ML20199J012
| ML20199J012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1997 |
| From: | Epstein E THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT |
| To: | NRC |
| References | |
| FRN-62FR47588, FRN-63FR50465, RULE-PR-50 62FR47588-00017, 62FR47588-17, AF41-2-019, AF41-2-19, NUDOCS 9711280023 | |
| Download: ML20199J012 (35) | |
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'7.vE' NWENE PROPOSED RUUE k 50 TABLE OFCONTENTS (foR FR t/7588)
- 1. INTRODUCTION
.....,............1 ll. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
..................3 A. Cost Estimates for Radiological Decommissioning......
3 B. Planned Operating Life for Susquehanna...........
11 C. Generic Challenges......................,.
14 D. Spent Fuel Disposal....................,..
16 E. Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal............. 19 Ill. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND LAW.................. 22 IV. ARGUMENT 28 V. CONCLUSION
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a THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT, INC, T
a 315 Peffor St., Harrisburg, Penna.17102 (717) 233-7897 BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NUCLEAR REGULATORY
- 10 CFR 50.2,50.75, & 50.82 COMMISSION
- Proposed Rule Making Amendments
- RIN 3150 AF41 THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT COMMENTS on FINANCIAL ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS for-
_ DECOMMISSIONING NUCl EAR POWER REACTORS I. INTRODUCTION Three Mile Islarid Alert (TMIA) has been actively involved with issues pertaining to nuclear decommissioning since the March 1979 accident at Three Mile Island (TMI)
Unit 2. Specifically, who should pay for the cost of nuclear decommissioning and radioactive waste management. Three Mile Island Alert does not dispute the nuclear industry's contention, as evidenced in the AnnualReports 1996 of Pennsylvania nuclear utilities (1), that radiological decommissioning and radioactive waste isolation expenses are subject to change and likely to increase. However, the fact of this matter is that the management, together with the shareholders of nuclear utilities, aggressively pursued he licensing, construction and operation of nuclear generating 1 Duquesne Light Company (DLC); General Public Utilities (GPU); Pennsylvania Power Company (PPC): Pennsylvania Power & Light Resources, Inc. (PPL);
Philadelphia Electric Company Energy (PEOO). Also, the Allegheny Electric Cooperative's (AEC) 10% stake in the Susquehanna Electric Steam Station (SESS).
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stations fully cognizant that no commercial nuclear reactor had been decommissioned ---
and that a solution to nuclear waste disposal did not exist. Furthermore, the industry has not actively sought a solution to the permanent storage and isolation of low-level.
. and high level radioactive waste.-The industry has thus willfully pursued a financial:
Investment in nuclear energy which was knowingly fraught with huge uncertainties.
Therefore, it is grossly unfair and inequitable to request the rate payers to provide a -
financial safety n'et.for the utilities' risky nuclear investment strategy. TMIA argues that rate payer equity and corporate accountability necessitates that a substantial portion
- (See Proposed Formula on Decommissioning, p.29) of what is being referred to as -
- " stranded costs'," (2) relating to nuclear decommissioning and nuclear waste disposal, should be borne by the entitles that are traditionally held responsible for imprudent -
and unreasonable management decisions -- the electric industry shareholder.
2 PECO Energy ' stated: "This legislation [ Pennsylvania] provides the possibility of, but 4
does not assure, full recovery of uneconomic or stranded costs." Report to Shareholders: Third Quarter 1996. J.F. Paquette, Chairman of the Board, December,
-1996.
For the purpose of clarity, " stranded costs" are " uneconomical" costs that utilities
- would not recover in a competitive market place.
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- 11. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES A. Cost Estimates for Radiological Decommissioning The wild fluctuation in the cost estimates for radiological decommissioning are based,- in large part, upon the lack of any prior decommissioning activity in nuclear plants. The largest commercial nuclear power plant to be decommissioned, Shippingport, a 72 megawatt (MWe) light water breeder reactor is substantialP/
smaller than the Beaver Valley-1& 2 (833 Net MWe; 836 Net MWe); Limerick (1,055 Net MWe at each unit); Peach Bottom 2&3 (1,065 Net MWe at each unit)
Susquehanna Electric Steam Station 1 & 2 (1,050 Net MWe for each unit); and Three Mile Island Unit-l (819 MWe) During Pennsylvania Power & Light's Base Rate Case (1995) (FA PUC v. PP&L, Docket No. R-00943271; R 00943271 COO 1, et seq.),
Company witne.;s Thomas LaGuardia President of TLG (3) admitted that Shippingport was "almost like a pilot plant." (Transcript, page 2103, Lines 17-20) Shippingport was owned and operated by Duquesne Light Company under special agreement with the Department of Energy. The entire core was removed and replaced three times prior to decommissioning, and as noted by Company witness LaGuardia during cross examination, "[T]here were several cores at Shippingport starting out as a pressurized water reactor and later being converted to a light water reactor." (Page 2105, Lines 19-21). Furthermore, the reactor vessel was shipped to the Hanford Reservration (through an exclusive and unique agreement with the Department of Energy) thus depriving the industry of critical hands on decommissioning experience. In fact, Shippingport was 3 TLG contracts with most commercial nuclear utilities in to provide funding targets for nuclear decommissioning and nuclear waste disposal.
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' dismantled and not decommissioned. The immense differences between Shippingport and commercial nuclear power plants currently operating; therefore, make any financial comparison between the t#'o inadequate and baseless.
Several other nuclear reactors are being prepared for decommissioning but provide little meaningful decommissioning experience that could be used reliably to predict the decommissioning costs of large nuclear generating stations.
For instance, Yankee Rowe was cited during the 1995 PP&L Base Rate Case as a reliable predictor'of the decommissioning cost estimates associated with a large commercial reactor. Yankee Rowe, however, is a small commercial plant (167 MWe) that had two unique advantages which make it an unlikely predictor of decommission lng costs at other nuclear plants: 1) Barnwell, the regional low level radioactive wasto disposal site, has increased its tipoing fees; and, 2) The most significant component removal, steam generators, was completed without Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval. The PP&L's witness, Thomas LaGuardia, admitted, "[t] hat's correct, at the time. They [ Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company]
didn't have the decommissioning plan approved at that time." (PP&L Base Rate Case, Page 2095, Lines 17-18.) Moreover, this plant is only in the initial phase of decommissioning and costs have already mushroomed from $247 to $370 million from 1993 to 1995 primarily for spent fuel management costs. (PP&L witness, Thomas LaGuardia, confirmed the figures on page 1029, Lines 16-22.)
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.Shoreham, a large Boiling Water Reactor (809 MWe), was decornmissioned after two full power days of operation or 1/7,300 of the fexpected" operating life of -
Pennsylvania nuclear generating stations, thus making it; too, an unpredictable and unstable indicator of future decommissioning costs.
e As of this filing, no commercial nuclear power plant has been decommissioned, decontaminated and returned to free release. Nuclear decontamination and decommissioning technologies are in their infancy and several identifiable industrial
- trends are apparent when reviewing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's treatment of prematurely shutdown reactors: 1) There is a reluctance to undertake, initlaie or (finance decommissioning research; 2) Prematurely shutdown reactors place an additional financial strain on the licensee; and,3) These reactors have been retired for mechanical or economic reasons. [ United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Adv_isory Panel for the Decontamination of Three Mile Island Unit 2, Septembar 23, 1993.]
Pennsylvania Power & Light contracted with the nuclear industry's decommissioning consultant, TLG, to construct decommissioning cost estimates based on work completed at Shippingport, Shoreham, Yankeo Rowe and small, prototype reactors such as: BONUS (17 MWe) placed in ENTOMBMENT; Elk River (20 MWe) a reactor approximately 2% of Susquehanna's size which operated for five years; and, Pathfinder (60 MWe), which operated for 283 full power days (PP&L Base Rate Case, LaGuardia, Page 1044, Line 1) before being placed in SAFESTOR in
- 1989.) These estimates, made by LaGuardia, relied on: 1) The. development of r.Jnexistent technologies; 2) Anticipated projected cost of radioactive disposal; and,3) 5-s
The' assumption that costs for decommissioning small and short lived taactors can be accurate _ly extrapolated to apply to large commercial reactors operating for forty years -
At the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, projected costs for decommissioning have increased by 553% since 1981. In 1981, PP&L engineer Alvin Weinstein predicted that PP&L's share to decommission SESS would fall between
$135 and $191 million. By 1985, the cost estimate had climbed to $285 million, and by 1991 the cost in 1988 doilars for the " radioactive portion" of decommissioning was
$350 million. The Company then contracted out for a site specific study which projected that the cost of immediate decommissioning [DECON] would be $725 million in 1993 dollars. The 1994 cost estimate remained steady at $724 million, but the market value of securities held and accrued in income in the trust funds declined, and thus the estimate reflected another increase in decommissioning costs. (PP&L Base Rate Case, Page,1016, Lines 7 27 and Page 1017, Lines 1-24.)
Additionally, the impact of the review of the Financial Accounting Standards Board [FAS3] (Security Exchange Commission) has yet to be configured into the decommissioning formula. "As a result, current electric utility industry accounting practices for decommissioning may change, including the possibility that the estimated cost for decommissioning could be recorded as a liability on a basis other than an accrual over the estimated life of the plant."( Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, 1994 Annual Reoort." Nuclear Decommissioning Cost, p.34.) According, to General Public Utilities: "The FASB is expected.to release an Exposure Draft in early 1996, and a final statement is expected to be effective for fiscal years oeginning after December 15,1996." (General Public Utilities,' 1995 Annual Reoort. p. 36.)
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One of the most disturbing and bizarre aspects of the radiological-decommissioning is the "Who's on first? What's on second relationship?" between majority and minority shareholders of nuclear power plants. For example, the
- Susquehanna Electric Steam Station is owned by PP&L (90%) and the Allegheny Electric Cooperative (10%). The Allegheny Electric Cooperative (AEC) AEC is scheduled to contribute 10% of the cost of decommissioning. Company consultant, TLG, estimated PP&L's decommissioning share to be $724 million for 90% of the total cost of decommissioning. Based on this calculation, AEC 's 10% share of $804 million should be $79 million. However, Allegheny is setting aside a figure based on 5% of the final decommissioning costs even though Laurence V. Bladen, Director of Finance and Administrative Services told Epstein that AEC is basing its decommissioning costs on data supplied by PP&L. (Telephone conversation, March 30,1995.) " Allegheny's portien of the estimated cost of decommissioning SESS is approximately $37.8 million and is being accrued over the estimated usefullife of the plant." (Allegheny Electric Coooerative 1994 Annual Recod, The Power of Initiative: Seizing Oooortunities on the Horizon. Decommissioning Trust Fund, Cost of Decommissioning Nuclear Plant, p.49.) The cost projections have not changed since the AEC's 1993 Annual _
fleppIt (p.27), (See 1995 Annual Pecort: Beyond Electricity. p.29.)
Unfortunately, PP&L has adopted a distant and negligent attitude toward AEC's obligations. Mr. Ronald E. Hill, senior vice-president of Finance for PP&L was questioned by Mr. Epstein during the PP&L Base Rate Case (1995) on the relationship between AEC and PP&L, and he exhibited this distant and negligent attitude:
O: Have you read Allegheny Electric Cooperative's annual report from last year by any chance?
Witness: I believe I glanced at it, but I can't recall specifics. (Page 448, Lines 15-22.)
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O: Can you tell me why they're [AEC) only putting aside $37.8 million?
Witness: Not specifically except they're probably using a different estimate than we used. (page 449, Lines S 8.)
0: Allegheny could be planning it (decommissioning) on entomb, they could be planning it on decon?
Witness: They could be basing they're estimate on the NRC required funding level, too. There are several different methodologies of coming up with the estimate to decommission plants.
Q: But it's possible that you could be putting aside money I believe, actually, your method is decon and their method is safe store.
Witness: I don't know what their method is. I don't believe it's safe store. (PP&L Base Rate Case, Page 450, Lines 1125 and Page 451, Lines 1-12.)
Unfortunately, AEC does not know what method it is employing to calculate decommissioning costs either. On March 30,1995, Mr. Epstein contacted Mr. Bladen of the Allegheny Electric Cooperative. Mr. Bladen informed Mr. Epstein that decommissioning costs were based on estimates supplied by PP&L. Bladen noted:
"It's not like we could decommission (Susquehanna] using a different method."
However, Mr. Bladen could not identify the decommissioning mode. Mr. Epstein called on M y 12,1995 and Mr. Bladen informed him that the method for decommissioning Susquehanna was "Greenfield." Mr. Epstein informed Mr. Bladen that Greenfield is not a decommissioning mode and Mr. Bladen responded, "l'Il have to do some further checking." Mr. Epstein recontacted Mr. Bladen on June 5,1995, at which time Mr.
Bladen replied, "I keep asking the engineers. I know its not ENTOMBMENT." Mr.
Bladen is charged with financial oversight of AEC, and although sincere and responsive, has absolutely no idea about the method and financial expectations associated with the decommissioning of Susquehanna.
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The impact of this uncertainty between decommissioning partners is clear.
Since PP&L has no enforcement mechanism to compel Allegheny Electric to fund 10%
of the decommissioning costs for SESS, the question of financial responsibility looms large, Mr. Epstein queried the Company witness during PP&L Base Rate Case (1995),
Mr. Ronald Hill, about the relationship:
O: But there is actually no coordination?
A: There is coordination, but they're under no obligation to accept our estimate and to fund in the same manner that we do. They are obligated to come up with their share of the money at the end.
Judge Christianson: Coordination but not control.
Witness: That's right your honor.
Q: Do you know what method right now they're anticipating Susquehanna will be decommissioned as?
A: No, I don't.
O: So it's possib'e they nay be envisioning the decommissioning of Susquehanna say, entomb, whereas right now you're envisioning it as decon?
Witness: They may be. (Page 450, Lines 1125 and Page 451, Line 1-12.)
The Allegheny Electric Cooperative is owned and controtted by fourteen (14) distribution cooparatives. AEC is not regulated by the Public Utility Commission nor does the company have publicly traded stock. Therefore, there is no behavior modifying mechanism afforded to state regulators or shareholders to oversee AEC's contributions. If current trends continue unabated, AEC's expected decommissioning savings will be grossly inadequate and will therefore undermine PP&L's decommissioning plans for Susquehanna, in addition, the Allegheny Electric Cooperative " generates approxima'ely 64%
of the power it delivers to its members through operation of the Raystown Hydroelectric Project...and its 10% ownership of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station..."
(Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Annual Reoort 1995: Beyond Electricity, p. 9.)
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Any sudden and unexpected interruption in electric distrib'ution, e.g.,-premature shutdown of Susquehanna, would further erode AEC's ability to make decommissioning contributions.
. AEC's tenuous financial position in regard to inadequate decommissioning savings wil! place a greater fiscal burden on PP&L and, thereby; 1) Create further uncertainties about PP&L's ability to meet its financial commitments to decommission SESS; 2) Undarmine TLG's net decommissioning estimates; and,3) Dilute TLG's contingency factor.
This case example is not unique among Pennsylvania electric utilities. Peach Bottom is owned by four companies, i.e. PECO (42.5%), Public Service Electric and Gas Company (42.5%), Atlantic City Electric Company (7.5%) and Delmarva Power and Light Company (7.5%). Regulatory oversight is dispersed among four state utility commissions and two federal authorities, i.e. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Yet there is no coordination in decommissioning planning among owners or regulatory agencies. If any one entity is unable to fund its portion of decommissioning, the entire process is in jeopardy. This fragile arrangement is replicated at majority of the nation's nuclear generating stations.
Additionally, Three Mile Island is carved up among three utilities operating in two states, i.e., Metropolitan Edison (50%), Jersey Central Power & Light (25%) and Pennsylvania Electric (25%). And in the case of TMI-2, decommissioning funding strategies vary from company to company. Met Ed is planning for SAFESTOR while Jersey Central Power & Light presumes DECON will be the mode of decommissioning. Further complicating the equation at TMI 2, is the fact that rate 10
a payers were charged $700 million for a unit that was on-line for 90 days (1/120 of its expected operating life.) At the time of the March 1979 accident, TMI 2 had set no e
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/ monies for decommissioning. Rate payers also contributed three times as much as 1
. General Public Utilities toward defueling the cripp!ed reactor, i.e., $246 million to $82
' million (GPU Nuclear, Press Release, January 10,1985).
The cost estimates for non radiological decommissioning, (an imprecise term),
are not mandated by the NRC although the agency stipulates that all nuclear power plants be returned to Greenfield, i.e. the original environmental status of the facilities prio'r to construction of the nuclear power plant. The fact that Greenfield has not been achieved by any large commercial nuclear plant and utilities are not required to save for this phase, places additional stiain on the companies ability to finance radiological and non radiological decommissioning.
B. Planned Operating Life for Nuclear Generating Stations Experience at large commercial nuclear power plants over 200 MWe has clearly demonstrated that TLG's assumption, which is shared by the nuclear industry, that nuclear units will operate for 40 years is a cruel fantasy that will penalize hostage rate payers. In fact, PP&L's counsel, Mr. David MacGregor conceded during the 1995 Base Rate proceedings, "He [ Thomas LaGuardia] knows nothing about the operations of.the Susquehanna plant."(PP&L Base Rate Case, Page 455, Lines 22 25 and Page 456 Line 1). The Company's witness, Thomas LaGuardia, was asked by Mr. Epstein:
"[H]ow many commercial nuclear power plants in this country have completed their full operating lives?" Mr. LaGuardia replied: "[N]one, essentially." (PP&L Base Rate Case,
- Page 1023, Lines 20-22.) Additionally, George T. Jones, Vice-President of Nuclear Engineering, was asked by Mr. Epstein:
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'Q: "In your experience,- which isfather extensive at TVA, Energy and CE, can you at least let me know what is the longest life of a plant you've been associated with?"
Mr. Jones:"I've never been associated with one that none of them have ever
- reached the end of their licensed life.
There has been e lot of work done and continues to be done on life extonsion, not by' us but t'y tb9 industry. I don't know." (Page 2272, unes 816.)
- Even Mr. MacGreger wavered on Susquehanna'n ability to operate !ct its full life. Mr.
Epstein asked him. But his (LaGuardia] methodology is cased on the fact the plant will operate for 40 years; is that not correct." Mr. Mac 3regor answered, "I'm not sure that's true." (Page 456, Lines 1518.)
Mr. LaGuardia's and Mr. Jones's acknowledgments are confirmed by empirical data. The following reactors have been shut down prematurely: Shoreham,809 MWe, operated for two full power days (which is.000136986% of the estimated life of Pennsylvania nucleEr units) and closed before it could begin commercial operation in May 1989; Trojan,1095 MWe which operated for 40% of its operating life (May 1976 to November 1992); Three Mile Island 2,792 MWe which operated for 1/120 of its operating life (December 1978 to March 1979), Dresden,200 MWe which operated for 45% of its operating life (July 1960 to October 1978); indian Point-1, 257 MWe which operated for 30% of its operating life (January 1963 to October 1974), San Onofre-1,436 MWe which operated for 35% of its expected life (from January 1968 to November 1992); and, Fort Saint Vrain,330 MWe which operated for 27.5% of its expected life (January 1979 to to August 1989). [Wndd List of Nuclear Power Plants:
Qoerable. Under Construction. or on Order (30 MWo and Over) as of December 31.
1993, " Nuclear. News," March,1995, pp. 38-42.]
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On December 4,1996. Haddam Neck, a 582 MWe Pressurized Water Reactor operated by Cornecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, closed prematurely in the hope of saving rate payers $100 million (" Nuclear Monitor", p.4, December 1996.) The plant came on line in January 1960 and operated for 72.5% of its predicted life.
A sense of fiduciary accountability and fair play dictate that utilities plan for decommicsloning based on the assumption that their nuclear units will be prematurely shut down. The chief indicators that the nuclear industry relies on to measure plant
!ongevity are spurious and imprecise. There is no clear nexus between operating capacity (measure of electricity actually produced compared to what would have been generated if the plant had operated continuously at full power) and plant longevity. As previously noted, operating capacity and historical evidence from commercial nuclear power plants give no indication that nuclear generating stations will operate for 40 years. On the contrary, empirical data has resoundingly demonstrated that nuclear power plants have not operated for the term of their Mense. [See infra ll A Discussion.)
Obviously, there is chronic shortfall between "tcrgctod' funding levels and actual costs for nuclear decommissioning. The burden of proof rests squarely on the shoulders of the nuclear utilities to demonstrate that a 40 year operating life, which they predicate their financial planning upon, is realistic. Furthermore, the nuclear industry has
- exasperated this problem by resolutely refusing to put aside adequate funds for nuclear decontamination and decommissioning.
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C.- Generic. Challenges Commercial Nuclear power plants in the United States are predominately.
' bolling water reactors (BWR) or pressurized water reactors (PWR) supplied by General Electric, Westinghouse, Combustion Engineering or Babcock & Wilcox. Historically,-
each vendor has encountered generic challenges at the reactors they construct.
- The most serious potential generic issues that face BWR's are vessel shroud cracks
. and containment vessel integrity.
Vessel shroud cracks are a serious problem which were first identified at Carolina Power & Light's - Brunswick 2 in 1991 (767 MWe; began operation in March 1977) and Brunswick-2 (754 MWe; began operation November 1975) in September 1993. The cracks at this facility were attributable to stress corrosion and irradiation.
Both are signs of premature aging. Cracks have also been identified at the following General EIActric Boiling Water Reactors: Dresden 3 (794 MWe which came on line in
' November 1971) and Quad Cities-1 (789 MWe which came on line February 1973), in addition, on June 30,1994, PECO Energy Company reported vessel shroud cracking in Unit 3 (1034 MWe; began operation in December 1974). [World List of Nuclear Power Plants. See supra).
The BWR Vessel and Internals Project owners group has announced " cracking of the core shroud is a warning that additional safety-class reactor internals are increasingly more susceptible to the same age related deterioration." [" Nuclear Monitor," November 21,1994, pp.1-2.) As Boiling Water Reactors age, they become more vulnerable to age-is;ated problems such as vessel shroud cracks, which have 14
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.l begun to appear at i General Electric Boiling Water Reactors. Stan Maingi of the; s
- Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources told Mr. Epstein on June 9,E 1995: "That's an issue that can shut them [BWR's] all down. They formed BWR Veswl !
j and intomals Project."
PP&L~ settled out of court with General Electric _(GE) in March 1992 for $55 million for problems relating to generic flaws in the Mark I containment structure.
t (PP&L Base Rate Case, Page_1038, Line 23-25 and Page 1039, Lines 1 18.)'"Certain;
- designs have prompted the NRC and others to raise questions about potential safety a
..; problems. These include General Electric's Mark l containment shell and the Babcock ~
&Wilcox designed reactors," (See "The Wall Street Journal," Wednesday March 18,~
- 1987, p.63.)--
The nuclear industry h'as yet to resolve generic challenges caused by the faulty fire barrier, Thermo Lag. The NRC declared this faulty fire retardant " inoperable" in 1992.Yet Pennsylvania's nuclear plants continue to endanger citizens to replace Thermo-Lag. For example, PP&L deployed over 15,000' (linear) of Thermo-Lag in Susquehanna (Robert G. Byram, Letter to the US NRC, Document Control Desk,..
b December 22,1994) and conductea tests that demonstrated that the material would not comply with regulat_lons as admitted by Mr. Gorge _ Jones during surrebuttal cross examination on May 26,1995 (PP&L Base Rate Case, Page 2276, Lines 1-10.) In addition, Robert G. Byram, senicr Vice President-Nuclear for PP&L acknowledged in a 4
letter to the NRC that the performance record of Thermo Lag, has led us to the.
conclusion that Thermo-Lag elimination through reanalysis is the only realistic-Japproach to resolving this issue.(Robert G. Byram, see supra. )
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Kent Walker, Chairman, OlG Thermal Sciences Inc. Task Force, NRC stated:-
During OlG inspection team reviews with Pennsylvania Power & Light Company'(PP&L) fire protection engineers on January 29 & 30,1992, -
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- regrading the Thermo-Lag 330-1' installed at Unit-1 at Susquehanna,.
George Mulley and Harold Fossett loamed that PP&L is using a failed -
test to. qualify test to quality 0 percent of the Thermo-Lag installed on.
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cable trays in Unit-1...In summary, based on the above information provided by the PP&L' engineers, it appears possible that Susquehanna-Unit 1 has been_ operating since 1982 with an unqualified Thermo Lag fire barrier configuration which may not perform adequately.-
(MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank J. Miraglia,' Jr., Deputy Director, Office of -
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, February 3,1992.)-
Unfortune.tely, the nuclear industry has failed to respond properly to NRC initiatives.= As a consequence, the Nuclear Energy Institute has assumed responsibility for interfacing with licensees on this issue. On October 1,1996, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission fined Thermal Science, Inc. (TSI) $900,000 for " deliberately providing inaccurate or incomplete information to tne NRC concerning TSI's fire -
endurance and ampacity testing programs." (James Lieberman, Director, NRC's Office of Enforcement, October 1,1996.)
r To date, the above mentioned generic issue remains unresolved.
D. Spent Fuel Disposal e
There is no location to permanently store spent fuel generated by nuclear power plants. This is a significant problem for Peach Bottom, Susquehanna and Three Mile Island where the fuel storage capacity will be exhausted before their license expires. Licenses' expire'at Peach Bottom's 2-3 in 2013-2104; Susquehanna 1-2 in 2020; and, Three Mile Island-1 in 2014. These facilities have become a high-level, 16 7
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radioactive waste (HLW) disposal sites and are seeking to increase storage capacity through an untested commercial technology, i.e., dry cask storage.
Even if spent fuel storage is increased, the additional cost will have a significant impact on decommissioningcFor example, at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station-cost was omitted from TLG's decommissioning estimate: "None of the estimates we have prepared include the cost of disposal of spent nuclear fuel," PP&L Base Rate Case, Page 1032, Lines 2012). But spent fuel is the main contributing factor in the escalation of decommissioning costs at Yankee Rowe. Themas LaGuardia, the
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Company's witness, admitted the increase during cross examination:
Mr. Epstein: "Are you aware that the cost has increased for the decommissioning of Yankee Rowe from $247 million to $370 million over the last two years?"
Witness: "Yes. I'm aware of what the estimate concludes."
Mr.' Epstein: "And half of the cost was attributable to spent fuel storage?"
Witness: "That's correct." (PP&L Base Rate case, Page 1029, Lines 16-22.)
Aggravating the critical shortage of HLW storage space is the bleak estimate for the completion of Yucca Mountain, the designated repository for high level nuclear waste. The earliest date this site could be available is 2010. Lynn M. Shishido-Topel, commissioner of the Illinois Commerce Commission testified on behalf of the National Association of Regulatory Commissioners before the House Subcommittee
.on Energy and Mining Resources and the House Committee on Oversight and Investigations (March 17,1995.) She told the panel that she was " fairly certain that DOE would not meet its revised 2010 deadline to begin accepting spent fuel from commercial reactors."[ Bureau of National Affairs (BNA)," Federal Facilities:
Industry, DOE Struggle to Find Acceptable Solution to Interim Storage of Spent Fuel, 17
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l Daily Environment Report News, ' March 18,1994 [1994 DEN 52 d10).) Shishido opel also predicted that the amount of spent fuel generated by 2000 will be 40,000 metric
-tons (MTU).
1 The State of Nevada has demonstrated that Yucca Mountain will probably hold i
about 20% of the total 85,000 MTU of spent fuel earmarked for the facility. (PP&L Base-Rate Case, Page 2287, Lines 4 19.) (State of Nevada, Nuclear Waste Project Office,-
-- Scientific.and Technical Concems, pp.811.).
Despite the overwhelming evidence that Yucca Mountain will not be operatio_ al.
n by'2010,' the NRC recently submitted a Revised Program Plan (10 CFR 960,1996)
- which points to a " Viability Assessment" to make "a rellat.s appraisal of the prospects for geological disposal." This revised strategy will ask the President of the United States of America for a site recommendation authorization in 2002.
Isolation of high level radioactive waste, which is primarily com;. sed of spent nuclear fuel, can not be separated from nuclear decommissioning. At the earliest, Yucca Mountain will be available 2015. Nuclear generating stations can not be immediately decontaminated and decommissioned with the presence of spent fuel on-site or inside the reactor vessel. Aggressive and destructive decontamination clean up processes will be unavailable until the spent fuel is removed the nuclear
_ generating stations' temporary storage facilities. Additionally, front-end generic decommissioning tasks require skilled workers for site-specific tasks. Labor costs are erratic and should be linked to inflationary indices. Finally, the NRC and the nuclear industry devote scant resources to decommissioning research and development. This laissez-faire approach should no; be rewarded by financially penalizing rate payers.
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' As noted ear"er, certain generic challenges face every nuclear power plant
~
[See infra Discussion 11 C.] Spent fuel storage is no exceptic,n. Two consulting engineers for PeMsylvania Power & Light warned that flaws at Susquehanna and the other 37 BWRs (including Limerick 12 and Peach Bottom 2-3) could result in a loss of -
pool cooling water that _ shields the partially spent uranium fuel. Their concerns
-languished for almost a year; yet, both engineers assert that PP&L is the best utility 4
they've ever worked for. These flaws already exist at Pilgrim and the Washington Nuclear Power-2 reactors. In fact, PP&L who originally played down the engineers report, agr.eed in June 199?. to modify both their spent fuel pools to make them less likely to boil. [ Andrew Maykuth, The Dallas Morning Star, 4A, July 3!,1994.]
If a long term solution to spent fuelisolation is not found in the next several years, Peach Bottom, Susquehanna and Three Mile Island nuclear generating siations in Pennsylvania will most likely be shut down prematurely due to a lack of storage space, (See E. Low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal for further discussion.)
E. Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Most nuclear generating stations currently serve as a temporary repository for low-level radioactive waste (LLRW). (The term is " low-level" is not analogous to low-risk.) PP&L's attitude of waste disposal mirrors that of that industry and government.
" Storage at the plant is an interim measure until a permanent, monitored above-ground [actualiy the f acility is specified to be above grade ] disposal site is ready in Pennsylvania. That facility, expected to open in 1999, will serve nuclear power plants, hospitals, medical research labs, universities and hundreds of industries that use 19 J
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)b radioactive materials." (PP&L, "Inside Susquehanne," Special Office of the President, p.2)
TLG provides nuclear waste storage and nuclear decommissioning costs estimates for all Pennsylvania utilities regulated by the Public Utility Commis lon.
However, TLG's recent testimony during the PP&L base rate case discredits their projections. Mr. La Guardia based his cost estimates for low level radioactive waste disposal on the assumption that the Appalachiar' Compact would be available when the SESS closes (PP&L Base Rate Case, Page 1034,17-20). He concluded that the disposal of LLRW is the most expensive component in the decommissioning formula (Page 2091, Lines 2125.) Furthermore, Mr. LaGuardia conceded it may be necessary to recomputate cost estimates for disposal because it now appears imminent that Barnwell will open for seven to ten years for all states except Nortt' Carolina (Page 2108, Lines 4 9.)
In addition to recomputing the cost of LLRW disposal downwards, the reopening of Barnwell could further postpone the siting of a regional waste facil;1y in Pennsylvania. Marc Tenan, Appalachian Sates LI.RW Commission executive director observed: "If Barnwell's going to open to the entire country for at least the next 10 years, is there really a pressing need to continue work on regional disposal facilities?"
("ACURIE Newsletter, About Low Level Radioactive Waste Management," May 1995, p.1.)
20
r TLG's dec$mmissioning estimateu from a dose assessment concentrated on the half life of the radionuclides cobalt 60 and cesium 137. The timing of decommissioning is based to a large degree on the period in which the above mentioned isotol 's decay and present an amenable workplace. However, Mr.
LaGuardia stated his unfamiliarity with the term hazardous life during the 1995 PP&L B6se Rate Case:
4 Witness: 'The half life is the period of time a ra i!onuclide takes to decay to half the radioactive level that occurred during that period. The hazardous life generally is referred to cheritini hazardous materials which don't go by the same definition. I'm not familiar with thai term with respect to radionuclides of concern."(PP&L Base Rate Case, Page 2118, Lines 16.)
i This is a glaring and costly omission. The hazardous life is ten to twenty half lives.Therefore, the hazardous life of cobalt 60, (mostly a gamma medical source) is at least 52.7 years and cesium 137, (fissivo product) is at least 301 years. (Projected hazardous life is based on half life values in the CRC Handbook of Chemistry and_
PhysicsJRBS). Moreover, as Mr. LaGuardia attested (Page 2100, Line 24), thele are conflicting radiation clean up standards for soll, water and surface as defined by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatc,ry Commission and eaci agency has conflicting cleanup standards for site restoration. (PP&L Base Rate Car,e.
Witness, LaGuardia, Page 2099, Lines 20 25 and page 2100, Lines 1 18.)
(For further discuulon see FR 52061, October 23,1981; 42 (R 60956, November 30, 1977; 40 CFR 192,12, July,1989 and US NRC, " Guidelines fo/ Decontamination of Facilities and Equipment Prior to Release for Unrestricted Use cf Termination of
- Licenses for Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear Vlaterial" Policy and Guidance Directive FC 83 23, Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety, Washington, DC, August,1987.)
i l
21 I
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4 lit. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND LAW A. Imposition of Nuclear Operating Costs onto Rate Payers i
United States jurisprudence has never recognized the right of utilitiet to recover imprudent, highly speculative utility expenditures. Bluelle/d Water Works &
Improvement Company v. Public Service Commission of the State of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 668,678 (1923) (no " constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures"); State of Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission of i
. Missourl,262 U.S. 276,289 91923) (an " abuse of discretion... by the corporate officers" disallows recovery for those expenditures). This emphasis, not on micro management of the corporate leadership of the utility, but on the preservation of the legitimate regulatory authority of the states, was magnified in Pike County Light and Power Company v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 465 A. 2d 735 (Pa.
Cmwith,1933), in which the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania stated that:
The elec;ric utility's tellance on its parent company as a source of power represented an abuse of management discretion in consideration of available alternative supplies of electricity, thus requiring a reduction in its purchase power expense, in the same case, the court stated that the *PUC has broad discretion in rate making matters" and that the actions of the utility were imprudent based upon the availability of lower cost power and the failure of the utility to pursue this alternative. Id. at 739.
22 i
This prudent investment" approach was also explored in New Orleans Public
[
Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989), in which the l
r State utility commission questioned the utility's actions in undertaking an investment in a nuclear generating station. The Supreme Court was asked by the utility to force the New Orleans City Council to grant the utility an increase in retail rates as determined by the FERC, after the District Court had refused to rule on the basis of the abstention doctrine. Id. at 355. The Council had refused to grant the retail rates, and stated that the utility's " oversight and review of its Grand Gulf obligation... was uncritical and soverely deficient." Id. at 356 (citing App. 24)(citation omitted). The Council also stated l
r that the ulti:ty " acted imprudently in falling to reduce the risk of its Grand Gulf commitment, in the wake of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in March,1979, 'by
[not) selling all or part of its share [in Grand Gulf) off station."Id. at 357. The Court declared that the abstention doctrine did not apply to the case, and reversed and remanded the case for further consideration to the District Court.
i Other courts have also held that the imprudent activity of the utility in investing in nuclear generating capacity is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration when determining the amount of a rate increase request. In Pa. PUC et al. v. Metropolitan Edison Company,141 P.U.R. 4th 321 (1993), the Commission was faced with a request from Met Ed for a rate increase prompted by the TMl 2 accident and subsequent need for decommissioning. In its threshold inquiries, the Commission explored whether the decommissioning costs were a *necessary and reasonable cost of doing business."Id. at 328. In addition, the Commission sought to determine whether the actions following the TMI accident were " imprudent or improper " id. The
~
Commission then noted that "no challenge ha[d] been made to the overall reasonableness of decommissioning costs."
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Given the uncertainty surrounding decommissioning, radioactive waste costs, unavailability of radioactive waste disposal facilities, and increased safety concerns surrounding nuclear plant operation, the pudency of the utility's decision to dedicate large amounts of capital to the nuclear venture are called into question.
The wild fluctuations of decommissioning costs based in large part upon the inability of the nuclear industry to maintain a nuclear generating plant for its full predicted operating life offered sound reasoning for a deviation in energy planning by corporate management. Reasonable and prudent utility decision making demand more than a simple acknowledgement of an industry. wide change in the form of a rate hike request. As stated by the Court in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989), the proper scope of analysis for the Commission is whether the decisions at the time, were " reasonable and prudent."
As reflected by the Commissions and the courts in many of the above cases, an extensive prudence inquiry is undertaken by the Public Utilities Commission under Sections 515 and 1308(f) of the Public Utliity Code whenever a utility requests rate recovery based in whole or in part on the cost of constructing an electric generating unit. The roots of this prudence inquiry were discussed by the Commission in Pa. PUC
- v. Pa. Power Company,85 PUR 4th 323 (1987), in which the Commission explained that a prudence review is demanded by the premise that "[l]t is the utility, not its rate payers, which selects the firms which work on a construction project. Therefore, the utility, not its rate payers, must bear the consequences of a firm's failure to perform adequately." Id. at 336. In addition, the Commission stated that rate recovery may be denied even if a utility has acted prudently on the basis of inadequate performance by 24
its agents, contractors, or subcontractors. Id. In the instant case, the decisions involving investment alternatives in the nuclear field were not made by the rate payers, but by the corporate management. A solid analogy can be drawn from the reasoning in Pa.
Power to the issue of " stranded costs" at nucuar power plants concerning the hands I
in which the decision making powers reside and the subsequent allocation of costs.
An extensive prudence review is necessary in rate increase request or
" stranded investment" proceedings to determine whether corporate mismanagement has resulted in costs that are then unjustly transferred to the rate payers. In a forceful dissent filed by Commissioner Joseph Rhodes, Jr., to the decision of the Pennsylvania PUC in Pa. PUC v. Metropolitan Edison Company,141 PUR 4th 321 (1993),
Commissioner Rhodes disagreed with the balance struck in the Majority opinion between costs borne by the shareholder and costs borne by the rate payer. In discussing the equity of the arrangement by which Met Ed rate payers were forced to pay rates which included the costs of decommissioning TMI 2, Rhodes stated the relevance of this case to future nuclear plant decommissioning cases:
Premature retirements bear great similarities to TMI 2 because they involve liabilities for premature retirements and decommissioning.
Therefore, the policy set forth in determining who should pay for TMl 2's decommissioning grows in significance because it may well establish a precedent for additional early retirement cases that might involve substantial rate increases.
Rhodes characterized the equitable considerations in this case between the rate payers and the shareholders in a simple but direct question: "Is it fair to impose these costs on rate payers?"
25
In Re Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Facility,70 PUR 4th 475 (1985), the Kansas State Corporation Commission was confronted with the pudency of the construction of a nuclear generating plant. The Commission discussed risk ascumption and risk sharing through a summary of the testimony of one of the intervener's witnesses, who testified to the proper role of regulation in the determination of rates. The witness, Dr. Sturgeon, explained that:
One of the goals of public utility regulation !s to create the same results within the regulated industry as would occur in a competitive market. In a competitive market, if a firm does not use th* efficient alternatives, it must either exit the market or receive a lower than normal return. Id. at 528.
Another witness, Mr. Drazen, argued that *Even without a showing of imprudent e, shareholders should bear a portion of the cost of Wolf Creek since regulation is a surrogate for competition." Id. at 529 The Corporation Commission declared that the
- risk sharing" approach advocated by the witnesses had considerable merit. It continued to discuss the need for " clear, equitable, and strong risk sharing policies to be established by regulatory commissions to be able to deal with the consequences of poor planning, even when no imprudence is demonstrated."
On the issue of decommissioning, the Commission stated that
- Decommissioning cost estimates are inherently uncertain and speculative" and that
"[t]o date, there has been no actual experience decommissioning a large, commercial nuclear plant and cost estimates have been traditionally low."in addition, the Commission held that "The current shortage (indeed nonexistence) of the site for the disposal of large quantities of radioactive waste makes detailed estimates of shipping 26
-. - - =
distance and cost vir'.ually impossible."Id. at 540 41. In the Wolf Creek rate case, Mr.
LaGuardia (also a Company witness in the 1995 PP&L Base Rate Case) failed to include inflation in his cost estimates and assumed a forty year operating life for the nuclear plant. Id. On the basis of this omission and the speculative predictions of operating life, the Commission chose a " midpoint" of LaGuardia's testimony.
The Commission also declared, *We believe that the NRC and general industry estimates of 30 years is a valid and realistic life to utilize for purposes of decommissioning estimates."Id. at 541.
Additionally, the Commission cited to NRC guidelines that suggested five criteria for evaluating alternative financing mechanisms for nuclear decommissioning.
One of the components of analysis in the discussion was titled *lntergenerational equity that the cost of decommissioning be spread equitably to all rate payers throughout the life of the facility."Id. (See Discussion on p. 32.)
The concerns expressed in the various cases discussed by the Commissions vested with the responsibility of approving rate hike requests, and recovery of new construction costs, are valid and applicable to the issue of imprudent " stranded costs."
An extensive prudence review of the costs incurred by nuclear utilities in the construction of nuclear generating stations and the subsequent decision by the owners and operators in their continuing operation is mandated by the speculative and imprudent nature of the corporate management. Duquesne Light Company, General Public Utilities, Pennsylvania Power & Light (and the Allegheny Electric Cooperative) and Philadelphia Electric Company, aggressively pursued nuclear 27-
ventures at Beaver Valley, Three Mile Island, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, l
Limerick and Peach Bottom with full and complete knowledge of the uncertainties that serve as the economic foundation of the nuclear industry. The present operating status f
of U.S. nuclear facilities bear out this premise: no commercial nuclear generating facility has completed its full operating life, due to safety and economic considerations, j
nor has a safe, permanent repository been found for the disposal of high level and -
low level radioactive waste. Clearly, the rate payer should not be made to bear the brunt of expenses incurred by premeditated imprudent and speculative management decisions. Once again, the admonishment of Commissioner Rhodes is pivotal: "[A] side from whether it is legal, is it fair to impose these costs on rate payers?"
1 IV. ARGUMENT Objective empirical data clearly demonstrate commercial nucloar power plants will not operate for their projected life of forty years. While the electric industry is entitled to recover a portion of decommissioning funding through the rate making process, the industry is not entitled to a full and complete rebate on " stranded l
investments.* These companies must assume responsibility for its business decisions.
The-industry aggressively sought to license, construct and operate a nuclear facility despite the fact that the riddle of how to resolve the "back end" of nuclear power production, i.e. (nuclear waste disposal and decommissioning) had not been solved.
' To allow nuclear utilities to recover 100% of decommissioning funding from the rate payer would be a de facto endorsement of corporate socialism. That is, shareholders profit from their investment decisions but are accorded rate relief when their imprudent and speculative decisions become uneconomical. Additionally, complete rate recovei, 28 t
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on speculative investments such as " stranded costs," penalizes electric utilities such as West Penn Power which pursued a non nuclear electric portfolio.
TMIA encourages the adaptation of Batelle Pacific Northwest laboratories (PNL) 1993 generic decommissioning formula by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in regard to " stranded cost" rate recovery for the decommissioning costs of nuclear generating stations. Allow full recovery for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's official projections for the min / mum cost to decommission Bolling Water Reactors. That figure is currently set at.5131.8 million (1986 dollars) for DECON; SAFESTOR $128.3 million (ten years), $131.1 million (30 years) and $106.1 million (100 years). PNL estimates the minimal cost to decommission a Pressurized Water Reactor at $105 million. These figures are based on a 3,400 MWT or greater. For the purpose of the study, Batelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, the contractor, used WNP 2 (Washington Nuclear Power Plant 2) (1112 MWe) (operated by the Washington Public Power Supply System) as a reference reactor. The Int /st/on factor formula Is: (0.75 L + 0.07 E + 0.18 8 ) + TAXES /lNSURANCE Where:
L = Labor & materials E = Energy & Transport, B= Waste burial.
This formula allows th6 costs to be indexed to any generic increases projected by the Commission. [ Decommissioning Costs Reassessment: Briefing for the TMI Advisory Panel, September 23,1995, Dr, Carl Feldman.} Funding in excess of the NRC's 29
i 5
financial goals should be paid into an external, segregated sinking fund by the
[
shareholders. However, should any individual nuclear unit shut down prematurely, the entire residue of decommissioning funding must necessarily be derived from shareholder contributions.
PNL's formula is sound and is periodically readjusted. Three Mile Island Alert encourages the study as a baseline counterweight to TLG's estimates. In fact, TLG examined the same reference reactor as PNL and the only significant cost differential was in relation to labor costs.
1 The issue of. rate payer equity and mandated feasibility of sharod costs was highlighted in PP&L's 1995 Base Rate request before the Pa. PUC. The Company went on record during the hearings as being disgruntled with the manner in which decommissioning costs are unfairly distributed among rate payers. Mr. Douglas A.
Krall, Manager Integrated Resource Planning for PP&L is on record decrying the current decommissioning formula during the PP&L Base Rate Case:
Mr. Epstein: "That if the rate increase for decommissioning fossil fuel plants are delayed future customers would unnecessarily be at risk."
Mr. Krall: "Yes. There would be an exposure that a customer who came on the last day of operation of the plant would get very little service from the plant and end up paying the whole cost of decommissioning." (Page 1925, Lines 16 24.)
Mr. Epstein: "But you would not be adverse to assessing future customers who got no electrical benefit from a plant decommissioning costs?"
Mr. Krall: *lt doesn't seem to me to be an equitable situation." (Page 1927, Lines 913.)
The nuclear industry has been pursuing a billing policy articulated by Luther J.
Carter:
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I These industry actors, for the most part, find themselves nicely insulated from the costs of waste management. The Price Anderson Act, for example limits industry liability, and the nuclear waste policy act allows utilities to pass wasto l
management costs through to rate payers. Thus nuclear waste management costs, like nuclear wastes, are a residue of the 1950s nuclear promotion policy. Moreover, a portion of nuclear wastes and their management costs is the result of improperly underpricing nuclear electricity and creating an over investment in nuclear plants and equipment. As a result, more waste than optimum was created. Furthermore, waste management costs are to be absorbed by taxpayers and rate payers instead of the shareholders of the industry actors who put their externality creating products on the market without fully accounting for social costs. [ Luther J. Carter, "Jurimetrics Journal," Fall, 1988. 29 JURIM J 97.)
Unless a more equitable funding formula for decommissioning is established, rate payers who are not yet born will be burdened for payment for the cleanup of a plant
}
that they derived no benefit from. Society as a whole, and the industry in specific, must i
assume responsibility for the decisions it makes. Creating and perpetuallng intergenerational problems is not constructive, prudent or equitable.
Future generations may be exposed to gross rate payer inequity if adequate decommissioning funding based on realistic estimates (and not " funding targets") are not assured. The solution should not simply be folsted on the backs of immediate hostage rate payers. The industry must assume financial responsibility for its decision to invest in nuclear power which necessarily means the shareholder should bear a substantial portion of decommissioning expenses. Clearly, a formula must be i
established that recognizes rate payer equity, i
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V. CONCLUSION l
In summation Three Mile Island Alert invokes the comments of Peter Bradford, former Nuclear Regulatory Commission Member, former Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission and current member of the Vermont Department of Public Service.
There never was such a regulatory compact [to ensure recovery of prudent, though ' stranded' costs). This statement may surprise anyone whose involvement in utility regulation predates 1985. Since that time, the breaching of the regulatory compact has been described and decried so otten and so vociferously that a casual observer might easily believe that this compact was a lesser known outcome of the original Constitutional Convention.
l The utility claim seems to be that they have an entitlement [for stranded costs) despite this history because the particular traumas of retall competition could not have been foreseen. As a factual matter, this claim is dubious. Furthermore, it mocks the notion of risk, which is by its nature not entireable foreseeable.
Utilities assert that they have the right to recovery extends to every dollar not disallowed as imprudent. However, regulators know how small a percentage of the total utility revenue stream is ever actually reviewed for prudence. in many states, utilities actively harass regulatory budgets and appointments in a manner hardly consistent with a statesmanlike compact. Even where such conduct is absent, the probability that regulators have actually disallowed every imprudent dollar is zero.
Strandable investment is the public's best leverage to an effectively competitive and an environmentally acceptable future. Regulators, legislators and others in public sector must not give it away until that future is well secured.
t-(Peter Bradford, Presentation before the Vermont Department of Public Service, July 16, 1996.)
32 e
O Respectfully submitted,
[,I $ ) 'Y/
(k,' Chairman 1
f Eric J6seph pste Three Mile Island Alert 315 Peffer Street Harrisburg, PA 17102 NOVEMBER 20,1997 Enclosure 33
a THREE MILE ISLANo ALERT, ING, 315 Peffer St., Harrisburg, Penna,17102 (717)233 7897 HISTORY OF THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT Three Miie Island Alert (TMIA) is a non profit citizens' organization formed in 1977 after the construction and licensing of Three Mile Island Unit 1 and after TMI 2 was constructed. TMIA is the largest and oldest safe energy group in centrcl Pennsylvania. TMIA has enjoyed widespread public and political support in its role as a watchdog of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station. In the spring of 1987, TMIA was recognized by the Pennsylvania House of Representatives for 10 years of community service. The House, along with the City of Harrisburg, formally applauded TMIA's efforts on behalf of the community at their 20th anniversary.
Since the March 1979 accident at TMl 2, TMIA has been actively involved with many Three Mile Irland related issues including: active intervener before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in hearings involving safety, technical and managerial issues; monitoring and tracking chronic safety, technical and managerial problems at Unit 1 and Unit 2; tracking adverse health effects as a result of the TMI 2 accident and the normal operation of Unit 1 (since 1974); participating in two radiation monitoring networks; ovaluating security problems at the Island; and, providing information, research and educational materials to the general public, media and elected officials.
TMIA also serves as regional clearinghouse on a broad spectrum of issues relating to nuclear power production incluaing problems at Peach Bottom 2 and 3, Susquehanna 1 and 2 and the proposed siting, licensing and construction of a low-level radioactive waste dump in Pennsylvania.
TMIA's policy is generated by a seven member planning council which meets quarterly. TMIA meets regularly with the NRC and Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources to discuss issues and problems relating to TMI 1 and 2.
The organization has two part time volunteers who staff the office. In addition, several individuals write, edit and mail TMIA's newsletter which is issued five to six times a year. All of TMIA's funding comes from membership dues, private contributions and fund raising events.
TMIA's office is open Monday through Friday from 10:00 am to 6:00 pm.
Weekend visits are available by appointment. The public and all interested parties are encouraged to stop by or contact the group by phone or mail.