.
CASTI21: If component cooling wuter to the reactor coc1:.nt pumpa a isolated on a PEASE "h" containment isciatien signal, all reactor coolant pumps should be stopped within 5 minutes because of loss of motor bearing cooling.
CAUTION: If the reactor coolant pumps are stopped, the seal injection flow shculd be maintained.
UCTE: The conditions given above for stopping reactor coolant pumps should be centinucusly monitored throughout this instruction.
1 HOTE: See Appendix "A" for guidelines en natural circulation if RCP's are l tripped.
C. Determine which steam generator is affected by observing the individual.
steamline pressures (PA!:S). A low steamline pressure compared to the others denotes the faulted loop; terminate auxiliary feedwater to that steam generatcr and verify main feedwater icolated.
CAUTIOU: Secondary system breaks inside containment may cause P:R-PORV(s).
To fail open, should this occur, isolate associated block valve.
Secondary system breaks in area of 3/G PORVs may cause their failure in open pccition, should this occur, isolate if possible.
Chould the ?"E-POR7 fail open and not be isolable, go to EDI-1.
"OTE: If nc icc; hac c lev steamline prescure compared to the others and all ste*-'daa' bave been isolated, determine if a break has occurred in the steamline, in the main feedline or in any piping system that connects with the secondary pressure boundary. If no indication of a break in the pressure boundary is found, go to Section III of E01-0 j and re-evaluate the accident with particular emphasis en the Less cf Reactor Coolant. If a leak from the seccndary systems is found, continue to follow these instructions.
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SQNP E01 Units 1 & 2 Page 3 of 8 - - -
Rev. 9 III. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont.)
D. Regulate the auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators to restore and/or maintain an indicated narrow range steam generator water level (PAMS) or indicated wide range level (PAMS) sufficient to assure that the steam generator tubes are covered. If loss of secondary ecolant is inside containment, maintain S/G 1evel between 40% and 71% on narrow range for possible instrument error. If water level increases in an unexplained manner in one steam generator, go to E0I-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
NOTE: Monitor the primary water supply (Condensate Storage Tanh) for the auxiliary feedwater pumps and upon reaching a low level, verify auto, switch over to ERCW at E 6" level in condensate storage tank. If auto. 1 switch over does not occur, manually switch over.
l E. Monitor Refueling Water Storage Tank level (PAMS).
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- 1. If containment spray has been actuated, and if the containment I pressure is reduced to nominal operating pressure (-0.1 to 40.3 PSID) reset containment spray. Spray pumps should be shut off and placed in the standby mode with operable flow paths.
- 2. The high head and low head safety injection pumps should rc,r 'n aligned to the Refueling Water Storage Tank. If the Refue Water Storage Tank low level alarm (2 29%) is reached, re! afety !
injection. Realign all safety injection pumps to the cold leg recirculation mode using the procedure presented in Table E-2.2.
Note, if the reactor coolant system pressure is above the shutoff head of the lu head safety injection (SI) pumps, etcp these pnaps and place in a standby mule prior tr. transfer te cold leg re-circulation.
- 3. If a low Refueling Water Storage Tank level alarm (229%) is reached while the containment spray pumps are still running, reset contain-ment spray. Spray pumps should be realigned to the recirculation mode using the procedure presented in table E-2,1 (can not be l achieved until RER pumps are changed over to recircultion mode).
i F. Safety injection should be terminated IF:
NOTE: The conditions given below for termination of safety inject. ion should be continuously monitored throughout this procedure.
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- 1. a.
One wide range reactor coolant temperature TH (PAMS) is less than 350 F.
AND
- b. Wide range reactor coolant pressure (PAMS) is greater than 700 psig and is stable or increasing.
SQNP E0I- - Units 1 and 2 Page 4 of 8 Rev. 9 III. SUBSEQLINT OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont.)
AND
- c. PZR water level (PAMS) is greater than 20% of span and risine.
AND
- d. Thg reactor coolant indicated subcooling is greater than 40 F.
NOTE: If all wide range reactor coolant temperature indicaters go above 350"F when attempting to satisfy the condition; c f F1, initiate SI manually and continue ope ati n u;..U . , ; m as of F2 or F3 are satisfied.
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- 2. a. Contain= cat pressure or containment radiation or containment recirculation sump levels do not exhibit either abnormally high or increasing readings.
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- b. All wide range rgactor coolant temperature TH ( ^"b) "#*
greater than 350 F, E
- c. Wide range reactor coolant pressure (PAMS) is greater than 2,000 psig, and is stable or increasing, AND
- d. k'ide-range indicated water level in at least one S/G is at or above 76%
AND
- e. PZR water level (PAMS) is greater than 20% of span, AND
- f. The reactor coolant indicated subcooling is greater than 40 F.
NOTE: If containment pressure, or containment radiation, or containment recirculation sump level exhibit either abnormally high or increasing readings when attempting to satisfy the conditions of F2, initiate. safety in -
jection and continue operation until the following conditions are satisfied.
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SQNP E0I Units 1 and 2 Page 5 of 8 Rev. 9 III. SUBSEOCENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont.)
- 3. a. Containment pressure or containment radiation, or containment recirculation sump level exhibit either abnormally high or increasing readings.
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- b. All wide range rgactor coolant temperature TH (PAMS) are greater then 350 F, s
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- c. Wide range reactor coolant pressure (PAMS) is greater than 2,00 psig, and is stable or increasing.
AND 1
- d. Narrow range water level in at least one S/G is at or above 1 40%. l islD
- e. PER water level (PAMS) is greater than 50% of span, E
- f. The reactor coolant indicated subcooling is greater than 40 F. .
THEN
- 4. Reset safety injection and stop the safety' injection pumps not needed for normal charging and reactor coolant pump seal injection flow.
CAUTION: If wide range reactor coolant pressure decreases by 200 psi or PZR water level decreases by 10% of span from the point of safety injection termination or reactor coolant sub-cooling drops below 40 F, Manualli Reinitate safety injec-tion to maintain reactor coolant pressure and PZR level.
Control reactor coolant pressure to the nominal value which existed when safety injection was initially terminated (T y or to a nominal value of 2000equaltoorlessthan350}F).
psig (Tygreater than 350 Go to E0I-0 to rediagnose the event.
- CAUTION: Stepping and starting of the charging / safety injection pu:ps can cause pump motor overheating or reduced motor
>tfe. Hence, if pumps are restarted once after termin-ation, an additional 15 F of subcooling should be added to the required subcooling prior to the second termination of,the high head pumps.
s SQNP .,,. - ---
E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 6 of 8 ,
Rev. 9 -' - -
III. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont.)
- 5. Place all non-operating safety injection pumps in the stand-by mode, and maintain operable safety injection flowpaths.
- 6. Isolate flow to the reactor coolant system cold legs via the boron injection tank and establish normal charging.
- 7. Reset containment isolation (Phase A). Re-establish normal makeup to maintain system pressure at values reached when safety injection was terminated (T 5350 F) or to a nominal value of 2000 psig (T 350 F). EnsUrethatwateradditionduringthisprocessdoes nok;>resultindilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboroncon-centration.
- 8. Re-establish operation of the pressurizer heaterr of sufficient pressurizer level to assure coverage of the pressur-izer heaters, e.g. through comparisons of pressurizer surge line, water space, and vapor space temperatures and maintain PZR water level between 50% and 70% for instrument error if loss of secon-dary coolant is inside containment. khen system pressure can be controlled by pressurizer heaters, and containment temperatures ,
are low enough to assure proper operation of control systems, j restore normal pressurizer level control.
I CAUTION: Should RCS temperature decrease below NDTT for the RX
, vessel, do not allow pressure to increase above required pressure - temperature limits in TI-28. i G. Monitor either the average temperature indication of core exit ther-mocouples (if available) or all vide range reactor coolant temperature Tg(PAMS)toverifythatRCStemperatureisatleastgo"Flessthansat-uration temperature at RCS indicated pressure. If 50 F indicated sub-cooling is not present, then attempt to establish 50 F indicated sub-cooling by steam dump from the steam generators to the condenser or the atmosphere. j CAUTION: If steam dump is necessary, reduce the steam generator pressure to 864 psig (200 psi below the lowest steam safety
_ valve setpoint) and maintain a reactor coolant cooldown rate of no more than 50 F/HR, consistent with plant make-up capability.
Steam dump should be initiated in the following manner.
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_. ., 1 SQNP E01 Units 1 & 2 Page 7 of 8 Rev. 9 III. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont.)
- 1. Establish a flow path in at least one steamline in an intact loop l (if possible) IF the main condenser is available and IF an uncontro-lled steam release will not be reinitiated upon opening the MSIV. {
- a. Transfer the steam dump system to steam header pressure con-trol. ,
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- b. Set the steam header pressure control setpoint to the pres-sure in the intact steam generator (s) at the time safety injection is terminated.
- c. Close steam seal supply valve 1-560.
- d. On the intact S/G(s), open the bypass warning valves for the MSIV(s).
- f. With conditions stabilized, establish main turbine seals and vacuum per GOI-2.
OR 5T IF all steamline stop valves are CLOSED and cannot be reopened, the main condenser is not available, or the rupture is downstream of the main stesmline isolation valves, dump steam to the atmosp-here from the intact loops using the steam generator power cperated relief valves. Set each steam generator power operated relief valve pressure control setroint to the pressure in the intact steam generator (s) at the time safety injection is terminated.
If 50 F indicated subcooling cannot be established or maintained, then manually reinitiate safety injection. Go to Section III of E0I-0 to re-evaluate the event, unless this re-evaluation has already been performed.
H. Implement emergency plan as required i
I. Verify control room vent isolation (See 50I-30.1B).
J. Verify U-2 containment equipment hatch temporary door closed (734el.)
K. Verify Fuel handling flogr equipment transfer hatch cover in place (734 el to lower elevations). -
L. Place additional CRDM cooling fans and lower containment cooling fans in service if break is inside containment and Phase B isolation has not yet occurred.
M. Transfer NR-45 to.1 SR and 1 IR detector.
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s SQNP ,
E01 Units 1 & 2 Page 8 of 8 Rev. 9 III. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont.)
N. When the reactor coolant temperature and pressure (PNIS) are stable, borate the reactor coolant system to cold shutdown conditions, as necessary.
O. After offsite power is available, establish the auxiliary systems neces-sary for a controlled cooldown to cold shut-down. If offsite power is available and all reactor coolant pumps are stopped, restart at least one reactor coolant pump in an intact loop (with the pressurizer spray line if possible) for cooldown purposes in accordance with procedures.
Maintain subcooled conditions in the reactor coolant system consistent with the ncrmal cooldown curve. If these subcooled conditicas cannot he maintained, restart safety injection pumps.
LOTE: If there is significant radioactivity in one or more steam gen-erator's secondary side due to tube leaks and steam is being dumped to the atmosphere, immediately isolate the steam generator associated with the break. If all steam generators with sign-ificant radioactivity cannot be isolated, begin cooldown and depressurization of the reactor coolant system to limit the re-lease of radioactivity to the environs.
NOTE: Safety injection pump operation should be reinitiated .if an un-controlled reactor coolant system depressurization or an uncontro-lled drop in pressurizer water level occurs during the cooldown process. These criteria apply in lieu of those given in Step F.
P. Stop D/Gs after 15 minutes (sooner if popossible) 'if not needed.
Q. After establishing operation of auxiliary systems, initiate a controlled cooldown and depressurization to cold shutdown conditions using Normal Cooldown Procedures.
NOTE: Safety Injection should be reinitiated if an uncontrolled reactor coolant system depressurization or an uncontrolled drop in pressurizer water level occurs during the cooldown process.
These criteria apply in lieu of those given in Step F.
NOTE: During the controlled cooldown, the reactor coolant system pres-sure will decrease below 1550 psig. Tripping the operating reactor coolant pump (s) due to the pressure criterion of C"*' "
is not required. Other criteria of Step B are still al:21-sic at this time.
R. Recovery procedures for the particular event must be developed and implemented to effect plant return to service.
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SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 l Page 1 of 1 l Rev. 9 l
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APPENDIX A 1
NATURAL CIRCULATION i
OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES A. The following are guidelines to determine if natural circulating is taking place in primary system.
- 1. Core AT as read on wide range RTD's (hot and cold) or an indicated AT between WR cold leg and incore T/C's, should be stable and temperature dropping a relatively stable AT with valves less than 55"F with a gradual decrease indicates natural circulation.
- 2. Incore T/C's temperature indicating below saturation temperature for the existing primary system pressure.
- 3. Heat is being removed form primary system by secondary system i.e. , SG's steaming and water being added to SG's, and secondary system pressure near saturation pressure for the primary system t e.mp e ra tu re .
B. Instructions to enhance natural circulation.
- 1. Keep SG 1evels in narrow range (tubes covered), between 40% and 71%
for post accident instrument error. .
- 2. Keep primary system pressur6 above saturation pressure for the existing hot leg (WR) or incore T/C temperature if possible.
- 3. Use steam dump or atmospheric reliefs to steam off and cool primary system.
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SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 1 of 2 Rev. 9 TABLE E-2,1 CONTAINtENT SPRAY SWITCHOVER TO RECIRCULATION MODE A. With a low RWST level alarm (..!29%) and containment spray pumpe still running, reset containment spray with HS-72-42 & 72-43 and:
- 1. Stop both containment spray pumps (CSP) (" pull to lock in stop" to preclude the possibility of pump restart while realigning suction valves).
- 2. Close the following valves:
- a. Close FCV-72-22 containment spray pump A-A suction from RWST (1 minute)
- b. Close FCV-72-21 containment spray pump B-B suction from RWST (1 minute)
- 3. Open the following ERCW valves (Panel M-27A):
- a. Open FCV-67-125 containment spray HX A ERCW inlet (1 min)
- b. Open FCV-67-126 containment spray HX A ERCW outlet (1 min) l
- c. Open FCV-67-123 containment spray HX B ERCW inlet I (1 min) i
- d. Open FCV-67-124 containment spray HX B ERCW outlet (1 min)
- 4. Open the following CSP suction valves:
- a. Open'FCV-72-23 containment spray pump A-A suction l from containment sump (1 min) I
- b. Open FCV-72-20 containment spray pump B-B suction from containment sump (1 min)
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- 6. Start contai=ent spray p=p A-A (HS-72-27A) l .
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SQNp E01 Units 1 & 2 --
Page 1 of 4 Rev. 9 ..
TABLE E-2.2 COLD LEG RECTRCULATION SWITCHOVER INSTRUCTIONS I. OPERATIONAL STEPS A. The following automatic phase of switch-over from the injection to the recirculation mode is initiated when the RWST is at inw level 29%
(120,000 gal) coincident with a containment sump level of 10%.
NOTE: This times provided at the end of subsequent steps are normal times for the valves to travel full stroke.
NOTE: All operator actions must be performed expeditiously, in a precise, orderly sequence. Do not interrupt the changeover operation until all actions are completed. If a valve fails to respond or to com-pleted its demanded operation, postpone any corrective action until the subsequent steps are performed except as noted. Loss of one complete train of power will allow the other train to be swapped, and parallel valves required to be closed will require one valve to be closed locally.
- 1. Verify RHR pumps operating or start if not.
- 2. Verify that valves FCV-63-72 (A-A) and FCV-63-73 (B-B)
RHR pumps suction from containment sump, start to open while RHR pumps continue to run. (2 min)
CAUTION: If a containment sump valve cannot be opened, stop the corresponding RHR pump.
B. The following manual operations are done upon verification that the automatic switchover phase has begun.
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CAUTION: Immediately stop any pumps taking suction from the RWST on indication of the RWST being empty. Complete the switchover steps listed below, then restart required pumps.
- a. Close,FCV-74-33 (40 see)
- b. Close FCV-74-35 (40sec) l 1
SQNP E01 Units 1 & 2 Page 2 of 4
- Rev. 9 TABLE E-2.2 I. OPERATIONAL STEPS (cont)
- 2. Open the following component cooling valves: (Panel M-27B)
- a. Open FCV-70-156 RifR EX. A outlet (60sec)
- 3. Verify flow to the RCS from the safety injection pumps and close the following SI pwnp miniflow valves:
- a. Close FCV-63-4 SI pump A-A miniflow (10 see)
(10 see) '
- 4. Verify that the automatic valve realignments in step A {
above have been completed. I
- 5. Open the following:
- a. Open FCV-63-8 RHR EX A outlet to centrifugal charging pumps suction and SI pump A suction (10 sec)
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NOTE: 480V breaker must be closed before operating valve from control room (Rx MOV bd Al-A)
- 7. Open the following parallel valves:
- 8. After completion of the above steps verify that the two Si pumps and centrifugal charging pumps are receiving suction supply flow from the RHR pump, and proper flow is established to RCS cold legs on all injection pumps.
CAUTION: Do not perform steps 9 and 10 until the above verification is made.
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SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 3 of 4 Rev. 9 1ACLE E-2.2 I. OPERATIONAL STEPS (cont)
- 9. Close FCV-63-5 safety injection pump suction from RWST (2 min)
- 10. Close the following:
- a. Close FCV-62-135 RWST to centrifugal charging pump suction (10 sec)
- b. Close FCV-62-136 RWST to centrifugal charging pump suction (10 see) 1
- 11. Periodically check auxiliary building area radiation monitors for detection of leakage from ECCS during recirculation. If significant leahage has been identified in the ECCS, attempt to isolate the leakage. The recirculation Flow to the RCS must be maintained at ,
I all times.
- 12. While the plant is in cold leg recirculation mode, make provisions for an evaluation of equipment in the plant.
l II. VERIFICATION:
A. After completing the preceding steps, verify that the safety injection l system is aligned for cold leg recirculation as follows: 1
- 1. One low head safety injection pump is delivering from the contain-ment recirculation sump directly to two reactor coolant sysica cold legs and to the suction of two charging / safety injection pumps.
- 2. The other low head safety injection pump is delivering from the containment recirculation sump directly to two reactor coolant system cold legs and to the suction of two high head safety in-jection pumps.
- 3. The two high head safety inject t and two charging / safety in -
i jection pumps are taking suctior, from the low head safety injection pumps and are delivering to four reactor coolant system cold legs.
- 4. The suction paths from the RWST to all safety injection pumps have been isolated.
- 5. If containment spray is required, verify that flow is being del-ivered.
B. If any failures have occurred, proceed to contingency actions.
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 4 of 4 ,
Rev. 9 I 1
TABLE E-2.2 III. CCNTINGENCY ACTIONS A. CONTAIN!!ENT RECIRCULATION SU51P VAIXE FAILS TO OPEN If a containment recirculation sump valve cannot be opened, stop the corresponding low head safety injection pump and verify that:
- 1. One low head safety injection pump is delivering flow to two reactor coolant system cold legs and to the suction of the two high head safety injection and two charging / safety injection pumps.
- 2. The two high head safety injection and the two charging / safety injection pumps are delivering to four reactor coolant system cold l legs.
B. LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF ELECTRICAL POWER If the single active failure is the failure of one of the emergency .
diesel generators to start in conjunction with a LOCA and a loss of offsite power, electrical power would not be available to one of the i vital safeguard busses. As a consequence, all engineered safeguards .
equipment assigned to that corresponding electrical power train would '
not be available for operation until power could be restored to that bus. The instruction for switchover to cold leg recirculation, as-suming a train failure, is essentially the same as the instruction, which assumed no single failures. The operator could follow the in-struction which assumed no single failure, with the understanding that those valves, without power, do not have to be repositioned.
It should be noted that if a train failed subsequent to the initiation of the safety injection signal additional steps may be required. For example, if no failure is assumed, the parallel suction valves in the line from the RWST to the charging / safety injection pump suction header would open en a safety injection signal. Should a subsequent failure of one of the electrical trains occur, one of the parallel suction valves could not be closed from the main control board. Therefore, position isolation of the RWST to charging / safety injection pump suction path would have to accomplished locally.
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