ML20087J785

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Final Deficiency Rept DER 83-60 Re Failure of Wiring in Vitro Main Steam & Feedwater Activation Sys to Meet IEEE-384 Separation Criteria.Condition Determined Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)
ML20087J785
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 03/09/1984
From: Van Brunt E, Vanbrunt E
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To: Bishop T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
ANPP-29037-BSK, DER-83-60, NUDOCS 8403230086
Download: ML20087J785 (4)


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Arizona Public Service Company f'O. box 2160C . PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85036 4

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- March 9,1984 f..h'P-2903 7-BSK/TRB cj.;

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O 9Q U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission S O m

, Region V E 3' Creekside Oaks Office Park r

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2 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 .;p Attention: Mr. T. W.-Bishop, Director Division of Resident

! Reactor Projects' and Engineering Programs 4

Subject:

Final Report - DER 83-60 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating to Wiring In Unit 2 Main Steam and Feedwater Activation System by Vitro Does Not Meet IEEE-384 Separation Criteria.

, File: 84-019-026; D.4.33.2 Re ference: A) Telephone Conversation between P. !!arbut and R. Tucker on September 1,1983. .

B) ANPP-27911, dated October 3,1963 (Interim Report) I C) ANPP-28324, dated November 30, 1983 (Time Extension)

D) ANPP-28551, dated January 4, 1984 (Tide Extension)'

E) ANPP-28913, dated February 21, 1984 (Tire Extension)

Dear Sir:

Attached is our final-writtee report of the deficiency referenced-above, which has been determined to be Not Reportable under-the requirements of

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10CFR50.55(e).

~ .Ver) truly rd,-
2 8. au_ nd E. E. Vai Punt, Jr.

APS Vice F'.esident, Nuclear ANPP Project Director --

'EEVB/TRB:db'

- Attachment l .

cc: See Page'Two 8403230006 840309 PDR ADOCK 05000530

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1 Mr. T. W. Bishop DER 83-60 i

Page Two '

sc: kichard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 T. G. Woods, Jr.

W. E. Ide D. B. Fasnacht A. C. Rogers B. S. Kaplan L. A. Souza J. Vorees J. R. Synum P. P. Klute A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. G. Bingham R. L. Pa tterson R. W. Welcher H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson L. E. Yorderbrueggen G. A. Fiore111 S. R. Frost J. Self D. Canady ,

Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operat? ins 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 1 Atlanta, GA 30339

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[' FINAL REPORT - DER 83-60 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)

, PVNCS UNITS 2 a-

1. Description of Deficiency While performing installation inspection et PVNGS on Unit 2, Main Steam and Feedwater Isolation Actuation System (MSFIS), it was reported that internal wiring of control cabinets, identified as tag
number 2J-SGA-C01 and 2J-SGB-C01 did not conform with the Class.1E separation criteria of IEEE 384. The cabinets'were supplied by Vitro Laboratories under Purchase Order ' Specification 13-JM-105.

Bechtel Engineering has corresponded with Vitro concerning this condition. Vitro has responden -by letter (VL-CS-T-185(83). The non-Class 1E circuits identified in'the NCR are smoke detector and trouble alarm circuits _which are low energy (24 V-de) circuits.

Bechtel and Vitro have determined that failure of these circuits will not affect the adjacent Class 1E circuits.. This determination

' is in'conformance with the Becntel position as' stated in

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Specification Change Nctice No. 3473 to 13-EM-306 and.SAR Change Notice 1114.

II. Analysis ' of Safety Implications ThesmokedetectioncircuitshithintheMai~n Steam.and Feedwater Isolation System (MSFIS) cabinet are not Class 1E circuits and are not connected, because they are superseded by the external smoke detectors. Therefore, no justification is required for compliance with the Regulatory Guide 1.75 separation requirement.

.The MSFIS' trouble alarms employ photosensitive resistance detectors-whose resistance changes from 90. ohms to 1 megohm when trouble is detected in the MSFIS cabinet. The alarm wiring ~ is ~ No. 22 AWG Tefzel insulated and is terminated on terminal blocks' within two metal boxes interconnected by a rigid metal conduit withinLthe MSFIS~

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The Plant annunciator employs'a.24V-dc, power supply to interrogate-

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j the resistance detectors through interconnecting wiring. LA signal-i input card in the ' annunciator is designed to -limit the' signal-

! current to 2 milliamps when_ the' input is .short-circuited at the Lannunciator terminals.t r

! . The' following: fault conditions .were analyzed to determine the degradation offthe Class ~1E wiring:

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! - A. : 'Considering the short1 circuit faultfacross thelNSFIS: resistance

' detector, the current would'lucrease to 2.milliamps, as limited. ~~

l ,--by-~the annunciatorfsignal1 input. card, resulting in an -

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la insignificant temperaturelrise(in the non-1E; wiring:with no- 4 -

inffection the 1/E wiring.

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Mr. T. W. Bishop ANP P-29037 Page Two B. Considering a short circuit fault across the annunciator signal input card, the current in the non-1E wiring will be limited by the internal resistance of the annunciator power supply, the interconnecting wiring, and the MSFIS resistance detector which is 90 ohms minimum.

Disregarding the internal resistance of the annunciator power supply and the resistance of the wiring, the maximum current would be:

24V-de/90 ohms = 0.266 amps Since the wiring in the cabinet (Po. 22 AWG) is rated at 3 amps, the temperature rise due to this fault current would be negligible.

C. Considering a ground fault in a non-1E MSFIS cabinet wire, a negligible current would flow in the annunciator power supply is otherwise ungrounded. The 1E wiring would not be affected.

, Since there is no degradation of the Class IE circuits by any fault in the non-1E circuits, the separation criteria of Regulatory Guide.

1.75 is not required. This condition is evaluated as not reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), since if this condition were to remain uncorrected, it would not represent a safety significant condition.

III. Corrective Action A. NCR EJ-3219 will be disposition "Use As Is."

B. SAR Change Notice 1114 is currently being corrected to reflect this justification and e.nalysis.

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