ML20078P702

Investigative Rept

ML20078P702
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	01/27/1995
From:	Sheridan M, Staley P, Wilson M CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML20078P701	List: ML20078P695 ML20078P702
References
NUDOCS 9502170191
Download: ML20078P702 (55)

Text

PALISADES PLANT INVESTIGATIVE REPORT Dated: January 27,1995 Michael G. Wilson MichaelJ.Sheridan P. Leni Staley Charlotte A. Walls 9502170191 950127 PDR ADOCK 05000255 '

F PDR

l INTRODUCTION l l

On December 21,1994, Roy J. Camano, Chief of the Region III Reactor Support Programs Branch for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"), wrote to the Palisades Plant l

Manager regarding Physical Security Concerns at Palisades. An attachment to that letter, which  ;

is considered exempt from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790, references an incident l

which occurred on December 9,1994 at Palisades involving a lieutenant and an armed security officer, both employees of Burns Security Services. More particularly, the NRC received a report that a lieutenant had stabbed an officer with a pen. Another incident involving a physical attack by the same lieutenant was also alleged to have occurred on an unknown date. )

"Ihe NRC requested that a thorough review of these allegations be conducted by l l

someone independent of the security organization. Consumers Power Company (" Consumers", .

"the Company" or " Licensee") was directed to investigate the facts of these specific allegations, as well as other similar events.

l In addition to the specific events of physical altercations involving this lieutenant, the attachment to the letter indicated that several security personnel are concerned about keeping their jobs if they report incidents such as this or other security problems to Licensee security management. The NRC therefore directed that the investigation include the broader question of whether there has been a " chilling effect" which keeps people in the security force from reporting safety or security concerns out of fear of retribution.

The December 21,1994 letter specifically requested that the Company's response contain no personal privacy, proprietary or safeguards information so that the response can be released to the public and placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

The NRC letter dated December 21,1994 was forwarded to the Consumers Power Legal Department on December 29,1994. "Ihe Company's Senior Vice President and General Counsel dedM that Michael Wilson, an attorney with experience in other investigations, should meet promptly at the Plant with the Plant Manager and the Vice President of Nuclear Operations to get a general understanding cf wim had occurred, and to initially detemune whether an investigation of the type being requested was within the capabilities of the Company's Legal Department.

Mr. Wilson visited the Palinde Plant on Tuesday, January 3,1995 and, over the course of several hours, met with the Plant Manager, the Vice President of Nuclear Operations, the Administrative Manager, and the Property Protection Superintendent. Upon his return to the Company's General Office in Jackson, Mr. Wilson met with his General Counsel and a determination was made that the Legal Department was qualified to conduct the investigation requested by the NRC.

By a memo dated January 5,1995, Consumers' General Counsel informed the Plant i

Manager that the Legal Department was willing to conduct an investigation that would be kept l

independent of not only the Burns Security organization, but of Plant Management as well. A copy of that memo is attached as Exhibit 1 to this report. Michael Wilson was assigned to lead ,

1 the investigative team. With the assistance of the General Counsel, three other experienced attorneys were recruited to assist in conducting the inv'estigation. Those three attorneys are Michael Sheridan, P. Leni Staley, and Charlotte Walls.

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i THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM Michael Wilson, who was assigned to lead the invesugative team, has 14 years $

expenance as a IM-~ for Consumers Power C&y, handling both plaintiff and defense work covering a broad range of substantive law areas. None of that work, however, involved the Palinds Plant. This litigation experience, of necessity, requires the development of invesugative skills. Mr. Wilson conducted a high profile investigation requested by a federal regulatory agency involving a licensed hydroelectric generating facility in the summer of 1992.

An extensive iriWat report was authored by Mr. Wilson and filed with the Federal Energy 1 i

Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). The FERC was highly complimentary of both the thoroughness and the candor of that report.  !

i Michael Sheridan, a lawyer with seven years experience, has been employed as a  !

litigation attorney at Consure:s Power Company since 1992 and also handles both plaintiff and  !

defense work. Prior to joining Consumers Power, Mr. Sheridan worked for four years as an assistant prosecutor in both Oakland and Macomb Counties in Michigan. Mr. Sheridan is well-versed in both civil and criminal law, having also conducted grand jury investigations. In addition, he worked closely with Mr. Wilson in all phases of the prior investigation mentioned above.

Leni Staley has been employed as an attorney at Consumers Power Company for almost five years. Her expertise includes a broad rarige of employment and labor issues, including questions arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the civil rights laws. She also participates in labor arbitration (grievance) heanngs, unemployment compensation hearings and regularly interviews witnesses and others for a wide 3

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variety oflabor and employment matters. Prior to becoming an attorney, for approximately five years, she managed a section consisting of 20-30 employees in the State of Michigan Department of Social Services. Ms. Staley has also spent three years early in her career as a claims investigator / analyst for Aetna Ufe & Casualty Company.

Charlotte Walls has been employed as an attorney at Consumers Power for over seven years. Her substantive expertise lies in ERISA employee benefit inues, EEO issues, including allegations of sex and race discrimination, and virtually any question relating to employee compensation. Her experience includes conducting investigations into all of the above matters when particular questions have arisen.

INDEPENDENCE OF THE INVESTIGATION ne NRC made it clear in its letter of December 21, 1994 that the investigation which it was requesting should be independent of the security organization at Palisades. While

" security organization" could have been interpreted narrowly to mean " Bums Security", the Licensee chose to read it more broadly and informed the Legal Department that the investigation would be kept independent of Plant Management as well. The letter from the General Counsel to the Plant Manager (Exhibit 1) reinforces that concept. The investigators took that charge senously, remaming cognizant throughout the investigation of the need for a thorough fact-fmding, and of being free from influence from any outside sources. The investigators are confident that the conclusions of this report are logical, and are based upon a thorough analysis of the extensive raw data which was gathered. If the NRC chooses to review that data, the expectation is that the NRC would reach the same conclusions.

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I Burns Security had conducted its own investigation into the December 9,1994 incident, and a copy of the repon generated by the Burns' investigator was made available to the legal %w.t team by Consumers Power's Palisades Administrative Manager. His investigation in no way rclied upon the Burns investigation, which was much narrower in scope. .

While the mere fact that an investigation is being conducted creates a certain amount of anxiety and tension, the investigators, for the most part, found that both the Burns employees ,

and the Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant employees were open, cooperative, courteous and professional in the interactions which took place during the course of the investigation. No attempts were made by anyone to influence the contents of this repon or to in any way restrict its candor.

SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION It was anticipated at the outset that the NRC's letter of December 21,1994 would largely define the scope of the investigation. However, before the investigation was even underway, the investigators learned that a third Burns employee, not a pany to the December 9 stabbing incident, had been discharged. The investigators received numerous comments from the employees interviewed concerning that individual, and would consider this repon incomplete 1

without a discussion of that individual and the impact that person's discharge has had on the security work force. .

his report will therefore address the following issues:

a) a description and analysis of the December 9,1994 incident involving the lieutenant and the security officer; covering the specific requests itemized in the attachment to the December 21,1994 letter from the NRC; 5

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l b) a description and assalysis of other incidents involving these two individuals; I c) a dimen==iaa of the third Burns employee who was discharged on January 5, i 1995; l

d) a dimen==ina of whether any of the above incidents or other incidents have led to a chilling effect which inhabits people from freely reparung safety or security concerns; and c) conclusions.  ;

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INVESTIGATION CHRONOIDGY AND MET 110DOIDGY l After the initial meenng at the Patienda Plant on January 3,1995, and after being officially assigned to conduct the investigation, Michael Wilson and Michael Shendan returned l

to Palisades for a full day, on Friday, January 6,1995 to begm the process of reviewing and J copying documents, scheduling interviews, arranging for work space at the plant, and taking care of other administrative details. Mr. Wilson was given training by the Burra Administrative Manager on the proper handling of safeguards information in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21, which included a had lesson plan, followed by a written examination. In addition, in  :

conjunction with the safeguards training, Mr. Wilson was fingerprmted and completed the r-* y forms for a criminal history check, as required by 10 CFR 73.57. It should be noted at this point that Mr. Wilson reviewed in detail the entire file which was generated as a result of this investigation and is confident that no safeguardt information has been produced or ,

disclosed. The training was nonetheless essential in terms of an awareness of the duty and the i

need to protect safeguards information, and it was readily apparent that such pivisction is taken most seriously by everyone at Palisades and Burns. After receiving his training, Mr. Wilton i

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did not deem it necesary for the three anorneys who assisted in the investigation to receive such l 1

REEIRIEg-  !

l Thmughout the course of the investigation, but on a more intennve basis at the outset, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Sheridan reviewed thousands of pages of documents and obtained l

copies of hundreds of those -f-:-:"==ts. Among the documents reviewed, set forth below in no particular order, were the followmg: 1 Safeguards reporting matrix; i

Safeguards information program;  !

i Safeguards lesson plan; Security accident reports; Safety meetmg minutes; e

Maintenance surveys;

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All Burns inculent reports on file; '

All Burns discipline logs on file; Burns organization charts and employee lists; l Palisades Plant organization chart;  ;

1 All correspurdcr.cc on file from Bums to Consumers or vice versa; Complete " Burns files" of the Palisades Plant Fipsy Protection Supenntendent, the Palisades Plant Senior Fiwiy Protection Operanons Supervisor, and the Palisades Pladt Pipiy Protection Operations Supervisor, who are the three principal Consumers Power employees who interface with Burns on a day-to-day basis; Complete personnel files of the two employees involved in the December 9 incident, and of the employee who was discharged on January 5,1995; 7

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l C@ personnel file of anathar Burrs employee who is known to . .li ly suport things to the NRC; Minutes or notes of Burns employee meetings; -

i uaman or notes relating to backshiR visita;  :

l Burns investigation file and report on the December 9 incident; l

Notes or maman relating to self-assessment; .

1 Contract between Burns and Consumers for security services at Palisades; i

Equipment out of-service logs;

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Burns lieutenant meeting minutes; Memo dim =I- g worker tumover at Burns; Burns performance objectives; Fitness for Duty procedures handout, and memoranda; Monthly resumes from Palisades Plant Fiwiy Protection Supenntendent , ,

Policies and procedures regarding logging of safeguards events; '

Burns nuclear security officer profiles discussing desirable and undesirable

. traits; 1 1

1 Palisades Plant brochures regarding general employee training, emergency preparedness, and "How Nuclear Power Works";

l Michigan state police report of the December 9,1994 incidenti l Mierellan=a memos and clippings containing positive comments about the security force; Documentation of Fitness for Duty testing of the two individuals involved in the December 9,1994 incident; Medical injury repon from the treating physician on the December 9,1994

• stab wound;" and 8

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h===*= relating to compliance with the ree*= of 10 CFR 73.56 for the employee diar *arged on January 5,1995.

Dunng the visit on January 6,1995 an interview schedule was arranged for the four I I

invesdgators to conduct interviews on January 9,10 and 11,1995. In addih, Michael Wilson l dmAnd a memo which Burns management released on Burns letterhead to all s.As on Friday, January 6,1995, explaining the investigation and encouraging people to cooperate. A copy of that memo to employees is attached as Exhibit 2 to this report.

In addition to the numerous documents reviewed at the plant, as itemized above, Mr.

Wilson familiarned himself with certain laws and other background information before designing the invesuganon. Among the things he reviewed were the following: j l

The Michigan Whistle-Blower's Protection Act (MCLA 15.361 et seq) and  !

cases decided thereunder; 42 USC 5851 govermng " employee pmtection" and cases Mdad t.%w.ds, l

Commerce Cleanng House Nuclear Regulation Reports; Miscellaneous NRC Regulations found in 10 CFR; and Michigan law and cases on assault and battery (MCLA 750.81 et seq).

On January 9,1995, the first day of conducting interviews, Michael Wilson, along with the Palisades Plant Manager, and a Pr.lisades Plant Staff Licensing Engineer, spoke by telephone with Mr. Terry Mededa, the NRC Inspector from Region III who is responsible for Palisades, and outlined the proposed scope of the investfgative process. Mr. Mededa was in general agreement with the scope which was outlined, and offered the following additional 'nput:

a) It is important that the people being interviewed are re-assured that the information disclosed in the interviews will be kept confidential:

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i b) All daen==== generated as a result of the investigation should be kept at the rienneme's .

General Office in Jackson and retained for a l minimum of one year; .!

c) De " chilling effnes' concern relates to whether people feel free to report safety or ,

security concerns without fear of retnbution of  :

any kind; d) The report should explain how the investigation was kept iPht of the i security organisation as well as the scope and i investigative methods used; and e) We should attempt to write the report in such l

a manner that it does not have to be controlled  ;

under the confidentiality rules of 10 CFR l 2.790.

Finally, as further backgmund information, Michael Wilson reviewed documents which reflect whistle-blower or "chdling effect" investigations at other nuclear power plants, including  !

Northern States Power Company's Prairie Island Plant and Florida Power Corporation's Crystal

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River Plant. Both of those files involved employees of Burns Security.

The investigators were advised, second hand, that the NRC would like to see a sample size of at least 15 50% of the work force interviewed in order to get an appropriate feel or grigtive for the atmosphere at Pah=W. In the interest of thoroughness,100% of the present Burns work force was interviewed as part of this investigation, from the Post Commander on down to part-time, unarmed security officers. In addition, tape-recorded interviews of both empioyees involved in the December 9 incident, who have since been discharged, were conducted off-site. A tape-recorded interview was also conducted of the now-retired former Post Commander. As an example of the comprehensive nature of this i

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invesagation, Michael Shendan travelled 40 miles to the home of a Burns empkys who wa off work on medical leave to interview him after he indiatert in a telephone conversation that  !

I he would like to be included in the investigation. 'Ihe only person with whom the investigators did not speak and who may have information relevant to this invesn&stion was the Burns employee whose employment was termmated on January 5,1995. The invesugators left a message on that person's answermg whim (which was recorded and raained) asking that person to contact them if he/she would like to be included. That "!-;d=+ call was not i i

returned.

j For most employee interviews, the investigators used a standard 19 page interview summary in order to explore the chilling effect aspects of the investigation. A sample blank copy of that interview summary is anached as Exhibit 3. 'Ihat interview summary was MW by the investigators in advance of the investigation, without input or participation from anyone else; and was not reviewed with or even shown to Bums management or Palisades Plant -

1 Management. As can be seen from Exhibit 3, there is ample room for comments on the standard interview summary form, and the investigators, using their legal skills, in fact elicited and recorded voluminous comments from the people interviewed. Prior to starting each )

interview, a standard introduction was given to the interviewees in an effort to make them feel at ease and to assure their frank responses. A copy of the standard interview introduction is attached as Exhibit 4. .

After providing the standard introduction and conducting the interviews, the investigator's notes were reviewed with each interviewee, and any changes or additions were made at that time. When the interviewee was satisfied that the investigator's notes accurately 11

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reflected and ====riand the conversation, the interviewee was anled to sign the nimmary form. Out of 69 people who were interviewed usmg the standard form, only one person refused to sign the form at the conclusion of the meerview. That person merely my.M

• private reasons' which were not revealed to the invesagator. Once the ::ummaries were signed, no  !

further comments or writing of any kind was made on those papers. The summanes have l

=miw in ths custody of the investigators and have not been reviewed by anyone but them. l In addition to the 69 people interviewed using the mandard interview forms, tape-l l

recorded interviews were conducted of 17 other individuals, and verbatim transcripts have been i

Prepared of those interviews. The original tapes have been retamed in the investigative file. The tape-recorded interviews are more in-depth than the standard interview forms, with the thought being that a broader range of issues should be explored with key managerial people at both i

Burns and Consumers. The persons from whom taped statements were taken and transcripts prepared are the following: -

Consumers Vice President of Nuclear Operations (CPCo);

Palisades Plant Manager; (CPCo);'

Palisades Administrative Manager (CPCo);

Palisades Property Protection Superintendent (CPCo);

Palisades Senior Propeny Protection Operations Supervisor (CPCo);  !

i Palisades Piwif Protection Operations Supervisor (CPCo);

Palisades Access Authorization Administrator (CPCo);

Palisades Human Resources Director (CPCo);

Palisades Senior Human Resources Administrator (CPCo);

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Burns Operations n' - ;- (who conducted Burns investigadan of the l

nar==dwr 9 incident) (Burns);  !

Palisades Post Co amander (Burns);

Adminie= rive Manager (Burns);

Security Shift Izader, B Shift (Burns); i Security Shift Imader, C Shift (Burns); j Former Post Commander, now retired (Burns);

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!)eutenant involved in December 9 incident (Burns); and Security Officer involved in December 9 incident (Burns).

Most of the interviews took place in heated but vacant trailers in front of the

,j Administration Building at Palisades. Offices with closed doors were used so that someone l passing through could not hear the conversations which were taking place. '

l The lieutenant who was involved in the December 9 incident would only talk to the  !

investigators in the presence of an attorney. Michael Wilson therefore travelled 44 miles to a  !

l law office in Allegan, Michigan to conduct that taped-interview. 'Ihe security officer involved l

l in the December 9 incident and the retired Post Commander were both interviewed (separately) l I

by Michael Wilson, off-site, at Consumers Power Company's South Haven Conference Center, l located approximately 10 miles away from the Plant.

The investigators worked together as a team and put in long hours on January 9,10 and 11 so that people from all three shifts could be included in the investigation. It is believed that the design and implementation of the investigation plan worked well to get a true reading of the attitudes, giw%ons and concerns of the entire Burns Security work force at Pahsades.

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TIIE pECEMBER 9.1994 INCIDENT Shardy before 7:00 AM on December 9,1994, a lieutenant who was working as a ,

diep.erk in the ID station (her=ia=hr referred to as "L-D*), informed a security officer ("S-0") over the radio of the times at which the S-O's lighting checks were scheduled while on patrol. The S-O did not hear the radio transnussion and did not respond. The L-D tried the radio a second time and the S-O did not respond. Instead, the S-O went to the ID station where the L-D was located and used the S-O's photo badge to enter. Early morning is particularly busy for the L-D on duty because of change of shift, and on this morning, the L-D was  ;

pr-aim with filling out rotation sheets and other paperwork.

Upon entering the ID station, the L-D asked the S-O if the S-O had heard the radio i transmission and the S-O replied in the negative. The S-O then asked what time the lighting checks were and was informed by the L-D that the S-O should have been paying attention to the radio. The L-D then continued working on paperwork. l l

The S-O had turned off his/her radio upon entering the ID station, purportedly due to static feedback when the hand-held radio is in close proximity to the base radio. While in the l I

ID station, the S-O heard a radio transmission directed to the S-O from the operator in the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS), askmg for the S-O's radio number. The S-O reached above the console where the L-D was working and responded tothe SAS operator using the ID station intercom. No physical contact was made when the S-O reached above the L-D's head, but while doing so, the S-O noticed that the paper on which the S-O's lighting checks were listed was in the stack of papers on which the L-D was working, about four down in the stack. Without 14

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asking the L-D's permission or forewarning the L-D in any way, the S-O grabbed the lighting '

l check paper out of the stack of papers in such a manner that it gave the L-D a paper cut on l

the arm. 'Ihe S-O then taunted the L-D, saying "Ha, ha, serves you right. You got a paper cut. -

l At that point the L-D became very angry and spun around in the chair and began to approach the S-O in a hostile manner with a pencilin hand and attempted to stab the S-O with the point of the pencil. The S-O grabbed the extendad wrist to avoid being stabbed with the  !

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pencil and demanded that the L-D " Quit!". 'Ihe L-D then changed hands with the pencil and  !

stabbed the S-O twice in the right arm, causing a superficial puncture wound and a two-inch i e c scratch. The incident was witnessed by another security officer who reported that the S-O l t

being stabbed with the pencil did not retaliate in any way. 'Ihere are conflicting stories by l people who saw the wounds as to whether or not the stabbing with the pencil drew blood. The investigators conclude that the stabbing with the pencil did, in fact, draw blood. While the -  :

5 doctor who treated it with a topical antibiotic described the wound as " superficial", it was l i

nonetheless described as a " puncture" wound. 'Ihe investigator who conducted the internal j investigation for Burns also concluded that the stabbing with the pencil had drawn blood. i Immediately following the stabbing incident, the S-O became angry and words were j exchanged between the S-O and the L-D, including a claim by the S-O that what the L-D had i done constitutes felonious assault. It is noteworthy that the S-O works during off-hours as a  !

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reserve police officer for the City of South Haven, and claims a familiarity with various criminal l

laws. While the stabbing incident was clearly unjustified, it would not constitute felonious  ;

assault under Michigan law. 'Ihat question is of more than mere academic interest, i

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l Some people, including at least one Burns lieutenant, expressed concem about whether it was "one-hour +rsle" to the NRC. After reviewing the Safeguard Reporung Matrix and Michigan law on assault and banery, the investigators conclude that this was not a one-hour reportable incident. According to page 25 of the Reporting Matrix, criminal acts committed on-site are one-hour report ble only if they constitute a felony. Under MCLA 750.81, acts of assault and batterf are considered a misdemeanor unless some other l

specific punishment is prescribed. Stabbing with a pencil would not rise to the level of a felony  !

l under any of the statutes reviewed.  :

After a state police report was made of the incident on the day it happened, the matter was referred to the Van Buren County Prosecutor for review on a charge of aggravated assault. On January 4,1995, the Prosecutor decided that he would not bring any charges against the L-D and the matter was considered closed as of that date.

Prior to the time that either Bums or Consumers could make a report to the NRC, at least one anonymous report of the incident had been made to the Resident Inspector, and he came to the Consumers Fregiy Protection Department to inquire about the incident. The investigators do not question that Consumers would have promptly we ersi the incident to the NRC, even if the anonymous reports had not been made.

Within minutes of the pencil stabbing incident, the S-O who was stabbed reported it to the Security Shift I.mder (SSL). De S-0, the SSL, arid the L-D caen completed a sepamte Burns incident report. The SSL relieved the L-D of duties at the ID station and the L-D was sent to the area of the Burns Post Commander's office, frequently referred to as the "back room."

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De S-O who was stabbed was sent to make regular wisy rounds. In the meantime, the SSL reported the incident to the Post Commander and had a disminnian with him about whether it was a one-hour reportable. The Post Commander then went in his omce with the Burns Adminierrative Manager and closed the door. Apparently, between the two of them, they damM it was not one-hour reportable. Upon emerging fmm the omce, the Post Commander requested that the SSL find a r=1-t for the L-D for that day. De SSL innierad that the L-D should be disarmed right away under these circuentmanen but was overruled by the Post Commander, who instructed the SSL to leave the L-D alone until relief came in.

At approximately 9:00 AM, two hours after the incident, the L-D was informed of his/her suspension and was sent home, and the L-D's photo key card was pulled and de-programmed.

At approximately 10:30 AM, with the permission of the SSL, the S-O who had been

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stabbed left the site to receive medical treatment. On the way to the medical facility, the S-O stopped at the Michigan state police post in South Haven and made a report of the incident. The state police trooper photographed the injuries, and then conducted follow-up interviews with the L-D at home and with the Burns Post Commander at Palisades.

The Post Commander informed the trooper that the incident was getting out of hand and that the L-D was suspended for at least a week.

Among the questions in the attachment to the*NRC's letter of December 21,1994 is whether there was compliance with the NRC's fitness-for-duty (FFD) requirements. The investigators reviewed documents showing that both employees involved in the December 9 altercation were referred to Shoreline Clinic in South Haven for FFD tests on December 9 and 17

the results of those tests were negative. Both employees confirmed that they took the breathalyzer and unnalysis tests on Decemher 9 and that the results were negative, and there was j l

nothing revealed dunng the course of the investigation which would cause the investigators to question that. Derefore, Fitness-for-Duty will not be die =d further in this report. I When the S-O returned to work after seeking medical treatment and after making l

the police report, the S-O was rhneiwwi by the Post Commander for making a police report "on company time."

When the S-O left work at approximately 3:00 PM on December 9, the S-O did not 1

know he/she had also been suspended. When the S-O arrived home there was a message on the answering machine to call the union steward. When the S-O did so, the S-O leamed of the suspension, but was told that the suspension was only pending the results of the FFD tests. On the 19th of December, the S-O, with a union representative present, met with the Post Commander at a local restaurant and was informed that the S-O's employ:nent was being terminated for fighting. It should be noted that " Fighting on Duty" is one of the standard boxes which can be checked on the Burns " Notice of Termination of Einployment" form, but that box was not checked on the form which was completed for the S-O. Rather, the box which was checkrxi is " Violation of Company Rules and Policies", and there are no comments written in the remarks section of that form.

He L-D involved in the December 9 incident was also terminated on December 19, i

1994, also for " Violation of Company Rules and Policies", and again with no remarks on the l Notice of Termination.

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l O'ITIER INCIDFNTS The L-D involved in the December 9 inimt was involved in a prior physical aherention with this same S-O apprei=*-ly one year earlier. In the earlier incident, which occurred in the weapons room in the presence of numerous other Burns employees, the S-O was the aggressor. The S-O's version of the story is that the S-O was attempting to show the L-D a police hold and twisted the L D's arm behind the back. It appears that the S-O applied considerable pressure and the L D stabbed the S-O with a pen in order to force the S-O to let i 30.

'Ihe L-D claims to be unaware of any discussion at the time about showing a police hold and recalls that the S-O came up and twisted the L-D's arm out of the blue with no forewarnmg. Having observed the demeanor of both individuals, and having spoken with other witnesses, the L-D's version of the prior incident is more credible. For example, when asked to explain the " police hold" in more detail, the S-O admitted that the S-O had received no -

special training in how to apply such a hold.

The arm-twisting incident was not documented in any Burns incident reports at the time it occurred. Virtually everyone who was asked agreed that it probably should have been.

The L-D claims to have reported it verbally to the SSL, but the SSL denies ever receiving such a report. According to the SSL, there would have been no reason nel to document it if the SSL had been aware ofit, particularly with this L-D who has

• friends" in the back room. Judging by the other incident reports which were reviewed, it is doubtnl that the arm-twisting incident was reported to the SSL when it occurred.

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The L-D involved in the December 9 incident is well known for a quick temper.

By the L D's own admianina, when another officer was taunting the L-D while the L-D was trying to est lunch, the L-D responded by striking the ofker in the arm and kicking the officer l in the shins. The officer involved in that inndmt is no longer employed at Palisades.

Another officer informed the investigators that he was stabbed with a pen by this same L-D but did not report it because he felt it would do no good. His perception is that artain people are protected and the back room would just " blow it off."

Many of the people who were interviewed were also aware of an incident in which this L-D became angry and threw " white-out" all over a control panel in an alarm station. The L-D's performance appraisals, while generally positive in terms of an ability to perform thejob, i also reflect that management was aware of the L-D's temper and mood swings at least as early as 1982 with r-M references to these traits since that time. t The S-O involved in the December 9 incident has also been involved in other -

incidents of employee misconduct, including a physical altercation that turned irto a shoving match with another lieutenant. The S-O's personnel file also reflects a temper problem noted in 1987 ad some incidents which could be classified as horseplay.

EVALUATION OF DECEMBER 9 INCIDENT AND OTHER INCIDENTS Having spoken with everyone who was directly involved, as well as those who are relying upon second-hand information, it is this investigation's conclusion that the L-D involved in the December 9 incident acted in an entirely inappropriate and unpmfessional manner and that i l

termination of the L-D's employment was justified. To make that statement is by no means an  ;

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endorsement of how Burns management has ranjaad~i to other incidents involving this same individual. In fact, the lack of a harsher response to earlier incidents may well have fostered the L-D's belief that he/she could get away with anything.

Dere is a strong sentiment among the Burns work force, as opposed to Burns management, that the "back room" was afraid of this L-D, partly because of a general belief that the L-D had made allegations in the past about sexual harassment and sex discrimination.

Whatever merit there may be to those allegations is beyond the scope of this investigation.

Nonetheless, Bums management has no convincing justification for a failure to deal with other disciplinary problems, including ftquent displays of a quick temper by the L-D.

Contributing to this " hands off' sentiment is the fact that the L-D is best friends with the Burns Administrative Manager who appears to have considerable influere in the back suom.

When the Post Commander is away, the Burns Administrative Manager is usually the person in charge of the entin: security force. De investigators are not suggesting that management should .

attempt to control friendships among employees. It is essential to good morale, however, that discipline for misconduct be applied in a fair, consistent, and even-handed manner to all people involved in similar incidents, regardless of whom they know. That has clearly not been the policy with this L-D.

As for the other person involved in the December 9 incident, the S-O does not have a clean state in terms of work record, but with the exception of the other physical altercations, the prior misconduct does not appear to have been of a serious nature. If the fate of this S-O j l

was to be determined by holding an election among the Bums employees at Palisades, there ,

would be a landslide vote saying the S-O was unjustly terminated. While there is a small faction 1

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that is syn =tha+ic to the L-D, the vast majority of employees who commented on the December 9 incident believe that the S-O was a " victim", and that the S-O's employment was wrongfully terminated by Burns. Here is a further strong sentiment among the work force at large, that the S-O was terminated because of the L-D'r .onnections to the back room. Finally, the fact that the S-O made a report to the state police is perceived as the factor which tipped the scales in the decision to terminate employment.

De investigators believe that the S-O exaggerated the extent of the injuries; that those injuries did not necensrily require medical treatment; and that the S-O purposely blew the entire incident out of proportion, including the report to the state police in order to make a point.

The S-O was nonetheless a victim of an unjustified act of aggression, and the S-O's actions on December 9, in isolation, would not seem to justify termination by Burns of an eight year employee. I The investigators fully recognize that employment decisions are not made by popular _

vote. Indeed, hiring and firing decisions are beyond the scope of this investigation. Here might well have been other factors that went into the Burns management's decision to terminate the S-O. However, the investigators' perceptions are that if this S-O is not reinstated, Burns management faces an enormous communications hurdle to restore confidence among this work force. There are very strong feelings that this S-O's termination was unjust and that it was directly related to the favored-status of the person with whom the S-O had the altercation. The perception is also strong that making a police report about the incident was the clincher in the decision to fire the S-O.

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11tE JANUARY 5 TERMINATION As noted above, the December 9 incident appears to have pmmpted the leaer of rh 21,1994 requesting an invesagation. However, the interview summaries in the investigation file are replete with comments about the officer who was fired on January 5,1995.

This report would simply not be complete without a di== ion of that officer. De investigators regret that the officer chose not to return their phone call so he/she could participate in this investigation. Hey believe, however, that they have a fair appreciation for this officer's personality fmm a review of records and fmm what others have reported.

De officer is single, with no danaadants, 55 year: of age, and has a bachelors  ;

degree in sociology from a state university. ne officer has been described as " eccentric", "a  !

t loner", "very emotional" and " quick-tempered." The officer has also been described as being i

conscientious about the job, but almost to the point of b .ing obsessive. While not everyone liked

~

the officer personally, and some were even afraid of the officer, most people thought the officer '

I was very thomugh and meticulous.

nere are numerous letters and incident reports in the files authored by this individual. It was no secret that this person regularly reported concems to the hRC and the NRC is openly listed as having received copies of many repons prepared by this person.

He officer appears to be very articulate, and may well have been overqualified for the position of security officer. Though quick to criticize'others, it appears that the officer does not accept criticism well. The officer is also quick-tempered and was involved in at least one I physical altercation with a lieutenant.

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'the events which led to this termination are: a fellow security officer, while l

attending diversity training offered by Consumers Power Company, expressed a concern about i being afraid of this officer and that the officer appeared to lose control when being disarmed and disciplined for the physical altercation mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 'Ihe concern I

expressed by the fellow officer led to a decision to suspend the omcer and to examine the criteria of 10 CFR 73.56. Personal privacy concerns of this officer prohibit a more detailed i, discussion of the dynamics involved in the decision to terminate the officer.

The officer's employment was terminated on Janury 5,1995, with the termination form indicating "not qualified." It appears to the investigators that the termination was not only l justified, but required by applicable federal regulations. I i

Although it is by no means unanimous among the Burns work force, a review of the interview summaries reveals some commonly held opinions that this officer was fired because 1

of frequent reports to the NRC. The investigators do not believe that to be the case, but those -

widely-held per@ons must somehow be dealt with in an educational process when Palisades l Plant management decides upon the actions it will take in response to the conclusions of this investigation. In light of the substantial documentation in this employee's personnel file which would raise concerns about the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56, it is too simplistic to say there is a cause and effect relationship between reports to the NRC and the firing. Because of privacy 1

concerns, of course, that personnel file is not available, to the work force at large. Management was well aware that people might make the connection between the discharge and the known reports to the NRC, but the investigators conclude that was simply not the reason, or even a I

24 i

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factor in the decision to terminate. While it is difficult to change those ppdons without interfering with the empicyee's right to privacy, it is an effort that must be undertaken.

CHILLING EFFECT 1here is nothing particularly unique or surprising about a 75-person work force l

l having the usual personnel concerns and problems. Personalities will sometimes conflict, l allegations are made, and management must attempt to address these issues as they arise, while at the same time accomplishing the work Bums was hired to perform.

l The standard interview summary which is attached as Exhibit 3 to this report was i designed to "take the pulse" of the Burns security work force at Palisades and the investigators believe they were able to do that.

The investigators have the general impression after interviewing that entire work force that its members are, for the most part, well-trained, professional, and conscientious - I workers. They are also proud of the work they perform, and cognizant of the importance of l

l security at a nuclear power plant. Regrettably, they also lack confidence in Burns management, l l

are suspicious of the "back room", and are frustrated with the lack of communication and l

t fecopaci Irom the.ir superiors.

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This investigation comes at a time when three employees with a combined total of I 37 years of' service were terminated within a three week time period. The Bums work force is also aware that the Burns contract with Consumers Power is out for bids for the first time in  !

history, with 3 or 4 competing bidders vying for the contract. It would be an understatement to say that the anxiety level among the work force is high and morale is at a low point.

25

2 _- #.a., . . , - - - - . . ~ . m .-_, _ _

As part of the standard interviewing process, the question was asked as to whether anyone " held it over your head" that the contract was up for renewal, and that if you care about yourjob you had better keep your mouth shut and not repon things. The investigators conclude i

that there is no evidence that any such thing occurred at any time.

Before discussing a chilling effect in detail, two imponant distinctions must be made.

The first involves the reponing of safety and security concerns as opposed to reporting personnel ,

type issues. The line between the two is not always easily discernable. For example, is a f

physical altercation between two security officers in a nuclear power plant a safety or security l issue? Or, is it more in the nature of a personnel / discipline type issue? While it is certainly i something that is disappointing to have occur, the investigators would tend to label it as more of a personnel matter than as something which seriously compromises safety or security. ,

i Because of that conclusion, the investigators do not believe that the incidents discussed in this report had any impact whatsoever on the Licensee's compliance with its approved security plan. -

l To avoid the discussion or disclosure of safeguards information, the security plan will not be discussed further.

l Before discussing a chilling effect, the second distinction which must be made f

relates to failing to report things out of a fear of retribution, as opposed to not reporting them i because it is futile to do so. The investigators make these two distinctions at the outset because i

they interpret the NRC's chilling effect concern to be related to employees' failing to report  ;

safety or security issues out of a fear of some kind of retribution. t i

The conclusion is inescapable that the Burns security work force at Palisades is l

reluctant to report personnel-type matters because of a widely-held and openly expressed i t

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sentiment that it does not do any good, that things get bogged down in back room politics, and (

i that there is no feedback which encourages the reporting of those matters.While Burns has a '

standard form incident report, commonly referred to as " blue paper," there is not a clear understandmg among the workers as to what types of incidents it should be used for, or what happens to it after it is submitted. If there was one theme which emerged loud and clear from 1

talking to these people, it was the need for communication and feedback from Burns management. It is essential that when Pnlitaden Plant management responds to this investigation, that the response include a requirement by Burns management, on everv . incident report l submitted, for mandatory follow-up with and feedback to the person who submitted the incident  !

report.

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, The investigators would not refer to what is described above as a " chilling effect", t because it is not primarily out of a fear of any kind of retribution that people fail to report these  !

L matters. Rather, the investigators would coin the phrase " apathy effect." If the NRC chooses -

l to read the interview summaries, it will see frequent comments along the lines of "why bother", j "it doesn't do any good" and "no feedback" in response to questions 12 - 17. j When it comes to plant-operational matters and issues which truly involve safety and security as opposed to personnel issues, there is litde reluctance to report, and indeed, most '

people believe it is an important part of their jo's to log and report such events. Having said I

that, the investigators cannot go so far as.to say that the incidents surrounding the firing of the three individuals referenced above have had absolutely no impact on the reporting of either type of concern.

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As could be expected with a group of this size, some Bums employees make no distinction in their own minds between an officer reporting an assault to the state police and someone reponmg a safety concern to the NRC. Because there is a giwydon among enough people that the report to the state police by the S-O who was stabbed with a pened was an important factor in the S-O's termination, it is fair to say that it has had an impact on some people in terms of reportmg anything to anybody. In other words, the attitude of this faction is " keep your mouth shut and don't make waves."

It should be emphasized that the investigators are not accusing Bums management of deliberately attempting to create a chilling effect by discharging someone for making a report to the state police. In fact, Burns management denies that it was even a factor. Hersuae of descriptions about the reactions of certam people in Bums management when they learned that a police report was made, however, the investigators do not accept the notion that the police report played no part in the decision to terminate the officer. -

Similarly, as noted above in reference to the January 5 termination, the investigators believe that Bums management had no choice in light of the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56 and made the correct decision. We conclude this termination was not in retaliation for reporting things to the NRC. Bums management, nonetheless, faces an uphill battle in changing the perceptions of a significant number ofits Palisades work force, to convince them that it was not a retaliatory discharge. However innocent and unintended, the investigators believe that the January 5 discharge of that employee will reinforce the feelings of the " keep your mouth shut" faction to do just that perhaps even with respect to reporting to the NRC.

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CONCLUSIONS i

ne significant conclusions of this report, in summary form, are as follows: }

1. While' the December 9 incident was not completely unprovoked, the L-D overreacted and rapaadd in an aggressive and assaultive manner which was unprofessional and inappropnate.

2. Prior displays of a quick temper by the L-D involved in the December 9

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incident were not dealt with by Bums management in a manner which i discouraged such conduct.

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3. De arm-twisting incident of a year earlier between the two people involved in the December 9 incident was unprovoked and unjustified on the part of the S-O and should have been reported by the L-D or others who witnessed it.  !

4. De S-O involved in the December 9 incident, while within his/her rights in l making a police report, exaggerated the seriousness of the incident and the extent of the mjunes.

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5. There is a strong sentiment among the work force that the S-O involved in the December 9 incident was a victim whose discharge was unwarranted. ,

6. nere is a widely-held belief, which the investigators accept, that the report  !

to the state police was a factor considered in the termination by Bums of the -

S-O involved in the December 9 incident.

7. Dere is a significant faction of the work force who believe that the discharge of the officer on January 5,1995 was due at least in part to frequent reports to the NRC. The investigators do not accept that underlying proposition as being true, but the perception among the work force is present nonetheless.

It will be difficult to communicate that the principal factor considered in the decision to terminate was compliance with federal regulations, because such ,

communications could create a separate set of privacy concerns among Burns employees.

8. A lack of feedback and effective communications from Burns management has led to a sense of apathy in terms of reporting personnel type problems, not out of a fear of retribution, but more from a sense that it would be futile to  :

make such reports. i i

9. People in the Burns work force are generally conscientious and continue to l report safety, security and operational type problems. Many people pride  ;

i 29 i i

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l themselves on not being intimidated in any way when it comes to reporting such matters.

10. Dere has been no deliberate attempt by Burns management to create a chilling effect by retalimnng against employees for itporting incidents. For at least some members of the Burns work force, however, the firing of three employees within a three week period has encouraged them to adhere to a

" silence is best" philosophy for the time being. This may inhibit the freedom with which they feel they can report things.

FINAL NOTE

)

It is the nature of an investigation that problems will be uncovered and disclosed.

l As is evident from reading this report, no effort has been made to sugar-coat or conceal the I

problems or perceptions which were found. The investigators do not want to create the  !

l impression, however, that there is a crisis situation at Palisades. In spite of sorne morale l problems and anxiety about the Burns contract with Consumers being out for oids, Burns employees are continuing to perform theirjobs in a professional and conscientioua manner. The investigators do not believe that safety or security have been compromised. -

De NRC is concerned, legitimately, with a chilling effect. Without getting wound up in the intricacies of that term of art, this report has concluded that some Burr.s employees, due to human nature, may be prone to follow a " silence is best" philosophy ::ntil the waters calm down. Burns has not deliberately sought to create that effect. The investigators are confident that Burns management, working together with Palisades Plant management, have the desire, the competence and the positive attitude necessary to address the problems which have been disclosed and that they will, in fact, be addressed.

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lJ Dated: January 27,1995 76c 6 mmh Michael G. Wilson On behalfof the ConsumersPower <

Company legal Department Investigation Team I

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To TJPalaisano, Palisades Plant From DAMikalonis, M-1066 h CONSUMERS nat: January 5, 1995 POWER COMPANY Subject REQUEST FOR INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION Internal G m is i s =

CC MGWilson, M-923A On or about 12/27/94, in your capacity as the Palisades Plant General Manager, you received a letter (dated 12/21/94) from Roy J.

Caniano, Chief--Reactor Support Programs Branch, of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff regarding " physical security concerns at Palisades. " The letter requests that those concerns be reviewed "by someone independent from your security organization." You have requested that the CPCo Legal Dept. in Jackson conduct an independent investigation to review those concerns and provide you a report of its findings and conclusions as a result of its investigation. You, in turn, would use that report to make a submittal to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as requested in Mr. Caniano's letter. i This meno is to acknowledge your request and to indicate that the Legal Dept is willing to conduct such an independent investigation.

To assure its independence, the attorneys and investigators from .

the Legal Dept. are being asked to prepara a report for me which will be the result of their own work and conclusions on the subject i

matter. Their report will not be reviewed by anyone at the Palisades Plant or the Nuclear Operations Dept while in draft form I

! before it is submitted to me in final form.

final version to you for your use. I will forward the I have one caveat as to timing. Mr. Caniano's letter requests your submittal to him to be within 30 days of the December 21, 1994 date of his letter. That would be on or before January 19, 1995.

Not having launabed the investigation yet, I cannot guarantee that we I

will be able to meet that date. While we will devote extensive resources to the effort, we do want to do a careful job. I just may have to advise you after we get into it that we need a little more time than the January 19, 1995 date would allow. However, we l

will cross that bridge if we come to it.

The team leader on the investigation will be MGWilson. He will be assisted by other experienced attorneys or investigators from the Legal Dept.

I understand his initial contact at the Palisades Plant for arranging facilities and working space will be you. If you soon.have not already, you can expect to hear from Mr. Wilson very

- .- - _ - _ _ . ______ D

F7 Sume intemellenal Security Serweces I 1 Pohsacos Nuclear Power Fl nt I 27780 Blu2 St:r Memcri:1 Hignw:y Covert. %chig:n 49043 Tel. #616) 764-8338 i

i As all of you are aware, Consumers Power Company is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its operation of the Palisades Nuclear Plant. The NRC has asked Consumers to conduct an evaluation of certain security issues which involve our operations at the Plant. The Plant Manager requested that the evaluation be conducted by Consumers' Legal Department.

The evaluation team, four attorneys from the Legal Department, would like to meet with as many members of our security force as possible next Monday through Wednesday, January 9,10, and 11,1995. The interviews will take place at the Palisades Plant. It is expected that most interviews will last less than an hour.

It is important that you understand that this evaluation is a fact-finding mission and there are no targets, nor are Bums' employees suspected of any wrongdoing. To encourage your candor, we have been informed by Consumers Power that individual interview information will be kept confidential and will not be disclosed to either Plant Management or Bums' Management unless information contains violations of the Plant Secunty Plan which may fall under reportability requirements or require further investigation. We urge you to cooperate fully with the evaluation team and to give -

candid, open and honest answers to their questions. You will be informed soon of your interview time.

Should you have any questions contact Steve Cote at extension 0561 or Don Zastrow at extension 0350.

Thank you for your anticipated cooperation.

sd i D.E. Zastrow .

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[ .. ._ _ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ __- _ _ _ _ _ - _ __ -_____________L

PALIBADES PL&MT-IMTERVIEW

SUMMARY

DATE OF INTERVIEN: January , 1995 PERSON CONDUCTING INTERVIEW: Michael G. Wilson, Attorney TIME INTERVIEW STARTED:

INTERVIEWEE NAME AGE PRESENT TITLE: Unarmed Security Officer l

Armed Security Officer Armed Security Officer, Fire Brigade Second Lieutenant First Lieutenant Other Full Time Part Time How long with Burns? How long at Palisades?

Have you received any promotions since you've been with Burns?

No YES. If yes, what and when? ____-

Did you receive a writuen communication from Burns telling you about this investigation?

NO YES Have you had any conversations with anyone from Burns about this investigation?

NO YES If yes, what were you told and by whom?

1

Has anyone from either Burns or Consumers told you anything which you interpreted as meaning that you should not be open and candid with us as we're doing these interviews?

NO YES If yes, wilat were you told (

and by whom?

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Please briefly describe your day-to-day duties?

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• 1 Who is your present supervisor?

How lona? (if < 6 men, who crior?) i 2

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1 Does Burns management hold regular employee meetings at the Plant?

NO YES If yes, do you usually attend?

i NO YES How often are these meetings held?

In general, what types of issues are discussed at employee i meetings?

2.

1 Is there an opportunity for questions and answers by employees?

NO YES Are questions encouraged or discouraged?

Does someone from Consumers Power usually attend? >

l l Always Sometimes Rarely i

3

Who?

Do you have occasions to meet one-on-one with anyone from Consumars on any kind of a regular basis to talk about your job or about any Plant concerns you might have?

NO YES If yes, how often does that occur?

Who would you usually meet with from Consumers?

What types of things do you discuss?

3.

Is there any kind of protocol or procedure in place, that you're aware of, that if you have some kind of concern either with your 4

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job or with something you see as a concern at the Plant, that  !

you're supposed to take it up with Burns management first?

NO YES If yes, how has that been communicated to you, and by whom?

4.

Has anyone ever told you 3Q2 to bring something to the attention of Consumers management without first talking to Burns management?

NO YES If yes, who, when and explain.

5. -

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Has anyone ever told you that you'll be disciplined in any way if f you bring something to the attention of consumers without first going through Burns?

i NO YES If yes, who, when and explain.

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L Do you know of any Burns employee who you feel has been discharged, disciplined or discriminated against in any way at this Plant because they raised some kind of concern with Consumers without going through Burns management?

No YES If yes, who, when and explain.

7e 6

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i Han anyone from Consumers ever told you that you shouldn't come to consumers with concerns about things you see or hear about at the Plant? .

NO YES If yes, who, when and explain.

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Mas anyone from either Consumers or Burns discouraged you in any ,

way from telling the NRC about things you see at the Plant?

NO YES If yes, who, when and explain.

9.

i Do you have any knowledge of any Burns employees at this Plant being discharged, disciplined or discriminated against in any way because they went to the NRC with some type of concern?

NO YES If yes, who, when and explain. )

10.

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l Even if it wasn't communicated to you directly, do you know of t

anything that was done indirectly by either Burns or Consumers to.  !

discourage people from expressing or reporting concerns that they- i have about the Plant?

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NO YES If yes, explain. '

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i Have you had occasions in the course of your job here to report things that you've seen going on at the Plant?  :

1 NO YES If yes, how did you report these '

i things and to whom? j i

12. '

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Have you ever felt that you have been ridiculed or discouraged in any other way from reporting things? -

NO YES If yes, explain.

13.

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Do you know of other Burns employees who have been ridiculed or.

discouraged in any way from reporting things?

NO YES If yes, who and explain.

14.

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My understanding is that there are standard form incident reports ured by the security force known as blue sheets. Are you familiar ,

l with those? l l

NO YES Are they something you use on a regular basis?

NO YES How often?

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Does turns encourage you to fill out these reports?

NO YES What types of things are they used for? ,

15.

Have you ever been criticized for Egg tilling out one of these sheets when someone thought you should have?

NO YES If yes, explain.

16.

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l Have you ever filled out one of these reports and had someone tell you it wasn't necessary for the type of incident you reported?

NO YES If yes, what was the nature cf the incident reported?

Who told you not to report that kind of incident?

What is your understanding as to what happens with these blue cheats after they are filled out? -

17.

Has anyone ever come back to you requesting more information after you filled out an incident report?

No YES 13

Is that typically what would happen? NO YES can you think of any occasion where anyone from either Burns or consumers has either directly or indirectly told you, in effect, if you care about your job, to keep your mouth shut?

NO YES If yes, who, when and explain._

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l Do you have any knowledge, or have you even heard about anyone else at the Plant who has been told directly, indirectly or by implication that if you want to keep your job, you had better keep your mouth shut or mind your own business?

NO YES If yes, who, when and explain.

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Overall, from your experience here, do you think that employees express themselves openly about concerns they have either about their jobs or about things going on at the Plant?

YES No If no, why not?

20.

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It's my understanding that the Burns contract with this Plant is up for renewal soon. Has Burns discussed that with its employees?

t No YES If yes, what have they told you about that?

21.

i Do you feel that anyone from either Burns or Consumers has held that over your head in any way, that Burns contract with Consumers is up for renewal?

r NO YES If yes, explain.

22.

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Do you know of any occasions when fellow employees, as opposed to .

i annagement, have put pressure on other employees to keep their mouth shut or to not report things?

NO YES If yes, explain.

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Regardless of what the source might be, do you feel any kind of 17 l

pressure to keep your mouth shut about things or do you feel you can freely voice your concerns without worrying about your job?,,,

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Is there anything I haven't asked you about which relates to concerne you have about being able to freely report things to either consumers or the NRC and that you thirJt I should know aboutT NO YES Explain.

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i We'll and the interview at this time, and I'd like to go over my notes with you, and if I've accurately summarized our conversation, I'd ask you to sign this and you can be on your way.

1 Interview concluded at: )

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I have reviewed this Interview summary with Michael G. Wilson consisting of 19 pages and additional sheet (s), and I agree that it accurately summarizes our conversation.

INTERVIEWEE SIGNATURE:

Michael G. Wilson l

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PALISADES INTERVIEWS-ADDITIONAL SEEETS flasleds ammhase omrrgesendias te mumhes,a en INiew SummarTI J

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Standard Interview Introduction Hi, , my name is . I'd like to explain to you why we're here. The NRC received a report of an incident involving some Burns Security officers at this Plant and asked Consumers to do an internal investigation. The purpose of that investigation is to determine whether Burns employees feel free to bring their concerns to Burns' management, Consumers management, or even directly to the NRC if it was something you believed they should know about.

I am an attorney from Consumers Legal Department in Jackson and we're conducting the investigation to keep it independent from Plant management. I want you to feel at ease. This is not an investigation of you personally. In fact, we're not investigating any wrongdoing by anyone from Burns. We're simply conducting these interviews for a fact-finding. In other words, when we're done -

interviewing, the results of our interviews will be summarized, without using any names, in a report which we'll submit to our General Counsel in Jackson. That report will get filed with the NRC without editing.

Even though no names will be used in the report, we are filling out an interview sheet as we go along to summarize our conversation. Thor,e summaries will be kept in Jackson, and will be shared with the 14RC and no one else, and only the NRC if they ask for them.

I'd m you to be open with me and to answer my questions as truthfully as you can. With that background in mind, unless you have any questions, why don't we get started.