ML20212Q171
| ML20212Q171 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1987 |
| From: | Haynes J ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-87, REF-PT21-87-008-000 ANPP-39650-JGH, PT21-87-008-000, PT21-87-8, RER-QSE-86-47, NUDOCS 8702020166 | |
| Download: ML20212Q171 (4) | |
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Arizona Nuclear Power Project
'"'" 20 P.O. BOX 52034 e PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85072-2034
/g Of January 9, 1987 Pg ANPP-39650-JCU/DJW/DRIF-92.11 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention:
Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2, 3 Docket No 530
Subject:
Interim Report - RER-QSE 86-47 A 50.55(c) Potentially Reportable Deficiency and 10CFR21 Relating to Diesel Generator Engine Failure File: 87-006-216
Reference:
Telephone Conversation between D. Willet and R. Rouse on December 23,1986 (Initial Notification - RER-QSE 86-47)
Dear Sir:
The h1C was notified of a potentially reportable deficiency in the referenced telephone conversation. At that time, it was estimated that a determination r.f reportability would be made within thirty (30) days. (January 22, 1987)
Due to the extensive investigation and evaluation required, an Interim Report is attached.
It is now expected that this information will be finalized by February 20, 1987 at which time a complete report will be submitted.
Very truly yours, J. G. Haynes Vice President Nucicar Production JGH/DRL:kp Attachments cc: See Page 2 8702020166 870109 t
PDR ADOCK 05000528 g
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RER-QSE 86-47 Mr. D. F. Kirsch Director Page Two i
January 9, 1987 ANPP-39650-JGH/DJW/DRL-92.11 s
cc:
J. M. Taylor Office of Inspection and Enforcement:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 A. C. Gehr
. (4141) j R. P. Zimmerman (6295)
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Records Center
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Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway - Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 I
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INTERDI REPORT - RER-QSE 86-47 POTENTIAL REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT (ANPP)
PVNGS UNIT 3 I.
Potential Problem On December 23, 1986, the Unit 3 Diesel Gencrator "B" engine failed during performance of startup procedure 93PE3SA01. The Unit was being run for the first time at 110% of its rated generator capacity After running less than ten minutes the connecting rods, pistons, bearing cap, and other miscellaneous materials for the #9 cylinders (9L & 9R) were ejected through the right hand side of the engine center frame. Other damaged engine parts immediately identified were the crank shaf t, cylinder sleeves, lef t hand side of the centerframe, engine webbing, and 9R cylinder block.
II.
Approach To and Status of Proposed Resolution Immediately after the event, the area was quarantined for safety reasons and preservation of root cause evidence. On December 24, 1986, representatives f rom the vendor (Cooper Energy Services) and ANPP inspected the undisturbed area. The area was video taped, grid mapped and photographed. The ejected parts were identified, tagged, bagged and moved to a reconstruction area.
Initial visual inspection of the failed parts indicate that the root cause for the event is related to a fatigue failure of the #9 main connecting rod at the crank shaf t area. This evnluation will be verified or modified with additional metallurgical examinations which include:
1.
Scanning Electron Microscopy of the f racture surf ace 2.
Hardness testing 3.
Tensile testing 4.
Chemical Analysis 5.
Meta 11ography Preliminary metallurgical examinations show that the fatigue failure initiated at an area where iron had been added through an electroplating process to the connecting rod. The less ductile iron plating could cause the metal fatigue.
A determination on the repairability of the engine is ongoing between ANPP, Cooper, and Cooper's subcontractors. Major component decisions in engine repair involve the crankshaf t and centerf rame.
III. Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operation Continued operation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 is justified for the following j
reasons:
1.
The total operating hours of the Unit I and 2 diesels greatly exceed the total operating hours of the Unit 3 "B" diesel. A generic problem to the other Units' diesels should have become evident by now.
2.
The total operating hours at 110% power on the Unit 1 and 2 diesels greatly exceed the operating hours at 110% power for the Unit 3 "B" diesel. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 diesels have been run for two hours at 110% power. - The Unit 3 "B" diesel failure occurred af ter less than ten minutes total run time at 110% power.
Due to the concern regarding the iron plating on the failed connecting rod in Unit 3, a record search on other connecting rods supplied to ANPP was performed by Cooper Energy Services. Cooper found that the Number 6 connecting rod in the Unit 2A diesel had been iron plated. The Unit 2A diesel was declared inoperable and brought down for inspection.
In place UT inspections of this connecting rod show no indications of failure.
IV.
Projected Completion of Corrective Action and Submittal of the Final Report The corrective action is indeterminent at this time. Determination of the root cause and repairability of the diesel are required before a recovery plan can be finalized. The complete evaluation and final report are forecast to be completed by February 20, 1987.
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