ML20076D090

Formal Demand for Adjudicatory Hearing on OL Amend Re Steam Generator Tube Repairs & Petition to Intervene.Amend Presents Significant Hazards Consideration.Hearing Required.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20076D090
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	05/19/1983
From:	Doroshow J THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 8305200669
Download: ML20076D090 (14)

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UNITED STATES OF AMER IC A D0tKETED NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TA E BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 83 ffM 19 A9:15

, In the Matter of )

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit 1) )

FORMAL DEMAND FOR AN ADJUDICATORY HEARING ON AMENDMENT TO THE TMI-l OPERATING LICENSE CONCERNING STEAM GENERATOR TUBE REPAIRS Three Mile Island Alert, Inc. (" Petitioner") hereby formally demands that it be granted a full adjudicatory hearing on the amendment to the TMI-l Pacility Operating License, No. DPR-50 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion in June, l974, permitting operation of TMI-l after completion of explosive expansion reoairs to all steam generator tubes in the upper tubesheet, most of which had failed due to an "intergranular attack (IGA) initiated from the primary side (ID) of the the tubes resulting in the formalion of st.ress assisted intergranular cracks." SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, October, 1982. Further, Petitioner formally demands that l

l such license amendment not become immediately effective before completion of the hearing requested herein, pursuant to S12(a)(2)(A) of S189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of i 1954, 4 2 II. S.C. 2239(a), as amended, because of the "signifi-

! cant hazards consideration" involved with this repair process and subsequent operation of the plant.

8305200669 830519 PDR ADOCK 05000289 0 pm i ~

! In support of this demand, Petitioner asserts as follows:

1. Petitioner Three Mile Island Alert, Inc., a public interest organization located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, has been a recognized intervenor in hearings established by the Commission's order and Notice of Hearing dated August 9, 1979, Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-79-8, 10 NRC 141 (1979),

representing its membership and other members of the public residing in the vicinity of the Three Mile Island Nuclear facilities. Any order permitting operation of TMI-l may affect : he interests of Petitioner and those whom it repre-sents to live in a environment free from health and safety hazards resulting from operation of TMI-1. Petitioner has the requisite knowledge and experience suitable to qualify

, it to be admitted as a party to any hearing concerning the subject license amendment.

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! 2. The TMI-l f acility has not operated since its sister plant, TMI-2, experienced the worst commercial nuclear plant accident in history on March 28, 1979. On July 2, 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued an Order directing that TM1-1 be maintained in a shutdown condition pending further order of the Commission, further determining that it was in the public interest that a hearing precede any_possible j restart of TMI-1. The commission based its action on a conclusion that, In view of the variety of issues raised by the l accident at the Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 i

facility, the Commission presently lacks the i

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requisite reasonable assurance that the same licensee's Three Mile Island Unit No. 1 facility, a nuclear power reactor of similar design, can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public.

3. In late 1981, in the midst of the process esta-blished by the Commission to examine if TMI-1 could ever be safely operated, approximately 16,000 to 20,000 potentially defective steam generator tubes were detected in the secon-dary side of both steam generators at TMI-1, causing primary to secondary leakage. These defects were determined to be caused by intergranular stress corrosion initiated from the surface on the primary side resulting in the formation of circumferential intergranular cracks. The active chemical impurity causing the corrosion was determined to be sulfur, the source of which was thiosulfate from the reactor-building spray system which entered the primary system by leaking through isolation valves in the spray system and entering the reactor coolant system during testing. The majority of the defects occured within the top 2-3 inches of the 24 inch upper tubesheet (UTS).

4. In April, 1982, the Licensee notified the NRC staff that it had decided to repair the steam generator tubes using an explosive repair technique which would expand the the tubes against the tubesheet, thereby establishing a new leak limiting / load carrying seal. The Licensee further decided to apply the explosive repair technique to all tubes within the UTS.

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5. By letter dated August 23, 1982, Darrel G. Eisenhut, Director of the. Division of Licensing of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, (NRR) notified the Licensee that a license amendment would be required before such repairs could begin, and before subsequent operation of the plant could be permitted. In particular, Mr. Eisenhut stated,

[Blecause the portion of the tube within the tubesheet contains defects greater than 40%

throughwall and your repair method for the majority of these defects will not involve plugging, an amendment to the Technical Specifi-cations (TS) 4.19 will be needed prior to return to power operation.... In the Staff's view, this section of the TS applies to the existing condi-tion of the steam generators and not the condition following repair.

6. In October, 1982, NRR issued a Safety Evaluation of Licensee's proposed repair technique, concluding without opportunity for public comment, that the NRC staff was reversing its prior position with regard to the necessity of a license amendment before use of the explosive expansion repair technique, finding unilaterally that the " proposed repair process does not involve an unreviewed safety question or a modification to the Technical Specifications and hence, may be conducted without NRC approval." NRR clarified that the " Safety Evaluation is limited to an evaluation of the acceptability of performing the explo-sive expansion repair," not of the acceptability of opera-tion after completion of the repair process. (emphasis added).

7. Licensee began performing said explosive expansion repairs shortly after the Safety Evalution was issued.

Petitioner believes that Licensee has now substantially completed said repair process.

8. NRC has consistently maintained that a license amend-ment will be required before operation after completion of the explosive expansion repairs. See, Eisenhut letter of August 23, 1982, supra; Statement by Eisenhut before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Inves-tigation, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, December 13, 1982, (Transcript at p,n. 39, 42) ("It is, and it still remains, and has always been our position that prior to restart of that unit an amendment will be required... IT]he degradation problems at Three Mile Island clearly are unique, and we have taken the position that prior to restart on that facility an amendment is required... it is an unreviewed safety question."); See, also, Commission letter in response to February 23, 1983 inquiry f rom Hon. Morris K. Udall, Chairman, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

9. There is little question that Licensee will request a license amendment to permit operation of TMI-l with subject steam generator tube repairs in place. On February 2, 1983, the Licensee requested a license amendment to allow the repaired steam generators to be declared operable, but recently withdrew that request. In a letter dated April 19, 1983 to the NRC, Henry D. Hukill, Vice-President GPU

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Nuclear, stated that Licensee will be resubmitting its request for a license amendment sometime after May 6, 1983.

See, also, Additional Statements of GPU Nuclear Corpor-ation, before the _ House of Representatives Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Commitee on Interior and Insular Affairs, April 26, 1983, at p. II-7.

10. Under S12(a)(2)(A) of S189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2239(a), as amended, the NRC is required to hold a requested hearing on any license amend-ment, but under the recently enacted "Sholly" amendment to the Act, may avoid holding a requested hearing prior to that amendment becoming immediately effecive only g it finds that the amendment presents no significant hazards consider-ation. In enacting this provision, Congress explicitly intended that license amendments involving irreversible consequences (such as those ... allowing a facility to operate for a period of time.without full safety protec-tions) require prior hearings or the public's right to have its views considered would be foreclosed, and that

" borderline" cases be resolved in favor of finding a significant hazard consideration. H. R . Rep.97-884, p. 37 (1982),

11. The NRC has already admitted that the TMI-l steam tube problem is the very worst in the entire country.

See, Statement of liarold Denton, Director of NRR in testimony before the liouse of Representatives Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Interior and Insular

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Affairs, February 1, 1982. Moreover, the NRC staff has already-recognized potential safety hazards which could result from operation of TMI-l due to the subject steam tube repairs. An internal NRC memorandum dated May 19, 1982 from William V. Johnston, Assistant Director Materials and Qualif-ications Engineering, Division of Engineering, to Thomas Novak, Assistant Director for Operating Reactors, Division of Licensing, reveals the following concerns:

a. "To the extent that we have not experienced this type of behavior before, ... the staff has not reviewed the potential consequences of known defects. Particularly, the potential for this type of corrosion to rapidly progress upon restart and adversely affect the [ steam generator) primary pressure boundary."

b. "We consider the existence of a type of corrosion which has extensively degraded the steam generators, to also have the potential to degrade other reactor coolant' system materials." (It is significant that the Waste Gas System and the critical PORV [ Power Operated Relief Valve] have already been identified as damaged by sulfer).

c. "The proposed repair technique involves a leak limiting rather than a leak free seal."(emphasis added). (In GPU's October 18-19, 1982 briefing to the NRC, Licensee indicated that this leakage will increase over time, and that in a five year life, the water leakage may increase by a factor of ten, causing increased radiation releases into the environment.)

d. ...[E]xcessive compressive loading may result upon heatup of the plant which could lead to bowing or local buckling which could cause new corrosion initiation sites."

12. Perhaps most significantly, the staff expresses concern with " rapid failures occuring upon plant restart."

No recommendations yet exist that the steam generators be tested to examine if the explosively expanded deformed tubes

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can withstand, for example, the pressure experience which would result from a turbine trip at maximum power, or from thermal shock which would be generated from inadvertent actuation of the emergency feedwater system at high power.

Common sense dictates that the extraordinarily hazardous potential consequences of " rapid f ailures occuring upon plant restart" or at any point mandate that the tube repair process and any testing procedure proposed by the Licensee or the NRC staff be fully examined in the context of a full adjudicatory hearing before the plant is permitted to operate.

13. Further, ia a September 19, 1982 memorandum, then Chairman of the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards ( ACRS) Paul Shewmon stated that a simultaneous rupture in each of the steam generators "isn't an incredible event." In a letter dated January 21, 1983, Congressman Edward J. Markey, Chairman of the subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, llouse committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, asked the Commission whether such an incident could lead to a sequence not encompassed by emergency procedures and whether this issue would be resolved before restart of the plant. In its response, the Commission stated, "Yes, a tube rupture in both SG's of a two SG plant could lead to a i

sequence not encompassed by the emergency procedures," and

( that while the issue was being considered under the TMI i

Action Plan (Item I.C.1), "(t)he Commission does not consider the implementation of this action plan item to be l

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D necessary before the restart of TMI-1. Congressman Markey then asked for clarificaiton of these comments by letter dated March 23, 1983. In its response dated May 5, 1983, the Commission could only state that a single tube rupture in both steam generators is " highly unlikely," is "not expected to result in core damage," but that "no probabil-istic risk assessment of the subject event has been performed by either the NRC staff or the ACRS for TMI-1."

(emphasis added). The Commission further noted that in the event that both steam generators have ruptured tubes, the operator would be forced to accomplish cooldown and depres-surization using at least one faulted steam generator, resulting in continuous leakage of primary coolant to the secondary system and thus releases of radioactive material to the environment. Clearly, such a scenario raises significant safety hazard considerations. The chances of, potential consequences of, and the ability of operators to handle multiple tube ruptures demand the most intense examination in the context of a full hearing before plant operation is allowed.

14. Moreover, failure to hold a prior hearing in this case through a "no significant hazard consideration" finding, would violate the express intent of Congress in enacting the "Sholly" amendment. Congressman Morris K.

Udall, Chairman of the llouse Committee on Interior and Insular Af f airs, and the Conference Committee out of which

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the "Sholly" amendment legislation was reported, has already stated, I am troubled by reports I have heard that some on the NRC staff believe this authority might be used to approve steam generator repairs at Three Mile Island Unit-1. Congress enacted the Sholly provision so that NRC could redirect its attention and resources away from trivial matters and concentrate instead on matters of great public concern and safety significance such at TMI-l steam generator repair work.

Statement of the Hon. Morris K. Udall, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, February 22, 1983.

Pursuant to the foregoing considerations, Petitioner herein,

1. States that it represents persons whose interests may be affected by the proceeding to grant a license ame ndme n t. to permit operation of TM1-1 with the subject steam generator tube repairs in place.

2. Request that a public adjudicatory hearing pursuant

'to 5189 of the Atomic Energy Act be held on this license amendment.

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3. Request that such hearing be held prior to the license amendment becoming immediate'ly ef fective and operation of TMI-l permitted.

4. Petition that it be granted leave to participate in such a hearing as intervenors.

Respectfully-submitted,

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May 19, 1983 By: nbWwvd2 /[ q tfw b t.( ~

l k canne Doroshow Louise Bradford Three Mile Island Alert, Inc.

315 Peffer Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102 4

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UNITED STATES OF AMERIC A NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

)

'(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit 1) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify.that copies of the attached FORMAL DEMAND FOR AN ADJUDICATORY HEARING ON AMENDMENT TO THE TMI-l OPERATING LICENSE CONCERNING SPEAM GENERATOR TUBE REPAIRS, dated May 19, 1983, was served this 19th day of May, 1983, by deposit in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, or hand delivered, to those on the atached mailing list.

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%a /j/M,re (nw

, / oanne Doroshow N

,i UNITED STATES OF ABERICA NUCLEAR REGULA'IORY CObtHSSION BEFORE 'HE A'IOMIC SAFEIY AND LICENSING DOARD In the Matter of:

FEIBOPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, )

) Docket Ib. 50-289

('Ihree Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart)

Station, Unit No.1) )

SERVICE LIST Docketing and Service Section Henry D. Hukill, Vice-President Office of the Secretary GPU Nuclear Corporation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission P.O. Box 480 WashLngton, D.C. 20355 Middletoun, Pennsylvania 17057 Ivan W. Smith, Esquire, Chairman Fis. Marjorie M. Aamodt Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel R.D. #5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cocmission Coatesville, Pamsylvania 19320 Washington, D.C. 20555 NGY/'IMI PIRC Dr. Walter H. Jordan 1037 thclay Street Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17103' 881 West Outer Drive *'

Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Dr. Chauncey Kepford & Judith Johnsrud Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power Dr. Linda W. Little 433 Orlando Avenue Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel -

State College, Pennsylvania 16801 5000 Hermitage Drive Raleigh, tbrth Carolina 27612 Mr. Steven C. Sholly thion of Concerned Scientists George F. Trowbridge, Esquire 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Dupont Circle Building, Suite 1101 1800 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20006 James A. Tourte11otte, Esquire Office of the Executive Legal Director P.ohe rt C. Adler U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Oxmission Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20555 505 n.xecuti ve Pouse Harrisburg, PA Ellyn R. Weiss Harmon & Weiss 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 Washington, D.C. 20006 Jordan D. Cunningham, Esquire Attorney for Newberry Township T.M.I. Steering Conmittee 2320 Ibrth Second Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110 m

o Judge Gary J. Edles, Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D.C. 20555 Judge John H. Buck Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmiasion W shington, D.C. 20555 Judge Christine H. Kohl Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D.C. 20555 Judge Reginald L. Gotchy Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D.C. 20555 Professor Gary Milhollin 4412 Greerwich Parkway, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20007 lbrry 11. Voigt LeBoeuf, Tnmh, Iniby & lhcRae 1333 New Hanpshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 '

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Victor Gilinsky, C0mmissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 John F. Ahearne, Commissioner U.S. Nuelear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 James K. Asselstine U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 m