ML20086R477
| ML20086R477 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1995 |
| From: | ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20086R475 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9507310154 | |
| Download: ML20086R477 (8) | |
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. 1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. The 0.60 La leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.
l 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS
}LL 6.2.1 and 3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM and CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System and the Co'ntainment Cooling System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA or MSLB for any double-ended break of the largest reactor coolant pipe or main steam line. Under post-accident conditions these systems will maintain the containment pressure below 44 psig and temperatures below 269.3*F during LOCA conditions or 413.5'F during MSLB conditions. The systems also reduce the containment pressure by a factor of 2 from its post-accident peak within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, resulting in lower containment leakage rates and lower offsite dose rates.
The Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere under post-LOCA conditions to maintain doses in accordance with 10 CFR Part 100 limits as described in Section 6.5.2 of the FSAR.
In MODE 4 when shutdown cooling is placed in operation, the Containment Spray System is realigned in order to allow isolation of the spray headers.
This is necessary to avoid a single failure of the spray header isolation valve causing Reactor Coolant System depressurization and inadvertent spraying of the containment. To allow for this realienment, the Containment Spray System may be taken out-of-service when RCS pressure is s 400 psia. At this reduced RCS pressure and the reduced temperature associated with entry into MODE 4, the probability and consequences of a LOCA or MSLB are greatly .
reduced. The Containment Cooling System is required OPERABLE in MODE 4 and is j available to provide depressurization and cooling capability.
9507310154 DR 950726 ADOCK 05000382 PDR WATERFORD UNIT 3 B 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. 89
PLANT SYSTEMS ;
BASES 3/4.7.1.2 EMERGENCY FEE 0 WATER SYSTEM ,
The OPERABILITY of the emergency feedwater system ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350*F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss-of-offsite power.
Each electric-driven emergency feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 350 gpa at a pressure of 1163 psig to the entrance-of the steam generators. The steam-driven emergency feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 700 gpa at a pressure of 1163 psig to the entrence of the steam generators. This capacity is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and i reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350*F when the shutdown cooling system may be placed into operation.
l The surveillance requirement to verify the minimum pump discharge pressure on recirculation flow ensures that the pump performance curve has not degraded i below that used to show that the pumps meet the above flow requirements and is consistent with the requirements of ASME Section XIe 3/4.7.1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE POOL The OPERABILITY of the condensate storage pool with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to cool the Reactor Coolant System to shutdown cooling entry conditions (350*F) following any design basis accident. ' Additional makeup water is stored in the wet cooling tower basins providing the capability to maintain HOT STANDBY conditions for at least an additional 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> prior to initiating shutdown cooling. The total makeup capacity also provides sufficient cooling for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> until shutdown cooling is initiated in the event the cooling towers sustain tornado damage concurrent with the accident or if natural circulation cooldown is required. The con-tained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. The l combined capacity is sufficient to maintain the plant at HOT STANDBY for )
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, followed by a cooldown to shutdown cooling entry conditions assuming l the availability of only onsite power or only offsite power, and the worst single failure (loss of a diesel generator or atmospheric dump valve).
This requires approximately 275,000 gallons and complies with BTP RSB 5-1.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 8 3/4 7-2
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES i
A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES. AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel '
generators are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.9 ;
" Selection of Diesel Generator Set capacity for Standby Power Supplies," March 10, '
1971, and 1.108 " Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite I Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, August 1977, and 1.137, " Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators," Revision 1, October 1979.
The provision allowing diesel generator starts utilizing manufacturers' recomended prelube and/or warmup procedures, including longer starting and loading periods, is to minimize stress and wear on the diesel engine and is in accordance with Generic Letter 84-15 concerning Diesel Generator R611ab111ty and Station Blackout. Fast starts from ambient conditions (includes lubricating and warmup systems operating while in standby lineup) at least once every 184 days is in accordance with RRAB PRA analysis of this surveillance. ,
The diesel generator Surveillance testing performed once per 18 months during shutdown is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108, Regulatory Position C.2. !
The maximum voltage limit in Surveillance test 4.8.1.1.2.d.2 was increased to 5023
- volts inGenerators.
Diesel response to NRC Information Notice 91-13; Inadequate Testing of Emergency A maximum voltage limit is provided to ensure that components electrically connected to the diesel generator are not damaged as a result of the momentary voltage excursion experienced during this test.
The Surveillance Requirement for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the station batteries are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129, " Maintenance Testing Februaryand Replacement 1978, of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants,"
and IEEE Std 450-1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and and Substations." Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, connection resistance values and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.
Table 4.8-2 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and gravity. each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and 0.015 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than 0.010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 8-2 AMENDMENT NO. 887 92
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. I BASES l
3/4 6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued) l Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. i The 0.60 La leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the i leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for.all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests. ,,
3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS i
3/4.6.2.1 and 3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM and CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System i ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA or MSLB for any double-ended break of the largest reactor coolant pipe or ,
main steam line. The Containment Spray System consists of two separate trains of equal capacity, each capable of meeting the design bases. Each train includes a containment spray pump, spray headers, nozzles, valves, and piping. Each train is powered from a separate ESF bus. Two trains of Containment Cooling, each capable of removing its design heat load, are '
provided. The Containment Cooling System LC0 requires two independent groups of containment !
cooling fans to be OPERABLE with one fan system to each group. An independent group for the !
Containment Cooling System is defined as two fan coolers that are powered from the same safety bus. Therefore, containment fan coolers "A" & "C" constitute one independent group and containment fan coolers "B" & "D" constitute the other independent group. l Under post-accident conditions these systems will maintain the containment pressure below 44 psig and temperatures below 269.3F during LOCA conditions or 413.5F during MSLB conditions. .
The systems also reduce the containment pressure by a factor of / from its post-accident i peak within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, resulting in lower containment leakage rates and lower ofisite dose rates. j The Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the l containment atmosphere under post-LOCA conditions to maintain doses in accordance with 10 CFR Part 100 limits as described in Section 6.5.2 of the FSAR. !
In MODE 4 when shutdown cooling is placed in operation, the Containment Spray System is realigned in order to allow isolation of the spray headers. This is necessary to avoid a single failure of the spray header isolation valve causing Reactor Coolant System depressurization and inadvertent spraying of the containment. To allow for this '
realignment, the Containment Spray System may be taken out-of-service when RCS pressure is 5; 400 psia. At this reduced RCS pressure and the reduced temperature assnciated with entry into MODE 4. the probability and consequences of a LOCA or MSLB are greatly reduced. The Containment Cooling System is required OPERAB'..E in MODE 4 and is available to provide Depressur1zation and cooling capability.
I i
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 6-3 AMENDMENT NO. 89
f c PLANT SYSTEMS' t u
BASES- !
3/4.7.1.2 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the emergency feedwater system ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350 F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss-of-offsite power.
Each electric-driven emergency feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of 350 gpm at a pressure of 1163 psig to the entrance of the steam ,
generators. The steam-driven emergency feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total !
feedwater flow of 700 gpm at a pressure of 1163 psig to the entrance of the steam i generators. This capacity is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350*F when the shutdown cooling system may be placed into operation.
With one emergency feedwater pump inoperable action must be taken to restore the pump to OPERABLE status withie 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and l in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. [
With two emergency feedwater pumps inoperable the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status the unit must be placed be in at least !
I HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
With three emergency feedwater pumps inoperable the unit is in a seriously degraded i condition with no safety related means for conducting a cooldown, and only limited means for '
conducting a cooldown with nonsafety grade equipment. In such a condition, the unit should r not be perturbed by any action, including a power change, that might result in a trip. The {
seriousness of this condition requires that action be started immediately to restore one j emergency feedwater pump to OPERABLE status. LC0 3.0.3 is not appropriate, as it could ;
force the unit into a less safe condition.
The surveillance requirement to verify the minimum pump discharge pressure on recirculation flow ensures that the pump performance curve has not degraded below that used to show that the pumps meet the above flow requirements and is consistent with the ,
requirements of ASME Section XI. .
3/4.7.1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE POOL i
The OPERABILITY of the condensate storage pool with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to cool the Reactor Coolant System to shutdown cooling ;
entry conditions (350'F) following any design basis accident. Additional makeup water is j stored in the wet cooling tower basins providing the capability to maintain HOT STANDBY !
conditions for at least an additional 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> prior to initiating shutdown cooling. The total makeup capacity also provides sufficient cooling for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> until shutdown cooling is initiated in the event the cooling towers sustain tornado damage concurrent with the 3ccident or if natural circulation cooldown is required. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. The combined capacity is sufficient to maintain the plant at HOT STANDBY for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> followed by a cooldown to shutdown cooling entry conditions assuming the availability of only onsite power or only offsite power, and the worst single failure (loss of a diesel generator or atmospheric dump valve). This requires approximately 275,000 gallons and complies with BTP RSB 5-1.
I WATERFORD - UNIT 3 8 3/4 7-2 l
,. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES l A.C. SOURCES, AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)
The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrcting the OPERABILITY of the diesel !
generators are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.9 " Selection of i Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies." March 10. 1971, and 1.108
" Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, August 1977 and 1.137 " Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators," Revision 1. October 1979. The provision allowing diesel generator starts utilizing manufacturers' recommended prelube and/or warmup procedures. including longer starting and !
loading periods, is to minimize stress and wear on the oid engine and is in accordance with Generic Letter 84-15 concerning Diesel Generator Reliability and Station Blackout.
Fast starts from ambient conditions (includes lubricating and warmup systems operating while in standby lireup) at least once every 184 days is in accordance with RRAB PRA analysis of this surveillance. ]
The diesel generator Surveillance testing performed once per 18 months during shutdown is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108. Regulatory Position C.2.
INSERT A l j
The maximum voltage limit in surveillance test 4.8.1.1.2.d.2 was increased to 5023 volts in response to NRC Information Notice 91-13: Inadequate Testing of Emergency Diesel Generators. A maximum voltage limit is provided to ensure that components electrically connected to the diesel generator are not damaged as a result of the ,
momentary voltage excursion experienced during this test. I The Surveillance Requirement for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of ihe station batteries are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129, " Maintenance Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants," l February 1978, and IEEE Std 450-1980. "IEEE Recommended Practice for Mairtenance.
Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."
Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, corjnection resistance values and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.
Table 4.8-2 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell ,
and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific i gravity. The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and 0.015 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilized at a low value, 1 is cb racteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. The normal limits for I each Jnnected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than !
0.010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 8-2 AMENDMENT NO. 92
t INSERT A Surveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.d.3 and 4.8.1.1.2.d.5 are the integrated testing <
requirethents that demonstrate the as designed operation of the standby A.C. power sources l disring loss of the offsite power source and during a loss of offsite power in conjunction with a Safety injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). ,
The testing verifies ali actinns encountered from the loss-of-offsite power (LOOP), l including shedding of the nonessential loads and the energizing of the emergency busses and respective loads from the diesel generator. It further demonstrates the capability of the !
diesel generators to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the ;
specified time.
The requirement to verify the connection and energization of permanently connected loads and ,
auto-connected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the diesel generators loading logic. Permanently connected loads are those loads that ,
remain connected to the bus upon the bus deenergizing and are subsecuently energized by the !
diesel generators. Auto connected loads are those loads that are disconnected from the bus l upon the bus deenergizing and are auto-connected through the automatic load sequencer.
Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2.d.3b verifies the diesel generators capability to energize the shutdown loads and surveillance 4.8.1.1.2.d.5b verifies the diesel generators capability to !
energize the emergency loads. Shutdown loads are those loads required upon a LOOP (Re: FSAR l Table 8.3.1). Emergency loads are those loads required upon a LOOP in conjunction with an SIAS. This testing verifies that in the event of a Design Bases Accident (DBA) coincident ,
with a loss of offsite power, the diesel generators are capable of supplying the necessary power to Engineered Safety Features (ESF) systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. !
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