ML20085C992
| ML20085C992 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1971 |
| From: | CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20085C988 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8307150415 | |
| Download: ML20085C992 (12) | |
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SR-1 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES NUC11.AR PLANT EEESIAp HEgggi DESCRIPTION OF CAUSE AND CORRECTION OF DAMAGE TO CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISMS AT THE PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT November 1971 1
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Prepared by: Consumers Power Company December 3, 1971 8307150415 711203 PDR ADOCK 05000 S
O O Summary Description of Incident On October 31, 1971 and November 1, 1971, many control rod drive mechanisms (CRDM) sustained internal damage when they were tripped with their hydraulic dashpot regions either dry or only partially filled with water.
Designation of Cause The cause of this incident was inadequate operating procedures in that these procedures did not contain adequate provisions for venting the control rod drive mechanisms after filling the primary coolant system when conducting control rod drive mechanism trip testing at atmospheric pressure.
Plant Conditions at the Time of the Incident
- The reactor coolant system had just been filled, and level was being maintained at 92-995 pressurizer level. This level range corresponds to a level that is several inches above the control rod drive mechanisms' seals. Reactor coolant system pressure was atmospheric and temperature was ambient. The control rod drive mechanism tool flanges were not removed as it was believed that the mechanisms would vent automatically through the control rod drive mechanism seal faces under these conditions.
Detailed Description of the Incident and Subsequent Investigations On October 31, control rod No 1 was drop-tested from 66 inches.
Further testing was delayed due to the inability of the computer drop-time program to function and a problem (later found to be broken gears) in the motor-drive package of control rod drive No 1. The computer program problem was corrected and the motor package replaced with a spare unit. Trip testing for all CRDM was resumed and completed successfully November 1, 1971. The only other unusual occurrence noted during this testing was computer print-out which indicated Rod 27 at less than zero inches. The drive motor was jogged and the rod position indication returned to zero.
On November 3, 1971, control rod drive mechanism No 22 was re-moved from the reactor vessel head for inspection. This inspection was l
prompted by a suspected shift (zero shift) in the inner cylinder of the mechanical energy absorber unit on six CRDM - No 22 being the most 1
Mechanical energy absorber unit is a portion of the piston guide tube. Its only purpose is to dissipate energy in the event of a dry scram.
9 9 2 pronounced. Air pressure was released from the drive housing when the autoclave nut was removed with the water level maintained ,just below the autoclave nut. This indicated that at least CRIM No 22 had not vented through its control rod drive mechanism seal. A displacement of the inner cylinder of the mechanical energy absorber unit of 1-7/8 inches was measured, and the piston guide tube assembly was replaced.
In addition, the motor package on CRIN No 2 was replaced on November 3 due to gear noise.
On November 5, for further verification of proper operation of the control rod drive mechanisms, pressure was raised to 200 psig and trip testing and motor torque testing was resumed. The 200 psig pressure was established to insure that water was in the hydraulic dashpot so that the drives would be decelerated in a normal manner for them to reach their i
lower limits of travel. The results of this testing were normal with one exception - control rod No 27 failed to withdraw. Inspection of the clutch unit removed from CRDM No 27 revealed that the clutch output shaft was broken.
The possible "zero shifts" of six CRDM, the broken clutch adaptor shaft and initial investigations indicated the need for further inspections to be conducted to uncover any possible damage to the control rod drive mechanisms:
- 1. All motor-drive packages were operated and listened to with the aid of a stethoscope.
- 2. All clutch units were removed and inspected at the plant for ,
damage to the clutch output shaft. They were subsequently all returned to the manufacturer for complete disassembly and a detailed inspection of the remainder of the clutch assembly.
3 All of the full-length (trippable) control rod drive mecha-( nisms' internal parts were removed and inspected in detail by the manu-facturer's personnel at the plant. Parts that showed damage were returned to the manufacturer for further inspection and repaired or replaced as necessary.
( 2 The hydraulic dashpot refers to the normal means of decelerating a rod on a trip. It is formed by the letdown nut and piston guide tube. It is effective only if water is in the piston guide tube.
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- 4. Displacement measurements were taken on all mechanical energy absorber units.
5 The reactor vessel head was removed, and all control rods were inspected for possible damage.
The results of these inspections are summarized in Attachment I.
Analysis of Cause and Effects Three causes were considered plausible in the early stages of investigation of this incident:
- 1. The normal operation wear rate was much greater than was contemplated for in the design of the control rod drive mechanism.
- 2. The application of excessive torsional forces by the motor to the drive train by the letdown nut driving against the hardstop due to limit switch failure.
3 Dry trips.
A review of the developmental testing program of the prototype control rod drive mechanisms revealed that this CRDM experienced testing conditions at least as severe as those expected to be experienced by a control rod drive mechanism during a cumulative lifetime of 40 years of normal operation in the Palisades Plant. Inspection of this prototype mechanism, which was used for the life test, revealed no damage similar to the damage observed in the recent inspections of the Palisades' drive mechanisms with the exception of some spalling of the malcomizing coating on the pinion gear teeth.
One of the clutch adaptor shafts that had been twisted was tested to destruction by the manufacturer. The torsional load required for plastic deformation of the shaft was 360 ft-lb, and 380 ft-lb were required to break the shaft. Drive-motor stall torque measurements were also made while driving into hardstop. The motor developed a maximum torque of 150 ft-lb during stall, or less than half that required to deform a shaft. In addition, a test unit was deliberately run into the hardstop several times. Inspection of this unit following these tests revealed no damage to drive mechanisms. It was concluded that the motor j driving a control rod drive mechanism into the hardstop could not be the cause of the damage observed in the control rod drive mechanisms.
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1 Other inspection and test result's confirmed the cause of this incident to be dry scrams due to the improper venting of the control rod drive mechanisms. These inspection and test results included:
- 1. Many piston guide tubes showed movement of the inner cylinder of the mechanical energy absorber.
- 2. Entrapped air escaped from the one unit that was opened im-mediately following the incident and from other units opened later, even with the pressurizer water level maintained ,just below the autoclave nut.
3 Test work was subsequently performed by the manufacturer to duplicate as nearly as possible the conditions experienced in the field and to measure the reaction of the vertical motion assembly (letdown nut, con-nector bolt, rack, rack extension, coupler and control blade) when dry tripped from 66 inches. These test results show a pronounced recoil in the vertical motion assembly. Coupler deformation was observed in these tests.
- 4. The results of metallographic examinations performed on the failed clutch output shaft showed the cause of the failure is due to an impact loading in the outward direction of shaft rotation, the same direc-tion which recoil loading applies.
5 All other defonnations observed in clutch input and output '
shafts were due to a similar loading in outward direction of shaft rotation.
- 6. The impact loading of the drive train also loads the motor gears such that damage could occur as was observed. Meta 11ographic exa-mination of the damaged gears confirmed they were impact loaded in the direction of rotation corresponding to outward control rod motion.
7 Calculations show that the water level could be below the hydraulic dashpot area under the conditions existing at the time.of.this incident, assuming no air laakage through the control rod drive mechanism seal faces.
The inadequate venting of control rod drive mechanisms prior to the trip testing at atmospheric pressure allowed trips to occur with the hydraulic dashpot either dry or inadequately filled with water. As a ,
result of these dry trips, the hydraulic dashpot was ineffective in de-celerating the drive as it approached the hardstop area of the energy
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absorber unit. This allowed many of the CRIN (refer to Attachment I) to impact the hardstops with sufficient energy to overcome the threshold force requirements (15,000-17,000 lbf ) for displacement of the mechanical energy absorber units. The mechanical energy absorber units are installed to preserve the integrity of vertical motion acsembly in the event of an accidental dry trip from a fully withdrawn condition. They are not intended to prevent damage to the vertical motien assembly.
Amplification of Dry Trip Effects Test stand work simulated a dry trip from 66 inches with no hard-stop movement. This work showed that, as the letdown nut impacts the hard-stop, the connector, rack and rack extension elastically elongate much the same as a spring. As the spring forces are released, the test stand mecha-nism rebounds slightly in the outward direction. The outward motion is impeded by the pinion gear and the drive train, fixed at the other end by i
the drive motor gears. It is this resultant outward rotation that causes damage to the drive train of a mechanism; however, if the mechanical energy absorber is displaced downward as the spring-type forces are released, the net motior. of the rack may be either downward or upward, and there may or may not be a torsional force applied to the drive train in the outward rota-tion direction sufficient to cause damage to the clutch or drive motor.
The metallographic examination results of the failed clutch output shaft are attached (Attachment II). These results show that the shaft failed under impact-loading conditions. The impact load was of the nature that the lower end (pinion gear) of the drive train was trying.to rotate in an out-ward direction as described above.
Twistingwasobservedtoclutchinputshaftsand/orclutchout-put shafts on same control rod drive mechanisms (refer to Attachment I) consistent with outward rotation. The gears on two motor-drive units were found damaged from the same cause.
The rebound loads the pinion gear very heavily, causing some a
spalling of the malcomizing coating as was observed on some- of the pinion gear teeth (refer to Attachment I).
1 The coupler used during the dry-trip test stand testing, pre-
- viously described, was damaged to an extent similar to that observed at
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the Plant. During the first test drop, the damage was limited to cracking of the thin webbing between the coupler's fingers. The second dry scram, using the same coupler, caused deformation of the coupler's fingers. Damage to the control rod blade connector load-bearing surfaces in these tests was limited to a slight upsetting of the load-bearing surfaces (includes a slight angular displacement of the tines). Similar damage was observed in the Palisades' control rod blades (summarized in Attachment I) . Under no circumstances, in the field or at the menufacturer's, did a coupler re-lease a rod; ie, the mechanical energy absorber performed its design func-tion of maintaining the integrity of vertical motion assembly.
i The varying degrees of damage found in the individual drives are due to the varying conditions under which the control rod drive mechanisms I
were trip tested on October 31 and November 1,1971, and the number of trips.
The amount of or lack of water available in an individual control rod drive i
mechanisms' hydraulic dashpots was dependent on the amount of air vented through the mechanisms' seals at pressures on the order of several feet of water. Thus, the precise energy status of a drive impacting the hardstop varies between the drives and, as a result, the damage observed varies be-tween individual drives.
Corrective Action As a result of the investigations conducted since this incident occurred, all control rod drive mechanisms have been disassembled and in-spected. All damages to the CRDM have been located and have been or will be corrected prior to further reactor critical operations as follows:
- 1. All twisted clutch output shafts (including the one broken) have been replaced.
i 2. All twisted clutch input shafts have been replaced.
3 The two motor-drive packages with gear damage have been 4
replaced with spare units.
14 The pinion gears showing significant spalling of the mal-l comizing coating on load-bearing surfaces are being replaced.
5 Two bevel gears showed a slight warpage and have been replaced.
- 6. All couplers that showed signs of damage are being replaced.
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7 The four energy absorber units with the maximum displacement will be replaced or repaired. The maximum displacement of a mechanical energy absorber unit remaining upon resumption of reactor critical opera-tions will be 3/4 inch. The effect of a dry trip, if it were to occur again, with these energy absorber units displaced was considered in the safety analysis of the TWX submitted November 16, 1971. It was concluded that this was not a problem with respect to reactor safety.
- 8. Load-bearing surfaces on the control blade's upper end fitting have been inspected for structural integrity and reworked as necessary for proper coupling operation.
Calculations have been made for the air volume trapped in the con-trol rod drive mechanism under varying pressure conditions, assuming the reactor coolant system has ,just been filled and that no venting has occurred.
These calculations show that adequate water level is attained in the drive mechanisms to provide normal drive deceleration by the hydraulic dashpot if the system pressure is maintained at 200 psig or greater. Plant operating and test procedures have been revised to preclude tripping of the drives below 200 psig reactor pressure unless the CR21 tool access tube flanges are removed.
Conclusions The cause of the incident has been positively determined. The control rod drive mechanisms were thoroughly inspected. All damage has been or will be repaired as described earlier in this report.
The adverse environmental conditions under which the control rod drive mechanisms were tripped were due to improper venting of the control rod drive mechanisms. Recurrence of this type of incident will be prevented by current plant operating and test procedures to allow drive-trip testing only if the tool flange is removed and water level is confirmed as being maintained within 6 inches of the tool flange or system pressure is 200 psig or greater.
In summary, Consumers Power Company submits:
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- 1. The cause of this incident has been determined.
l 2. Adequate corrective measures have been taken.
3 The potential for recurrence is negligible.
ATTACHMENT I ,
PALISADES CRDM - DRY-SCRAM INCIDENT 11/71 (Refer to Figure 1) 4 No of Clutch Clutch Coupler Zero Piston Guide Control Scrams Output Input Motor Condition Shift Tube Movement Blade CRDM 10/30- Shaft Shaft Pinion Gear Damage (Degree (By Synchro) (Measured) Hanger No- 11/1/71 Damage Damage Damage (Gears) of Damage) (Inches) (Inches) Damage 1 2 Twist Twist Spalled Jammed Severe -
13/16 Straightened 2 1 Twist Twist Spalled-Bow Noisy Moderate - -
Straightened 3 1 None Twist Spalled None Light -
1/8 None 4 2 None None Minor None None - -
None 5 1 None Twist None None Light -
1/4 None 6 1 None None Minor None None -
11 16 Filed 7 1 None Twist Spalled None Light -
14 Filed i 8 1 None None Minor None Moderate 0.5 38 Straightened
, 9 1 None Twist Spalled None Moderate - -
Straightened 10 1 None Twist Minor None Light -
3/16 None 11 1 None Twist Minor None Light 0.5 5/16 NI i 12 1 None Twist Minor None Light -
3/16 NI 13 1 None None None None Light 1.0 34 Filed 14 2 None None None None None 0.7 34 None 15 2 None Twist Spalled None Moderate - 14 NI 16 1 None Twist Minor None Light -
14 NI g 17 18 1 None Twist Spalled None Light -
1/6 NI T 1 None None None None None 09 15/16 NI 19 1 None None None None None - -
NI 20 1 None Twist Spalled-Bow None Light - -
NI
- 21. 1- None Twist Minor None . Light 05 - None 22 2 None None None None None 19 1-7/8 None
. 23 1 Twist Twist Spalled None Light -
Filed i 24 2 Twist Twist Spalled None Moderate 18 Filed 25 1 None Twist Minor None None 05 12 Filed 26 1 None Twist Spalled None Severe -
3/6 Straightened
. 27 2 Broken Twist Spalled None Severe - - Ncae 4
28 1 None None None None Light - - None 29- 1 None None None None None 1.1 13/16 NI 30 1 Twist Twist Spalled None Light - - NI 4
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ATTACHMENT II ,-
PALISADES CRDM - DRY SCRAM INCIDENT 11/71 (Refer to Figure 1) (Contd)
No of Clutch Clutch Coupler Zero Piston Guide Control Scrams Output Input Motor Condition Shift Tube Movement Blade CRDM 10/30- Shaft Shaft Pinion Gear Damage (Degree (By Synchro) (Measured) Hanger No 11/1/71 Lamage Damage Damage (Gears) of Damage) (Inches) (Inches) Danage 31 1 None Twist Minor None Medium - - NI O
32 1 Slight Twist Minor None Light -
1/8 NI 33 1 Slight Twist Minor None None - 14 None 34 1 None None Spalled None Light - 14 None 35 1 None None None None Severe -
3/8 Filed 36 1 Slight Twist Minor None None 0.6 1/4 None 37 1 Slight Twist Spalled None Light - -
NI 38 1 None Trist Spalled None Light - - None 39 3 None Twist Spalled None Severe 1.3 1-1/16 Straightened 40 2 None Twist Spalled None Light 0.5 9/16 NI 41 1 Slight Twist Spalled None Light -
1/16 NI 42 NA)
Part-length rods cannot be tripped.
45 NA)
Notes:
Slight indicates keyway upsetting only.
Light indicates thin webbing between coupler fingers is cracked.
Moderate indicates coupler webbing cracking and some deformation.
Severe indicates coupler webbing cracking and deformation interfered with mechanism removal.
Spalled indicates spalling of malcomizing coating on pinion gear teeth load bearing surfaces - replaced.
Minor indicates light chipping of malcomizing coating primarily on crowns of pinion gear teeth - not replaced.
Spalled-bow indicates same as spalled with bowing of bevel gear - replaced.
Straightened indicates tines required straightening.
Filed indicates edges of load bearing portion of tines required dressing up.
NI indicates not yet inspected as of 1600 December 2,1971.
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.. ATTACHMENT II FAILURE ANALYSIS OF CLUTCH ADAPTER SHAFTS -
PART NO. SE-2855-9 PALISADES CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISMS A failure analysis was conducted on some failed clutch adapter shafts from the Palisades Control Rod Drive Mechanisms. The probable cause of failure was the imposition on the shaft, at the keyway, of a high impact type load or torque.
This shaft is made of AISI 4140 steel heat treated to Rc 38 We have examined six of these components which typically exhibited deformation about the lower keyway as shown in Figure 1. However, one shaft'actually sheared completely off in the keyway (Figure 2). The deformation observed is fully consistent with the previously outlined mechanism of deformation.
Macrohardness checks of.the material of the sheared shaft showed hardnesses of from Rc 37 - 38 on a transverse cross section to Rc 39 41 on the shaft surface. Meta 11ographic examination of the alloy revealed a typical tempered martensite structure (Figures 3 and 4). The chemical analysis of the material is given below.
Mn P Si Cr Mo S C 0.66 0.017 0.223 0.65 0.163 0.026 0.426 This conforms to the AISI composition limits. The material appears to be as specified on the drawing CND-SE-2855.
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