ML20135H954

Petition of Mi Lewis for Leave to Intervene & Request for Hearing

ML20135H954
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	09/18/1985
From:	Lewis M LEWIS, M.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#385-580, FRN-50FR27006, RULE-PR-50 SP, NUDOCS 8509250058
Download: ML20135H954 (6)

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In the matter of r A! :9 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY Docket No 50-289 (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, thit No.1)

PETITION CF MARVIN I. IEWIS, INTERVENOR, FOR A NEW OR EXPANDED CONTDITION CONCERNING THE ix HARTMAN IEAK RATE ALIEGATIONS.

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l HISTORY:

Allegations have bsued inthe TMI81 Restart Hearings trat the leak rate at both TMI#1 and at TMI#2 have been erroneous.

coolant which escapes $ontrolled from Of The leak rate refers to the amount the reactor cooling system. The leak rate determines certain subsequent actions.

If the leak rate is higher than that allowed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules or the Licensee technical specifications, the leak fate must decrease or the reactor must go "off line." A technician by the name i Hartaan alleged that determination of leak rates ' involved improper procMures.

Hartsen alleged that these improper techniques were used to p.: ovide erroneously samil leak rates which allowed the TMI#2 reactor to stay "on line" in direct violation of the NRC rules and the Licensee's technical specifications.

The Licensee was subsequently fined far these actions.

Due to the publicity and hearings on these Hartman allegations, attention

. j has centerred on leak rate measuresent for several years.

THE PRESENT:

Ihrelated to the Hartman Allegations, the NRC has issued a memorandum admitting new and continuing errors in leak rate measuresent. The difference l

between the present error and the Hartmen allegation is that the gesent error is not a purposeful concealment of a dangerous leak rate as in the Hartment Alle6mtions but the new error results from incompetence on the part of the NRC, nuclear steam system supplier and the Licensee.

The Hartnan Allegation involved a procedure wherein the Licensee bubbled hydrogen gas thru a measuring tank while collecting data for a leak rate calculation. The hydrogen toofr up space in the liquid in the tank. -..The w

result was a false reading for amount of liquid in the tank which reading was l

used to calculate the leakage. The result was a lower than actual leak b

rate.

h The p sent error involves the use of an " Evaporative Ipos Term."

application of the evaporative loss term resulted in negative leak rates, f

Since the reactor cooling system is closed and usually pressurized, the RCS experencing a negative leak rate equates to water flowing uphill. The L

NRC admits,"There does not appear to be a subr.tantial basis for this (evanorative loss) term being included in the RCS Irak Rate determination."

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2 The NRC, Licensee, and nuclear stea.m syttes supplier continue to use the evaporative loss term erroneously.

THE FtJftRE:

5 The NRC, the nuclear steam y31 stem supplier and the Licensee have demonstrated a continuing pattern of incompetence. Further, years of attention to the leak rate measurement has culmi n ted in an admission of continuing error. 9 This error involves the first line of defence against a major nuclear accident, the reactor cooling system. The leak rate relates to the soundness of the RCS.

A small leak rate within NRC regulations and Licensee's technical specifications der.onstrates a sound, uncracked RCS with acceptable losses from normal operation. Conversely, a leak rate

, greater than that allowed by NRC regulation and Licensee's TS, presents a RCS with unacceptable losses ani possibly dangerous cracking or other immediate 'and safety related problems.

Recent changes in NRC regulations put even more emphasis on leak rate measurement. The NRC has proposed to use the" leak-before -break " concept.

IBB assumes that the piping will leak before suffering a double ended-guillotine break which is a very dangerous loss of coolant accident. The use of IBB concept assumes that the leaking pipe will signal itself thru leak rate measurements well before a double ended guillotine pipe break causes a IOCA.

The NRC, Licensee and nuclear steam systen supplier have developed erroneous

. leak rates and continue to do so. More and more, the NRC relies upon the leak rates to indicate the soundness of the RCS. Erroneous leak rates cannot indicate

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the soundness of the RCS accurately. The NRC;is:dealisgi,in a centradiction:

A. the NRC admits that leak rates are erroneous, B. The NRC relies more asi acre on-leak rates to indicate-soundness. of the I

RCS.

The RCS is the fir'st line of defence against : a major nuclear accident.

The NRC' relies on erroneous leak rates to indicate the soundness of the RCS.

The Public's right to health and safety is eroded or elimiuted because the NRC relies upon error to measure the soundness of the first line of defence against a major nuclear accident.

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RECOMv5NDATIONS :

1.

Isak rates have and continue to have systematic, procedural and purposeful ImakrNescannotindicatethesoundnessorleaktightcondition arrors.

of the RCS considering the present conditions.

2.

LBB concept does not provide adequate indication since LBB indica *.or i

is the reported leak rate which iserroneous.

3 TMI#1 Hearings on the Hartmen Allegations should be reopened with the investigation expanded to take in all aspects of leak rate. Further, I respectfully petition that 'I be accepted to contend upon the following contention:

" Leak rates have been and are being measured erroneously.

Erroneous leak rates allow the TMI#1 reactor to be operated outside technical specification limits, increasing danger of a major nuclear accident and reducing the public's safety."

Attachments :

Memorandum for Hugh L Thompson from Stewart, Ebneter entitled "TMI 1 Technial Specification on RCS Leak Rate" dated Sep,6,1935 FR Vol 50 No 126 July 1, 1985 Page 27006 Modification of GDC 4 Requirement s for Protection Against Dynamic Effects of Postulated Pipe Ruptures, Proposed Rule.

Standing: Marvin I Irwis, 6504 Bradford Terrace, Phildelphia, Pennsylvania, (215)2895964, has been an intervener previously. His standing derives therefore from the previous intervention in these proceedings.

Mr Irwis still visits, drives thru and does business in the TMI Exclusion Area Basis:

The basis of this contention is the danger to the public health

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and safety expounded in the above section entitled,"The Future."

I certify that I sent the above submittal and petition to the TMI#1 Restart distribution list.

Respectfully submitted, h

• h M. l. LEWIS 6606 ERADFORD TERR.

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Hugh L. Thompson Jr., Director, Division of Licensing FROM:

Stewart D. Ebneter, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region I

SUBJECT:

TMI-1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ON REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAK RATE Recent test results from TMI-1 during the RCS heatup June 8-9, 1985, reconfirmed results obtained during the Hot Functional Test during April 11-19, 1985 (Inspection Report 50-289/85-16). These recent tests all indicate that the RCS leak rate was essentially zero.

However, the application of exclusion of the evaporative loss term permitted by Technical Specification 3.1.6.2 resulted in negative final RCS leak rate values ranging from 0.21 to 0.29 gpm when the evaporative loss term applied was 0.27 gpm.

This evaporative loss term does not appear in the Babcock and Wilcox Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG 0103).

It did not appear in TMI-2 Technical Specifications. An informal survey showed that about half of the B&W plant Technical Specifications have provision for an evaporative loss term and half do not.

On the basis of the results from TMI-1, it appears that the evaporative losses are actual!y zero.

There does not appear to be a substantial basis for this term being included in the Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate determin-l ation. My staff recommends that this issue be reviewed by the Division of Licensing and, if warranted, action be taken to modify Technical Specifications l

for TMI-1 and similar facilities to delete consideration of an evaporative loss term'id RCS leak rate determinations.

S ewart D. Ebneter, Director Division of Reactor Safety

Attachment:

Inspection Report 50-289/85-16 s

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1 27908 Federal Register / Vol. 50. No.126 / Mond :y. July 1.1985 / Proposed Rules l

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emergency core cooling system (ECCS) have demonstrated that for the specific perfonnance and containment design, case of the main primary loops of j

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rfod expires pressurtzed weter reactore, double.

f mber Comenenta received ended guillotine or longitudinal ruptures te wi be considered ifit is are extremely unlikely. Attempts are practical to do so, but assurance of currently underway to learn if these i

_, considerstica can only be given to Andings are applicable to other high e

ea=== ate received on or before this energy piping systems, including pipina date.

In boiling water reactors.

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m assessesa Send comunents to:

These deterministic and probabthetic Seastery. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory analyses depend on advanced fracture t'ammission. W on. D.C. 3o558, mechanice techniques, and include to CPR part 30 Atta: Docketing and Branch.

Investigations of potential indirect tseencogen of Genersi Design Deliver comments to: Roosa 1121.1717 failure mechanisms which could lead to l

Crfterten 4 Requiremente for H Street. NW Washington. D.C.

pipe rupture.The objective of this protesten Against Dynamic Effects of betwun 0:15 a.m. and 820 p.m.

approach (hereafter referred to se leak-Passideeed pipe Ingtares w wkdays.

before-break)is to dennonstrate by Copies of the regulatory analysis, analysis that the detection of small documents misrence la this nonce and flaws, either by inservice inspection or aemocv: Nuclear Regula osemate moeind may be examined at: by leakage monitoring systema,is r a==t in.

the NRC Ptablic Document Room at 1717 j

assured long before the Sows can grow acmet Proposed rule.

H M NW, Washinstm D.C.

to critical or unstable sises and lead to i

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88"T88" large bevak areas such as the double.

euemmasmThe Nuclear Regulatory Joha A.O'Brien.OfRoe of Nuclea' ended guillonne pipe rupture.

Co==l ian is proposing to amend its W

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GeneralDesign Criterion 4 (CDC 41 regulations that regstre the protection of N,34, Appendix A.10 CPR Part 80, states:

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4 etmetwes. systems and -- Q Nm mmer Criterion 4.-Envirofunental and missile Importeet to desist bases. "-t sts systems, and pect,s of gestula pipe Tehls of Camesmas components important to sefety shall be a

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, o ss dynamic eSects associated with certals VI. Avedsheny especumenes test 4 and postulated accidents.

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YIE F8F8'**'k E*d888888 A88 88888"888 Components shan be appropriately

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mesmcation will t the selective x, gey eio,, y Am Cuencoden q t k effects ofm/ssiles, pipe removal of pipe restraints and jet xL use of Sabissesin WCPR Fort es i

"Al#P 4f.anddischoryntyfluids, shot 0

hopingessent shields tem operating ts, under esostruction eng Besteund mey result /hom equ/pment fellures and etesipe, bet willactimpact Recentinves tiene using both

/)om events andconditions outs /de the other requirements such as detennialstic probabilistic analyses nocAserpower unit."(empbasis added)

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