ML18227D448

10/18/1977 Letter Enclosed Generic Westinghouse Pressure Transient Analysis Performed for the Westinghouse Owners Group on Reactor Coolant System Overpressurization

ML18227D448
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	10/18/1977
From:	Robert E. Uhrig Florida Power & Light Co
To:	Lear G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML18227D448 (28)

Text

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NRC FORM 195 i(2 281 NRC DISTRIBUTION FoR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL Mr. George Lear FROM:

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NUMBER FPL FILE NUMSER DATE OF DOCUMENT 10-18-77 Miami, Pla. 33101 DATE RECEIV6D RiEi Uhrig 10-21-77 C3NDTDRIZED PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED l~ETTE R JPORIGINAL PfGN C LASS I F I E D Qcopv Ltr trans the fo]. lo~ng 1P ENCLOSURE Generic Westinghouse pressure transient analysis on reactor coolant system overpressuri za tion...; . ENCL, A.. ~ ~

Description of the final overpressure mitigat ng system....... ENCL. B....

(Total: 18P)

REACTOR VESSEL OVERPRESSURIZATION DISTRIBUTION PER G EECH 10 21 76 OVE~Q$ 2s~+<

NT NAME: Turkey Pt Units 1 5.2 A~gmeA1 DHL 10-21-77 &4CL. B - 0 8. TRAMS @MT. I. SIN@ 5 FOR ACTION/INFORMATION BRANCH CHEEP:

PR INTERNAL 0 IST R I BUTION NRC PD GOSSICK 6 STAFF EW BOSNAK A/CC SHAO BAER ~mt c, BUTLER ~L W~c ZECH EXTERNAL OISTRIBUTION CONTROI NUMBER LPDR:

TIC:

NSIC ~ 'dC 77 y41.)I/7~

NRC FORM 196 (2 28)

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PmgTOQP g IP/g Fg E )Opy P. 0. BOX 013100, MIAMI, PL 33101 FLORIOA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY October 18, 1977 L-77-324 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation p Attention: Mr. George. Lear, Chief Og~

Operating Reactors Branch 53 U. S.

Division of Operating Reactors Nuclear Regulatory Commission A0 lp Ig Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Lear:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 Over ressure Protection Four copies of the generic Westinghouse pressure transient analysis performed for the Westinghouse Owners Group on reactor coolant system overpressurization are enclosed for your informa-tion. Also enclosed is a description of the final Overpressure Mitigating System (OMS) planned for use at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.

This information is being submitted in-response to a request by the NRC Staff made at a meeting between the Staff and the Westinghouse Owners Group on May 25, 1977.

Very truly yours, PaIA~(

Robert E. Uhrig Vice President REU/MAS/cpc Enclosures (2) cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Region II Robert Lowenstein, Esquire 77'29400

'EOPLE...

SERVING PEOPLE

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ATTACHMENT Re: Turkey Point Units 3 a 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 6 50-251 Over ressure Protection S stem Description The final Overpressure Mitigating System (OMS) for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 will use the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV's) with a variable low pressure set point as the pressure relief mechanism. The variable low set point is energized and de-energized by two switches, one for each PORV, on the main control board. The variable low pressure set point is derived from reactor coolant system (RCS) wide range temperature using redundant trans-mitters. The reactor coolant pressure signal is obtained from redundant wide range pressure transmitters. Below an RCS temperature of 300 F, the set point is a constant 415 psig. Above 300 F, the set point increases linearly from 415 psig at 300 F to 2335 psig at 462 F. (Set point selection is discussed in Section III).

Various alarms are included in the OMS. On decreasing pressure, an alarm and annunciator will activate at 390 psig. This alarm alerts the operator to energize the OMS.

The alarm will not clear unless (1) the low pressure set point is energized, (2) the PORV mode selector switch is in AUTO, and (3) the motor operated valves (MOV's) up-stream of the PORV's are indicated open. This assures proper alignment of the OMS. On increasing pressure an alarm and annunciator w'ill actuate at 400 psig. This alarm will inform the operator that RCS pressure is approaching the PORV low set point. Action can then be taken to remedy the. cause of. increasing pressure, or, of a normal heatup, to de-energize the OMS by placing if'art the two NDTT control switches to the "Normal" position.

Should pressure continue to increase to the PORV set point, an alarm and annunciator will inform the operator that the PORV's have received a signal to open from the OMS.

The PORV's are spring loaded closed and require air to open.

The air is presently supplied by instrument air. A re-dundant supply of air to the valves is included in the OMS.

Redundant accumulators, one dedicated to each PORV, will be added to the present air source. Each accumulator will be

'sized to assure a minimum of 10 minutes operation of the OMS.

Redundant check valves will be provided for each accumulator to prohibit backfeeding the instrument air system. The accumulators, up to the second check valve, and the associated lines to the PORV's will be seismically supported.

Existing alarms in the control room will alert the operator to a loss of instrument air to the PORV's and associated accumulators.

Figure 1 is a functional representation of the OMS. Figures 2 and 3 are elementary electrical diagrams of the OMS.

The Overpressure Mitigating System is designed to mitigate mass input and heat input induced pressure transients which may occur during cold shutdown. The OMS will prevent the peak pressure attained during these transients from exceeding Appendix G NDT limits. Only one of the two PORV's in the OMS is required to meet this design objective.

The second PORV provides redundant relief capacity within the OMS.

A review of past experience indicates that the most common mass input initiated overpressure transient is a loss of letdown with continued charging. With the positive dis-placement charging pumps at Turkey Point, the expected mass input rate would be approximately 40 gpm. As demonstrated in Section 3 of the accompanying Westinghouse analysis, this is a very slow transient and is easily mitigated by the OMS.

Up to the present time there.,has been only one overpressure transient due to the inadvertent operation of a safety injection pump. Administrative controls (discussed in Section IV) in effect at Turkey Point ensure that the safety injection pumps cannot deliver to the RCS during cold does shut-down conditions. However, since a remote possibility exist, the OMS was designed to mitigate the effects of this transient. The mass, input was obtained from the head-flow-characteristics of the safety injection pumps (Figure 4).

Setpoints for the OMS were selected in accordance with the accompanying Westinghouse analysis. This setpoint selection is discussed in Section III. " Initial plant conditions assumed in the analysis are (1) 50 psig initial pressure, (2) 100 F initial temperature of both RCS and pressurizer, and (3) water solid operation. The mass injected. is also assumed to be at, 100 F to eliminate the effect of mixing the injected water with. the reactor coolant..

The safety injection accumulators were not considered a credible mass input mechanism in the design of the OMS.

Multiple failures of the administrative controls which are in effect to ensure isolation of the accumulators would, be required to have an inadvertent actuation.

mitigation, the It should also pressure is be noted that, assuming no peak limited to'he initial accumulator pressure.

Pressure transients caused by heat input to the reactor coolant have occurred when a reactor coolant pump allowed.

after a temperature differential had been was'tarted to develop in the reactor coolant system. Starting a coolant reactor coolant pump can circulate cooler volumes of into warmer parts of the system, particularly the steam generators, where the volumes are heated. Procedures are in effect at Turkey Point which prohibit starting reactor

'coolant pumps with a temperature differential between Th and Tc of >25F. However, since there is a potential for starting a reactor coolant pump with a temperature

differential in the RCS, the OMS is designed to mitigate this transient. The setpoints for the OMS were established consistent with the accompanying Westinghouse analysis.

A 50 F hT between reactor coolant and steam generators was assumed since it is higher than allowed by procedure and a 50 F or higher hT should be easily recognized by the operator as a condition prohibiting starting of reactor coolant pumps. The initial pressure used in setpoint selection was 300 psig based upon reactor coolant pump seal hT require-ments. Initial reactor coolant temperatures of 100 to 250 F were assumed, and setpoints were chosen to assure peak pressures below Appendix G NDT limits throughout this entire range.

In addition to the above performance criteria for the OMS, the NRC has imposed additional design criteria. The follow-ing is a listing of the NRC criteria and a description of how the OMS meets these criteria.

1. 0 erator Action The OMS is designed to perform its intended function for at least 10 minutes without operator action. The most. restrictive condition is the continued operation of a safety injection pump with an assumed loss of instrument air. The redundant sources of air to the PORV's are sized to ensure a minimum of 10 minutes operation of the OMS under the most restrictive conditions.

2. Sin le Failure Criteria The OMS provides complete redundancy and meets the design objectives assuming a single failure in the OMS. One of the two PORV's provides the required relief capacity for the OMS; the second PORV provides redundant capacity. The OMS set-points and RCS pressure signals are derived from redundant temperature and pressure transmitters., Two enable/disable switches are installed on the main control board. The installation of the OMS is in accordance with the separation criteria used in the design of the Turkey Point Plant. Power supply, from transmitters to the solenoid valves controlling air to

.'the PORV's, is aligned in two separate trains. As out-lined in the system description, a redundant air supply, separate for each PORV, is included in the OMS.

Testability is provided in the OMS. A verification of OMS operability prior to solid system, low temperature operation will be included in cooldown procedures.

Testing will be accomplished by (1) closing the PORV isolation valves, (2) enabling the OMS, and (3) inputing a temperature signal below 300 F (test done with RCS pressure above 415 psig) . In this manner, OMS circuits

as well as PORV operability will be verified. In addition, the associated instrumentation will be surveilled for calibration and proper operation using the same methods followed for safety-related instrumenta-tion.

4. IEEE-279 Criteria The OMS meets the intent of IEEE-279. The OMS is designed against single failure, is electrically separate',

and meets the physical separation requirements used in the. design of the Turkey Point Plant. In addition, testing of OMS operability prior to the need for opera-tion is included to enhance system reliability.

5. Seismic Criteria The electronic components of the OMS are placed in racks installed to seismic requirements. Applicable Westinghouse specifications were used in the installa-,

tion of the components into the rack. Accumulators, provided as a redundant air supply, will consider seismic loading, and the accumulators (to the second check valve) and .air lines to the PORV's will be seismically supported. The PORV's were designed and manufactured in accordance with ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section III, and are Class I valves.

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XXX. Set oint Selection Figure 5 shows the selected setpoints for the OMS plotted with the 0 F/hr NDT curve (Figure 3.l-lb, Turkey Point Technical Specifications). Below an RCS temperature of 300 F, the setpoint is a constant 415 psig. Above 300 F, the setpoint increased linearly from 415 psig at 300 F to 2335 psig at 462 F. The anticipated operating range of the OMS is for an RCS temperature of 300 F and below. The transients used for setpoint selection and the assumed initial conditions are discussed as part of the design basis. The procedure and the analytical support for set-point selection are taken from the accompanying Westinghouse analysis. Table 1 presents the setpoint selection procedure for mass input transients; Table 2 presents thetheprocedure for heat, input transients. Figure numbers in procedures refer to figures in the Westinghouse analysis.

The maximum setpoint overshoot for mass injection transients is 78 psi. This was evaluated with a PORV of setpoint of 415 psig and results in a maximum RCS pressure 493 psi.

This is below the minimum NTD pressure (Figure 5) of 510 psig. The maximum setpoint overshoot for heat input transients increased from 22 psi at 100 F to 105 psi at 250 F. This was evaluated with a PORV setpoint of 500 psig, the. only setpoint considered in the Westinghouse analysis. With the 500 psig setpoint, the NDT pressure limit was exceeded for RC temperatures less than about 235'. The maximum amount by which the NDT pressure limit was exceeded was 43 psi at.

180 F. 'The chosen PORV setpoint of 415 psig is 85 psi below the assumed setpoint and hence provides a factor of

- two conservatism for the most restrictive case. Additional analysis has been provided by Westinghouse confirming that the lower setpoint is conservative. This analysis will .be forwarded shortly as a supplement to this report.

Above a reactor coolant, temperature of 300 F, the setpoint of the OMS is variable. The setpoint is chosen to maintain, at the minimum, an approximately 85 psi margin between setpoint and NDT pressure limit.

IV. Administrative Controls Administrative controls as well as the addition of the OMS provide assurance that NDT limits will not be exceeded.

Controls are in effect at Turkey Point to isolate the Safety Injection (SI) accumulators and high pressure SI pumps from the RCS under appropriate conditions and to assure a minimal primary to secondary hT prior to RCP starts. These controls have been discussed in detail in prior submittals including number and location of breakers.

Turkey Point Operating'Procedure 0205.2 (" Reactor Shutdown, Hot Shutdown'to Cold Shutdown Condition" ) includes the following steps to isolate the SI accumulators and high pressure SI pumps from the RCS prior to going to cold shutdown conditions. Locations of valves may be found on figure 6.2-1 of the Turkey Point FSAR.

1) When the RCS pressure is 1000 psig, the SI accumulator discharge valves (865A, B, 6, C) are closed and tagged. Motor operators on the valves are de-energized by locking open and tagging the supply breakers.

2) Safety injection is isolated by verifying that the high head SI to cold leg isolation valves (843',.A a B),

high head SI to hot leg isolation valves (866 A & B),

and high head SI to Boron Injection Tank valves (867 A 6 B) are closed and tagged. Motor operators on the valves are de-energized by locking open and tagging 'the supply breakers. The high head SI pumps aie not. de-energized because they are shared by both. units.

During the Integrated Safeguards Test (OP 4104.2) in addition .to the valves described above, the SI pump discharge header tie valves (MOV 878 A 6 B) and the affected unit's SI pump manual discharge valves (888 series) are closed during the Integrated Safeguards Test (OP 4104.2).

Operating Procedure 0202.1 (" Reactor Startup, Cold Condition to Hot Shutdown Conditions" ) includes the following pro-cedural requirements for starting a reactor coolant pump:

, 1) While in a solid condition, reactor, coolant pumps are-not started unnecessarily..

2) Prior to necessary RCP starts, the. following steps are taken: If RCS temperature is above 212 F, an RCP will not be started until it is verified that steam generator pressure is less than or equal to the saturation pressure corresponding to'he RCS temperature. *If RCS temperature is below 212 F, an RCP will not be started until it is verified that there is no significant vapor flow from the atmospheric steam dump valves and that the recorded temperature between the hot. leg and cold leg for each loop is less than 25 F. ~

Administrative Controls (Continued)

Steam pressure and reactor coolant temperature will be obtained from the plant data computer. Accuracy of the indicated steam pressure is to within 3.5 psi which equals approximately l2 F in saturation temperature. Accuracy of the indicat'ed reactor coolant temperature is to within 9 F above 200 F and at most 16 F below 200 F. Assuming the maximum values of the errors in pressure and temperature are added, the maximum hT which may exist is 21 to 28 F, far below 'the design hT of 50 F. The requirement of less than a 25 F difference between loops is an extension of a similar requirement already in effect during cooldown.

Schedule Two phases are required for total implementation of the OMS.

Phase One will include the circuitry necessary to add the low PORV setpoint feature and both alarms described in Section X. The alarm on decreasing pressure will not include the interlocks with mode and setpoint switch position and MOV open indicator lamp as part. of Phase One. Phase Two will include the above interlocks and the redundant air accumulators. Xmplementation of Phase One is in progress and it is our intent to complete this phase by the end of 1977. Phase One will be completed no later than the first cold shutdown of each unit in 1978. lt is our intent to implement Phase Two by the end of 1978. Phase Two will be completed no later than the first. cold shutdown of each unit in 1979.

j ~3 Recommendations for Technical S ecifications The design of the OMS is based on. assumed conservative transients, and for these cases the reactor coolant pressure does not exceed NDT limits. Administrative controls have been implemented which makes the probability of the assumed transients remote. Based upon the high level of assurance against exceeding NDT limits provided by these improvements, no additional technical specifications are required.

VII. Additional NRC Concerns The following NRC concerns specific to Turkey Point were discussed during a phone conversation with NRC representa-tives on June 23, 1977. At that time, detailed response was deferred to this submittal.

Concern 1: The enable syst: em alarm should include an interlock with MOV position.

Response 1: This has been included as described in Section I.

Concern 2: The position of the PORV normal mode selection switch should not disable the OMS.

It is beneficial for the operator to be able to over-ride automatic signals and open or close the PORV's as plant conditions require. The OMS was des'igned, therefore, to be enabled only when the mode selector switch is in auto. The existing switch remains in the position selected. To assure that the OMS is not inadvertently disabled, the enable system alarm has been interlocked with the mode selector switch position as described in Section I.

Concern 3: How is RCS bT discerned prior to RCP start?

Concern 4: Clarify the valve positions during the Integrated Safeguards Test.

Concern 5: Current setpoints for RHR isolation act.

to isolate additional relief capacity.

Response 5: RHR relief capacities were not considered in the design and analysis of the OMS.

However, FPL is considering increasing these'etpoints to make available the additional capacity. Increasing the setpoint will also decrease the probability of isolating letdown, a major cause of past overpressurizations.

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FIGURE 2 ELECTRICAL DIAGRAM FOR PTP 3/4 NDTT CONTROL WIDE RANGE PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE SIGNALS FROM REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TRAIN "A" INSIDE CONTAINMENT OUTSXDE CONTAINMENT POWER PQ SUPPLY TM mV/I TO PORV~

81 ~T t PE SETPOXNT l OTHER OTHER J PLANT PLANT TO ANNUNCIATOR EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT "NDTT CONTROL ACTXVATED" TRAIN "B" TO PORV S2

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FIGURE 3 ELECTRICAL DIAGRAM FOR PTP 3/4 NDTT CONTROL TYPICAL POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE CIRCUIT TRAIN "A" 125 V DC TRAIN A FOR PORV //1 TRAIN B FOR PORV 82 AUTO MANUAL OPEN OPEN SWITCH CONTACTS CONTROL ENABLE BOARD DISABLE I I CONTROL) i SWITCH CD BOARD $ 4 kRACK [

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SAFETY INJECTION PUMP PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS

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• TABLE 1

'ASS INPUT TRANSIENT SETPOINT SELECTION STEP PROCEDURE APPLICATION TO TURKEY POIbT Select relief valve'setpoint Setpoint ~ 415 psig operating range For limiting mass input rate From Figure 4, at 415 psig SI pump obtain hp ~F from Figure flow 595 gpm = 82-7 lb/sec- bP REF =

4.2.1 113PSI For total RCS volume; obtain RCS Volume = 9343 Ft3 (FSAR table 4.1-1)

F> factor from Figure 4.2.2 FY ~ .76 For the relief val~e opening Relief valve opening time = 2.0 sec.

time (total, including delay) (Pre Op test 1000.16) FZ .733 obtain FZ factor from Figure

.4.2.3 5 ,For the relief valve setpoint Setpoint ~ 415 psig FS ~ 1.24 selected, obtain FS factor from Figure 4.2.4 Calculate the product of VxFSxFZ factors and ~ 113 x .76 x 1.24 x .733 =. 78 psi hP ~v Fv, FS, determined in Steps 2 FZ through 5 This is the setpoint'vershoot hp.

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• TABLE 2 INPUT TRANSIENT

'EAT SETPOINT SLECTION STEP PROCEDURE APPLICATION TO TURKEY POINT For both the 6000 ft and TRCS ~ 100'F TRCS - 140'F TRCS

- 180'F TRCS

~ 250'F 13,000 ft3 RCS volumes, obtai hP 6K ~ 31 psi hP 6K ~ 62 psi hP 6K ~ 98 psi hP 6K ~ 157 psi reference setpoint overshoots hP 13K 27 psi hP 13K ~ 40 psi hP 13K ~ 6g psi hP 13K 118 psi hP 6K and hP 13K from Figure 4.2.9 for the initial RCS temperature, T RCS 2 Using both Pigures 4.2.10 and 4.2.11, determine therefer-Por TRCS and hP 6K

.100'F 31 ps For TRCS and hP6K ~ 62 140'F psi Por TRCS ~

and hP6K VA 6K ~ .115 180'P 98 psi Por hP6K VA 6K TRCS 157

.139 psi ~

250'~nd ence normalized US (US 6K and UA ~ .084 VA ~ .098 UA 13K) for both RCS volumes For TRCS 100 F For TRCS 140'F For 180'F For TRCS 250'F TRCS 13K deter-using hp 'hp 6K and and hP 13K 27psi and hP 13K and hP 13K~68psi and hP13K 118 psi mined in Step 1 and for the .126 VA 13K " .158 VA 13K .184 VA 13K ~ .224 isotherm, TRCS Determine what fraction, f, S.G. area ~44,430 f~ .766 f~ .766 f .766 of 58,000 ft2 constitudes the (FSAR Table 4.1-4 actual steam generator heat p - ~44 430 766 transfer area 58,000 Multiply both UA6K and UA13K UA6K~.084 x .766 UA6K~.098 x .766 UA6K .115 x .766 UA6K .139 x .766 (from Step 2) by -f (from Step .064 ~..075 ~ .088 ~ .106

3) to obtain new formalized I

.UA 6K and UA 13K values. UA'13K ~

UA13K o 126.x.766 UA13K~.158 x o766 .184x.766 ~

UV13K ~ .224 x .

a ,097 .121 ~ .141

~.172 Por the same isotherm, TRCS> For TRCS ~ 100'P Por TRCS

~ 140 P Por TRCS ~ 180'F For TRCS ~ 250 P and for UA'6K and UA'13K, and UA6K .064 and UA'6K ~ .075 and UA'6K .088 and UA'6K .106 obtain new setpoint overshoot hP'6K ~ 24 psi hP 6K ~ 45 psi 74 psi hP'K ~ 120 psi hP 6K and hP'13K for the 6000

't3 and 13,000 ft3 volumes. RCS and UA 13K

~ 100'F

.097 For and TRCS ~ 140'F UA'3K ~.121 For TRCS 180'F and UA'13K ~.141 For TRCS 250'F and UA'3K ~ 1.72 hP 13K ~ 20 psi hP'3K ~ 37 psi hP'13K ~ 53psi hp'3K ~ 92 psi

TABLE 2 CONT'D For the actual volumes VRCSi VRCS 934 Xt3 lineraly interpolate the set- {rSAR table 4.1-1) point overshoot, AP'VRCS> ~or the new steam generator VA AP'RCS 22 psi hp'VRCS ~ 41'si AP'VRCS ~ 63 psi from the relationship:

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