ML20198A511
| ML20198A511 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek, Crane |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1998 |
| From: | Fornicola J GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| FRN-63FR52201, RULE-PR-50 63FR52201-00012, 63FR52201-12, NUDOCS 9812170015 | |
| Download: ML20198A511 (3) | |
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98 DE 15 P3 :16 GPU Nuclear,Inc.
t Roua 441 Son December 11, 1998 NUCLEAR Post Office Box 480 1950-98-20696 Middletown PA 17057 0480
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Tel 717-944 7621 c.
ADJ Nfr. John C. Hoyle Secretary of the Commission ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudication Staff United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555-0001
Subject:
Comments on Amendments to Requirements for hionitoring the Efrectiveness of Alaintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,63 Fed. Rec. 52201 (1998)(to be codified at 10 CFR f 50.65) (proposed September 30,1998)
I.
Dear Secretary licyle:
The purpose of this letter is twofold. First, it provides GPU Nuclear's conunents on the " Proposed Rulemaking to 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Afonitoring the Effectiveness of hiaintenance at Nuclear Power Plants"(63 Fed. Rea 52201, September 30,1998). Second,it identifies GPU Nuclear's endorsement of comments, regarding the subject proposed rulemaking, provided on behalf of the nuclear industry by the Nuclear Energy Institute.
GPU Nuclear's comments on the proposed rulemaking:
- 1. The NRC and the industry (through the representation of the Nuclear Energy Institute or NEI) have been working to codify mutually agreeable rule language and implementation guidance that will be effective in meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65. The proposed rulemaking derails the collaborative efforts in that it interjects change which conflicts with that efrort prior to its completion.
Failing to incorporate mutually agreed upon language and guidance in the proposed rulemaking results in further ambiguity through the introduction of terms such as those found in paragraph (a)(4):
"sigmficant", " risk-sigmficant configurations" and " degrade the performance ofsafetyfimetions to an unacceptable level" The terms are ambiguous because they are neither defined nor are references for their definitions identified. Attempts to clarify their meaning through the use of k[
supplemental information in the Federal Register are circular: risk-significant configurations add signi/lcant contributions to risk.
1 An unequivocal, unambiguous definition of terms is necessary if the rulemaking is to be etTective for two reasons. First, ambiguity makes it impossible for licensees to determine in advance ofinspection and possible enforcement action, what action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulations.
Second, ambiguity creates the risk that current, official NRC expectations will not be achieved because additional, unofficial expectations may be created through inspection and enforcement activities.
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Page 2 of 3 GPU Nuclear has expended considerable resources to identify risk significant SSCs under the current hiaintenance Rule and to institute a documented program of risk evaluations associated with maintenance on risk-significant SSCs. This investment and plant focus on risk should not be diffused by changes tolerating ambiguity in the hiaintenance Rule. Further, existing regulatory requirements already provide the NRC with adequate oversight and enforcement authority to prevent licensees from allowing maintenance to " degrade the performance ofsafetyfunctions to an unacceptable level" i
2.
The act of performing safety assessments for "allplanned maintenance activities" as described in the proposed miemaking is burdensome and ineffective, no matter the perceived Dexibility in the lesel of sophistication with which the assessments might be performed. The burden develops from the need to perform assessments which correspond with each of the multitude of maintenance actions associated with the operation of a nuclear generating station. To be of any benefit, the assessments must be perfonned prior to the start of any maintenance activity on any SSC within the rule' s scope. In addition, each assessment must include a review of both the current and expected plant configurations regardless of the particular SSC' s contribution to safety or the increased risk associated with the maintenance action.
The implementation of the assessment requirement as proposed will be inetrective in achieving the larger goal to " ensure that the plant is not placed in risk-sigmficant configurations or configurations that woulddegrade the performance ofthe safety)imctions to an unacceptable level" This is because the proposed required action does not account for etTective work process controls and engineeringjudgement to address the impact of maintenance actisities already in place. Instead, it requires an all inclusive assessment program uhid diffuses the focus from high-safety significant SSCs to include additional SSCs having little or no safety significance. The hiaintenance Rule scope, dermed in section (b) [10 CFR 50.65(b)] is not limited to those SSCs necessary to prevent nuclear fuel damage or fission product release. In fact, experience during hiaintenance Rule baseline inspections hadaown that the scope is even broader than the initial industry interpretation of the existing language. Consequently, assessments would be required for a large number of maintenance activities regardless of the particular SSC's contribution to safety. The potential exists that applying resources to SSCs that are not Risk Significant will reduce the resources available for the Risk-Significant SSCs resulting in an adverse impact on the public health and safety. As a minimum, the end result is greater etTort expended by the licensees on activities without commensurate benefit to the public health and safety.
GPU Nuclear is presently implementing the resource intensive Oram-Sentinel risk assessment and configuration management method for maintenance risk assessments. Based on the reading of the proposed rulemaking, it is uncertain whether this methodology will satisfy the proposed assessment requirement if applied to "all planned maintenance activities" The proposed assessment requirement should be limited to those SSCs that make significant contributions to safety. h1oreover, the proposed hiaintenance Rule should expressly authorize qualitative assessments and blanket disposition of SSCs with low safety significance. Those narrow circumstances in which quantitative assessments are necessary should be clearly defined and prescribed. This will ensure that personnel remain focused on SSCs that significantly contribute to overall plant safety. Aforcover, the assessments will be taken seriously because they in olve significant maintenance activities.
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GPU Nuclear disagrees with the conclusion of the backfit analysis that the proposed rulemaking will
" provide substantial increase in protection to the public health and safety. at a cost that is justi/ led by the increasedprotection" The Federal Register background discussion noted the cumulative results of the first 50 baseline inspections found 10% of the plants had not assessed the impact on safety of the total p ant equipment out of sersice. This failure characterized those plants as being at greater risk than realized. It was also identified that the safety assessment tools of 38% of the inspected plants did not include all high-safety-significant SSCs. These deficiencies were characterized as individual weaknesses. The sum of both of these items was reported as having caused " concern" among the NRC senior managers and the Commission.
GPU Nuclear believes that both types of deficiencies are the result ofinadequate language and guidance. Adequate language and guidance would have reduced the number ofinitial findings. Both the inspected and to-be-inspected licensees worked to incorporate revised concepts and actions into their Maintenance Rule Programs as the inspections proceeded and information was made available.
These actions minimized the total number ofidentified deficiencies. The continued lack oflanguage and guidance, the increased administrative burden of the safety assessments for all maintenance activities, reduced concentration on more safety significant SSCs and the attendant commitment of resources associated with this proposed rulemaking will have a detrimental effect on current and future rule compliance efforts.
In summary, the proposed rulemaking is unlikely to achieve the NRC' s expectations for three reasons.
First, the proposed rulemaking makes licensee compliance difficult and leaves room for interpretations beyond the NRC' s current expectations due to the lack of acknowledged or defined terms and adequate guidance. Second, it creates an onerous administrative burden rather than focusing attention on risk-significant SSCs and maintenance activities. Third, the proposed rulemaking fails to correct weaknesses in the current rule. As a member of NEI, GPU Nuclear has reviewed and endorses their comments submitted with regard to the disposition of this proposed rulemaking.
Sincerely, Johh C. Fornicola "m : tor, Nuclear Safety Assessment WGH cc: File 98205
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