ML20101L151

Petitions Director of IE to Proceed to Revoke License NPF-27 & Issue Immediate Show Cause Order,On Basis of Licensee Violations,Deficiencies & Willful Acts

ML20101L151
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	12/23/1984
From:	Anthony R ANTHONY, R.L., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
CON-#185-874 2.206, NUDOCS 8501020146
Download: ML20101L151 (6)

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Q I. JY Q GO}401I%tY 6 0 5 U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISS... DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INSPECTIDN & ENFORCEIUiET '

RE: Phila. Electric Co. Limerick C,cn Sta, Unit 1.~ Deckot No.: 50-352,353 'd.) j PETITION BY INTER 7ENOR, R.L. ANTHONY / FRIENDS OF THE EARTH,TO THE DIRECTOR,OFF.0F INSPECTION AND ENFORCE! LENT TO INSTITUTE PROCEF,DDGS TO REVOKE LICENSE NPF-27, ISSUED TO PECO;1ND TO ISSUE AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS LICEN.SE SHOULD NOT BE REVOKEH.

12/23/84

• !i '0'D '4 7 BACKGRCUND FOR PETITION.

inthony/ FOE h'as been an intervener in the Limerick licensing- proceedings since 1981. From the time of our first knowledge in February.11984 eftskPart 70 ,

license application up to the present we have entered appeals with NRC a6 enc'i'8 against the issuance of a fuel license and a low power operating licen se for PECo.

Ye have appeals awaiting decisions with NRC and the U.S.Th$rd Circuit Appeals Court. Ye believe these appeals will be decided in our favor. Meanwhile PECe is assuming,apparently,tha%t deem not have to respect our appeals,and,we under-stand, has started or is about to start the fission process in # 1 reacter. Ye assert that PECe is in violation of NHC Tegulations and is subjecting us ed the public to the risk of cItensiv, unauthorized health and safety dangers by start-ing the nuclear re acter wkthout the required safety provisions.

Ye therefore seek to stop the threat to our he a lth and safety through the revoking of the" low power" license issued.t.e PECe em 10/26/84 by NRC Off. of Nuclear Reacter Regulation. Anthony /F0E petitions the Director,hereby, under 10 CFR 2.200 to revoke License NPF- 27,and, te that end, under 10CFR 2.201(c)to find that the public health. and safety are at risk because of RECo's operation of this reacter,and,further, to find that PECe has willfully violated our he a lth, safety an d interests and these of the public. And in addition we petition the Director,under 10'CFR 2.202 (a) to institute proceedings and to serve en the licensee an order to show cause why License NPF -27 should not be revoked.

We submit below the evidence which proves PECo is not qualified to operate this reacter safely a nd the specific dericiencies and violations in equipment,preced-ures, training, testing and safeguards, from NRC an d PECe records .

c3N$ WILLFUL ACTION. -

' We claim that PECo's application for exemptions from the requirements of g@ 10 CFR 50 constitute willful sacrifice of public safety in the interest of speedin6 the reactor getting inte service.The details in J.S.Kemper's letter, y 10/25/84, to H.R.Denten,NRC demonstrate this: (Request for Exemption fran 10 CFR, App. 1,GDC 19) h5

@@ Para.1.... main centrol room becomes either inoperative er uninhabitable.

mao 2. ..makes it highly unlikely.. . . . . . . . . simultaneously unavailable.

3.The likeliheed..the centrol reem uninhabitable is very small...

4. The likelihood that the Remote Shutdown Systems would not function as designed is small...

5...using equipment presently installed..in conjunction with temporary jumpers...

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Tho quotations abovo ches a ca:ual a ttitudo to:ard the lose cf the control room,and ability to shut down the plant in case of an accident. Such a less would bring a estastreyhy to the public,and the workers in the plant. To dismiss this possibility with unsubstantiated assumptions such as these abovw,

" highly unlikely" and "likeliheed is very small" is irresponsible at the least, and we assert that it constitutes a deliberate, willful negleet of public safety.

The concluding paragraphs of Mr.Komper's letter are included below .

(1.).

We conclude that as Tice President Engineering and Resea rch,he speaks for PECo. PECo,thereby,and NRC,in issuing the license an d granting the exenytions, enderse the dismissing of the importance of public hegith and safety with:

"Only the potential impact en public hea lth and sa fety is at issue". This is the key issueland the one that must centrol, net the secondary one that Mr.

a Kemper stresses, a delay in the attainment of commercial eyeration( and sub-rurther oequent increase in ratepayerAs cost)" The final paragraph is 3wishful thinking and unsupported by any firm evidence,"..we have concluded that granting the re-quested exemption will not endanger life er irewerty... and is otherwise in the public interest." (Emphasis added).Te emphatica lly deny PECe's(and NRC's) con-clusions above and assert the extreme threat to our health and saefety and that of the public involved in the risk of less of operation er habitability of the centrol reen.

In granting the eremytions, including the one above, NEC-NER (at 2 D, license 8,NFF-27) is in violation of 10 CFR 50.12 since the exemptions violate the public l bealth ,saf ety and interest. (~Je quote from the draf.t "Fac ility Operating License" supplied to us by V.S. 3*yer en 10/17/84, since we were never sent: a copy of Lic. NPF- 27 when it was issued.)

OTHER EXEMPTIONS.

Granting of an exemption from 10 CFR 50 Apr. A.cDC-61 as requested in the le tter, V.S. Beyer to H.R.Denten, 9/21/84, inKPF-27,is in violation of 10CFR 50.12.

Not connecting the standby gas treatment system to the refueling area prior to the first refueling outage risks discharging ra dioactive gas to the public's (Emphasis added.)

(1.)

The requested exmiption does not inpact the ccrmon defense and security. Only the potential inpact on pubile health and safety is at issue.

The requested exerrption is in the pubi le Interest in that any delay in ccmnencement of low power testing and pcwer ascension would cause a delay in the attairment of ccmnercial operation Cand subsequent Increase in ratepayer's cost) and since, as shown above, the health and safety of the pubile will be adequately protected.

Based upon the foregoing, we have concluded that granting the requested exemption wl11 not endanger life or property or the ccmmn defense and security and is otherwise ,ln the pubile Interest.

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accident. To assort that (p.2) "Thoso cotmitte t3 otaosphoro in caso of en effoetivelyprecludotheroloasocfrdicactivity-totherofuoI5k."donot guara ntee that they are sufficient er will be carried out,ner is there evidence to substantiate the assumptions summed up in, .." we have concluded that granting the requested exemption will not enda nger life er property er the commen defense and security and is otherwide in the public interest". Ye.cacclude the exact ey-yesite,and further declare that connecting SGTS services to the refueling area is essential to protect the public is neesseary and in the public interest.

.. delaying the operation of Limerick" is,and must be secondary to public safety!

Having the SGTS functioning ir vital protection for the public against the acci-dental release of . radioactive gases since lic. NPF-27 does not exclude exceeding 50% power eyeration ( C.(~10) (f) ner 100% power ( C. (1.) ).

Granting an eremytien from 10 CFR 50 lyy.J,as requested in J.S.Kemper's letter of 9/14/84 to H.R.Denton is not justified and is in violation of 10CFR 50.12 bec ause it enda n gers the public health and safety. Public safety is ignored on page 2, " ..it can be concluded that there is reasonable assurance against undue air lock' leakage..." Public safety requires more than " reasonable assurance";

it is a question of human lives, and nothing short of all possible assurance is natisfactory. It is not true that there could be (p.2)" ne significant increase in the environmental impact beyond that experienced with no exemption." And we deny (p.4) "That it can be concluded that there is reasonable. assurance against undue TIP guide tube leakage.." We further assert that(y 4. D.)" aremytien from the requirement to perform local leak rate 7 testing 6n seven HER relief va lves.."

makes safe shutdown uncertain and is a threat to public health and safety and is in viol tion a of 10 CFR 50.12. '

It is centrary to NRC regulations and NEPA and AE1 that public safety should be put in second place te (p.5.)" Changes to fa c ilitate such testing at the pres-l ont time would have.an adverse impact en system turnover and plant startup,"and l (p.6.) "If literal compliance were mandated...Ifdesign ch nges a were undertaken, a corresyending delay in the operation...Any delay in the eyeration of Limerick

..would cause the cost of g unit to increase." The last sentence (p.6.) shows where PECo's priorities lie f4ts disreguard of the public s afety and interest,

" Denial... ,would have a substantial financial 18 Pact en PEQe and its customers to sud is not warranted..." NRC must not allow PECO's financial str ightsa compromise the~ safety and lives of the public. -

A further eremytien requested by PECe in a letter,V.S.Beyer to H.R.Denten, 9/21/84,peses a severe threat to public sa fety and interest by yestyening until the first refueling outage adequate isolation valves fsr the hydrogen recombiner lines and the Drywell Chilled Water and Reacter Enclosure Cooling Water.. Public safety is at risk because of the absence of these valvee;the operation of the reacter is unsafe and 10 CFR 50.12 wa s vielatsed by the granting of this exemption by NRC in lic.NFF-27. Any penetr ations of the prima ry containment have the potentici

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for radicactive rologsos to tho public cnvironnant cud no safogu rds a counceted with these should be emitted,especially in the first phase of eyeration of the reacter. It cannet be assured to oper ate safely and to shut down without risk to the public with the camission of the valves cancelled by this exemption. There is ne substantiation to PECO'e assertion (p.3)" The probability of a release to the environment through these closed systers inside containment is lew" PECe goes l en to explain the ez.act kind of accident which could cause such a re3 esse. We f disagree with NRC's finding tha,t (p.3) "This deviation represents a justifiable, I temporary exemption from 10 CFR 50,1py. 1, ceneral Design Criteria en the 56."yand (3 4.)

contrar

• ne significant increase in environmental impaet". There iaghe risk of fatal impact en the public in the event of a nuclear accident and emergency.

We call especial attention to Mr.Beyer's use of the same weres as quoted ffen Mr.Kemper's letter,10/25/84 (p.2 above)" (p.4.) Only the potenfial impact on public he alth and safety is at issue. This certainly appears to discount and probably dismiss the issue of public .. health and safety at of any controlling relevance. On the other hand he also stresses the avoidance of" delay (p.4.) in the attainment of commercial *yeration","If literal compliance..were mandated..

a corresponding delay in the eyeration",and "would cause the cost of the unit to increase." We repeat that " literal compliance" is no less than is prayer to protect lives and it is what the regulations and NEB 1 and AEA require . Con-sider ations of speed in getting Limerick in,oper ation and the financial effects of delay en PECO are secondary issues which must yield to the protection of the public. Justification of the above> exemptions by PECe show its deliberate and willful disregard of the public health, safety and interest.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS.

We have received copies of licensee event reports starting with 84-001, dated 10/27/84,butonlyreported.'11/26/84 We have ayyarently not been supplied with copies of all these reports since there are gays in numbers emd me de not

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knew ehether there were operating incidents before # 84-001, connected with the nuclear fuel. In any case the 12 reports that we have been sent demonstrate that the Limerick plant a nd personnel are not in condition to operate the # 1 reacter safely and that License NPF-27 should bes revoked immediately to protect the public health- and safety. The 12 reports are listed heres l

LER # Event Report Summary - 84-001 10/27/84 11/26/84 Deficiency -ehannel check & radiaties monitor 84-002 10/31 11/30 Channel bypase, trip signal, full scram.84-003 10/31 11/30 CO2 pilot gas suryly valve elesed for 5 days84-005 11/9 12/10 Trir coils burnt out, full acra,a signal 84-006 11/13 12/13 Drywell purge fan,less your to chlorine analyser 84-007 11/14 12/14 Improper venting-start core spray,RER, diesel gen.

844008,010 11/15 & 18 12/14 Equipment malfunction.centrol reen vent. isolation 84-009 11/16 12/14 Radiation monitor out, radioactivity sample missed 84-011 11/18 12/17 Technician short circuit, damage high radiation men.

, 84-13 11/20 12/19 RHR isolati on valve failed to eyen from remote yanel 84-021 11/15 12/14' Short in test cable plug- isolation water cleanup

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. Thoco canploo of Liconoco Royerts culy givo 'a hint of tho truo picturo of equiynont failure (construction dofocicucios,yroceduro gays cud raintenanco Lad operator blunders by PEC. at the Limerick plant. The list above shows 12 ex-amples,yractically all of which could have enda ngered the public with a serious cocident affecting saf ety systems at the plant,and consequent involvement of the reacter and the threat of radioactivity to the environment. The record above included 12 License Events in 25 days and we de not knew whether all the events were reported or whether we were supplied a complete record. For example # 04 and

1. 12 are missing and there is a gap between # 13 and # 021. This record,however, of 12 events in 25 days ( approximately }{/ ieek ) without the fistien process started,is a serious warning of the dangers to the public in actual eyeration, which we understand started about 12/15 Since we have no event record since

1. 84-13 en 11/15,we have .cne idea how many more there have been from then to the present. 'is an example of events which could have been concealed, we found the notice of a fuel bundle hitting g g nt fuel yeel wall en 8/22/84 en the last page (p.27) of NRC Juglen L Inspec.g84-43 and 84-11 in para. 6 which conclud-es (we claim with willful deceptiveness) "No violations were identified."

The record above conclusively proves that PECe is not able to operate the Limerick _reacter in confermance with NRC regulations and without the probability of accidents and errors which would threa ten the hea lth, safety and interest of the public.

A sample of the Licenset t rents above desenstrate PECo's inability to carry eut safety responsibilities, sed call for the revoking of Lic. NPF-27:

1. 84-001 (7.i-1).." channal checks of the,four scram discharge volume level transmitters and the f our refueling area ventilation erhaust duct radiation'.

monitors were not performed as required.."

1. 84-002 (p. 1-3) " This event wa s ca used by personnel errer-the failure of the I&C Technician to check with Shift Supervision prior to reconnecting the cable to the detector. The subsequent scram event would not have occurred if the IRM had be en bypas s e d . . . "

1. 84-005 (p. 1-1) ".. source voltage was slightly high,.. feeder tripped open..

With shorting links removed. .RPS trip system. . . caused a full scram signal . . "

1. 84-006 (p.1-2) "The cguse of the event was inadequate investigation by tue operators attempting to resolve the drywell purge problen..."

1. 84-00J ( y. A-2) " .. a reacter low level isolatien signal. The 'C' core spray pump and the'C' RHR yump operated on minimum flew rdeirculation to the suppression. peel. D 13 diesel generater output breaker did not close ente its emergency bus,.."..." Cause of the event was imprayer venting. . ."

OTHER DEFICIENCIES. of While we de not have a complete record3deficiencies and eyen er unresolved construction er operation items which disqualify PECe from being able te operate the nuclear reacter safely,we include a sampling of some which sceuld 3 prevent PECe from holding Lic.NPF-27 Inspection 84-49,-12. Open : 3 11 Diesel;-unresolved,y. 17 Inspection Brookhaven' Nat. Lab. ,10/4/84 Starostecki Eemper , para. 10.1 Open Findings (10)

Ua ingludo additicnal reports involving 'safoty iscuou that aro unresolved, thyr ontiroty)but uith opseial refersuces indicated ,

(a Insy. 84-47 (p. 7,15,17,18) 84-27 ( p.16,20) 84-29-(p.9) 12 welds with rejectable indications. 84-50 (p. 5,6.) Eurley-Daltreff11/9/84(deficioney re. security guards.) 84-52 (Ittek.1 p. 14,20,23.) 84-54 Exceptions (p.3,4,7.)

84-55 ( y.13,14,15) 84-56 Training ( p.2.) 84-62 Test exceptions (p.4,5.)

84-60,-13 ( p . 13,14,15,16 ) 84-59 Shutdown margin 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> instead of 30 minutes.

(p.4.) Centrol Room Design Review 10/84 Incomplete, Mis sing ( y.11,16,20. )

Schwencer-Bauer 10/16/84 Tech. Eval, Control Reem. Incomplete, inadequate ( p.18',19,20)

Kemper- Schwencer 10/15/84NoNRtl safety ev aluation en the resolution of generic issue ( p.2.) Kemper-Schwencer8/1/84 DeferzelRHRSW PRE radiation moniter(p.2.)

Daltreff-Martin 9/27/84 Emergency Preparedness deficiencies, Deferrals Att,B 84-18

( #1 through # 49.) Kemper- Schwencer 8/8/84 Sprinklers deferred. 84-24,08 Inspector question of deferred Standby Gas Treatment System (p.5.) 84-39 Uncom-pleted maintenance ~ atr ining(p.6) .

Kemper- Schwencer 9/12/84 Deferral of 8 surveillance tests. Daltreft-Martin 9/7/84 Deferral of Emergency Preparations ( y.5,6,8,13,18,24,25,28,34,35,38.)

Kemper- Starostecki 11/7/84 Brookhaven Review of ESW (p.4,5.) 84-31 Maintenance Trending (p.17.) Kemper-Schwencer9/6/84 Seismic / Dynamic Qualification defer-ral (p.2.) Kemper-Schwencer 9/4/84 Deferral Pressure Isolation Yalves Leak Testing ( Para. 3,(3) ) Kemper-Schwencer 9/27/84 Reacter Coelant deferra1(para.( 3.)

84-63 Guard deficienciese (y.2,3, Attach.1 77-04,78-17,f79-03,79-16,80-09.)

Three letters Kemper- Schwencer en the same feedwater check valves (lF074 1 and 17074 B) cast doubt en PECo's reeerds and show a degrading of standards and cafety. Letters 9/7 and 10/4/84 both specify " minimum crack length of 3t inches" (para.2.) while letter 10/12 emits thir. Kemper- Schwencer 10/12/84 Down-grading turbine steam va lve test weekly,te 31 c', 's. Kemper-Starostecki. 9/7/84 Downgrading t leak rate-testing; 1C/L2/84 Leakage ren ution tests; ~9/26/84 Nitrogen inerting l cystem3 redesign deferral.

The letters en tornado missiles and damage to the Ultimat4 Heat Sink,Kemper and Beyer to Murley and Schwencer 8/23,9/4,9/11,9/24,and 10/19/84 emit altogether the threat to safe shutdown from the design railws;y erylosion which could simulta-neously collapse the cooling towers and disable the water infake structure at the river. Lic. NPF-27 should be revoked bec ause there is ne prevision to mitigate this.

We assert NRC. violated 10CFR 50.12. in granting Exemption fren 10 CFR 50 App.1, GDC 2&4, Ultimate Heat Sink, Boyer-Denten 10/19/84, INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM.

We h g g er been given a final Torrey Pines report. We conclude Schwencer-Bauer letter 3 has not been gered as to " find-ing. that would yetentially delay the startup progr ma ". Without assurance 3 Lic.NPF'27 ,

cheuld never have been issued.

CONCLUSION. On the bas is of the violations, deficiencies and willful acts by the licensee set forth above we petition the Director to proceed to revoke Lic. NPF-27 and issua an immedigte showa c use order to this effect.

Res .c fu ly submitted cc: NRC:&Wetterhahn,AB Conner Cermiss Staff Counsel,Decketing,NRR.

LB,3rd Cir.Ct. LEA, ethers enServ. List 8.S.

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