ML19259D232

Draft Trip Rept of 790925-27 Site Visit of NRC Emergency Planning Review Team 4

ML19259D232
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim, 05000471, 05000472
Issue date:	10/09/1979
From:	Selby J Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION
To:	Pagano F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML112341174	List: ML19259D232
References
FOIA-81-283 NUDOCS 7910170409
Download: ML19259D232 (5)

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DRAFT OBattelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories P.o. Bau 999 Richland, Washington U.S.A. 99352 Telephone (509) 375-2566 Telex 15-2574 October 9, 1979 Mr. Frar.k Pagano Offl a of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Nuclear Regulatory Commission

, Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. P;ganc:

TRIP REPORT ON SITE VISIT TO PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION -

EMERGENCY PLANNING REVIEW The site was visited by NRC Emergency Planning Review Team No. 4 during the week of September 25-27, 1979. The team members were Tom McKenna of NRC Headquarters, John Sears of NRC Headquarters, Robert Bores of NRC I&E Region I, Mr. Chamberlain of LASL, Jack Selby and Dan Glenaof Battelle-Northwest. The following report is a summary of the reviews, discussions and meetings that were conducted. Additionally, John Hanna, NRC Pilgrim Project Manager and Robert Defayette, NRC, participated in the two days of public meetings.

Tuesday, September 25, 1979 The six team members met at 8:30 a.m. with the following Boston-Edison personnel:

Paul McGuire, Station Manager Rich Machon, Assistant Station Manager Harry Balfor, Emergency Planning Coordi nator Lon Sowdon, Health Physicist Robin Schult, Health Physics Supervisor Chris Bowman, Health Physics Engineer G. Lawald, Law Firm representing Boston Edison This initial discussion centered around the planned activities for the visit. The team was told that Boston-Edison is considering the use of a DC powered computer at the technical support center to provide all available data from the reactor control roon as an al-ternative to close coupling this center to the control room. It was pointed out the Boston-Edison is concerned about action levels and response of offsite agencies to small occurrences.

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_r reporters or members of a local intervenor group. Some of the problems identified were:

1) The desire of Boston-Edison to hold meetings with state and local personnel to characterize what leads to establishment of "EALs". "PAGs" do not necessarily lead to evacuation.

2) In notifying the public, how should special areas, such as beaches or hospitals be treated? Need for verification scheme (call back?).

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3) How should instructions be given? The use of different signals to. identify actions will make it difficult to effectively train affected personnel in needed response.

4) Further guidance on location of centers and size is expected by Boston-Edison. Tom indicated not to expect much more. In the plan or accompanying documentation Boston-Edison should clearly state assumptions, philosophy and resolution of human factor problems. The review will be based on this material.

5) Need for measurable / observable training objective.

Thursday, September 27, 1979 _ The team members met with state and local representatives in Meme:ial Hall. The state representatives included the Head of Civ;.1 Defense, Bob Cunningham; Brenden Knowland, Depaty; members of the Department of Public Health (Al caprone, Bill Bell) and the State Police. Locally, several small towns, including Plymouth and Duxberry, among others, were represented plus local and regicnal civil defense personnel. 1 - i - a e \ Mr. Frank Pagano OBattelle i October 9, 1979 }- Page 4 f Actual discussion of state and local plans began about 10:00 a.m. Much of the next two hours was devoted to political rhetoric and discussions of who will fund an emergency notification system of seemingly unkncwn characteristics. Some of the positions taken were: State Civil Defense .

1) Fast warning may not be the best although the capabilities may exist.

2) Current plans call for 5 mile evacuation zone. Feel that 10 mile plan will be in place by the end of the year.

3) Alerting and warning is the responsibility of local elected officials not Boston-Edison.

4) Feel that Public Health personnel should be confirming or evaluating the situation before alerting public.

Stata Police

1) Do not feel a seldom used alert program (unlike severe weather warning system) is too useful.

2) Don't know what 15 or 30 minute notification means. Does this mean thau evacuation would be started within the entire 10 miles immediately rather than the firs

• one or two hours?

3) How long it would take to accomplish evacuation should be important.

J

4) Several minutes (3 to 5) should be used to determine what protective action is most appropriate based on event, weather conditions, etc.

5) Audible alarm system could be counter-productive. More in-formation will be required.

The one hour public comment section was chaired by Frank Pagano. Most of the time was occupied by local pressure groups. There were a few questions that should hz;ve been answered during the meeting rather than after the meeting was over. There was a complaint about short notification and short discussion period. 3 l ~ V Mr. Frank Pagano October 9, 1979 Page 5 General Observations _

1) Need a summary handout for meetings that explains purpose of meeting, what NRC is trying to accomplish, why (extreme con-servatism, AL7.RA , continue to accumulate good record, etc.).

2) Try to answer all questions at public session.

3) Need for a nationwide approach to public warning system (possibly extension of several weather-warning programs to nuclear - the siren simply alerts public to listen to the radio for instructions). This is necessary to assure proper training and understanding of public throughout the United States.

4) Because of the severe impact on the instrument industry fo3-lowing request from as many as 50 utilities, each wanting as many as five different types of instruments that are to be designed and built in undefined quantities to be operational by January 1981, it appears that the instrument requirements should be consolidated for the entire industry. (Steering committee made up of representatives from NRC and consultants, utility and instrument manufacturers to define " generic" re-quirements.

5) Need to define purpose of various centers and whether they are to be operational during worst case. Most or all -of these centers may need to be located offsite. Philosophy should then be most convenient for the " normal" occurrences or usable under all conditions. Generally, these are not compatible.

Respectfully submitted, O i y h j)/ J .j M. Selby, Manager Radiation Sta ndards & Engineering 'I R. D. Glenn, Senior Development Engineer Environmental Evaluations JMS:RDG:lsp cc: WL Axelson AE Desrosiers 1* Team 4 File -