ML20044C951

LER 93-009-00:on 930408,technician Discovered That Estimate of Sample Flow for U2 Reactor Bldg Vent Sampler Flow Rate Monitor Not Calculated.Caused by Personnel Error.Technician counseled.W/930428 Ltr

ML20044C951
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	05/07/1993
From:	Bax R, Bridges M COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-93-009-02, LER-93-9-2, RLB-93-071, RLB-93-71, NUDOCS 9305140176
Download: ML20044C951 (4)

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\ Cordova. Illinois

(/ Telephone 309/654-2241 RLB-93-071 April 28, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Docket Number 50-265, DPR-30, Unit Two Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER 93-009, Revision 00, for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code of l Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B). The licensee shall '

report any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specification.

Respectfully, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION R. L. Bax Station Manager RLB/TB/plm cc: J. Schrage ,

T. Taylor INPO Records Center NRC Region II l '

14%LL. J, 9305140176 930507 ^'

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ADOCK 05000265 ppg y-

s v LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

. facility Name (1) Docket Number (2) . Pace (3)

Quad Cities Unit T o 015101010121615 1lof 0l3 Title (4) ,

tiiised Tech Spec Surveillance To Estimate Sample Flow On Rx Buildino Vent Samples Due To Personnel Error ,

__ Event Date (5) LER NumJer (6)

Report Date (7) Other facilities Involved (B)

Month Day Year Year j ,// sequential f//j/j/ Revision Month

/ Day Year facility Names Dodet Number (s) {

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/ _ Number 0151010101 l l

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01 4 01 8 91 3 91 3 010l9 010 015 01 7 91 3 01 51 01 01 Of i 1 l THIs REPORT Is SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OT 10CFR I (Check one or more of the followino) (11t I 2 20.402(b) _ 20.405(c) _ 50.73(a)(2)(iv) _ 73.71(b)

• POWER _ 20.405(a)(1)(1) _ 50.36(c)(1) _._ 50.73(a)(2)(v) _ 73.71(c) ,

LEVEL g i _ 20.405(a)(1)(ii) _ 50.36(c)(2) _ 50.73(a)(2)(vii) __

Other (specify j (10) 01 01 0 _ 20.405(a)(1)(iii) _K_ 50.73(a)(2)(i) _ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) in Abstract  !

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Hame TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE  :

Mark L. Bridges. Tech Staf f Enoineer. Ext. 2944 310l9 615141 l2121411 [

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COM 0 EN FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUsE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- l REPORTABLE cAusE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUIAC- REPORTABLE TURER TO NPPDS TURER TO NPRDS i I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1  ?

I I I I I I I I I I I I l l .

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) Expected Month l Day l Year submission j lyes (If ves. comolete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X l NO I l l ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces. i.e. approximately fif teen single-space typewritten lines) (16) 63STRACT:

)

On April 8, 1993, at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />, Unit Two (U2) was in the REFUEL mode. A Chemistry ,

technician was conducting his normal rounds when he realized he had failed to l estimate sample flow at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> for the U2 reactor building vent sampler [FLT] l

[IL]. The U2 reactor building vent sampler flow rate monitor [FI] [IL) had been inoperable since 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br /> on March 11, 1993, due to modification M04-2-87-051B.

The technician went immediately and estimated sample flow. He reported the event >

to his supervisor who informed the SE. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)(b), which requires the licensee to report any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. The cause of the event was personnel error. The technician forgot to perform the ,

surveillance at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />. The technician was counseled by Chemistry Supervision on the importance of properly completing all Technical Specification required i surveillances. j I

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r s d AlfgrNT REPDRT (LER) TEXT rftNfJNUATf0N Forr Fev 2.Q_

o FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) Pace (3)

Year / sequential) ffj/

// Revision f

/ Number /// Number Juad Cities Unit Two 015101010l21615 9I3 - 01019 - 0I0 01 2 0F O! 3 TEXT Energy Industry Identification system (EIIs) codes are identified in the text as [XX)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Hater Reactor - 2511 MWt rated core thermal power.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION: Missed Tech Spec Surveillance to Estimate sample flow on Rx building vent samples due to personnel error.

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: Two Event Date: April 8, 1993 Event Time: 0900 Reactor Mode: 2 Mode Name: REFUEL Power Level: 0%

This report was initiated by Deviation Report D-4-2-93-028.

REFUEL Mode (2) - In this position interlocks are established so that one control rod only may be withdrawn when flux amplifiers are set at the proper sensitivity level and the refueling crane is not over the reactor. Also, the trip from the turbine control valves, turbine stop valves, main steam isolation valves, and condenser vacuum are bypassed. If the refueling crane is over the reactor, all rods must be fully inserted and none can be withdrawn.

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On April 8, 1993, at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />, Unit Two (U2) was in the REFUEL mode. A Chemistry technician was conducting his normal rounds when he realized he had failed to estimate sample flow at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> for the U2 reactor building ventilation sampler

[FLT] [IL]. The U2 reactor building ventilation sampler flow rate monitor [FI]

[IL] had been inoperable since 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br /> on March 11, 1993,- due to the 902-3 panel annunciators [ ANN) being out-of-service (005) for modification M04-2-87-051B.

Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.2-6 requires sample flow to be estimated once every four hours when the flow rate monitor is inoperable. This estimation involves a local visual inspection of the sample flow meter and recording the sample flow rate. The shift engineer (SE) had initiated Q005 1700-12. " Reactor Building Ventilation Sampler Flow Rate Monitor Outage Report", at that time. The technician went immediately to the sample skid and estimated sample flow. He then reported the event to his supervisor who in turn informed the SE.

At 1020 hours0.0118 days <br />0.283 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.8811e-4 months <br />, the SE declared the 902-3 panel annunciators operable. He then declared the reactor building ventilation sampler flow rate monitor operable and closed outage report QOOS 1700-12.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)(b), which requires the licensee to report any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

DVR 419 j

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT r0NTINUATION Form Rev 2.0

, FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NutGER (2) LER NWEER (6) Pace (3)

Year /// sequential fff /jf//

f Revision >

/// Number /// Number Ouad Eities Unit Two Ol5101010l21615 913 - Ol019 - 010 01 3 0F 01 3 TEXT Energy Industry Identification system (EIIs) codes are identified in the text as IXX)

The root cause of the missed surveillance requirement was personnel error. The technician was aware of the need to estimate flow, but forgot to perform the surveillance at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />. The technician received a turnover prior to beginning his shift at 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br /> on April 7, 1993, and had estimated the flow rate twice previously on his shift (at 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br /> and s300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br />). He also was aware that it was his responsibility to perform the 0100 hotr surveillance.

D. SAFETY CONSE0VENCES OF THE EVENT:

The safety consequences of this event were minimal. The flow rate monitor was administratively inoperable due to work on the 902-3 panel annunciators. The flow indicator was operable throughout the event; only the low sample flow annunciator was inoperable. Flow checks over the period of inoperability showed sample flow remained steady around 1.15 scfm. Also, the U2 reactor building ventilation continuous air monitor (CAM) was operable throughout the event. The CAM also has a sample flow indicator. Had a low sample flow condition occurred, the CAM would have replicated the design intent of the reactor building ventilation sampler flow rate monitor with no loss or degradation in performance.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The immediate corrective action was to satisfy the requirement for estimating flow. Upon completion, the technician informed his supervisor who informed the SE. The technician was counseled by Chemistry Supervision on the importance of properly completing all TS required surveillances.

The Chemistry Department is currently evaluating the use of various aids to remind individuals to perform compensatory measures on time to prevent recurrence (NTS

1. 2652009302801).

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS 1 Missed TS surveillances that do not contribute to equipment degradation are not reportable to the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS). A search was conducted for the previous two years of deviations and found 11 instances of missed TS surveillances. The cause of the 11 events can be broken down as follows; 4 due to personnel error, 4 due to procedural inadequacy, and 3 due to programmatic problems. The four personnel errors were due to Nuclear Station Operators (NS0s) failing to take recombiner outlet temperatures (2), a NSO failed to perform a surveillance prior to entering EGC, and an Operating Supervisor failed to ensure position verification of a fire valve. Of these 11 events, none were missed by the Chemistry Department. The Chemistry Department has only missed two TS surveillances in the last five years. Both were due to poor communication practices and procedural changes were implemented to prevent recurrence. The cause of this event was not related to communication or procedural inadequacy. This is the first missed surveillance of this type by the Station over the last two years and the first of this type by the Chemistry Department over the last five years; and therefore, does not constitute a negative trend..

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

This event did not contain any equipment failures.

DVR 419