IR 05000139/1976001
| ML20054C789 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, 05000139 |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1976 |
| From: | Norderhaug L, Rizzolo V, Schuster M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323G049 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-81-339 50-139-76-01, 50-139-76-1, NUDOCS 8204210655 | |
| Download: ML20054C789 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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REGION V
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50-139/76-01 (IE-V-125)
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s IE Inspection Report No.
University of Washington Docket No. 50-139 Licensee Seattle, Washington 98105 License No.R-73
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Priority
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Category F
- Facility Nuclear Reactor Facility Safeguards Location Nuclear Reactor Building.
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Type of Facility Teaching. Reactor Soecial Security (Unannounced)
i Type of Inspection
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Dates of Inspection April 26 and 27,1976 June 2-3, 1975 Dates of Previous Inspection 64'//'76 PrincipalInspector,I
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b-2@7S Acco=panying Inspectors /.' : 3 f4 a.f a Date M. D. Schuster, Physical Security Inspector
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Date Other Accompanying Personnel:
Reviewed by
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V. fl.'Rizzk Chief, Safeguards Branch M,
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SUMMARY OF FINDIi!GS
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Enforcement Action _
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Items of Noncompliance
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None
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Deviations None
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Other Sionificant Findinos
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Security k'eaknesses
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a. l l
No control and accounting system is provided for the removable b.
cores for padlocks used both inside and outside the security area to protect essential equipment.
(Details 4.b.(2)).
Stacks of brick along the south exterior wall of the !!uclear c.
Reactor Building shield secured openings from view of the security patrol.
(Details 4.B.(3)).
The procedure for dealing with bomb threats does not provide d.
guidance to operations personnel.
(Details 4.b.(4)).
2.
Requested Augmented Security As a result of the NRC's telephone call on February 23, 1976, the licensee alerted the operating personnel to challenge visitor's The licensee also notified the University Police need for access.
to exercise additional diligence.
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Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings As a result of an inspection conducted on June 2 and 3,1975 50-139/75-02 (IE-V-65)), the NRC issued a l'otice of (Repor.t flo.
Violation and a list of unresolved matters related to the licensee's physical security program.
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The following licensee actions to these items were verified on this inspection.
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a.
Finding
" Contrary to 10 CFR 73.'40 and your Security Plan, inspection of_ keys at the University Police Department revealedl-
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(Letter R. H. Engelken,l'RC'to i4. R. Hill, University of Washington dated June 25, 1976.)
Action
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Full compliance with 10 CFR l
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73.40 was achieved on June 20, 1975."
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Finding
" Drawings included in the Sec'urity Plan dated August 7,1974 are incomplete.
Approximately one inch (equal to 10 feet) was omitted from,the center of the building drawings, a_nd the locations of;
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are not shown. "
(Letter R. H. Engelken to W. R. Hill, University
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l of Washington dated February 6,1976.)
Action The Security Plan Drawing, dated August 6,1974 has been re-
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drawn and it now contains complete information.
c.
Finding
"The following features of the physical barriers which en-c. lose the nuclear reactor laboratories decrease the effec-tiveness of the barriers to possible unauthorized intrusion:
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Hill, University of Washington dated February 6,1976.)
Action
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d.
Finding
" Effective key controls have not been established.
For example, a master key issued to an individual no longer on the faculty has not been retrieved and 'three master keys are known to have been lost.
However, the locks associated with those keys have not been re-keyed."
(Letter R. H. Engelken to W. R. Hill, University of Washington dated February 6,1976.)
Action
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The re-keying of all _ security locks had been completed prior to the inspection. !
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(Security Weaknesses, Paragraph b.).
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Other The licensee is in the process. of revising his security plan (to be submitted to NRC by the end of May) to incorporate recent changes in position titles and minor facility modifications described in a letter to Region V dated February 24, 1976.
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Management Interview 1.
Entrance
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The inspectors met with W. Miller, Assistant Director for Reactor Operations upon arrival at the facility at 1:00 p.m. on April 26, 1976 at which time the scope of the inspection was discussed.
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Exit The exit briefing was conducted at 12:30 p.m. on April 27 with W. 5. Chalk, Director of the Muclear Engineering Laboratories and A. W. Wakefield, Assistant Director for Facilities Engineering.
At that time the findings of the inspection were discussed.
The licensee-registered no objections.
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DETAILS
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1.
Time on site
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Arrived' April 26,1976 - 1:00 p.m.
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Departed April 27,1976 - 1:15 p.m.
Manhours on site - 18 2.
Persons Contacted
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W. S. Chalk, Cirector W. P. Miller, Assistant Directo'r for P.eactor Operations A. W. Wakefield Assistant Director for Facilities Engineering C. Carrier, Reactor Operator W. Peoples, Technical Services A. Stearns, Deputy Chief, University Police 3.
Inspection Program
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a.
The following security areas were inspected.
No items of non-
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compliance or other significant findings were revealed:
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Security Plan (2)
Essential Equipment
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Security Areas
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Security Program Review l
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Protection of SIN l
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Observations in other areas follow:
(1)
Security Systems The reactor is enclosed in a two story "high bay".
The walls on the second level (which is at ground level on one side) are entirely of glass.
Access doors to both the glass enclosed
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control room on the second level and to the lower level equip-ment bays have glass panels.
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(2) Access Control The key control and accounting system, upgraded upon completion of the re-keying effort for all security doors, was reviewed and appeared to be consistent with Regulatory Guide 5.12.
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However, the removable cores from s curity padlocks used both within and outside the building to secure essential equipment were not being afforded a commensurate level of protection.
The licensee took measu.es to incorporate those cores into his control system prior to completion of the inspection.
(3)
Surveillance
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On the south side of the Nuclear Reactor Building two stacks of brick obscure the emergency exit and the ventilation grill from view of the periodic security patrol.
The licensee indi-cated that the bricks would be relocated.
(4)
Procedures
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The written procedures for response to a bomb threat' while describing the actions of the campus police did not provide guidance for reactor operating personnel nor for the person receiving the threat.
The licensee agreed to expand upon their procedure drawing upon the expertise of the University Police Department.
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