ML20078N863

Response Opposing Joint Petitioners 831017 Restatement of Contentions.Licensee Agrees to Substitution of Revised Proposed Contention 1 for Original Proposed Contentions 1, 2 & 3.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20078N863
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	10/31/1983
From:	Trowbridge G METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
83-491-04-OLA, 83-491-4-OLA, ISSUANCES-OLA, NUDOCS 8311030049
Download: ML20078N863 (14)

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'83 y- c LIC .p0/3z /8.p a :27 UNITED S*'TES OF AMERICA SIEJ[Jf..I5[;'

NUCLEAR hrGULATORY COMMISSION EEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING ECARD In the Matter of .

Docket No. 50-269 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY  : ASLEP 83-491-04-OLA (Th'ree Mile Island Nuclear  : .(Steam Generator Repair)

Station, Unit No. 1)  :

LICENSEE'S' RESPONSE.TO RESTATEMENT OF CONTENTIONS OF LEE ET AL.

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT At the October 17, 1983 Prehearing Conference, Licensee and Joint Petitioners, Lee et al. agreed to atter.pt to resolve their differences.as to the meaning and intended scope.of Joint Petitioners' Proposed Contention 1. Under the. guise of that r effort, Joint Petitioners proposed and have now submitted to Licensee'and the' Board a wholesale revision of Contentions 1, 2 and 3, to which new bases have been added.1/ Withcut an oppor-tunity to review the transcript of the prehearing or to check l 1/ In their submission, Joint Petitioners incorrectly state

-that the Board instructed Licensee and Joint Petitioners to at-l ter.pt to reach agreement on Contentions 1 and 2. In fact, the l Board's acquiescence in the parties' own proposal was limited l

to Contention 1. Tr. 169-171; Order (Memorialication of Special Prehearing Conference), dated October 21, 1983, p. 3.

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carefully the references cited by Joint Petitioners in support of the revised contentions, Licensee's counsel was unwilling to agree to the revisions. Having now had such an opportunity, Licensee is prepared to agree to the substi.ution of Revised Proposed Centention 1 for Joint Petitioners' original Proposed Contentions 1, 2 and 3, and addresses below the all'owability of the revised contention.

II. RESPONSE TO REVISED PROPOSED CONTENTIONS As a replacement for their original Proposed Contentions 1, 2 and 3, Joint Petitioners now assert one generic contention with seven subcontentions, followed in most instances by a brief reference to the basis for the subcontention. Each of the seven subcontentions relates to a separate alleged defi-ciency of the repair program. Licensee will address each of them in turn. In general, in Licensee's view, Joint Petition-ers have yet to proffer bases for any of the subcontentions-which are logical and technically credible, or supported by referenced and plausible authority; Joint Petitioners also have yet to satisfy their obligation "to diligently uncover and apply all publicly available information to the prompt fornula-

. tion of contentions." Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 'N.R.C. , slip. op. at 11 (June 30, 1983).

Joint Petitionefs' Revised Proposed Subcontention 1(1) --

that the efficacy of the lithium additions has'not been ade-quately established to warrant reliance on this method to

prevent reinitiation of Intergranular Stres.s Cerrosion Cracking

("IGSCC") -- assumes a premise, not supported by any basis, that there is a potential for a future buildup in active sulfur concentrations sufficient to require lithiur centrol. As explained in the SER and TR-006, Licensee developed and imple-mented a detailed program to provide the requisite assurance that when operations are restarted, the sulfur concentration will remain below the level needed to initiate IGSCC. That program included (1) a cleaning process which removed suffi-cient quantities of sulfur to eliminate the potential for fu-ture corrosion, (2) laboratory corrosion tests which verified that corrosion will not reinitiate under operating conditions and (3) imposition of administrative centrols to prevent further introduction of centaminants. (See SER 553.5-3.7 at 27-33; TR-008 at 27-33.) Joint Petitioners have provided no basis for challenging the efficacy of this program.

As explained in TR-008, Licensee's increase in the minimum lithium level is simply intended as additional assurance that sulfur-induced ICSCC will not recur.2/ Thus, the fact that there is some uncertainty as tc the effectiveness of lithium as an inhibitor of sulfur-induced IGSCC does not bring Licensee's 2/ The TMI Technical Specifications already require that, for purposes of pH control, lithium concentrations in the primary coolant be kept between 0.2 and 2.0 ppm (TR-008 at 31 (Table VI-1).) Licensee's increase in the minimum lithium concentra-tion to 1.0 ppm is simply intended as additional assurance that sulfur-induced IGSCC will not recur. (See TR-008 at 23 (Lithi-um added because it "could possibly be inhibitor").)

safety program into question; if lithium does help, the system will have yet another backup against IGSCC; if it does not help, the other means of protection described above will provide the necessary assurance of safety. Joint Petitioners have provided no basis for a different conclusion. Revised Proposed Subcontention 1(1) must accordingly be refected as lacking in basis.

Revised Prcoosed Subcontention 1(2) asserts that "[a)ctive forms of sulfur can be generated from presumably benign sulfur remaining on the t2bes after cleaning." This statement is-true enough, but provides no basis for questioning the post-repair integrity of the tubes and expanded joints. As explained in TR-OOS and the SER, it is unnecessary to comoletely remove the sulfur because low levels of sulfur in solution (such as the less.than 0.1 ppm sulfate currently in the TMI-l steam genera-tor coolant) do not have a significant corrosive effect.

.(TR-OOS at.24-25; SER 5 3.5 at 27, 5 3.6.2 at 30.) Any sulfur remaining on the tube. surfaces after cleanisg will be released so slowly that there will be more than ample time to prevent-buildup of corrosive sulfur concentrations. (SER 5 3.5 at 28.)

The references cited by Joint Petitioners provide no basis co challenge these conclusions? The quoted statement by R. L.

Dillon (SER-Att. 3 at 6) expresses that consultant's concern

that IGSCC could reinitiate during the cleaning ~ process itself

-because of the large quantities of sulfur then put in solution; Mr. Dillon was~not addressing the possible risks associated

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with operation after conpletion of clean-up. (See SER Att. 3 at 12.) In any event, Joint Petitioners ignore the fact that Mr. Dillon's concerns have not been borne out; rather than increasing the sulfur in sclution to 10 ppm (for a total of 3 Kg. or 6.6 pounds of sulfur) as he predicted, the hydrogen per-oxide cleaning process only increased sulfur levels to .4 ppm

(.33 pounds total); that amount, of course, was subsequently reduced to .1 ppm as the cleaning process was completed. (See TR-008 at 33; SER 53.6 at 30.) They also ignore the fact that in Licensee's laboratory tests, actual TMI tubing subjected to simulations of the cleaning process, het functional tests, and operating cycle showed no evidence of corrosive attack. (See TR-008 at 27; Licensee's Response to TMIA at 27-28.)

The quotation from the Third Party Review Report similarly is unrelated to the possibility that active sulfur might be generated during operations. The Third Party Review Group's statement that there is no quantitative measure of the potential for reactivation is unquestionably true; however, the inference the authors drew from this and related factors was that the_ cleaning crocess was not essencial. (SER-Att. 6, May 16, 1983 Review at 5.) The Third Party Review Group ultimately

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reached the conclusion, moreover, "that peroxide flushing is not essential to plant safety nor is peroxide flushing expected to have a'n adverse effect on plant safety" (Id. at 6.) Thus, like the Dillon reference, the Third Party Review provides no basis ."or the concern that IGSCC will reinitiate under operating conditions.

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T Joint Petitioners' Revised Procesed Subcontention 1(3) t asserts that morphological changes, namely, Intergranular At-

~ tack (" IGA"), on the inner tube surfaces remote from the ex-panded joints might be a precurser of IGSCC. To support this 1

contention, Joint Petitioners note that the "[m]ost extensive IGA was in the vicinity of major cracks," (TR-008 at 81) which apparently suggests"to Joint Petitioners that the IGA not in the vicinity of cracks might someday deteriorate into cracks.

! TR-008 acknowledges that surface IGA was present in areas remote from the cracking. It also explains that such local IGA

, is present in Inconel 600 tubes generally, presumably as a result of tube manufacturing process. (TR-008 at 81.) But when present in other Inconel 600 tubing, this surface IGA has not progressed to the type of extensive IGA (6 to 10 grains

, deep) that was sometimes found in the vicinity of the~TMI-1

. tube cracks; nor has it progressed to IGSCC. Joint Petitioners have not explained how or why such a progression should occur j here. Indeed, they have ignored the evidence that does exist and which suggests it will not so progress: no additional intergranular attack was observed during Licensee's lead corro-sion testing on specimens which contained general surface IGA as well' as cracking. (TR-008 at 27, 81.) Revised Proposed Subcontention 1(3) accordingly lacks any bases and should be rejected. -

Revised Proposed Subcontention 1(4a), as best we 9 I understand it, asserts that Licensee's analysis of the effects l i

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of dynamic stress on 40L' through-wall cracks is inadequate because it is based on fracture mechanics calculations rather

-than experimental verification.3/ Initially, we note that Joint Petitioners have. ignored the fact that the. key input parameters used in the calculations were experimentally veri-fled'. (TR-008 at 84 and Figure IX-4.) -Perhaps more signifi-cantly, however, this proposed contention, like TMIA's related quarrel.with linear fracture mechanics theory, i s an impermissible attack on the Commission's regulations. (See 10 C.F.R. $ 2.758 and discussion in Licensee's Response to.TMIA at 8, 21-22). As we explain in our Response to TMIA, 10 C.F.R.

-5 50.55a(g), by its incorporation of relevant provisions of the ASME Code and accompanying appendices, provides that a tube flaw will be deemed acceptable for service if calculations based on linear elastic fracture mechanics demonstrate its ac-ceptability. Joint Petitioners have not petitioned for a waiv-

er of 10 C.F.R. 9 50.55a(g); its criticism of Licensee's reli-ance on-fracture analysis calculations must therefore be rejected as a. challenge to that regulation.

Joint Petitioners next assert in Revised Prcoosed Subcontention 1(4b), that eddy current testing (ECT) cannot be 3/ Joint Petitione'rs' actual statement is that the effect of dynamic stress has only been demonstrated " empirically with no experimental verification." But, of course, an empirical con-clusion is one which is based on experiments, or other demon-strable evidence. Given Petitioners' reliance on Mr. Dillon's

!. discussion (SER Att. 3 at 7), we assume they meant to say "through calculations" rather than " empirically."

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relied upon to accurately assess the depth of cracks. We are hardpressed to ascertain how the; referenced section of the NRC Staff's.SER'(at 13) provides a basis for this contention.

Quoted in full, the Staff there states that:

The' licensee interpreted;the eddy-current test measurements of the through-wall depth of the indications in the UTS transition zone regions-as greater than 40%-through-wall, and hence tubes with such indications were characterited as defective tubes. Metallurgical examination conducted by the licensee on tubes removed from service confirmed that the. flaws in the transi-tion zone region all exceeded.50% through-wall, with the majority 100% through-wall.

Joint Petitioners apparently fear that because the NRC Staff deceribes the size of tube cracks in the transition zone simply as " greater than 40%" through-wall, yet thereafter notes that metallurgical examinations showed the cracks were actually 50%

to 100% through-wall, the ECT probe must not be accurate. The perceived inconsistency is non-existent; 50% and 100% are

" greater than 40%;" and the NRC described the metallurgical findings as " confirming" those found by ECT.3/

Moreover, Joint Petitioners ignore a substantial amount of information showing that even if the ECT used in the transition zone to determine whether a joint should be expanded were less 3/ . It should be-noted that Licensee's ECT tests did differen-tiate the depth of' cracks which were greater than 40%

through-wall; we assume that because 40% is the threshold for determining whether a tube is defective (i.e., all tubes with

-cracks-40% through-wall or greater are deemed defective and hence. repaired), the NRC Staff felt there was little point in specifying how much deeper than 40% the cracks actually were.

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than 100% accurate, it would not affect the integrity of the post-repair tube. First, to guard against the possibility that some cracks in the transition zone might have gene undetected, Licensee expanded all joints, whether or not 40% or greater i

through-wall cracks had been observed by the ECT. Second, in order to ensure that all cracks in the free span of- greater than 40% through-wal'1 and~of sufficient arc-length to be of concern were detected, the Licensee ~ developed a comprehensive

. testing program using a special, mo.re sensitive ECT system with a 0.540-inch high gain probe rather than a 0.510-inch st.andard gain probe. (See SER 5 3.3 at 13; TR-008 at 78-79.) The abil-ity of-the' .540-inch probe ECT to detect unacceptable defects vas. confirmed by metallurgical examination of tubes taken from the TMI-l steam generator: a 100% correlation between the .540 probe ECT and the metallurgical examination was found. (TR-008 at 80-and Figure IX-1.)

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In sum, Joint Petitioners' references provide no support

' for its contention, and Joint Petitioners have pointed to no l.

defect in. Licensee's assessment of the reliability of its ECT f

pregram. Their.centention.accordingly must be rejected.

By Revised Proposed Subcontention 1{4c),-Joint Petitioners assert.tp.at Licensee did. net evaluate the effect of " creep" during its expanded joint laboratory' qualification tests. No basis whatsoever'is stated for-the contention. Nor is there

. any explanation why the effect of " creep" has any relationship to the repair-program, i

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Although Joint Petitionern do not define the term " creep",

we assume they are referring to the phenomenon of the slow flow (change in shape) of metal which can occur when it is exposed to extremely high steady-state temperatures and 1 cad cycling.

While creep certainly can be a problem under such -

circumstances, Joint Petitioners have cited no authority, nor provided a logical and technical explanation, to support its contention that it would be a problem under the comparatively moderate temperatures (for creep purposes) experienced by the steam generators during operation. It is clear that their personal opinion that creep might be a problem, without more, is not adequate for this purpose. See generally, Detroit Edisen Co. (Enrice Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2),

LSF-78-11, 7 N.R.C. 381, 386-37, aff'd, ALAS-470, 7 N.R.C. 473 (1978). Accordingly,' Revised Proposed Subcontention 1(4c) must be rejected as lacking in specificity and basis.

Revised-Proposed subcontention 1(5) states that the possi-ble effects of potential cracking agents other than sulfur have not been studied, intending to suggest, apparently, that the study of other causative agents which Licensee did perform was inadequate and hence that ICSCC might reinitiate. Joint Peti-tieners assert our analysis was defective first of all because synergistic effects have not been considered. Again, they cite no authority for the proposition that synergistic effects should be considered, especially given the other chemicals found to be present, and the small quantities of such chemicals

found. In the absence of such an analysis, Joint Petitioners provide no basis to support their contention.

The quoted sections of the Third Party Review documents aise provide no bases for the contention. The statement that con:Eminants such as lead, mercury, or phosphorus can induce IGSCC is a truism, but begs the question; there is ' simply nothing to suggest that these other contaminants were or are prasent in sufficient quantities to induce IGSCC under the en-vironmental conditions attendant to operation. The Third Party Review did suggest that because carbonaceous material was found near the areas of tube failure, it might have played a role in the failure which is not presently understood. But the Third Party Review Group in no way suggested that this uncertainty rendered the analysis of the cause of the IGSCO, or the tube repairs, inadequate to the contrary, they specifically found that Licensee's actions "are considered adequate for safety."

(SEE Att. 6, May 16, 1983 Review at 3.)5/ The sole recommenda-tion made by Third Party Review Group concerning the uncertain role of carbon was "that specific analyses for (carbon] organ-ics be performed" as part of Licensee's Impurity Ingresc Control Program. (Ibid.)

As the Third Party Review' Group notes, Licensee is in the process of purchasing a Total Organic Carbon analyzer so that 5/ Mr. Aamodt himself conceded at the prehearing conference that "it is quite evident that the active forms of sulfur were the culprit." (Transcript of October.17, 1983 ? rehearing Con-ference, at 143.)

I it can per' form the tests suggested by that Group. Licenses, moreover,'has initiated strict adninistrative controls to guard against. introduction of all contaninants, including carbon.

(See TR-DOS-at 29-30.) Joint Petitioners have given no indica-tion as.to why.they fear these actions are inadequate to prevent carbon-induced IGSCC; nor does the Third Party Review

- support snth a contention. Revised Proposed Subcontention 1(5) should therefore be rejected as lacking any bases.

III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons and those stated in our opening response with respect to other contentions, none of Joint Peti-tieners' contentions should be admitted fo'r litigation. Joint Petitioners should therefore not be permitted to participate as parties to the instant proceeding.

Resp 4.ully -

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'O 'org9/ F. Trowbridge,.P.C.

rnest L. Blake, Jr., .C.

Delissa A. Ridgway Diane E. Burkley SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWERIDGE 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202)822-1000

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Counsel for Licensee Dated: October 31, 1983 k

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'83 NOV -2 A9 :47 October 31, 1983 C F T U.- 0 F 5 i. i. e <

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, UNITED STATES OF' AMERICA 00CKEith'J SRANC & "5' N NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of'  :

METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., ET AL. ocket No. 50-289-OLA ASLBP 83-491-04-OLA (Steam Generator Repair)

, (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit.No. 1)  :

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Response to l Restatement of Contentions of Lee et al.," dated. October 31, 1983, were served this 31st day of October,.1983, by deposit in~the United States mail, first class, postage' prepaid, to those persons on-the attached service list.

L 3 2 (. v. k u _. -

, Diane E. Burkley i

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-e t UNITED STATES OF. AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC. SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

-In the' Matter of )

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METROPOLITAN EDIEON CO., et al. ) Docket No. 50-289-OLA t

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(Three Mile. Island Nuclear ) ASLBP 83-491-04-OLA Station, Unit No. 1) ) ,

(Steam Generator Repair)

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SERVICE LIST

• Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman Joanne.Doroshow Atomic Safety - and Licensing Board Louise Bradford U.S. Nuclehr Regulatory Commission Three Mile Island Alert, Inc.

Washington, D. C. 20555 315 Peffer Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102 Dr. David L. Hetrick Professor of Nuclear Engineering Jane Lee University of Arizona- 183 Valley Road Tucson, Arizona 85271 Etters, Pennsylvania 17319 Dr. James C. Lamb, III Norman Aamodt

-313 Woodhaven Road R. D. 5, Box 428 Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Coatesville, Pennsylvania -19320 >

• Mary E. Wagner, Esquire Office of Executive Legal Director

~U.S. Nuclear Regulatoqr Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing'and Service Section (3)

Office. of the Secretary' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

' Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing

-Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555