ML20211Q268
| ML20211Q268 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1987 |
| From: | Haynes J ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-87, REF-PT21-87-047-000 ANPP-40058-JGH, PT21-87-047-000, PT21-87-47, RER-QSE-86-47, NUDOCS 8703030052 | |
| Download: ML20211Q268 (16) | |
Text
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _
l 1-BECSV50 l
NRC 1
Arizona Nuclear Power Project @l FEB ;f 7 P.o BOX 52034 e PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85072-2034
[kt%
February 9, 19 ANPP-40058-JGli N M R2.11 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention:
Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2, 3 Docket Nos. 50/528, 529, 530
Subject:
Final Report - RER-QSE 86-47 A 50.55(e) and 10CFR21 Reportable Condition Relating to Diesel Generator Engine Failure File: 87-006-216
Reference:
(A) Telephone conversation between D. Willet and R. Rouse on December 23, 1986. (Initial Notification - RER-QSE 86-47)
(B) ANPP-39650, dated January 9,1987.
(Interim Report - RER-QSE 86-47 i
Dear Sir:
The NRC was notified of a potentially reportable deficiency in reference (A),
and an interim report by reference (B). Attached, is our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under the requirements of 10CFR 50.55(e) and 10CFR21.
Very truly yours,
/N $
J.G.Ila[nes Vice President Nuclear Production JGil/DRL:kp Attachments cc: See Page 2 8703030052 870209
{DR ADOCK 05000528 PDR
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Final Report - RER-QSE 86-47 Mr. D. F. Kirsch Director Page Two February 9, 1987 ANPP-40058-JGH/DJW/DRL-92.11 cc:
J. M. Taylor Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 E. A. Licitra NRC Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 i
A. C._Gehr (4141)
R. P. Zimmerman (6295)
Records Center i
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway - Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 l
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E
FINAL REPORT - RER QSE 86-47 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)
ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT (ANPP)
PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, 3 I.
Description of Deficiency On December 23, 1986, the Unit 3 Diesel Generator "B" engine f ailed during performance of startup procedure 93PE3SA01. This startup procedure requires in part, that each standby diesel generator undergoes a 24-hour (minimum) run to meet PVNGS FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.4.7 and PVNGS Technical Specification Section 3/4.8, Paragraph 4.8.1.1.2 Item 7.
During the first two 1.ours of this test, the diesel generator is loaded to 6050 kW (110% rated power) and for the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> loaded to 5500 kW (100% rated power). The Unit was being run at 110% of its rated generator capacity.
In less than 10 minutes at 110% power engine trouble alarms were received in the diesel generator room and there was a very loud noise. Test personnel in the control room actuated the Diesel Emergency Stop Pushbutton. A cursory examination revealed that the engine has experienced mechanical damage but was still running. The overspeed butterfly valve was manually tripped and the engine speed reduced but did not stop.
The test personnel attempted to stop the diesel by isolating fuel oil and starting air but the engine continued to run apparently using crankcase oil as fuel and drawing in air through a hole in the damaged crankcase.
Electrical power was shut off in the area to prevent a fire from starting. The engine was stopped about 40 minutes af ter the event began shortly af ter spraying foam through the hole in the crankcase. The lube oil was isolated just prior to the engine stopping. Immediately after the event, the area was quarantined for safety reasons and preservation of root cause evidence. On December 24, 1986, representatives from the vendor (Cooper Energy Services) and ANPP inspected the undisturbed area.
The ejected parts were identified, tagged, bagged and moved to a reconstruction area. No personnel injuries or fire resulted from the incident.
Later inspection revealed that the crankcase door #9, right cylinder was knocked out and numerous broken parts of the master connecting rod, lower bearing cap, articulating rod, pistons, wrist pins, counterweights, bearing, and bronze bushing were either thrown out through the door or lying in the crankcase.
Evaluation To determine the root cause of f ailure and establish the necessary corrective action, the following particular conditions were evaluated:
component design, possible damage during shipment or installation, system operation, component defect, and impact to other PVNGS diesels. _
1.
Component Design Diesel Generator 31-DGB-H01 is a KSV-20 cylinder vee-type turbocharged 4-stroke diesel engine with a rated speed of 600 rpm.
The connecting rod assemblies, each consisting of an articulated rod, master rod, and rod cap, are carbon steel forgings. The main rod is connected to the crankshaf t journal via a rod cap, studs, and nuts.
Each articulated rod is attached to the master rod via a pin-and-bushing assembly with a bolt and locking device (see Figures 1, 2, and 3).
Each cast-iron piston is attached to its respective master or articulating rod similarly.
2.
Possible Damage During Shipment or Installation The Unit 3 Train B diesel generator has undergone extensive jobsite inspection during the receiving, installation, and startup phase.
There is no documented damage caused by shipment or installation to any of the connecting rod assemblies, crankshaf t, or associated components.
In addition, a thorough inspection by PVNGS and vendor personnel indicates that the engine failure did not result from an installed damaged component.
3.
System Operation Prior to the engine failure, substantial preoperational testing as required by PVNGS FSAR 3.8.1.1 had been successfully completed.
Engine parameters (cylinder head temperature, lube oil temperature and pressure, jacket water temperature and pressure, etc.) were monitored and within their normal operating ranges prior to failure.
The generator had been run approximately 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> before the failure.
4.
Evaluation of Unit 3 Diesel Component Defect The attached Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the connecting rod and bearing assembly. The articulating rod was broken at the lower end with the fractured surface typical of a sudden overload type failure. The lower bearing cap was separated from the master rod with all four studs fractured. The fractured surfaces were examined and determined again to be, an overload mode of failure with substantial deformation prior to failure. The mating surfaces of the lower bearing cap and the master rod did not indicate any fretting or wear.
One nut had stripped threads which indicated overstressing during separation.
The master rod section between the articulating pin bore and crank shaf t bearing was completely fractured and the fractured surfaces indicated fatigue failure. Beach marks indicated that fracture orginated at the center oil hole on the articulating pin bore side and propogated towards the bearing side. The bore side edge, where the crack initiated, shows mechanical damage which was caused by the impact of various failed parts..-
A second, smaller crack initiated from the upper oil hole. This crack was later opened for examining the cracked surface. The surface showed that the crack, had again initiated at the pin bore side at the hole and propogated towards the bearing surface.
The master rod, bearing cap and _ articulating rod were machined -from ASTM A-521 class CG forging material (carbon steel, quenched and i
tempered). Hardness testing, tensile _ testing and chemical analysis and a metallographic examination were conducted on the material F
adje. cent to the fatigue failure. The microstructure adjacent to fractured material is basically fine grain pearlite. The results of chemical, tensile _and hardness testing are shown in Table 1.
The results meet the material specification requirements.
The metallographic examination revealed that the pin bore surface was a plating of about 1/16" thick. According to Cooper, the plating was a build-up done by electroplating iron to repair overmachined surface of the bore. The columnar grains, which appear equiaxed in this section had some intergranular cracking. Chemical.anlaysis and microhardness testing was done on the plating surface. The results are shown in Table 2.
The examination of the second cracked surface revealed the presence of an electroplated layer of about 1/16" thick. The primary fractured' surface of the rod does not indicate plating well because of the mechanical damage along that edge. The presence of plating is observed on the bearing side. However, there is no plating around
{
the edge of the hole due to machining of an oil groove, on the crankshaf t bearing side only.
(
The fatigue fracture surfaces were also examined under a scanning electron microscope (SEM). The striations observed in the SEM photographs confirm fatigue failure. The striations observed near the end of the section indicate rather low operating stresses, on more than 95% of the total area cracked by fatigue.
An SEM photograph taken at the initiation point of the second crack showed columnar grain structure of plating that is typical of electroplated deposits.
A liquid penetrant examination on the plated pin bore surface adjacent to the main fracture showed cracking indicative of the.
brittle nature of the iron plating.
Review of the vendor quality verification records revealed that the Unit 3 Train B diesel generator cylinder master rod had been repaired during fabrication. The articulated rod pin bushing bore was machined approximately 0.060 inch oversize. The bore was remachined to design dimensions by electroplating with iron.
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During the investigation of this failure, the vendor identified two more iron plated master rods which were used at PVNGS. One master rod was used in the same engine at the #2 cylinder. _This rod was disassembled and the articulating rod pin bore and the bearing surfaces were liquid penetrant examined. Three cracks were observed on the pin bore side. A 1" x 3/8" crack was observed at a corner. A second smaller crack in the vicinity of the first crack seems to have initiated at a defect in the plating. A third crack, also small was initiated at the lower oil hole. The plating thickness is approximately 1/32" but was not present on the radius of the center oil hole as it was in the failed rod.
Unit-2 Another iron plated master rod identified by the vendor was in the Unit 2 A diesel #9 cylinder. This rod was removed and the bore area examined by liquid penetrant method. It did not have any cracking indications. The plating was only about 1/64" thick, and was not present on any oil hole radii.
In addition to the iron plated rods, there were four master rods which were repaired by flame spraying a Nickel-Aluninum-Molybdenum Alloy (METCO 447). Three rods in the B engine of Unit 2 were repaired in the bore area of the ball. The approximate size of the repair was 4 " x 1/4 x.045" thick. The fourth rod was in A engine of Unit 2.
This rod was removed and disassembled, and the repair area, which was on the face of the bail, showed a small area of some disbondment in one corner.
Conclusion The results presented in the previous section clearly show that the engine failure was caused by the crack which initiated at the oil hole which in turn was caused by the iron plating. The iron plating appears to have very little ductility and easily cracks at stress concentration points even under light loading. The loading on the master rod was low since a small fraction of the entire cross-section failed under ductile tearing (overload).
The poor ductility of the plating was obvious, as several observed cracks developed on the surface. Though this cracking probably occurred af ter the main crack had weakened the section, it indicates j
that the plating is susceptible to cracking even under light loads.
The crack propagated into the base metal due to mechanical bonding.
The disbonding of the flame sprayed nickel alloy appears to have resulted from the difficult geometry on which the spraying was perfo rmed. At the time of spraying, the bronze bushing was in place and the build-up was bridged over the edge of the bronze bushing from the corner of the bail.
With a favorable geometry, the nickel spray is expected to be capable i
of providing acceptable service for the life of the part.
i I
Root Cause The root cause for this event was determined to be a crack which initiated at an oil hole in the articulating pin bore of the master connecting rod. The crack initiation was the result of iron electroplating used to build-up the bore during the manufacturing process. The crack propogated under cyclic loadf ag and caused failure of the rod which led to the failure of the engine.
Transportability The evaluation of this condition included the specific use of iron plating or metal spraying in major power train components, identification of components that have been repaired using these processes, traceability of components, other repair methods, review of procedures for adequacy of rework, and quality program implications.
An extensive engineering evaluation was completed to determine the root cause of the Unit 3B diesel generator failure. This root cause was determined to be the use of brittle iron plating for repair work in high stress areas of the diesel generator. Fabrication records for critical components have been reviewed and areas of repair using iron plating or metal spraying have been identified for PVNGS CES Diesel Generators. All rods that have been repaired with iron plating, have been replaced on the PVNGS Diesel Generators. All Rods that were repaired using metal spraying have been identified and evaluated. One rod had been replaced which was repaired in an area where the geometry did not produce a sound buildup. Other metal sprayed rods are concluded as satisfactory based upon the favorable geometry of the repair area and no ultrasonic indications in the reapir areas af ter more than 400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> of operation.
t I
CES has stated that records have been reviewed and it is concluded that the areas of iron plated metal repairs have been adequately identified.
l Based on a review of CES shop records, detailed metallurgical analysis l
and field examinations, ANPP has concluded that the application of the iron plating on the rods was the only deficiency identified.
In addition, based on a comparison of fabrication records, with serial numbers and locations, for 20 rods, actually located in the Units 2 and 3 l
diesels, CES has maintained traceability of components.
Based upon the extensive evaluations conducted to resolve this condition, it is concluded that the deficiency is applicable to iron plated rods only, which have been removed f rom the PVNGS diesel generators.
Safety Significant Assessment i
10CFR50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria 17-Electric Power Systems requires in part that an onsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to l
safety. This system, is required to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety function, assuming a single failure. For each PVNGS Unit, redundant diesel generators are l
provided as part of the Class lE AC electrical systems, standby power l
sourc e s. These diesels are provided to mitigate those potential events l
described in the FSAR which assume a loss of offsite power (LOP) and which could be initiated from plant operations modes 1 through 4.
Such LOP limiting events are: steam line breaks, loss of condenser vacuum, reactor coolant pump rotor seizure and steam generator tube rupture. In the event of loss of offsite (preferred) power during safe plant shutdown or in the event of post-accident operation of engineered safety feature (ESF) loads, diesel generator failure of the type discussed and its subsequent load drop could constitute a substantial safety hazard. Thus, if the subject diesel generator connecting rod failure had occurred during operation of Unit 3 in modes 1 through 4, one of the two available onsite AC electrical power supplies would have been rendered inoperable and the probability of occurrence or the consequences of these accidents, previously evaluated in the FSAR, may have been increased.
II.
Analysis of Safety Implications Based upon the above, this condition is evaluated as reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) since, if left uncorrected, it could have adversely affected the safety of operations. This condition is also reportable under the requirements of 10CFR Part 21 since, it constitutes a known defect of a basic component and a substantial safety hazard. This report addresses the reporting requirements under 10CFR Part 21 with the exception of section 21.21 (b)(3) subpart vi.
III. Corrective Action Unit 1 Cooper Energy Service (CES) records indicated that CES did not use iron plated or nickel sprayed rods on the Unit 1 A or B diesels. Therefore, no corrective action will be taken on these diesels.
Unit 2 Cooper Energy Service identified that the Unit 2A diesel #9 cylinder master rod had been iron plated. This rod has been replaced. In addition, the #3 master rod that had been nickel sprayed and showed some disbondment has been replaced. The remaining rods in the Unit 2A and 2B diesels which CES repaired using nickel spray, have been ultrasonically examined and no crack indications were found. See Tables 3 and 4.
Unit 3 CES identified that (in addition to the failed #9 cylinder master rod) the #2 cylinder master rod had been iron plated in the B diesel. Both of these rods will be replaced during the repair process. In addition, all 3A and the remaining 3B rods have been ultrasonically examined for defects and no crack indications were found. See Tables 3 and 4.
Repairs will be made to the Unit 3 engine to return it to service.
Restoration of the Unit 3 diesel to new condition with factory clearances between all moving parts will consist of cleaning and inspection of major stationary, rotating and reciprocating parts and replacement of parts beyond repair.
III c
A detailed description of inspection and repairs is as follows:
The crankcase was pumped down, broken parts removed and the crankcase wiped down and inspected.
For the #9 right and lef t cylinders, the connecting rod, pistons and related parts will be replaced, including two cylinder liners, two jacket water expansion seals, two counterweights, one articulated rod, one master rod and miscellaneous tubing and instrumentation.
'The #9 connecting rod journal was milled in place and a new master rod bearing was manufactured to fit the journal within the specified factory tolerances.
The centerframe requires repairs in four areas:
1.
Casting in upper inspection cover area below cylinder #9L.
2.
Casting in upper inspection cover area below cylinder #9R.
3.
The archway between cylinders #9L and #9R.
4.
A part of the web between cylinders #8 and #9.
Damaged material will be removed and replaced with steelplate structures that are mechanically secured to the parent casting with bolting and metal stitching.
The generator was disassembled and inspected. The light film of oil and fire fighting foam was removed by solvent and dry rag cleaned. A polarization index was performed. The generator was reassembled and the space heater energized.
Broken tubing and supports will be repaired and/or replaced. The turbocharger was disassembled, inspected, cleaned, and any damaged parts will be replaced.
An evaluation and inspection was performed concluding that there was damage to the #2 control rod bearing and turbo thrust bearing which resulted from loss of lubrication while the engine continued to run.
These repairs are being completed under NCR-SM-6732. The forecast completion date for the turbo thrust bearing is February 13, 1987 and the control rod bearing is forecast for completion on February 27, 1987.
Prior to final assembly, the fuel oil system, starting air system, lube oil system, air intake and exhaust system, jacket water system, and cooling water system will be inspected for internal contamination.
Repair will be performed under the PVNGS Site QA program and procedures, repair procedures will be approved by CES, accepted by resident engineering, and converted to step by step work / inspection plans. These plans will be approved by CES, project quality control engineer, project quality assurance engineer, quality engineering, and operations engineering. Completion of each step will be signed by CES and each inspection point accepted by a QC inspector..
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Af ter completion of repairs and final assembly, a three part retesting program will.be performed. In the first part, the diesel will be started, ran for apperximatley 15 minutes and checked for leaks and distress. In the second part, the diesel will undergo 35 consecutive starts and loading to 50% power level, plus other load tests to verify generator performance. Finally, in the third part, the diesel will be.
tested as required by the Final Safety Analysis Report before going into service. CES will verify and recertify that the diesel engine meets seismic and other qualification requirements prior to mode 4 entry.
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TABLE 1 Results of Tensile, Chemical and Hardness Testing of the Master Rod Material l
l Y.S.
I U.T.S 1
l l
l l KSI l
KSI l Elongation l R.A.
l l Tensile Testing -
l l
l l
l l (0.25" dia. specimen)-l 64.7-l-114.00 l
-19%
l -46.8 l
l l
C l S
I P l Si-l Cr l Ni l Mn l Cu l Mo l Al l l Chemical l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
1 l A,nalysis l.48 l.043 l.011 l.25 l.10 l.15 l.71 l.19 l.025 l.03 l Microhardness Testing (500 gram load) l 1
1 I
I I
I lKnoop Hardness l-258 l 255 l 262 l
255 l 258 l l
l I
l l
l l
l Equivalent Rc l
2L l 21 l 22 l 21 l 21 l TAELE 2 Results of Microhardness Testing of Iron Plating l
1 l
Transverse Section l
l l
I I
I l
lKnoophardness l
167 l
169 l
167 l
161 l
l l
l 1
I I
l Equivalent Rn l
81 l
82 l
81 l
79 l
Plated Surface l
l l
l l
l lKnoophardness l
224 l
185 l
180 l
192 l
l l
l 1
l l
l Equivalent Rn l
94 l
86 l
85 l
88 l
l l
l C l S
l P l Si l Cr l Ni l Mn l Cu l Mo l Al l
l l Chemical l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l Analysis 1.032 l.003 l.001 l.015 l l.04 l l
l l.043 l
- -None Detected l
l l
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L
TABLE 3 RESULTS OF LIQUID PENETRANT, ULTRASONIC EXAMINATIONS AND REPAIRED ROD LOCATIONS DIESEL CENERATOR NUMBER I
I I
I I
I I
I l
CYLINDER NUMBER I 1A l 1B 1 2A I
2B l
3A I
3B l
l l
l l
l l
1 I
I 1
1 -
1 -
l UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks l UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks l
I I
I I
I (NS) l l
l l
l l
1 I
I I
I I
2 1 -
1 1 UT No Cracks l UT No Cracks l UT No Cracks
! PT Cracks (IP) l I
I I
I I
I I
I I
3 1 -
I i UT No Cracks * (NS) l UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks l
I I
i l PT I (NS) l I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
4 1 -
1 1 UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks i
I I
I I
I I
I I
I 5
l -
I 1 UT No Cracks l UT No Cracks 1 UT No Cracks 1 UT No Cracks l
I I
I I
I I
I I
I 6
1 -
I -
1 UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks l
I I
I In i
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I l
7 l -
I -
1 UT No Cracks 1 UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks l UT No Cracks I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I 8
I -
I 1 UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks l UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks I
1 I
I I
I I
I I
I 9
l -
1 -
I UT No Cracks (IP) i UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks l Failed (IP) l I
I I
I Pr I (NS) l I
I I
I I
I I
I I
i 10 l -
1 1 UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks i UT No Cracks I
1 I
I I
I I
i
- Some Disbonded Nickel Spray 1
IP - Iron Plating NS - Nickel Spray UT - Ultrasonic Test PT - Dye Penetrant Test i
TABLE 4 1
LIQUID PENETRANT EXAMINATION RESULTS OF MASTER RODS REMOVED FROM ENGINES l
1 1
I ROD LOCATION l
I l
l PVNGS UNIT I
ENGINE l (CYLINDER I NICKEL REPAIR I
ANY BASE l
ANY REPAIR l
l NUMBER l NUMBER I NUMBER) 1 MATERIAL l
METAL CRACKS 7 l MATERIAL PROBLEMS?
I 1
I I
I I
I
.I l
3 I
B l
9 l
IRON l
YES I
YES I
J l
l I
l l
(Fracture)
(cracks) l I
I I
I I
I I
i j
l 3
l B
l 2
I IRON I
YES l
YES l
l l
l l
1 l
l Approximately l
(cracks) 1 1
I I
I i
1 x 3/8-1 I
I I
I I
I l
l i
2 l
A I
9 I
IRON l
NO l
N0 1
I I
I I
I I
l I
I I
I l
l l
l 2
l A
I 3
l NICKEL l
N0 I
YES l
i i
l l
l l
l (small areas of l
4 l
l l
l l
l aisboament)
I i
I i
I i
l l
l 1
2 l
A l
6 I
NONE I
NO l
N/A l
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Turbo Exhaust 3.
Exhause Manifold 10.
Combustion Air Piping s
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Counterveight
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- 12. Centerframe
- 13. Master Rod 6.
Cylinder Block
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Water Inlet Header 7.
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Figure 1 - KSV Diesci Engine for Nuclear Power Plant Se rvice
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- 15. Rod Cap 4.
Washer (4)
- 16. Locknut (4) 5.
Bolt Lock (4)
- 17. Stud (4) 6.
Pin Bolt (4)
- 18. Bear 1=g Shell Bottos 7.
Drake Nut (4)
- 19. Art. Rod Pin 8.
Bolt Lock (2)
- 20. Rod Pin Bolt 9.
Washer (2)
- 21. Bearing Cap (Nuc
- 10. 011 Passage Tightening Sequence)
- 11. Bushing
- 22. Washer
- 12. Dowel Pin (4)
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Figure 2 - Master Connecting Rod and Articulating Rod Assembly 9
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l Figure 3 - Connecting Rod and Bearing 9
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