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NRC FORM 366
EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 16*1998)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 PAGE 131 CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY - PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 05000255 1 OF 2
TITLE 141 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 98-010, REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FAILURE OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP EVE ~T nt.TE 151 I S:R 0.11 ***nr-n 11'::1 REPORT n.1TE 171 nTUS:R Clt.f"ll ITIS:C:: 111vn1 VFn /RI SEQUENTIAL I REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 07 21 98 98
--* 010 0
08 18 1998 05000
,.OPERATING* I I
THIS RFPORT IS C::llR.MITTl'n PllRC::llAl\\lT TO THE nr:n1 *ft.. llll=lllTC:: nc 1n rcR 6* trh.,,.i.- nn* nr morel 1111 MODE (9) 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) x 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)
OTHER 0
20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(v)
Specify in Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(vii) or in NRC Form 366A
. I ll"S:l\\ICCC r.nNT.ar.T cnD THIC:: I Cl 11 71 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER !Include Area Code)
Dale Engle, Licensing Engineer (616) 764-2848 l"nlVIDI FTF n111i: 111111= i:nR S:Al"H
- A11 11ci: ni:c l"RIDi:n IN ru1c:: -~- n* 1 1 ::II
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
. REPORTABLE TO EPIX TO EPIX B
SJ CPLG W318 y
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT h.-c.. 1tu1141 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR 1~
Ix 'NO.
SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 1 5 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16).
On July 21, 1998, at 1452 hours0.0168 days <br />0.403 hours <br />0.0024 weeks <br />5.52486e-4 months <br />, with the Plant operating at 99.6% power; the reactor was manually tripped due to a partial loss of main feedwater [SJ]. At the time of the reactor [RCT] trip one of the two main feedwater pumps [P] had tripped.
The Control Room received an oil system trouble alarm [AA] on the "A" main feedwater pump turbine driver, followed immediately by a trip of the main feedwater pump. In response to the trip of the main feedwater pump, the reactor was manually tripped in accordance with operating procedures. When the steam generator low level set point was reached, the auxiliary feedwater system [BA] actuated as expected.
The main feedwater pump trip was caused by failure of the coupling which drives the feedwater pump's main lube oil pump, resulting in a feedw~ter pump trip on low lubricating oil pressure.
The main lube oil pump coupling [CPLG] and associated components were replaced and satisfactorily tested in conjunction with returning the plant to operation.
9808240283 980818 PDR ADOCK 05000255 s
PDR NRC FORM 366 (6-1 998}
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\\) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 6/98 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 11 l DOCKET12l LER NUMBER f6l g CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY YEAR I SEQUENTIAL REVISION PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 05000255 NUMBER NUMBER 98 010 00 2
TEXT (If more space 1s required, use add111onal copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On July 21, 1998, at 1452 hours0.0168 days <br />0.403 hours <br />0.0024 weeks <br />5.52486e-4 months <br />, with the Plant operating at 99.6% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a partial loss of main feedwater. Prior to the reactor trip, both main feedwater pumps were operating in automatic mode providing feedwater to the steam generators. The Control Room received an oil system trouble alarm on the "A" main feedwater pump turbine driver, followed immediately by a trip of the main feedwater pump.
In response to the trip of the main feedwater pump, the reactor was manually tripped in accordance with operating procedures. Subsequent to the reactor trip, the steam generator low level set point was reached, resulting in an actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system.
All safety systems functioned as designed. This event resulted in both the manual actuation of the reactor protection system [JD] and the automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system.and is therefore reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an event that resulted in actuation of engineered safety features.
ANALYSIS AND CAUSE OF THE EVENT The "A" main feedwater pump turbine driver was subsequently inspected to determine the cause for the pump trip. Upon disassembly and inspection, it was determined that the main feedwater pump trip was caused by failure of the coupling which drives the feedwater*
pump's main lube oil pump, resulting in a feedwater pump trip on low lubricating oil pressure. The coupling was noted to have exceeded its service life, having worn excessively at its mating surfaces, ultimately to the extent that it could no longer transmit torque from.the drive shaft to the oil pump shaft. Contributing to coupling wear were worn drive shaft bearings, which allowed excess shaft play, and the coupling itself, which was not appropriately centered between the shafts.
Past periodic inspections of the main feedwater pump turbine driver internal components have been performed without detailed written instructions, resulting in the missed opportunity to identify and replace these components prior to failure.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
This event had no safety significance. Applicable safety systems functioned as expected.
The plant was stabilized and maintained in hot shutdown until the next day when it was returned to service.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The main lube oil pump coupling and associated components were replaced and satisfactorily tested in conjunction with returning the plant to operation.
- Detailed work instructions are being developed and implemented to support future periodic inspection activities on the main feedwater pump turbine driver internal components.
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| 05000255/LER-1998-001, :on 980101,large Leak of CCW During Power Operation Was Noted.Caused by Failure of Flanged Joint Rubber Gasket.Ccw Sys Was Refilled,Vented & Chemistry Restored to Normal |
- on 980101,large Leak of CCW During Power Operation Was Noted.Caused by Failure of Flanged Joint Rubber Gasket.Ccw Sys Was Refilled,Vented & Chemistry Restored to Normal
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000255/LER-1998-002, :on 980112,potential Challenge to Channel Separation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate of Temporary Mod. Specific Controls for Future Temporary Configuration Alterations Have Been Incorporated Into Plant Procedures |
- on 980112,potential Challenge to Channel Separation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate of Temporary Mod. Specific Controls for Future Temporary Configuration Alterations Have Been Incorporated Into Plant Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000255/LER-1998-003, :on 980113,watertight Door Were Found Improperly Latched.Cause Has Not Been Determined.Door 59 Was Verified Closed & Was Properly Latched |
- on 980113,watertight Door Were Found Improperly Latched.Cause Has Not Been Determined.Door 59 Was Verified Closed & Was Properly Latched
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000255/LER-1998-004, :on 980216,notified Security That Escorted Visitor Had Inserted Her Keycard Into Exiting Turnstile Card Reader Upside Down.Caused by Primarily to Card Reader bleed- Through.Initiated Quarterly Surveillance to Verify Card |
- on 980216,notified Security That Escorted Visitor Had Inserted Her Keycard Into Exiting Turnstile Card Reader Upside Down.Caused by Primarily to Card Reader bleed- Through.Initiated Quarterly Surveillance to Verify Card
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000255/LER-1998-005, :on 980217,actuation of Containment Isolation Occurred.Caused by Inadvertent Containment High Radiation Signal.Plant Status Evaluated & Equipment Lineups Restored |
- on 980217,actuation of Containment Isolation Occurred.Caused by Inadvertent Containment High Radiation Signal.Plant Status Evaluated & Equipment Lineups Restored
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000255/LER-1998-006, :on 980305,personnel Determined That Operating Procedures Lacked Specific Guidance.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Alarm Response Procedure 7 Was Revised |
- on 980305,personnel Determined That Operating Procedures Lacked Specific Guidance.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Alarm Response Procedure 7 Was Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000255/LER-1998-007, :on 980413,HPIS Sys Was Noted Inoperable During TS Surveillance Test.Caused by Performance of Flawed Procedure.Operators & Engineers Will Be Trained to Improve Operational Decision Making Through Resources & Knowledge |
- on 980413,HPIS Sys Was Noted Inoperable During TS Surveillance Test.Caused by Performance of Flawed Procedure.Operators & Engineers Will Be Trained to Improve Operational Decision Making Through Resources & Knowledge
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000255/LER-1998-008, :on 980511,noted That Procedure Did Not Fully Satisfy Requirement to Test High Startup Rate Trip Function. Caused by Misunderstanding of Testing Requirements.Revised TS Surveillance Test Procedure & Reviewed Other Procedures |
- on 980511,noted That Procedure Did Not Fully Satisfy Requirement to Test High Startup Rate Trip Function. Caused by Misunderstanding of Testing Requirements.Revised TS Surveillance Test Procedure & Reviewed Other Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000255/LER-1998-009, :on 980531,small Pinhole Leak Found on One of Welds,During Leak Test Following Replacement of PCS Sample Isolation Valves.Caused by Welder Error.Leaking Welds Repaired |
- on 980531,small Pinhole Leak Found on One of Welds,During Leak Test Following Replacement of PCS Sample Isolation Valves.Caused by Welder Error.Leaking Welds Repaired
| | | 05000255/LER-1998-010, :on 980721,reactor Manually Tripped.Caused by Failure of Coupling Which Drives Feedwater Pump Main Lube Oil Pump.Main Lube Oil Pump Coupling & Associated Components Replaced & Satisfactorily Tested |
- on 980721,reactor Manually Tripped.Caused by Failure of Coupling Which Drives Feedwater Pump Main Lube Oil Pump.Main Lube Oil Pump Coupling & Associated Components Replaced & Satisfactorily Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000255/LER-1998-011, :on 981217,inadequate Lube Oil Collection Sys for Primary Coolant Pumps Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Process.Exemption from 10CFR50,App R Was Pursued |
- on 981217,inadequate Lube Oil Collection Sys for Primary Coolant Pumps Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Process.Exemption from 10CFR50,App R Was Pursued
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000255/LER-1998-012, :on 981215,discovered That MSIVs Were Slightly Open Based on Local Stem Position.Caused by High Packing Friction Introduced by Packing Replacement During 1998 Rfo. Completed Actions to Assure MSIVs Will Fully Close |
- on 981215,discovered That MSIVs Were Slightly Open Based on Local Stem Position.Caused by High Packing Friction Introduced by Packing Replacement During 1998 Rfo. Completed Actions to Assure MSIVs Will Fully Close
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000255/LER-1998-013, :on 981222,safeguards Transfer Tap Changer Failure Caused Inadvertant DG Start.Caused by Failed Motor Contactor.Contactor Was Replaced.With |
- on 981222,safeguards Transfer Tap Changer Failure Caused Inadvertant DG Start.Caused by Failed Motor Contactor.Contactor Was Replaced.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-1998-014, :on 981227,control Rod Drive Seal Housing Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking. Faulted Control Rod drive-2 Seal Housing Was Replaced |
- on 981227,control Rod Drive Seal Housing Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking. Faulted Control Rod drive-2 Seal Housing Was Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) |
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