ML20078L117

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Scenarios
ML20078L117
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 02/27/2020
From: Gregory Roach
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:
NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
Roach G
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Download: ML20078L117 (57)
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Davis-Besse Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: DB NRC 2020 Examiners: Operators: SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: 100% Power Turnover: SFAS (Safety Feature Actuation System) Ch 3 RCS Pressure LO and LOLO Bistables have been tripped due to an instrument failure last shift.

Planned:

  • Stop #1 Heater Drain Pump (HDP) for maintenance
  • I&C to repair failed instrument and restore to service Critical tasks:
1. Isolate overcooling SG (CT-17)
2. Restore Seal Return or Shutdown the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) (CT-B)

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 N-BOP/SRO Stop #1 Heater Drain Pump for maintenance 2 C-ATC/SRO Makeup Filter High diff press 3 TS-SRO Containment Spray Pump (CSP) Oil Leak (TS)

R-ATC/SRO RCP 1-1 high vibrations 4 C-BOP Reduce power (TS)

TS (2)-SRO Trip RCP (TS) 5 C-BOP/SRO Feedwater (FW) auto re-ratio fails when trip RCP 6 C-ATC/SRO Inadvertent SFAS Levels 1 through 3 - Trip reactor 7 Major OVCLG - Leaking Main Steam Safety Valve SFRCS (Steam Feed Rupture Control System) fails to auto 8 C-BOP/SRO initiate on Low Steam Pressure

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 1 of 16

Scenario Event Summary DAVIS-BESSE 2020 NRC SCENARIO 3 The crew will take the watch with power at 100%. SFAS (Safety Features Actuation System)

Ch 3 RCS Pressure LO and LOLO Bistables have been tripped due to an instrument failure last shift. I&C will commence troubleshooting later this shift.

EVENT 1: Stop #1 Heater Drain Pump (HDP) for maintenance The crew will Stop #1 HDP IAW DB-OP-06227, Low Pressure Feedwater (LPFW) Heaters in preparation for planned PMs.

EVENT 2: Makeup (MU) Filter High diff press After #1 HDP has been stopped, the Lead Evaluator will cue event 2. Annunciator 2-4-A, Letdown or MU Filter Differential Pressure (d/p) Hi, will alarm due to high d/p across the #1 MU Filter (PDI MU13 greater than 25 psid). The crew will implement alarm procedure DB-OP-02002, Letdown/MU Alarm Panel 2 Annunciators actions, validate #1 MU Filter d/p is high, and swap to #2 MU Filter using DB-OP-06006, MU and Purification System.

EVENT 3: Containment Spray Pump (CSP) Oil Leak (TS)

The Lead Evaluator will then cue event 3. An EO performing normal rounds will call the control room and report the oil has leaked out of the CSP 1. The SRO will declare the CSP 1 Inoperable and enter TS 3.6.6 Condition A. The crew will direct disabling CSP 1 from starting.

EVENT 4 & 5: RCP 1-1 high vibrations- FW auto re-ratio fails when trip RCP The Lead Evaluator will then cue RCP 1-1 high vibrations. Annunciators 6-1-A, MOTOR VIB HI and 6-5-A, MONITOR SYSTEM TRBL will alarm. The SRO will implement DB-OP-02515, RCP Pump and Motor Abnormal. The SRO will implement DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown to reduce power. The ATC will reduce power to less than 72% and RCP 1-1 will be stopped. When the RCP is stopped FW will fail to auto re-ratio and the BOP will be required to take loop demands to hand and re-ratio. The CSRO will Notify I&C to reduce the RPS High Flux Trip setpoints within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> IAW TS 3.4.4, RCS Loops. The crew will also receive Annunciator 5-4-E TILT IMBALANCE ROD INS LIMITS which indicate Regulating Rods are outside of their insertion limits, requiring entry into TS 3.2.1, Regulating Rod Insertion Limits.

EVENT 6: Inadvertent SFAS Levels 1 through 3 - Trip reactor After the plant has stabilized the Lead Evaluator will cue event 6. SFAS Channel 4 loses power causing SFAS levels 1 - 3 to actuate. An SFAS Level 3 inadvertent actuation is entry criteria for DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture. SFAS Level 3 inadvertent actuation causes a loss of Seal Return to the RCPs. The 30-minute timer to restore Seal Return or SD the RCPs starts when RCP Seal Return is lost (CT-3).

EVENT 7 & 8: OVCLG - Leaking Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) & SFRCS (Steam Feed Rupture Control System) fails to auto initiate Following the reactor trip the crew will identify Overcooling due to a MSSV on SG 2 failing to reseat. The crew will implement attachment 20, lowering SG pressure attempting to seat the safety. The crew will recognize the MSSV will not close and initiate and isolate SFRCS. SFRCS fails to automatically actuate on SG low pressure requiring manual re-positioning of the AFW valves. The crew will then isolate the SG 2 and terminate the overcooling (CT-17). Due to the Inadvertent SFAS Actuation, Seal Return will be required to be restored within 30 minutes or the RCPs shutdown to prevent seal failure (CT-3).

When the overcooling SG is isolated, and Seal Return or RCPs shutdown is established the scenario can be terminated.

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 2 of 16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Stop Heater Drain Pump (HDP) 1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • HIS318, LP HEATER DRAIN TANK PUMPS 1 indicating lights
  • II318, HEATER DRAIN PUMP 1 (HDP 1) AMMETER Brief stopping HDP 1 IAW DB-OP-06227, Low Pressure TEAM Feedwater Heaters Section 3.5 Verify adequate condensate pump capacity exists for the loss TEAM of the HDP 1 flow.

Direct EO to adjust HC311, FAIRCHILD RELAY LY311 HAND BOP CONTROL for HDP 1 discharge valve, until the DIAPHRAGM PRESSURE TO LV311, is approximately 15 PSIG Role play as EO, DIAPHRAGM PRESSURE TO LV311, is BOOTH approximately 15 PSIG CUE IAW DB-OP-06227 Step 3.5.2.

Stop HDP 1, using HIS318, LP HEATER DRAIN TANK

  • SRO/BOP PUMPS 1 Direct EO to Close HD 5, LOW PRESSURE HDP 1 BOP DISCHARGE ISOLATION
  • Role play as EO, HD 5, LOW PRESSURE HDP 1 DISCHARGE ISOLATION is Closed BOOTH IAW DB-OP-06227 step 3.5.4.

CUE

  • Role play as I&C, remove from service and drain LSH391, LP FW HEATER DRAIN TK 1 IAW DB-OP-06227 step 3.5.5.

NOTE: The following steps are not required to be completed in order to continue with the scenario.

TEAM Monitor Condensate Flow and Reactor Power.

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 3 of 16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Stop Heater Drain Pump (HDP) 1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TEAM Evaluate expected Annunciators NOTE: 13-3-C LPFW HTR 1-1 TRIP alarms ~30 seconds after pump is stopped SRO/BOP Implement DB-OP-02013 13-3-C LP FW HTR 1-1 HI LVL TRIP NOTE: No CTRM or field manipulations are required for the LPFW HTR 1-1 TRIP If asked, role play as an EO

  • GS346, STEAM SEAL REGULATOR DUMP TO LP HEATER 1-1, is closed.
  • HD300B, LOW PRESSURE HEATER 1-2 NORMAL BOOTH DRAIN, is closed.

CUE

  • Level in Feedwater Heater 1-1 and 1-2 are normal If asked, role play as Field Supervisor
  • Reset the LPFW HTR 1-1 high level trip BOOTH IAW DB-OP-02013 CUE

At Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 2, Makeup Filter High diff press NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 4 of 16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Makeup (MU) Filter High diff press Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • PDI MU13 indicates >25 PSID
  • 2-4-A LETDOWN OR MU FILT P HI Recognize MU Filter high differential pressure for in service MU CREW Filter 1 (indications available listed above)

Implement DP-OP-02002 Letdown/MU Alarm Panel 2 ATC Annunciators for 2-4-A LETDOWN OR MU FILT P HI Validate MU Filter high differential pressure with PDI MU13 ATC indicating >25 psid Direct placing MU Filter 2 in service in accordance with DB-OP-SRO 06006, MU and Purification System SRO/ATC Verify MU Filter 2 is not aligned as the Purification Demin Filter SM If necessary, Role-play Shift Manager and inform the SRO that MU Filter 2 has been verified NOT aligned as the CUE Purification Demin Filter ATC Swap to Makeup Filter 2

  • SRO/ATC Open MU12B, MU FILTER 2 INLET ISO, using HISMU12B.
  • SRO/ATC Close MU12A, MU FILTER 1 INLET ISO, using HISMU12A.

Ensure work request initiated to have filter replaced (alarm CREW procedure guidance)

At Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 3, CSP 1 Oil Leak NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 5 of 16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Containment Spray Pump (CSP) 1 Oil Leak (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • Local indication only, Equipment Operator report Role-play EO and report:

While performing my zone tour, I noticed that all the oil Booth has drained out of CSP 1 inboard bearing reservoir. The Cue sight glass is broken and will need replaced. All the oil has been contained to the skid.

o REQUIRED ACTION: Restore containment spray train to OPERABLE status.

o COMPLETION TIME: 7 days NOTE: The following steps are not required to be completed in order to continue with the scenario.

SRO May contact Maintenance and/or Work Week Manager Crew Discuss and/or direct disabling CSP 1 from starting May discuss/review plant risk with Containment Spray Pump 1 Crew unavailable and discuss protecting equipment (CSP 2)

Booth If necessary, role play as maintenance, Report Containment Spray Pump 1 will be required to be Cue removed from service to repair broken sight glass BOP Turn on CS Pump Blue Operability Light NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 6 of 16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Containment Spray Pump (CSP) 1 Oil Leak (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If necessary, role play as EO to disable CSP 1 as directed

  • Rack out breaker
  • Remove the emergency close control power fuses Booth behind the CSP 1 Emergency Control Transfer Switch on E1 upper right cubicle Cue
  • Place Emergency Control Transfer Switch for CSP 1 on E1 in EMERGENCY NOTE: Local control switch is a rocker arm type switch and cannot be locked out.

At Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 4 & 5, RCP High Vibrations NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 7 of 16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 3 Event # 4&5 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

RCP High Vibrations and Auto FW Reratio Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • 6-1-A MOTOR VIB HI
  • 6-5-A MONITOR SYSTEM TRBL CREW Recognize RCP 1-1 high vibrations
  • Implement Alarm Procedure DB-OP-02006, RCP ALARM 6-1-A.

ATC/BOP

  • Depress Switch HS RC64 on Control Room Panel C5718 to attempt to reset Vibration Annunciator Alarm.

SRO Implement DB-OP-02515, RCP and Motor Abnormal Procedure Verify the RCP 1-1 motor conditions exceed operational limits CREW using the PPC or SPDS Implement DB-OP-02515 Attachment 1, Reactor Coolant Pump SRO Shutdown Implement DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown SRO

  • Commence a power reduction to 72% or less ULD with ICS in Automatic
  • At the LOAD CONTROL Panel, set the rate of change to the
  • SRO/ATC rate specified by the Command SRO
  • Select the target RTP as determined by the Command SRO Monitor Reactor Power to confirm power is being reduced at CREW approximately the expected rate (NI vs. HBP)

Monitor Regulating Rod Insertion Limits during the Shutdown ATC per Technical Specification 3.2.1 ATC Monitor Axial Power Imbalance NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 8 of 16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 3 Event # 4&5 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

RCP High Vibrations and Auto FW Reratio Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Perform DB-OP-02504 Attachment 6, Balance of Plant Actions for Rapid Shutdown o At approximately 90 percent power, notify the Field

  • SRO/BOP Supervisor to remove the Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Main Steam Minimum flow lines from service
  • When Condensate flow is less than 7.0 MPPH (FI578),

then establish two Condensate pumps in operation Notify the System Control Center (SCC) Load Dispatcher of the SRO unit load reduction

  • SRO/BOP Place the SG Load Ratio (Tc) in Auto ATC Check reactor power at 72 percent or less
  • SRO/ATC Stop RCP 1-1 BOP Verify proper Feedwater flow ratios of 2.4 to 1 Recognize auto re-ratio is not occurring:
  • Take both FW Loop Demands to Hand
  • SRO/BOP
  • Ratio FW to approximately 2.38 MPPH on SG1
  • Ratio FW to approximately 5.74 MPPH on SG2 ATC Verify Tave control is on RCS Loop 2 Monitor Pressurizer level due to Tave transient 4-2-E (Lo LVL) may alarm reduce MU-32 Setpoint to ~180 IF Pressurizer water level > 228 inches enter TS 3.4.9 SRO/ATC
a. Pressurizer water level 228 inches
  • CONDITION A: Pressurizer water level not within limit.

o REQUIRED ACTION: Restore level to within limit.

o COMPLETION TIME: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 9 of 16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 3 Event # 4&5 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

RCP High Vibrations and Auto FW Reratio Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS flow is greater than the flow required by TS 3.4.1, SRO DNB Limits. REFER TO DB-OP-03006, Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Checks. (Computer Point F744)

SRO Notify I&C reduce RPS High Flux Trip setpoints within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />

b. Three RCPs operating and:
2. LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation," Function 1.a (High Flux - High

  • SRO Setpoint), Allowable Value of Table 3.3.1-1 is reset for three RCPs operating

o REQUIRED ACTION: Satisfy the requirements of LCO 3.4.4.b.2.

o COMPLETION TIME: 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> Note: Crew may elect to add Boric Acid to maintain rods within insertion limits.

  • LCO 3.2.1 Regulating rod groups not within the physical insertion limits specified in the COLR.
  • CONDITION A: Regulating rod groups inserted in restricted operation region.

o REQUIRED ACTION A1: Perform SR 3.2.5.1.

  • SRO COMPLETION TIME: Once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> AND o REQUIRED ACTION A2: Restore regulating rod groups to within limits.

COMPLETION TIME: 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet the LCO At Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 6, Inadvertent Actuation of SFAS Levels 1 through 3 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 10 of 16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Actuation of SFAS Levels 1 through 3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • SFAS components repositioning
  • Critical Recognize an actuation of SFAS Levels 1 through 3 Task (CT-B) TEAM (MU38 closes causing a Loss of RCP Seal Return)
  • Time of SFAS _________

Perform DB-OP-02000 Immediate Actions

  • Trip the reactor
  • SRO/ATC o VERIFY Reactor Power is lowering on the Intermediate range o Trip the turbine o VERIFY all Turbine Stop Valves OR Control Valves closed SRO Route to DB-OP-02000, Section 3 SRO/ATC Verify Immediate Actions Implement any necessary Specific Rules Actions
  • ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF SUBCOOLING MARGIN TEAM
  • POWER FOR C1 AND D1 BUSES OR EDG START Implement Specific Rule 6
  • Verify C1 and D1 are energized
  • Verify both CCW Pumps are running
  • Verify both Service Water Pumps are running Implement any necessary Symptom Mitigation Sections
  • LACK OF ADEQUATE SUBCOOLING MARGIN TEAM
  • LACK OF HEAT TRANSFER

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 3 Event # 7&8 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

Partially Stuck Open Main Steam Safety Valve and SFRCS failure to actuate on Low Steam Generator Pressure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • SFRCS Low Steam Pressure Actuation Fails BOP Recognize Overcooling due to SG 2 less than 960 psig SRO Route to DB-OP-02000, Section 7 for Overcooling Implement Attachment 8, Place MU/HPI/LPI in Service
  • Start/Verify running both CCW Pumps
  • Start both HPI Pumps
  • Start both LPI Pumps
  • Open DH 64 and DH 63
  • Transfer Makeup Pump suctions, MU6405 & MU3971, to the BWST (depress off)

ATC

  • Set Pressurizer Level Controller to 100 inches
  • Start Standby Makeup Pump IF AT ANY TIME Pressurizer Level is less than 40 inches
  • Lock MU Pump suctions, MU6405 & MU3971, on the BWST
  • Verify Pressurizer heaters are off
  • Isolate Letdown by closing MU2B
  • Open MU6421
  • Throttle open MU6419 as needed (Alternate Injection Line)
  • Direct EO to open MU6423B If asked role play as security, Booth steam is issuing from aux building roof steam relief exhaust Cue pipe on the east side Perform Attachment 20 to attempt to reseat the MSSV BOP
  • Lower SG pressure to a minimum of 700psig using the TBVs
  • Recognize the MSSV has NOT reseated NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 12 of 16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 3 Event # 7&8 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

Partially Stuck Open Main Steam Safety Valve and SFRCS failure to actuate on Low Steam Generator Pressure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If asked role play as security, Booth

  • steam continues to issue from the aux building roof Cue steam relief exhaust pipe on the east side Initiate AND Isolate SFRCS using SFRCS MANUAL BOP ACTUATION switches BOP Verify proper SFRCS alignment CREW Determine the overcooling cannot be isolated CREW Determine SG 2 is causing the overcooling NOTE: Overcooling must be isolated <10 minutes from the Critical time SG 2 is less than 630 psig Task (CT-17)

If applicable, Time SG 2 less than 630 psig_________

Critical Close AF 599 (isolate FW flow SG 2)

Task BOP (CT-17) Time AF 599 is closed_________

Recognize AFW is not properly aligned for a low pressure trip

  • SRO/BOP on SG 2 and
  • Realign AFW components as required BOP Stabilize RCS temperature using the AVV on SG 1 ATC Initiate RCS depressurization to minimum adequate SCM NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 13 of 16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 3 Event # 7&8 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

Partially Stuck Open Main Steam Safety Valve and SFRCS failure to actuate on Low Steam Generator Pressure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Throttle MU/HPI as necessary to control Pressurizer level Restore Seal Injection using Attachment 10

  • Close MU 19 ATC
  • Block and open MU 66A, MU 66B, MU 66C and MU 66D
  • Open MU 19 to obtain 12 - 15 gpm Seal Injection flow Recognize SFRCS SG level setpoint on High due to inadvertent BOP SFAS Restore RCP Seal Return using Attachment 10
  • Verify MU 59A, MU 59B, MU 59C and MU 59D are closed
  • *Block and open MU 38
  • *Block and open MU 59A, MU 59B, MU 59C and MU 59D

Time MU38, MU59A, MU59B, MU59C and MU59D are opened OR RCPs are stopped Time__ ____

BOP Verify proper SFRCS actuation CREW Check for PTS criteria CREW Check for adequate SCM When Overcooling Steam Generator is isolated, and either Seal Return is restored, or the Reactor Coolant Pumps are shutdown, the scenario can be terminated NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 14 of 16

Justification for Critical Tasks The term Critical Task, is defined in NUREG-1021, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINER STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS. The listed critical tasks were compiled based on a review of Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06, EOP Technical Bases Document, and additional CTs were added based on established DB Operations expectations and standards for previously identified Critical Task.

CT-17: Isolate Overcooling SG

1. Safety Significance:

The partially open Main Steam Safety Valve on Steam Generator 2 will cause an uncontrollable overcooling

2. Cues:
  • DB-OP-02000 Section 7 Overcooling
3. Measured by:
  • The required action to complete the critical task is to Close AF 599 (isolate FW flow SG 2)
  • The required end time for completion of CT-17 is 10 minutes from when SG 2 is less than 630 psig
4. Feedback:
  • AF599 indicates closed CT-B: Protect RCP Seals
1. Safety Significance:

The inadvertent actuation of SFAS levels 1-3 will result in a loss of seal return flowpath. Extended operation without a RCP Seal Return flowpath may result in seal failure and unisolable RCS leakage.

2. Cues:
  • Loss of seal return flow as indicated by MU38 closed and RCPs running
  • DB-OP-02515, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP AND MOTOR ABNORMAL OPERATION and DB-OP-02000 Attachment 10
3. Measured by:
  • Time zero for CT-B is when MU38 goes closed (inadvertent actuation of SFAS levels 1-3)
  • The required action to complete CT-B is to restore Seal Return or shutdown RCPs
  • The required end time for completion of CT-B is 30 minutes
4. Feedback:

MU38, MU59A, MU59B, MU59C and MU59D are opened or RCPs are stopped NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 15 of 16

SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Simulator Setup:

  • 100% Power
  • Fail SFRCS low pressure trip on SG 2 automatic actuation
  • Establish SG 2 unisolable steam leak following reactor trip Procedures:
  • DB-OP-06006, Makeup and Purification System
  • DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown
  • DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture
  • DB-OP-01000, Operation of Station Breakers For Simulator Instructor:

- BDP3H CSP1 LOCAL/REMOTE fuses TRUE

- BDP3D CSP1 CLOSE FUSE 242 remove

- BDP3E CSP1 CLOSE FUSE 243 remove NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 16 of 16

Page 1 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST DATE: Today SHIFT: NIGHTS MODE: 1 POWER: 100%

SECURITY RISK: GREEN PLANT ONLINE RISK: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: 2 PLANT CONDITION: 1 SHUTDOWN DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH:

ACTIVE ALERTS: NONE GRID CONDITION: NORMAL N/A ADDITIONAL PROTECTED EQUIPMENT - None CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR OPERABILITY/AVAIL IN EFFECT - None OUTSTANDING PROMPT OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS - None SHIFT ACTIVITIES COMPLETED Entered T.S. 3.3.5 Condition A.1 Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation due to a failed RCS Pressure Transmitter (CH 3)

PLANNED I&C will commence troubleshooting on Day Shift Stop #1 HDP for maintenance, it will be shutdown for an extended time period at power ALARM STATUS -None ZONE 1 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS -None ZONE 1 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 1 - BURDENS - None ZONE 2 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS -None ZONE 2 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 2 - BURDENS - None ZONE 3 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS -None ZONE 3 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 3 - BURDENS - None CONTROL ROOM - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS-None CONTROL ROOM - WORKAROUNDS-None CONTROL ROOM - BURDENS - None CONTROL ROOM - DEFICIENCIES -None OUTAGE-RELATED repairs in the CTRM - None

Page 2 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST GENERAL STATUS Intake Chlorination (Primary Oxidant) - OOS Intake Actibrom (Oxidant enhancer) - OOS Circwater Chlorination (Primary Oxidant) - Pumps 1 & 3 Circwater Actibrom (Oxidant Enhancer) - I/S Circwater Trasar (Scale inhibitor) - I/S Pumps 1 & 3 Collection Box Sodium Bisulfite (Dechlorinator) - I/S RCS Zinc Injection (Crud Layer Enhancement) - I/S Polishers I/S: 1, 2, 3, 4 MUT press band: 30-40 psig MSD Skid #1: I/S MSR 1 Drains: Forward MSD Skid #2: I/S MSR 2 Drains: Forward

                              • Screen Wash Catch Basin aligned to the North Settling Basin 5/18/2016 ***************

EVOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS - None FOLLOW-UP ITEMS-None

Page 3 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST ACTIVE DB LICENSE REQUIREMENTS (TS, TRM, FHAR, ODCM, FLEX)

Issue Date & Next Action Due Equipment Owner/

Time Specification Action Required Responsible Affected Test Entered Individual Leader SFAS Ch 3 Today T.S. 3.3.5 A.1 One or more Parameters with one channel inoperable. Place channel in trip RCS Pressure Action Completed I&C 0100 Condition A within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Transmitter FUNCTIONAL EP RELATED EQUIPMENT REQUIRING COMPENSATORY ACTIONS

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Davis-Besse Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: DB NRC 2020 Examiners: Operators: SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: 100% Power Turnover: Maintain 100% Power Planned: Place cooling tower makeup (CTMU) pump 2 in service and stop CTMU pump 1.

Critical tasks:

1. Shutdown the Reactor - ATWS (CT-24)
2. Control HPI (CT-5)

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 N-BOP/SRO Swap Cooling Tower Makeup (CTMU) Pumps 2 TS-SRO RC TE3A6 Hot Leg temp to SCM meter (TS) 3 C-ATC/SRO MU32 fails closed (use alt inj line)

C-BOP/SRO 4 Startup (SU) Transformer 02 Lockout (TS)

TS-SRO C-BOP/SRO Main Feed Pump (MFP) low oil pressure - trip MFP -

5 runback works R-ATC/SRO 6 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Rupture C-BOP 7 Major ATWS - Key Switch Works 8 C-ATC/SRO PZR Spray valve fails closed

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 1 of 18

Scenario Event Summary DAVIS-BESSE 2020 NRC SCENARIO 4 The crew will take the watch with the plant at 100% power.

EVENT 1: Swap Cooling Tower Makeup (CTMU) Pumps The BOP will swap CTMU Pumps IAW DB-OP-06232, Circ Water and Cooling Tower Operation to support planned maintenance.

EVENT 2: RC TE3A6 Hot Leg temp to SCM meter fails high (TS)

The Lead Evaluator will cue event 2, RC TE3A6 Hot Leg temperature to SCM meter failure high.

The crew will respond to annunciator 4-1-B, Sub Cooling Margin LO, and indications of RC TE3A6 failure, and SCM meter of 0 degrees. The SRO will identify this as a Tech Spec required Post Accident Monitoring instrument and enter TS 3.3.17 Condition A (TS).

EVENT 3: MU32 fails closed (use alt inj line)

When the Tech Spec 3.3.17 is entered the Lead Evaluator will cue MU32, Pressurizer Level Control Valve to fail closed. The crew will diagnose the failure with indications of low makeup flow and Pressurizer level lowering with Makeup Tank (MUT) level rising. Manual control of MU32 demand signal will not affect makeup flow. The Unit Supervisor will implement abnormal procedure DB-OP-02512, Loss of RCS Makeup. MU32 will be isolated IAW DB-OP-06006. The alternate injection line may be placed in service at this time.

EVENT 4: Startup Transformer 02 Lockout (TS)

After letdown is in service, the Lead Evaluator will cue the SU Trans 02 Lockout. Annunciator 1-1-G, SU XFMR 02 LOCKOUT will alarm and the SRO will implement DB-OP-02001, Electrical Distribution Alarm Panel 1 Annunciators and enter T.S. 3.8.1 Off-Site AC Sources.

EVENT 5: MFP low oil pressure - trip MFP - runback works When the T.S 3.8.1 is entered the Lead Evaluator will cue MFP low oil pressure. The BOP will implement DB-OP-02010, Feedwater Alarm Panel 10 Annunciators. The standby oil pump will fail to start which will require MFPT 2 to be tripped. The plant will runback to 55% power.

EVENT 6: SG Tube Rupture At Lead Evaluators discretion a Steam Generator Tube Rupture will be cued. DB-OP-02000, Section 8 will be implemented. The Plant will be reduced to low level limits and steam flow will be transferred from the Turbine to the Turbine Bypass Valves.

EVENT 7: ATWS - Key Switch Works After Steam Loads are transferred the Reactor Trip Buttons will fail resulting in an ATWS (CT-24). The ATC will activate the key switch which will shut down the reactor.

EVENT 8: PZR Spray valve fails closed The ATC will be directed to reduce RCS pressure to minimum subcooling margin. When this is attempted it will be recognized that the PZR spray valve is failed closed and the alternate PZR Vent Line method will be used. The ATC will control HPI to maintain RCS inventory (CT-5)

When the pressure reduction has begun and HPI has been throttled the scenario can be terminated.

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 2 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Swap CTMU Pumps for maintenance Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • SRO/BOP TOWER MAKEUP PUMP 2 Stop Cooling Tower Makeup Pump 1 using HIS922, COOLING
  • SRO/BOP TOWER MAKEUP PUMP 1 Monitor:
  • Motor amps TEAM
  • pump indications are normal CUE
  • pump discharge pressure is 34 psig and steady.

At Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 2, RC TE3A6 Hot Leg temp to SCM meter failure (TS)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 3 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

RC TE3A6 Hot Leg temp to SCM meter (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • 4-1-B, SUB COOLING MARGIN LO
  • RC TE3A6 indicates 899 °F
  • Subcooling margin meter indicates 0 °F TEAM Recognize indications of RC TE3A6 loop 2 Thot PAM failure.

Refer to DB-OP-02004, Reactor Coolant Alarm Panel 4 Annunciators, for 4-1-B TEAM

  • Determines subcooling margin is satisfactory
  • Determines RC TE3A6 loop 2 Thot instrument failure (TI RC3A6, Channel 2 Loop 2 Thot, fails high)
  • Determine TS 3.3.17 for Function 2 is not met
  • SRO Condition A: One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable.

o REQUIRED ACTION: Restore required channel to OPERABLE o COMPLETION TIME: 30 days SRO Refer to TRM 8.3.7 for SCM meter - only 1 channel is required NOTE:

There is no procedure direction to reference TS 3.3.17. If necessary, ask this TS reference as a follow-up.

May refer to the following surveillance tests to evaluate operability of RC TE3A6

  • DB-SC-03165, PSAT/TSAT MONTHLY TEST On Lead Evaluators discretion, proceed to Event 3, MU32 Fails closed NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 4 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

MU32 Fails closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • MU32 demand rising with no increase in makeup flow
  • PZR level lowering
  • Computer Point Z750, RC MU CTRL VLV (% OPEN)

Recognize MU flow inappropriate for existing PZR level and CREW MU32 demand signal CREW Dispatch EO and/or I&C to MU32 After 2 minutes role play as EO report MU32 local position indicates closed, all other indications look normal.

BOOTH CUE IF asked, role play I&C do not see anything obvious with MU 32, will get a work order started to troubleshoot SRO Implement DB-OP-02512, Loss of RCS Makeup IF level is below set point by 20 inches then close MU2B using ATC HISMU2B Reduce Letdown flow to a minimum of 25 gpm by throttling MU6

  • SRO/ATC using HCMU6 and verify MU4 is closed ATC Place MU32 in hand (LICRC14) and reduce demand to zero NOTE:

It is acceptable for the crew to elect to use the guidance in DB-OP-02512 Attachment 4 to isolate MU32 and place the alternate injection line in service.

REFER TO DB-OP-06006, Makeup and Purification System, SRO Section 4.20, Removal of MU32 from Service for Maintenance NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 5 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

MU32 Fails closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Throttle MU6, LETDOWN FLOW CONTROL, as necessary to ATC maintain a Pressurizer Level band of 210 to 220 inches Contact EO to Close MU209, NORMAL MAKE-UP FLOW ATC CONTROLLER INLET ISOLATION.

NOTE: The following 2 steps may be performed at any time in any order.

IF additional MU flow is needed to control Pressurizer level THEN Raise the setpoint on FICMU19, RCP SEAL INJECTION ATC FLOW CONTROL MU19, not to exceed a maximum of 10 GPM on any Reactor Coolant Pump IF the Alternate Injection Line is required to maintain Pressurizer level, THEN perform the following:

  • Open MU6421
  • Direct EO to Close MU6423A, ATC
  • Direct EO to Open MU6423B
  • Direct EO to Slowly Throttle open (over ~5 minutes)

MU6423A until flow is 12 to 15 gpm as read on FI6435, RC NR MU Line 1

  • Throttle open MU6419 to maintain Pressurizer Level band Role play as EO BOOTH
  • after 3 minutes, MU209, NORMAL MAKE-UP FLOW CUE CONTROLLER INLET ISOLATION is closed.
  • Operate MU6423A and MU6423B as directed Provide PZR level band for manual level control - May refer to SRO DB-PF-06703 curve CC4.3 REFER TO TRM 8.1.1, Boration Systems - Operating - No entry SRO is required SRO Notify SM to perform required notifications and Fleet Updates When PZR level has been stabilized and at Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 4, Startup Transformer Lockout NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 6 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

Startup Transformer Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • 1-1-G SU XFMR 02 LOCKOUT
  • 1-2-G SU XFMR 02 DNGR
  • ACB 34562 Open
  • 81-B-65 Open & 81-B-67 Open BOP Implement DB-OP-02001, Electrical Distribution Panel 1 CREW Recognize Startup Transformer 02 Lockout and loss of K bus BOP Check Bus A and B are energized Verify the following are open:
  • 34562
  • 81-B-65 ATC/BOP
  • 81-B-67
  • HX02A
  • HX02B SRO Notify the Load Dispatcher K Bus is de-energized Booth Role play as Load Dispatcher:

Cue If requested, Well send a crew to investigate Direct Field Supervisor to isolate SU Transformer 02, refer to DB-SRO OP-06311, 345KV Switchyard Procedure Booth Role Play as the Field Supervisor, Cue Isolate SU Transformer 02 IAW DB-OP-06311 BOP/ATC Dispatch Equipment Operator to investigate S/U Xfmr 02 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 7 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

Startup Transformer Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role play as EO, Booth Cue Local Annunciator Alarm (102-7-A) SUDDEN PRESSURE is in alarm. SU Transformer 02 has no visible damage.

SRO Implement DB-OP-02521, Loss of AC Bus Power Sources Notify the Shift Manager to perform the following:

  • REFER TO RA-EP-01500, Emergency Classification.

SRO

  • REFER TO NOP-OP1003, Grid Reliability Protocol.
  • REFER TO NOP-OP-1015, Event Notifications.
  • REFER TO NOBP-OP-0011, Fleet Reporting and Updates.
  • Determine LCO 3.8.1, is not met due to SU02 being inop
  • a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System

o REQUIRED ACTION A.1: Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for

OPERABLE offsite circuit(s)

COMPLETION TIME: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> AND o REQUIRED ACTION A.2 (Not applicable in this scenario) o AND o REQUIRED ACTION A.3 Restore offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

o COMPLETION TIME: 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> If asked, Role play as Field Supervisor, Booth Another Operator will ensure completion and review of DB-Cue SC-03023, Off-Site Sources Inform the System Dispatcher to take all necessary steps to SRO restore power to 02 Startup Transformer NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 8 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

Startup Transformer Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Refer to DB-OP-02102, Startup Transformer 02 Alarm Panel 102 ATC/BOP Annunciators for alarm 102-7-A NOTE: Same actions as transformer lockout

  • BOP Transfer B bus reserve source selector switch to X01 If necessary, role play as the Field Supervisor, Booth IAW DB-OP-06311, Step 3.17.A, verify HS6295, BUS B Cue RESERVE SOURCE, in the X01 position.

Booth If asked, role play as EO, Cue Positioned Local RSSS as directed When Tech Spec is entered and B bus reserve source selector switch has been transferred to X01, at Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 5, MFP low oil pressure - trip MFP, runback works NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 9 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

MFPT low oil pressure - trip MFP, runback works Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • PI1256, HDR PRESS Implement DB-OP-02010, Feedwater Alarm Panel 10 BOP Annunciators BOP Determine Bearing Pressure is low using PI1256, HDR PRESS BOP Attempt to start standby MFPT 2 Main Oil Pump 2 Start MFPT 2 Emergency Bearing Oil Pump using HIS1188, BOP EMER BEARING OIL PUMP
  • SRO/BOP Trip MFPT 2 using HS798, TURBINE TRIP CREW Monitor Plant Runback to 55% power NOTE: The following steps are not required to be completed in order to continue with scenario REFER TO DB-OP-06401, Integrated Control System Operating SRO Procedure for plant runback REFER TO DB-OP-06902, Power Operations, for guidance to SRO operate plant equipment for the current power level BOP Dispatch Zone 1 Operator NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 10 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

MFPT low oil pressure - trip MFP, runback works Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Role play as EO as required,

  • No Indication of oil leaks at MFPT 2 Booth Cue
  • Local bearing oil pressure indicating approximately 3 psig, no other abnormal indications at MFP 2
  • BF3272 MFPT 2 Main Oil Pump 2 has tripped open IF Pressurizer water level > 228 inches enter TS 3.4.9 Condition A
a. Pressurizer water level 228 inches SRO
  • CONDITION A: Pressurizer water level not within limit.

o REQUIRED ACTION: Restore level to within limit.

o COMPLETION TIME: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ATC Return the Load Control Panel back to Auto At Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 6, Steam Generator Tube Rupture with ATWS NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 11 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 1 of 5 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture with ATWS and Spray valve failed closed (~280 GPM)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • 12-1-B MN STM LINE 2 RAD HI
  • 9-4-A VAC SYS DISCH RAD HI
  • High activity on condenser off-gas radiation monitors
  • Increasing Makeup flow CREW Recognize indications of a tube leak #2 Steam Generator SRO Implement DB-OP-02531, Steam Generator Tube Leak Calculate the RCS Leak rate using the computer calculation for ATC RCS Leakage. (5 minute average preferred)

Route to DB-OP-02000, SFAS, RPS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube SRO Rupture, Section 8 Monitor Pressurizer level ATC

  • Anytime Pressurizer level is <100 inches - trip Reactor Notify the Shift Manager to refer to RA-EP-01500, Emergency SRO Classification Implement Attachment 8, Place MU/HPI/LPI in Service
  • Start the STBY CCW Pump
  • Start both HPI Pumps
  • Open HP 2A, HP 2B, HP 2C and HP 2D SRO/ATC/
  • Start both LPI Pumps
  • Open DH 64 and DH 63
  • Transfer MU Pump suctions to the BWST AND press OFF
  • Start the STBY Makeup pump o May place Alternate Injection Line in-service ATC If Pressurizer <200 inches isolate Letdown - Close MU2B NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 12 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 2 of 5 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture with ATWS and Spray valve failed closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Place SG/RX in Hand and reduce power to place both SGs on low

  • SRO/ATC level limits SRO Direct Chemistry to perform Attachment 2 SRO Direct Radiation Protection to perform Attachment 3 Direct an Equipment Operator/Field Supervisor to perform SRO Attachment 4 Direct startup of the Auxiliary Boiler on Demineralized water and SRO then transfer Auxiliary Steam to the Auxiliary Boiler Check MSR 2nd Stage Reheat High Load Valves have closed BOP
  • MS195A and MS195B WHEN Condensate flow is less than 3.5 MPPH, THEN establish
  • SRO/BOP one Condensate Pump in operation.

If necessary, role play as EO, Aux Boiler start-up in Booth progress.

Cue NOTE: Booth operator to prevent Aux Boiler Trip When both SGs on low level limits

  • Verify SG/RX Demand at zero demand (ATC)

SRO/ATC/

  • BOP AND reduce the demands to zero
  • Reduce Generator load to less than 50 MWe NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 13 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 3 of 5 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture with ATWS and Spray valve failed closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Attempt to Trip Reactor at 50 MWe Critical Recognize the reactor does not trip and perform DB-OP-02000, Immediate Actions response not obtained Task ATC

  • At the Rod Control Panel, insert the Reactor Trip Test key (CT-24) AND rotate clockwise to depower the CRDMs Verify DB-OP-02000 Immediate Actions
  • Trip the reactor ATC
  • VERIFY Reactor Power is lowering on the Intermediate range
  • Trip the turbine
  • VERIFY all Turbine Stop Valves OR Control Valves are closed Implement Specific Rules
  • ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF SUBCOOLING MARGIN CREW
  • POWER FOR C1 AND D1 BUSES OR EDG START Check for Symptoms
  • Lack of Adequate Subcooling Margin CREW
  • Lack of Heat Transfer
  • Overcooling

ATC/BOP Recheck Attachment 8 is complete If Pressurizer Level is less than 40 inches:

  • Lock MU Pump suctions on the BWST ATC
  • Isolate Letdown
  • Verify Pressurizer heaters are off NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 14 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 4 of 5 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture with ATWS and Spray valve failed closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Maintain Pressurizer level at approximately 100 inches ATC NOTE: MU 32 failed closed, may use MU 32 Bypass and/or place Alternate Injection Line in service Verify DB-OP-02531 Attachments are in progress

  • Direct Chemistry to perform Attachment 2 SRO
  • Direct Radiation Protection to perform Attachment 3
  • Direct an Equipment Operator/Field Supervisor to perform Attachment 4 ATC Turn off all Pressurizer heaters When directed use Pressurizer Spray to reduce RCS pressure ATC

- Recognize the Spray valve is failed closed Route to step 8.25 for using the Pressurizer Vent for RCS SRO pressure reduction BOP/ATC Start the Quench Tank Circ Pump BOP/ATC Close DR2012A and DR2012B Reduce RCS pressure to close to the minimum adequate SCM:

Pressurizer Vent Line Method

  • SRO/ATC
  • Open RC 200
  • Open RC 239A o Cycle RC 239A and Pressurizer Heaters to control RCS Pressure Critical Task Throttle High Pressure Injection ATC
  • Control Pressurizer level by controlling MU and HPI (CT-5)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 15 of 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 5 of 5 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture with ATWS and Spray valve failed closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Begin an RCS cooldown at 100°F/hr, using both SGs NOTE: The following steps are not required to complete the scenario Block the SFAS Low RCS Pressure trips when the BLOCK ATC PERMITs come in CREW Check for PTS Criteria, REFER TO Specific Rule 5 When RCS Pressure Reduction and Cooldown have begun, and HPI has been throttled the scenario can be terminated NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 16 of 18

Justification for Critical Tasks The term Critical Task, is defined in NUREG-1021, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINER STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS. The listed critical tasks were compiled based on a review of Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06, EOP Technical Bases Document, and additional CTs were added based on established DB Operations expectations and standards for previously identified Critical Task.

CT-24: Shutdown Reactor- ATWS

1. Safety Significance:

When the Reactor is tripped the reactor trip pushbuttons will fail to cause a reactor trip.

2. Cues:
  • Reactor power not lowering on the Intermediate Range
3. Measured by:

Continuing in EOP with mitigation strategy prior to reactor being tripped

4. Feedback:

Reactor Power is lowering on the Intermediate Range CT-5: Control High Pressure Injection

1. Safety Significance:

A Steam Generator Tube Rupture will require High Pressure Injection to be placed in service and throttled to prevent violating the RPV P-T Limit by maintaining RCS inventory and minimum subcooling margin

2. Cues:
  • SCM Meters
  • DB-OP-02000 Specific Rule 3
3. Measured by:

HPI must be throttled prior to violating RV P-T Limit

4. Feedback:
  • SCM Meters
  • Pressurizer level

SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1. Simulator Setup
  • 100% Power
  • ATWS (Key switch works)
  • PZR Spray valve failed closed on Rx trip
  • #1 CTMU in service
2. Procedures
  • DB-OP-02512 Makeup and Purification System Malfunctions
  • DB-OP-02001, Electrical Distribution Alarm Panel 1 Annunciators
  • DB-OP-02521, Loss of AC Bus Power Sources
  • DB-OP-02102, Startup Transformer 02 Alarm Panel 102 Annunciators
  • DB-OP-06401, Integrated Control System
  • DB-OP-06902, Power Operations
  • DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture
3. For Simulator Instructor

Page 1 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST DATE: Today SHIFT: NIGHTS MODE: 1 POWER: 100%

SECURITY RISK: GREEN PLANT ONLINE RISK: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: 2 PLANT CONDITION: 1 SHUTDOWN DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH:

ACTIVE ALERTS: NONE GRID CONDITION: NORMAL N/A ADDITIONAL PROTECTED EQUIPMENT - None CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR OPERABILITY/AVAIL IN EFFECT - None OUTSTANDING PROMPT OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS - None SHIFT ACTIVITIES COMPLETED-None PLANNED Swap CTMU in preparation for planned maintenance ALARM STATUS -None ZONE 1 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS -None ZONE 1 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 1 - BURDENS - None ZONE 2 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS -None ZONE 2 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 2 - BURDENS - None ZONE 3 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS -None ZONE 3 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 3 - BURDENS - None CONTROL ROOM - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS-None CONTROL ROOM - WORKAROUNDS-None CONTROL ROOM - BURDENS - None CONTROL ROOM - DEFICIENCIES -None OUTAGE-RELATED repairs in the CTRM - None

Page 2 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST GENERAL STATUS Intake Chlorination (Primary Oxidant) - OOS Intake Actibrom (Oxidant enhancer) - OOS Circwater Chlorination (Primary Oxidant) - Pumps 1 &

Circwater Actibrom (Oxidant Enhancer) - I/S 3

Circwater Trasar (Scale inhibitor) - I/S Pumps 1 & 3 Collection Box Sodium Bisulfite (Dechlorinator) - I/S MUT press band: 30-40 RCS Zinc Injection (Crud Layer Enhancement) - I/S Polishers I/S: 1, 2, 3, 4 psig MSD Skid #1: I/S MSR 1 Drains: Forward MSD Skid #2: I/S MSR 2 Drains: Forward

                              • Screen Wash Catch Basin aligned to the North Settling Basin 5/18/2016 ***************

EVOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS - None FOLLOW-UP ITEMS-None

Page 3 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST Next Action Date Issue Specification Equipment Action Due/

& Time Owner/

Affected Required Responsible Entered Test Leader Individual

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Davis-Besse Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: DB NRC 2020 Examiners: Operators: SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: 100% Power Turnover: Maintain 100% Power Planned: Routine activities Critical tasks:

1. Isolate Overcooling Steam Generator (SG) (CT-17)
2. Feed Water (FW) Flow Control (CT-16)
3. Control Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Inventory (CT-30)

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description R-ATC/SRO 1 D2 Lockout - Power reduction (TS)

TS-SRO Station Air Compressor (SAC) 2 trip 2 C-BOP/SRO (SAC 1 Auto start fail) 3 I-ATC/SRO Power range (NI5) high failure I-BOP/SRO Place Reactor Protective System (RPS) Channel 2 in 4

TS-SRO Manual Bypass (TS) 5 C-ATC/SRO Turbine Vibration - trip Rx OVCLG - Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR) 2ND STG 6 Major/ALL FAIL Aux Feed Pump (AFP) Target rock fails open - Steam 7 C-BOP/SRO Generator (SG) overfeed 8 C-ATC/SRO Makeup Pump (MUP) Trip - Loss of Both MUPs

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 1 of 14

Scenario Event Summary DAVIS-BESSE 2020 NRC SCENARIO 5 Direction for the crew is to maintain 100% power.

EVENT 1: D2 Lockout - Power reduction due to loss of Cond Pump (TS)

The lead evaluator will cue event 1, D2 Lockout. The CSRO will implement DB-OP-02521, Loss of AC Bus Sources. The crew will identify a loss of #2 Cond Pump. DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown will be utilized to lower power to within the capacity of two condensate pumps.

EVENT 2: SAC 2 trip (SAC 1 Auto start fail) (TS)

SAC 2 and the Emergency Instrument AC (EIAC) will lose power when Bus D2 is lost. SAC 1 will fail to Auto start causing entry into DB-OP-02528, Loss of Instrument Air. The BOP will manually start SAC 1 and verify IA pressure recovers. T.S. 3.7.5 for the Motor Driven Feed Pump and T.S. 3.8.1 Off-Site AC Sources will be entered.

EVENT 3: Power range (NI5) high failure When Tech Specs have been entered, the lead evaluator will cue event 3, Power Range Nuclear Instrument NI-5 fails high, which will cause rods to insert due to the Integrated Control System (ICS) system responding to the failed high signal. The crew will take actions to stabilize the plant per abnormal procedure DB-OP-02505, Nuclear Instrument Failures.

EVENT 4: Place RPS Channel 2 in Manual Bypass (TS)

When the plant is stable, the Unit Supervisor will direct placing RPS Channel 2 in Manual Bypass IAW DB-OP-06403, RPS and NI Operating Procedure, and the Power Range Test Module in Test Operate IAW DB-OP-02505, NI Failures. The Unit Supervisor will enter applicable T.S. 3.3.1 for RPS Channel 2 in Manual Bypass.

EVENT 5: Turbine Vibration - trip Rx The Lead Evaluator will cue the Main Turbine bearing vibration increase. Annunciator 15-2-E, T-G BEARING VIB HI will alarm. The crew will respond in accordance with DB-OP-02015, Turbine Alarm Panel Annunciators, trip the reactor and GO TO DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture.

EVENT 6: OVCLG - MSR 2ND STG FAIL Event 6 will be automatically triggered when the reactor trips. The MSR Second Stage Reheat Valves fail to auto close. The crew will identify indications of Overcooling and the Unit Supervisor will route to section 7 for Overcooling. Implementation of attachment 20, Isolate or Control Potential Source of Overcooling, should identify the MSR Second Stage Reheat Valves failing to auto close. MS314 and 199 will not close if attempted to manually close. The crew will then Initiate and isolate SFRCS to terminate the overcooling. (CT-17)

EVENT 7: AFP Target rock fails open - SG overfeed AFPT 2 will start and feed at full flow with its discharge valve failed open. The BOP will be required to control SG2 level with AFPT 2 speed control. (CT-16)

EVENT 8: MUP Trip - Loss of Both MUPs The MUP will trip due to low lube oil pressure at the same time as the Reactor Trip. The STBY MUP will not start. RCS Pressure will be lowered to allow High Pressure Injection (HPI) flow to maintain RCS Inventory. (CT-30)

When SG2 level and the Pressurizer level are being controlled the scenario can be terminated.

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 2 of 14

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 and 2 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

D2 Lockout Power Reduction SAC 1 fails to Auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • 0 volts on EI6261
  • All D2 Bus load and supply breakers open
  • AD213 Open Team Recognize D2 bus has locked out SRO Route to DB-OP-02521, Loss of AC Bus Sources Notify the Shift Manager to perform the following:
  • REFER TO RA-EP-01500, Emergency Classification.

SRO

  • REFER TO NOP-OP-1015, Event Notifications.
  • REFER TO NOBP-OP-0011, Fleet Reporting and Updates.

Review E-1040A, Electrical Distribution Manual to determine what TEAM loads have been lost TEAM Recognize loss of Condensate Pump 2 and Heater Drain Pump 2 SRO Refer to DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown Determine the power reduction method, target power level, and SRO rate of power reduction for 2 Condensate Pumps Use DB-OP-02504 Attachment 1, Power Reduction Actions ICS Full Automatic to reduce power

  • At the LOAD CONTROL Panel, set the rate of change to the
  • SRO/ATC rate specified by the Command SRO
  • Select the target RTP as determined by the Command SRO O Monitor Reactor Power to confirm power is being reduced at approximately the expected rate Monitor Regulating Rod Insertion Limits during the Shutdown per ATC Technical Specification 3.2.1 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 3 of 14

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 and 2 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

D2 Lockout Power Reduction SAC 1 fails to Auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Monitor Axial Power Imbalance between 0 and negative ATC 20 percent using APSRs NOTE: The crew will lower power to be within the capacity of two Condensate pumps. They may elect to initially lower LIC420 and LIC421 set points, or to place them in Manual to keep Condensate Flow at approximately 7 MPPH Monitor Condensate Flow at approximately 7 MPPH using LIC420 BOP and LIC421 At approximately 90 percent power, notify an Equipment Operator BOP to remove the Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Main Steam Minimum flow lines from service. (Directed by Attachments 6 and 15)

Team Recognize SAC 1 did not auto start and the EIAC has lost power SRO Refer to DB-OP-02528, Loss of Instrument Air for loss of SAC 2

  • SRO/BOP Start SAC 1
  • Determine LCO 3.8.1, is not met due to Bus Tie Transformer AC supplying both 4.16 kV Essential busses
a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System

o REQUIRED ACTION A.1: Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for

  • SRO OPERABLE offsite circuit(s) o COMPLETION TIME: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> AND o REQUIRED ACTION A.2: (Not applicable) o AND o REQUIRED ACTION A.3: Restore offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

o COMPLETION TIME: 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 4 of 14

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 and 2 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

D2 Lockout Power Reduction SAC 1 fails to Auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • o CONDITION B: MDFP inoperable REQUIRED ACTION: Restore EFW train to OPERABLE o COMPLETION TIME: 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> BOP Dispatch EOs to Bus D2 and SAC 1 Role play as EO as requested,
  • Close HD6
  • It appears the D2 86 lock-out relay has actuated
  • Cues for HTR 2-1 Trip

- GS957, STEAM SEAL REGULATOR DUMP TO LP FW Booth HEATER 2-1, is closed.

Cue - HD331B, LOW PRESSURE FEEDWATER HEATER 2-2 NORMAL DRAIN, is closed.

- HD331A, LOW PRESSURE FEEDWATER HEATER 2-2 EMERGENCY DRAIN, is controlling LP Feedwater Heater 2-2 Level.

- LP Feedwater Heater 2-1 level is normal When plant is stabilized and at Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to event 3, Power range (NI5) high failure NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 5 of 14

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 and 4 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Power range (NI5) high failure and Place RPS Channel 2 in Manual Bypass (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • Rods inserting Crew Recognize that NI5 has failed high SRO Implement DB-OP-02505, Nuclear Instrumentation Failures
  • Place the Rod Control Panel in MANUAL
  • SRO/ATC
  • Place the Reactor Demand Hand Auto Station in HAND IF proper RCS Tave control by Feedwater is NOT indicated, BOP THEN, place BOTH Feedwater Loop Demands to HAND AND adjust FW Demand to stabilize RCS Tave Crew Determine which Power Range Nuclear Instrument(s) have failed
  • Determine LCO 3.3.1 is not met for functions 1,7, and 8
  • CONDITION A: One channel inoperable o REQUIRED ACTION: Place channel in bypass or trip o COMPLETION TIME: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> SRO Refer to TS 3.3.16 (only 3 ARTS Channels required)

Notify SM to refer to reactivity management, event notifications, SRO and Fleet Update requirements Brief contingency actions for Power Range instrument failure

  • Rapid Feed Water Reduction (RFR) will not actuate SRO
  • Main FW block valves will not auto close NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 6 of 14

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 and 4 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Power range (NI5) high failure and Place RPS Channel 2 in Manual Bypass (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF Pressurizer water level > 228 inches enter TS 3.4.9 Condition A

a. Pressurizer water level 228 inches SRO
  • CONDITION A: Pressurizer water level not within limit.

o REQUIRED ACTION: Restore level to within limit.

o COMPLETION TIME: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />

  • Directs placing RPS Ch 2 in Manual Bypass per DB-OP-06403, Reactor Protective System (RPS) and Nuclear SRO Instrumentation (NI) Operating Procedure
  • Directs placing the Power Range Test Module for the affected channel in TEST OPERATE
  • Obtain RPS Manual Bypass key and RPS Ch 2 door key
  • Rotate the MANUAL-BYPASS KEY SWITCH to actuate the BOP manual bypass relay in RPS Channel 2
  • Check MANUAL-BYPASS light is BRIGHT
  • Check SUB-SYSTEM light is DIM
  • SRO/BOP Place the Power Range Test Module for NI5 in TEST OPERATE NOTE: ICS IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE IN AUTO TO CONTINUE SCENARIO SRO Directs placing ICS in Auto per DB-OP-06401, ICS Procedure
  • Depress AUTO on HC NI44, ROD CONTROL PANEL ATC
  • Verify Tave at setpoint
  • Depress AUTO on HIC ICS20, REACTOR DEMAND If necessary, place Feedwater Loop Demands in auto
  • Adjust FEEDWATER DEMAND to place measured variable BOP on the caret

On Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 5, Turbine Vibration - Reactor Trip NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 7 of 14

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 5 Event # 5, 6, 7, 8 Page 1 of 4 Event

Description:

Turbine Vibration - Trip Rx, Overcooling, Overfeed, and Loss of MUPs Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications Available:

  • 15-2-E T-G BEARING VIB HI
  • DEHC Panel Turbine Bearing Vibration screen NOTE: Annunciator may alarm prior to BOP seeing on panel)

CREW Recognize Turbine Vibrations increasing BOP Refer to DB-OP-02015, Turbine Alarm panel 15 Annunciators BOP Identify Turbine bearing vibration above 12 mils Trip the reactor GO TO DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture.

  • Manually trip the reactor
  • SRO/ATC O Verify power decreasing in the intermediate range O Manually trip the turbine O Verify all Turbine Stop Valves OR Control Valves are closed.

SRO Route to DB-OP-02000, Section 3 Verify immediate actions

  • Verify Reactor is tripped SRO/ATC
  • Verify power decreasing in the intermediate range
  • Verify Turbine is Tripped
  • Verify all 4 Stop Valves or Control Valves are closed SRO Route to DB OP 02000, Section 4 Supplemental Actions Implement any necessary Specific Rules Actions
  • ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF SUBCOOLING MARGIN CREW
  • POWER FOR C1 AND D1 BUSES OR EDG START NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 8 of 14

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 5 Event # 5, 6, 7, 8 Page 2 of 4 Event

Description:

Turbine Vibration - Trip Rx, Overcooling, Overfeed, and Loss of MUPs Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Implement any necessary Symptom Mitigation Sections

  • Lack of Adequate Subcooling Margin CREW
  • Lack of Heat Transfer
  • Overcooling
  • Steam Generator Tube Rupture NOTE: Crew may route to Overcooling at this point if symptom is identified early ATC Check for all Group 1-7 Control Rods fully inserted ATC Perform Attachment 1, Primary Inventory Control Actions.
1. Transfer MU Pump suctions to the BWST position AND press OFF for each switch.
  • MU3971
2. Set Pressurizer Level Controller to 100 inches Recognize MUP 1 tripped
  • Check Component Cooling water is available to the RCPs.

ATC

  • Close MU19.
  • Close MU32
  • Attempt to Start the STBY MUP
1. Perform Attachment 8, Place HPI/LPI/MU in service to start HPI and LPI.

ATC

2. Notify the CSRO to reduce RCS pressure using heaters AND spray to 1700 to 1800 psig to allow HPI injection to maintain PZR level.

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 9 of 14

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 5 Event # 5, 6, 7, 8 Page 3 of 4 Event

Description:

Turbine Vibration - Trip Rx, Overcooling, Overfeed, and Loss of MUPs Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify both HPI Trains are in service as follows:

  • Critical
  • Verify both CCW Trains are in service Task ATC * *Start both HPI Pumps (CT-30)
  • Verify all HPI Injection valves are open (HP2C HP2D HP2A HP2B)

Verify both LPI Trains are in service as follows:

  • Verify both LPI Pumps are running ATC
  • Open both piggyback valves (DH64 DH63)

NOTE: May use guidance in DB-OP-02512, Makeup and Purification System Malfunctions Attachment 6, RCS Pressure Control After Reactor Trip Maintain Pressurizer Level

  • Critical
  • Turn off all PZR Heaters.

Task ATC

  • Reduce RCS pressure to between 1700 and 1800 psig (CT-30) using RC 2, PZR SPRAY VALVE.
  • *Throttle HPI flow to maintain Pressurizer level Perform Attachment 2: SG Inventory and Pressure Control BOP Actions Verify Steam Generator Levels are being controlled per Specific BOP Rule 4, Steam Generator Control.

Verify Steam Generator Pressures are being controlled by BOP automatic operation of the TBVs BOP Identify Overcooling SRO Route to Section 7.0 Overcooling ATC Verify Attachment 8, Place HPI/LPI/MU in service NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 10 of 14

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2020 Scenario # 5 Event # 5, 6, 7, 8 Page 4 of 4 Event

Description:

Turbine Vibration - Trip Rx, Overcooling, Overfeed, and Loss of MUPs Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Implement Attachment 20, Isolate or Control Potential Source of SRO Overcooling Identify MSR Second Stage Reheat Steam Valves are failed open BOP

  • MS199, MSR 1 REHEAT STEAM SOURCE
  • MS195B, MSR 1 REHEAT STEAM HIGH LOAD BOP Attempt to close MSR Second Stage Reheat Steam Valves If called, role play as EO, MSR Second Stage Reheat Steam Booth Valves cannot be closed locally Cue
  • MS199, MSR 1 REHEAT STEAM SOURCE
  • MS195B, MSR 1 REHEAT STEAM HIGH LOAD Critical Task BOP Terminate the overcooling. Manually Initiate and Isolate SFRCS (CT-17)
  • Verify proper SFRCS actuation
  • Verify SG pressures are equal BOP
  • Control AVVs to maintain RCS temperature constant or slowly decreasing
  • Verify proper SG level control BOP Recognize SG2 above setpoint with full Aux Feedwater flow Critical Control SG2 level by performing one or more of the following:

Task BOP

  • Reduce AFPT 2 speed (CT-16)
  • Close AF599 When Pressurizer Level is being maintained in a band of 80-120 inches and SG2 level is being controlled IAW SR4, the Scenario can be terminated NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 11 of 14

Justification for Critical Tasks The term Critical Task, is defined in NUREG-1021, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINER STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS. The listed critical tasks were compiled based on a review of Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06, EOP Technical Bases Document, and additional CTs were added based on established DB Operations expectations and standards for previously identified Critical Task.

CT-17: Isolate Overcooling SG

1. Safety Significance:

The MSR Second Stage Reheat Valves fail to auto close which causes an overcooling

2. Cues:
  • SG Pressure lowering to less than post trip expected value
  • DB-OP-02000 Section 7, Overcooling
3. Measured by:

Manually I&I SFRCS or align valves per Table 1 DB-OP-02000 to isolate overcooling within 10 minutes of SG(s) pressure 630 psig

4. Feedback:
  • SG Pressure
  • Valve indication aligned per Table 1 of DB-OP-02000 such that MSIV of affected SG is closed.

CT-16: FW Flow Control

1. Safety Significance:

Control FW to mitigate excessive Pri/Sec heat transfer

2. Cues:
  • SG2 above level setpoint with full Aux Feedwater flow
  • DB-OP-02000 Specific Rule 4
3. Measured by:

FW flow to the affected SG(s) must be controlled within 10 minutes of SG(s) pressure 630 psig

4. Feedback:
  • Reduce AFPT 2 speed or AF599 indicating Closed NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 12 of 14

Justification for Critical Tasks The term Critical Task, is defined in NUREG-1021, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINER STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS. The listed critical tasks were compiled based on a review of Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06, EOP Technical Bases Document, and additional CTs were added based on established DB Operations expectations and standards for previously identified Critical Task.

CT-30: Control RCS Inventory

1. Safety Significance:

HPI Pumps 1 and 2 Auto starts are failed and both MUPs are not available post trip. Failure to manually start an HPI Pump and control RCS inventory would eventually lead to a loss of SCM.

2. Cues:
  • Makeup Pump Status
  • DB-OP-02000 Attachments 1, 8 & 13, and Specific Rule 3
3. Measured by:
  • Starting HPI pumps
  • High Pressure Injection flow into the RCS
4. Feedback:
  • Rising Pressurizer level
  • High Pressure Injection flow into the RCS NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 13 of 14

SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1. Simulator Setup
  • 100% Power
  • 1 and 3 TPCW Pumps in service
  • SFRCS disabled
  • MUP 1 in service
  • MUP 2 fail to start
  • SAC 1 fail to AUTO start
  • HPI pumps 1 & 2 fail to AUTO Start
2. Procedures
  • DB-OP-02515, Nuclear Instrument Failures Abnormal
  • DB-OP-02526, Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer Upset
  • DB-OP-06403, Reactor Protective System (RPS) and Nuclear Instrumentation
  • DB-OP-06401, Integrated Control System
  • DB-OP-02002, Letdown/Makeup Alarm Panel
  • DB-OP-02512, Makeup and Purification System Malfunctions
  • DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown
  • DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 14 of 14

Page 1 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST DATE: Today SHIFT: NIGHTS MODE: 1 POWER: 100%

SECURITY RISK: GREEN PLANT ONLINE RISK: GREEN PROTECTED TRAIN: 2 PLANT CONDITION: 1 SHUTDOWN DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH:

ACTIVE ALERTS: NONE GRID CONDITION: NORMAL N/A ADDITIONAL PROTECTED EQUIPMENT - None CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR OPERABILITY/AVAIL IN EFFECT - None OUTSTANDING PROMPT OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS - None SHIFT ACTIVITIES COMPLETED Started #3 TPCW Pump and Stopped #2 TPCW Pump in preparation for clearance to support routine PMs.

PLANNED None ALARM STATUS -None ZONE 1 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS -None ZONE 1 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 1 - BURDENS - None ZONE 2 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS -None ZONE 2 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 2 - BURDENS - None ZONE 3 - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS -None ZONE 3 - WORKAROUNDS - None ZONE 3 - BURDENS - None CONTROL ROOM - ODMI TRIGGER POINTS-None CONTROL ROOM - WORKAROUNDS-None CONTROL ROOM - BURDENS - None CONTROL ROOM - DEFICIENCIES -None OUTAGE-RELATED repairs in the CTRM

Page 2 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST GENERAL STATUS Intake Chlorination (Primary Oxidant) - OOS Intake Actibrom (Oxidant enhancer) - OOS Circwater Chlorination (Primary Oxidant) - Pumps 1 &

Circwater Actibrom (Oxidant Enhancer) - I/S 3

Circwater Trasar (Scale inhibitor) - I/S Pumps 1 & 3 Collection Box Sodium Bisulfite (Dechlorinator) - I/S MUT press band: 30-40 RCS Zinc Injection (Crud Layer Enhancement) - I/S Polishers I/S: 1, 2, 3, 4 psig MSD Skid #1: I/S MSR 1 Drains: Forward MSD Skid #2: I/S MSR 2 Drains: Forward

                              • Screen Wash Catch Basin aligned to the North Settling Basin 5/18/2016 ***************

EVOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS - None FOLLOW-UP ITEMS-None

Page 3 of 3 SHIFT MGR/UNIT/FIELD SUPERVISOR/SHIFT ENGINEER TURNOVER CHECKLIST Next Action Date Issue Specification Equipment Action Due/

& Time Owner/

Affected Required Responsible Entered Test Leader Individual

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