ML20129G730
| ML20129G730 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1996 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129G716 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9610030134 | |
| Download: ML20129G730 (180) | |
Text
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i ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) UNITS 1 AND 2 I
DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SON-TS-96-04)
LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES i
UNIT 1 UNIT 2 License page 6 License page 6 page V page V page IX page IX page XIV page XIV
,, 3/4 3-58 3/4 3-59 3/4 3-59 3/4 3-60 3/4 3-60 3/4 3-61 3/4 3-61 3/4 3-62 3/4 3-62 3/4 3-63 ,
3/4 3-63 3/4 3-64 3/4 3-64 3/4 3-65 3/4 3-65 3/4 3-66 3/4 3-66 3/4 3-67 3/4 3-67 3/4 3-67a 3/4 3-68 3/4 7-43 3/4 3-69 3/4 7-44 ;
3/4 7-31 3/4 7-45 1 3/4 7-32 3/4 7-46 I 3/4 7-33 3/4 7-47 l 3/4 7-34 3/4 7-48 3/4 7-35 3/4 7-49 I 3/4 7-36 3/4 7-50 3/4737 3/4 7-51 3/4 7-38 3/4 7-52 3/4 7-39 B 3/4 3-4 l
3/4 7-40 B 3/4 7-7
, 3/4 7-41 B 3/4 7-8 B 3/4 3-4 6-2 B 3/4 7-7 i B 3/4 7-8 6-2 9610030134 960926 PDR ADOCK 0S000327 P PDR a i
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(c) By no later than June 30, 1982, all safety-related electrical Nlh i
l . equipnient in the facility shall be qualified in accordance with the provisions of: Division of Operating Reactors
" Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of l Class IE Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors" (DCR l g Guidelines); or, NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on ;
Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Elcetrical
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Equipment," December 1979. Copies of these doc';ments are attached to the Order for Modificatial of License DPR-77 i ; dated November 6,1980.
(13) Loss of Non-Class IE Instrumentation and Control Room System EIir'During Uperation (dection /.lu) .
Prior to exceeding five percent power, TVA must complete revisions to plant emergency procedures to the satisfaction of the NRC.
l 7 (14) Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls (Section 7.11) l In conformance with IE Bulletin 80-06, TVA shall test the system to identify any further areas of concern, and TVA shall review the control schemes to determine that they are the best in terms of equipment control and plant safety. The results of these -
test and review efforts shall be provided to the NRC in accordance with the bulletin. O' (15) Diesel Generator Reliability (Section 8.3.1) l Prior to operation following the first refueling, TVA shall implement the following design and procedure modifications as outlined in Section 8.3.1 of SEP, Supplement No. 2. These include: (a) Moisture in Air Starting System; (b) Turbocharger bear Drive Problem; and, (c) Personnel Training.
(16)FireProtectionSy:te-(S: tion".51 i
CTVA, t the sa sfactio of the t' C, shall:
(a Prior o June 1 1, submi the.follo ing 3 ite s which de with he Essen al Raw C ling Wate (ERCW) s pply: (a) e close the necessary exposed c duit with 1 1/2-hou fire barri r; reroute rain D ERp! pump cab es and ER ! transform 195ERT (
ower cabl to obtai ft a minimum 20-foot se aration fro
. A train A; d, (c) e ' lose the CW junctio box with 1 1/2-hour fir barrier;
! b) Prior o November 1,1980, ) install ive fire da, ers; an , ,
(2) r place and elocate s inkler hea a in the au liary j l
buil ing.
l (c) By eptember , 1981. TV shall rep 1 ce the contr 1 room ,
pan s acc$aM M E. l i
R13 -
,y, 8 *. -g (
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9/8/81
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INSERT A l
.TVA shallimplement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire-protection program referenced in Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's Final Safety Analysis l
Report and as approved in NRC Safety Evaluation Reports contained in NUREG-OO11, Supplements 1,2, and 5, NUREG-1232, Volume 2, and NRC letters dated May 29 and October 6,1986, subject to the following provision:
TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a
, fire.
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INDEX ;
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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 6
PAGE SECTION i
3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS
- )
3/4.2.1 Axial Flux Difference..................................... 3/4 2-l' 3/4.2.2 Heat Fiux Hot Channel Factor.............................. 3/4 2-5 j i
3/4.2.3 Nuclear Enthalpy Hot Channel Factor....................... 3/4 2-10 R142- l
, 3/4.2.4 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio................................. 3/4 2-12 ,
1 3/4.2.5 D N B P a ra me t e r s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '3/4 2-15 l 1
J 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION j i
3/4.3.1' REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION..............<........ 3/4 3-1
-3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM. i INSTRUMENTATION......................................... 3/4 3-14 ;
1 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation...................... 3/4 3-39 3/4 3-43 Movable Incore Detectors..................................
Seismic Instrumentation................................... 3/4 3-44 Meteorological Instrumentation............................ 3/4 3-47 Remote Shutdown Instrumentation........................... 3/4 3-50 Chlorine Detection Systems (Deleted) . 3/4 3-54 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation....................... 3/4 3-55 3/4 3-58 c),L},/. Fir: Octc:ti n I,stre 2,tet4 9...........................
Deleted....................................'............... 3/4 3-70 :15 Explosi ve Gas Moni tori ng Instrumentation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-71 1
i V Amendment No. 62, 138, 148 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 November 16,1990 Mngt ir 1000
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I INDEX l
,g.yg LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i
SECTION PAGE 1 I
3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT 51NK........................................ 3/4 7-14 l 1
3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION.......................................... 3/4 7-15 l 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM................. 3/4 7-17 l 3/4.7.8 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM................... 3/4 7-19 3/4.7.9 SNUBBER 5..................................... ............ 3/4 7-21 3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION............................... 3/4 7-29 J
3/4 7.11 'f!RS 5' PPR555!0M 5.YSTE"5 .
fire Suppression-Water 5y; tem ............................ 3/4 7-31 helehed -- S p r ay o rd / o r Sp r iekl e e-Sy stems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-33
-00 Sy:t ............................................... 3/4 7-35 2
-fir: M :: Statiens ....................................... 3/4 7-37 3/4.7.12 [ IRE"ARRIERPENCTRATIONS................................ 3/4 7-41 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES Operating................................................. 3/4 8-1 Shutdown.................................................. 3/4 8-8 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS A.C. Distribution - Opers'61ng............................. 3/4 8-9 A.C. Distribution - ShJtdown.............................. 3/4 8-10 D.C. Distribution - Operating............................. 3/4 8-11 D.C. Distribution - Shutdown.............................. 3/4 8-14 3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES .
Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective 3/4 8-15 Devices.................................................
f October 22, 1987 IX Amendment No. 61 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1
INDEX
.r s BASES h
SECTION pjAj g 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM ........................ B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK......................................... B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION...........................................
B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM.................. B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.8 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM.................... B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS................................................... B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION................................ B 3/4 7-6 3/4.7.1 IIRC S""""ESSION SYSTE E .................................. B 3/4 7-7
__ 3/4.7.1 IIRC "A""IC" "CNCT"ATI0N y................................. B 3/4 7-7 (odeJ.
3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l 3/4.8.1 and 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION l
SYSTEMS............................................................. B 3/4 8-1 3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES.................... B 3/4 8-2
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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION........................................ B 3/4 9-1 l 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION............................................ B 3/4 9-1 l 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME................................................. B 3/4 9-1
) 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS.......................... B 3/4 9-1 l 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS............................................. B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE.......................................... B 3/4 9-2 R208 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL PIT AREA (DELETED)............... B 3/4 9-2 l 3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION.............. B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM................... B 3/4 9-2 1
June 14, 1995 l
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 XIV Amendment No. 157, 204
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INSTRUMENTATION N's h8Ca e son 5 *
- 4 M t. 3 . 3 - 11 :
is also daIth d., f FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION _
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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.8 a inimu , the 1 ed ection instrume tation f r each fire ye et nz e sho in T le 3 -11 sha 1 be OPE ABLE. !
APP CAB ITY: henev equ'pment pr tected by the fire detecti n instru ent is eq red t be OP ABLE I l
CT N:
h ,t numb of 0 RABLE f' e detecti instrume t(s) 1 s than t minimu nu r OPERA E re frement f Table 3. 11:
- a. ithi 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> e ablish a re watch p trol t inspect e zone (
with the inope able instr ment (s) at east o ce per ho r, unles the in rument(s) is locate inside the ontai ent, then / inspect e c ntainment t least o e per 8 ho rs or nitor the containme t l ir temper ture at le st once per hour a the loca ns liste in Specific ion 4.6.1. .
. Rest e the inope able inst ment (s) to OPERABLE tatus wi in
! 14 ys or, in 1 eu of any,4ther r ort require by Specif ca-l t' n 6.6.1, prepare and bmit a pecial Report /to the C mission u .,
ursuant to ecificati n 6.9.2 ithin the next 30 days utlining the action aken, the 'ause of he inoperability and t plans and schedule r restori g the i trument(s) to OPERABLE atus.
l c. The pr visions of Specific tions 3.0.3 a 3.0.4 are not applic le. !
l l l SURVEILLANC REQUIREME S
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l 4.3.3.8.1 Each o e abov required fire etection ins ruments whi are accessible duri operati n shall be demo trated OPERA E at least nce per (
6 nths by ormance f a CHANNEL FUN IONAL TEST. ire detecti n which I e not acc ible dur'ng plant operati n shall be de onstrated OP RABLE y the per ormance o a CHANNEL FUNCTI NAL TEST duri g each COLO UT00WN exceedi 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> nless performed i the previous months.
4.3. .8.2 The PA Code 72D super sed circuits upervision a sociated ith th detector arms of each of th above require fire detect ~on instru nts s all be dem strated OPERABLE a least once pe 6 months.
4.3.3.8.3 The non-supervised ircuits betwee the local f're protec on pan is and actu ted equipment shall e demonstrated OPERABLE at ast once er 6 m nths.
The[iredetectioninstruentslocatedw' hin the cont inment ar not r uired _
to #e OPERABLE during th performance of Type A Cont nment Lea age Ra
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Tests.
7ovember 23,19ti4 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-58 Amendment No. 36
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TABLE 3.3-11 M
@ FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS E Fire Minimum Instruments Operable i e Instrument Location Ionization Photoelectric Thermal Infrared C
5 1 iesel Gen. Rm. 2B-8, El. 722 5
- 2 el Gen. Rm. 2B-B, E1. 722 5
~ 3 Dies Gen. Rm. 18-B, E1. 722 5 4 Diesel n. Re. 18-B, El.'722 5 t 5 Diesel Gen. Rm. 2A-A, El. 722 5 ,- R101 ;
6 Diesel Gen. 2A-A, El. 722 5-7 Diesel Gen. Rm. -A, El. 722 /5 '
8 Diesel Gen. Rm. 1 , E1. 722 5 9 Lube Oil Storage Rm. 1. 722 1 10 Lube Oil Storage Rm. E . 722 -
1 11 Fuel Oil Transfer Rm. E1. 2 1 t' 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Rm. E1. 7 , 1
- Diesel Gen. Corridor, El. 722 6 13_ ,/ ;
Y 14 Air Intake & Exhaust Re. 2B, / 9
$ El. 740.5 C 15 Air Intake & Exhaust Rm. 1B, E1. 740.5 9
f to 16 Air Intake & Exhaust Rm. 2A, 9 ' P, >
EI. 740.5 l p' ;
17 Air Intake & Exhaust Rs. lA, 9
/
gii3 El. 740.5 -
18 DieselGen.28-BRelayBd.,/ 3 M !
El. 722 3 r j
>y 19 Diesel Gen. 1B-B Re1 Bd., 3 I@ E1. 722 N $ giot O& 20 Diesel Gen. 2A-A' Relay Bd., 3 t w El. 722 / !
jF 21 Diesel Gep.
E1.f722 7 IA-A Relay Bd., 3 g
[~ i e' 22 Diewl Gen. Board Rm. 28-B, 2
$ / E1. 740.5 @ lRil3 ;
23 - Diesel Gen. Board Rm. 28-8, 2 i
- E1. 740.5 l Rll3 24 Diesel Gen. Board Rm. IB-B, 2 E; E1. 740.5 gall 3 ,
- 25 Diesel Gen. Board Rm. IB-8, 2 l
E1. 740.5 gi13
k y, TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued] . j E
g FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS :
Y-r Fire Minimum Instruments Operable
' Zone Instrument Location Ionization Photoelectric Thermal Infrared C
3 26 Diesel Gen. Board Rm. 2A-A, 2 E1. 740.5 lR113j.
[ Diesel Gen. Board Rs. 2A-A, 2 27
- 1. 740.5 grin 3 ,
28 Diese en. Board Rm. lA-A, 2 I f E1. 7 29 Diesel Gen. d Rm. IA-A, 2 lRll3 E1. 740.5 t Q
30 Cable Spreading Rs. -Cll, 14 lRll3 :
E1. 706 p
, 31 Cable Spreading Rm. C7-C11, 14 -
s E1. 706 P ) -t'
[ 32 Cable Spreading Rm. C7-C11, 4
(
- E1. 706 Y@
$ 33 Cable Spreading Rm. C7-C11, El. 706 -
34 Cable Spreading Rm. C3-C7, El. 706 14 %
3 giol 35 Cable Spreading Rm. C3- , 14 b E1. 706 T-39 Cont. Spray Pump -A, 2 '
b E1. 653 40 Cont. Spray mp 18-B, 2 D 3
mg as 43 El. 653 RHR P 1A-A, E1. 653 2 g 'g i
.$ 47 Au . Bldg. Corridor, El. 653 10
[ 48 rridor, Control Bldg. 4 PJ E1. 669 49 Corridor, Control Bldg. 4
~
U El. 669 50 Mech. Equipm Rm. Col. C1, 2-S El. 669 51 Mech. Equip. Rm. Col. C1, .
2 E$
e El. 669 f i ,g -
u
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TABLE 3.3-11'(Continued) 8 8 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS 5
- Fire Minimum Instruments Operable Zone Instrument Location E
Ionization Photoelectric Thermal Infrared Z 52 Mech. Equip. Rm. Col. C3, 2
,_. El. 669 53 Mech. Equip. Rm. Col. C3, 2
- 1. 669 54 25 Batt. Rm. 1, E1. 669 3 55 250-V t. Rm. 1, El. 669 -
56 250-V Batt. d. Rs. 1, El. 669 57 250-V Batt. B Rm. 1, E1. 669 2
2 /
/
58 250-V Batt. Bd.
59 250-V Batt. Bd. Rm.
2, El. 669 2 /
E1. 669 2 / s w 60 250-V Batt. Rm. 2, E1. 69 2 61 250-V Batt. Rm. 2, E1. 6 3
/
/ l 3
[
w a 63 62 24-V & 48-V Batt. Rm. E1. 6 24-V & 48-V Batt. Rm. E1. 669 3
/
/ 3 n )
- " 64 2'4-V & 48-V Batt. Bd. R , / p E1, 669
/ g m
65 24-V & 48-V Batt. Bd. Rm., J 66 El. 669
/2 i
(
)
R101 CommunicationsRm.El.669/ 4 67 Communications Rm. E1. I 4 t- i 68 Mech. Equip. Rm. E1. 6 69 70 Mech. Equip. Rm. E . 669 Aux. Bldg. A5-A , Col. W-X, 2
.5 2 3(
g f
El. 669 k2 71 /.ox. Bldg. -All, Col. W-X, 5 2 E1. 66 g
g & 72 Aux. Pump Turbine IA-S, 1 x
N2 . 669 -
03z 73
- x. FW Pump Turbine IA-5, 1 l
N1 E1. 669
- P 76 S. I. & Charging Pump Rms. 5 m e El. 669 77 5. I. Pump Rm. IA, El. 669 1 78 S. I. Pump Rm. 18, E1. 669 1 79 Charging Pump Rm. IC, El. 669 1
.t
[
TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued) m"
@ FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS R
E Fi,2 Minimum Instruments Operable
, Zope Instrument Location Ionization Photoelectric- Thermal Inf red C /
5H 80 Charging Pump Rm. 18, El. 669 1 81 arging Pump Rs. IA, El. 669 1
~ 88 Au Bldg. Corridor Al-A8, 8 El. 69 89 Aux. B1 Corridor Al-A8, 8 ;
El. 669 90 Aux. Bldg. Cor ' dor A8-A15, 8 El. 669 '
91 Aux. Bldg. Corridor -A15, 8 El. 669 92 Aux. Bldg. Corridor Col. 4 i R El. 669
- 93 Aux. Bldg. Corridor Col. U-W, h N
1 R101 !
Y El. 669 M O 94 Valve Galley, El. 669 2 95 Valve galley, El. 669 N\
Ih i 98 Cntet Purge Air Fltr., El. 690 2 2 99 Cntet Purge Air Fltr. El. 690 2 2. ,
102 Pipe Gallery, El. 690 4 103 Pipe Gallery, El. 690 4 106 Aux. Building, El. 690 8 sI
~
107 108 Aux. Building, El. 690 Radio Chemical Lab.
El. 690 a,
8 3 hI 109 Radio Chemical La . Area, 3 li;' y El. 690 E$ '
Ry 110 Aux.' Bldg. -A8, Col. Q-U, 10 xg El. 690 l
M" 111 Aux. B1 . Al-A8, Col. Q-U 10 g El. O
- - 112 Aux. Idg. A8-A15, Col. D-U 9
$$ . 690 113 ux. Bldg. A8-A15, Col. Q-U 9 El. 690 114 Waste Packaging Area El. 706 3
( ,
- .h '
~ .iy'j7 TABL'E 3.3-11 (Continued)
$ FIRE DETECTION-INSTRUMENTS 8
y Fire Minimum Instruments Operable 2 Zone Instrument Location Ionization Photoelectric Thermal I i E 1 Waste Packaging Area El. 706 3 ;
Z 116 Cask Loading Area El. 706 2 Rlol g 117 Cask Loading Area El. 706 2 ;
118 Fuel Storage Area El. 706 2 119 New 2 120 Aux. M B1 1 Storage Area E1.
Gas Trtat. Fitr. 706 1 1 El. 714 lRil3 121 . Aux. Bldg. Gas tat. Fitr. I 1 .
E1. 714 [gri3 122 Add. Eqpt. Bldg. E1. & 6 i 717.5 l 123 Volume Cont. Tank Rs. IA, 1 1 ,
El. 690 lR146 1
m 124 Additional Equip. B . 6 6 }
} El. 706 trg 125 Valune Cont. nk Rs. IA, 1 1 R146 -
J, E1. 690 'j
%q ,
w 126 ABGTS . El. 714 2 127 ABG . E1. 714 2 128 S Rs. E1. 714 2 %
129 ABGTS Rm. E1. 714 2 D >
130 Ventilation & Purge Air Rs. 3 21
% El. 714
- k f-. 1 Ventilation & Purge Air Rs.
E1. 714
-3 1 ti 132 Ventilation & Purge Air Rm. 3 :
's El. 714 R101 133 Ventilation & Purge Air Rs. 3 -
I (8y El. 714 (h , .
134 Aux. Bldg. A5-All, Col. U-W, 7 !
- E1. 714 135 Aux. Bldg. A5-All, Col. U-W, 7 .
g E1. 714 !
Heating & Vent. Rs. E1. 714
- 136 4 ,
137 Heating & Vent. Rs. E1. 714 4
{ 138 Heating & Vent. Rs. E1. 714 4 I
TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)
FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS ,
E Fire Minimum Instruments Operable i Zone Instrument Location Ionization Photoelectric Thermal Infrared C
5 139 Heating & Vent. Rm. El. 714 4 140 bove Hot Instr. Rm. I
'E . 714 14 1 Abov ot Instr. Rm. 1 ,
El. 7 142 Aux. Bldg. -A8, Col. 12
/
Q-0, El. 71 143 Aux. Bldg. Al-A8, 1. 12 -
Q-9, El. 714 144 Aux. Bldg. A8-A15, Col. 9 f
-'/
s Q-0, E1. 714 Aux. Bldg. A8-A15, Col. 9 /
/ ( Q h
l
[ 145 Q-U, E1. 714 F,/ 6 N2 St rage Area, El. 706 146 147 ABGTS filter El. 714 1 1 4 R101 148 ABGTS filter El. 714 1 1 g j t 149 Cable Spreading Rm. C3-C7, 15 3 El. 706 l 4 150 Cable Spreading Rm. C3'-C7 15 i N
5 E1. 706 t 153 Add. Eqpt. Bldg. El. 0.5 4 Add. Eqpt. Bldg. . 740.5 154 155 156 Refuel Rm. El RB Access 4
El. 734-6 19 2
(
\
k)f p g 157 RB Acces . El. 734 2 gg 160 SG B1w . Rs. El. 734 4 g g 161 SG dn. Rm. El. 734 .
4 xg 162 E S Rm. El. 734 :- 3 y <+ 163 GTS Rm. E1. 734 .T 3 EGTS Fitr. A El. 734
- g 164 1 2 -
gto 165 EGTS Fltr. A El. 734 1 2 g" EGTS Fitr. B El. 734 1 2 167 EGTS Fltr. B El. 734 1 2 172 Mech. Eqpt. Rm. El. 734 1 173 ~ Mech. Eqpt. Rm. El. 734 1 A ,Q J
{ !6w:1
_ . _ _ . . _ - _ __._____s_.~,.mm__m
TQi..
JAB.LE 3.3-11 (Continued) e FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS
=
2 FIRE MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE
[ ZONf INSTRUMENT LOCATION Ionization Photoelectric , Thermal Infrared z
Z 174 Mech. Eqpt. Rm. El. 734 1 R101
- 175 Mech. Eqpt. Rm. El. 734 1 N 176 480-V Shtdn. Bd..Rm. IAl, El. 734 2 177 480-V Shtdn. Bd. Rs. IAl, El. 734 2 178 480-V Shtdn. Bd. Rs. IA2, El. 734 2 -
179 -V Shtdn. Bd. Rs. IA2, El. 734 2 /
180 480- tdn. Bd. Rs. 181, El. 734 2, '
181 480-V Sh . Bd. Rs. 1B1 El. 734 -2 182 480-V Shtdn. . Rs. IB2 El. 734 /3 183 480-V Shtdn. Bd. . 182 El. 734 / 3 R
184 185 6.9-KV Shtdn. Bd.
6.9-KV Shtdn. Bd. Rs.
A El. 734
- 1. 734
/' 7 7
\ i alas 186 6.9-KV Shtdn. Bd. Rs. B E . 34 7 S Y 187 6.9-KV Shtdn. Bd. Rs. B El. 7 %
3 /
$ 188 480-V Shtdn. Bd. Rm. 2Al E 34 2 189 480-V Shtdn. Bd. Rs. 2A . 734 2 R101 190 191 480-V Shtdn. Bd. Rs.
480-V Shtdn. Bd. . 2A2 El. 734 El. 734 3 3 l 3
f 192 480-V Shtdn. . 281 El. 734 2 i h
ar
=~ -
ph
&5 s E.1 N FI
.C
_ - - - _ ~ _ .. . _ _ _ - _ _
TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)
M FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS E Fire Minimum Instruments Operable .
s Zone Instrument location Ionization Photoelectric Therma 1 Infrared C
5
" 193 ^
480-V Shtdn. Bd. Rm. 2B1 2 ['
E1. 734 194 480-V Shtdn. Bd. Rm. 2B2 2 .l E1. 734 195 Shtdn. Bd. Rm. 2B2 2 E. 4 196 125-V Ba Bd. Rm. I El. 734 1 197 125-V Batt. . Rm. I E1. 734 1 198 199 125-V Batt. B . m. II E1. 734 125-V Batt. Bd. II E1. 734 1
1 -
/ ,
R 201 200 125-V Batt. Bd. Rm.
125-V Batt. Bd. Rs. II I E1. 734
- 1. 734 1 /
1/
[ 202 125-V Batt. Bd. Rm. IV E1. 34 ,4 4 203 125-V Batt. Bd. Rm. IV El. 7 '/
1 i cn 204 Aux. CR E1. 734 2 205 AuN. CR El. 734 / 2 [ D R101 -!
206 Aux. CR Inst. Rm. lA / 1 %
D 207 E1. 734 Aux. CR Inst. Rm. lA
/ 1 l
f 208 E1. 734 Aux. CR Inst ( Rm. IB
/ 1
\]
D k
/
E1. 7) V '
f
'\- / !
209 Aux.f R Inst. Rm. IB 1 E1. 734 b 210 XIJx.CRInst.Rm.2A 1 N El. 734 gD g a 21 Aux. CR Inst. Rm. 2A 1 -
l qg E1. 734 J 212 Aux. CR Inst. Rm. 2B 1
~
.N yz E1. 734 o Aux. CR Inst. Rm. 2B 1 E1. 734 h"
- e. 213 214 Mech. Eqpt. Rm. El. 732 5 e 215 Mech. Eqpt. Rm. E1. 732 5 216 CR F1tr. B E1. 732 1. 1 217 .- CR F1tr. B El. 732 1 1 I c
T*]-
L.?
't k
m TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)'
E g FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS h Fire Minimum Instruments Operable
. Zone Instrument location Ionization Photoelectric Thermal Infrared c /
'5 218 CR F1tr. A El. 732 1 1
-d 219 rR F1tr. A El. 732 1 1 220 ~ CR E1. 732 25 221 Tech ' al Support Center, 5 E1.
222 Technical port Center, 5
/ -
E1. 732 ,/
f 225 Relay Bd. Rm. E . 32 13 /
226 Electric Cont. Bds. 1. 732 11 /
227 228 Oper. Living Area E1.
Oper. Living Area E1. 73 2 7 / 1 R 229 Main Cont. Bds. El. 732
/ 8
- 9' 230 Aux. CR Bds. L-4A, 4C, 11A & d)
Y 10, E1. 734 ' R101 f) 233 Ctr1. Rod Dr. Eqpt. Rm. El. 759 f 4 ,
234 Ctr1. Rod Dr. Eqpt. Rm. El. 757 4 235 Ctri. Rod Dr. Eqpt. Rm. E V 759 ) .
f "
236 Ctr1. Rod Dr. Eqpt. R 3 v il. 759 237 Mech. Eqpt. Rm. E1,449 4
1 D '
238 239 Mech. Eqpt. Rm Mech. Eqpt.
. 749 1 Sp
. E1. 749 2 240 ' Mech. E . Rm. El. 749 241 242 480-4 FMR Rm. 1A E1. 749 V XFMR Rm. IA E1. 749' 2
3 k 1
243 80-V XFMR Rm. 18 El. 749 3
M g
c @g 244 245 480-V XFMR Rm. 18 E1. 749 3
3 g-480-V xfmr Rm. 2A El. 749 3
$& 246 247 480-V xfmr Rm. 2A El. 749 3 m@
w" 480-V xfmr Rm. 28 El. 749 3 248 480-V xfmr Rm. 2B El. 749 3
[g 249 125-V Batt. Rm. I El. 749 1 -
e- 250 125-V Batt. Rm. I El. 749 1
E 'o 251 125-V Batt. Rm. II El 749 1 252 125-V Batt. Rm. II El. 749 1 '
253 125-V Batt. Rm. III 'il. 749 1 254 125-V Batt. Rm. III El. 749 1
_ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . ______.m.__-._.
. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____..__m._.___..___...m.__________.._____.____.__.___.__.___..____._____.__._______.__.m_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _
m TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)
E g FIRE DETECTION INSTRlMENTS Fire Minimum Instruments Operable Zone Instrument location C Ionization Photoelectric Thermal Infrared 6 255 256 125-V Batt. Rs. IV El. 749 1 '
y 125-V Batt. Re. IV El. 749 1 257 480-V Bd. Rs. IB E1. 749 4 R101 258 480-V Bd. Rm. IB E1. 749 4 259 480-V Bd. Rs. IA E1. 749 480-V Bd. Rs. lA E1. 749 4
4
/
261 480-V Bd. Rs. 2A El. 749 4 /
/
262 -V Bd. Rm. 2A E1. 749 263 264 480- d. Rm. 2B El. 749 480-V Bd. . 28 E1. 749 4
4 f'
4 m 267 Aux. Instr. E1. 685 8
's 268 Aux. Instr. Rs. 685 9
[ 269 Computer Rm. E1. 68 4 270 Computer Rm. El. 685 /
$ 271 Aux. Instr. Rm. E1. 685 8 4
\
272 273 Aux. Instr. Rm. El. 685 Computer Rm. Corridor 9
l
)
f
% i f
276 Intk. Pumping Sta.
3
/ D El 690 & 670.5.
277 296 ERCW Pump Sta.
Aux. CR Bds 11B, . 734
. 704
-48, 4D, &
21 6
8 lh lRil:
297 Main nt. Bds.
298 330 C n Main CR Bds. El 732 eactor Building Annulus 9
9 h' [
)
h q
331 3
Reactor Building Annulus Lwr. Compt. Coolers, E1. 693 3
4 4
R101 mg 54 Upr. Compt. Coolers, E1. 778 4 a
" 356 RCP 2, E1. 693 2 357 RCP 2, E1. 693 2
$,5 360 RCP 1, E1. 693 2 361 RCP 1, E1. 693 2 3 364 RCP 3, E1. 693 2
- 365 RCP 3, El. 693 2
@ 368 RCP 4, E1. 693 2
.. p t
( d
2n M .*:
TABLE 3.3 (Continued) $$ /
- v. FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS E
8 Fire Minimum Instruments Operable j Zone Instrument Location Ionization Photoelectric Thermal Infrared R101 369 RCP 4, E1. 693 2 E 372 Reactor B1dg. Annulus 22 373 Reactor Bldg. Annulus 21 87 Turbine Cont. Bldg. Wall, 18 Rll3 E1. 706 427 125V Batt. Rm. V El. 749 2 428 25V Batt. Rm. V E1. 749 2 458 C ting Room Ceiling E1. 690 2 462 480V Bd Rs. 1B2 21. 734- 1 463 480V Sd Rs. 2A2 El. 734 1 - R101 465 Counting Ro Ceiling'El. 690 2 466 480V Sd Bd Rm. 2 El. 734 1 467 480V Sd Bd Rs. 18 1. 734 1 R 468 480V Sd Bd Rs. 182 E 734 1
- 469 480V Sd Bd Rs. 2A2 El. 1 i
';' 470 480V Sd Bd Rs. 2A2 El. 734 1
$ 471 480V Sd Bd Rs. 2A2 El. 734 1 f
/ nC!
D 1
n\
3
!- b a
n-
=
Z
<:~ ."
'~^ o i
f Th ,@
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._ __. _ _ - _ . . ~ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ - _ _ . . _ _ . _ - . _ _ . . _
i 1 0a.Ieki PLANT SYSTEMS l
' jd 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS j l v i
! FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM _ l l
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.11.3 The ire suppr ssion water system shall e OPERABLE wit : !
/a. T fire sup ression pum , each with capacity of 16 gpm, with R70 eir disch rge aligned o the fire s pression heade ,
- b. An OPERA E flow path apable of tak g suction from the forebay and tran ferring the ater through d stribution pip g with OPERABL R190 section lizing contr or isolation valves up to t first valve of l the lo p header tha isolate: !
1 l 1. pray and/or prinkler Syste (s) required t be OPERABLE per Specificatto 3.7.11.2 or i
l 2. Hose stand pe(s) require to be OPERABLE per Specifica- l tion 3.7. .4. l l $PPLICABI TY: At all imes. / !
i l
j' 1 t
\
AGIIDE: )
I
. With only one pump OPERAB E, restore the i operable equipment to ;
OPERABLE status within 7 ays or, in lieu of any other repo . re- :
quired Specification .6.1, prepare a submit a Special Report to 40 the Co ission pursuan to Specificatio 6.9.2 within the ext 30 days t11ningtheplafsandprocedurestobeusedtores re the
! inop 'able equiipent to OPERABLE statu or to provide an 1 ternate l bac ppumporsuppl/. The provision of Specifications 3.0.3 and l 3. 4 are not applicable.
R190
~
W th the fire suppr/'
3
- b. ession water sys em otherwise inope able (the } j rovisions of Specification 3.0.4 e not applicable)- i
- 1. Establish / backup fire supp ession water syste within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and ,
/
- 2. In lieu 6f any other repor required by Speci cation 6.6.1, R40 submit Special Report i accordance with.5 cification 6.9.2:
a) y telephone within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, Confimed by tele aph, mailgram or acsimile transa ssion
/ b) ;
- no lat.er than th first working day following the e nt,
- and ;
i- ]!
SEQUOYAH UNIT 1 3/4 7-31 Amendment No. 46, 66, 186 ,
September 13, 1994
1 h
PLANT SYSTEMS d 6 81 ur, l #
ACTION: (Continued) !
c) In writing within 14 days following the event, outlini the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and he plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPER LE l status. ;
SURVEILLA E REQUIREMENTS 4.7.11.1 Th fire suppression water system shall be demonstra d OPERABLE:
- a. At 1 st once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASI by starting each elect *c motor driven pump and operating it for least 15 minutes !
on reci culation flow.
]
- b. At least nce per 31 days by verifying that ch valve (manual, power oper ed or automatic) in the flow pa is in its correct position.
R17
- c.
At least once er 6 months by performan of a system flush. j
- d. At least once pe 12 months by cyclin each testable valve in the :
flow path through at least one compl te cycle of full travel. '
- e. At least once per months by pe orming a system functional test which includes simul ted automat'c actuation of the system throughout its operating sequenc and: ,
- 1. Verifying that eac aut atic valve in the flow path actuates l to its correct posi io ,
- 2. Verifying that each p develops at least 1653 gpm at a R70 system head of 338 ee
- 3. Cycling each valv in th flow path that is not testable during ,
plant operationjf.hrough a least one complete cycle of full. '
travel, and /
- 4. Verifying that the No. 1 fire pump starts to maintain the fire suppressior/ water system press re greater than or equal to 125 psig and that the No. 2 fir pump also starts automatically within 16 1 2 seconds when the f e suppression water system is not ma 6tained greater than or equ 1 to 125 psig by the No. 1 pump.
- f. At least ance per 3 years by performing a flow test of the system in accorda e with Chapter 5, Section 11 of t e Fire Protection Handbook, 14thEftion,publishedbytheNationalFire.ProtectionAssociation.
l /
" Note: /These flushes should coincide with the chlor ation of the raw l service and fire suppression. water system. T se flushes should l be run, one between April 1 and June 30, and t other between R17 l September 1 and November 15.
l Within the prescribed spring and fall test period, viation from i the six-month performance frequency is authorized. w SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-32 Amendment No. 13, 66 l January 25, 1988 1
l
l PLANT SYSTEMS i T' SPRAY AND/0R SPRINKLER SYSTEMS T;O c lCa.c.
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION r
3.7.11.2[The f llowing pray and/o sprinkler systems s 11 be OPERAB :
- a. Rea tor Buil ing - RC p mp area, A nulus
, b. xiliary uilding - lev. 669, 90, 706, 7 , 734, 749, ; 9, ABGTS Filters, TS Filters, Cont. Purge F.1ters, and 125V attery Room .
c Contr Building Elev. 9, Cable Sp eading ficom, CR air filters, and o rator livin area.
- d. Di el Genera or Buildin - Corrider ea.
- e. urbine Bui ding - Co rol Building all.
APPLICAE LITY: Wh ever equi ent protecte by the spray / rinkler system s 1 req ir to be OP BLE. l ACTION: j 1
- a. Wit one or mo e of the above required spray nd/or sprinkler systems ;
i perable, thin one hour stablish a cont nuous fire wate with ckup fire uppression eqt pment for those areas in which dundant ystems or omponents coul be damaged; fo other areas est blish an 190 hourly fi watch patrol For Spray and/ Sprinkler Syst ms inside Contain nt which are i perable as a re it of inoperabl fire detec-tion i trumentation, continuous or h rly fire watch s not re-quire when complying ith the ACTION quirements of S cifica-tion .3.3.8. Resto e the system to ERABLE status wi hin 14 days or, n lieu of any ther report requ ed by Specificat on 6.6.1, R40 pr pare and submit a Special Report o the Commission pursuant to S ecification 6.9 2 within the nex 30 days outlinin the action aken, the caus of the inoperabil ty and the plans nd schedule or restoring the stem to OPERABLE tatus.
b The provisio s of Specificatio 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 a e not appli bl e. j SU EILLANCE RE0VI MENTS
.7.11.2 Each o the above require spray and/or spri ler systems hall be demonstrated OP BLE:
- a. At east once per 31 d s by verifying tha each valve anual, p er operated or auto atic) in the flow th is in it correct l sition.
- b. At least once per 1 months by cycling ach testabl valve in th flow path through t least one complet cycle of f 1 travel.
I S2ptember 13, 1994 i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-33 Amendment No. 36, 186
a ra m -
PLANT SYSTEMS b(
SURVEILL CE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
\
\
- c. At'1, east once per 18 months:
1.
\
/
[
By performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system, and:
I a) Verifying that the automatic valves in the flo path tuate to their correct positions on a cros zone or single zone detection test signal as design d, and
\
b) Cycling each valve in the flow path that s not testable ,
during plant operation through at least one complete cycle '
i of full travel.
- 2. By visual inspe tion of the dry pipe, sp ay and sprinkler headers to verify their h tegrity, and 3.
\
By visual inspectio of each nozzle' spray pattern is not spray area to verify the structed.
l i
I i
t MAR 251982 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-34 Amendment No. 12 R16 March 25, 1982
T PL/.NT SYSTEMS
~
'Idnii
'" i
@2 SYSTEMS gQ LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION m J I
3.7.11.3P e followi g low pressu e CO2 system shall be OPE BLE. l l
- a. Computer oom.
b Auxilia y Instrument Room. i Diese Generator oms.
- d. Fu 011 Pump R ms.
- e. esel Genera r Building E ctrical Board coms. RIO)
APPLICAB ITY: Whene er equipment otected by the 02 systems is equired to be OPER LE.
ACTIO .
- a. With o e or more of e above require C07 systems i perable,
- withi one hour est lish a continuo fire watch wi h backup fire i
.supp ession equipm nt for those area in which redu dant systems o com onents could e damaged; for ot er areas, esta ish an hourly )
fi e watch patro . Restore the sy em to OPERABL status within 4 j i
d ys or, in lie of any other rep t required by pecification i
.6.1, prepare and submit a Speci 1 Report to th Commission pu suant R l to Specificat'on 6.9.2 within t next 30 days tlining the a ion j taken, the c use of the inoper ility and the ans and sched e for !
restoring t e system to OPERA E status.
The provi ions of Specifica ons 3.0.3 and 3. 4 are not ap icable.
I
' S RVEILLANCE REQ IREMENTS
/ / I I I 4.7.11.3.1 ach of the above re uired CO2 systems shall be demon trated l j OPERABLE at least once per 31 d ys by verifying t at each valve manual, po er f operated o automatic) in the l ow path is in it correct positi n.
i '
l I
)
l l
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-35 Amendment No. 36,96 January 22, 1989 l
~
C n'C PLANT SYSTEMS O d.,
(/---
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) P' 4.7.11.3.2 E4ch of the above required low pressure CO2 syste shall be demonstrated OPl BLE: 1
- a. At least on per 7 days by verifying the 2 storage tank level to be greater than and pressure to be reater than 270 psig, and j b At least once per 18 m ths by v fying:
l 1. The system valves and ciated ventilation dampers and fire l door release mechan s ac e manually and automatically, upon receipt of a imulated ac tion signal, and
- 2. Flow from ea nozzle during a " Puff .
l
)
l l
i l
i l
l l
, MAft 251982 .
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-36 Amendment No. 12 'R16
i PLANT SYSTEMS y .b FIRE HOSE STATIONS QQ,d LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
/
3.7.11.4fThefrehose ations sho n in Table .7-5 shall e OPERABLE.
APPLI BILITY/. Whenev r equipment in the area protected y the fire ose sta ons is equired o be OPERAB .
AyTION:
- a. With o e or more of he fire ho stations hown in Table 3.7-5 inope able, route - additiona equivalent capacity fire hose to the unpr tected area ( from an 0 RABLE hose station withi 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> if th inoperable f e hose is e primary eans of fire ppression; o erwise route he additio al hose wit n 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. estore the ire hose stat n to OPERA E status w hin 14 days o , in lieu of any other rep t required y Specific ion 6.6.1, pr are and subm a Special Re rt to the ommission p suant to Speci ication 6.9.2 within the ext 30 days outlining t action taken, the cause of he inoperabil ty, and the plans and s edule for rest ing the stati n l to OPERA E status.
, b. The pr isions of S ecification 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 re not apoli ble.
URVEILLANCE R UIREMENTS 4.7.11.4 E of the fi hose stati s shown in Table .7-5 shall be R1 demonstrat GPERABLE:
- a. At least o e per 31 day by visual inspecti n of the stat ons accessib1 during plant perations to assur all required equipment is at th station.
l l . At lea t once per 18 onths by:
! 1. Visual inspect'on of the stations et accessible uring plant l operations to assure all require equipment is a the statio ,
2 Removing th hose for inspecti and re-racking and
At least on per 3 years by:
- 1. Part' 11y opening each ose station valve to verify va ve OPE BILITY and no fl blockage.
- 2. C ducting a hose h rostatic test at pressure of 0 psig or
! t least 50 psig a ve maximum fire m in operating essure, hichever is grea r.
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-37 Amendment No. 36, 114, 143 July 31, 1990
i
[g {n' e a.
PLANT SYSTEMS 1
~
TABLE 3.7-5 g17 FIRE HOSE STATIONS LOCAT QN ELEVATION HOSE RACK #
- a. React r Building - Annulus Area Platform 778.5 1 96
. Platform 778.5 1-26 197 Platform 778.5 1- -1198 Platform 778.5 1 6-1199 Platform. 759.5 1200 Platform 759.5 1-26-1201 Platform 759.5 1-26-1202 '
Platform 759.5 1-26-1203 Platform 740.5 1-26-1204 Platform 740.5 1-26-1205 ,
740.5 1-26-1206 !
Platform l Platform 740.5 1-26-1207 Platform 721.5 1-26-1208 Platform 721.5 1-26-1209 Platform 721.5 1.5 1-26-1210 1-26-1211
[%
Platform
.5 1-26-1212 l Platform 7 Platform 701. 1-26-1213 Platform 701. 1-26-1214 l Platform 701. 1-26-1215 l Platform 67 .78 1-26-1216 i Platform 6 .76 1-26-1217 Platform 79.78 1-26-1218 ;
Platform 679.78 1-26-1219
- b. Reactor Building - RCP & ower Containment A Filters Area Reactor Building
- 679.78 1-26-1220 Reactor Building 679.78 1-26-1221 Reactor Building 679.78 1-26-1222 Reactor Building 679.78 1-26-1223 l 1-26-1224 Reactor Building 679.78 Reactor Building 679.78 1225
- c. Cortrol Build'r.g Control Buildi 732 0 86 Control Build' g 732 0-26-11 1 Control Buil ing. 706 0-26-118 i Control Bui ding 706 0-26-1192 MAY 4 1982 3/4 7-38 Amendment No. 13
[ SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 t
y he
~
e bYfL Mt.
c
- ~' 2. TABLE 3.7-5 (Continued) R17
..y.-
"~
\ FIRE HOSE STATIONS LOCATION y
\ ELEVATION HOSE RACK #
ControlBbfidic; 685 0 88 Centrol Buildin: 685 0-2 1193 Control Buildjr 669 0- 6-1189 Control Buildir, 669 26-1194
- d. Diesel Gener or Building
\
Corridor 722 0-26-1077 Corridor \ 740.5 0-26-1080 Air Exhaust Rm. 740.5 0-26-1082 Lube Oil Storage Room gi47 2.0-2 722 0-26-2337
- e. Additional Equipment uilding - Unit 1 South Wall 740.5 1-26-687 South Wall 706 1-26-686
- f. Auxiliary Building 1-26-669 7 2-26-664 49 1-26-664 734 2-26-670 734 0-26-684 734 1-26-670 734 0-26-682 734 1-26-671 734 Siamese utlet 1-26-672 734 1-26-665 714 0-26-660 714 1-26-666 714 0-26-677 706 0-26-658 690 0-26-690 690 661 2
Siamese Outlet 1l-690 1-2 -667 669 1 68 669 0-26-6 669 0-26-68 653 0-26-663 653 0-26-691 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-39 Amendment No. 13, 143 July 31, 1990
g e c, b~7 d '
TABLE 3.7- 5 (Continued)
O R17 FIRE HOSE STATIONS ,
LOCATION \ ELEVATION HOSE RACK #
- g. CCW Intake Pumping 5 tion
. 690 0-26-866 90 0-26-867 0-26-868 690 0-26-869 69 0-26-870
- h. ERCW Pumping Station ,
688 0-26-927 688 0-26-926 688 0-26-930 704 931
- 704 0- -925 704 0 720 0-26-929 0-26-924
('
\
720 720 0-26-932 ,
i i
e b
I l
c
,L .
~
4 MAY 4 1982 3/4 7-40 Amendment No. 13 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 l
. PLANT SYSTEMS
$.a ?ih?!
- F 3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS he.!e. e.c. '
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i
r__
J
- 3. 7.12 P All fi barrier pe trations (in luding cable enetration bar iers, fir doors and ire dampers) in fire zone oundaries pr ecting safety '
re ated area shall be fu tional.
PLICABIL Y: At all t mes. l ACTION: !
a With one o more of the o e required ire barrier pe trations !
non-funct'onal, within ne .1aur either, establish a co tinuous fire watch on at least one . ide of the aff cted penetratio , or verify the OPE ABILITY of f'.'e detectors o at least one si of the non-l functi nal fire bar er and establi h 'a hourly fire atch patrol. '
Resto e tha non-fu tional fire b rier penetration s) to functio 1 ;
stat s within 7 d s or, in lieu f any other repo required by Spe ification 6. 1, prepare and submit a Special eport to the lR40j Co mission purs nt to Specific tion 6.9.2 withi the next 30 da s /
o tlining the tion taken, th cause of the non fenctional pen - ;
o ration and p1 ns and schedul for restoring th fi ? barrier l penetration (s to functional tatus. 1
- b. The provisi ns of Specifica ions 3.0.3 and 3. .4 are not appi cable.
SURV ILLANCE REQUI EMENTS I / / 1 1
.7.12 Each o the above requi ed fire barrier pe etrations shall e verifie to be functio al:
1
- a. A least once per 1 months by a visua inspection
- b. rior to returnin a fire barrier pe tration to func ional stat i following repair or maintenance by erformance of a isual insp c-tion of the aff cted fire barrier p netration(s).
t I
I-November 23, 1984 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-41 Amendment No. 36 9
, y, a R ., ;
l l '
INSTRUMENTATION 7L, s ec c} n s jelge hg . BASES
'z .
3/4.3.3.8 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION l =
l OPER ILITY of e fire dete tion instr entation sures that adequate l warning apability available or the pro t detecti of fires. This l capabi ty is requ' red in order to detect d locate f res in the'r early l stag . Prompt tection of res will r uce the p ential for damage to saf y related uipment and is an integ al element n the over 11 facilit f e protectio program. .
In the vent that a ortion of e fire de etion inst mentation inoperable the establi ment of fr uent fire atrols in e affected reas is requir to provid detection c ability u il the ino rable inst mentati n is resto d to OPERA LITY.
l 1 hourly fi e watch patr is require that a trai ed individu be in he BR-3
(_ spec ied area a intervals o 60 minute with a marg'n of 15 min es.
i 3/4.3.3.9 l This Specification is deleted.
R152
, 3/4.3.3.10 EXPLOSIVE GAS NONITORING INSTRUMENTATION This instrumentation includes provisions for monitoring the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the waste gas holdup system. The OPER-ABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements for monitoring potentially explosive gas mixtures.
P 1
+-
R153 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-4 Amendment No. 43, 148, 149 November 25, 1992
i i PLANT SYSTEMS 34 n
BASES l
SNUBBERS (Continued) !
R43 location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 8.8 and 8.10. The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.
l 3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION I
The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak test-ing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium.
This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values. Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with surveil-lance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continu-ously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e., sealed sources within radia-tion monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.
3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS bf "'C' b E8
= -
The ERABILITY fthefiresuppNsio systems ens
- es that adequ te fire sup ession ca bility is vailable to confine and xtinguish fir s occuri in any po ion of th facility w re safety r ated equipme is locat . The fi suppress n system co ists of the ater system, pray and/ r sprinkl s, CO2 , an fire hose s tions. The ollective ca bility of t fire supp ession sys ms is adequa e to minimiz potential da ge to afety rela d equipmen and is a maj r element in he facility f re protection..
l program.
I the event at portions of the fire su ression syste are inoperabl ,
alter te backup re fighting e ipment is r uired to be ma e available i the ffected are s until the in erable equi ent is restore to service.
W n the inoper ble fire fight'ng equipment 's intended for use as a bac p i eans of fire uppression, a onger period f time is allo ed to provid an alternate me ns of fire fig ing than if e inoperable e uipment is t e primary me s of fire supp ssion. l The surveillance re uirements pro de assurance at the mini m OPERABILITY requir ents of the fir suppression stems are met.
\ \
In the event th fire suppress n water syste. becomes ino rable, immed' ate I l co rective measures ust be taken ince this syst provides t e major fire ;
ppression capabi ty of the pla . The requir ent for a enty-four ho <
report to the Co ssion provide for prompt ev uation of e acceptabil' y of the correctiv measures to p vide adequate fire suppre ion capabili y for the continued p otection of th nuclear plant June 20, 1985 R43 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-7 Amendment No. 39-
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES
(. [
f3/4./.11 FIRE SUPP/ESSION (YSTEMS ((ontinuec/)
All ourly f're watc patrols equire hat a t ined ih vidual e in the f ecifie area a interva s of 60 inutes ith a m gin of minute .
A continuo s fire tch req res th a trai d indivi ual be the speci ied area t all mes, th the sp cified ea conta n no im diment t rest ict the vements of the c ntinuou fire wa ch, and hat eac compartm nt BR-3 wit in the s cified rea is p trolled at least once eve y 15 mi tes with ma gin of 5 inutes.
A spe ified ar a for a ontinuo s fire w ch is o e or mor fire zon s ithin a ingle fi e area, hich ar easily cessibl to each ther and can be patro ed with 15 min tes. E y access is defin d as: n ic ' ecd , ors or inop rable car reader no C-Zo e entry equired, or no ha ards tha will interf re with t e conti ous fir watch a ivity b ng perf rmed with th 15-mi te perio .
__- ~ _ _
3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS '/~//g $~ec,
_g 6c d /s ) cje M T functiona integri of the fire b rrier pe trations nsures th t '
ffire will be co ined or equatel retar d from s reading t adjacent por ons of the facility. This de ign fe ure mini izes the ssibilit of a s gle fire r idly invo ing sev ral ar s of the facility p ior to de ection nd extingui ment. T fire b rier p etration are a pas ive eleme t in the facili fire pro ction p gram a are sub ect to per* odic insp tions.
Fir barrier p etratio , inc1 ing cabl penetratio barriers fire doors d dampers re consi red fu .tional w n the visu 11y obser d condi-tion s the same s the as esigne conditio For thos fire barr er penetr tions tha are not in the as-de gned c dition, evaluatio shall be erformed o s w that the odificati has n degrade the fire r ing of th fire barr er enetration.
Durin periods o time w n a barri r is not fu tional, e ther, 1) a continuoup fire wate is req red to be maintained i the vici ity of the affected tarrier, o 2) the ire detec ors on at 1 st one si of the af ected barrier /must be ve ified 0 RABLE and a hourly fir watch pa 01 establi hed, until he barrier is rest ed to fun tional statu .
All hourly ire wat h patrols equire that trained i dividual b in the sp cified area at inter als of 60 inutes with margin of 15 minutes.
A conti ous fir watch req ires that a ained indi idual be i the specified a a at al times, th t the specif d area con ain no imp iment BR-3 restrict t moveme s of the ontinuous fi watch, an that each cmpart nt within th speciff d area is atrolled at 1 ast once ev ry 15 minu es with a margin o 5 minut s.
) A pecified area for a continuous fi e watch is ne or more fire zo es l
/ withi a single fire area, which are eas ly accessib to each her aric can j
be p rolled w thin 15 mi utes. Easy a cess is defi ed as: no locked oors or operable card reade , no C-Zone e ry required or no haz rds tha will
~
l in erfere wi h the cont} uous fire wa h activity eing perfo ed wit 'n the
-minute p riod.
/
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-8 Amendment No. 39 R43 November 25, 1992
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
- c. A Radiological Control technician # shall be onsite when fuel is in the R62 reactor. .-
- d. All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either [r" a licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to FP Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation.
OI e. 'A ire rigad of at east membe s sha 1 be intai ed o ite t al t'mes.# The ire Br gade hall n t inci de th Shif Oper tion Sup R182) isor nd 2 ther m mbers f the inimu shif crew eces ary f r sa e '
hutd n of he un or a y pers nnel r quire for ther ssen ial 1 func ons d ring fire ergen y. ] R62 e
- f. The. Operations Superintendent shall hold a Senior Reactor Operator R160 license.
- g. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety-related functions (i.e., senior reactor operators, reactor operators, assistant unit operators, Radiological Control, and key maintenance personnel).
Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overtime. The objective shall be to have operating personnel work a normal 8-hour day, 40-hour week while the unit is operating. However, in the event that unforseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for refuel-R156 ing, major maintanance, or major plant modification, on a temporary basis the following guidelines shall be followed:
- 1. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> straight, excluding shift turnover time.
- 2. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in any 24-hour period, nor more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in any 48-hour period, nor more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any 7-day period, all excluding shift turnover time.
- 3. A break of at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> should be allowed between work periods, including shift turnover time, i 4. Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of overtime should be considered on an individual basis and not for the entire staff l on a shift.
Any deviation from the above guidelines shall be authorized in advance by the Plant Manager or his designee, in accordance with approved administrative R182 procedures, or by higher levels of management, in accordance with established procedures and with documentation of the basis for granting the deviation.
Controls shall be included in the procedures such that individual overtime shall be reviewed monthly by the Plant Manager or his designee to assure that excessive hours have not been assigned. Routine deviation from the above guidelines is not authorized. offs c.
- The Radiological Control technician God fi,e bi Nade uvmpus;d es)may be R62 Sh;a in -ini = rc=iremente for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in order to accommodate unexpected absence provided immediate action is taken to fill the required positions. March 31, 1994 6-2 Amendment No. 32, 58, 74, 152, 156 178
. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 l
j V -
k ::
4 h5 Le
~ ,
(13) Fire Protection ri;te;;; 'Sectier, 0.Z !
' k2 fa. VA shall aintain in effect and ully impi ment all provi-sions of he approv fire prot tion plan and the C staff'
- Fire P tection Re ew in the quoyah S ety Eval ation Re-i g port nd Suppleme ts.
- b. TV shall repl e the contr room ce ing pane s with pa is A ceptable to RC by Septe r 30,1 1.
4 l c. TVA shall oply with Se ion III. , III.J, I.L and I I.0 of i Appendix of 10 CFR 50 except w ere NRC h approved devia-I tions, o a schedule e nsistent ith that quired fo other
, operati g reactors. y October 1, 1981, A shall s it a J '
repor that identif s and ju- ifies dif rences be een exis ng or propos fire pr ection fe tures and ose fea i
tur s specified i Section I.G, III. , III.L an III.0 o
( Ap endix R to 10 FR Part .
(14) Como11ance With Reaulatory Guide 1.97 TVA shall implement modifications necessary to comply with Revi-sion 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and R45 ,
Following an Accident," dated December 1980 by startup from the j Unit 2 Cycle 4 refueling outage. /
l- (15) Corrosion of Carbon Steel Pioina TVA shall carry out a surveillance program on corrosion of carbon steel piping in accordance with TVA document SQRD-50-328/81-10
- dated August 25, 1981, and procedures for implementation are to be
- submitted for NRC concurrence by October 15, 1981.
, (16) NUREG-0737 Conditions (Section 22.2)
Each of the following conditions shall also be performed to the satisfaction of the NRC:
I a. Shift Technical Advisor (Section 22.2. I. A.1.1)
TVA shall provide a fully-trained on-shift technical advisor to the shift operations supervisor.
l
- b. Independent Safety Enaineerina Group (Section 22.2. I.B.1.21 TVA shall have an onsite Independent Safety Engineering Group.
4 i
i March 31, 1994 Amendment No. 45,169
.. _ - . _ . . - . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . ~ . . . _ _ . . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ . . _ . - . . . . _
l i i l
l l
INSERT A . '
TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire I
. protection program referenced in Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's Final Safety Analysis Report and as approved in NRC Safety Evaluation Reports contained in NUREG-OO11, Supplements 1,2, and 5, NUREG-1232, Volume 2, and NRC letters dated May 29 and l l ' October 6,1986, subject to the following provision: )
i TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program without ,
prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely - l l affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a l fire.
1 l
i I
i i
i I
I l
3 l
l l
l i -
i .
l l INDEX >
g...
'3 P LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
SECTION PAGE r
3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE..................................... 3/4 2-1 [
4 3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX. HOT CHANNEL FACT 0R.............................. 3/4 2-4 j l 3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY HOT CHANNEL FACT 0R....................... 3/4 2-8 i 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATI0................................. 3/4 2-10 R130 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS............................................ 3/4 2-13 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION l
3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION....................... 3/4 3-1 ;
3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION......................................... 3/4 3-14 ;
3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation...................... 3/4 3-40 Movable Incore Detectors.'................................. 3/4 3-44 i f
Seismic Instrumentation................................... 3/4 3-45 Meteorological Instrumentation............................ 3/4 3-48 Remote Shutdown Instrumentation........................... 3/4 3-51 :
Chlorine Detection Systems (Deleted) 3/4 3-55 RS4 l l Accident Monitoring Instrumentation....................... 3/4 3-56 fireDetecticaIn:trumentati63n........................... 3/4 3-59 l h h.4e , 1 (Deleted).................................................
3/4 3-68 R134 l Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation.................. 3/4 3-69 1
l l
I V Amendment No. 54, 130, i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 134 November 16,19%!jf93 l i
1 l
I INDEX i
$<,s.,;.
i LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE l
3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM 1
Essential Raw Cooling Water System........................ 3/4 7-13 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK........................................ 3/4 7-14
-/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION.......................................... 3/4 7-15 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-17 3/4.7.8 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM................... 3/4 7-19 3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS.................................................. 3/4 7-21 l 3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION............................... 3/4 7-41 l 3/4 7.11 ff!RC SUPPRESS!0M SYSTE"S' Tire Suppre:;ien k' ster Sy:t:SI............................ 3/4 7-43 l
'S Spr y and/or Spr nkler Sy:te- 3/4 7-45
'{4 i l 'CO SY tC 2(l * * * * * * - 3/4 7~47 2 7 Fi re Me: St:ti er.t........................................ 3/4 7-48
. I' 3/4.7.12 [IRESARRIERPEMETo^T!0NS)................................ 3/4'7-52 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES 0perating................................................. 3/4 8-1 Shutdown.................................................. 3/4 8-9 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS A. C. Di stri bution - Operati ng. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-10 A.C. Distribution - Shutdown.............................. 3/A 8-11 D.C. Distribution - Operating............................. 3/4 8-12 4
D.C. Distribution - Shutdown.............................. 3/4 6-15 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 IX i
'INDEX BASES SECTION Pl.GE 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM ........................ B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK......................................... B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION........................................... B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM.................. B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.8 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM.................... B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS................................................... B 3/4 7-5 .
3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION................................ B 3/4 7-6a 3/4.7.l p IRC 5"PPRESSION SYSTC t d................................... B 3/4 7-7
,f!RC OARRIER PENETRATION ,.. .............................. B 3/4 7-7 3 /4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 and 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS............................................................. B 3/4 8-1 3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES.................... B 3/4 8-2 _~ '
3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION........................................ B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION............................................ B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME................................................. B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS.......................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS............................................. B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE.......................................... B 3/4 9-2 i R194 l 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL PIT AREA (DELETED)............... B 3/4 9-2 l 3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION.............. B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM................... B 3/4 9-2 1 l June 14, 1995 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 XIV Amendment No. 194
p __ _ (T%s Spe&che,, ;s cle)dd Th> - 4- INSTR'UMENTATION l - l i5 t
%?%: a\ So cbe Iebe c{ #
" FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION
^
~ -- -- '
l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1 _1 3.3.3.8kAsami mum, the ire detecti instrumen ation for ach fire l rdetect n zone own in Ta e 3.3-11 sh 11 be OPER BLE. ApPLLCABILITY- Whenever quipment pr etted by e fire det ction instru nt is quired o be OPERA 8 E.# A ION: ith the umber of OP RABLE fire tection i trument(s) ess than the inimum number ERABLE requ rement of T le 3.3-11: l Within 1 hour establi h a fire w tch patrol inspect the one(s) with t inoperable nstrument( ) at least o ce per hour, nless the instr ent(s) is lo ated insid the contain ent, then ins ct the , cont nment at lea t once per 8 hours or m itor the cont inment air , tem rature at le st once pe hour at the ocations list d in Sp ification 4. 1.5. l b. R store the in erable ins rument(s) to PERABLE statu within 4 days or, i lieu of an other report required by Sp cifica- . g tion 6.6.1, p epare and ubmit a Speci 1 Report to th Commission lR28 pursuant to pecificati 6.9.2 withi the next 30 da s outlining the action aken, the use of the in perability and the plans a d schedule r restorin the instrumen (s) to OPERABL status.
. The prov sions of Sp ifications 3. 3 and 3.0.4 a not appli ble.
SUR ILLANCE RE IREMENTS ; ; ; i f I
.3.3.8.1 Ea h of the abov required fir detection inst uments whic are ccessible d ring operatio shall be dem strated OPERAB at least ce per 6 months by performance of a CHANNEL FUN TIONAL TEST. F re detectio which are not a assible durin plant operati n shall be demo strated OPE ABLE by the perf ance of a CH NEL FUNCTIONA TEST during ea COLD SHUT WN exceedi 24 hours unie s performed i the previous 6 onths.
4.3.3. .2 The.NFPA S andard 720 sup rvised circuits supervision associated l with he detector al rms of each of the above requi d fire det tion instr ment shall be demo trated OPERAB at least once er 6 months
- 4. .3.8.3 The non supervised cir uits between th local fire protection p nels and actuat d equipment sh 11 be demonstra ed OPERABLE t least on per months.
# The fire dete ion instrument located withi the contai ent are not required to be OPERAB during the pe formance of Ty A Containm nt Leakage te Tests.
I November 23, 1984 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-59 Amendment No. 28
2 TABLE 3.3-11 2 IIRE DEIECTION INSTRIMENTS l MININUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE ~ g FIRE Ionization Photoelectric Thermal Infrared' q ZONE INSTRUMENT LOCATION
~ 5
' Diesel Gen. Re. 28-B, El. 722 l
' Diesel Gen. Re. 28-B, El. 722 5-i 2 5 3 Diesel Gen. Rs. 18-B, El.~722 Diesel Gen. Rm. 18-B, El. 722 .
5 5 Diesel Gen. Rs. 2A-A, El. 722 5 6 'esel Gen. Rs. 2A-A, EI. 722 5 7 Die 1 Gen. Rs. lA-A, El. 722 5 8 Diesel n. Rm. IA-A, El. 722 1 9 Lube Oil age Ms. El. 722 1 , 10 tube Oil Stora Re. El. 722 1 11 Fuel Oil Transfer El. 722 1 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Re. 722 - 6 M 13 Diesel Gen. Corridor, El. 14 - Air Intake & Exhaust Re.' 2B, 740.5 / 9
.['
Y 15 Air Intake & Exhaust Rs. 18, El. 0.5 / 9
$ 16 Air intake & Exhaust Re. 2A, EI. 74 .
Air Intake & Exhaust Rs. lA, El. 740.5 /
/ 9 9
7' I 17 Diesel Gen. 28-B Relay Bd. El. 722 3 k 18 19 20 Diesel Gen. 18-B Relay Bd. El. 722. Diesel Gen. 2A-A' Relay Bd. El. 72 3 h 21 Diesel Gen. 1A-A Relay Bd. El. 722 3 ' 1' 740.5 2 22 Diesel Gen. Bd. Rs. 2B-8,
- 1. 740.5 2 l k 23 Diesel Gen. Bd. Rs. 28-24 Diesel Gen. Bd. Rs. IP , El. 740.5 2 1 D
Diesel Gen. Bd. Rs.4 B-8, El. 740.5 2 A 25 26 Diesel Gen. Bd...Rin. 2A-A, El. 740.5 2 2 27 Diesel Gen ydI Re. 2A-A, El. 740.5 2B Diesel Gert:' Bd. Rs. lA-A, El. 740.5 2 29 DieseJAfen. Bd. Re. lA-A, El. 740.5
/
/-
m # 0 xi. J
l.IAb' TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued) ' ' FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS 5 z i FIRE MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE / g ZONE INSTRUMENT LOCATION Ionization Photoelectric Thern)rF Infrared d Cable Spreading Rs. C7-C11, E1. 706 14 rv 31 Cable Spreading Rs. C7-011, El. 706 14 32 Cable Spreading Rs. C7-C11. El. 706 14 33 le Spreading Rs. C7-C11, El. 706 14 34 Cab preading Rs. C3-C7, E1. 706 14 35 Cable 5 ading Re. C3-C7, El. 706 14 41 Cont. Spra ump 2A-A E1. 653 2 42 Cont. Spray P 28-B E1. 653 2 45 RHR Pump 2A-A El. 3 2 46 RilR Pump 2B-B El. 65 w 47 Aux. Bldg. Corridor, El. 53 N 10 (g - l 48 Corridor, Control Bldg. El. 69 4 O { w 49 Corridor, Control Bldg. El. 6 4
)
J. 50 Mech. Equip. Rm. Col. C1, E1. 66 2 ( 51 Mech. Equip. Rm. Col. C1, E1. 669 2 R86 52 Mech. Equip. Rm. Col. C3, El. 2 53 Mech. Equip. Rm. Col. C3, E . 669 54 55 250-V Batt. Rm. 1, E1. 6 250-V Batt. Rs.'1, E 3 2 h 3 69 3 56 250-V Batt. Bd. R 1, El. 669 4 57 250-V Batt. B 58
- m. 1, El. 669 250-V Batt d. Re. 2, El. 669 2 7' 59 250-V B . Bd. Rm. 2, El. 669 2 h 2
60 250- att. Rm. 2, El. 669 3 EF 61 -V Batt. Rm. 2, El. 669 $$ 62 24-V & 48-V Batt. Rs. El. 669 3 p n& 63 24-V & 48-V Batt. Rm. El. 669 3 3 Q =
- $ 24-V & 48-V Batt. Bd. Rm. El. 669 2 U"
65 24-V & 48-V Batt. Bd. Rm. El. 669 2 h~ o 66 Communications Rm. El. 669 4 G' 67 Communications Rm. El. 669 4 E$ 68 Mech. Equip. Rm. E1. 669 2 69 Mech. Equip. Rm. El. 669 2 70 Aux. Lidg. AS-All, Col.W-X, El. 669 5 '- 71 Aux. Bldg. AS-All, Col.W-X, El. 669 5 '
TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)
@ FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS 9
R
, IRE MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE 2 INSTRUMENT LOCATION Ionization
- c. Photoelectric Thermal Infrared 5
d 74 Aux. FWPT 2A-5, El. 669 1 m 75 . FWPT 2A-S, El. 669 f l 82 SI Chrg Pop Res. El 669 83 SI P Rs. 2A, El. 669 1
/ 5 84 SI Pump 2B, E1. 669 1 85 Chrg. Pump 2A, El. 669 1 86 Chrg. Pump Re. , El. 669 1 87 Chrg. Pump Rm. 2C, 1. 669 1 88 Aux. Bldg. Corridor -A8, El. 669 8 89 Aux. Bldg. Corridor Al- E1. 669 8 m 90 Aux. Bldg. Corridor A8-Al , 1. 669 -
} 91 Aux. Bldg. Corridor A8-A15, 669 8 i w 92 Aux. Bldg. Corridor Col. U-W, E . 669 4 i
a N 93 Aux. Bldg. Corridor Col. V-W, El. 4 .--.--_. 96 Valve Galley, Elev. 669 2 P 97 Valve Galley, Elev. 669 2 b 100 Cont. Purge Air Filter, E1. 690 2 2 101 Cont. Purge Air Filter, E1. 6 2 2 R86 104 Pipe Galley, El. 690 4 105 Pipe Galley, El. 690 106 Aux. Bldg., El. 690 107 Aux. Bldg., El. 6 8 8 -i
% i 108 Radio Chemical ab. Area, El. 690 3 3- t 109 Radio Chem' Lab. Area, El. 690 3 N'y 110 Aux. B1 . Al-A8, Col. Q-U, E1. 690 10 Eg 111 Aux. dg. Al-A8, Col. Q-U, El. 690
*g
!l 112 A . Bldg. A8-A15, Col. Q-U, El. 690 10 9 G g 113 ux. Bldg. A8-A15, Col. Q-U, El. 690 9 P 114 Waste Pkg. Area, El. 706 3 g: 11 Waste Pkg. Area, E1. 706 3 f Gm 6 Cask Loading Area, El. 706 2
%m 117 Cask Loading Area, El. 706 2
. j.y lh w TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)
R _g FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS , 5 x
' FIRE MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE ,
E ZONE INSTRUMENT LOCATION Ionization Photoelectric Thermal Infrared i 4 n 118 Fuel Storage Area, El. 706 2 119 N uel Storage Area. E1. 706 2 120 ABGTS *1ter, El. 714 1 1 ! 121 ABGTS Fi r, El. 714 1 1 122 - Add. Eqpt. g., El. 706 & 717.5 6 . 124 Add. Equip. 81 . E1. 706 6 - g 126 ABGTS Rs., El. 7 2 g 127 A8GTS Rs., El. 714 2
- g. 128 ABGTS Re., E1. 714 2 '
a w 129 A8GTS Rs., El. 714 2 R86- _) 130 Vent. & Purge Air Rs., El. 14 j
,o w 131 Vent. & Purge Air Rs., E1. 7 3 ( i Vent. & Purge Air Re., El. 714 J, 132 3 i e w 133 Vent. & Purge Air Rs., El. 714 3 %
$ 134- Aux. Bldg. A5-A11, Col. U-W, El. 71 7 N 135 Aux. Bldg. AS-All, Col. V-W, El. 7 136 Heat. & Vent. Rs., E1. 714 4 137 Heat. & Vent. Rs., El. 714 4 ggg sa 138 139 Heat.
Heat.
& Vent. Rs., El. 7
& Vent. Ra., El 14 4
4 3 . g
@k h 140 Above Hot Instr. R , El. 714 .-+--
)
ggg 141 Above Hot Instr ., El. 714 1 7. [ 4 "g<+ 142 Aux. Bldg. A 8, Col. Q-U, El. 714 12 Q 143 ' Aux. Bldg. 1-A8, Col. Q-U, El. 714 12 ,
. A8-A15, Col. Q-U, E1. 714 i Na, -
gg 144 145 146 Aux; 81 Aux. dg. A8-A15, Col. Q-U, El. 714 torage Area, El. 706 4 9 9 m $] Jo 147 BGTS Filter, El. 714 1 1 C 148 ABGTS Filter, El. 714 1 1 I'Y 14 Cable Spreading Rs. C3-C7, El. 706 15 10 Cable Spreading Rs. C3-C7, El. 706 15
'i = 151 VCT Room 2A, El. 690 1- 1 152 VCT Room 2A, El. 690 1 1 R137 ,
1
, I i
_ _ , , . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ ~ . - _ ._ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . - - . _ _ _ _ . _. _
TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued) FIRE DETECTION INSTRUM.E!Wi a 2-FIRE MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE [ INSTRUMENT LOCATION Ionization Photoelectric Therma [ Infrared z t G 153 Add. Equip. Bldg., El. 740.5 4 m 154 dd. Equip. Bldg., El. 740.5 6 155 R el Rs. El. 734~ 19 158 RB ss Rs. El. 734 2 ,/ 159 RB Acce Rs. El. 734 2 / R86 160 SG Blwdn. El. 734 4 161 SG Blwdn. Rs. 734 4 /-' 162 EGTS Rs. El. 734 3 / 163 EGTS Rs. El. 734 3 / ' 164 EGTS Filter A, El. 734 / 1 2 165 EGTS Filter A, El. 734 / 1 2 R 166 EGTS Filter B, El. 734 / 1 2 Y 167 172 EGTS Filter B, El. 734 Mech. Equip. Rm., El. 734 1 1 2
/
C4 b I E 173 Mech. Equip. Rs., El. 734 1 p j 174 175 176 Mech. Eqpt. Rs. El. 734 Mech. Eqpt. Rs. El.734 480-V SD Bd. Rs. lAl, El. 734 1 1 2 I (41 177 480-V SD Bd. Rs. lAl, El. 2 178 480-V SD Bd. Rs. IA2, E 734 g 179 480-V SD Bd. Re. lA2 . 734 2 180 480-V SD Bd. Rs. 1 , El. 734 2 b 181 182 480-V SD Bd. Rm 480-V SD Bd. B1 El. 734
. 182 El. 734 2
3 kg i / j , gx 183 480-V SD . Rs. 1B2 El. 734 3 !
.4 184 6.9KV S . Rs. A El. 734 7 Q D Ew 5 ."
185 186 6.9K 6 D Bd. Rs. A El. 734 V SD Bd. Rs. 8 El. 734 7 7 (Q / i R173
%~
z$ 187 188
.9KV SD Bd. Rs. B El. 734 480-V SD Bd. Rs. 2Al El. 734 7
2 h '. R86
?" 189 480-V SD Bd. Rs. 2Al El. 734 2 ;
- c. 19 480-V SD Bd. Rs. 2A2 El. 734 3
] T 191 480-V'SD Bd. Rs. 2A2 El. 734 3 k _
- ~ - ~ -
, TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued) b FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS e FIR MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE ZONE INSTRUMENT LOCATION Ionization Photoelectric Therma. Infrared
" 192 480- D Bd. Rm. 2B1 E1. 734 2 193 480-V S Bd. Rs. 281 El. 734 2 194 480-V SD Re. 282.E1. 734 2 195 480-V SD Bd. . 2B2 El. 734 196 125-V Batt. Bd. m. I, El. 734 2
1 f j/ 197 125-V Batt. Bd. I, El. 734 198 125-V Batt. Bd. Rm. , E1. 734 1- / 199 125-V Batt. Bd. Rm. II, El. 734 1 1
,/
200 201 125-V Batt. Bd. Rm. III, . 734 125-V Batt. Bd. Rm. III, E1. 734 1
/
[ 1 125-V Batt. Bd. Rm. IV, El. 7 202 { 203 125-V Batt. Bd. Rm. IV, E1. 734 -I 1[ Y 204 Aux. CR El. 734 2 j
$ 205 Aux. CR El. 734 '
206 Aux. CR Inst. Rm. lA, E1. 734 2 I f 207 Aux. CR Inst. Rm. lA, E1. 734 1 208 Aux. CR Inst. Rm. 18, El. 734 1 1
% R86' 209 Aux. CR Inst. Rm. IB, El. 734 1 210 Aux. CR Inst. Rm. 2A, E1. 734 211 Aux. CR Inst. Rm. 2A, El. 73 1 212 . Aux. CR Inst. Rm. 28, El. 7 1
1 p~ I 213 Aux. CR Inst. Rm. 28, E 214 Mech. Equip. Rm.. El. 32 734 5 1 h. 215 Mech. Equip. Rm., . 732 5 ' k'E 216 CR Filter- B, El 32 1 EE 217 CR Filter B, . 732 1 1 p R86 Q i 1 R& 218 CR Filter , El. 732 1 1
*3 CR Filt A, El. 732 7
219 220 Main , El. 732 25 1 1 h
-I 221 Tec ical Support Center, El. 732 5 7 222 T hnical Support Center, El. 732 5 R86
$$ 225 elay Bd. Rm. El. 732 13 226 Elec. Cont. Bds. El. 732 11
_ .___ _ ._____.___.-__m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ . _ _ _ _____.____.___._m- _ _ _ _
4 M TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)
@ FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS
?
E
, FIRE e ZONE MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPER M INSTRUMENT LOCATION Ionization Photoelectric T)(rmal Infrared 7 Operator Living Area, E1. 732 7 1 22 Operator Living Area, El. 732 8 229 Main CR Bds., E1. 732 9 230 233 CR
. CR Bds. L-4A, 4C, lit. & 10, El. 734 pt. Rm., El. 759 9
4 / [ 234 CRDM Eq Rm., El. 759 4 / 235 CRDM Equip. m., E1. 759 236 CRDM Equip. Rm. E1. 759 4 / t 237 Mech. Eqpt. Rm., 749 4/ f 238 Mech. Eqpt. Rm., El. 49 - f 1 R' 239 Mech. Eqpt. Rm., El. 7 / 2 I 240 Mech. Eqpt. Rm., E1. 749 ' 2 Y 241 480-V XFMR Rm. 1A, E1. 749 9 1 3
$ 242 480-V XFMR Rm. 1A, E1. 749 3 0 ~ -. {
243 480-V XFMR Rm. 18, El. 749 244 245 480-V XFMR Rm. 1B, El. 749 480-V XFMR Rm. 2A, El. 749 3 3 f [ I R86 3 - 246 480-V XFMR Rm. 2A, E1. 7J 3 247 \ 480-V XFMR Rm. 28, El '149 3 J 248 480-V XFMR Rm. 28 . 749 4 ( 249 125-V Batt. Rm. , E1. 749 kF 250 251 125-V Batt. 125-V Bat
. I, E1. 749
- m. II, El. 749 1
1 h ) 1 pD '/ i E@ 252 125-V B . Rm. II, El. 749 1
!; @ 253 125- att. Rm. III, E1. 749 1 x@ 254 1 Batt. Rm. III, E1. 749 1 Q 7 255 5-V Batt. Rm. IV, El. 749
*l 256 125-V Batt. Rm. IV, El. 749 1
1 h G' 257 480-V Bd. Rm. 1B, El. 749 4 !
$M 2 480-V Bd. Rm. 18, El. 749 4 59 480-V Bd. Rm. lA, El. 749 4 "
260 480-V Bd. Rm. 1A, El. 749 4 261 480-V Bd. Rm. 2A, El. 749 4 ,
^
D D .t
.),['N TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)
E g FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS x 5 '
. FIRE ZONE MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE INSTRUMENT LOCATION Ionization Photoelectric Thermal Infrared
" 262 480-V Bd. Rm. 2A, El. 749 4 263 480-V Bd. Rm. 2B, El. 749 4 264 480-V Bd. Rm. 2B, EI. 749 4 267 . Inst. Rm., El. 685 8 268 Aux. st. Rm., E1. 685 269 Compute m. E1. 685 9 4
270 Computer R 1. 685 , 271 Aux. Inst. Rm. ~ 685 /4 8 272 Aux. Inst. Rm. El. 85
/
/ 9 273 Computer Rm. Corrido , El. 685 M 3 /
276 Intake Pump Sta. El. 69 670.5 277 ERCW Pump Sta. El. 704 15 / Y 296 Aux. CR Bds. L-48, 40, & 11B 734 21 / 8 O 297 6 / Main CR Bds. El. 732 9 -' 298 Common MCR Bds. El.732 9 332 Reactor Building Annulus . 3 n86 333 Reactor Building Annulus 353 4 Lwr. Compt. Coolers, E1. 693 4 355 Upr. Compt. Coolers, E1. 778 t 358 359 RCP 2 E1. 693 RCP 2 El. 693 4 2 C 362 RCP 1 E1. 693 2 ( N EE 363 366 RCP 1 El. 693 2 2 ( p'}-.- RCP 3 El. 693 / 4R 367 RCP 3 El. 693 2 7 370 371 RCP 4 El. 693 2 2 M 3 RCP 4 El. 69
*E 374 Reactor ding Annulus 2 N '
% 375 20 3 React Building Annulus 19 f
LM 387 T ine Cont. Bldg. Wall, El. 706 1 427 25-V Batt. Rm. V, El. 74 9 18 2 8 428 125-V Batt. Rm. V, El. 749 2 g P i
$ TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)
' FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS S! .'
E
. FIR c- ZONE MINIMUM INSTRUMENT $ OPERABLE INSTRUMENT LOCATION Ionization
- Photoelectric , Thermal Infrared
, 458 Coun Room Ceiling, El. 690
" 2 462 480V Sd Rm 182, El. 734 463 1 480V Sd Bd A2, El. 734 465 1 Counting Room C ' ing, E1. 690 2 466 480V'Sd Bd Rm 182, . 734 1 467 480V Sd Bd Rm 182, El. 34 468 1 480V Sd Bd Rm IB2, E1. 7 469 1 R86 480V Sd Bd Rm 2A2, E1. 734 470 1 480V Sd Bd Rm 2A2, El. 734 471 480V Sd Bd Rm 2A2, El. 734 .1 1
Y R /
* /
/ ,
i
/ >
r
+&-
L t hp ag i IM 3 l i E m .n
'4 F2 l -P s
e,.U l/ : b ( .
4 + ELANT SYSTEMS i g , 3[.%h.' 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM h r LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ! ) 3.7.11.16 The fire uppression ter system 11 be OPERA LE with: i
- a. Two fir suppression umps, each w h a capaci of 1653 gpm, ith 1 R58 l
their d scharge ali ed to the fi suppressi header, and I j . An OP BLE flow p th capable of taking suc on from the for bay and ansferring ae water thro gh distrib ion piping with PERABLE g 73 ! see onalizing c trol or isol tion valve up to the first alve off th loop header hat isolate: 1 Spray and/ r Sprinkler stem (s) re ired to be OPE LE per Specifica ion 3.7.11.2 r
- 2. Hose st ndpipe(s) re ired to be PERABLE per Spec ication 3.7.11 4.
APPLIC BILITY: A all times. , ACTIO :
- a. With nly one pump PERABLE, re tore the inoperab e equipment to OPE BLE status w hin 7 days , in lieu of any otner report R28 req ired by Speci ication 6.6 , prepare and su it a Special port to he Commissio pursuant t Specification 6.9 2 within the xt 30 d s outlining he plans an( procedures to be sed to restor the operable equ pment to OP ABLE status or to rovide an alt rnate ackup pump o supply. Th provisions of Sp ifications 3. 3 and 3.0.4 are no applicable.
R178
- b. With the fi e suppressi water system oth rwise inopera e (the l provisions of Specific ion 3.0.4 are not applicable): ,
- 1. Esta ish a backu fire suppression ater system w hin 24 hour , and
- 2. In ieu of any her report requi ed by Specific tion 6.6.1, s it a Speci Report in accor ance with Spec ication 6.9. :
) By teleph e within 24 hour ,
b) Confirme by telegraph, a lgram or facsi ile transmis on no later t n the first work ng day followi the event, nd
^
.z y
3/4 7-43 Amendment No. B8, 58, 178 SEQUOYAH UNIT 2 September 13, 1994
~ m PLANT SYSTEMS a. e hn ,h LM ACTION: (Continued) c) In writing within 14 days following the event, ou ining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and he plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERA E status.
SURVE4LLANCE REQUIREMENTS s 4.7.11.1 The fire suppression water system shall be demon rated OPERABLE:
- a. A least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST ASIS by starting each el' tric motor driven pump and operating it or at least 15 minutes on r circulation flow,
- b. At lea t once per 31 days by verifying s at each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow pat is in its correct position.
- c. At least o e per 6 months by perfo ance of a system flush. R4
- d. Atleastonce\per12monthsbycclingeachtestablevalveinthe flow path throu h at least one omplete cycle of full travel,
- e. At least once pe 18 months y performing a system. functional test which includes si ' lated a omatic actuation of the system throughout -
its operating seque e, a d- u. l
- 1. Verifying that e\a automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct p s tion,
- 2. Verifying that'each ump develops at least 1653 gpm at a I
- system head 338 fe , R58
- 3. Cycling ea valve in t flow path that is not testable during plant ope tion through ' least one complete cycle of full ,
travel, nd j
- 4. Verify ng that the No. 1 fi pump starts to maintain the fire
, suppr ssion water system pres ure greater than or equal to i 125 sig, and that the No. 2 f e pump starts automatically wi in 10 1 2 seconds if the fi suppression water system is n maintained at greater than or qual to 125 psig by the
- o. 1 pump.
- f. At east once per 3 years by performing a low test of the system in ac ordance with Chapter 5, Section 11 of t Fire Protection Handbook, ;
1 th Edition, published by the National Fire rotection Association.
- Note: ese flushes should coincide with the chlorinati of the raw service and fire suppression water system. These flushes s uld be run, one R4 between April 1 and June 30, and the other between S tember 1 and November 15. f ,
Within the prescribed spring and fall test period, devia 'on from the y six month performance frequency is authorized. SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-44 Amendment . 4, 58 January 25, 88
l PLANT SYSTEMS ( E'4 ,e~ep . [$
~
SPRAY AND/0R SPRINKLER SYSTEMS i r ( LIMITING l CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.11.2he foi owing spray and/or spri kler systems hall be OPE LE:
. React Buil' ding RC pump are , Annulus l L' . Auxi iary Buildi g - Eley. 6 , 690, 706, 14, 734, 749 759, ABGTS l Filters. EGTS Filter , Cont. Purge Filters, and 12 V Battery Ro s.
! c. ontrol Buil ing - Elev 669, Cable reading Room, MCR air filter , l and perator livi g area. l
- d. Diesel Ge rator Build g - Corrider Area.
1
. Turbine uilding - C trol Buildin Wall.
APP CABILITY: henever equ pment protect d by the spray sprinkler syst m is re ired to be PERABLE. ! ACTION:
- a. Wi h one or no e of the abov required spray and/or sprink r systems i operable, w hin one hour stablish a con inuous fire w ch with ackup fire ppression eqt paent for thos areas in whi redundant systems or uponents coul be damaged; f other areas stablish an R17 3 l hourly fir watch patrol. For Spray and/ r Sprinkler S stems inside i Containme which are in perable as a re uit of inoper le fire l detection instrumentati , a continuous or hourly fir watch is not i required when complyin with the ACTI requirements f Specifica-tion 3. 3.8. Restor the system to ERABLE statu within 14 day or, in ieu of any o er report requ ed by Specifi ation 6.6.1, R28 prepa and submit Special Report o the Comiss on pursuant to Spec ication 6.9. within the next 30 days out11 ing the action l
tak , the cause o the inoperabil ty and the pl s and schedule for re oring the sys em to OPERABLE atus.
- b. T e provisions f Specification .0.3 and 3.0. are not appli bl e.
SURVEIL CE REQUIREME S 4.7.1 .2 Eachofth!aboverequired ray and/or sp inkler systems shall be l demo trated OPERAB : !
, a. At least nce per 31 days y verifying t at each valve manual ,
i power op rated or automat c) in the flo path is in i correct positio .
- b. At lea t once per 12 m nths by cycli each testabl valve in th flow !
l- path rough at least one complete c cle of full t vel . , l September 13, 1994 SEQUOYAH UNIT 2 3/4 7-45 Amendment No. 28,178
1 t Tce Eek Puz PLANT 5YSTEMS ( , SURVEILLANC EQUIREMENTS (Continued) I l
- c. At least on per 18 months:
- 1. By performi a system functional t which includes simulated automatic actu on of the syste , and:
a) Verifying that aut atic valves in the flow path actuate to their c et positions on a cross zone or ;
- single zone detec on st signal as designed, and '
l b) Cycling each lve in the f path that is not testable during pla operation through least one complete cycle l of full avel.
- 2. By visua nspection of the dry pipe, spray a prinkler headers to ver y their integrity, and l 3. B visual inspection of each nozzle's spray area to ve ify the l ray pattern is not obstructed.
t s 1 i I-l f v SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-46
l l I,y:-
~
PLANT SYSTEMS A1 l F L/t.\ d~co. Q SYSTEMS 2 r LIMITINGl CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 1 1 3.7.11.3 The follo ng low press e CO systems shall be OPE BLE. 2
. Compute Room
- b. Auxili ry Instrument oom i
- c. Diese Generator Ro ms
- d. Fuel Oil Pump Roo
- e. I Di el Generator uilding Elect cal Board Ro s lR85 j APPLICABIL Y: Whenever equipment prot cted by the C systems is r quired to be OPERAB . 2 ACTION:
With withinoneehourestab1'shacontinuosfifewatchwihbackupfire r more of the bove require C0 systems in perable, suppre sion equipment for those ar s in which red dant systems o compo ents could be amaged; for her areas, est lish an hourl fir watch patrol. Restore the stem to OPERAB status withi da 14 6. or, in lieu o any other r ort required b Specification 1, prepare a submit a Sp cial Report to e Commission rsuant R28
! Specificatio aken, the cau 6.9.2 within the next 30 day outlining the action I of the inop rability and th plans and sch dule for restoring the ,ystem to OP ABLE status.
b. The provisi s of Specif' ations 3.0.3 an 3.0.4 are no applicable. SURVi LLANCE REQUIR ENTS
/ / / /
4
.11.3.1 Eac of the abov required 00 sy 7 tems shall be demonstrated ERABLE at le t once per days by verTfy ng that each alve (manual, perated or a omatic) in wer e flow path is n its correc position.
4.7.11.3.2 ach of the ove required 1 pressure C0 systems shall e demonstrat OPERABLE: a. At least on . per 7 days by erifying the C07storage ta level to be greater han 50% and pr ssure to be eater than 27 psig, and l At least nce per 18 mon s by verify g:
- 1. T 1 system valves and associat d ventilation ampers and f' e '
or release me anisms actua e manually an automatica11 , pon receipt of a simulated ctuation sign , and
- 2. Flow from ea nozzle duri g a " Puff Tes ."
l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-47 Amendment No. 28, 85 January 22, 1989
PLANT SYSTEMS t i FIRE HOSE STATIONS LIMITING (CONDITIONFOROPERATION 3.7.ll.4jhefir hose statio s shown in ble 3.7-5 all be OP ABLE. APPL [CABILITY: Whenever eq pment in th areas prot cted by t fire hose sta ions is r utred to be PERABLE. AfTION:
- a. With one or ore of the ire hose s tions show in Table 3.7
/ inoperable route an a ditional eq valent cap ity fire hos to the unprotec d area (s) f om an OPERA E hose sta ion within.1 our if the inopera e fire hos is the pri ry means of fire suppress'on; other-wise, ute the a itional hos within 24 h urs. Restore he fire h e stati n to OPERA E status wi in 14 days r, in lieu of any other repo t required y Specifica ion 6.6.1, epare and sub it a Speci Rep rt to the ommission p suant to Sp ification 6.9 / within t, n t 30 days utlining th action take , the cause of he inoper ility, d plans a schedule f r restoring he station to ERABLE st us.
- b. The provi ions of Spe fications 3 .3 and 3.0.4 a e not appl able.
SURVE LANCE reg 6IREMENTS ' I / / / / /
.., i
- 4. .11.4 E ch of the f' e hose stat ns shown in Ta e 3.7-5 sh I be d monstrat d OPERABLE:
- a. At least o ce per 31 d 's by a visual i spection of the fire se stations ccessible d ing plant oper ions to ass re all re ired equipmen is at the ation. '
- b. At le t once per 8 months by:
- 1. Visual ins ction of all th stations n t accessib e during pl t ,
operation to assure all r quired equi ment is a the station. Removin the hose for in pection an re-rackin , and
- 3. Inspe ting all gaskets and replac'ng any de aded gaskets in the ouplings.
/
At leas once per 3 year by: l 1. artially openin each hose tation v ve to verify valve l OPERABILITY and o flow bl ckage. 4 2. Conducting a ose hydros atic test at a pressur of 150 psig or A32 at least 50 sig above aximum fi e main opera ing pressure whichever i, greater. June 25,1985 (' SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-48 Amendment No. 32
l e *L TABLE 3.7-5 I Y'i3::
?U \ FIRE HOSE STATIONS
~
j QCATION ELEVATION H0 RACK # i
- a. Reactor ilding - Annulus Area l
l Platform 778.0 2-26-1196 ' Platform \ 778.0 2-26-1197 Platform \ 778.0 2-26-1198 Platform \ 778.0 2-26-1199 Platform X 759.0 2-26-1200 Platform \ 759.0 2-26-1201 Platform 759.0 2-26-1202 i Platform 759.0 2-26-1203 Platform \, 740.0 2-26-1204 Platform N 740.0 2-26-1205 Platform l 740.0 2-26-1206 ' Platform s \ 740 2-26-1207 l Platform 7 .0 2-26-1208 Platform 0 2-26-1209 Platform 21.0 2-26-1210 i Platform 721.0\ 2-26-1211 l Platform 701.0 \ 2-26-1212 Platform 701.0 \ 2-26-1213 Platform 701.0 \ 2-26-1214 Platform 701.0 N 2-26-1215 Platform 679.78 2-26-1216 Platform 679.78 \g 2-26-1217 Platform 679.78 2-26-1218 Platform 679.78 2-26-1219
- b. Reactor Build' g - RCP & Lower Containment Air Fil (sArea Reactor Buildin 679.78 \-26-1220 Reactor Buildi 679.78 2v26-1221 Reactor Build'ng 679.78 2-h-1222 Reactor Buil ing 679.78 2-2A1223 Reactor Bu' ding 679.78 2-26-1224 Reactor B 11 ding 679.78 2-26-1225
- c. C trol Building \ {
Con ol Building 732 0-26-1186 Co rol Building 732 0-26-1191 ! Control Building 706 - 0-26-1187 ; Control Building 706 0-26-1192 l r SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-49
& e. g_. Er? C- I Table 3.7-5 (Continued)
.cu FIRE HOSE STATIONS *'
LOCATION ELEVATION H0S RACK # Control Building 685 0 6-1188 ControlBuilding\ 685 1193 Control Building \ 669 0-26-1189 Control Building \ 669 0-26-1194
- d. DieselGenerator\uilding Corridor \s 722 0-26-1077 Corridor 740.5 0-26-1080 Air Exhaust Rm. \ 740.5 0-26-1082 Lube Oil Storage Room 722.0- 722 0-26-2337
. lR124 I
- e. Additional Equipment Buil ng - Unit 2 North Wall \ 740.5 2-26-687 North Wall 06 2-26-686
- f. Auxiliary Building 75 2-26-669 79 2-26-664 ato4 49 1-26-664 734 2-26-670 734 0-26-684 734 1-26-670 t
734 0-26-682 734 Siamese Ou let 2-26-671 734 2-26-672 734 2-26-665 714 0-26-660 714 2-26-666 l ' 714 0-26-677 706 0-26-658 690 0-26-690 690 661 690 Siamese Outlet 26-674 690 2- -675 669 2-2 667 669 2-26 68 669 0 2 669 0-26-68 653 0-26-663 653 0-26-691 e v i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-50 Amendment No. 104, 124 July 31, 1990
1 i N '
</eh&&/ # ' @ ^ d l i Table 3.7-5 (Continued) l l )
FIRE HOSE STATIONS
)i LOCATION ELEVATION HOSE RACK #
l l l
- g. CCW Intake Pu ing Station l 1
\s 690
- 690 0-26-866 0-26-867 :
N 6 0-26-868
's'-
90 0-26-869 690 0-26-870 i \ l l
- h. ERCW Pumping Station \ \ l, 688 \ 0-26-927 l 688 \. 0-26-926 688 '
. 0-26-930 704
\ 0-26-931 704 \ 0-26-925 1 704 720
\ 0-26-928 0-26-929 l
l' 720 924 i ! 720 0 -932 l l l l l l \ l l i l l ? l-SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-51 i o i
b PLANT SYSTEMS p!!.-! W. 3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS 0Q. L LO. LIMITING ONDITION FOR OPERATION -= l 3.7.12 11 fir barrier pe trations (i luding cabl penetration arriers,
/ Tired ors and ire dampeas in fire zon boundaries otecting sa ety related '
are , shall e functiona . A LICABIL Y: At all imes. CTION: a With one or more of th above requ~ red fire barri penetratio l non-fun tional, with one hour e ther, establis a continuou fire ! watch n at least o side of t affected pene ation, or v rify the O ERABILITY of fire detect s on at least e side of t e non-fun ional fire b rrier and e ablish a hourl fire watch atrol. Re ore the non- unctional f e barrier pene ation(s) to functional s tus within 7 days or, in ieu of any oth report re ired by { ecification .6.1, prepa e and submit a ecial Repor to the [ R28 l ommission p rsuant to Sp cification 6.9. within the ext 30 days 1 outlining t e action tak n, the cause of he non-func ional pene- l tration an plans and s hedule for rest ing the fir barrier c penetrati n(s) to func ional status.
- b. The pro isions of Sp cifications 3.0 3 and 3.0.4 e not appli ble.
S RVEILLANCE QUIREMENTS 1 i i i i i i ( ' 4.7.12 Eac of the abov required fire arrier penetra ions shall e verified to be func ional:
- a. At least o e per 18 months y a visual ins ection. ,
b Prior to eturning a fire barrier penetra ion to fun tional sta s followi repairs or mai tenance by perf rmance of visual in ection of the ffected fire b rier penetratio (s). _ k 4 l I i I 4
, a t November 23, 1984 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-52 Amendment No. 28 1
f i
^
INSTRUMENTATION 7(.s Spygc}l,n 7, [\cee,
^ , *I' BASES 3/4.3.3.8 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATIO PERABI TY of t fire d tection i strumen ation ens res that dequate war ing capa ility is availab for the prompt tection f fires. This ca bility 's requir in or r to det ct and 1 cate fir in thei early s ges. P mpt dete tion of fires wil reduce the pote ial for age to ,
s fety rel ted equi ment an is an in egral e ment in he overa facili ire prot etion pr gram. In he event that a ortion of the fir detecti instrum tation s inoper le, the tablis ment of f equent f re patro s in the ffected reas is re ired to ovide etection apabili untilteinoperaleinstrmentatin;R35 is re tored to PERABI TY. l All hourl trained i dividual be in fire atch patr is requ e that e BR-4 (spe ified are at int rvals of 0 minut s with a margin of 5 minut s. , l 3/4.3.3.9 This Specification is deleted.
- 3/4.3.3.10 EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION R134 !
l This instrumentation includes provisions for monitoring the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the waste gas holdup system. The OPERA-BILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements for monitoring potentially explosive gas mixtures. l i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-4 Amendment Nos. 35, 46, 134 November 25, 1992
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES ' 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS [c . s deh T e OPERAB LITY o the fir suppressi n systems [ ire _uppressi n capa lity is vailable o confine a dsures f th adequate exting sh fires (oceing in a y porti n of the facility ere safety related e uipment is lo ted. T fire s ppressio system co sists of t e water s stem, spra a d/or spri klers, 0,, and ire hose s ations. T collect ve capabil' y of e fire s ppressi n tystem is adequa e to minim e potent al damage safety r ated e ipment a d is a maj r element the fac'lity fire otection program. I the ev nt that ortions of he fire s pression systems ar inoperable, alter ate bac up fire ighting eq pment is quired t be made av ilable in the ffected areas un il the ino rable equ ment is stored to ervice. Whe the in perable ire fighti equipmen is inten d for use s a backup me ns of f re suppr ssion, a 1 ger perio of timo i allowed t provide an a ernate means of fire fight' g than if he inoper ble equipm nt is the imary eans of ire suppre ion.
/
l T e survei ance requi ements pr vide assur nce that t minimum OP ABILITY requi ments o the fire s ppression systems ar met. In the ent the fi e suppres ion water ystem beco s inoperable immediat cor ective asures mus be taken since this system prov des the majo fire [ X su pressio capability of the p1 t. The r quirement f r a twenty-f ur hour r ort to he Commiss'on provid s for prom t evaluatio of the acce tability the c rective me sures to ovide ade uate fire s ppression ca ability f he con nued prote ion of t nuclear ant. A 1 hourly f e watch trols reg re that a ained indiv dual be i the speci ied area a interval of 60 min es with a rgin of 15 inutes. A continu s fire w ch require that a tr ned individ al be in e sp ified are at all ti es, that t e specifie area contai no imped' ent to r trict the ovements f the cont nuous fire atch, and t at each c partment BR-4 w thin the s ecified a ea is patr led at lea t once ever 15 minut s with a argin of 5 minutes. A sp ified ar for a co inuous fir watch is o or more ire zone within a ingle fir area, whi h are easi accessibl to each her and n be patr led withi 15 minute . Easy ac ess is defi d as: no locked d rs or inop rable car reader, n C-Zone en y required or no haz rds that ill j interf re with t e continuo fire wat activity ing perfo ed withi the Qmiuteperio. J i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-7 November 25, 1992 l
PLANT SYSTEMS
! e d; 3.12 BASES 3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS efefe
$cet en .'o n
( T function integrity f the fire ba rier penetra ons ensures hat ; j [ fires ill be con ined or ade ately retard d from sprea ng to adjace t j porti ns of the acility. T s design fea re minimizes he possibil ty of a sing e fire rap' ly involvin several are of the faci ity prior to detection and extinguish nt. The fi e barrier pe trations are a passive el ent in i th facility f re protecti n program an are subject periodic i spections. l
)
Fire ba rier penetr ions, includ ng cable pene ration barr' rs, fire oors and d pers are c sidered func onal when th visually o erved condi-ion is th same as th as-designed ndition. Fo those fire arrier penetrati s that are ot in the as- esigned cond' tion, an ev uation shall e performe to show th the modific ion has not egraded the fire rating of the fire barrier pe tration. D ring perio of time whe a barrier is ot functio 1, either, 1) a conti.uous fire tch is requi d to be main ined in th vicinity of t e affe ted barrier, or 2) the fd e detectors at least e side of the affected bar ter must be verified OPE iBLE and a ho ly fire wa h patrol esta ished, un il the barr er is restore to function status.
' All hou y fire watch patrols requi e that a tr ined individu be in the l pecified a a at interva s of 60 minut s with a ma gin of 15 min es.
A co inuous fire tch requires that a trai ed individual e in the specifie area at all mes, that th specified ea contain no impediment o restric the movement of the conti ous fire w ch, and that ach compar ent BR-4 within he specified rea is patrol ed at leas once every 15 minutes wi a margin of 5 minutes. specified a ea for a cont'nuous fire atch is one or more fire ones wit n a single f're area, whic are easily accessible to ach other d can be atrolled wit ;n 15 minutes. Easy acce is defined a : no lock doors or inoperable c d reader, no Zone entry required, or o hazards at will i terfere with he continuous ire watch ctivity being erformed w thin the
-minute peri . -
l .a SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-8 November 25, 1992 ! l
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ! c. A Radiological Control technician # shall be onsite when fuel is in the R50 reactor.
- d. All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to i
Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation. l DaJ e. I A F' e Br' ade o at le st 5 me ers s 11 be aintain d onsi e at il ti es#. he Fir Brig de shal not i ludeteShiftOperatonsSper-iR16( sor a d 2 ot r mem ers of e min um shi t crew ecess y for safe shutd n of t unit or any ersonn requi ed for ther senti l (func ons du ng a ire eme gency. )
- f. The Operations Superintendent shall hold a Senior Reactor Operator R145 license.
- g. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit i the working hours of unit staff who perform safety-related functions (i.e., senior reactor operators, reactor operators, assistant unit l operators, Radiological Control, and key maintenance personnel). R142 f Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of !
overtime. The objective shall be to have operating personnel work a normal 8-hour day, 40-hour week while the unit is operating. Howevct, in the event that unforseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for refuel-ing, major maintanance, or major plant modification, on a temporary l l basis the following guidelines shall be followed:
- 1. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours straight, excluding shift turnover time.
- 2. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours in any 24-hour period, nor more than 24 hours in any 48-hour period, nor more than 72 hours in any 7-day period, all excluding shift.
turnover time.
- 3. A break of at least 8 hours should be allowed between work periods, including shift turnover time. I
- 4. Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of overtime should be considered on an individual basis and not for the entire staff on a shift.
Any deviation from the above guidelines shall be authorized in advance by the l Plant Manager or his designee, in accordance with approved administrative R169 l procedures, or by higher levels cf management, in accordance with established procedures and with documentation of the basis for granting the deviation. Controls shall be included in the procedures such that individual overtime shall be reviewed monthly by the Plant Manager or his designee to assure that ; excessive hours have not been assigned. Routine deviation from the above i R142 guidelines is not authorized. l Es.{e).
#The Radiological Control technician 6nd fire bri n de compcsitic3 may beh @
Cth= the mint ur receirement0 for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in R50 order to accommodate unexpected absence provided immediate action is taken to i fill the required positions. March 31, 1995 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 6-2 Amendment No. 50, 66,142,14E 169
i ENCLOSURE 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE -l SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) UNITS 1 AND 2 i DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 l (TVA-SON-TS-96-04) , DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR 3 J REMOVAL OF FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS i 1 p
i introduction t TVA proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SON) Units 1 and 2 technical ! specifications (TSs) and fire protection license conditions based on guidance provided , by Generic Letters (GLs) 86-10 and 88-12. i By letter dated April 24,1986, NRC issued GL 86-10, " implementation of Fire Protection Requirements." This letter requested that licensees incorporate the Fire ! Protection Program into their Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). It also encouraged licensees, upon completion of this program, to apply for an amendment to their operating license to replace current fire protection license conditions with a new ; standard license condition and amend TSs to delete fire protection requirements from ' TS. Guidance for implementation of GL 86-10 was provided on August 2,1988, by the issuance of GL 88-12, " Removal of Fire Protection Requirements from the : Technical Specifications." TVA's proposed amendment request has been developed ! based on guidance given in GL 88-12. ! Following implementation of this proposed change, a significant reduction in the content of the fire protection related TSs will be achieved. Such action is consistent with the NRC goal of TS Improvement Program by reducing the size and complexity of j current TSs without a reduction in the level of fire safety. ! Descriotion of Chance ) The following is a description of the proposed TS revisions included in Enclosure 1.
- 1. Section 3/4.3.3, " Monitoring Instrumentation," that contains limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and surveillance requirements (SRs) for fire protection instrumentation is deleted in its entirety. The associated Table 3.3-11 is also removed in its entirety. These specifications are relocated to SON's Fire i Protection Report.
- 2. Section 3/4.7.11, " Fire Protection Systems," that contains LCOs and SRs for i SON's Fire Suppression Water System, Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems, CO 2 Systems, and Fire Hose Stations is deleted in its entirety. These specifications are j relocated to SON's Fire Protection Report. !
- 3. Section 3/4.7.12, " Fire Barrier Penetrations," that contains LCO and SRs for
, SON's fire barrier penetrations is deleted in its entirety. This specification is relocated to SON's Fire Protection Report. l 4. Section 6.2.2, " Facility Staff," that contains item (e) for addressing fire brigade staffing requirements is deleted and relocated to SON's Fire Protection Report. i
l
- 5. Index pages V, IX, and XIV are revised to reflect the above changes.
- 6. SON's current License Conditions 2.C(16) for Unit 1 and 2.C(13) for Unit 2 1 contain commitments from 1980-1981 that are associated with modifications to SONS fire protection system that were completed. The proposed change deletes these license conditions in their entirety and replaces them with a new standard license condition that reads:
TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program referenced in Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's Final Safety Analysis Report and as approved in NRC Safety Evaluation Reports l contained in NUREG-0011, Supplements 1,2, and 5, NUREG-1232, Volume 2, and NRC letters dated May 29 and October 6,1986, subject l to the following provision: i TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the j event of a fire, j Reason for Chance in 1991, TVA developed a Fire Protection improvement Plan that contained major work activities to correct weaknesses in SON's fire protection program. The plan was ' divided into four phases with scheduled completion dates for each phase Since 1991, periodic status reports on the completion of each phase have been p;ovided to NRC. The last status report dated December 1,1995, noted that Phases 1,2, ano 3 were complete. The completion of Phase 4 involved submittal of SON's Fire Protection Report to NRC. This report was provided to NRC by letter dated l August 30,1996. Included with the report was a proposed change to incorpnrate, by l reference, SON's Fire Protection Program into Section 9.5.1 of SON's FSAR. Following the incorporation of the Fire Protection Program within the FSAR, GLs 86-10 and 88-12 encourage licensees to amend their operating licenses to: (1) replace current license conditions regarding fire protection with a new standard license condition, and (2) relocate fire protection requirements from TSs. Pursuant to the GL guidance, TVA is submitting the proposed TS change. The proposed change is being submitted at this time to coincide with NRC review of SON's Fire Protection Report and to coincide with TVA's Fire Protection improvement Plan schedule. In addition, the proposed TS change is considered a line-item TS improvement that provides requirements consistent with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG 1431, R1). TVA also considers the proposed TS change to be
, a CBLA (Cost Beneficial Licensing Action) item as it is estimated to save TVA
$450,000 over the life of the plant,
i l i Justification for Chanaes l This proposed amendment removes the fire protection requirements from TS in the fi major areas of fire detection instrumentation, fire suppression systems, fire barriers, and fire brigade staffing requirements and adds administrative controls to address the i Fire Protection Program consistent with requirements for other programs. The proposed changes are based on guidance provided in GL 88-12. The following i discussion addresses each proposed change relative to the elements of GL 88-12. l
- 1. GL 88-12 states:
l "First, the NRC approved Fire Protection Program' must be incorporated into the l FSAR and submitted with the certification required by 10 CFR 50.71(e)(2), as ; l requested by Generic Letter 86-10. The FSAR update includes the incorporation of . the Fire Protection Program, including the fire hazards analysis and major ' commitments that form the basis for the NRC-approved Fire Protection Program. l This may be accomplished by referencing the documents which define the licensee's Fire Protection Program as identified in the NRC's Safety Evaluation l Reports. I i "The staff does not intend to repeat its review of the approved Fire Protection l Program incorporated in the updated FSAR. The staff may audit the updated FSARs to assure that they have incorporated the approved Fire Protection Program. Licensees should not use this FSAR incorporation as an opportunity to make changes in the approved Fire Protection Program. Licensees should wait until the standard license condition is in place and then use the procedures described in the i license condition to make any necessary changes in the Fire Protection Program." i Section 9.5.1 of the SON FSAR references SON's Fire Protection Report that contains the administrative and technical controls, operating requirements, tests and inspection requirements, fire brigade staffing requirements, fire hazard analysis, and major commitments that form the basis for SON's Fire Protection Program (reference TVA letter to NRC dated August 30,1996). The requirements that are removed from TSs as part of this change letter are located in Part II, Section 14.0 of SON's Fire Protection Report. The SERs associated with SON's Fire Protection Program are as follows: NUREG-0011, Supplements 1,2, and 5, NUREG-1232, Volume 2, and NRC letters l dated May 29 and October 6,1986. Changes to SON's Fire Protection Program l have occurred subsequent to the issuance of these SERs. These changes are 1 reflected in TVA's Fire Protection Report provided in TVA's August 30,1996 letter. l The evaluation of these changes conclude that there is no adverse affect on the plants ability to reach and maintain a fire safe shutdown condition. i ! l l l _
. ._ - . . .. ~ . - . _ - _ . .. . . _ - . . . . ~
i (
- 2. GL 88-12 states:
"Second, the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and Surveillance Requirements associated with fire detection systems, fire suppression systems, fire barriers, and the administrative controls that address specifications is provided in Enclosure 2. The existing administrative controls related to fire protection audits are to be retained in TS. Also, any specifications related to the capability for safe shutdown following a fire, e.g., see item 8(j) in Enclosure 1 to Generic j Letter 81-12, are to be retained in TS."
SONS current TS LCOs and SRs for Fire Protection Instrumentation (TS 3.3.3.8), Fire Suppression Water Systems (TS 3.7.11.1), Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems (TS 3.7.11.2), CO2 Systems (TS 3.7.11.3), Fire Hose Stations (3.7.11.4), Fire Barrier Penetrations (TS 3.7.12), related Bases sections, and fire brigade staffing requirements are removed from the SON TSs. These requirements are relocated by reference into Section 9.5.1 of the SON FSAR. A markup of the proposed FSAR change is contained in the SON Fire Protection Report that was submitted to NRC by letter dated August 30,1996. The administrative controls related to fire protection audits were proposed to be relocated from the SON TSs to TVA's Quality Assurance Plan. This proposed change was submitted to NRC by letter dated June 7,1996 (SON TS Change 95-19). The fire protection audit requirements proposed for relocation to TVA's Quality Assurance Plan remain unchanged and are provided below: ,
- a. The fire protection programmatic controls including the implementing procedures at least once per 24 months, 1
- b. An independent fire protection and loss prevention program inspection and audit l shall be performed annually utilizing either qualified off-site license personnel or l an outside fire protection firm, and
- c. An inspection and audit of the fire protection and loss prevention program shall i be performed by an outside qualified fire consultant at intervals no greater that three years.
In addition, any other current TSs related to safe shutdown capability following a i fire that are not already described in this subtrottal remain unchanged. l
- 3. GL 88-12 ste.tes:
" Third, all operational conditions, remedial actions, and test requirements presently included in the TS for these systems, as well as the fire brigade staffing
- requirements, shall be incorporated into the Fire Protection Program. In this manner, the former TS requirements will become an integral part of the Fire Protection Program and changes subsequent to this amendment will be subject to
- the standard licenso condition. These remedial actions include shutdowns currently required by TS 3.0.3 when an LCO and its associated Action Requirements cannot be met." l
Operational conditions, remedial actions, and test requirements as wel: as the fire brigade staffing requirements removed from TSs are an integral part of SON's Fire Protection Program. Plant procedures that implement SON's Fire Protection Program provide specific instructions for operational conditions, remedial actions , and testing. '
- 4. GL 88-12 states:
" Fourth, the standard fire protection license condition in Generic Letter 86-10 must be included in the license. Any other current fire protection license conditions shall be removed. This license condition precludes changes to the approved Fire )
Protection Program without prior Commission approvalif those changes would adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions in the event of a fire." The standard fire protection license condition in GL 86-10 is adopted and included in this amendment request. The new standard license condition will replace current License Conditions 2.C(16) for Unit 1 and 2.C(13) for unit 2 of Sequoyah's Facility Operating Licenses DPR-77 and DPR-79.
- 5. GL 88-12 states:
" Finally the Administrative Controls Section of the TS shall be augmented to support the Fire Protection Program. This shall be accomplished by additions to two specifications. First, the Unit Review Group (Onsite Review Group) shall be given responsibility for the review of the Fire Protection Program and implementing 1 procedures and the submittal of recommended changes to the Company Nuclear 1 Review and Audit Group (Offsite or Corporate Review Group). Second, Fire l Protection Program implementation shall be added to the list of elements for which written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained.
i "The Emergency Plan and the Security Plan were used as models to determine the appropriate administrative control for the Fire Protection Program. These additions will provide administrative controls for the Fire Protection Program that are equivalent to those for other programs that are implemented by license condition." l And, "if the plant's TS differ from the STS, additions to the administrative controls for the Fire Protection Program should be proposed that are consistent with the administrative controls for the Emergency and Security Plans." And, "In Generic Letter 86-10, licensees were reminded of their responsibilities to report deficiencies in the Fire Protection Program which meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72 l and 10 CFR 50.73. Other conditions which represent deficiencies of this program and are not encompassed by the above reporting criteria should be evaluated by l ' the licensees to determine appropriate corrective action." l t I
i 4 SON's current TSs under Section 6.0, Administrative Controls, already support the Fire Protection Program. Although SQN TSs differ from the STS, the current ! administrative controls for the Fire Protection Program are consistent with the l administrative controls for the Emergency and Security plans. I With regard to the Unit Review Group responsibilities, the SON Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) is responsible for reviewing the site's Fire Protection Program and implementing procedures. This responsibility is a new responsibility for the SON PORC that is being added to TVA's Quality Assurance Plan (TVA-NOA-PLN89-A, Revision 7) and is similar in format to the PORC responsibilities established for TVA's Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The PORC responsibilities were proposed to be relocated from SON TSs to TVA's Quality Assurance Plan under TS Change 95-19 dated June 7,1996. With regard to the Offsite Review Group responsibilities, TVA's Nuclear Safety Review Board provides overview of PORC activities, including receiving written minutes of the SON PORC meetings and activities. Accordingly, TVA's NSRB will have oversight of proposed changes to SON's Fire Protection Program. With regard to written procedures, TS Section 6.8, Procedures and Programs, contains requirements for establishing written procedures for implementing the Fire Protection Program, as appropriate. With regard to reporting, TVA is adopting the guidance of GL 86-10 for reporting deficiencies in the Fire Protection Program which meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. Other conditions which represent deficiencies of this program will be addressed under TVA's corrective action program, as appropriate. In summary, the changes in the proposed amendment are consistent with requirements outlined in GL 88-12. The proposed amendment will (1) reference TVA's Fire Protection Report submittal that provides for incorporation of SON'c Fire Protection Program into the FSAR, (2) incorporate the operational conditions, remedial actions, tests, inspections and fire brigade staffing requirements that are removed from TSs into the Fire Protection Program, and (3) include a license amendment to adopt the standard fire protection license condition. The current Administrative Controls in Section 6.0 of SON's TS and Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan assure a multi-discipline review of any proposed changes to SON's Fire Protection Program and to requirements in the FSAR or plant procedures. Environmental lmoact Evaluation The proposed change does not involve an unreviewed environmental question because operation of SON Units 1 and 2 in accordance with this change would not:
- 1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmental impact previously evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) as modified by NRC's testimony to the Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board, supplements to the FES, environmentalimpact appraisals, or decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
1 l' i i. l l I l f 2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels. I l 3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for SON that may -
- j. have a significant environmental impact.
l l l l l
- l. I i !
i i j l. 1 i 1 I i i i 2 I 1
l E h i ENCLOSURE 3 , PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE i SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) UNITS 1 AND 2 : I DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SON-TS-96-04 ) DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION l I i : l l j i { i l i i l i 1 i i
}
Significant Hazards Evaluation TVA has evaluated the proposed technical specification (TS) change and has i determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SON) in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed TS change implements the guidance of NRC Generic Letter 86-10,
" Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements," and GL 88-12," Removal of Fire Protection Requirements from the Technical Specifications." TVA's proposed change is administrative in nature since no technical requirements are being changed. The current technical specifications associated with fire protection are removed and are relocated to the SON FSAR. In addition, implementation of the proposed standard fire protection license condition provides assurance that any future changes to the SON Fire Protection Program would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Since the technical content of the Fire Protection requirements have not changed, this amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of aa accident proviously evaluated.
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.
The proposed changes to the fire protection requirements in this proposed amendment are administrative in nature. Technical requirements associated with SON's Fire Protection Systems have not been altered. Accordingly, the amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The technical requirements for fire protection are relocated from the TSs to the FSAR by reference to the Fire Protection Report for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. This report was submitted to NRC by letter dated August 30,1996. The report contains the technical requirements for SON's Fire Protection Program. Under TVA's proposed TS change, the operational conditions, testing and remedial action requirements, that are removed from TSs and relocated to the Fire Protection Report remain unchanged. The existing plant procedures will continue to provide the specific instructions for implementing these technical requirements. Since technical requirements are not changed, the proposed change does not involve a reduction in the margin of safety. l t
l ENCLOSURE 4 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SON-TS-96-04) REVISED TS PAGES l l l t l i f
_e. i I (c) By no later than June 30,1982, all safety-related electrical equipment in j the facility shall be qualified in accordance with the provisions of: Division l of Operating Reactors " Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental l R4
' Qualification of Class IE Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactos" (DOR l Guidelines); or, NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental l Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment," December 1979. l Copies of these documents are attached to the Order for Modification of l l Licence DPR-77 dated November 6,1980.
1 (13) Loss of Non-Class IE Instrumentation and Control Room System Bus Durina Operation (Section 7.10) l Prior to exceeding five percent power, TVA must complete revisions to plant [ emergency procedures to the satisfaction of the NRC. I i (14) Enaineerina Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls (Section 7.11) 1 in conformance with IE Bulletin 80-06, TVA shall test the system to identify any further areas of concern, and TVA shall review the control schemes to determine that they are the best in terms of equipment control and plant safety. The results of these test and review efforts shall be provided to the NRC in l accordance with the bulletin. (15) Diesel Generator Reliability (Section 8.3.1)
- Prior to operation following the first refueling, TVA shall implement the following l design and procedure modifications as outlined in Section 8.3.1 of SER
- Supplement No. 2. These include
- (a) Moisture in Air Starting System; (b) l Turbocharger Gear Drive Problem; and (c) Personnel Training.
(16) Fire Protection TVA shallimplement and maintain in affect all provisions of the approved fire l protection program referenced in Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's Final Safety Analysis l l Report and as approved in NRC Safety Evaluation Reports contained in l l NUREG-0011, Supplements 1,2, and 5, NUREG-1232, Volume 2, and NRC l letters dated May 29 and October 6,1986, subject to the following provision: l l TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program without l prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not l adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the l event of a fire. l l l l l l l Amendment 9, I i
! 1 I l INDEX i LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE f l 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 2-1 l 3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR-FQ (Z) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 2-5 3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY HOT CHANNEL FACTOR . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 2-10 R142 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 2-12 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 2-15 l 3 /4 . 3 INSTRUMENTATION l 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYE'IEM INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-14 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-39 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-43 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-44 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-47 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-50 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS (DELETED) . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-54 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . .. . . 3/4 3-55 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (DELETED) . . . . . . . 3/4 3-58 l DELETED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/4 3-70 i R152 EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . 3/4 3-71 I SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 V Amendment No. 62, 138, 148, I i
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g.. . _- l l M EE I ' LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE ! 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-14 3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION '
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-15 R65 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-17 i
3/4.7.8 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-19 3/4.7.9 SNUBBEPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-21 3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-29 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS (DELETED) . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-31 3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS (DELETED) . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-41 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS R65 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES OPERATING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-1 SNUTDowN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-8 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS , A.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-9 A.C. DISTRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-10 D.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-11 D.C. DISTRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-14 3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-15 l l I I l l l l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 IX Amendment No. 61, i f
i l INDEX f BASES SECTION Eh2E I 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-3 ; 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (URS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.8 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-5 { 3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-7 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS (DELETED) . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-7 f 3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS (DELETED) . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-8 i 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ' 3/4.8.1 and 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 B-1 i 3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 8-2 i 1 I 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONE i 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 I l 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 1 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 l 3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL PIT AREA (DELETED) . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-2 lR208 3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION . . . . . . B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-3 l f SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 XIV Amendment No. 157, 204,
- . . _ . . _ ~ . - . -... .
F f INSTRUMENTATION ;
.L FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ,
l t 3.3.3.8 This Specification is deleted, , i t t 1 I t f i l I l 1 I i l t l [ SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-58 Amendment No. 36, i i
TABLE 3.3-11 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS This Table is deleted. (Pages 3/4 3-59 through 3/4 3-69 deleted) SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-59 Amandment No. 12, 37, 97, 109, 142, 148, 181
i PLANT SYSTEMS
- 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.11.1 This Specification is deleted.
I i Pages 3/4 7-31 and 3/4 7-32 are deleted. 1 1 1 i i l l l l l l l i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-31 Amendment No. 13, 36, 66, 186, i l
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PLANT SYSTEMS SPRAY AND/OP. SPRINKLER SYSTEMS l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
- 3.7.11.2 This Specification is deleted.
j l Pages 3/4 7-33 and 3/4 7-34 are deleted. , 5 P I l l i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-33 Amendment No. 12, 36, j
l 1 i l I PLANT SYSTEMS
.Q,0 Q2 SYSTEMS 1
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l 3.7.11.3 This Specification is deleted. 1 l 1 l l I Pages 3/4 7-35 and 3/4 7-36 are deleted, i 1 l i i l i l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-35 Amendment No. 12, 36, 96, l l l
FJANT SYSTEMS FIRE HOSE STATIONS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.11.4 This Specification is deleted. I i 1 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-37 Amendment No. 36, 114, 143,
,- , , m-,
PLANT SYSTEMS TABLE 3.7-5
- FIRE HOSE STATIONS
\
i P l l P i l h l a i This Table is deleted * [ (Pages 3/4 7-38 through 3/4 7-40 are deleted) l l l i l i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-38 Amendment No. 13,
PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4,7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.12 This Specification is deleted. I l 1 5 i P f i s 9 I SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-41 Amendment No. 36, i l l
INSTRUMENTATION , BASES 3/4.3.3.8 FIRE DETECTION TNSTRUMENTATION ' This Specification is deleted. 3/4.3.3.9 This Specification is deleted. 3/4.3.3.10 EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION R152 This instrumentation includes provisions for monitoring the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the waste gas holdup system. The OPER-ABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements for monitoring potentially explosive gas mixtures, i l l l i
'l 4
I l i J l 1 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-4 Amendment No. 43, 148, 149, lR153 l I
I PLANT SYSTEMS BASES SNUBBERS (Continued) location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 8.8 and 8.10. The R43 addition or deletion of any hydraulic or meenanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50. 3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is baned on 10 CFR 70.39 (c) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, BR-3 and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values. Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a
! source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.
1 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS l This Specification is deleted. I i l r l
)
1 l l l l l l l i i t SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-7 Amendment No. 39, i
l' ! PLANT SYSTEMS BASES i l l 3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS This Specification is deleted. t l l l l r l l l l l' l l l l l l l i i l i i l I l i I SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-8 Amendment No. 39, l I i i t
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
- c. A Radiological Control technician" shall be onsite when fuel is in R62 the reactor.
- d. All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator FP Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation.
- e. Deleted
- f. The Operations Superintendent shall hold a Senior Reactor Operator R160 license.
- g. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety-related functions ,
(i.e., senior reactor operators, reactor operators, assistant unit ; operators, Radiological Control, and key maintenance personnel). Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overtime. The objective shall be to have operating personnel work a normal 8-hour day, 40-hour week while the unit is operating. However, in the event that unforseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for refueling, major maintenance, or major plant modification, on a temporary basis the following guidelines shall be followed:
- 1. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours straight, excluding shift turnover time.
- 2. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours in any 24-hour period, nor more than 24 hours in any 48-hour period, nor more than 72 hours in any 7-day period, all ,
excluding shift turnover time. R156
- 3. A break of at least 8 hours should be allowed between work ,
periods, including shift turnover time.
- 4. Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of overtime should be considered on an individual basis and not for the entire staff on a shift. ,
Any deviation from the abeve guidelines shall be authorized in advance by the i Plant Manager or his designee, in accordance with approved administrative procedures, or by higher levels of management, in accordance with established R182 procedures and with documentation of the basis for granting the deviation. Controls shall be included in the procedures such that individual overtime shall be reviewed monthly by the Plant Manager or his designee to assure that excessive hours have not been assigned. Routine deviation from the above guidelines is not authorized. l l r #The Radiological Control technician may be offsite for a period of time not to ! exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence provided immediate action is taken to fill the required positions. l I SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 6-2 Amendment No. 32, 58, 74, 152, l 156, 178, 1 l i
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-- -.- -. . - . ~ - _. - - -.. _
-. -.- . - - . - ~
i k , l (13) Fire Protection , TVA shall zmplement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program referenced in sequoyah , Nuclear Plant's Final Safety Analysis Report and as approved in l NRC Safety Evaluation Reports contained in NUREG-0011, l Supplements 1, 2, and 5, NUREG-1232, Volume 2, and NRC letters 3 dated May 29, and October 6, 1986, subject to the following provision: TVA may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to i achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. l (14) Comoliance With Reculatory Guide 1.97 l TVA shall implement modifications necessary to comply with i l' Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light R45 l Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions , During and Following an Accident," dated December 1980 by j startup from the Unit 2 Cycle 4 refueling outage. , (15) Corrosion of Carbon Steel Pioinq !. TVA shall carry out a surveillance program on corrosion of l carbon steel piping in accordance with TVA document SQRD l 328/81-10 dated August 25, 1981, and procedures for ! implementation are to be submitted for NRC concurrence by October 15, 1981. I (16) NUREG-0737 Conditions (Section 22.21 R2 , Each of the following conditions shall also be performed to the satisfaction of the NRC:
- a. Shift Technical Advisor (Section 22.2. I.A.1.1) ;
i TVA shall provide a fully-trained on-shift technical advisor to the shift operations supervisor. R169
- b. Indeoendent Safety Encineerina Group (Section 22.2, I.B.1.2)
TVA shall have an onsite Independent Safety Engineering Group. e l l Amendment Nos. 45, 169, l i
._ m . _ . _ _ __ _ , _
i l l l 1 INDEX I l LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR-FQ(Z) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 2-4 3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY HOT CHANNEL FACTOR . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 2-8 i 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 2-10 R130 l 3/4 2.5 DNB PARAMETERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 2-13 1 I 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-1 ! 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 3-14 i 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION l l RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-40 l l MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-44 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-45 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-48 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-51 l CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS (DELETED). . . . . . . . . . . .3/4 3-55 R54 i 1 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-56 I l FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (DELETED) . . . . . . . . 3/4 3-59 l l i DELETED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/4 3-68 R134 i EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . 3/4 3-69 1 I i i t 4 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 V Amendment No. 54, 130, 134,
I INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERhTION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS s _ == i SECTION PAGE 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-13 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-14 3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-15 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EPCRGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-17 3/4.7.8 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-19 3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-21 3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-41 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS (DELETED) . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-43 3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS (DELETED) . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-52 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 S-1 I l Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-9 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS l l A.C. Distribution - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-10 A.C. Distribution - Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-11 D.C. Distribution - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-12 l D.C. Distribution - Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 8-15 l i i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 IX Amendment No.
INDEK BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.8 AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-6a 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS (DELETED) . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-7 3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS (DELETED) . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-7 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 and 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 8-1 3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 8-2. 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL PIT AREA (DELETED) . . . . . . B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION . . . . . . B 3/4 9-2 j' 3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-3 a SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 XIV Amendment No. 194, l
. . . ~ . -- . .. -
INSTRUMENTATION FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.8 This Specification is deleted. i* ! l l l l 1 j l l l l SEQUOYAH - L* NIT 2 3/4 3-59 Amendment No. 28, l l l
e TABLE 3.3-11 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS , This Table is deleted. (Pages 3/4 3-60 through 3/4 3-67a) SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-60 Amendment No. 32, 86, 137, 173,
l l I , PLANT SYSTEMS l 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM , LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 4 3.7.11.1 This Specification is deleted. , l i i l I l l I Pages 3/4 7-43 and 3/4 7-44 are deleted. l 1 l l l l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-43 Amendment No. 4, 28, 58, 178,
. . _ ~ - - . _. . .
PLANT SYSTEMS SPRAY AND/OR SPRINKLER SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.11.2 This Specification is deleted. Pages 3/4 7-45 and 3/4 7-46 are deleted. l I 1 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-45 Amendment No. 28, 178,
i PLANT SYSTEMS
. CO, SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION- ,
3.7.11.3 This Specification is deleted. i l l I ! I 1 j l' SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-47 Amendment. No. 28, 85, I l I
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l
' PLANT SYSTEMS l
FIRE HOSE STATIONS i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.11.4 This Specification is deleted, t io l l l l l l l 4 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-48 Amendment No. 32,
- I l' l
l l 1 TABLE 3.7-5 ; FIRE HOSE STATIONS 1 l i l I This Table is deleted (Pages 3/4 7-49 through 3/4 7-51) i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-49 Amendment No. 104, 124, t 1
PLANT SYSTEMS ! 3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7 12 This Specification is deleted. t l t i l l l l l l I 1 l l i !, .i 4 i l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-52 Amendment No. 28, ) i
i f. i
- j. INSTRUMENTATION '
I t i l BASES ! I ! 3/4.3.3.8 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION
~This Specification is deleted.
3/4.3.3.9 This Specification is deleted. l' 3/4.3.3.10- EXPLOSIVE GAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION R134 ' t This instrumentation includes provisions for monitoring the concentrations of l potentially explosive gas mixtures in the waste gas holdup system. The OPERA ' BILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements for ; monitoring potentially explosive gas mixtures. 1 I f l
)
j i a l l ; L l l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-4 Amendment Nos. 35, 46, 134 l t
1
)
i i l PLANT SYSTEMS i l BASES 3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS This Specification is deleted. l e i l J P I i L i i f f i I SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/; 7-7 Amendment No. l i
i t l l i PLANT SYSTEMS BASES f 3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS , t This Specification is deleted.
- l. t I
r i l l l l l I i l l l i i l t l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-8 Amendment No. l
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
- c. A Radiological Control technician
- shall be onsite when fuel is in R50 the reactor,
- d. All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation.
- e. DELETED
- f. The Operations Superintendent shall hold a Senior Reactor Operator jR145 license,
- g. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety-related functions (i.e., senior reactor operators, reactor operators, assistant unit operators, Radiological Control, and key maintenance personnel). ;
Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overtime. The objective shall be to have operating R142 personnel work a normal 8-hour day, 40-hour week while the unit is operating. However, in the event that unforseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for refueling, major maintenance, or major plant modification, on a temporary basis the following guidelines shall be followed:
- 1. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 i hours straight, excluding shift turnover time.
- 2. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 l hours in any 24-hour period, nor more than 24 hours in any I 48-hour period, nor more than 72 hours in any 7-day period, all excluding shift turnover time.
, 3. A break of at least 8 hours should be allowed between work ! periods, including shift turnover time. I
- 4. Except during extended shutdown periods, the use of overtime 1 should be considered on an individual basis and not for the i entire staff on a shift.
Any deviation from the above guidelines shall be authorized in advance by the Plant Manager or his designee, in accordance with approved administrative R169 l procedures, or by higher levels of management, in accordance with established procedures and with documentation of the basis for granting the deviation. Controls shall be included in the procedures such that individual overtime shall be reviewed monthly by the Plant Manager or his designee to assure that R142 excessive hours have not been assigned. Routine deviation from the above guidelines is not authorized, l l l
#The Radiological Control technician may be offsite for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence provided immediate ,
action is taken to fill the required positions. 1 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 6-2 Amendment Nos. 50, 66, 142, 145, 169,
i i i i
)
i i l' ENCLOSURE 5 ! I
. PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE l l
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON) UNITS 1 AND 2 ; i DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 ; (TVA-SON-TS-96-04) ! REVISED FSAR PAGES l 4
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i . I SQN-7 ' 2.2.3.9 Evaluation Storage of Potential facilities Fire and Smoke Hazard from Onsite 011 The onsite 9.5 in Sections storage facilities for d 'sel fuel oil are described in detail l at the plant is)4.1 and 9.5.4.2. The maximum amount of fuel oil stored diesel 68,000 gallons in each of four storage tanks within the within e erator diesel generator building,2)b E S .gf h add ti age d two tanks storTwo 550-with a capacity diesel generatorofbuilding. 71,000 gallons each are located south-southeast of the ;
. A 300 meters from the control building, respectively.The storage sites are { '
A postulated fire involving the oil storage facilities which are located south-southeast of the diesel generator building should have no consequences other than the effects of dense smoke. These tanks are i I separated from other facilities and are~ surrounded by a high dike. J Theoll'storagetanKsinthedieselgeneratorbuildin[ gar)eembeddedina k'5 concrete substructure of a class I seismic building. The storage tank avant er a fire 'a say are and diesel aenerators separated by thick concrete walls.f Tr-the cutt:! +~/c!"* g any stcrage taak, the ri*e wou!d b: 7::trict:d a._....u._ to it: :ub'_c
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h rm_d b; -!ttg:t:d _,,__i by ac2!'#!:d CO. re _,_,.__.._..,a <_u_ ,___ _, 50E'YN50?.bNb th$??SNh5N$Db5 *?b Nh W pSu' rye (% 2 T h An evaluation of the hazard to perronnel in the control room from a release of dense smoke is given in Section 6.4.1.2., , 2.2.4 Forest Fires Further clearing has taken place since the time of plant construction. For the most part, the ground has been cleared for two thousand feet b around the plant buildings. There are no wooded areas close enough to present a hazard from forest fires. ' 2.2.5 References l 1. 7 TIC-ECS-27 R2, " Main Control Room Habitability During Hazardous Chemical Releases at or Near the Plant." l l l 4
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t 2.2-10' COC4/0027F
SON-11 ,g 2.4.11.3 Historical Low Water From the beginning of stream gauge records at Chattanooga in 1874 until the closure of Chickamauga Dam in January 1940, the lowest daily flow in the Tennessee River at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site was 3,200 cfs on September 7 and 13,1925. The next lowest daily flow of 4,600 cfs occurred in 1881 and also in 1883. Since January 1942, low flows at the sit _e have been regulated by TVA reservoirs, particularly by Watts Bar and Chickamauga Dams. Under normal operating conditions, there may be periods of several hours daily when there are no releases from either or both dams, but average daily flows at
)
the site have been less than 5,000 cfs only 0.2 percent of the time and have been less than , 10,000 cfs,1.3 percent of the time. ' On March 30 and 31,1968, during special operations for the control of watermilfoil, there were no releases from either Watts Bar or Chickamauga Dams during the two-day period. The previous I minimum daily flow was 700 cfs on November 1,1953. Since January 1940, water levels at the plant have been controlled by Chickamauga Reservoir. Since then, the minimum level at the dam was 673.3 on January 21,1942. 2.4.11.4 Future Control . Future added controls which could alter low flow conditions at the plant are not anticipated because no sites that would have a significant influence remain to be developed. 2.4.11.5 Plant Reauirements e 2.4.11.5.1 Two-Unit Ooerotion
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The safety releted water supply stems requiring river water are: e essential rdw cooling water (ERCW) (Subsection 9.2.2), d that portion of the high-pressur ire-protection system (HPFP) I g ,}~ (Subsection 4-5-t) supplyi emergency feedwater to the steam generators. The khigh-pressure fire l protection pumps are sub ersible pumps located in the intake pumping station. Reference Figures l 1.2.3-14 and 1.2.3-15. he intake pumping station sump is at elevation 648. The entrances to ! the suction pipes for the HPFP pumps are 't elevation 651 feet 0 inches which is 32 feet and 24 feet, respectively, below the maximum normal water elevation of 683.0 and the minimum riormal water elevation of 675.0. F:: ?!: ::; ::::n : ef th- P""" i::n; :ng:n:: 'n; : f:N
'cre: :p:::t::n, ::: d:::^ :n ^.5.0. The ERCW pump surfp in this independent station is at elevation 625.0, which is 58.0' elow maximum normal wat elevation, 50.0' below minimum normal water elevation, and 14. ' below the 639.0' minim possible elevation of the river. For l 11 the flow requirements for the E CW system, see Subsecti n 9.2.2.
> an2 1 1 a s. 3 8 l
l i 4 e 2.4-45
l 1 l l SQN-11 1 Since the ERCW pumping station has direct communication with the river for all water levels and is abm:s pr9able maximum flood, the ERCW system for two-unit plant operation always operates in en ooen coolii:q cycle. 2.4.11.6 Heat Sink Dependability Recuirements The ultimate heat sink, its design bases and its operation, under all normal and credible accident conditions is described in detail in Subsection 9.2.5. As discussed in Subsection 9.2.5, the sink was modified by a new essential raw cooling water (ERCW) pumping station before unit 2 began operation. The design basis and operation of the ERCW system, both with the original ERCW intake station and with the new ERCW intake station, is presented in Subsection 9.2.2. As described in these sections, the new ERCW station is designed to guarantee a continued adequate supply of essential cooling water for all plant design basis conditions. This position is further assured since additional river water may be provided from TVA's upstream multiple-purpose resevoirs, as previously discussed during Low Flow in Rivers and Streams. 3 2.4.11.6.1 Loss of Downstream Dam The loss of downstream dam will not result in any adverse effects on the availability of water to the ERCW system or these portions of thegHPFP supplying emergency feedwater to the steam generator. /. . ort)) i 1 2.4.11.6.2 Adecuacy of Minimum Flow ; The cooling requirements for plant safety-related features are provided by the ERCW system. The i required ERCW flow rates under the most demanding modes of operation (including loss of l downstrea'm dam) are given in Subsection 9.2.2. Two other safety-related functions may require water from the ultimate heat sink; these are fire protection water (refer to Subparagraph 2.4.11.6.3) and emergency steam generator feedwater (refer to Subsection 10.4.7). These two functions have smaller flow requirements than the ERCW systems. Consequently, the relative abundance of the river flow, even under the worst conditions, assures the availability of an adequate water supply for all safety-related plant cooling water requirements. 4 y f. /,
$ )hwnd d 2.4.11.6.3 Fire-Protection Water fj,dd g7
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2.4.12 Environmental Acceptance of Effluents i The ability of surface waters near Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), located on the right bank near Tennessee River Mile (TRM) 484.5, to dilute and disperse radioactive liquid effluents accidentally released from the plant is discussed herein. Routine radioactive liquid releases are discussed in Section 11.2. 2.4-46 O
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SQN bt.o ,.A HPTfs m>./ damaging steps necessary to ave the plant in the f d mode when the flood exceeds plant grade. [" :ytte e ter (: d 7:;tce auxiliary feedwater for reactor cooling. Other re- 9essential 9.5.i Mplant1V 1 3 cooling loads will be transferred from the com- ponent. cooling water to the ERCW System (subsection 9.2.2). The Radio- active Waste (Chapter 11) l System will be secured by filling tanks below DBF level with enough water to prevent flotation; one exception is the waste gas decay tanks, which are sealed and anchored against flotation. The CVCS holp up tarik will also be filled and. sealed.to prevent flotation. i Some power and communication lines running beneath the DBF and not designed for submerged operation will require disconnection. Batteries beneath the DBF will be disconnected. 2.4A.4.2 Reactor Initially Refueling i If time permits, fuel will be removed from the unit (s) undergoing l refueling and placed in the spent fuel pit; otherwise fuel cooling will i be accomplished as described in subsection 2.4A.2.2. If the rafueling ! ! canal is not already flooded, the mode of cooling describet. 1. Jubsection 2.4A.2.2 requires that the canal be flooded with borated water from the i refueling water storage tank. If the flood warning occurs after the reactor vessel head has been removed or at a time when it could be removed before the flood exceeds plant grade, the flood mode reactor i l cooling water will flow directly from the vessel into the refueling l cavity. If the warning time available does not permit this, then the upper head injection piping will be disconnected above the vessel head to allow the discharge of water through the four upper head injection stand-pipes. Additionally, it is required that the prefabricated piping be l installed to connect the RHR and SFPC Systems, and that ERCW be directed , to the secondary side of the RHR System and SFPC System heat exchangers. l 2.4A.4.3 Plant Preparation Time All steps needed to prepare the plant for flood mode operation can be i accomplished within 24 hours of receipt of the initial warning that a flood above plant grade is possible. An additional 3 hours are a.vailable l for contingency nargin before wave runup from the rising flood might enter the buildings. Site grading and building design prevent any flooding before the end of the 27 hour preflood period. 2.4A.5 Equipment Both normal plant components and specialized flood-oriented supplements will be utilized in coping with floods. All such equipment required in the flood mode is either located above the DBF or is within a nonflooded structure or is designed for submerged operation. Systems and components needed only in the preflood period are protected only during that period. 1
/
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2.4A-8 COC4/0002F i
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$QN-4 of fires on structures, systems, and components important to safety. T Fire-fighting systems shall be designed to assure that their rupture or )
inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of these structures, systems, and components. Compliance The plant is designed to minimize the probability of fires and explosions, and in the event of such eccurrences to minfalze the potential effects of such events to plant safety-related equipment and personnel. Prime consideration is given these requirements throughout the design process by providing for the dupilcation and physt. cal separation of components in plant design and the use of materials classified as noncombustible and/or fire resistant wherever practical in all areas of the plant. Equipment and fac111 ties for fire protection, including detection, alarm, and extinguishment, are provided to protect both plant equipment and personnel from fire, explosion, and the resultant release of toxic vapors. Fire-fighting systems are designed to assure that.their rupture or inadvertent operation will not impair systems important to safety. All portions of the Fire Protection Systems necessary to protect safety-related equipment in Class I structures are designed to seismic requirements. The Fire Protection Systems provided are: l
- d l' . High-pressure water, ,
- 2. Carbon dioxide, and 4,g y 4 jC., f,./edw pg[w f.r./ l
- 3. Portable extinguishers. l i
signed and installed in accordanc.e with We applicable ! All systems ar requirements 4' t"" "iti-et rire w et:: g; ,3;g g t!-- 3 yt:n:;;g 3 4 t'e re'er-a - i- id:::th. 0.5.1.3. The Fire Protection System is , l designed such that a failure of any component of the system or inadvertent operation:
- 1. Will not cause a nuclear accident or significant release of radioactivity to the environment.
- 2. N111 not impat, the ability of equipment to safely shut down and isolate the reactor or limit the release of radioactivity to the environment if the event of a postulated accident. ;
A, F,+ ndt 4J f y,rf The Fire [tection Systems for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant are discupsed in subsh .,vu 5.3.1. Protection from fire in the contrel room is d8e discussed in subsect. ton 6.4 (Habitability Systems). Criterion 4 - Environmental and Missile Design Bases. Structures, systems, and components important to safety are designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and , postulated accidents, including LOCA. These structures, systems and
- components shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects.
3.1 4 0033F/C0C4
4
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l SQN Personnel Access Doors in Crane Wall ; See Figures 3.8.3-10 through 3.8.3-12. Four access doors in the lower half of the crane wall are provided in each Reactor Building at the following locations. l Floor Elevation Azimuth 679.78 221* 679.78 299* i 693.00 114* 16'-11" l 722.00 299* l The doors provide passageways 3 feet-0 inch wide by 6 feet-6 inches high through the concrete crane wall for workmen and tools. When closed, the doors seal the passageways against steam jets, pressure, and missiles that may originate from pipe rupture in the compartment inside the crane wall. Each door is manually operated and hinged to a steel frame embedded in the concrete wall. Each door consists of a steel skin plate stiffened by horizontal framing. The skin plate is faced with a cushioning structure of vertically arranged square, steel tubing separated from the doors skin plate by a collapsible latticework of steel bars, the. purpose of which is F to absorb the energy of missiles striking the door. The cushioning i structure is covered with sheet steel for appearance. Bearing of the door against the frame is through steel bars. An elastomer seal is attached to the periphery of the door to reduce the possibility of damage from jets to items beyond the door. Two lever-type latches operable from i either side hold the door in the closed position. Hinges on the doors I are provided with graphite impregnated bushings. The doors, under normal operating conditions, provide an effective seal j against airflow and can be operated and secured by one man from either side. For pipe rupture accidents, the doors seal the passageways in the
-crane wal'1 against missiles, jets, and pressure that may originate within the crane wall enclosure, thus preventing consequent damage to the !
containment vessel and to piping and machinery between the crane wall and containment vessel. l The doors will maintain their integrity and seal for not less than the i first 12 hours following an accident. Limited leakage during this period is permissible, j L ^" part: ef th: d^ct:, n ::pt th: :::':, :r: " reproof Iacrea:ad ,
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I I (R }. ft ?Adv va }.5 D accident is the introduction of moder ion into the vault. " Optimum moderation" as described in ANSI N18.2-1973 is not a realistic oblem because physically achievable water densities are considerably too low (< 0.01 gm/ *) to yield K.,, values higher than full density water. Also, administrative controls have been nstituted to prevent the use of water fog or spray to combat a fire in the new fuel storage vault in addition, metal covers will be placed over the vault when fuel handling operations are not being performed. Thus, a full density value of 1.0 gm/cm' was used for water in the calculations. Thus, for normal operations, using the method described above including all the biases and uncertainties mentioned, the K.,, of the new fuel storage racks is determined to be 0.9343. This meets the criteria stated in Section 4.3.1.5. , l Soent Fuel Storaae - Wet The reactivity of the spent fuel storage racks was calculated (reference 32) using the SCALE system of codes for cross section generation and KENO for reactivity determination. The fuel assemblies were assumed to be enriched to 5.0 weight percent U235, and of the VANTAGE 5H design. For the purposes of this analysis, the V5H fuel design was more reactive than standard fuel. The moderator was assumed to be pure water at the most reactive temperature (68 F) within the design limits of the pool. No dissolved boron was used in the water. A conservative minimum B10 loading of 0.0233 gm/cm'in the Boral plates was assumed. Using a radially infinite array of fresh fuel assemblies, the enrichment of the spent fuel racks cannot be increased above 4.0 weight percent U235. Therefore this analysis took credit for reactivity decrease due to bumup of the stored fuel, and for administrative controls on fuel placement. Bumup in discharged fuel was treated by an ' equivalent enrichment" technique based on depletion calculations by CASMO. Mechanical uncertainties and biases because of mechanical tolerances during construction, for example variations in the storage lattice pitch, were treated by using the worst case conditions in the KENO calculations. The calculation method and cross section values were verified by comparison with a set of critical l I experiments analyzed using KENO and SCALE. This benchmarking data was sufficiently diverse to establish that the method bias and uncertainty will apply to rack conditions which include strong h neutron absorbers and large water gaps. A bias for the KENO / SCALE method, for the extrapolation of the benchmarking data to 5.0 weight percent U235, and for boron particle self shielding was calculated. A total bias of 0.01345 (added to the KENO k-offsetive) was found. Uncertainties arising from the statistics of the KENO run, from the KENO method and enrichment extrapolation, frorn mechanical tolerances, and from the CASMO bumup calculation were calculated. A total uncertainty (squared, summed, and rooted) of 0.01454 was found. The Technical Specifications require that any fuel assembly with enrichment greater than 4.0 weight percent and bumup less than 7500 MWD /MTU be placed in spent fuel storage rack locations that face' adjacent cells filled with water or with fuel assemblies with at least 22,000 MWD /MTU. A multi-cell KENO model was used which conservatively modeled the most reactive spent fuel pit configuration allowed by the Technical Specifications. The multi-cell KENO model consisted of four quarter fuel assemblies of two different enrichments, four quarter storage cells, and the water region between them in an infinite lateral array. The infinite array results in a checkerboard configuration containing the two fuel enrichments, fresh 5.0 weight percent and an equivalent enrichment. The equivalent enrichment was chosen to conservatively model 5.0 weight percent fuel bumed to 20,000 MWD /MTU. 4.3-32
1 SON-10
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The building construction employs monolithic pours of concrete. This approach for structures of this type produces a very low leakage barrier. The low leakage characteristics of this barrier help to reduce the rate at which purified annulus air must be released to maintain the enclosed volume at a negative pressure. This factor contributes significantly to keeping the exclusion area boundary and the low population zone (LPZ) dosage levels within 10 CFR 100 guidelines. 10 , The' size of the annular region between the primary containment and tha shield building assures a residence time for allleakage into the annulus. The residence time will average about 90 minutes and is a significant factor in reducing exclusion area boundary and LPZ dosages. This I to factor is neglected in the accident dosage analyses given in Subsection 15.4.1 and Appendix 15B and this tends to make these analyses more conservative. Penetrations The shield building wall is provided with more than 200 penetrations to accommodate l mechanical equipment piping, cable trays, and electrical conduit which leave and enter the I shield building. Leakage through the shield building wall when the annulus is at a negative pressure is expected to be restricted almost entirely to openings in these penetrations. The allowable leakage rates for these penetrations are given in Subsection 6.2.1.2. The design thus assures that penetration leakage will not exceed predetermined quantities. Such a capability ensures that the inleakage will be sufficiently low to keep the dose contributions at the exclusion area boundary and to the LPZ within 10 CFR 100 guidelines. l 10 Openings in mechanical piping penetrations are sealed typically as shown in Figure 6.2.1-1 A ! through H. The seals are some combination of silicone room temperature vulcanizing (RTV) foam, stygard 170 silocine elastomer, a flexible membrane boot type on the inside and/or outside of the shield wall, welded plates, or single gaskets which " - - ' m:9% r" are designed to withstand the combinations of shield building and piping movements in the SSE and retain their functional integrity. In addition, seals at or below elevation 724.0 are designed to be water tight for flood static head and surge forces. All l seals, where possible, are installed outside the shield building such that whether during normal ! operation, accidents, or flood, the differential pressures will tend to enhance the tightness of the seal. The Shield Building penetration seal materials have been selected to sustain the integrated doses for 40 years normal plant operation and LOCA/HELB events. Cables routed in cable trays pass through the shield building wall through rectangular cable sleeve penetrations as shown in Figure 6.2.13. The single interior metal barrier plate of the ' penetration assembly, containing the metal cable sleeves, effectively seals most of the open space within the wall opening for cable trays. The sealant materialinstalled around cables within the cable sleeves is
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- l 6.2-8 l
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Penetrations Seals for mechanical penetrations are a flexible membrane type or single gaskets. They are designed to withstand auxiliary buildin'g i and piping movements on the SSE and retain their structural integrity. N Ot0r!;!: Chc:Or fo it :::': 2r0 % .:':tidt. All seals, where possible, are designed such that whether during l normal operation or accidents, the differential pressures will tend to enhance the tightness of the seal. Sealing methods for electrical l l penetrations are similar to those for the shield building electrical penetrations.
- The ventilation duct isolation dampers are double-tracked with one I inside and o?e outside the containment barrier for physical i separation. The dampers have resilient blade end and blade edge I seals which will retain their' functional characteristics indefinitely over the operational temperature extremes. The motor operators for 6 these dampers have been sized to tightly close the damper blades against their resilient seals. The entire damper and motor operator assembi i P-- % w.w p toeoperate during kL s designed w and
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6.2.1.3.3 Containment Pressure Transients - Short Term Analysis Description of Analysis Calculating pressure and temperature transients following a loss of coolant accident is a three-step process involving the computer codes and a calculation for the compression ratio. l During the first few seconds of the blowdown period of the reactor l coolant system, the TMD computer code (References 14 and 15) with 6 l unaugmented critical flow and the Y compressibility factor is used to I calculate pressure and temperature transients. It is during this period , that the peak transient pressures, differential pressures, temperature l and blowdown loads occur. The containment pressure at or near the end of blowde,wn is calculated by l the containment compression ratio analysis described in Subparagraph l 6.2.1.3.4. Although the TMD code can be run to the end of the blowdown, this is not normally done, because the THD code assumptions, such as no structural heat sinks and no containment sprays, become important in a long transient. The TMD code can conservatively compute the RCS blowdown transient. The LOTIC code (References 18 and 30) does not calculate containment 6 ) pressure during the RCS blowdown. The containment pressure calculation l in LOTIC begins after blowdown. At the end of the blowdown phase, the containment pressure is inputed at the compression ratio value. The containment upper and lower compartment temperatures are calculated based on this compression. These temper-atures are not necessarily the same as that predicted by the TMD code. 9 6.2-10 0058F/C0C4
I SON 40 Little contamination is expected to enter the main control room habitability system area during l10 ingress or egress activities during the emergency operating mode. The basis for this position is that during this brief period when the door is open the air flow will be from inside the main control room habitability system area to the outside. Since the pressure will never be below atmospheric in the main control room habitability system area during this interval, little contamination is expected to leak into the area. In such circumstances the makeup air input of up to 1000 cfm to the main control room habitability system area is considered sufficient to prevent significant infiltration. lIO Offices including the technical support center, living accommodations, and emergency equipment and supplies are also important features in the Main Control Room Habitability System. The scope of the office and living accommodations provided is shown in Figure 1.2.3-3. This shows that sanitary facilities provided include a toilet, shoner, and iocker room. Also provided is a kitchen that is equipped with a microwave, refrigerator, cabinct space, and a sink. Cabinets located within a main control room contain emergency supplies, first aid equipment, full coverage goggles, contamination clothing for whole body protection from beta radiation, face masks, self-coatained breathing apparatus, and emergency radiation monitoring equipment'to support possible emergency operations. The self contained breathing apparatus is effective against smoke, airborne radioactive contamination, oxygen deficient atmosphere. l go Fire protection for the main control room is - sid;d b , P.; _ J ,;n;;m.bu ,1;b'; %,,s ,i ,,, l the enem : M W - % !niera A# c-~rc! CM $, _:: day e " rperWent. c' ; ; ; ;r;, m ;c_ ; h : :d 5 ; ,h ; u g j bb,,a ( Sf
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Face masks and self-contained breathing apparatus are provided to permit emeroency operation nizatio gype smoA cetectors r instal ed i [ e con rol m as ow in F gurb 7.,1.4 sheet 1). pon dete lo o O ( s . n the ntr room, alarm 's unde ; the ete ors do n af t operatio of the v lation tem, ex p to isol te th su ply ! rd t betw n he Ma Con rol oom d non- sential ar s f the El. 6 ' 32 Con rol uild a via an el ctrically release fire damna' The naar2+mr le reem^neihla far + 21< i n n enneanci2+= er+ian +^ av+ina"leh = ff he le nnahla +n Mn (Ira o^^- en, he mgu *rgnce gr ,- an + r a l to tse g .yiii; y , l' Cratec' !ccated i""^^= the aux!:ry be!!d!ag adjaceat tc. but reparate f r ^'= ' +"" a -'ia "^^+"^1 r bd,\),4 Safe sh [h</o down' center /even with he main control can be achieved k CanddJtL ma tained )~~from- the backup' control completely destroyed. ""O de;!;- b2eie mecidant 2nd *ha 1^ee ^f =2!"n. coat"c' '^~" hihitaki'ity 2 e "c!
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m ,--'"d iE'het5i1 47hbb:$bkI^$ 5 5 [M[bA , 5 7. E N Aw b Y F U M 7 8P1[* 71 ). Environmental parameters for equipment in the Main Control Room are described in subsection 3.11. The opcr; tor !: re:pon:ib!c for jegir.;- 6 [ whether ne nnt fico. dam nurf onuirmont ennniene +rinefar af rentret to
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Details on the noncombustible control panels : and consoles and on the fire resistant wiring installed in the Main ! Control Room are given in subsection 7.4.1.1. The hazard to the control room from potential smoke generated by outside facilities (see subsbetion 2.2.3.5) is minimal due to the distance of j l separation between the sites and the control building air intake. The i ! capabilities described above in Subsection 6.4.1.2, System Design, i provide for the mitigation of consequences from smoke intrusion into 'the . I control room from any source. 6.4.1.3 Desian Evaluation The Main Control Room Habitability System has several features that l collectively provide the capability needed to satisfy Criterion 19 (10 CFR 50, appendix A). An evaluation of this system, therefore, must take into consideration the contribution provided by the:
- 1. Shielding enclosing the main control room. Analyses presented in subsection 12.1.2 show that this shielding reduces the control room personnel dosages from external sources created during a LOCA to a l
small fraction of that permitted. ' l 1 l t 6.4-5 0061F/COC4
l l SON p-l 1 top deck structure will withstand these loads and remain within the allowable limits established in the Design Criteria. ] . l J Desion Considerations l '. The blanket panels are hinged on top of the crane wall. The major loads are applied directly into the crane wall. 'l l 2. A blanket panel must be flexible,.i.e., be capable of deforming out of its plane in response to relatively low forces without disintegrating. Deformation of panels during DBA is permissible, but formation of. missiles must be averted.
'3. The deck forms an integral part of ice condenser performance during l DBA, Structural loads are a function of air pressure and flow l
relationships, which in turn are affected by deck characteristics. l 4. The top deck structures are subjected to loads from the air handling unit. Material Consideration
- 1. Refer to Subsection 3.8.3 of the Design Criteria for steel go l
structures. gy
/
~
i @# Blanket material must be fire resistant by its own composition or by' l means of a suitable cover sheet. ' i N ~~ l 3. Blanket material must not be significant source of halides in i
- gaseous form, either by gradual diffusion of inherent ingredients or l by radiolysis of component materials following a DBA.
- 4. Blanket material must not be a significant source of leachable halides during exposure to containment spray following a DBA.
1 Thermal and Hydraulic Performance Requirements
- 1. Heat input to the plenum through the top deck assembly is limited to 13.5 BTU /hr-ft'.
- 2. Resistance to air flow during DBA is minimized, in terms of both l Inertia of panels and obstruction by grating. Panels may reclose or l
remain open following DBA. Panels open on low differential piessure - for small flow rates.
- 3. A vapor barrier is estabil.shed on the upper surface of the blanket panels, i Interface Requirements l~ 1. In the process of opening, adjacent blanket panels will interfere j with each other. This is acceptable in view of their flexibility.
..)
6.5-64 0062F/COC4 I i l-L - , , - l
c SON-8 d
- b. Separate routing of the reactor trip signals from the redundant logic system cabinets is 'i maintained, and in sodition, they are separated from the four process channel sets.
- 2. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System
- a. Separate roeiting la maintained for the four basic sets of ESF Actuation System process
$ sensing signals, comparator output signals and power supplies for such systems. The S separation of these four channel sets is maintained from sensors to instrument racks to ! logic system cabinets.
- b. Separate routing of the ESF actuation signals from the redundant logic system cabinets is maintained and is separated from the four process channel sets. lg
- c. Separate routing of control and power circuits associated with the operation of engineered j safety features equipment is required to retain redundancies provided in the system design and power supplies.
J 3. Vital Power Supply System The separation criteria presented also apply to the power supplies for the load centers and busses distributing power to redundant components and to the control of these power supplies. 1 , Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System process circuits may be routed in the same wireways provided circuits have the same power supply and channel set lT identity (1,11, Ill or IV). 7.1.2.2.3 Fire F,eiectica
% % % G &4(n 7T-1).
Details of fire protection are provided iri LwE 1 7.1.2.3 Physical Identi'icetion of Safety Related Eauinment Adequate identification is provided to distinguish Reactor Trip, Engineered Safety Features and instrumentation and Control Power Supply Systems as safety related. As previously stated there are four protection channel set racks. A color coded nameplate on each rack of each set is used to identify the protection sets. The color coding of the protection set nameplates is: l Protection Set Color Coding i Red with white lettering ll Black with White lettering i lli Blue with white lettering i j IV Yellow with black lettering
. ../
7.1-12
o SON 8 I 7.2.1.2.3 Scatially Deoendent Variables , The following variable is spatially dependent:
- 1. Reactor coolant temperature: See Paragraph 7.3.1.2 for a discussion of this variable spatial dependence. ,
7.2.1.2.4 timits. Maroins and Levels The parameter values that will require reactor trip are given in the SNP Technical Specifications, and in Chapter 15, Safety Analysis. Chapter 15 demonstrates that the setpoints used in the SNP Technical Specifications are conservative. (Refer also to Subparagraph 7.1.2.1.9) The setpoints for the various functions in the Reactor Trip System have been analytically determined such that the operational limits so prescribed will prevent fuel rod clad damage and loss of integrity of the Reactor Coolant System as a result of any Condition 11 incident (anticipated malfunction). As such, the Reactor Trip System limits the following parameters to:
- 1. Minimum DNBR - 1.30 Ib '
- 2. Maximum System Pressure - 2750 psia
- 3. Fuel rod maximum linear power - maximum rated power. 6 The accident analyses described in Section 15.2 demonstrate that the functior.at requirements as i' specified for the Reactor Trip System are adequate to meet the above considerations, even assuming, for conservatism, adverse combinations of instrument errors (Refer to Table 15.1.3-1).
Safety limits associated with the reactor core and Reactor Coolant System, plus the Limiting Safety
- System Setpoints, are presented in the SNP Technical Specifications.
7.2.1.2.5 Abnormal Events The malfunctions, accidents or other unusual events which could physically damage Reactor Trip System components or could cause environmental changes are as follows: pg &P' / '?" ' " F
- 1. Earthquake (discussed in Chapter 2 and Chaptery r.0 y)s,7 fm :1,e
- 2. Fire (See ?- St ' ' % G P- M
- 3. Explosion (Hydrogen buildup inside containment). (See Section 6.2). gg !
- 4. Missiles (See Sections 3.5 and 10.2.3).
- 5. Flood (See Chapter 2 and 31.
- 6. Wind and Tornadoes (See Section 3.3).
All instrumentation, control and communication lines that will be required for operation in the flood g mode are either above the design basis l 1 I t 7.2-15
SON-B L *
- b. Containmer.t pressure (not required for Steam Generator tube rupture) g 2 Secondary System Accidents
- a. Pressurizer pressure
- b. Steam line pressures .
- c. Steam line pressure rate
- d. Reactor coolant average temperature (T, ) g
- e. Containment pressure 7.3.1.2.3 Sostially Deoendent Variables i I
The only variable sensed by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System which has spatial dependence is reactor coolant temperature. The effect on the measurement is negated by taking 3 multiple samples from the reactor coolant hot leg and electronically averaging these samples in the process protection ' system. 7.3.1.2.4 Limits. Maroins and Levels l l Prudent operational lim'rts, available margins and setpoints before onset of unsafe conditions or requiring protective acion are discussed in Chapters 15 and the SON Technical Specifications. (Refer also to Subparagraph 7.1.2.1.9) 7.3.1.2.5 Abnormal Events The malfunctions, accidents, or other unusual events which could physically damage protection h system components or could cause environmental changes are as follows:
- 1. Loss of coolant accident (See Sections 15.3 and 15.4) '
l
- 2. Steam breaks (See Sections 15.3 and 15.4)
- 3. Earthquakes (See Chapter 3 and Chapter 2) Og~
- 4. Fire (See Subsection 9.5.1) #~)j i
- 5. Explosion (Hydrogen buildup inside containment) (See Section 15.4) 1
- 6. Missiles (Sae Section 3.5 and 10.2.3)
- 7. Rood (See Chapters 2 and 31 7.3.1.2.6 Minimum Performance Recuirements Minimum performance requirements are as follows:
- 1. System response times:
The Engineered Safety Features actuation system response time, or time delay, is defined as the interval required for the Engineered Safety Features sequence to be initiated subsequent to the point in time that the appropriate variables (s) exceed setpoint(s). The delay l 7.3 7
- - . . _ _ . - ___m l t l
SQN-6 i L' Results ' RCS Inventory and Pressure Control i The pressurtzer PORV's might be subject to inappropriate opening due to environmental effects which could exist from high energy pipe breaks Inside containment. Such inappropriate opening has been judged to be ! acceptable because (1) adequate annunciation is provided to alert the operator to the event, (2) adequate ' time is available for operator action, and (3) the control system design is such that operator action is possible. RCS inventory and pressure control could also be jeopar'dized by inappropriate control circuit actuations which would lead to a reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal failure. Control system modifications have been made to both the component cooling water system, which supplies cooling to the pumps thermal barrier and to the chemical and volume control system (CVCS), which supplies seal injection water to assure seal integrity in the presence of fire-induced spurious control system actuations. t In that these modifications would also render the seals immune to damage due to pipe break induced inappropriate actuations, this feature was judged to be assured without further evaluation. Steam Generator Inventory and Pressure Control r-The control system for the SG power operated relief valves (PORV's) could (' be affected by high energy pipe breaks in the main steam valve room. ; This inappropriate opening is considered to be acceptable because i (1) adequate annunciation is provided to alert the operator to the event, I (2) adequate time is available for operator action, and (3) the control system design assures that the operator can override the inappropriate open signal. For a steamline breaks (1.4 ft') downstream of the flow restrictor coupled with a spurious opening of a steam generator power operated relief valve and its failure to close the steamline break analysis performed for a break upstream of the flow restrictor / , (4.6 ft') is bounding. l' An inappropriate opening of a main steam isolation valve bypass valve would defeat steam generator isolation. Normally the control circuits for these valves are deenergized by opening a handswitch in the MCR after the valves are closed during plant startup. It e:: d!:::" r:d h r'95 tM Uw ennrins M D50 H eadi nnoninn o evi!uath th:t : r: '- th: MCP. = !d : = : er th.ee "a!vec nie 6 gha s ne.c &n n. fei!ure e : add et ed b" e ;"ir.g mn*,m.1 e. t r.e. n. t. +. e.e. s. + h. o. e a. . m .e i. o. . . s.
- h. a .o o. m a +.
s
- a. t. - si-n ECCS Response An inappropriate actuation of the reactor building auxiliary flow and equipment drain sump pump could jeopardize long term ECCS response by pumping water out of the ECCS active sump. This actuation is considered to be acceptable because (1) adequate indication is provided to alert the operator to the event, (2) adequate time is available for operator action, and (3) control system design is such that operator action is possible, i
7.3-22 0069F/COC4
. ~ . . - - - _ _ . --- -
SQN 1 1 7.4 P SYSTEMS REOUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTOOWN The process signals and information necessary for safe shutdown are systems in both the primary and secondary sides of th Supply System. operational protective functions, functions. including startup and shutdown as wel required for maintaining safe shutdown of the reactor the minimum under nonaccident conditions. This capability will permit the necessary operations that will: ' i l. Technical Specifications andPrevent the reactor from achieving criticality
- 2. 1 Provide not an exceeded. adequate heat s, ink such that design and safety limits are The designation of systems that can be used for maintaining a safe those systems which provide the following capabilities: shutdo
- 1. Boration.
2. Residual heat removal. 4 Discussions of the systems required for a safe shutdown, which are identifled in Section 7.4.1, together with the applicable codes , Ana'ysis Reporta / f4, 4 Ab7wcriteria, and guidelines are c9nt,ained in othe E74(5=, f.r.i) . ' 7.4.1 Descriotion 7.4.1.1 Control Room Availability Seismic Category I Structure, at elevation 732.the main control r Ventilation System, is described in detail in Section 9.41The . , is Hain Control Room designed to maintain habitability in accordance with GDC-19 during essentially all conditions. Extensive fire in the Main Control Room could, however, force its evacuation. Aur111ary Control Room located in the Auxiliary Building.In that
, safe a
shutdown condition. controls provide a capability to bring the units to anc' Auxiliary _ . .controls
. . . . . _ are
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l SON-10 1 ( The construction raaterials used in the main control room are noncombustible. The main contr boards are of steel and the internal surface is painted with a fire-retardant paint. Electrical wiring is flame resistant as shown by the vertical flame test as described in the Insulated Power Cable ) Engineer's Association, IPCEA, Publications and the American Society for Testing Materials, ASTM i D 470-64T. Each control and electrical panel is monitored by a combustion product ionization-type detector l 10 i which annunciates detectors in the 7.1.4-1. is shown in Figure Main Control Room in case of fire or smoke. The location of these l { For details on the habitability systems of the main control room, see Section 6.4. 7.4.1.2 exiliary Controls In case it becomes necessary to evacuate the main control room due to fire or smoke, the capability exists to establish and maintain the reactor (s) in a safe shutd wn condition fr m locations outside the Main Control Room. TL p.7.f, " c}Mu/~ C.c, Prdds [W,2f./), Th. i.-,,;e ei . gne,nt e oro ince,.y en e7n,gn,;gte e gg_t,gi, ucc beergt a gy,gt g...y,.... be,,3 cc S000 vo : ;hu;down bc;rt. Th;;; bc;rd; ::: !c;;;;d h :h; Aud':;ry Su !d:n;; on C';v;;;ca; 7h =ad H9 The ?uvm?"y rea're! reem !r !ccated 6 +5e ^.u9!! ry 9u!! ding en E!:r;t!:n 72d adj;;; ; to ;h; Con;re' ",0 'd:ng. l 7 % .. a _ __.__i s__ + - .s 2,,,;,;en,,.gnere r ,99,,,3,e .o.,,,3,ey by ,c -...g .c p .;;; redund- :t function; :nd ;!:;;ric;' ;; pare;;ca is rn; n;; n;d. wxL.; wJr.) l 3o l l Eachffunction is designed with a transfer switch to disconnect it from the main control room . Placing the transfer switch in the local operating position will give an annunciating alarm in the control toom and will turn off the motor control position lights on the control room panel. For d ! certain systems the purpose of this transfer switch is to prevent actuation of the system due to a spurious signal caused by fire { 1 CAny exceptions to the above are evaluated and documented on design' criteria SON-DC-V-2.17 and SON-DC V 12.2. 7.4.1.3 Systems Available for Hot Shutdown D To achieve and maintain hot shutdown for various nonaccident reactor conditions, essential control functions are provided both inside and outside the main control room for the following systems: I System FSAR Reference Section
- 1. Reactor Coolant System Chapter 5
- 2. Chemical and Volume Control System Section 9.3.4
- 3. Residual Heat Removal System Section 5.5.7
] ,
J ,,devU-
- T pg Q,rf fc.u, J.f l)f'* Y ,
{ 7.4 2 - l
SQN-6 . s.
- 4. Component Cooling System Section 9.2.1 S. Main Steam System Section 10.3
- 6. Ventilation System Section 9.4
- 7. Essential Raw Cooling Water System Section 9.2.2
- 8. Auxiliary Feedwater System Section 10.4.7.2
- 9. Olesel Generators Chapter 8 In addition to the functions indicated above, the turbine may be tripped in the main control room or at the turbine; the reactor may be tripped in the main control room or at the reactor trip switchgear; and all automatic systems continue functioning as discussed in Section 7.3.
Other evernme are diernnnartad fram tha main ran+ rat rann &^ ne o--* inadver't ant annratinn Ana en a firo 7.4.1.3.1 Main Controls The indicators and controls available in the main control rooms are discussed in Section 7.1.4. 7.4.1.3.2 Auxiliary Controls '
~~'
The indicators and controls available outside of the main control room are described in this section.
- 1. Reactor Coolant (RC) System The following information is available to the operator in the auxiliary control room;
- a. RC temperature.
- b. Pressurizer pressure.
- c. Pressurizer level.
- d. Pressurizer relief tank level.
- e. Pressurizer relief tank pressure.
Controls for the RC System pumps, the oil-lift pumps, the valves necessary to vent the pressurizer, and the pressurizer heaters are j available outside of the main control room. l
- 2. Chemical and Volume Control System The operator can control the following functions and equipment from outside the main control room:
- a. Charging and letdown flow. l
- b. Demineralizer bypass. di 7.4-3 0070F/COC4 l
l
SQN-6
- c. Divert flow to the holdup tank.
- d. Charging pumps.
- e. Boric acid tank flow.
Seal flow. f. 6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System
- 3. '
l To achieve and maintain hot shutdown, the only function required of this system is to ensure enclosure of the RHR isolation valves. W crerster can etre! these vi!ve: 2nd prevent inadverteat oper=M en l dea +e Fir #rce cut:ld: th: "CR. j
' l
- 4. Component Cooling System (CCS) l l
The header pressures and flows are indicated on the auxiliary l control room panels. Controllers for the following functions and ' equipment are located outside the main control room:
- a. The main CCS pumps. .
- b. The booster pumps. I
- c. All header flow control. )
- d. Diversion valves to the component coolers.
- 5. Main Steam System The steam generator pressures are displayed in the auxiliary control 6 %
l
)
room. The steam flow to the auxiliary feed pump turbine, the l operation of the power relief valves, and the cessation of blowdown and sampling can be controlled from the panels outside the main control room.
- 6. Ventilation System The containment pressure is displayed on auxiliary control panels for both units.
The controllers needed to control the lower compartment cooler units, the control rod driver cooler units, and the recirculation valves are located on panels outside the main control room.
- 7. Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System l
From outside of the main control room, the operator has control of the following: f I ! a. ERCH pumps,
- b. Header flow.
- c. Header isolation.
- d. Header pressure.
- e. Header diversion valves.
- f. Cooler discharge flow valves.
.a l
7.4-4 0070F/COC4
o SQN-6
- 8. Auxillary Feedwater (AFW) System Panels outside the main control room contain the displays and controls for the following equipment and functions:
- a. AFW pumps,
- b. ERCH supply header isolation valves.
- c. Steam generator level control.
- d. AFW pump discharge, pressure.
- e. Steam generator levels.
- f. AFW flow to each steam generator. 6
- g. Total turbine-driven pump header flow.
The steam generator levels are provided by two channels of instrumentation. -
- 9. Diesel Genera tors The operator h0s the ability to initiate emergency start and !
emergency stop c./ the diesel generators from outside the main I control room. 7.4.1.4 Systems Available for Cold Shutdown j The systems available to achieve and maintain hot shutdown are available also for cold shutdown. 7.4.1.4.1 Main Controls The indicators and controls available in the main control room are discussed in Section 7.1.4. 7.4.1.4.2 Auxiliary Controls In addition to the functions that are available outside the main control room discussed in Section 7.4.1.3.2, the operator is provided with control of the following RHR functions and equipment: !
- 1. Inflow valves.
- 2. RHR pumps.
- 3. Recirculation flow. [", "h y ' 'f
- 4 Cross flow. ,.
- 5. Outlet flow.
- 6. Outlet temperature.
./
or pp To achieve c injectio anutoown the operator must be able to defeat the safety gnal trip circuit and close the accumulator isolation valves The instrumentation and controls for certain systems may require some modification in order that their functions may be performed outside the control room. Note that the plant design does not preclude attaining the cold shutdown condition; from outside the control room. An 7.4-5 0070F/COC4
. W \v '
ed SON-8 h ! assessment of plant conditionsican be made en ; !;ng :;r , b;;:: '; c;;d : .;r;; :: ;;;;b::;h per::d=; f;r T.;'dag th; ne;;;;;ri phy;;;;l .T.;d f;;;;;;r.; to :n... ............. ; .d ;; ;rd! l l e-0; : t in order to attain cold shutdown. During such time the plant could be safely maintained at hot shutdown condition.
- %* "-4 preced: :: t; b: !:"r:::d b :!heth:; cc'd th"* der- ' Tem cudde th: ec-tec! c~~ are OF ; . 9 ^ ^! 27 6 7.4.1.5 Additional Systems Available Outside the Main Control Room The following systems are not required for safe shutdown but are provided with controls both inside and outside the main control room so essential functions can be maintained:
- 1. Containment Spray System, Section 6.2.2.
- 2. Safety injection System, Section 6.3.
- 3. Waste Disposal System, Chapter 11.
7.4.1.5.1 Main Controls The indicators and controls available in the main control room are discussed in Section 7.1.4. 7.4.1.5.2 Auxiliarv Controls
- 1. Containment Spray System The controllers for the containment spray pumps, the spray header flow, and the supply flow are available outside the main control room.
s
}
- 2. Safety injection System From panels located outside the main control room, the following functions and equipment can be controlled:
- a. Accumulator tank pressure. .
- b. Accumulator filling flow,
- c. Flow to the cold legs of the RC System.
- d. Accumulator tank to RCDT flow.
- e. Flow to the RHR heat exchangers,
- f. SIS pumps. .
- g. Flow from the refueling water storage tank.
- h. Flow to the CCP injection tank. lp
- i. Containment sump discharge.
- 3. Waste Disposal System The Gaseous and Liquid Processing Systems and the boron recycle panels are local panels located in the Auxiliary Building. The sump r
I I 7.4 6
SQN pump and isolation valves are controlled from panels in the vicinity of the auxiliary control room. 7.4.2 Analysis Hot shutdown is a stable plant condition, automatically reached following a plant shutdown. The hot shutdown condition can be maintained safely for an extended period of time either automatically or manually. In the unilkely event that access to the control room is restricted, the plant can be safely kept at hot shutdown or taken to cold shutdown by the use of the monitoring Indicators and the controls listed in Sections 7.4.1.3 and 7.4.'. 4. These indicators and controls are provided outside as well as inside the control room. The safety evaluation of the maintenance of a shutdown from the main ; control room has included consideration of the accident consequences that might jeopardize safe shutdown conditions. The accident consequences that are germane are those that would tend to degrade the capabilities for boration, adequate supply for auxiliary feedwater and residual heat removal. I The results of the accident analyses are presented in Chapter 15. Of i these, the following produce the most severe consequences that are pertinent: l '. Uncontrolled boron dilublon.
- 2. Loss of normal feedwater.
- 3. Loss of external electrical load and/or turbine trip.
- 4. Loss of all alternating current power to the station auxiliaries (station blackout).
It is shown by these analyses that safety 1s not compromised by these, incidents with the associated assumptions being that the instrumentation and controls indicated in Section 7.1.4 are available to control and/or monitor shutdown. These available systems will allow a maintenance of hot shutdown even under the accident conditions listed above which would tend toward a return to criticality or a loss of heat sink. - L 5 + S U L .F "L'
" E~I'AL'.b.# k0 i
l i 7.4-7 0070F/COC4
SON-10 I receive power from the 120V AC backup source under operator control. The transfer breakers are mechanically interlocked to prevent paralleling the inverters with the backup source. Therefore no single failure in the Instrumentation and Control Vital Power Sapply System or its associated power supplies can cause a loss of power to more than one of the redundant loads. The inverters are designed to maintain their outputs within the limits of 60 Hz 11.0 percent and l 120V AC12 percent. The loss of the alternating-current or direct-current inputs are alarmed in l the control room, as is the loss of an inverter's output. There are no inverter breaker controls on the control board, as no manual transfers are necessary in the event of loss of the 480V AC preferred power source. , I i j Ph 1 %ysical
- 7. r. h*parann and provisions to protect against fire are discussed in Chapter Sa / b f,c, dlk' l
Based on the scope definitions presented in Reference 1 (IEEE 308- September,1971), Reference 2 l l (IEEE 279-1971), and References 3 (IEEE 338-1971), the criteria whith are applicable to the - instrumentation and Control Vital Power Supply System are IEEE 308-Sept.,1971 and Regulatory Guide 1.6 (March,1971). Availability of this system is continuously indicated by the operational status of the system and is verified by periodic testing as discussed in sections 8.3.1.1 and 8.3.2.1. 7.6.2 Residual Heat Removal isolation Valves 7.6.2.1 Descriotion i There are two motor operated gate valves (FCV 74-1 (8702) and FCV 74-2 (8701) as shown in l logic diagram, Figure 5.5.7-3) in series in the inlet line from the Reactor Coolant System to the ! Residual Heat Removal System. They are normally closed and are only opened for residual heat l- removal after system pressure is reduced below 380 psig and system temperature has been reduced to approximately 350'F. (See Chapter 5 for details of the Residual Heat Removal System). They are the same type of valve and motor operator as those used for accumulator ) isolation, but they differ in their controls and indications in the following respect: l The pump suction isolation valve adjoining the Reactor Coolant System is interlocked with a pressure signal to prevent its being opened whenever the system pressure is greater than 380 psig. There are also interlocks which prevent its begin opened unless the RWST suction valve (FCV 63-1) and containment sump isolation valve (FCV-63-72) are fully closed. During normal plant operation, power is removed from the valve control circuit to prevent inadvertent opening of the valve. Valve status indication is provided at the control switch onthe Main Control Board at all times. During residual heat removal operations, power is restored to the valve and it is opened from the control switch on the Main Control Board. Annunciation to warn against system overpressurization is provided to the operator by a high RHR suction pressure alarm. This alarm is actuated from any iO one of two pressure switches located on the RHR common header suction piping. The other pump suction isolation valve, adjoining the Residual Heat Removal System, is similarly interlocked to prevent opening closed with i 1 A f
- 7.6 2 l
l l
}
Electrical Penetration Assemblies b The Westinghouse canister type electrical penetration assemblies have been tested to TVA E specification requirements which conform to IEEE-317,1971, "lEEE Standard for Electrical Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." The j,1, Conax and Westinghouse modular electrical penetration assemblies meet the 1976 version of IEEE-317. The documentation of successful completion included certified test reports of all tests required and ' listed in the specifications and quality assurance appendix, and applicable TVA inspector's reports. Each electrical penetration assembly furnished has been shop inspected by a commissioned representative of the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel inspectors. Each assembly has been Code stamped, in accordance with the 1971 Edition ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Ill. The dose rate at which TVA has conducted 100 hour tests on materials and equipment is 10' Rad /hr dose rate that may occur during the first hour of a LOCA. It is the TVA position that a factor of 5 in dose rate is not significant in this region. There is no mechanism that TVA is aware of that would tend to produce significant increases in degradation in the region between 10' and 10' Rad /hr. However, radiation-induced oxidation of materials can become an important damage
' mechanism at lower exposure rates and consequent longer exposure times. Therefore, IEEE 278,
" Guide For Classifying Electrical Insulating Materials Exposed to Neutron and Gamma Radiation,"
recommend using exposure rates above 10' Rad /hr. It is the TVA position that 10' Rad /hr for 100 hours represents a reasonable and conservative combination of dose rate and exposure time for radiation testing, , Cable terminations to low voltage power, control, and indication penetration assemblies are generally made in all metal splice boxes. However, in a number of instances on the outhoard side of containment electrical penetrations, field cables were spliced to the penetration pigtails in cable trays, in these cases, a special enclosure was used to act as a qualified fire stop (refer to Figure 8.3.1-37, -38, and -39). These particular splices are located within the last 5-foot section of the cable tray. The trays in the annulus area of containment contairing these splices are fitted with solid top and bottom covers in the immediate area of these splices. A quadfied fire barrier made of silicone foam and ceraform/kaowool fiberboard was installed on the side of the splice opposite to the penetration as shown on Figure 8.3.1-37, -38, and -39. On the other side of the splice in the tray (end of tray runs toward the electrical penetration), kaowool materials were inserted in the voids between conductors, and all the exposed conductors to the electrical penetration were covered with Flamemastic material. This configuration constitutes a qualified fire barrier which in the unlikely event of a fire in the splice area, will contain and isolate the fire from adjacent trays of electrical equipment. 1 8.3-40 -_
SON-8
) C "'
?*. Splices were made in accordance with vendor-recomr.nonded splicing procedures, and ful the environmental qualifications required for this location. The fire barrier and the electrical penetration splice box designs are based upon tests performed by Factory Mutual and TVA on
. scale mockups. The TVA test results have been reviewed and approved by the NRC.
8.3.1.3 - Conformance with Anorooriate Quality Assurance Standards 5 Conformance Assurance Plan. with appropriate quality assurance is described in Chapter 17 gand the 8.3.1.4 indeoendence of Redundant AC Power Systema The criteria and their bases which have been used to e'stablish the minimum requirements fo preserving the independence of redundant Class 1E electric systems are stated in IEEE 5308 andj Regulatory Guide 1.6, Rev. O. The TVA Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan describes the i administrative criteria responsibility during the design and control that has been provided to assure compliancej with and installation.' g thesel The nuclear power generating station protection system (GSPS) includes the reactor 5protectio , system (RPS), engineered safety features (ESF), essential supporting auxiliary systems (ESAS)! Class 1E electric systems. These systems are required for the safe shutdown of the reactor.
# will not result in failure to safelyeactor. shutdown the rRedundant systems are provide, The reactor protection system (RPS) is the overall complex of instrument channels, powe 1:gic channels, and actuators together with their interconnecting wiring, involved in produc reactor trip. '
The engineered safety features (ESF) and essential supporting auxiliary systems (ESAS), as clements of the nuclear power generating station protection system, are the systems which take tutomatic action to isolate the reactor and to provide the cooling necessary to remove the thermal centainment in the event of a serious reactor accident. Certain ES continuous duty to prevent as well as to mitigate reactor accidents. Examples of ESAS systems are component power and controlcooling, systems.emergency raw cooling water, together with their supporting electrical There ESF systems consist of sensor instrument channels, power supplies, actuation channe actuators together with their interconnecting wiring involved in the operation of engineered safety futures are actuated by the separate actuation channels. Each coincidence network energizes an cngineered safety features actuation device that operates the associated safety features equipmen! (3.g., motor starter, valve operator, etc.). l e 8.3-41
SQN-6 ) P 8.3.1.4.2 Cable Routing and Separation Criteria D.}L Electrical wiring for the GSP5, which includes the RPS, ESF, ESAS, and Class lE electric systems, are segregated into separate divisions of separation (channels or trains) such that no single event, such as a short circuit, fire, pipe rupture, missile, etc., is capable of disabling sufficient equipment to prevent safe shutdown of the reactor, removal of decay heat from the core, or to prevent isolation of the. primary contain-ment. The degree of separation required for GSPS electrical cables varies with the potential hazards in a particular zone or area of the power plant. These criteria do not attempt to classify every area of the nuclear plant, but specifies minimum requirements and guidelines that have been applied with good engineering judgment as an aid to prudent and conservative layout of electrical cable trays, wireways, conduits, etc., throughout the plant (both inside and outside the containment). Mechanical Damage (Missile) Zone Zonts of potential missile damage exist in the vicinity of heavy rotating machinery or near other sources of mechanical energy, such as pipe whip, steam release, or pipes carrying liquids under high pressure. Layout and arrangement of cable trays, conduit, wireways, etc., are such that no locally generated force or missile can destroy both redundant engineered safety feature functions. In rooms or compartments having heavy rotating machinery, such as the reactor coolant pumps, the reactor feedwater turbines, or in rooms containing high-pressure feedwater piping or high-pressure steam lines, a minimum separation of 20 feet, or a minimum 6-inch '
' thick reinforced concrete wall is provided between trays containing cables of different divisions. In an area containing an operating crane, such i as the upper compartment of the reactor building, there is a minimum i
horizontal separation of 20 feet or a minimum 6-inch thick reinforced concrete wall between trays containing cables of the different divisions of separation. Fire Hazard Zone The electrical cabling has been. arranged so as to eliminate, , insofar as b ' is practical, all potenti'al for fire damage to cables and to separate the redundant divisions of generating station protection system (GSPS) cabling. Such arrangemert ensures that fire'in one division will not , cause damage to cables in another division. Routing of power or control cable for GSPS through rooms or spaces where there is potential for l accumulating large quantities (gallons) of oil or other combustible 6 l fluids through leakage or rupture of lube oil or cooling systems is avoided where possible. In cases where it is impossible to provide other b routing, only one division of GSPS cables are allowed in any such space, and the cables are protected from dripping oil by the use of conduits or flanged covered cable trays designed to prevent oil from reaching the cables. No GSPS cables are routed through rooms containing oil storage tanks. In any room (except the auxiliary instrument room and the 6 annulus) or, space in which the only source of fire is of an electrical 8.3-43 0078F/C0C4
SOM-10 nature, cable trays carrying redundant divisions of GSPS cables have a minimum horizontal s separation of 3 feet if no physical barrier exists between the trays. If a horizontal separation of at least 3 feet is not attainable, a fire-resistant barrier is provided. This barrier is either a 1/2-inch minimum thickness of Marinite-36 (or its equivalent), or a fire-resistant barrier of two sheets of minimum 14-gauge steel with a minimum 1-inch air space separating the two sheets of steel, extending at least 1 foot above (or to the ceiling) and 1 foot below (o.' to the floor) the line-of sight communication between the two trays. Vertical stacking of trays carrying cables of different divisions of GSPS cables is avoided whenever possible. However, whenever it becomes necessary to stack open- top trays vertically, one above the other, there is a minimum vertical separation of 5 feet between trays carrying cables of different divisions. The lower tray has a solid steel cover and the upper tray has a solid steel bottom. If 5 feet is not attainable, then a fire-resistant barrier is provided. This barrier is either a 1/2 inch tr.inimum thickness of Marinite-36 (or its equivalent), or two sheets of minimum 14-gauge steel with a minimum 1-inch air space separating the two sheets of steel. This barrier extends a minimum of 3 feet (or to nearest wall) on each side of the tray edge. In cases where trays carrying cables of different divisions of separation cross, there is a minimum vertical separation of 12 inches (tray top of lower tray to tray bottom of upper tray) with the bottom tray covered with a solid steel cover and the top tray provided with a solid steel bottom for a minimum distance of 3 feet on each side of the tray crossing, def,4,-l ]..o o'.s <lude,U t)L Qu., ,Y .> J& t Cable So eadino Room s ~ f f id f ,o ; WQ pf, @ h ,,[ [ m 2 r./) f ., The cable spreading room is the area provided under the main control room where cables leaving the various control board panels are cospersed into cable trays or conduits for routing to all parts of the plant. Since the cable spreading room is protected from missiles by its seismic Category I walls i and there are no internal sources of missiles, such as high-pressure ' piping or heavy rotating machinery, the only potential source of damage to redundant cables is from fire. Orneke deteciere end e i piciecLen suppress,sn sys;ern hose ha :ne;;:ed ensea >~ j wenmnu<~m.,um, gee m e mm be -a: :r' " $ ::b!: :p ::Q;; r;;m. Where l ' j GSPS cables of different divisions (train A or train B) of separation approach the same or adjacent - 9 unit control panel (see the Main Control Room discussion) with spacing less than 3 feet, these cables are run in metal (rigid or flexible) conduit or enclosed wireway to a point where 3 feet of separation exists. A minimum horizontal separation of 3 feet separates trays carrying cables of different divisions (channels or trains) if no physical barrier exists between the trays. Where a hori- < zontal separation of 3 feet does not exist, a fire-resistant barrier of either a 1/2-inch minimum i thickness of Marinite-36 (or its equivalent), or two sheets of steel (minimum 14 gauge) with a l minimum 1-inch air space separating the two sheets of steel, extending at least one foot above (or l to the ceiling) and one foot below (or to the floor) the line-of-sight communication between the,two trays. Vertical stacking of cable trays carrying cables of different divisions of separation has been avoided p,kJ,.a U-a fre A$l 0<, t.5 ff rw Y he.w,A0 a & f a f,& 3..s (~ u d. \ 8.3-44
l SQN-6 whenever possible. However, whenever it becomes necessary to stack open trays vertically, one above the other, there is a minimum vertical separation of five feet between trays carrying cables of different divisions of separation. The lower tray has a solid steel cover and the upper tray has a solid steel bottom. If five feet is not attainable, then a fire-resistant barrier is provided. This barrier is either a 1/2-inch minimum thickness of Marinite-36 (or its equivalent), or two sheets of steel (minimum 14 gauge) with a minimum 1-inch air space i separating the two sheets of steel. This barrier extends a minimum of 1 foot (or to the nearest wall) on each side of the tray edge. ' In cases where trays carrying cables of different divisions of GSPS 6 cables cross horizontally, there shall be a minimum vertical separation The of 1 foot (tray top of lower tray to tray bottom of upper tray). ; bottom tray shall be covered with a solid steel cover, and the top tray ' provided with a solid steel bottom for a minimum distance of 3 feet on each side of the tray crossing or to the wall (s). Auxiliary Instrument Room and Reactor Building Annulus b i
)
The aux 111arv instrument room is the area under the cable spreading l room.4 Slice' the auxiliary instrument room is protected from missiles by Its seisolc Category I walls and there are no internal sources of , l missiler, such as high-pressure piping or heavy rotating equipment,No the
,. only potsntial source of damage to redundant cables is from fire.j / '
cc-5;:: M: : tert::: 2r: :ter:c '- :n'; ree , in ne power capies that have a prottetive device rated greater than 30 ampere are routed in this room unless they are in separate conduits. Fica '"d = *e~+="^+k detecto : "!!h I k^c#
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c^55 r it biikd ,~av: h b: r 5 :ta!! d. The aux 111ary instrument room contains the process instrument racks, the (solid-state protection racks, and associated instrument and relay racks. Solid-bottom type cable trays with solid steel flanged covers have been used where a minimum horizontal separation of I foot and a minimum vertical separation of 3 feet cannot be maintained. A minimum horizontal separation of I foot is provided between trays carrying cables of If no physical barrier exists different divisions (channels or trains) between them. If required the same barriers as in the cable spreading room are provided. Whenever it becomes necessary to stack train A or B trays vertically,,one above the other, there is a minimum separation of 3 feet between these trays carrying cables of different divisions. If 3 feet is not attainable, then a fire-resistant barrier is provided. Whenever it becomes necessary to stack channel I, II, III, or IV trays vertically, one above the other, there is a minimum separation of I footIf between the tray top of lower tray and the tray bottom of upper tray. - I foot is not attainable, then a fire-resistant barrier is provided. These barriers for trays (trains or channels) stacked vertically are t ' equivalent to either a 1/2-inch minimum thickness of Marinite-36 (or its i g equivalent), or two sheets of steel. This barrier extends a minimum of 1 CAuAl Q uk rL/,,LL
, ( L4.,p 2 ( n , u .i)-Uf L AL,4 4 . 0078F/C0C4 8.3-45 t
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I i SQN:6 i foot (or to nearest wall) on each side of the tray edge. In cases where ! redundant trays cross, there is a minimum vertical separation of 1 foot l (tray top of lower tray to tray bottom of upper tray) with covers and bottoms 3 feet on each side of crossing. As the cable trays or enclosed g wireways leave the solid-state protection system racks, they are spread r as soon as possible to attain these separations. l t The Annulus The annulus is the area in the reactor building between the steel ! containment vessel and the concrete shield building. Cables leaving the i various electrical penetrations in the annulus are dispersed into cable ! trays or conduit for routing through the shield building wall to other j areas of the plant. Since the annulus is missile protected by its ! seismic Category I wall and there are no internal sources of missiles 6 I such as rotating heavy machinery, the only potential source of damage to Separation requirements for : redundant cables would be from fire raceways containing redundant d , ons of GSPS cables are the same as I the . Auxillary Instrument Room. F.~ f4L 114.u f4Ls), A A~~J.o % l , AW s A G/4b 1 4(= 9 7.r./). Main Control Room and Auxiliary Control Room l Redundant GSPS cables enter the main control room through separate floor openings. Each unit control panel, which has redundant components, has a ^ minimum of three separate vertical and/or horizontal risers (enclosed ' l wireways) from each of the respective terminal block groups to the ,. i control room floor (or bottom of walk space). Non-safety related cables l6 ( are routed through one or more riser (s), preferably near the center of [ the control panel. The redundant GSPS cables (train A or train B 6 ! l separation) are routed separately in each of the other two or more l risers, preferably one near each end of the control panel. Risers of ! like trains of separation have been arranged such that the adjacent panel l has a corresponding like train riser (i.e., train A in one panel has train A nearest it in the adjacent panel). The minimum separation distance between redundant Class lE circuits internal to Control Boards, Panels, Relay Racks, etc., is 6 inches of-free air space. Wherever this separation distance is not maintained, barriers are provided between redundant Class lE wiring. Within the l Westinghouse supplied main and auxiliary control room panels, braided ! sheath material, such as Belden Brald, is an acceptable barrier for reducing the redundant Class IE separation to less than 6 inches. The braid is used only over wire with teflon or other approved insulation. l Braid covered wiring for redundant Class IE circuits are restrained such b that their braids do.not touch nor are they able to migrate with time to touch. Within an enclosure containing multiple divisions of wiring the redundant divisions of Class lE wiring are separated from non-divisional wiring by
- a 6-inch air space or barrier, except as described below. If non-divisional wiring must be terminated on a Class 1E (divisional) component s
8.3-46 0078F/COC4
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} l (switch, relay, terminal block, etc.), the component must be rated for the maximum voltage and current which could be applied to the non-divisional component and the non-divisional circuit is run with the divisional wiring, terminated on the divisional riser, and treated as a non-divisional cable routed with divisional (GSPS) cables per cable tray and conduit systems separation requirements. Most Class lE panels and enclosures contain wiring for only one division of redundant Class IE circuits and wiring for non-divisional circuits. For these enclosures the non-divisional circuit wiring is assumed to be in close proximity to the wiring for the single division of Class 1E circuits in the enclosure. Therefore, the entire non-divisional circuit (including external cabling) is separated from all wiring and cabling of , the opposite redundant division of Class lE circuits. All non-divisional cables routed to the enclosure are treated as "non-divisional cables routed with divisional (GSPS) cables" per cable tray and conduit systems separation requirements. Also see section 7.7.1.10 for electrical separation in the panels. 6 If both non-divisional w1' ring and divisional wiring are terminated on the same component (switch, relay, terminal block, etc.), the component must be rated for the maximum current and voltage that could be applied to the non-divisional circuit. For example, a Train "A" valve limit switch enclosure may contain Class 1E wiring for annunciation or valve position status lights. The non-divisional wiring is in close proximity to the Train "A" wiring and must not be routed with Train "B" cables or routed to Train "B" equipment. Hiring for utility power outlets and lighting circuits installed in ' control boards, panels, or enclosures are in dedicated conduits to provide separation from Class IE and Non-Class lE wiring. l Non-safety related functions that are derived from Class IE circuits must ! employ adequate isolation. Isolation is adequate if no credible failure on the non-Class IE circuit prevents the Class IE circuit from performing l its design basis function. Credible failures include short circuits, open circuits, grounds, and the application of the maximum credible AC or DC potential. l Separation of Class IE Electric Ecutoment All Class lE electric equipment has physical separation, redundancy, and a controlled environment to prevent the occurrence of an external event that would threaten the safe shutdown of the reactor. No internally generated fault can propagate from Class IE electric equipment to its redundant equipment during any design basis event. All Class 1E electric equipment that has to operate during a flood has been located above maximum possible flood level unless it is designed to operate submerged in water.
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l l pro SQN-6 od - The Class -lE electrical loads are separated into two or more redundant load divisions (channels or trains) of separations. The number of - divisions has been determined by the number of independent sources of , power required for a given function. The electric 'ipment that accommodates these redundant divisions is separated by sufficient physical distance or protective barriers. The separation distance has , been determined by the severity and location of hazards. The environment ! In the vicinity of the equipment is controlled or protection provided ' such that no environmental change or accident will adversely affect the operation of the equipment. i l The physical identification of safety-related electrical equipment is in , accordance with Paragraph 8.3.1.5.
)
6900-Volt Eauioment The diesel generators and 6900-volt shutdown boards are designed for a two-division (train A and train B) separation. The 6900-volt equipment is located in seismic Category I structures. The diesel generators are located in ths diesel generator building at approximately elevation 722 l l and have reinforced concrete barriers separating each unit from all other I unfts and have no single credible hazard available that would jeopardize , more than one unit. The diesel generator arrangements are shown in Figure 8.3.1-1. The 6900-volt shutdown boards.are located in the auxiliary building at approximately elevation 734 (See Figure 8.3.1-2). A minimum distance of - i 10 feet separates shutdown board 1A-A from board 2A-A, and shutdown board ; IB-B from 2B-B. An 8 inch reinforced concrete block wall extending to ) the ceiling is used to separate 6900-volt shutdown boards IA-A and 2A-A ! from shutdown boards 18-B and 2B-8. 480-Volt Equipment The 480-volt shutdown boards, 480-volt reactor MOV boards, 480-volt , reactor vent boards, and control and auxiliary building vent boards are ! separated into train A and B groupings by 8 inch reinforced concrete block walls extending to the ceiling between redundant trains. The 480-volt shutdown board transformers associated with each power train are separated from the transformers associated with other power trains by 8 inch reinforced concrete block walls extending to the ceiling. The 480-volt equipment is located in the aux 111ary building on elevations 734 and 749. The location of these boards is shown in Figure 8.3.1-2. g 125-Volt DC Eculpment , 1 The 125-volt vital batteries are located in the auxtilary building on l elevation 749 and are divided into four divisions (channels I, II, III, I and IV) of separation. Each 125-volt vital battery is separated from all 1 i other 125-volt vital batteries by providing individual rooms for each ( battery with 8 inch reinforced concrete block walls extending to the i 8.3-48 0078F/COC4
l
- t SQN-6 ceiling. The ventilation system is designed to remove and dissipate the hydrogen given off by the batteries (see Section 9.4 for ventilation system description). The 125-volt vital battery boards are located in the auxiliary divisions building on elevation 734 and are also divided into four of separation.
Each 125-volt vital battery board is separated t from all other 125-volt vital battery boards by 8 inch reinforced concrete block wall extending to the ceiling. The location of these batteries and boards is shown in Figure 8.3.1-28. f The fifth vital battery system 2hus4 consistfof a 125-V de battery along f with the appropriate battery rack, charger, board, distribution panels,
cabling, instrumentation, and protective devices necessary to ensure continued operation of the two unit plant should vital battery I, II,
! III, or IV become disabled for longer than the technical specification period. g This system provides (1) a highly reliable source of low noise direct-current power, (2) proper power distributton to ariy assigned primary vital battery board loads, and (3) sufficient capacity to supply the worse system. case loading conditions of any single primary vital battery
-120-Volt AC Ecutoment The vital inverters are located in the auxiliary building on elevation 749 and are divided into four divisions (channels I, II, III, and IV) of separation.
The channels I and II inverters are located in the Unit 1 area area. while the channels III and IV inverters are located in the Unit 2 The channels I and II inverters are separated from the channels III and IV inverters by an 8 inch reinforced concrete block wall extend-Ing to the ceiling. The channel I and the channel III inverters are separated by a distance fromofthe 60 feet. channel II and the channel IV inverters, respectively, Figure 8.3.1-28. The location of the Inverters ts shown in l Aurillary Control Board Shutdown from remote locations outside the main control room due to the main control room, cable spreading room, or the aux 111ary instrument room becoming uninhabitable or inoperable is performed in aux 111ary control 6 board. secttonThis 1.4 J remote shutdown auxiliary 9,C.1) . % control is fully described in
- k. f.u i%fL Q.4 Electrical Penetrations of Primary Containment Redundant GSPS cables enter the containment via separate electrical penetrations.
Where possible, redundant GSPS cables utilize electrical g penetrations spaced horizontally instead of vertically. Where redundant GSPS cables are installed in ?lectrical penetrations spaced vertically, power cables carrying high en6;;j are located above low energy circuits, l6 or barriers are provided between the high energy and low energy circuits ! where the vertical spacing is less than 3 feet. Two or more areas'have
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l l l } 8.3-49 i' 0078F/COC4 l
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/df0 I SON-9 I ray i been provided for electrical penetrations so that redundant GSPS cables can be installed in separate penetration areas. Cables through penetrations of the primary containment are grouped in such an arrangement that failure of all cables in a single penetration cannot prevent a RPE or engineered safety features action. The penetration areas are shown on Figures 8.3.1-37 and 8.3.1-38. l 8.3.1.4.3 Sharino of Cable Travs and Routino of Nonsafety Related Cables There are five different cable tray systems, namely: 6900-volt, 480- volt, control, medium-level signal, and low-level signal trays. The 6900-volt trays carry only 6900-volt cables and are located in the highest level position of stacked trays. All 480-volt power cables, lighting cabinet feeders, ;
I and DC power cables that have a protective device rated greater than 30 amperes are run in j 480-volt trays. Medium-level signal trays carry the following cables: signal cables for inputs to cnd outputs from the computer other than thermocouples; instrument transmitter, recorders, RTD's greater than 100 millivolts, tachometers, and indicators; rotor eccentricity and vibration detectors; and shielded annunciator cables used with solid state equipment. Signal cables for thermocouples, l I strain gauges, thermal converters, and RTD's that are 100 millivolts or less are run in low level signal trays which occupy the lowest level in a stack of trays. All other cables are run in control trays. Any exceptions to the above must be evaluated and documented by TVA in design criteria SON-DC V-12.2 and SON-DC-V 11.3. 9 Within a division the minimum standard spacing between trays stacked vertically is 9 inches, tray bottom to tray bottom. Within a division, the minimum standard spacing between trays installed side by side is 6 inches. The trays are constructed of galvanized steel, 6 to 18 inches wide and approximately 4 inches deep. All cable tray systems located in Category I structures, except those lG in the intake structure, have seismic Category I supports as described in Subsection 3.10.2.
^ l RPS cables (channels I,11, Ill, and IV), inside and outside containment are routed in cable trays End/or conduits that are designated for their respective division of separation.
ESF and essential supporting auxiliary system (ESAS) cables (trains A and B) are routed in 6900-volt,480-volt, or control trays and/or conduits that are designated for their respective l (o division of separation. RPS and ESF analog circuits may be routed in the same conduits, cable trays, or wireways provided the circuits have the same characteristics such as power supply and channel identity (1,11, Ill, or IV). Vital instrument cables for the generating station protection system (GSPS) which includes the RPS and ESF may be routed in the same conduits, wireways, or cable trays provided the circuits have the same characteristics such as power supply and channel identity (1,11, Ill, or IV). Automatic actuation and power circuits for the generating station protection systems which j (, includes the RPS, ESAS, reactor scram logic, I l l 8.3 50
SON 10 The GSPS receives its power supply from preferred (off site) and the standby (onsitel sources. The w normal power and control circuits from the preferred source are routed in conduits or cable trays separate from the alternate power and control circuits. These circuits ara identified by a suffix S1 j or S2 added to their respective cable numbers, except for the circuits involved with the primary of common station service transformer (CSST) which are identified by suffix S3. l The circuits associated with the standby power sources (Class 1E electric syctems) are separated into two or more redundant divisions. The circuits between the diesel generators and the 6900-volt shutdown boards are designed for a two divisional separation (train A and train B). The feeder circuits from the 125-volt vital battery boards to the control buses in the shutdown
. boards are separated into four divisions (Channels I, ll, Ill, and IV). Feeder cables to the control buses in the train A shutdown b'oards are supplied from battery boards I and til and the feeder cables to the control buses in the(train B shutdown boards are supplied from battery boards 11 and IV. The Channels I,11,111, and IV vital instrument power systems are supplied from vital battery boards I,11, Ill, and IV, respectively,'and have been physically separated and routed independently from each other.
8.3.1.4.4 Fire Detection and Protection in Areas Where Cables Are Installed l A firehnd smoke det tion syste is installed to provide i ediate detec n and identific on of fire an r smoke ' hazardous areas. Some area wher moke detectors wit control r m alarm l l are instal d are- l i I, Main trol room ceiling
- 2. M cont I panels in control room ,3
- 3. elay boar in relay room '
Cable spreadi room
- 5. Computer room eiling l 6. Auxiliary instrum troo ceiling l 7. Electrical shutdown ard room ceiling l 8. Vital battery roo l 9. Auxiliary contr room
- 10. Diesel Gener or Bldg.
A h Press e Fire Protection S pression tem is installed as the ' mary means of fire iO l suppr sio with a carbon dioxide fi pro ction system with manual con olinstalled in the cable spreadi room as a backup. l A arbon di ide system with tomatic ntrolis installed in each of the diesel- enerator rooms, n each of the iesel-gener r electrical bo d rooms, in the oil pump room of the 'esel-generator building, in the xiliar strument rooms, an computer room of the control buildin 30 in addition, po e hemical dry powder and C fire extinguishers and a hign-pressure ater fire protection s em are ated throughout
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8.3-52 i
SQN-6 t plant. Refer to Subsectio 9.5.1 for detailed description of the ; i fir protection system. The de ign of the wall and floor el rical penetration fire stops through tre barriers utilize a se te cable sleeve for each cable ay. The desig and installation of t se p etration fire stops employ w Corning 3- 48 silicone RTV fo (compo nts A and B) as the seala material an a combination of fire barrie material. This mater 1 in its cured foa state is no orrosive and f e retardant. From ach side (3 of the wall or loor ope ng, the cables ar separated within he cable . sleeve using an norgan c fiber. The .sealan material is t n installed within the cable lee and is confined by the iber. The opening at the cable sleeve opent is covered with a fire bar er boar that is cut to fit around the ca and cable tray configuratio . In addition, t expos surfaces of cables are coa d from the fire barrier boar for a min um distance of 5 feet or o he nearest electrical anel or encio ure with an ablative m eria that is approved by Factor Mutual Research orporation. Typic electr cal penetration firesto through walls and loors that are d ignated f e barriers and pressu barriers are shown i Figure 6.2.1 . Con it penetrations, containin cables, rough designated tre barriers b ; u lize General Electric RTV-106 ilico rubber Dow Corning -6548 licon foam, or equivalent as the *ea ant material. This mat tal is installed around the cables in eith the end of the conduit te ination . or in the nearest available conduit x on each side of the barr rs. I organic fiber is used on each si e o the sealant material. Spa e- 1 co uits are plugged or capped u 11 us . l l A sam e of this material has een tested an independent laborator ' accordt to ASTM E84, stand d method of t ting of " Surface Burning Character tics of Buildin aterials." The esult of the test was tha l the materia has a flame read of 20. In add tion Dow Corning has conducted a ammability (vertical burn) test o samples of the cure foam in accor ce wit a corporate test method ich is comparabl to l Underwriters La rato les, UL 94. The following res were obtained: lammability (Vertical Burn) l Ave ge Time to erage Percent i Time in F;phe Flame & Glow-Out Height loss 15 seco s 7.2 conds 1.3 60 se nds 15.6 se nds 13.5 ; Th results from the vertical burn st how that the material se f- i l tinguishes after flame source is re ved. 8.3-53 0078F/COC4
SQN-6 l The f barrier m rials used in the de n and installation of the penetrat n fire ops employ a combinati n f inorganic fiber and f er board. Th e terials are made from cept 1 ally high purity al ina and silica c stituents and are capa e of with anding continuo exposure t a mperature range of 000*F to 230 . l Chapter 7, " Qual Assurance describes the admin tr ve respo Ibility and ntrol u d to verify that penetra on fire stops and ! sea have been prope y1 talled. The procedure f 1 tallation of I s icone RTV foam seala requires a control sampi be ma prior to roduction installatio seals, to establish t range of roper nsity, cell struct e an color of the mater 1 in its expa ed state. Th rocedure also equires random inspect n of the' cable co ing mate al to ensur an acceptab thickness s applied. TVA has ond ed fire tests on fu 1 s le assemblies of electrical l penetrati ire stops that must sea against air pressure. The requi d l differen a air pressure across t netration under test was main-tained y adj ting a normal dam r tog her with an exhaust fan in the exhau duct. external gas rner was ocated under the cable out de the rea of coat cables. T burner was nited on the fire sid f t t facility and lowed t burn for 30 min es before shutoff. he ! re was allowed to if- tinguish,'therefore o water spray est was conducted. s The results of the sts re that no fire burned t o the penetration ~' to the cold si of the st facility and the pres e seal maintained it integrity. he results om the tests demonstr e at the design prov es an ective fire sto and pressure seal nder mulated condit n hen tested as a com eted system. In a tio fire tests on similar esigns ing the same type of sealant ma rial hav been conducted by othe. . est results are recor d in port serial . 26543 dated October 1975, of Factor Mutual esearch orporation. During periodic testing of secondary containment, if any appreciable leakage is observed then a visual inspection will be made to identify any open or deteriorated penetration fire stops and pressure seals. Any defective seals and penetration fire stops that are found will be repaired or replaced as necessary to ensure the integrity of the penetration fire stops and pressure seals over the life of the plant.
^ pre::d;r: "'"YSI-131 ;;;;;ifies r;;uir;;;nts for br;;;hing pene47444en M*- topt. l6 # ^* #"-tMr "re prot:: tion d:t:t h, ::: ::: tion 0.5.'.
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8.3-54 0078F/COC4
1 . l - l m I I s SON-6 8.J.1.4.7 Fire Barriers and Separation Between Redundant Travs
'ihe criteria for separation between redundant trays for Various. Zones Where the or ,6 )
areas of the plant is described in Subparagraph 8.3.1.4.2. physical separation between redundant trays could not be attained, fire barriers have been provided. These fire barriers raph for Various zonesb or 8.3.1.4.2. b en.rs Mr. areas the plant are also described inJubpar L A b B7?!s,j m jd p ,a lL
$sfu Cable 9 M efrocfAroA & )\ J fire stops for redundant cable tray runs t rough openings in floors g,,, p,4fg Also, fire hb'f' ,
l and openings in walls between building have been provided. barri ! These b4rri s are described in entering the main control room. b & b.#aJ Sucparagraph 8.3.1.4.4a / l'
.d(sa,7.T./),
i Physical Identification of Safety Related Ecuipment in AC Power 8.3.1.5 l Systems l ' The onsite power system equipment and associated field wiring is identified so that two factors are physically apparent to plant operating - and maintenance personnel:
- 1. That equipment and wiring is safety related and m i
- 2. That equipment and wiring is properly identified as part of a py particular division of separation.
The scheme used to physically identify major safety-related AC electrical equipment employs a suffix label. The suffir label added to the equipment name is -A or -B, which represents train A or train BFor example, 69 diesel-generator power source.1 A-A is safety-related equipment, where the 1 Indicates U represents board A, and the -A is assigned to train A. The 125-volt DC vital systes is shared between both units and divided 6 The 125-volt vital charger,125-volt vital battery into four channels. board, and 125-volt vital battery of each channel is physically identified in its label by I. II, III, or IV, respectively. The 120-volt AC vital instrumentation and control power systes is divided into four channels. Four each of the 120-volt AC vital inverters and vital instrument power boards are identified For byexample, Unit 1 or 2 prefix 120-volt ACand a
-1, -II -III, or -IV suffix, respectively. vital Instrument power 1-I is safety-re Indicates Unit 1, and the -I is assigned to thannel I.
To further physically identify, the onsite power systes agulpment, aName l ' color coding scheme is used. surfaces of this equipment are color coded respe separation as described in Subparagraph 8.3.1.4.5, except in the unitThe almic bu control and auxiliary (backup) control rooms.The component nameplates on i on these boards are color coded by systems. . l 0078F. 0C4 l 8.3-58
l SON-10 The components comprising the Preferred Power System have been arranged to provide sufficient independence (both physical and functional) to minimize the likelihood of simultaneous outage of both preferred circuits. Functional independence has been achieved by providing separate control circuits, powered by separate DC sources. The single line diagrams of these non-safety related 250V DC Systems are included as Figures 8.2.1-3 and 8.2.1-4. 8.2.1.2 Transmission Lines. Switchvard, and Transformers The eight 161-kV and the five 500-kV lines connecting the plant with the TVA transmission network are indicated functionally on Figure 8.2.1-1. The onsite transmission line arrangement is shown on Figure 8.2.1-2 and the offsite transmission line routing in the vicinity of the switchyard is shown on Figure 8.2.1-5. These lines are routed to minimize the likelihood of their simultaneous failure. The physical separation of the most widely spaced transmission lines at a point on a circle with a radius of one mile from the plant center exceeds 1/4 mile. From reviewing Figure 8.2.1-5, it is to evident that this separation requirement from Regulatory Guide 1.155 is met. l Physical arrangement of the equipment is shown on Figure 8.2.1-2 Normally, total functional independence is not maintained in the switchyard itself, due to the fact that all bus sections are electrically connected together. However, in the event of an electrical fault, electrical separation is ! established in a few cycles by circuit breaker operation. The fault isolation and bus transfer scheme is designed to permit automatic fault isolation while still maintaining multiple connections from the 161-kV switchyard to the grid. Thus, both independent circuits providing preferred power will remain energized. Switchyard control and functional independence is further discussed in Paragraph 8.2.1.5. -T l
) '
It is also possible to isolate the incoming circuit associated with a Common Station Service ' transformer from the other incoming transmission lines. This makes it possible to functionally isolate the transformer on a single hydro unit either at the Watts Bar or Chickamauga Hydro Station, which itself has been isolated from the grid. Location of Common Station Service Transformers and CCW cooling tower transformers is shown on Figure 8.2.12. Physical separation between common station service transformers A, B, and C is a minimum of 65 feet, centerline-to-centerline and 35 feet between closest parts. No missile barrier is required between the Common Station Service Transformers to protect one transformer in the event of a failure of the other transformer. The physical arrangement is based on TVA's expericqce and the analysis of previous failures on transformers with similar construction. A fire is the major concern relative to a transformer failure. In addition to the physical separation,
. Also, the yard area is automatic covered with afire thickprotection layer of loosehas beengravel limestone provided wh h isb:: IC/ "'S):ta-r designed 5.~.
tc limit the spread of transformer oil should a transformer tank rupture. Ther r fore, these three design features provide the necessary protection to minimize to the extent prac ical the likelihood of the simultaneous
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_ - - . _ ___ ~_ . _ . _ - - _ . - _ _ . . _ , _ . _ __ _ . _ _ - P SQN-2 LIST OF FIGURES (Continued) Number Title , 9.4.5-1 Flow Diagram, Heating Ventilating Air Flow ! 9.4.5-2 Mechanical, Heating and Ventilating 9.4.5-3 Mechanical, Heating and Ventilating ; 9.4.5-4 Flow Diagram Heating and Ventilacing Air flow 9.4.5-5 Mechanical Heating and Ventilating - 9.4.6-1 Mechanical Flow Diagram Heating and Ventilating j 9.4.7-1 Flow Diagram, Heating and Ventilating Air Flow ' t 8 9.4.7-2 Mechanical Logic Diagram, Ventilation System i i 9.4.7-3 Mechanical Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning l 9.4.8-1 Mechanical Control Diagram Containmer.t Ventilation !
, System i
9.4.8-2 Mechanical Control Diagram Containment Ventilation ; System , ! 9.4.8-3 Mechanical Logic Diagram, Ventilation System , 4 9.4.8-4 Mechanical Logic Diagram, Ventilation System I 9.4.8-5 Mechanical Logic Diagram, Ventilation System ! 9.4,9-1 Flow Diagram Heating and Ventilating Air Flow 9511 r!ce Oi ig?am rire oretectica and o a" Ser" ice u3tgr 9 5.'-2 c!Ow O!:; rim cire o rctectter and 6:e Scr"!:: H:ter q l 975,1 --3 F1nw niagram rica orc +ertion 3rd one Scr"i;; H;t;r- ; l- 9.5.I i - IICW Oiagr;T 'ran f0rT0r F'r0 Prot :t!On Sy:t:T QR 1-5 r!ce O!:; ram Tr:n: form:r etr Protection "yft;m 3 o 95'S F10e Df gr: T c' retection
- 95 FI;; Ciagram Fir: Protection
-9.5.' S ricw Diegram rirc Protection 9-17 0079F/C0C4 4
r SON-2 LIST OF FIGURES (Continued) f Number - Title l 9.5.:10 Ficu O!:gr c!r: 'rct:ct!cn 5.1-10 Flow Diagram F Protection. ! t 9.5. 11. Flow Diagr Fire Pr ection l l 9.5.1-12 Flow Di ram Raw Service ater Cooli g and Fire l Prote ion 9.5.1-13 F1 Diagram Raw Service Water, tre Protection and 1
- aring Lubrication System' 9.5.1-14 Fl Diagram Fire Protecti and Raw vice Water l l
l 9.5.1-15 Flow D gram Raw Servic Water Cooling an tre Protecti / i
/
9.5.1-1 Flow Diagram 0: St age, Fire Protection and Pur ng System
- 9. .1-17 Flow Diagram C S rage and Fire Protection '
^
- 9. 1-18 Mechanical .ntrol Dia am High Pressure Fire } ,
Protection ystem l 9.5.1-19 Mechani al Logic Diagram Hi Pressure Fire P'rotec on-1 i 9.5.1-20 Logi cDiagram CO: Storage Fire rotection and Pur ing System I 9.5.1-21 .e anical Control Diagram CO Stora , F1 e r ,/ Prot tion and Purging System 9.5.1-22 Mechanica logic Diagram High Pressur Fi Protection 9.5.1-23 Mechanical Con ol Diagram High Pr sture Fire Protection Syste 9.5.1- Mechanical Control D- ram ,C Storage, Fire Protection and Purging st 9.".1-25 Logic Diagram CO Stora , r re Protection Purging System 9.5.1-26 Mechanical Instrume ts and Control n,
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l 9-18 0079F/C0C4 l l
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SQN 5 t LIST OF FIGURES (Continued) j L
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s asum 9.5.2-1 Intraplant Communications 9.5.2-2 Plant to Offsite Communication 9.5.2-3 Communications Equipment Availability Table l 4 9.5.4-1 Flow Diagram Fuel Oil, Atomizing Air and Steam 1"% 9.5.5-1 Lube Oil and Water System
.u 'e.$s. 1 1
9-19 0079F/COC4 l 1 l
SON-9 ! ? i
- o The ACS includes the following equipment:
9 ,
- 1. Four full-capacity auxiliary charging pumps (two per unit)
- 2. Auxiliary makeup tank
- 3. Filter t
- 4. Demineralizer
- 5. Two auxiliary charging booster pumps -
Each auxiliary charging pump (ACP) capacity is 100 gal /h and each auxiliary charging booster pump capacity is 300 gal /h. Both capacities are several times greater than the maximum leakage loss from the primary system. Leakage loss is based on No. 2 and No. 3 sealleakage (576 gal /dl with ) No.1 seal injection and return lines isolated and an RCS pressure of 500 lb/in g (maximum during 2 ) i " flood mode"), plus the remainder of recoverable and nonrecoverable leakage,215 and 30 gal /d respectively, based on the average annual rates for normal power operation (at full RCS pressure). The auxiliary makeup tank (AMT) has a capacity of 384 gal to provide a minimum of 24 hours makeup based on the above leakage loss. A filter and demineralizer are provided for cleanup of makeup water. The filter and demineralizer l are designed for flow rates of 10 gal / min and 27 gal / min, respectively. l 9.3.5.2 , System Desian Descriotion q The ACS is shown on Figure 9.3.6-1. The initial supply of auxiliary makeup water is from the demineralized water tanks. The majority of leakage, from RCS pump seals, etc., is collected in the reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT) and is pumped by the RCDT pumps to the AMT. This recoverable leakage is the main preferred source of makeup water. Additional makeup water is supplied from other preferred sources: (1) accumulator tanks via the RCDT pumps, (2) pressurizer relief tank via the RCDT pumps, and (3) demineralized water tanks. t t 7 Jhe N :abov=e preferred sources of makeup water are**backed -^ '"- 1 up :by the&yodd$wa which can tyb water to the AMT. To prevent inadvertent injection d ._- n; into the primary system, this source is connected, via fire hose, only if it is needed. Auxiliary makeup water is borated to the extent necessary to maintain refueling shutdown concentration in the RCS. Hydrazine and lithium hydroxide are added to makeup water as required. l Boric acid and hydrazine are added and mixed with the makeup water in the AMT in a batch process. l t 9.3-43
=
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SQN-6 i west, and exhaust fans on the roof; elevation 732.0. A total of 412,000 supplied. cfm is exhausted, and a total of 412,000 cfm outside air is Four centrif ugal, belt-driven, twc>-speed supply fans, located in eleva-tion 773.0 fan room, deliver equal quantities of air to the east side of g elevation 706.0 and elevation 685.0 rooms through four independent duct systems. Each fan serving elevation 706.0 is rated at 68,000 cfm at 1.0 inch water gauge static pressure and is powered by a 25 hp motor. Each fan serving elevation 685.0 is rated at 68,000 cfm at 1.5 inch water gauge static pressure, and is powered by a 30 hp motor. These fans are located in elevation 773.0 fan rooms. Four centrifugal, belt-driven, two-speed supply fans, located in the elevation 732.0 fan rooms, deliver equal quantities of air to the middle of elevation 706.0 and elevation 685.0 rooms through four independent duct systems. Each fan serving elevation 706.0 is rated at 35,000 cfm at 3/4 inch water gauge static pressure, and is powered by a 10 hp motor. Each fan serving the elevation 685.0 floor is rated at 35,000 cfm at jg 1.0 inch water gauge static pressure, and is powered by a 15 hp motor. Thirty-six propeller fans, installed in pairs in exhaust housings on the roof, elevation 732.0 exhaust air from the two floors below. Each propeller fan is rated for 11,500 cfm at 1/4 inch water gauge static pressure, and is powered by a 1.5 hp motor. During cold weather, all supply and exhaust systems can be closed off by motor operated dampers to conserve heat. However, the two supply fans serving east elevation 685.0 floor may be operated at half speed since two hot water heating coils located in the supply duct connected to each of these fans are designed to heat the incoming air from 15*F to 60*F. With no exhaust fan running, the operation of these two supply fans will pressurize the entire Turbine Building to prevent infiltration of cold outside air. 9.4.4.2.3 Miscellaneous Ventilating Systems
-h p
glf The three toilet rooms, and three janito"'s closets are each ventilated by roof-mounted, roof-ventilator type exhaust fans. Plant air enters each room through a louvered door and is exhausted td the plant. Approximately 270 cfm is exhausted from each toilet room, and approximately 90 cfm from each janitor's closet. The lubricating oil purification room at elevation 685 is ventilated by a centrifugal fan mounted on the room roof which discharges to the outdoors by means of a duct routed to a casement exhaust housing. App ex %2tely '.300 c' of ?! Mt li# it exhau:ted through the re
@Ser. Muated in the exhau!! cpeatag, and the r00r r:d Or art d;;!gned to : hut Of' !' :!-#!Ow ia :::e Of re.
1 9.4-22 0083F/COC4 i
SON-11 9.4.5 Diesel Generator Buildina 1 11 9.4.5.1 Desian Bases The Diesel Generator Building Ventilating Systems are designed to maintain an acceptable building environment for the protection of the diesel generators, electrical boards and equipment, batteries, and for the safety of operating personnel. Each diesel generator unit room is separately ventilated to limit the room maximum ambient temperature to 120'F when the entering air is 97 F and the diesel generator is operating. Battery areas are ventilated at all times for hydrogen removal and electrical board rooms are ventilated to limit the room ambient temperature to 104'F when the entering air is 97'F. 9.4.5.2 System Descriotion The Diesel Generator Building Heating and Ventilating Systems are shown on Figures 9.4.5-1 through 9.4.5-3. Two diesel generator room exhaust fans, one battery hood exhaust fan, and one electrical board room exhaust fan are located in the fan room at elevation 740.5 for each of the four diesel generator units. These centrifugal type exhaust fans discharge to the outdoors. One generator and electrical panel ventilation fan is provided within each diesel room at the air supply opening to the room. These fans deliver cooling air to the generator air intake and to the interior of the generator's electrical control panel. Each of the diesel generator room fans is connected to its respective diesel generator engineered safety power supply. One exhaust fan will automatically start upon diesel generator start The generator and electrical panel ventilation fan will run when either of the exhaust fans is running. Approximately 40,000 cfm of fresh air is routed throuah each diesel generator room when one exhaust fan is ooerating lira d?mpers. premded la e?ch e!r eupp!y and exhaust opening j
# C - m,m 3.te +;- m,,.i~ ,,te r eci3 e the ygg m im , rg ef c,e
/
1 Each diesel generator unit is provided with separate fans designed to exhaust 1000 cfm of air from the battery area hood at elevation 722 and approximately 3500 cfm of air from the elevation 740.5 electrical board room. A roof mounted air intake admits outdoor air to each electrical board room. Other building exhaust fans provide ventilation for the lubricating oil storage room, fuel oil transfer room, CO2 storage room, toilet room, radiation shelter room, and muffler rooms. 9.4-26 l l 1 l
^
.:w. _
SQN-6 The battery hoods, toilet rooms, oil rooms, and storage rooms are ventilated at all times while the electrical board rooms and muffler
~
rooms are ventilated as required to remove heat during warm weather. However, the battery hoods CO2 and lube oil rooms diesel generator rooms and electrical board rooms exhaust fans are stopped during a CO, 6 initiation. Each exhaust fan and the corridor air intake vent is provided with motor- l R" operated shutoff dampers designed to close tight when the fan is not running. A backdraf t damper is installed in the duct between the air intake room lA-A and the CO2 storage room in order to prevent CO2 backflow into the diesel generator air intake room in the event of a CO, system rupture. Thermostatically controlled electric unit heaters are located within the diesel generator rooms, equipment access corridor, storage rooms, I radiation shelter room, electrical board rooms, and toilet room. These i heaters are designed to maintain the rooms at not less than 50*F when lD 15'F outdoors. Thermostats in each air exhaust room are designed to stop all operating l 6 diesel generator room fans upon a drop in room exhaust air temperature to below 40*F. The thermostats will automatically start the exhaust fans 8g and the generator and electrical panel ventilation fan upon room
-y temperature rise to 80*F. The thermostats will also start the standby exhaust fan, during diesel operation, when the room exhaust air temperature exceeds 80*F. l
- l The Additional Diesel Generator Building The Additional Diesel Generator Building Heating and Ventilating Systems are shown on Figures 9.4.5-4 and 9.4.5-5.
Two diesel generator room exhaust fans, one fuel oil transfer room l exhaust fan, one transformer and 6.9 kV board room exhaust fan, and one 480-volt auxiliary board room exhaust fan are located in the fan room at i elevation 741.7 for the additional diesel generator unit. i The diesel generator room fans are connected to the additional diesel generator engineered safety power supply; one room exhaust fan and the generator will start automatically upon diesel generator start. The room exhaust fan which starts is preselected by placing the fan in the " auto" mode. Approximately 45,000 cfm of fresh air is routed through the diesel generator room when one exhaust fan is operating. rire da per:, provided { in ==ch air supply mad evh20st ventilation opering !a th: engine reem- ) ce!ng, vill automati c:.lly clo: to 1:clate the ics. ici case OT firex Combustion ;ir u! "et be : hut off to th: engine. g
'T 3
1 l 0083F/COC4 9.4-27 l
l SON-2 9.4.6 Condensate Demineralizer Building Environmental Control System 9.4.6.1 Deslon Basis The Condensate Demineralizer Building (CDB) Environmental Control System (ECS) is designed to supply an acceptable ventilation air flow to the CDB' continuously and to supply increased air flow for heat removal as necessary. All cooling needs within the building are accomplished with 2 ventilation air flow. This ECS is designed to maintain building l temperatures below 105'F when the outside temperature is 97*F. Heat is supplied by duct and space electric heaters when required. The duct heaters are interlocked with supply fans to prevent their operation upon fan failure. The heaters are designed to maintain the building at 50*F or higher except in the condensate polisher rooms where freeze l protection is the design basis. Heating requirements are based on an i outside temperature of 15*F. Supply and exhaust ductwork is designed in accordance with the SMACNA Low j Pressure Duct Standard. . i Air flow is from areas of lower radioactivity potential to areas of greater radioactivity potential. There is no requirement for exhaust monitoring or filtration.
, c're d:rper: Or: ;; d tc prevert t'.: :prc:d Of #'r: d th'a the '"'1d' y 9.4.6.2 System Description The CDB ECS is shown in Figure 9.4.6-1. I Air is supplied to the building through air intakes located on floor elevation 706. An air intake is located in the north wall and auxiliary air intakes are located in the south and west walls. Air supplied I through the air intake in tne north wall and the auxiliary air intake in I the south wall is ducted to the required release points throughout the building. Air supplied through the auxiliary air intake in the west wall is blown directly into the valve gallery.
Air is exhausted through two roof exhaust fans located on elevation 729 over the valve gallery. An additional roof exhaust, located on elevation 729, is connected by ductwork to tank rooms and the hall on elevation 685, and to the high crud filter room, condensate polishers rooms, and cation and anion tank rooms on elevation 706. The CDB ECS uses two speed fans only. Main CDB control panel controls set the fans to automatic operation, high or low speed operation, or the off position. In the automatic mode of operation outdoor air temperature 2 controls fan speed. When a fan is started its respective outdoor damper is opened. All air intake and exhaust dampers are spring-loaded to fail I closed. l i 9.4-29 0083F/COC4
l l SON-11 j i 9.5 OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5.1 Fire Protection Svstem O 9.5.1.1 Desion Basis -
,/ \,,
The} Fire Protection System is designed to achieve the following objectives:
\ , ,
\
- a. P'rovide fire protection in those plant areas where a e could affect the ability to chieve and m'aintain safe plant shut'donn. \
\
- b. Pro gide\ fixed water a ca' bon dioxide suppressio' systems based on an Analysis of Fire Haz ds.
- c. Provi hose racy and portab g fire exti uishers thr ghout the pl nt. Th high-pressure fire protect n syst normally utilges 10 foot hoses. Inh few cas s 125 foot oses are used. !
These e cept' ns have been eva at and determined t'o,be ac[eptable.
- d. Protect s ety-related equipmen n he auxiliary, control, r actor, and diesel genegtor buildings and in e RCW Pumping Sta. on against failure of fire rotection system compon nts.
- I
\ l
- c. Pro ide curb around all oi facilities w ere a potent' for an ci pipe rupture exists,
- f. Sour.d predisc rge al ms in the areas w ere tomatic initiatioh of a CO2 system is re uired l
to ensure adequ te e for personnel evac ion. \ Provide an early rning fire detection system to notify personnel o fire, actuate automa ic g. suppression s te , provide for manual actua 'on of control valves, d control auxiliary l 11 i equipment.
- h. Provide mergency fe water the steam generat rs under maximum d ign basis flood l
condi ns as defined i Ap ndix 2.4A. 9.5. System Descrioti T hi h-pressure fir rotectio system (HPFP) furnishes raw ater for fixed wate spray systems, preacti n sprinkler ystems, fire ose racks, and fire hose conn etionc throughout t plant. (The
' flow dia ram fo the HPFP system 's shown in Figures 9.5.1-1 t ough 9.5.1-15.) Lo -pressure crrbon d xi fire protection syste, s (CO2 ) are also provided for ome areas. The ca bon dioxide system al furnishes carbon dioxide or turbine-generator purging. (The CO 2 systems re shown in Figures . 1-16 and 9.5.1-17.)
1 W er for fire ighting is provided from t e river by four submersible el ctric motor-drive pymps cated in the i take pumping station. Tbse
/ 9.5.1.1 Design Basis la)( l i
~
} The Fire Protection System and fire protection features are described in the Fire Protection Report (FPR). The FPR is a separate document that is revised and updated
(\ periodically similar to this FSAR (e.g.10CFR50.59 process) . The FPR should be referred to for a detail description of the Fire Protection Program. 9.5 1
SQM-11 y 5 ,.- c. 9.5 OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5.1 Fire Protection System ,p h g v (L\p I (,o j $ g 'il T*' b 9 g"'o 9.5.1.1 Desian Basis {I h 8 g, The Fire Protection System b f:r; :d +6 artieve the followinn a fire could.affe t e ability to achieve and fP v e safe a.vmainta fire protection n ose plant areas w plant utdo n.
- b. ide fix ter and carbo dioxide s ppression stems b sed on a Analysi of Fire azards,
- c. P ide se rack and portable fire tingu'shers throug ut the plant. Th igh-pressure fire n system n mally utilizes 1 foot ses. In e cases 125 f t oses are used.
The xceptions hav een evalu ed a dete ined o be ceptable.
- d. tect safe -related equi men in the auxili y, co I, reactor. d esel' gene tor buildings and in the ER Pumping a on against failu o fire rotection em compon ts.
- e. Provioe curos aivuuu ii vd 'm.J. Leo vv;iwi e o pu Wobo. ivr au J p pc . c+"ra exists,
- f. nd predischarge alarm 'n the e where automatic initia o of a CO 2system is required to e cure adequate time for rs nel acuation.
- g. P vide n early warning fire te 'on sys m to notify p sonnel of a , actuate automatic suppressi systems, provi for ma al ac ation of co trol valves, and ntrol auxiliary ] 11 equipment.
Provide emerge fee ater to the steam gener o under maximum design be flood
,V conc.dt ...s as defi d n Appendix 2.4A.
9.5.1. System Descriotion The high- ssure fire protection system (H P) urnishes raw water for xe water spray systems, preactio spn Ier systems, fire hose rack , and hose connections t rough ut the plant. (The flow di ram to he HPFP system is sho n in Figur 9.5.1-1 through .5.1-1 Low-pressure carbo dioxide fire rotection systems ( ) are also p vided for som areas. Th carbon dioxide sys m also furnishe carbon dioxide f turbine-generato urging. ( e CO2 system are shown in Fi res 9.5.1-16 and .1-17.) Water r fire fighting is pr vided rom the river by four submer I electric motor-drive pu s loc d in the intake pumpin st tion. These i I 9.5-1
50N-6 f Air flow is from areas of lower radioactivity potential to areas of greater radioactivity potential. All exhaust air is moni.tored for i excessive radioactivity levels. M r e ; r: ar: '/: d to p# event the :prc d of 't r: betu::r t5: CC"ES ;r.d 1 th: = t: ;; d:g: ire of the W!!!;ry Ouildirs. J 9.4.9.2 System Description i l The CDHEB ECS is shown on Figures 9.4.2-1 and 9.4.9-1. ' Air induced by the CDHEB supply fan frora e waste package area supply ! duct is used for building ventilation. ~ a ventilation air is supplied ' to areas of low radioactivity potential end migrates by naturally induced I flow paths to progressively higher areas of contamination. The CDWEB ventilation exhaust fan exhausts air from the area with highest i contamination potential and directs it to the fuel Handling Area Exhaust , System where it is passed through a radiation monitoring station prior to I its release to the atmosphere. l The CDHEB utilizes one speed ventilation fans. The fans are manually 1 controlled and operate continuously.
)
I Additionally, separate air-conditioning recirculation systems serve the potentially contaminated areas and the moderately contaminated areas.
. I
- 9. 4. 9. 3 Safety Evaluation No nuclear safety-related systems or components are located in the Condensate Demineralizer Haste Evaporator Building. Therefore, a single 2 l 1
l failure within the EC System will not affect nuclear safety. l 9.4.9.4 Inspection and Testing Recuirements
- The CDWEB ECS will be tested initially to assure that design criteria have been met. Continued satisfactory operation will demonstrate the !
system capability. 9.4.10 Postaccident Samoling Ventilation System 9.4.10.1 Design Basis l
- The postaccident sampling facility environmental control system (PASFECS) f provides heating, cooling, and ventilation during normal plant operations and training activities. In addition, heating, ventilation, and control of airborne radiological contamination is provided during postaccident acquisition and testing of samples. This is accomplished through pressurization of the areas by the ventilation system which induces air from areas of lesser to areas of greater contamination potential. The system maintains temperatures within a range of 50*F to 104*F. The l6 PASFECS has redundant isolation capability in all ductwork which rg interfaces with the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) or V penetrates the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE).
l 9.4-41 0083F/COC4
SON-10 pumps a ea rated at 1500 gal / min at 400 fe head. They satisfy the draf pumps and SME code for ves for Nuclear Power (1968) and Sei ic Category I Requirements. he pumps are powered y Clas E sources that automatically transfe o the emergency diesel gene tors on loss of off ' e power. , y are capable of operating during an take condition from minimum evel upon loss f down-stream to the maximum design basis floo A yard fire main o s the periphery of ep nt buildings and p vi s protection for the switchyard, s rage a as, and other eas a cent to the po erhouse. Sectionalizing valves are ' provided to ermit isola n of pote ial faults i the loop, d a cross-con etion to the Auxiliary Feedwat System is prov ed to upply feedwat to th steam generators ing flood conditions. Hydra are appropriately I ed throughout the r The fire rotec+. ion ade are pressuriz through an ' e onnection with th Raw Service at i System, 'th th ressure eing maintain by t 1 0,000 a!!on raw water t ks on the a 'sary b ilding roo he storage ta ks are filled b ee raw servic water pumps loc ed in t turb e bu ing e pumps are eac rated a 0 al/ min at 235 f t head. The pum a e normally i I op ed with t pumps in serv d one as spare to press ize the fire e ion headers nd su ly raw w er services Raw Service ater System s pply i tomatic ily isolated j when the ire pum com n. The MO - -d ^^-~^! diegesme for theep evetame sr= 6;;.,, ,,, 7;ww es u.o. H b inrougn 5.5. .-2G. t location dr win how the loc tion o e hand-oper ' e control equi ment. e Figures 1.2.3- ough 2.3 7; i s 1.2. 1 1, 1. 2. - 1.2. -15,1. . O, 1.2.3- 1, 1.2.3 27, 1.2.3-24, an .1-1. I IO A fire detection y .m is provided w h consists of initi g devices, loc on I panels, remote transmitter-re ivers oviding multi ex UX) functio , an computeri d multip x central -' control equi ent. The ystem's ' itiatin devices e sist of tector , which are id tified as to type and I cation on Figur 9. 1-26 throu 9.5. -42, and flo p ssure switches ich are _ t provide for each fixed sup ssion system. entral proce or unit (CPU) co nicates with the local con i panels via the rem e MUX units er loo ed circuits. The X eq 'pment allows the pro ssor interrogate each ocal control p in turn and to r elve data ' m the panels. W en an initia device chan es from normal to t ble or alar status, it is de cted at the re ote MUX transm r-receiver nd when next in rogate the entral processor wil ransmit t s status change. The c ge is valuated by t processor an visual and audible indicati s ar provided. l l 9.5-2
- ./
l t SON-11 l M An larm condition results in t f !!owing system responses: l i a. S unding of audible de ces loc ly* and in the ain control room.
- b. Illu ' nation of indic ing lamps on he local ontrol nel indicating the lo ti n of the alarm g device.
- c. Actuatio (via cal control panel circ s) of automatic sup ession stems, fi pumps, fire dampers, ire oors, and ventilation ment.
- d. Identifica ' of the location and me of ceipt of the alarm c ndit on a catho e ray tube (CRT) d' pla and a printer whi are both ocated in the ma' control om and o a redun nt pri er in the Unit Auxiliary ins ument Room.
- Not Supervisory ignal ty modules are not quired t sound art audible localilarm.
T logic diagrams for he etection system are sho n' Figures 9.5.1-43 through 9.5. . 9.5.1.3 Desian Evaluation , rs, et,. o,-+ ec+:, eyne pre.j! der 3 reurbie ree ee e4 mf ete er ot h e 4: e<:ght i g r;e-+ t- -!! <:= r uppr:n- -d--- +"reugheu+ ht - a'-a+ . F r fire pumps rovided and are d ned to start in se to main in adequate ssure in th fire mai Th water and car di ide fire protection stems are 'smic egor Ifor
,. those p s of the sy ms su ying the a iliary buildi ,rea r buildings, trol bay, a diesel n tor building. ernainder of the Pr etion Syste which ~ clu es the yard, tur ne buildi service b din and office buildin not seismically ied.
oar +-ht 4: e e" ;nher: cre prev!ded ! ver!ce pc-*! n: cf the p!:-* for f!;'*:ng Om0!!:r 'tre: =d
^' e -:-^ :-d * ;pe +h st 2 re pet:b'- ""+h t he rpeci':e +'/per c' re aburt!b!er ca "'h!ch +"cy
- C: d.
An automatic fire detection sys m i installed in variou reas of the plant to give rapid notificatio f a fire to the main control ro m and o initiate autom tic sponses where such a need exists. uoyah Nuclear Plant's fir protection ystem des' n is base n the results of a fire haz ds a ysis covering those are s where an u itigate fire could aff a unit's ability to re and mai ain a safe cold shut wn. The analy invo ed a detailed rev w of the plant d gn and an eval n of the effects f postulated fires. The esults of the analys are provided the Sequ ya Nuclear Plan Fire Protection Progr eevaluation forwarded the N by a letter from E. *lleland to . S. Boyd dated Januar 24,1977, and TVA's res nse to subsequent NRC q stio forw ded by letter from J.E. ill and to S. A. Varga dated ember 9,1978; January 19,19 ; arch 8,1979; and a le rfr L. M. Mills to L. S. R en ein dated October 3,197 For documentation of t As-C figured Fire Detecti and pression System i the C ntr Building 669.0 - C1 Corridor, ce SAR 9.5.1 S ety Assess ent/ Safety 11 Evaluati (RI # B3 940808 800). pu f,+ qM / . l Additional rmation desc ' ing revisi s to the fire prot tion rogram cq in be found in t following d uments: RIMS .S62 60294 842. 11
,\
9.5-3 M ME b,T;'A
SON-10 9.5.1.4 Tests and insoections All sections of the High Pressure Fir r tection System, including yard pip' g, were initially hydrostatically tested. The system is shed and tested at regular inter s to ensure that it is free
~
of silt or obstructions. Fixed water suppression systems re tested in cordance with s veillance instructions which are based on the applicable NFPA c e requirements. ose system and fixed suppression systems ill be visually inspected at re ular intervals to ensu that all quipment protecting Appendix R a as and safety-related sys ms is in place and in goo op ating condition. IO The L -Pressure Carb Dioxide System is inspected re tar intervals to verify that the is sufficie carbon diox' e in the storage tanks and tha all equip ent is in good operating ondition. The syste is teste in accordance with surveillan instructions hich are based on e applicable NFPA code quir ents. The detectio annunciation circuits are sted in accordance with su eillan . instructions which are sed the . applicable NFPA de requirements. Portabi fire extinguis ers are inspe d at regular intervals to verify that ey a fully charged and in go physical conditi n. Exting hers are aintained in accord ce wi surveillance instructions which at ased on the a licable NFPA co e requirements. 9.5.2 Plant Communications Svstem 9.5.2.1 Desion Bases Interolant and/or Offsite Systems f) v' The design basis for interplant and/or offsite communications is to provide dependable systems to ensure reliable service during normal plant operation and emergency conditions. The primary interplant communications systems are microwave radio, carrier telephone, commercial telephone service, radios, emergency notification system, and health physics network. See Section 9.5.2.3 for a general description of each system and Figure 9.5.2-2 for simplified diagrams of the systems provided. Intraolant Communications The design basis for the intraplant communications is to provide sufficient equipment of various types such that the plant has adequate communications to start up, continue safe operation, or safely shutdown. v l I 9.5-4
. I SQN-1 lo I
- 6. Power failure to the timers and to the remote control unit actuating i relays is annunciated. !
Refer to Figure 9.5.2-3 for availability of intraplant communications , l during various postulated conditions. F 9.5.2.5 Inspection and Tests l t l Two communications. systems were covered by preoperational test (TVA-11): '
- 1. The sound-powered telephone systems provided for the backup
- control center, health physics office, and diesel building / !
shielded room. i
- 2. The evacuation alarm system. .
All systems are carefully installed and checked for proper operation ;
- initially by construction forces. . Routine maintenance is performed by i operating personnel on a regular basis and includes such items as ;
checking for proper switch operation, checking for proper operating l l ' levels, visual inspection, etc. l The most comprehensive testing, however, results from the heavy daily
-usage of the equipment and the subsequent reports of any of the users. ,
Individual power failures in the equipment are annunciated. I I 9.5.3 Lighting Systems 9.5.3.1 Design Bases l l There are three basic lighting systems in the plant designate 1 as i follows: normal, standby,'and emergency. These systems are desbyned in-accordance with the recommendations of the Illuminating Engineering Society, National Electrical Code, TVA Electrical Design Memorandums, and
- good engineering practice to provide the required illumination necessary for safe conduct of plant operations and under normal conditions to make l the plant personnel as comfortable as possible. i l
The normal- system is designed to economically provide the amount and l quality of illumination to meet normal plant operatiens and maintenance . I requirements. The standby system, on loss of the normal lighting. system, provides the 4 minimum illumination level necessary for the safe shutdown of the reactor
.and the evacuation of personnel from the plant if the need should occur.
It forms an integral part of the normal lighting requirements but is fed i from an entirely independent source. i
;- The emergency lighting system, fed from independent de voltage sources.
- provides immediately the minimum illumination level in areas vital to the
! safe shutdown of the reactor when the other lighting systems are j unavailable. l 9.5-11 0084F/COC4
/
. , - ~ , .- . .- - _
- ~ . . ,, . , - - ., -
SQN 9.5.3.2 Description of the Plant Lighting Systems All plant lighting systems have the following features in common: adequate capacity and rating for the operation of all loads connected to the systems, independent wiring and power supply, overturrent protection for conductor and equipment using nonadjustable circuit breakers, copper conductor with 600 Volt insulation run in metal raceways. The insulated cable used inside the primary containment area is resistant to nuclear radiation and chemical environmental conditions in this area. The plant lighting system consists of three basic schemes, the first of which is the normal lighting. This system is for general lighting of the plant; the major power supply is through normal and alternate feeders from the 6.9 kV comon boards A and B to 3-phase,120/208 Volt AC trans-formers feeding lighting boards distributed throughout the main plant. Other lighting boards in the service building, office building, gate-house, etc., are fed from various 480 Volt boards through 3-phase 120/208 Volt AC transformer. These lighting boards feed the normal lighting cabinets. designated by the prefix LC _ , located near load centers. In the power boards and control rooms, alternate rows of fixtures or alternate fixtures are fed from different lighting boards to prevent i total blackout in a particular area in case of failure of one of the l other lighting boards or cabinets. The second system is the standby lighting which forms a part of the normal lighting requirements and is energized at all times. This system 3 ( is fed from 480 Volt shutdown boards l A2-A, 2A2-A, IB1-B, and 2B1-B to ._., 3-phase 120/208 Volt AC transformers to each standby lighting cabinet, l designated by the prefix LS _. The shutdown boards have a normal and l alternate ac power supply and in event of their failure are fed from the i diesel generators. The cable feeders to the standby cabinets located in ; the Category I structure are routed in redundant raceways and the fixtures are dispersed among the normal lighting fixtures. l The third lighting system is referred to as the emergency system. The feeder to this system is electrically held in the off position until a power f ailure occurs on the AC systems. Then the emergency lighting cabinets, designated by the prefix LD_, are automatically energized from the 125 Volt DC vital bittery boards. This system is an essential supporting auxiliary system for the ESF, and the cable feeders to the LD cabinets are routed on the redundant ESF cable tray system or in conduit. The fixtures are incandescent type and are dispersed among the normal and standby fixtures with alternate emergency fixtures being fed from redundant power trained LD cabinets. I In addition, 8-hour battery powered emergency lighting system is e, provided rem +
- i. ,,-- a,-,- . a .u e,--,a v-,smi,,, e-, i u m- o e 3 nenensi, a HtbYb$h[htbNtIod"dsduTM' " WM Pddus fy.k(sw 2 c.1) .
w. 9.5-12 0084F/COC4 1 / i i___________________________--____________
SQN /do 0 7 9.5.3.3 Diesel Generator Buildino Lighting System The diesel generator building lighting cabinets are fed through 480-208/ . 120 Volt 3-phase local lighting transformers, which in turn are fed from the diesel 480 Volt auxiliary boards respectively. Each of these auxiliary boards has dual feeders from the 480 Volt shutdown boards, the diesel should start within the prescribed time to provide the 480 Volt AC power requirements for the safe shutdown of the plant through the standby feeds to the 480 Volt shutdown boards, thus supplying power again to the diesel generator building transformers. Each diesel generator unit has a lighting cabinet which supplies approximately one-half of the lighting for that unit, with the remaining half being supplied from the lighting cabinet of the adjacent like-trained unit. 9.5.3.4 Safety-Related Functions of the Lichting System ! The normal lighting is safe for the operation and evacuation of the plant to the extent of the design criteria for seismic mounting of conduits, 4 boxes, and fixtures and the reliability of the power source feeding it. '
.along with the quality of the materials and fleid installation.
The standby system provides low level lighting in the vital areas, less critical areas, and exit points for the safe shutdown of the reactor and ; evacuation of personnel. j l
.- The emergency lighting in the vital areas is adequate for the safe l shutdown of the reactor and the evacuation of personnel. ]l 9.5.3.5 Inspection and Testing Reauirements l Following the complete installation of a lighting system, it shall be tested and inspected. The operation of the lighting system shall be observed during the initial and periodic testing of the normal and alternate feeder systems and during the emergency power tests to the various boards from which these emergency lighting systems are fed.
l Maintenance and relamping of the normal and standby lighting systems shall be according to routine plant operating procedures. The 125 Volt emergency lighting system shall be tested periodically by tripping the holding coil circuit fed from the LS standby cabinet, thus closing the feeder circuit to the LD emergency cabinet. All emergency lamps of this system shall be inspected and replacements made where necessary. A written record of dates and results of these tests shall be maintained by plant personnel responsible for these tests. 9.5.4 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System 9.5.4.1 Desion Bases l That portion of the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System within the Diesel Generator Building is designed to Class I seismic requirements, and is designed to be impervious to the effects of tornadoes, hurricanes, j floods, rain, snow, or ice as defined in Chapter 3 of this document. 9.5-13 0084F/COC4
SON-10 i in response to licensing question concerning IE Information Notice 79-22 on environmental y qualification of control systems, TVA performed a systematic (matrix) evaluation of the environmental effects resulting from high-energy pipe breaks inside and outside containment upon nonsafety-related systems. Specifically, safety features required to mitigate the consequences of _ high-energy pipe break and those required to obtain and maintain a safe shutdown following such . an event were evaluated to determine if a single inappropriate actuation of an interfacing nonsafety-related system could unacceptably affect the required safety feature. TVA's conclusion is that although there is a possibility for disruptive signals to be generated, these are in every case acceptable because the operator will always have sufficient indication and time to take :orrective action. Consequently, a safe shutdown can be achieved at SON even if a postulated accident is compounded by environmentally induced inappropriate. operating instructions have been modified ; as an additional precaution to preclude the event or to alert the operator to the possibility of the event. l The evaluation concerning the environmental effects on the atmospheric relief and main steam isolation bypass valve controls is as follows. The control system for the atmospheric relief valves J could be affected by high-energy pipe breaks in the main steam valve room. This inappropriate opening is considered to be acceptable because (1) adequate annunciations provided to alert the ' operator to the event, (2) adequate time is available for operator actinn (3) the control system design assures that the operator can override the inappropriate open signal, j An inappropriate opening of a main steam isolation bypass valve would defeat steam generator ' isolation. Administrat:"e controls require the referenced valves to be closed and their control switches to be placed in the "close" position after the main steam isolation valves are open. This / l guards against the valve actuation due to environmental effects in the steam valve vaults following l a steam line break or flood. Cur:ng ; f::: : th: C;n:::' .::d:n; th: N::: ::: p. ":d :: d: ::::; :: I the valve enntrnt cirenhe Thie will otim'nm w o, ,A.~..~."..'..,-..M..--.. A... *. .- 3:-- t.
. . . . A.. ...
r nnons n,,um,, g_. . _ ( 10.3.7. References 1.0 Deleted. l 30 s 2.0 Westinghouse Report NSD-MWR 0215, The Morpholine / Boric Acid Application , l Document For Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 Nuclear Power l Plants. l 3.0 EPRI Report TR 102134, PWR Secondary Water Chemistry Guidelines - Rev. 3. lo l t I i I l l 1 J 10.3-13
l l SC1N-11 core. Pump runout protection is provided for all pumps. Each electric motor-driven pump is equipped with a cavitating venturi, whict * ~s a small throat area designed to limit flow by choking. '] The venturi pressure recovery cone allow me pressure loss across the venturi to be minimized.
~
Electric motor-driven pump runout is designed to be limited to 650 gpm to the steam generators, , which is less than that which would result in pump cavitation. The turbint-driven pump utilizes the I turbine speed control which uses a flow signal to limit the flow to the steam generators to 880 gal / min. I The preferred sources of water for all auxiliary feedwater pumps are the two 385,000 gallon non-seismic condensate storage tanks. A minimum of 190,000 gallons in each tank is reserved for the AFW Systems by means of an administrative limit based upon indicated level. As an unlimited l 11 backup (seismic Category I) water supply, a separate trained ERCW System header feeds each electric pump. The turbine pump can receive backup (seismic Category I) water from either train A or B ERCW header. The ERCW supply is automatically (or remote-manually) initiated on a ! two-out-of-three low-pressure signal in the condensate suction line. Consequently, even assuming the worst single active failure, auxiliary feedwater can be supplied indefinitely from the ERCW System. However, since the ERCW System supplies poor quality water, it is not used except in cmergencies when the condensate supply is unavailable. The ERCW System is described in subsection 9.2.2. In addition, the Fire Protection (FP) System may be connected downstream of each electric pump by a spool piece to supply unlimited raw water directly to the steam generators , in the unlikely event of a flood above plant grade as discussed in Appendix 2.4A. TM P C, n:, l E der-SM ' r&refr- 9P j f The AFW System is designed to deliver 40'F to 120*F water for pressures ranging from the RHR System cut-in point (equivalent to 110 lb/in2 g in the steam generator) to the steam generator i safety valve set pressure (accumulation pressure equivalent to that required to relieve 11 percent nominal steam flow). Criteria for the AFW System design basis conditions are shown in Table , , 10.4.7-5. Significant pump design parameters are given in Table 10.4.7 6. Pump characteristics , l l gnd power requirement curves are given in Figures 10.4.7.-13 and 10.4.7-14. 2 System piping is designed for pressures up to approximately 1650 lb/in g where necessary. Separate 1E power subsystems and fully qualified control air subsystems serve each electric-driven AFW pump and its associated valves. The valves associated with the turbine-driven pump are i served by both 1E electric and fully qualified control air subsystems, with appropriate measures precluding any interaction between the two subsystems. The turbine-driven pump receives control power from a third direct current electric channel that is distinct from the channels serving the clectric pumps and is not dependent on alternating current power for a period of 4 hours during I1 SBO. The essential components of the AFW System and subsystems necessary for safe shutdown l can function as required in the event of a loss of offsite power. I 10.4-34 v
SON-8
)
compartment is provided with internalliquid drainage and collection capability routed to an external point for sampling and collection. The extemal collection point is surrounded by a covered g concrete sump connected to the module. The sump in each module will be used as a passive sump by design to collect any liquid (e.g., fire suppression water) and sampled periodically to detect the presence of water and/or radioactive releases in the module. The interior surfaces of each module (excluding the concrete cap) are g coated sealed with a decontaminable coating. No rmanenti mstalled fi de etion or ' e sup' s on syste is vided i et OS i cturesh yard fire main, ydrants, and dran ouses are pr ded to affor nual ir ighting ability for t tire OSF. Fires
- he - W storatie cilities will uoht by he SQ fi bri . The 05F structures are designed to contain (within each module) all fire suppression water from a design basis fire in a way that wi!! not preclude processing of the water (if determined to be radioactive) using the existing SONP liquid radioactive waste treatment system.
The entire OSF is enclosed within a 10-foot high barbed wire security fence. The security fence for the OSF is provided with an intrusion detection device with tamper indication which alarms in the OSF gatehouse. The OSF is provided with closed circuit television monitoring capabilities and is continuously lighted at night. Access to the OSF is controlled through the.OSF gatehouse. These security measures may be changed depending on future needs and requirements. 11.5.7 Shioment _. Waste is shipped to a commercial disposal site according to federal regulations and disporal site criteria. Waste may also be shipped to a broker / processor for processing to meet federal E regulations and disposal site criteria. Drums and boxes containing radwaste are transported ' rom the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to the disposal facility in a sole-use flatbed or van-type truck trailers. Dewatered resins, solidified resins, evaporator concentrates, and chemical sludges are packaged in liners or high integrity containers 5 and transported either by sole-use van type trailer of in a transportation cask (dependent upon dose rates). All radioactive waste is packaged and transported in accordance with the TVA Radioactive Material Shipment Manual. I 11.5-7
r r SON-10 s Table 13.5.1-1 (Sheet 1) PLANT SYSTEM OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS General Ooeratino instructions Plant Startup from Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Load Plant Shutdown from Minimum Load to Cold Shutdown
- Normal Power Operation
- Apparatus Operations
'I 6900 V and 4B0 V Shutdown Board Ground Location and Isolatiori Procedure Sgp /vrt.A AG.4 W W t. l 10 l i System Ooeratino Instructions
- Main Steam Supply l - Steam Dump System Condensate and Feedwater System
- Condenser Vacuum System Auxiliary Feedwater System l
Extraction Steam and Heater Drains and Vents System Auxiliary Boiler System Fire Detection System Condensate Demineralizer Polisher Operation Condensate Dcmineralizer Regeneration and Resin Transfer l -
' Condensate Demineralizer Waste Disposal
- Containment Space Heaters !
Containment Pressure Control iO Condensate Demineralizer Acid and Caustic Unloading Steam Generator Blowdown (
- Fuel Oil System Lubricating Oil System Raw Cooling Water System Raw Service Water System l 1 -
High Pressure Fire Protection System T6 M ' n,x.; h~.' , 1 - RCS Boration During a Fire Related Loss of CVCS Letdown and Boric Acid Makeup Condenser Circulating Water System
- Amertap System
- CCW Cooling Tower System I 10 Condenser Water Box Tube Shooting '
Water Treatment System Vendor Water Treatment System Control Building and Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System
- Containment Purge System Containment Upper and Lower Compartment Heating, Cooling, and Ventilation System Incore instrument Room Ventilation System Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Onsite Electrical Power System Board Rooms Heating, Venting and Cooling Containment Air Return Fans l
- Control Air System t -
Auxiliary Compressed Air System
- - Service Air System l
Generator Hydrogen Cooling System l _ _}}