ML20054C784

Forwards IE Insp Rept 50-139/76-01 of Special Physical Security Insp on 760426 & 27.Weaknesses Noted Re Security Sys,Access Control,Surveillance & Procedures

ML20054C784
Person / Time
Site:	05000000, 05000139
Issue date:	05/25/1976
From:	Rizzolo V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:	Roy G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML19323G049	List: IR 05000083/1975002 IR 05000083/1977004 IR 05000139/1975001 IR 05000139/1975002 IR 05000139/1976001 IR 05000139/1977003 IR 05000139/1978002 IR 05000139/1978004 IR 05000139/1979002 IR 05000139/1979003 IR 05000139/1980002 IR 05000139/1980003 ML20054C747 ML20054C768 ML20054C771 ML20054C781 ML20054C784 ML20054C787 ML20054C792 ML20054C797
References
FOIA-81-339 NUDOCS 8204210642
Download: ML20054C784 (2)

See also: IR 05000139/1976001

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UNITED STATES

g g CQPT

NUCLEAR REGULATORY cot.it.11sslON

REGION V

SUITE 202. WALNUT CREEK PLAZA

1990 N. C ALIFORNI A BOULEVARD

WALNUT CREEK, C ALIFORNI A 94596

MAY 251916

G. W. Roy, Chief, Field Coordination and Enforcement Branch

Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Headquarters

UtiIVERSITY OF WASHIriGT0ft

DOCKET T10. 50-139

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Enclosed is the report of the special physical security inspection

conducted on April 26 and 27, 1976 for the above facility.

The following weaknesses and vulnerability were noted during the

inspection:

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1.

Security Systems

The reactor is enclosed in a two story "high hay".

The walls

on the second level (which is at ground level on one side) are

entirely of glass.

Access doors to both the glass enclosed

control room on the second level and to the lower level equip-

ment bays have glass panels. l

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2.

Access Control

The key control and accounting system,. upgraded upon completion

of the re-keying effort for all security doors, was reviewed

and appeared to be consistent with Regulatory Guide 5.12.

However, the removable cores from security padlocks used both

within and outside the building to secure essential equipment

were not being afforded a commensurate level of protection.

The licensee took measures to incorporate those cores into his

control system prior to completion of the inspection.

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G. W. Roy, Chief, IC&EB

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(University of Washington

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3.

Surveillance

On the south side of the Nuclear Reactor Building two stacks

of brick obscure the emergency exit and the ventilation grill

from view of the periodic security patrol.

The licensee indi-

cated that the bricks would be relocated.

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4.

Procedures

The written procedures for response to a. bomb threat while

describing the actions of the campus police did not provide

guidance for reactor operating personnel nor for the person

receiving the threat.

The licensee agreed to expand upon

their procedure drawing upon the expertise of the University

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Police Department.

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V. N. Ri

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Safeguards Branch

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Enclosure:

IE Inspection Report No.

50-139/76-01 (IE-V-125)

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