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LER 93-012-00:on 930601,U-2 DG Cooling Water Pump Inoperable Due to Inadequate lubrication.U-2 DG Cooling Water Pump replaced.W/930630 Ltr
	ML20045F332
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	06/30/1993
From:	Bax R, Davis S; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	; NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
	LER-93-012-01, LER-93-12-1, RLB-93-090, RLB-93-90, NUDOCS 9307070189
	Download: ML20045F332 (6)
	v • d • e

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/ /#'N Commonwe:lth Edison

/ -- ) Quad Caes Nuc33r Power Sttion

{ y N 22710 206 Avenue North Cordova, liinnois 61242-9740

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\s Teephone 309/654-2241 RLB-93-090 June 30, 1993 i

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Docket Number 50-265, DPR-30, Unit Two ,

r Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER)93-012, Revision 00, for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B). The licensee shall report any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specification.

Respectfully, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION 4%R. L. Bax Station Manager RLB/TB/pim Enclosure cc: J. Schrage -

T. Taylor INPO Records Center NRC Region III 5BtGRW/093.RLB 9307070189 930630 PDR S

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4 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev 2.0 Facility NIme (1) Docket Number (2) Pace f3)

Quad Cities Unit Two 0151DI010121615 1lofl0l5 Title (4)

U-2 Diesel Generator Coolino Water Pume Inoperable.

Event Date (5) LER Number (6) Report Date (7) Other f acilities Involved (8)

Month Day Year Year /// Sequential //j/ Revision Month Day Year Facility Names Docket Number (s) fff ff

/// Number /// Namber 01 51 01 01 Of I l

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01 6 01 1 91 3 91 3 01112 010 016 31 0 91 3 01 51 01 01 Of I l THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the followino) (11) ;

4 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)

_ _ _ 73.71(b)

POWER _ 20.405(a)(1)(i) _. 50.36(c)(1) _ 50.73(a)(2)(v) _ 73.71(c)

LEVEL __ 20.405(a)(1)(ii) ___ 50.36(c)(2) _ 50.73(a)(2)(vii) __._ Other (Speci fy (10) 0 0 7 _ 20.405(a)(1)(iii) JL 50.73(a)(2)(i) _ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) in Abstract

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_ 20.405(a)(1)(iv) _ 50.73(a)(2)(ii) .__ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) below and in ffffffffffffffff,fffffffff

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f 20.405(anin ) _50a3(an2nu o _50a3(an2nx> Texo j

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NIme TELEPHONE NUMBER i AREA CODE Steve Davis. Tech Staff Group Leader. Ext. 2186 310I9 61514!-1212141 i COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONEN FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) cAusE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANuFAc. REPORTABLE CAUsE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE ,

TURER TO NPRDS TURER TO NPRDS A I I I I I I i 1 I l I I I I I I I I I I I l l l 1 I I I ,

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) Expected Month I Dav l Year submission :

lyes (If ves. comolete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X l NO I I I ,

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fif teen single-space typewritten lines) (16) I A .' ABSTRACT:

At approximately 1500 hours0.0174 days 0.417 hours 0.00248 weeks 5.7075e-4 months on June 1, 1993. Unit 2 was in the run mode at !

approximately 7 percent of rated core thermalpower. CECO concluded on June 1 through review of available information that the U-2 Diesel Generator [DG) Cooling Water Pump (DGCHP) [P] was inoperable during the period from February 16 to March 15, 1993.

The Unit 2 DGCHP was inoperable from February 16 to March 15 due to inadequate lubrication. The oiler piping was incorrectly assembled due to inadequate training on how to set and position this type of oiler. ,

Corrective actions include replacing the U-2 DGCHP, walkdowns to verify the adequacy of drawings / instructions used by Operations and Maintenance, and ensure proper installation of oilers and sightglasses on other plant equipment.

Corrective actions also include training of Operations and Maintenance personnel, revision of maintenance lesson plans, and communication of lessons learned to other CECO facilities. A self-assessment was also chartered to look at craft capability, work package detail and other maintenance practices.

LER265\93\012.WPF

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L LICENSEE EVENT REPORV (LER) TEXT c0NTfNUATION Form Rev 2.0 i FACILITY NAME (1) D0cKET NUPBER (2) LER NUPBER f 6) Paoe (3)

Year jj/j sequential

// ///

fff Revision .

/// Number /// Number j Juad cities Unit Two 0 I 5 1 0 I O I O l 21 61 5 913 - 011l2 - Ol0 01 2 0F O! 5 VExT Energy Industry Identification system (EIIs) codes are identified in the text as [xx] t PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

k General Electric - Boiling Hater Reactor - 2511 MHt rated core thermal power.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION: U-2 Diesel Generator Cooling Hater Pump Inoperable.

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

i Unit: Two Event Date: June 1, 1993 Event Time: 1500 ,

Reactor Mode: 4 -Mode Name: RUN Power Level: 7% ,

a This report was initiated by Licensee Report 265/93-012. !

i RUE Mode (4) - In this position the reactor system pressure is at or above 825 psig, and the reactor protection system is energized, with APRM protection and RBM interlocks in service (excluding the 15% high flux scram).

1 B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: l At approximately 1500 hours0.0174 days 0.417 hours 0.00248 weeks 5.7075e-4 months on June 1, 1993 Unit 2 was in the run mode at [

approximately 7 percent of rated core thermal power. CECO concluded on June 1 through review of available information that the U-2 Diesel Generator [DG) Cooling -

Water Pump (DGCHP) [P) was inoperable during the period from February 16 to March ,

15, 1993.

j CECO determined on approximately April 22, 1993 that the 1/2 Diesel Generator was !

inoperable prior to this date due to design deficiencies described in LER !

265/93-10. l As such, there were no operable DGs to Unit 2 during the period February 16 to_ l March 15. During this period, Unit 2 was in the run mode until March 6 when Unit 3 2 entered a refueling outage. The removal of, fuel from the core was completed on .:

March 15. :l Having no operable DGs during the period February 16 to March 6 while the mode switch was in run was contrary to Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.E.1. This TS -

l states that if there are no operable DGs to a given Unit-that an orderly shutdown .;

of that Unit must be initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown i condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Having no operable DGs. during the period March 6 to March-15 while the reactor was_in cold shutdown was' contrary to TS 3.9.E.3. This . l TS states that when the reactor is in cold shutdown or refueling mode a minimum of .

one operable diesel is required whenever any work is being performed which has a i potential to drain the' vessel, Secondary Containment is required _or a core or containment cooling system is required. Removal of fuel from the core on March 15 l

eliminated the need per TS to have an operable DG. The Station had not initiated I any Limiting Conditions of Operation prior to this date, however, since it was not- ,

known as of that time that either DG was inoperable. ,

LER265\93\012.WPF

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LIEENSEE EVEN7 REPORV (LER) tex? EONTINUATION Form R n 2 1 FACILITY NAME (1) D0cKEV NUMBER (2) LER NUPEER f 61 Pace (3)

Year ,/,/j/ sequential /j/,

/ Revision f

/// Number /// Number Quad Eities Unit Two O f 51010 l 01216I 5 913 - 01 1 l 2 - 010 01 3 0F 01 4 TEXT Energy Industry Identification system (EIIs) codes are identified in the text as [xx)

On March 25, 1993, the Unit 2 DG was taken Out of Service (DOS) for scheduled outage maintenance. On March 29, an Operator while on his routine rounds '

questioned the height of the Unit 2 DGCWP oiler. Maintenance examined the bearings for possible damage. Upon removal of the vent cap, metal particles were ,

found in the bearing housing. Upon disassembly of the pump, approximately one tablespoon of oil was found in the oil reservoir. This is the expected oil level based on the height of the oiler. The bearing retainer ring, which provides ;

spacing between the ball bearings, was found in pieces. The races and the ball bearings were intact, but the bearing and pump shaft had apparent heat damage. !

The balls were coated with a heavy grease like film. :

The exact date of failure of the bearings is unknown, however, the Unit 2 DG was last demonstrated operable via 2.5 hour5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months run on February 16 by performing QCOS 6600-1, " Diesel Generator Monthly Load Test". There were also three 15 minute runs of the U-2 DGCHP from February 4 through February 13. The February 4 run was the pump operability surveillance which also obtains Inservice Testing (IST) vibration data. No abnormalities were noted.

C. APPAREN1_CMSE OF EVENT:

This report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of

10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B). The cause of the 1/2 DGCHP being inoperable is described in LER 265/93-10. The Unit 2 DGCWP was inoperable from February 16 to March 15 due to inadequate lubrication. The oiler piping was incorrectly assembled due to inadequate training on how to set and position this type of oiler.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

'The safety significance of this event is minimal. The U-2 DGCHP may have been able to function after February 16 but for a:. unknown length of time. CECO cannot conclusively determine how much longer the pump could have operated with the as-found condition. The pump continued to function with no abnormalities being noted up to the time the pump was taken DOS for routine niaintenance. In the opinion of company experts, if the bearing did not have adequate lubrication, the ,

pump would not have operated for longer than a few minutes.

The safety significance of this event is dependent upon the ability to operate the 1/2 DG. Under certain 1/2 DG auto-start situations, the 1/2 DGCHP would have ,

failed to start due to electrical logic design deficiencies. The safety significance associated with the 1/2 DG logic is contained in LER 265/93-10.

Furthermore, the 1/2 DGCHP could have been started by taking the pump control switch to trip and then back to the auto after trip or close position.

LER26s\93\012.WPf l

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e LIrENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Fonn Rev 2.0 rACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER N M ER (6) Pace f3)

Year /// sequential /// Revision fff

/// Number /j//ff Number i Joad cities unit Two O l 5 l 0 l 0 1 0 1 21 61 5 9l3 - Of 1 I 2 - Ol0 01 4 Or 01 5 TEXT Energy Industry Identification system (Ells) codes are identified in the text as [XX)

Operators have been trained to identify a loss of power to a DGCHP and would have responded to the event in adequate time to prevent DG damage. Simulator lesson plans include this scenario. Operators, as a part of training, dispatch personnel to the diesel generator whenever it is autostarted. This dispatch increases the likelihood that the inoperable DGCHP condition would have been promptly corrected. Quad Cities Annunciator Procedure QCAN 901-1(2)-8 A-4 " Diesel -

Generator 1/2 Trouble", requires the control room operator to dispatch an operator to DG local panel of the trouble alarm. This is the first required operator action.

Operators receive extensive training on the importance of the DGCHP to operability ,

of the DG in a loaded condition. '

Quad Cities Annunciator Procedure 2212-45 C-3, " Cooling Water Pump Failure",

requires the operator at the local DG panel to manually start the 1/2 DGCHP if the pump is not running. This would be accomplished by first attempting to manually start the pump by placing the control switch to start. If this did not start the pump, further action would have required the operator to move the feed power selector switch to Bus 28, starting the pump.

An Event Tree analysis was performed to describe the operators' actions during this scenario.

The Event Tree analysis indicates that it would be reasonable to conclude that actions necessary to restore power to the 1/2 DGCHP would have been accomplished in 5 to 10 minutes from the event initiation. Therefore, even with problems with a period of indeterminate operability of the Unit 2 DGCHP, it is reasonably likely that the 1/2 DGCHP would have been started in time to prevent a complete loss of onsite power on Unit 2. It is also significant that the probability of a LOCA coincident with a loss of all offsite power is approximately 10 E-08/yr.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The corrective actions associated with the 1/2 DGCHP inoperability is described in '

LER 265/93-10.

Corrective actions for the improper assembly of the U-2 DGCHP oiler piping include I the following. The Unit 2 DGCHP was replaced, and the pump operability surveillance QC05 6600-6, " Quarterly Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Flow Rate ,

Test", was performed and the pump declared operable on April 10, 1993.

The Technical Staff performed walkdowns on safety related and nonsafety related equipment sightglasses and oilers in the plant to ensure proper installation.

The Operations Department held discussions on how to determine proper oil level during operator rounds.

To address the inadequate training of maintenance personnel on oiler piping I assembly, a detailed training session was held by the Master Mechanic with the ,

mechanics using the actual DGCHP hardware that was improperly positioned as a mockup and training guide. ;

LER26s\93\012.wPf

LfCENSEE EVENT REPORT fLER) TEXV CONTVNUATION form Rev 2.q_ y FAcfLITY NAME (1) DOCKEV NuPEER (2) LER NUPEER f 6) Pace (3)

Year fj/j// sequential // Revision

/// Number /p/

j/j

/ Number Quad cities Unit Two 0 l 5101010121615 9I3 - Of 1 I 2 - 010 01 5 0F 01 5 TEXT Energy Industry Identificatior, system (EIIs) codes are identified in the text as [XX)

Operations and Maintenance have jointly conducted plant walkdowns to further clarify the drawings / instruction used by Operations and Maintenance concerning sightglasses and oilers. A matrix has been developed on the different styles of sightglasses and oilers in the plant. An action plan has been developed to

address the results of the walkdowns and how they relate to enhanced training, both Operations and Maintenance lesson plan revisions, and the marking of sightglasses. (NTS #2651809301201) will track implementation of the action plan)

A self-assessment was chartered utilizing corporate groups and onsite Quality Verification (QV) to look at craft capability, work package detail and other maintenance practices. Upon receipt of the report from the task force, the Maintenance Superintendent will review the recommendations for applicability and implement an action plan by September 1, 1993. (NTS 2651809301202).

By July 1, 1993 a followup " Lessons Learned Green Border Notification" will be issued to all CECO sites describing this event, its causes, and corrective actions (NTS#2651809301203).

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

A search was performed for previous events.

See LER 265/93-010 for previous events involving inadequate design of the diesel generators.

No previous events were identified involving low oil level due to sightglass or oilers being installed improperly.

An NPRDS Search identified 4 previous occurrences in industry involving bearing failures related to incorrectly installed or adjusted oilers.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

The U-2 DGCHP was manufactured by Ingersoll Rand [IO75), Model 5SB.

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ML20045F332

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