ML19351A639

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LER 89-020-00:on 891117,full Reactor Scram Occurred Due to Simultaneous Loss of Power to 1A & 1B 24/48-volt Distribution Panels During Panel Transfer.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Trained Re event.W/891215 Ltr
ML19351A639
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/15/1989
From: Bax R, Dolecheck D, Pacilio J
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-020-03, LER-89-20-3, RLB-89-280, NUDOCS 8912200099
Download: ML19351A639 (5)


Text

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                            /~N Commonwealth Edison                                                                                                         !
                                           ) ound Cites Nuclear Power Station
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                                  *. ' " 22710 206 Avenue North                     _
7. >; 4 A Cordova, lilinos 61242 9740
                             \s' ' Tsiephone 30lW654-2241                                                                                              -{
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      .g RLB-89 280                                                                                                                       .
                                                                                                                                                            +
                          . December.. 15,,1989
  • U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Hashington,'DC .20555 I

Reference:

Quad Cities. Nuclear Power Station Docket 6 timber 50-254, DPR-29, Unit'One Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 89-020,' Revision 00, for Quad Cities-Nuclear Power Station.

                         - This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of-the Code of                                                      .

Federal Regulations, Title ~10 Part 50.73(a)(2)(iv): The licensee shall . report any event or condition'that resulted in manual-or automatic. actuation of any-Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection-System (RPS). Respectfully, COMMONHEALTH EDISON COMPANY i; ' QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STAT!ON J - R. L. Bax h h . Station Manager l-RLB/MJB/ad Enclosure e cc: R. Stols R. Higgins INPO Records Center NRC Region III  ; t 2499H 8912200099 891215 fp> <

                                                  .PDR         ADOCK 05000254                                                                        f S               '

PDC ' t

                              .                   . . _ ,                  . _ .      . . _ _ . . . . _ _ _ . . . .     . ~ _   _ . . . _ . _ . _

II LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Form Rev 2.0 Fact 11ty Name (1) Docket Number (2) Pane (3) ggg[Citie Unit one of El 01 01 0! 21 El 4 1 lofl0 l4

  • Title (4) Reactor scram Occurred During the Transfer of the 24/48-Volt Distribution Panels Caused by an Personnel Error Event Date (E) LER Number (6) Recort Date (7) Other Facilities Involved (B)

Month Day Year Year /// sequential /,// Revision Month Day Year Facility Namet Docket Numberfs)

                                  /// Number             p///  Number 01 51 O! 01 01 l l
                                  ~~                     '"

11 1 11 7 al 9 al 9 0 l 210 010 1 12 11 E al 9 01 El 01 01 of I l gpg,gg THis REPORT Is sVBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS 0F 10CFR (Check one or more of the followinal fil) 2 -- 20.402(b) __._ 20.405(c) .JL 50.73(a)(2)(tv) __ 73.71(b) POWER ._ 20.405(a)(1)(1) 50.36(c)(1) _, 50.73(a)(2)(v) _ 73.71(c) LEVEL 20.405(a)(1)(11) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vit) Other (specify 0!0 l0 (101 20.405(a)(1)(111) __ 50.73(a)(2)(l) .,_ 50.73(a)(2)(viti)(A) in Abstract

   //////////////////////////           _    20.405(a)(1)(iv)    _    50.73(a)(2)(11)       __   50.73(a)(2)(viti)(B)         below and in
   //////////////////////////                20.405(a)(1)(v)     _ _  50.73(a)(2)(111)           50.73(a)(2)(x)               Text)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) Name 0. Dolecheck, Technical staff Engineer, Ext. 2190 TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE J. Di Pacilio. Technical Staff Enoineer. Ext. 2162 3 1019 61 El 4l -l 21 2! 41 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COM FAILURE DESCRIBE 0 IN THIS REPORT (13) CAusE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE CAust SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE TURER To NPRDS TURER TO NPRES I I I I I l l I l l 1 1 I l i I I I I I i i i I I I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED f14) Expected Month l Day l Year submission lYet fif ves. comolete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X l No l I l ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, t.e. approximately fif teen single-space typewritten lines) (16) On November 17, 1989, Unit One was in the REFUEL mode. At 1324 hours, a full scram occurred due to a simultaneous loss of power to the "lA" and "18" 24/48-volt distribution panels during a distribution panel transfer. These panels supply power to the two divisions of the Intermediate Range Monitors of the neutron monitoring system [IG). Loss of both divisions of neutron monitoring caused both channels of the Reactor Protection System [JC] to actuate, which resulted in a' full scram. The scram signal was reset at 1326 hours after the "lA" and "lB" distribution panels were reenergized. The cause of the event is being attributed to personnel error. Corrective actions will include personnel training on this event and a review of battery test procedures and Reactor Protection System (RPS) and essential service bus procedures. This occurrence is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). 2453H/0706Z

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT fLER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rev 2.0

      ..   . FACILITY NAME (1)                      DOCKET NUptER (2)             LER NUMBER f6)                            'Pana f31
      \             ,,                                                           Yeari       ' Sequential      Reviston                         l l///

lll jj mmr //l/ llj lj umr hd Eitist Unit One DlEl0l010!21114 819 - Dl213 - Dl0 01 2 0F of 4 TEXT Energy Industry Identification system (E!!s) codes are identified in the text as [XX)

                    -PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
                   -General Electric ~- Bolling Hater Reactor - 2511 MWt rated core thermal power.

EVENT IDENTIFICATION: Reactor Scram Occurred During the Transfer of the 24/48 1 Volt Distribution Panels Caused by Personnel Error LA. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT: Unit: One Event Date: November 11, 1989 Event Time: 1324 Reactor Mode: 2 Mode Name: REFUEL Power Level: 0% This; report was initiated by Deviation Report D-4-1-89-104. REFUEL Hode (2) - M this position interlocks are established so that one control rod only may be withdrawn when flux amplifiers are set at the proper sensitivity Llevel and the refueling crane is not over the reactor. Also, the trip from the  ; turbine control valves, turbine stop valves, main steam isolation valves, and - condenser vacuum are bypassed. If the refueling crane is over the reactor, all rods must-be fully inserted and none can be withdrawn. B. -DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: On November 17, 1989, Unit One was in the REFUEL mode and the 24/48-volt direct current (VDC)-battery.[BTRY) discharge test for the "IB" battery had been completed.

The configuration of the 24/48 VDC distribution center [JX] was set up so that the-  ;
                     "1A" and "lB" distribution panels [PL) which feed the neutron monitoring systems.

p' [IG) were being fed from the "lA" battery charger (BYC). This configuration i allowed the battery discharge test to be performed on the "lB" battery. The battery discharge test-procedure is written assuming the battery to be tested is completely isolated from the rest of the system. After the IB battery discharge test, it was desired to place the 24/48 VDC distribution center in'a configuration

                  .that would allow an equalize charge with no loads on the "lA" battery in-L preparation to perform the battery discharge test.

Since the-battery discharge test procedure did not apply to this configuration, an

                 '00S request was generated to control it. When the Out-of-Service (005) was being performed to place the 24/48 VDC distribution center in the proper configuration so the "lA" battery could be prepared for discharge testing, the "A" and "B" neutron l                 : monitoring instrumentation panels were deenergized.                   The instrumentation panels
                 ..w ere deenergized as a result of the "lA" main feed [JX] to the "lA" and "lB" panels being tripped'before restoring power to the "lB" distribution panel utilizing the "1B" main feed.

2453H/0706z

7 + e LICENtEE EVENT REPORT fLER) TEXT CONTINUATIDu Form Rev 2.0 lp FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER f6) Pane f3) Year. p/,j se pential //jj

                                                                                      //                    Revision
                     ' ' "                                                                                /

4 ,,

                                                                                      ///   M*r       j//
                                                                                                      /      M*r fhad Cities Unit one                 0 I E l 0 l 0 1 0 l 21 El 4 819        -   0l2 10       -    010      01 3  0F    01 4 TEXT:        Energy Industry Identification system (E!!s) codes are identified in the text as (XX]

A full' reactor scram occurred on November 17, 1989, at 1324 hours. The scram was caused by a simultaneous' loss of power to the 1 A" and "lB" 24/48 VDC distribution panels. These panels' supply power to the two divisions of the Intermediate Range Monitors of the neutron monitoring system [IG). Loss'of both divisions of neutron monitoring caused both channels of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JC] to

               . actuate, which resulted in a full scram. The neutron monitoring system and RPS functioned as designed.

Throughout the course of~this event, Unit One was in the REFUEL mode with no fuel moves taking place. At the time of the scram, all control rods were fully inserted.

               .On November 17, 1989, at 1326 hours, the reactor scram was reset.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

               ~This occurrence is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), which states that the licensee shall report any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of.any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).

The cause of this event is being attributed to personnel error. The personnel involved with the preparation and validation of the 005 did not perform an adequate review of the system configuration. D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

                .The safety consequences of this event were minimal. Unit One was in the refuel mode.with all of the control rods inserted and no fuel moves taking place. The two divisions of the' Intermediate Range Monitors that were deenergized during this event actuated the safety systems as designed.

E. ' CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The 00S that was being performed was completed in order to restore power to the "lA"'and "1B" buses. The Control Room Operator was then able to reset the scram after the panels were energized. The duration of the s: ram was two minutes. Operating personnel will be trained on this event and their responsibilities with respect to 005 requests (NTS 2542008910401). Technical Staff personnel will be trained on this event and the appropriateness of utilizing a temporary procedure change in lieu of an 00S request to control events of this nature will be discussed (NTS 2542008910402). In order to enhance the battery discharge test procedures, they will be reviewed

              -for adequacy of precautions (NTS 2542008910403).
    ~24s3H/0706z
                                                                                                        -           -                  i

Y ' LIrrunrr rytmT atPORT (Lta) TEXT confimuATIok Form Rev 2.o FACILITY NAME (1): DOCKET NtpSER (2). LtR hupatR f 6) ' Pace !3) i . ,.;- ' ' ' Year sequential Revision

u. --

her "a L cition unit one o I s I o I o I o l 21 si 4 aio - o12lo - oIo el 4 or el 4 TEXT Energy Industry Identification system (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX)- s In additlon, the RPS and essential service bus procedures will.be reviewed for-adequacy in: regard to this event (NTS 2542008910404). F.- PREVIOUS EVENTS:

               -There has been one previous event' caused by the transferring of a 24/48 VDC-
               ' distribution panel .LER 265/84-002, which occurred on January 4, 1984,
   -G.          COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

There was no component failure associated with this event. l-( 1 2453H/0706Z

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