ML19332E758

LER 89-019-00:on 891105,half Group II & III Isolation Occurred While Performing Valve Flow Check Surveillance. Caused by Leaky Isolation Valve on Transmitter.Surveillance Methods Will Be Reviewed & Procedures revised.W/891205 Ltr

ML19332E758
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	12/05/1989
From:	Bax R, Brohm K COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-019-03, LER-89-19-3, RLB-89-268, NUDOCS 8912120087
Download: ML19332E758 (6)

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CommonweaRh Edison- i SiMf . ound Cities Nuclear Power Station : i k . . 0.2710 206 Avenue North .

- , L 'E Cordova, lilanois 61242 9740. t

'T Telephone 309/654 2241

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f RLB-89-268

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December.5, 1989 w .U,:S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk

-Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

QuadCities Nuclear Power Station Docket Number 50-254, DPR-29, Unit One i i

L Enclosed is' Licensee Event Report (LER)89-019, Revision 00, for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code of I

Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(iv): The licensee shall report

, any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).

Respectfully, 1:

L COMMONNEALTH EDISON COMPANY i QUAD.~ CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION R..L. Bax Station Manager RLB/MJB/ad Enclosure cc: R. Stols R. Higgins INPO Records Center NRC Region III 2487H .,

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, 8912120087 891205 g g PDR ADOCK 03000254

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, e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) g Fact 11ty Name (1) Docket Number (2) _figt_(31 1 Quad Citias unit one 0!s10101of21s14 ilofl0 ls fi*t1'e (4) ESF Actuation During Outage Surveillance Due to InadeouatL&t.gadure IntQyttion and P_gssible leakino Instrmt Isolatign Valve Event.Date (El LER Number (6) Reoort Date f7) Other Facilities Involved fB1

• Month Day Year . Year /// Sequential ,/jj

// Revision Month Day Year Facility Names Docket NumbgIll) j/I

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Il 1 of E Bl 9 Bf 9 0 l 1 l9 010 1 l2 of $ Bl 9 01 11 01 01 01 I l TH1$ REPORT 15 SUBMITTED PUR$UANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR OPERATING (Check oqe or more of the following) (11) 1 20.402(b) ___ 20.405(c) _K. 50.73(a)(2)(iv) _ 73.71(b)

POWER 20.405(a)(1)(1) _ 50.36(c)(1) . _ _ 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEvtL 20.405(8)(1)(11) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) Other (Specify f101 0 l0 l0 __ 20.405(a)(1)(tii)

___ 50.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) in Atistract

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j/}////////', 20.405(a)(1)(v) __ 50.73(a)(2)(111) _ 50.73(a)(2)(x) Text)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (121 Name TELEftighE NUMBER AREA CODE Kevin Brohm. Technical Staff Encineer. Ext. 2149 3 10 l9 61$'41-l2121di COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COM N[ FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT f13)

CAuSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE TURER TO NPRDS TURER TO NPRDS x .1 1 C I Il $1 v RI si_fti9 l l l l l l 1 1 I I I I I I I i 1 I I _f I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 Expected Month l Day I Yggt Submission lYet fff yet. comolete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X l NO  ! I l l ABSTRACT ~ (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fif teen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 5, 1989, Unit One was SHUTDOWN for a refueling outage. At 1745 hours0.0202 days <br />0.485 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.639725e-4 months <br />, while performing QIS 47-1, Excess Flow Check Valve Surveillance, a half Group II and III isolation occurred. This is believed to have been caused by a faulty manifold isolation valve on the A channel reactor water level transmitter. At 1812 hours0.021 days <br />0.503 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.89466e-4 months <br />, after successfully completing testing of excess flow check valves 1-263-2-13B and -158 in accordance with QIS 47-1, a full Group II and III isolation occurred. Also, trips of the IB Recirculation Pump Motor Generator (MG) set, Control Room ventilation and Reactor Building ventilation systems occurred. The Standby Gas Treatment (SBGTS) system auto-initiated. The full group isolations, resultant trips and SBGTS auto-initiation occurred as a result of one of the reactor water level transmitters, 1-263-58B, being valved back into service while the "A" half group isolation signal was still activated. The procedure did not provide adequate instructions for the maintenance personnel to return the transmitter back to service.

'The systems were returned to normal operating status by 1855 hours0.0215 days <br />0.515 hours <br />0.00307 weeks <br />7.058275e-4 months <br />. An Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone notification was made at 2028 hours0.0235 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.71654e-4 months <br /> in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(lv).

Corrective actions will include a comprehensive review of the surveillance methods, revising procedures, performing a static pressure test and completing training.

This report is being submitted to comply with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(lv).

2401H/06982

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LittNitt EVENT REPORT fLER) TEXT CONTINtlATION Form Rev 2.0 FACILITY.NAME (1)- DOCKET NUMBER (2) Ltt NUMBER f6) Pana (3) -

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Quad fitiet Unit Dna 0l110l0l0l 21 El 4 aI9 - 011 l9 - 0l0 01 2 0F DI 5 Text Energy Industry toentification system (t1Is) codes are toentified in the text as (xx]

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2511 MWt rated core thermal power.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION: ESF Actuation During Outage Survelliance Due to Inadequate r Procedure Instructions and Possible Leaking Instrument Isolation Valve ,

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: One .

Event Date: November 5, 1989 Event Time: 1812 Reactor Mode: 1 Mode Name: SHUTDOHN Power Level: 0%

This report was initiated by Deviation Report 0-4-1-89-098.

SHUTDOWN Mode (1) - In this position, a reactor scram is initiated, power to the control rod drives is removed, and the reactor protection trip systems have been deenergized for 10 seconds prior to permissive for manual reset.

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On November 5, 1989, Quad Cities Unit One was in the SHUTD0HN mode at 0 percent of

. rated core thermal power. The refuel outage reactor vessel hydrostatic test had been completed at 1520 hours0.0176 days <br />0.422 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.7836e-4 months <br />, and reactor [RCT] pressure had been reduced.to 800

-psig in order for Instrument Maintenance (IM) personnel to perform QIS 47-1 Excess Flow Check Valve Surveillance.

QIS 47-1 is required once per operating cycle to functionally test all instrument

-line excess flow check valves [V) and is normally performed following the hyorostatic test. The excess flow check valves are designed to close when a flow greater than two gallons per minute (gpm) at'1,000 psig reactor pressure is sensed. In order to test the valves, a line break is simulated by opening the impulse 1tne drain (backflush) valve. This leakage. flow is monitored at the point where the instrument rack drain manifold drains into the drain funnel. -

To functionally test the excess flow check valves, QIS 47-1 requires that the instruments associated with each excess flow check valve [LOV) be isolated. This precaution is taken to preclude the possibility of initiating false trip signals and to protect the instrument from damage due to rapid depressurization of the impulse line. This is accomplished by closing the isolation valves (ISV) to each sinstrument.

2401H/06982

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Litthiff EVENT REPORT fLER1' TEXT CONTINUAT1oN Form Rav 2'.o ,

IFACILITYNAME(1) DOCKET NuMER (2) LER NUMBER f61 Pace"f31

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_gggt cities unit one o I E 1 o I e 1 o i 21 11 4 aIe - ol 1 Ie - oIo 01 3 or of 5 TEXT' Energy Industry Identification system (E!!s) codes are identified in the text as [XX]

.At-1745 hours, on November 5, 1989, while QIS 47-1 was being performed on the e valves associated with the 2201-6 instrument rack, a channel [CHA)[IB) A low ' level

(+8 inches) reactor scram signal was received and low-low level (-59 inches) ,

reactor recirculation pump trip occurred. Annunciators [ ANN) A8, Group II Isolation Channel Trip, and 88, Group III Isolation Channel Trip, alarmed [ ALM) on ,

the 901-5 panel [PL)-signaling a half group isolation. These trips initiated from the 1-263-5BA level transmitter [LT) which was isolated at the tirr.e. The Control Room attempted to contact the IM personnel after receiving the half group isolations.

At 1812 hours0.021 days <br />0.503 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.89466e-4 months <br />, level transmitter 1-263-588 was being valved back in to service by opening the manifold isolation valves [ISV). While valving this level transmitter back in, a full Group II and III isolation occurred. In addition, the trips of the IB recirculation (RR)[AD) pump [P) motor-generator set [MG), Control Room [VI) and ,

Reactor Building ventilation (VA) systems, and the auto-initiation of the standby ,

gas treatment system (SBGTS)[VA) occurred.

After the channels reset, the Unit Operator immediately reset the group isolaticus. The.IM personnel at the 2201-6 rack were eventually contacted and informed to immediately stop performing QIS 47-1 until further notice. At 1855 hours0.0215 days <br />0.515 hours <br />0.00307 weeks <br />7.058275e-4 months <br />, the systems were returned to their' normal operating status. At 2028 hours0.0235 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.71654e-4 months <br />, an Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone notification was made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(b)(2)(11).

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This' report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(iv): The licensee shall report any event or.

condition that results in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).

The cause of the A half group tsolation is suspected to be due to a leaky isolation l valve on the 1-263-58A transmitter. The cause of the valve leaking has not been determined. A contributing cause was inadequate procedural instructions.

Following the hydrostatic test, reactor pressure was reduced. The pressure drop occurred during the course of the surveillance. It is suspected this pressure drop was measured as a differential pressure by the 1-263-58A level transmitter due to a

[L leaky isolation valve. When the transmitter sensed a differential pressure of 60.09 inches of water, which is equivalent to a low water level scram and ESF l actuation setpoint of +10.4 inches of water level,'a half Group II and half Group III-isolation occurred. The full group isolations occurred when the 1-263-58B level transmitter manifold isolation valves were reopened to return the transmitter to service. The transmitter was initially isolated at a higher I pressure, but upon reopening the manifold isolation valves, transmitter 1-263-58B

!. spiked downscale due to sensing a lower pressure. This occurred because the instrument was not at reactor pressure prior to valving back into service. IM personnel were not aware that the pressure between the transmitter and reactor l should be equalized, as QIS 47-1 did not provide adequate instructions on returning I. the transmitter to service.

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2401H/06982

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LIftMitt EVENT REPORT (LER) T[xT CGNTINuATION Form Rev 2.0  !

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMatt f 6) Pane (3)

Year sequential / Revision ,

.. Number Number Quad Cities Unit one 0 l E l 0 l 0 1 0 l fl El 4 Bl9 - 0I1 l9 - 010 D1 4 0F 01 E TEXT Energy Industry Identification system (E!!s) co6es are identified in the text as [xX)

D.- SAFETY-ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The safety.of the public and plant personnel was not affected by this event. The reactor was in SHUTOOWN mode for a refueling outage, and a scram was manually inserted. QIS 47-1 is specifically required to be accomplished with the mode ,

switch in the SHUTDOHN position so that a trip in the level transmitters'would not create a scram. In this event, the initiation of the Group II and Group III isolations was-in response to a false signal; however, they functioned as designed.

If a loss of coolant eccident (LOCA) had occurred during the isolation of the 1-263-58A and B transmitters, transmitters 1-263-57A and B were fully operable to initiate a Group II and III isolation. Activation of the Group II and III isolations at +8 inches of water level trips the Control Room ventilation and Reactor Building ventilation systems so that the Control Room personnel are not exposed to radiation doses and station release limits do not exceed 10CFR100 guidelines.

.E.- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Work Request 079747 was initiated for the IM Department to perform a static pressure test on level transmitter 1-263-58A. This test will be performed by pressurizing the 1-263-58A transmitter to 1,000 psig and monitoring the pressure eith the isolation valves closed to verify whether an isolation valve is leaking. i The valve will then be replaced if defective. A supplemental report will be initiated if the cause is determined to be other than a leaky valve (NTS 2542008909801). In addition, procedure QIS 47-1 will be revised to include the requirement that the equalizing valve [PCDV] be opened during isolation of the transmitter. This will assure that a differential pressure will not be created between the two legs of the transmitter (NTS 2542008909802). A comprehensive review of the refuel outage reactor vessel hydrostatic. test and QIS.47-1 will be performed to determine the changes required in order to prevent this event from occurring again (including required communications and reactor vessel pressure control guidance) (NTS 2542008909803). Training will be required for the technicians on any revised procedures (NTS 2542008909804).

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

A Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) search was conducted for nationwide ,

failures of the transmitter due to manifold valves failing to isolate completely. '

No failures of this nature were found. The station has experienced similar j previous events involving inadvertent trips and isolations while parforming  !

Instrument testing:

DVR 4-2-88-062 (LER 88-028)

DVR'4-2-88-060 (LER 88-027) 2401H/06982 l

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LitEktEE EVENT REPott fLEtt TEXT CONTimuATION Form Rav 2.0 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) .. LER NtseER (6) Paan (3)

S Year // sequential /p/p/ Revision p/jp/

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-,f oIEIoIoIo121El4 oI1 19 oIo ol & of E nuad cities unit One aI9 - - OF TEXT Energy Industry Identification system (E!!s) codes are identified in the text as [XX)

As a result of 4-2-88-060 (LER 88-027), corrective action was established under

, NTS 2652008806005, which required that an evaluation of the Instrument Maintenance Department's methods be performed in order to improve their performance. This item

.is still in process and the evaluation has been completed. The recommendations are being evaluated at this time. Based on the actions committed to and actions in progress, no further corrective action is deemed necessary.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

The manifold is a three-way valve manufactured by Andersen-Greenwood and is of type MIVHS-4. This manifold is rated at 6,000 psi at 200'F and 4,000 psi at 500'F.

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