ML17158A877

Exercise Manual.

ML17158A877
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	08/15/1995
From:	PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
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ML17158A876	List: ML17158A875 ML17158A877 ML18026A459
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NUDOCS 9509070121
Download: ML17158A877 (303)

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FORWARD 9509070121 9'50623 PDR ADOCK 05000387 F ... PDR

FORWARD H

This exercise/drill package has been developed to provide the basis for conduct of the simulated radiological accident at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit ¹1, located in Luzerne County, the state of Pennsylvania.

The exercise will test and evaluate the effectiveness and capabilities of the Emergency Preparedness Response Program for the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company.

This package is to be utilized by the exercise/drill referees to initiate, control, and evaluate the activities of the participants in the exercise.

The Pennsylvania Power and Light Company. approves this document as the standard for conduct in performance of the July 11, 1995 Practice Drill and the August 15, 1995 NRC Exercise.

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION I INTRODUCTION A. Major Exercise Event Schedule I-3 B. Exercise Development Philosophy SECTION II OB JECTIVES SECTION III GUIDELINES'FOR CONDUCT OF EMERGENCY EXERCISE SECTION IV REFEREE LOCATION AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS IV-1 SECTION V TIMELINE V-1 A. Summary V-2 B. Detailed Timeline V-9'-29 C. Basis of Timeline Events

1. Basis and Detailed Discussion for Initial V-30 Classification Trigger V-35 Basis and Detailed Discussion for Initial Plant Transient

'3. Basis and Detailed Discussion for Radiological V43 Impacts SECTION Vl INITIAI CONDITIONS VI-1 A. ISES Daily Report VI-2 B. Priority Lists Vl-5 C. Operator Turnover Sheets VI-10

RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS VII-1 SECTION Vll A. Offsite Release Data VII-1

1. Weather and Met Data Log 'VII-1

2. Plume Trajectory and Field Monitoring Team Data Vll

3. Release Rate Data VII-15 B. Reactor Water Isotopic VII-19 C. Suppression Pool Water Isotopic VII-21 D. Drywell Air Isotopic VII-23 E. Wetwell Air Isotopic VII-25 F. Containment Post Accident Rad Monitor Readings VII-27 G. Reactor Building ARM Readings VII-29 H. Reactor Building Hi Range ARM Readings VII-36 I ~ Turbine Building ARM Readings Vll-42 J. Control Structure ARM Readings Vll-'48 K. PASS Sample Information , Vll-54 L: In-Plant Radiological Conditions VII-59 M. Spic Analysis Data Sheets VII%2 SECTION Vill MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEETS VIII-1 SECTION IX EXERCISE QUESTIONS IX-1 A. NRC Questions IX-1 B. Questions/Topics of Discussion for HPN Communicator IX-5 I

C. General Office Questions/Projects IX-11 D. MOC Questions/Rumors IX-14 SECTION X SIMULATORINFORMATION X-1

SECTlON I INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION The Annual'NRC Exercise is scheduled to be conducted August 15, 1995. The exercise is the annual NRC Exercise to satisfy 10CFR50 and NUREG 0654 requirements.

The exercise has been developed to test most of the major aspects of the Station's Emergency Preparedness Program (see the Exercise Objectives,Section II).

This annual exercise will have participation by the counties and the appropriate State agencies.

A practice drill is scheduled for July 11, 1995 in preparation for the NRC Exercise. The

'practice drill contains events similar to the NRC Exercise. This is an attempt to ensure the participants are not tested on material never seen before. The practice drill will provide an opportunity for the participants to sharpen the skills that will be used during

'he graded exercise.

This package has been developed to guide the referees in the conduct and evaluation of the exercise/drill. This package contains all of the information and data necessary to properly conduct the exercise/drill in an efficient and coordinated manner.

EXERCISE/DRILL PARTICIPANTS WILL NOT HAVE PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF THE SIMULATED INCIDENT OR ANY PARTS SUCH AS:

RADIOLOGICAL PLUME RELEASE INFORMATION INCLUDING TIME, CONTENT, SIZE, AND WEATHER PATTERN USED.

The exercise/drill should allow individuals and agencies who are assigned responsibilities in an emergency to demonstrate they are adequately trained and capable of responding.

SECTION I PART A- MAJOR EXERCISE EVENT SCHEDULE

DRlLL SCHEDULE July 7 Referee Training Time: 0830-1200 Location: EOF LCR Attendees: All Referees and Observers July 11 Practice Drill Time: Day. Shift Location: Simulator and ERFs (MOC from SOP)

Attendees: All Players, Referees, and Observers July 12 Critique Preparation Time: 0830-1400 Location: EOF LCR Attendees: Lead Facility Referees July 13 Critique Presentation Time: 1400-1600 Location: Video Conference Attendees: Lead Facility Referees, Lead Coordinators and Managers, others optional August 11 Referee Training II Time: 0900-1200 P Location: Video Conference Attendees: All Referees and Observers August 15 NRC Exercise Time: Afternoon Shift Location: Simulator and all ERFs Attendees: All Players, Referees, and Observers I

August 16 Critique Preparation Time: 0830-1400 Location: EOF LCR Attendees: Lead Facility Referees

August 17 Critique Presentation Time: 1000-1130 Location: Video Conference Attendees: Lead Referees,'ead Coordinators and Managers, others optional 1-5

SECTION I PART B - EXERCISE DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY

EXERCISE DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY NUREG N.3 Proper scenario development determines the outcome of the exercise. All operating nuclear power plants, including SSES have already demonstrated their ability to protect the health and safety of the public. SSES has people who are knowledgeable and can respond in an emergency, therefore chances of failing an exercise are remote. SSES can fail an exercise or get a reduced SALP rating because of attitude and that is where scenario development is important.

I An attitude is generated when an exercise is being conducted and observed; this attitude will affect present and future exercises. The scenario must be detailed enough to test and challenge the participants, and provide information to support expected operator and engineer responses. An answer to a participant's question should be an exact summary of why their solution will or will not mitigate the event. If participants are given that type of answer they will react as if the situation is more realistic and will work on a solution eagerly. This type of attitude is contagious and this willingness to respond will be transferred to the offsite participants. If an individual asks a question and only gets the reply "no, that won't work" time after time, they get disgruntled and disgusted with the scenario and won't look further since they expect the same answer.

This down attitude will affect how 'communications flow and how interfaces between the different groups occur.

Scenario development is important so that no matter how unrealistic the initiating conditions appear, after the participants are involved for a period of time, they have forgotten the beginning; They then become active participants in providing input and corrective actions to the other participants.

It is important to realize that the scenario is not to test the participants knowledge of the plant. The scenario SHOULD test the response organization's knowledge of the Emergency Plan Position Specific Procedures and other plant procedures, and how the people arid the procedures interface with each other. Periodic exercises are conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities. Sub portions of exercises or separate drills such as fire or medical emergencies develop, maintain, and test key skills.

An emergency exercise must involve significant effort in research-and development to ensure that the events, depicted are as realistic as possible. Realism is created through the use of the simulator and additional referee supplied information..The referee supplied information will come in the form of supplied. data sheets simulating CRT screens', gage/meterlrecorder readings, area conditions, props (simulated injuries), and simulated reports (daily operating report, service information letters, Nuclear Network messages; etc.). ~

Information will be supplied to the Emergency Response Facilities directly from the simulator via phone lines to a CRT displaying live plant data. The CRT.display will not be normal plant display but one used for exercises only.

Initiating events for an exercise can be human error or equipment malfunction; No one wants to assume that they will make mistakes, especially of'the magnitude that can cause significant plant damage. Since the possibility does exist for human error, events.may be initiated as a result but are not meant as an indication of staff incompetence.

Equipment malfunction is difficult to incorporate into a scenario to the extent required to cause plant damage and serious offsite environmental problems. The plant design, equipment reliability and redundancy, construction, and installation of systems preclude such events.. The SSES Final Safety Analysis Report analyzes the capabilities of plant systems to maintain control over radioactive material in the plant during all types of abnormal conditions. Therefore to cause a serious event for an exercise some unrealistic assumptions must be made.

If the conditions listed in the scenario were probable, an unanswered safety question would exist and actions would be taken to remedy the situation, This must be clear so that the general public doesn't believe that the scenario events are probable, 4

SECTION II OBJECTIVES

A royal of 1995 NRC Evaluated Exercise Ob ectives Please indicate review and approval of the objectives for the August 15, 1995 NRC Evaluated Exercise by signing below:

ECwPcA/

H.G. Stanle, P uclear Operations

A royal of 1995 NRC Evaluat'ed Exercise Ob ectives Please indicate review and approval of the objectives for the August 15, 1995 NRC Evaluated Exercise by signing below:

G:T. Jone, P

'- Nuclear Engineering

RESP ORP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS A.1.a Each plan shall identify the State, local, Federal and private YRLYN 2/28/95 The requirement Is fullfllledIn the SSES sector organizations (including ublities), that are intended to Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 6.0 and Is a SNEP'NEP be part of the overall response organization for Emergency basic element of the emergency response Planning Zones. (See Appendix 5). organization which Is demonstrated each exercise and drill.

A.1.b Each organization and suborganization having an YRLYN This obJectlve will be demonstrated by each operational role shall specify its concept of operations, and PPSL faclllty during the exercise.

its relationship to the total efforL A.1.c SNEP Each plan shall illustrate these interelationships in a block YRLYN 2/28/95 The requirement Is fullfIliad ln the SSES diagram. Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Figures 6.1 thru 6.7 and ls a basic element of the emergency response organization which ls demonstrated each exercise and drill. (Ch 6 Flg 6.1)

A.1.d SNEP Each organization shall identity a specific individual by title YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration as each organlzatlon Is who shall be in charge of the emergency response. activated. Ch 6 Sec 6.3.2 A.1.e SNEP Each organization shall provide for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day YRLYN 2/28/95 The requirement Is fullfllledIn the SSES emergency response, including 24.hour per day manning of Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 6.0, 6.2, 6.

communications links. 2.7, 6.3, 6.3.1.5. This obJectlve Is fulfilled by fllllng out manning rosters during the exercise/drill for the next shift that will report to the response organlzatlons.

It ls Intended to conduct a simulated turnover to the State and Federal Authorltles at the end of the plume phase which will simulate start up

) of the FRMAC. Ch 6 Sec 6.2 A.3 SNEP Each plan shall include written agreements referring to the YRLYN 2/28/95 The requirement Is fullfIliad In the SSES concept of operations developed between Federal, State Emergency Plan Appendix A. The basic and local agencies and other support organizations having requirement ls fulfilled during medical and fire an emergency response role within the Emergency Planning emergency drills. The agreements with the Zones. The agreements shall identify the emergency State, couuntles and local governements will be demonstrated during the plume phase of measures to be provided and the mutually acceptable the FEMA evaluated exercise.

criteria for their implementation, and specify the arrangements for exchange of information. These agreements may be provided in an appendix to the plan or plan itself may contain descriptions of these matters and a signature page in the plan may serve to verify the agreements. The signature page format is appropriate for organizations where response functions are covered by laws, regulations or executive orders where seperate written agreements are not necessary.

RESP ORP 5'ESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS SNEP Each principal organization shall be capable of continuous YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by filling out shift (24-hour) operations for a protracted period. The individual rosters. The fllllngout of the next shift rosters in the principal organization who will be responsible for causes the organization to plan for the assuring continuity of resources (technical, administrative, continuous extended operation of the and material) shall be specified by title. emergency response facllltles.

It ls Intended to conduct a simulated turnover to the State and Federal Authorltles for the end of the plume phase exercise to simulate start up of the FRMAC. Ch 6 Sec 6.2.l A.4.1 SNEP Each principal organization shall be capable of continuous 6 YRP 9/24/91 The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing will not be demonstrated.

(24-hour) operations for a protracted period. The individual in the principal organization who will be responsible for assuring continuity of resources (technical, administrative, and material) shall be specified by title. 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> manning will be demonstrated by a shift change once every 6, years.

B.1 SNEP Each licensee shall specify the onsite emergency YRLYN 2/28/95 This requirement Is fullfIliad In the SSES organization of plant staff personnel for all shifts and its Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 6.0-6.2 relation to the responsibilities and duties of the normal staff Tables 6.1 and 6.2 and Is a basic element of complement. the emergency response organlzatlon which la demonstrated each exercise and drill. Sec 6 0-6.20 B.2 SNEP Each licensee shall designate an individual as emergency YRLYN 2/28/95 This requirement Is fullfIliad In the SSES coordinator who shall be on shift at all times and who shall Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 6.0 and 62.

1 and Appendix E and ls a basic element of the have the authority and responsibility to immediately and unilaterally initiate any emergency actions, including emergency response organlzatlon which Is demonstrated each exercise and drill. This providing protective action recommendations to authorities-requirement willbe demonstrated as each responsible for implementing offsite emergency measures.

emergency faclllty Is activated. Ch 6 Sec 6.0 B.3 SNEP Each licensee shall identify a line of succession for the YRI.YN 2/28/95 This requirement Is fullfIliad In the SSES emergency coordinator position and identify the specific Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 6.2.1, 6.3.1.

conditions for higher level utility officials assuming this 2 and Is a basic element of the emergency function. response organlzatlon which Is demonstrated each exercise and drill. Ch 6 Sec 6.2.1 B.4 SNEP Each licensee shall establish the functional responsibilities YRLY 2/28/95 The requirement Is fullfIliad In the SSES assigned to the emergency coordinator and shall clearly Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 62.1 and ls a basic element of the emergency response specify which responsibilities may not be delegated to other elements of the emergency organization. Among the organlzatlon which la demonstrated each exercise and drill.

responsibilities which may not be delegated shall be the decision to notify and recommend protective actions to authorities responsible for offsite emergency measures.

0654 RESP GRP DESCRIPTION REaD FREa LAST DEMO COMMENTS B.5 SNEP Eacli licensee shall specify the positions or title and major YRLYN 2/28/95 This requirement Ia fullfIliad In the SSES tasks to be performed by the persons to be assigned to the Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Tables 6.1 and 6.2 functional areas of emergency activity. For emergency and Is a basic element of the emergency situations, specific assignments shall be made for all shifts response organlzatlon which Is demonstrated and for plant staff members, both onsite and away from the each exercise and drill. Ch 6 Tbl 6.1 site. These assignments shall cover the emergency functions ln Table 8-1 entitled "Minimum Staffing Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies". The minimum on-shift staffing levels shall be as indicated in Table 8-1. The implementation schedule for Ilcenseed operators and the shift technical advisor on shift shall be as specified ln the July 31, 1980 letter to all power reactor licensees. Any deficiencies in the other staffing requirements of Table 8-1'must be capable of augmentation within 30 minutes by September 1, 1981, and such deficiencies must be fully removedby July 1, 1982.

B.6 SNEP Each licensee shall specify the interfaces between and YRLY 2/28/95 The requirement ls fullfIliad In the SSES among the onsite functional areas of emergency activity, Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Figure 6.7 and Is a licensee headquarters support, local services support, State basic element of the emergency response and local governement response organization. This shall be organization which ls demonstrated each illustrated in a block diagram and shall include the onsite exercise and drill.

technical support center and the operational support (assembly) center and the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

B.7 SNEP Each licensee shall specify the corporate management, 6 YRS administrative, and techriical support personnel who will augment the plant staff as specified in the table entitled "Minimum Staffing Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies," (Table 8-1) and in the following areas:

B.7.a SNEP a. logistics support for emergency personnel, e.g. YRI.YN 2/28/95 The requirement Is fullfllledIn the SSES transportation, communications, tempoary quarters, food Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 6.2.7and Is and water, sanitary facilities in the field, and special eqipment a basic element of the emergency response and supplies procurement; organization which Is demonstrated at least In part each exercise and drill.

8.7.b SNEP b. technical support for planning and YRLYN 2/28/95 The requirement Is fullfIliad In the SSES reentry/recovery operations; Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 62.6 and Is a basic element of the emergency response organlzatlon which ls demonstrated at least In part each exercise and drill.

QsmS EsB 0654 RESP ORP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS B.7.c SNEP c. management level interface with governemental YRLYN 2/28/95 The requirement ls fullfIliad In the SSES authorities; Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 62.1 and ls a bash element of the emergency response organlzatlon which ls demonstrated at least In part each exercise and drill.

B.7.d SNEP d. release of information to news media during an YRLYN 2/28/95 The requirement ls fullfIliad In the SSES emergency (coordinated with governmental authorities). Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 6.32.1 and Is a basic element of the emergency response organization whIch ls demonstrated at least In part each exercise and drill.

B.S SNEP Each licensee shall specify the contractor and private YRLYN 10/25/94 The requirement ls fulNllied In the SSES organizations who may be requested to provide technical Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Table 6.3 and Is a assistance to and augmentation of the emergency basIc element of the emergency response organization.- organlzatlon which Is demonstrated at least In part each exercise and drill.

B.Q SNEP Each licensee shall klentify the services to be provide by YRLYN 10/19/95 The requirement Is fulfilled In the SSES local agencies for handling emergenies, e.g., police, Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 6.3.4 and ambulance, medical, hospital, and firefighting organizations Appendix A and Is a basic element of the shall be specified. The licensee shall provide for emergency response organlzatlon which ls transportation and treatment of injured personnel who may demonstrated at least In part during each also be contaminated. Copies of the arrangements and medical (9/14/94) and fire emergency drill (10/19/94). Appendix A agreements reached with contractor, private and local support agencies shall be appended to the plan. The agreements shall delineate the authorities, responsibilities, and limits on the actions of contractor, private organization, and local services support groups.

C.1 SNEP The Federal government maintains indepth capability to assist licensees, States and local governments through the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan

[formerly Radiological Assistance Plan (RAP) and Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP)]. Each State and licensee shall make provisions for incorporating the Federal response capability into its operation plan, including the following:

RESP GRP D ESCRlPTION REQD FREQ I.AST DEMO COMMENTS SNEP a. specific persons by title authorized to request 6 YRS 2/28/95 It ls Intented to have a mock NRC response Federal assistance; see A.1.d, A2.a. team partlclpate In the MOC, TSC, and EOF.

The communlcatlons with the NRC will simulate the response as lt would occur from lnltlal notifications to the NRC Operations Center up until manning ln the various facllltlea.

It ls Intended to conduct a simulated turnover to the State and Federal Authorltles for the end of the plume phase and simulated start up of the FRMAC. Ch 6 Sec 6.3.1 SNEP b. Specific Federal resources expected, including 6 YRS 2/28/95 It ls Intended to have a mock NRC response expected times of arrival at specific nuclear facility sites; team participate In the MOC, TSC, and EOF.

The communlcatlons with the NRC will simulate the response aa It would occur from lnltlal notifications to the NRC Operations Center up until manning ln the various facllltles.

It Is intended to conduct a simulated turnover to the State and Federal Authorltles for the end of the plume phase and simulated start up of the FRMAC.

SNEP c. specific licensee, State and local resources 6 YRS 2/28/95 It Is Intended to have a mock NRC response available to support the Federal response, e.g., air fields, team partlclpate In the MOC, TSC, and EOF.

command posts, telephone lines, radio frequencies and The communlcatlons with the NRC will telecommunications centers. simulate the response as It would occur from Inltlal notlflcatlons to the NRC Operations Center up until manning In the various facllltiea.

It ls intended to conduct a simulated turnover to the State and Federal Authorltles for the end of ihe plume phase and simulated start up of the FRMAC.

SNEP Each principal offsite organization may dispatch 2/28/95 It ls expected that the State will dispatch representatives to the licensee's near-site Emergency DER/BRP and PEMA Inrilvlduals to the EOF Operations Facility. (State technical analysis representatives during the Plume Phase exercise.

at the nearsite EOF are preferred.)

SNEP The licensee shall prepare for the dispatch of a 5YR 7/28/92 The posltlon of County coordinator will be representative to principal offsite governmental emergency filled for both of the risk counties and possibly operations centers. for the State EOC depending on the extent of psrtlclpatlon by the state .

0654 RESP ORP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS C.4 SNEP Each organizatiion shall identify nuclear and other facilities, 5YR This obJectlve will be fullfIliad by having organizations or individuals which can be relied upon in an during the drill requesting additional an'nJect emergency to provide assistance. Such assistance shall be resources from outside organlzatlons to help identified and supported by appropriate letters of agreement. with the emergency.

D.1 SNEP An emergency classification and emergency action level YRLYN 2/28/9S The requirement ls fullfIliad In the SSES scheme as set forth in Appendix 1 must be established by Emergency Plan Chapter 5 Section 5.1, 52 end the licensee. The specific instruments, parameters, or table 5.1 and ls a basic element of the equipment status shall be shown for establishing each emergency response organtzation which Ia emergency dass, in the in-plant emergency procedures. demonstrated ln each exercise and drill. Ch 6 Sec 6.3.1 The plan shall identify the parameter values and equipment status for each emergency class.

P D2 . SNEP The initiating conditions shall Include the example conditions YRL'YN 2/28/95 The requirement Is fullfIliad In the SSES found in Appendix 1 and all postulated accidents in the Final Emergency Plan Chapter 5 Section 5.1, 52 and Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the nuclear facility. Appendix F and ls a bash element of the emergency response organlzatlon which ls demonstrated In each exercise and drill. Each of the three emergency response organlzatlons (control Room, TSC, EOF) will be required to make an emergency ciasslf Ication during the cource of the scenario. Appendix F E.1 SNEP Each organization shall establish procedures which describe YRLY 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by response mutually agreeable bases for notification of response organlzatlon at each level of emergency.

organizations consistent with the emergency classification Appendix C and action level scheme set forth in Appendix 1. These procedures shall include means for verification of messages.

The specific details of veriTication need not be included in the plan.

EZ SNEP Each organization shall establish procedures for alerting, YRLY 2/28/95 Actual demonstratIon for exercise partlclpants notifying, and mobilizing emergency response personnel. by using pager system and telephone.

E.4 SNEP, Each licensee shall make provisions for follow up messages from the facility to offsite authorities which shall contain the following information if it ls known and appropriate:

E.4.a SNEP a. location of incident and name and telephone YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual Demonstration by Control Room, TSC, number (or communications channel identification) of caller; and EOF. Appendix C

0654 RESP ORP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS E.4.b SNEP b. date/time of incident; YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by Control Room, TSC, and EOF.

EA.c SNEP c. class of emergency; YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by Control Room, TSC, and EOF.

E.4 f SNEP f. chemical and physical form of released material, YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by Control Room, TSC, including estimates of the relative quantities and and EOF using simulated data derived from concentration of noble gases, lodines, and particulates. conditions Indicated In simulator control room.

The simulated radiological data as found by the onslte partlclpants and offslte monitors Is theoretically tied to the plant events.

EA.I SNEP I. recommended emergency actions, including YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by Control Room; TSC, protective measures; and EOF.

E.6 SNEP Each organization shall establish administrative and physical 2YR 2/28/95 The scenario willdrive the need to contact the means, and the time required for notifying and providing outsIde agencies to provide Instructions to the prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure public wlthln the plume exposure pathway. Ch pathway Emergency Planning Zone. (See Appendix 3.) It 7 Sec 7.3.2 shall be the licensee's responsibility to demonstrate that such means exist, regardless of who Implements this requirement It shall be the responsibility of the State and local governments to activate such a system.

F.1 SNEP communication plans for emergencies shall Include YRLYN Backup or alternate communlcatlons paths organizational titles and alternates for both ends of the willonly be tested lf the primary system

'he communication links. Each organization shall establish reliable primary and back up means of communication for actually falls during tha drill. As the emergency response organlzatlons (TSC 8 EOF) are activated the communlcatlons licensees, local, and State response organizations. Such systems should be selected to be compatible with one systems, Including the backup methods are tested by actually contacting the offslte another. Each plan shall include:

eillergency response network.

F.1.a SNEP a. provision for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day notification to and YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by fllllng out shift activation of the State/local emergency response network; rosters. The filling out of the next shift rosters and at a minimum, a telephone link and alternate, including causes the organlzatlon to plan for the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day manning of communications links that continuous, extended operation of the initiate emergency response actions. emergency response facllltles. Ch 8 Sec 8.2.2

/wjjg RESP ORP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS F.1.b SNEP b. provision for communications With continuous YRLYN 2/28/95 The obJectlve will be demonstrated during the State/local governments within the Emergency Planning exercise by all applicable facllltles.

Zones; It Is Intended to conduct a simulated turnover to the State and Federal Authorltles for the end of the plume phase and start up of a simulated FRMAC. Ch 8 Sec 8.3.2 F.1.c SNEP c. provision for communications as needed with YRLYN 2/28/95 The ob)ective will be demonstrated during the Federal emergency response organizations; exercise by all applicable facllltles.

It ls Intended to have a mock NRC respdnse team partlclpate ln the MOC, TSC, and EOF.

The communications with the NRC will simulate the response as It would occur from Initial notifications to the NRC Operations Center up until manning In the various facllltlea. Ch 8 Sec 8.2.2 F.1.d SNEP d. provision for communications between the YRLYN 2/28/95 The obJectlve will be demonstrated during the nuclear facility and the licensee's near-site Emergency- exercise by all applicable facllltles.

Operations Facility, State and local emergency operations centers, and radiological monitoring teams; lt Is Intended to have a mock NRC response team partlclpate In the MOC, TSC, and EOF.

The communlcatlons with the NRC will simulate the response as It would occur from Inltlal notlflcatlons to the NRC Operations Center up until manning In the various facllltles. Ch 8 Sec 8.6.1 F.1.e SNEP e. provision for alerting or activating emergency YRLYN 2/28/95 The obJectlve will be demonstrated during the personnel in each response organization; and exercise by all applicable facllltles. Ch 8 Sec 8.6.1 F.1.f SNEP f. Provision for communication by the licensee with YRLYN 2/28/95 The obJectlve will be demonstrated during the NRC headquarters and NRC Regional Office Emergency exercise by all applicable facilities.

Operations Centers and the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility and radiological monitoring team It Is Intended to have a mock NRC response team partlclpate In the MOC, TSC, and EOF.

assembly. area.

The communications with the NRC will simulate the response as It would occur from Inltlal notlflcatlons to the NRC Operations Center up until manning In the various facllltles. Ch 8 Sec 8.6.1 F.3 SNEP Each organization shall conduCt periodic testing of the entire N/A Perlodlc testing Is carried out as rountlne emergency communications system (see evaluation criteria testing by the emergency planning staff as called for by PMIS schedules. Ch 9 Sec 9.1.2 H.10, N.2.a and appendix 3).

RESP ORP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS 0.3.b SNEP Each licensee shall provide space which may be used for a 2 YR 2/28/95 The obJectlve ls considered a basic element of limited number of news media at the nearsite Emergency the emergency response organtzatlon.

Operations Facility.

It Is Intended to have outside players participate as mock media representatives to ask questions of the media staff at the MOC. It Is also Intended to have a mock NRC media person respond to the MOC aa part of the NRC Region I response team.

H.1 SNEP Each licensee shall establish a Technical Support Center The obJective Is demonstrated during each and an onsite operations support center (assembly are) in drill and exercise and Is considered a basic accordance with NUREG4696, Revision 1. element of the emergency response organization. Ch 8 Sec 8.1.2 H.10 SNEP Each organization shall make provisions to inspect, inventory QRTRLY 3/1/95 This function Is carried out as rountlne testing and operationally check emergency equipment/Instruments and Inventory checking by the emergency at least once each calander quarter and after each use. planning staff as called for by PMIS schedules.

There shall be sufficient reserves of Instruments/equipment to replace those which are removed from emergency kits for calibration or repair. Calibration of equipment shall be at intervals recommended by the supplier of the equipment.

H.11 SNEP Each plan shall, in an appendix, include identification of This function Is carried out as rountine testing emergency kits by general category (protectiv equipment, by the emergency planning staff as called for communications equipment, radiological monitoring by PMIS schedules.

equipment and emergency supplies).

SNEP Each licensee shall establish an Emergency Operations The obJectlve Is demonstrated during each Facility from which evaluation and coordination of all drill and exercise and Ia considered a basic licensee activities related to an emergency is to be carried element of the emergency response out and from which the licensee shall provide information to organization.

Federal, State and local authorities responding to radiological emergencies, in accordance with NUREG 0696, Revision 1.

H.4 SNEP Each organization shall provide for timely activation and 2YR 2/28/95 The obJectlve Is demonstrated during each staffing of the facilities and centers described in the plan. drill and exercise and Is considered a basic element of the emergency response organization.

H.S SNEP Each licensee shall klentify and establish onsite monitoring systems that are to be used to initiate emergency measures in accordance with Appendix 1, as well as those to be used for conducting assessment.

TI>>s tguipment shall include:

K~~

0654 RESP QRP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS H.S.a SNEP a. geophysical phenomena monitors, (e.g., 2/28/95 The obJective la demonstrated during each meteorological, hydrologic, seismic); drill and exercise and ls considered a basic element of the emergency response organization. The weather used during the FEMA Observed exercise will be canned weather to fulfillthe state obJectives.

H.5.b SNEP b. radiological monitors, (e.g., process, area, 5YR 2/28/95 The obJective Ia demonstrated during each emergency, effluent, wound and portable monitors and drill and exercise and Is considered a basic sampling equipment); element of the emergency response organization. All the radiation readings are simulated using data supplied to the participants after they have taken the proper actions by referees/controllers.

H.5.c SNEP c. process monitors, (e.g., reactor coolant system 5YR 2/28/95 The obJective ls demonstrated during each pressure and temperature, containment pressure and drill and exercise and ls considered a basic temperature, liquid levels, flow rates, status or lineup of element of the emergency response equipment components); organization. The process monitors are simulator control room fndlcators responding to the malfunctions Initiated to drive the scenario and to the actions of the control room participants.

H.5.d SNEP d. fire and combustion product detectors. 5YR 2/28/95 The obJective ls demonstrated during each drill and exercise and Is considered a basic element of the emergency response organization. The fire and combustion products detectors are simulator control room Indicators responding to the malfunctions Initiated to drive the scenario and to the actions of the control room participants. The detectors will respond as would be expected In a real event, depending on the type of event.

H.6 SNEP Each licensee shall make provision to acquire data from or YRLYN for emergency access to offsite monitoring and analysis equipment including:

H.6.a SNEP a. geophysical phenomena monitors, (e.g., YRLYN 2/28/95 The Indications required to provide data to the meteorological, hydrologic, seismic); exercise participants during the exercise will be provided by the simulator or referee Informatllon.

H.6.b SNEP b.'adiological monitors including rate meters and YRLYN 2/28/95 This obJectlve will be demonstrated by the sampling devices. Dosimetry shall be provided and shall participants during the exercise. The meet, as a minimum, the NRG Radiological Assessment participants will need to demonstrate proper Branch Technical Position for the Environmental use of the Instrumentation to obtain Information from the referees/controllers.

Radiological Monitoring Program; and

0654 RESP ORP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS H.6.o SNEP c. laboratory facilities, fixed or mobile. YRLYN 2/28/95 Appendix Atlve will be demonstrated by the participants during the exercise. The partlclpants will need to demonstrate proper use of the analysis equipment before data will be provided by the referees/controllers.

H.7 SNEP Each organization, where appropriate, shall provide for 5YR 2/28/95 The obJectlve Is demonstrated during each offsite radiological monitoring equipment in the vicinity of the drill and exercise and la considered a basic nuclear facility. element of the emergency response organization. Radiological equipment Is stored In the EOF for use by the offslte monltorlng teams. The onslte radlolglcal response team (OSCAR) has radlologlcal equipment In the response vehicle at all times.

This vehicle ls used for all drills snd exercises.

H.g SNEP Each licensee shall provide for an onsite operations support 5YR 2/28/95 The obJectlve ls demonstrated during each center (assembly area) which shall have adequate capacity, drill and exercise and la considered a basic and supplies, including, for example, respiratory protection, element of the emergency response protective clothing, portable lighting, portable radiation organization. The OSC Is the Shift monitoring equipment, cameras and communications Supervisor's office In the Control Structure equipment for personnel present in the assembly area. and la used during each drill and exercise.

Appendix D, Enc 1 SNEP Each licensee shall identify plant system and effluent YRLYN 2/28/95 The requirement ls fullfIliad In the SSES parameter values characteristic of a spectrum of off-normal Emergency Plan Chapter 5 Section 5.1, and conditions and accidents, and shall identify the plant Appendix E and ls a basic element of the parameter values or other information which corresponds to emergency response organlzatlon which Is the example initiating conditions of appendix 1. Such demonstrated ln each exercise and drill.

parameter values and the corresponding emergency class Appendix E shall be included in the appropriate facility emergency procedures. Facility emergency procedures shall specify the kinds of instruments being used and their capabilities.

SNEP Each licensee shall establish the means and time required to YRLYN warn or advise onsite individuals and individuals who may be ln areas controlled by the operator, including:

J.1.a SNEP a. Employees not having emergency YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration Irtltlated by events In the assignments; scenario. The emergency response organization will Inltlate evacuation of selected on site areas, evacuation of the radlologlcaly controlled area, an accountablllty and lastly an evacuation of all nonwsaentlal site personnel.

Appendix C

RESP QRP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS SNEP b. Visitors; YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration Initiated by events ln the scenario. The emergency response organization will Initiate evacuation of selected on site areas, evacuation of the radlologlcaly controlled ares, an accountability and lastly an evacuation of all nonwssentlal site personnel.

SNEP c. Contractor and construction personnel; and YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration Initiated by events In the aceharlo. The emergency response organization will Initiate evacuation of selected on site areas, evacuation of the radlologlcaly controlled area, an accountability and lastly an evacuation of all nonmssentlal site personnel.

SNEP d. Other persons who may be in the public YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration initiated by events In the access areas on or passing through the site or within the scenario. The emergency response owner controlled area. organization will Initiate evacuation of selected on alta areas, evacuation of the radlologlcaly controlled area; an accountability and lastly an evacuation of all non~ssentlal site personnel.

SNEP The organization's plans to implement protective measures for the plume exposure pathway shall include:

SNEP a. Maps showing evacuation routes, evacuation 6YR 2/28/95 Actual demonstration during each drill and areas, preselected radiological sampling and monitoring exercise and la considered a basic element of the emergency response organization.

points, relocation centers in host areas, and shelter areas; (identification of radiological sampling and monitoring points Appendix 0 Fig 4.1 shall include the designators in Table J-1 or an equivalent uniform system described in the plan);

SNEP b Maps showing population distribution around the 6YR 2/28/95 The obJectlve Is demonstrated during each nuclear facility. This shall be by evacuation areas (licensees drill and exercise snd Is considered a basic shall also present the information in a sector format); element of the emergency response organization. Appendix 0 SNEP c. Means for notifying all segments of the transient 6 YR 2/28/95 The obJectlve Is demonstrated during each and resident population; drill and exercise and ls considered a basic element of the emergency response organization. Ch 8 Sec 8.5.4 SNEP The bases for the choice of recommended protective actions 2YR 10/25/94 The obJectlve Is demonstrated during each from the plume exposure pathway during emergency drill and exercise and Is considered a basic conditions. This shall include expected local protection element of the emergency response organization. The obJectlve Is demonstrated afforded in residential units or other shelter for direct and by InJects to the scenario by actors asking inhalation exposure, as well as evacuation time estimates. 'appropriate questions. Ch 8 Sec 8.5.4

QRP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO SNEP Each licensee shall make provisions for evacuation routes 6YR 9/13/94 The obJective willdemonstrated during the and transportation for onsite individuals to some suitable practicaexerclse by evacuating a selected offsite location, including alternatives for inclement weather, high traffic density, and specific radiological conditions. 'OMMENTS group.

The requirement Is fullfiliad In the SSES

'ach J.7 SNEP licensee shall establish a mechanism for YRLYN 2/28/95 recommending protective actions to the appropriate State Emergency Plan Appendlc F, Tables 5.1, 5.2, 7.

and local authorities. These shall include Emergency Action 1 and 79 and ls a basic element of the Levels corresponding to projected dose to the population at emergency response organization whIch ls demonstrated In each exercise and drill.

risk, in accordance with Appendix 1 and with the recommendations set forth in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 of the Appendix F manual of Protective Actions Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear incidents (EPA-520/1-75-001) (Now EPA 400).

As specified in Appendix 1, prompt notification shall be made directly to the offsite authorities responsible for implementing protective measures within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone.

L.4'ESP J.S SNEP Each licensee's plan shall contain time estimates for The requirement ls fullfilledIn the SSES Emergency Plan Appendlc 6, and Ia a basic evacuation within the plume exposure EPZ. These shall be in accordance with Appendix 4. element of the emergency response organization which ls demonstrated ln each exercise and drill.

L,1 SNEP Each organization shall arrange for local and backup 6YR 10/19/94 The requirement Is fullfiliad In the SSES hospital and medical services having the capability for Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 6.3.4, evaluation of radiation exposure and uptake, including Chapter 9 Table 9.1 Appendic A and Appendix D. A medical emergency willnot be conducted assurance that persons providing these services are In conJunction with the NRC/FEMA observed adequately prepared to,handle contaminated individuals.

exercise.'he L.2 SNEP Each licensee shall provide for onsite first aid capability. 5YR 10/19/94 requirement Is fullfiliad ln the'SSES Emergency Plan Chapter 7 Section 7.4. A medical emergency will not be conducted In conJunction with the Health PhysIcs drills.

SNEP Each organization shall arrange for transporting victims of 6YR 10/19/94 The requirement Is fullfilledIn the SSES radiological accidents to medical support facilities. Emergency Plan Chapter6Section 6.3.4 Appendix A. A medical emergency will not be conducted In conJunction with the NRC/FEMA observed exercise. Appendix A

hLIB5 RESP GRP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS SNEP Each organization, as appropriate, shall develop general 6YR 2/13/90 The requirement ls fullfIliad In the SSES plans and procedures for reentry and recovery and describe Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 6.0 and 6.5, the means by which decisions to relax protective measures Chapter T Section 6.32 and Appendix C. A (e.g., allow reentry into an evacuated area) are reached. tabletop dlscusslng recovery/reentry will be This process should consider both existing and potential conducted emphaslzlng the radiological conditions. aspects. The tabletop will be conducted after the practice drill. Various managers of the Emergency Response Organzlatlon will be Involved by observing and working ln control cells during the Ingestion Pathway portion of the exercise to support the State objectives.

Ch 6 Sec 6.Ch 6 Sec 6.1 SNEP Each licensee plan shall contain the position/title, authority 6YR 2/13/90 The requirement ls fullfIliad ln the SSES and.responsibilities of individuals who will fill key positions in Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 6.5, Figure the facility recovery organization. This organization shall 6.6. A tabletop dlscusslng recovery/reentry include technical personnel with responsibilities to devlop, will be conducted emphaslzlng the evaluate and direct recovery and reentry operations. The. radiological aspects. The tabletop will be conducted after the practice drill. Ch 6 Sec 6.5 recovery organization recommended by the Atomic industrial Forum's "Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan" dated October 11, 1979, is an acceptable framework.

SNEP Each licensee and State plan shall specify means for 6YR 2/13/90 The requirement Is fullfIliad In the SSES informing memebers of the response organizations that a Emergency Plan Chapter 6 Section 6.5, Figure recovery operation is to be initiated, and of any changes in 6.6. A tabletop dlscusslng recovery/reentry the organizational structure that may occur. will be conducted emphaslzlng the radiological aspects. The tabletop will be conducted after the practice drill.

SNEP An exercise is an event that tests the intergrated capability 6YR 10/25/94 The 1995 NRC Observed Exercise will be and a major portion of the basic elements existing within planned, coordinated and conducted as emergency preparedness plans a'nd organizations. The required by NUREG 4654 and FEMA REP-14 8c15 to support the licensee, State and Local emergency preparedness exercise shall simulate an objectives.

emergency that results in offsite radiological releases which would require response by offsite authorities. Exercises shall be conducted as set forth in NRC and FEMA rules.

0654 RESP QRP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS N.1.b SNEP An exercise shall Include mobilization of State and local 6YR 10/25/94 The 1995 NRC Observed Exercise will be personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability to planned, coordinated and conducted aa respond to an accident scenario requiring response. The required by NUREQ %654 and FEMA REP-14 6 organization shall provide for a critique of the annual 15 to support the licensee, State and Local exercise by Federal and State observers/evaluators. The objectives.

scenario should be varied from year to year such that all The graded plume phase exercise will be an major elements of the plans and preparedness organizations off hours, unannounced exercise during the are tested within a five-year period. Each organization summer.

should make provisions to start an exercise between 6:00 p.m. and midnight, and another between midnight and 6:00 a.m. once every six years. Exercises should be conducted under various weather conditions. Some exercises should be unannounced:

N.1.b.1 SNEP N.1.b.1 Each organization should make provisions 6YR to start an exercise between 8:00 p.m. and midnight.

N.1.b.2 SNEP N.1.b2 Each organization should make provisions 6YR 8/27/85 to start an exercise between midnight and 6:00 a.m. once every six years.

N.1.b.3 SNEP N.1.b.3 Exercises should be conducted under various weather conditions.

N.1.b.3.s SNEP N.1.b.3.a Exercises should be conducted under 6YR 4/18/90 various weather conditions.

a. Spring drilVexercise.

N.1.b.3.t SNEP N.t.b.3.b Exercises should be conducted under 6YR 8/31/93 various weather conditions.

b. Summer drill/exercise.

N,1.b.3.c SNEP N.1.b.3.c Exercises should be conducted under 6YR 10/25/94 various weather conditions.

c. Fall drill/exercise.

N.1.b.3.e SNEP N.1.b.3.d Exercises should be conducted under 6-YR 2/28/95 various weather conditions.

d. Winter drill/exercise.

RESP ORP DESCRIPTION

~8 REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS N.1.b.3.e SNEP N.1.b.3.e Exercises should be conducted under 6YR various weather conditions.

e. With precipitation.

N.1.b.4 SNEP N.1.b.4 Some exercises should be unannounced. 6YR 2/23/89 N2.a SNEP A drill Is a supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing and maintaining skills in a particular operation. A drill is often a component of an exercise. A drill shall be supervised and evaluated by a qualified drill instructor. Each organization shall conduct drills, in addition to the annual at the frequencies indicated below: 'xercise N2e(A) SNEP COMMUNICATIONDRILLS - Communications between the YRLY 2/28/95 This function Is carried out as rountlne testing nuclear facility, State and local emergency operations by the emergency planning staff aa called for centers, and field assessment teams shall be tested by PMIS schedules. Ch 7 Sec 7.1 annually.

Communications drills shall also include the aspect of understanding the content of messages.

N2.a(M) SNEP COMMUNICATIONDRILLS - Communications with State MONTHLY 2/28/95 This function Is carried out as rountlne testing and local governments within the plume exposure pathway by the emergency planning staff as called for Emergency Planning Zone shall be tested Monthly. by PMIS schedules.

Communications drills shall also include the aspect of understanding the content of messages.

N2+(Q) SNEP COMMUNICATIONDRILLS - Communications with Federal QRTRLY This function Is carried out as rountlne testing emergency responsee organizations and States within by the emergency planning staff as called for pathway shall be tested quarterly.

the'ngestion by PMIS schedules.

Communications drills shall also include the aspect of understanding the content of messages.

SNEP FIRE DRILLS - Fire drills shall be conducted in accordance 6 YRN 9/14/94 with the plant (nuclear facility) technical speciTicatiions.

0654 RESP 0RP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS NX.c SNEP MEDICALEMERGENCY DRILLS - A medical emergency YRLY 10/19/94 involving a simulated contaminated individual which 'rill contains provisions for participation by the local support agencies (i.e., ambulance and offsite medical treatment facility) shall be conducted annually. The offsite portions of the medical drill may be performed as part of the required annual exercise.

N.2.d SNEP RADIOLOGICALMONITORING DRILLS - Plant environs YRLY 2/28/95 and radiological monitoring drills (onsite and offsite) shall be conducted annually. These drills shall Include collecting and analysis of all sample media (.g., water, vegetation, soil and air), and provisions for communications and record keeping.

The State drills need not be at each site. Where appropriate, local organizations shall participate. '/28/95 N2.e SNEP HEALTH.PHYSICS DRILLS - (1) Health physics drills shall SEMI-ANN be conducted semi-annually which involve response to and analysis of, simulated elevated airborne and liquid samples and direct radiation measurements in the environment. The State drills need not be at each site.

Analysis of inplant liquid samples with actual elevated C'2) radiation levels including use of the post accident sampling system shall be included in Health Physics drills by licensees annually.

N.3 SNEP Each organization shall describe how exercises and drills are to be carried out to allow free play for declsionmaking and to meet the following objectives. Pending the development of exercise scenarios and exercise evaluation guidance by NRC and FEMA the scenarios for use in exercises and drills shall include but not be limited to, the following:

N.3.a SNEP a. The basic objective(s) of each drill and exercise N/ 2/28/95 ThIs obJectlve Is described In the and appropriate evaluation criteria; Referee/Controller Manual that ls made up for, each drill and or exercise. This obJectlve Is met In Section II of the manual.

N.3.b SNEP b. The date(s), time period, place(s) and 2/28/95 This obJectlve Is described In the participating organizations; Referee/Controller Manual that Is made up for each drill and or exercise. This obJectlve Is met In Section I 8 III of the manual.

N.3.c SNEP c. The simulated events; 2/28/95 This obJectlve ls described ln the Referee/Controller Manual that la made up for each drill and or exercise. This obJectlve Is met In Section III of the manual.

lmftZ RESP QRP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS N.3.d SNEP d. A time schedule of real and simulated intiating 2/28/95 This obJectlve ls described In the events; \ Referee/Controller Manual that Is made up for each drill snd or exercise. This obJectlve ls met ln Section V of the manual.

N.3;e SNEP e. A narrative summaly describing the conduct of 2/28/95 This obJectlve ls described In the the exercises or drills to Include such things as simulated Referee/Controller Manual that ls made up for causualties, offsite fire department assistance, rescue of each drill and or exercise. This obJectlve ls personnel, use of protective clothing, deployment of met In Section V of the manual.

radiological monitoring teams, and public information activities; NB.f SNEP f. A descriptionn of the arrangements for advance 2/28/95 This obJectlve Is described In the materials to be provided to official observers. Referee/Controller Manual that Is made up for each drill and or exercise. This obJectlve Is met In Section IV of the manual.

N.4 SNEP Official observers from Federal, State, or local governments 10/27/94 A crltlque will be conducted and a report will observe, evaluate, and critique the required exercises. A Issued.

critique shall be scheduled at the conclusion of the exercise to evaluate the ability of organizations to respond as called for in the plan. The critique shall be conducted as soon as practicable after the exercise, and a formal evaluation should result from the critique. ~

SNEP Each organization shall establish means for evaluating 2/28/95 This obJectlve Is fulfilled for each Item observer and participant comments on areas needing Identlfled for Improvement by the crltlque improvement, including emergency plan procedural process, Including participant feedback, during the drill or exercise. The Item ls changes, and for assigning responsibility for implementing reviewed and entered Into the open Item corrective actions. Each organization shall establish tracking system as deemed appropriate.

management control used to ensure that corrective actions are implemented.

0654 RESP GRP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS 0,4b SNEP Each organization shall establish a training program for instructing and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emergency response plans.2/ The specialized initial training and periodic retraing programs (including the scope, nature and frequency) shall be provided in the folowing categories:

b. Personnel responsible for accident assemssment; 2/ If State and local governments lack the capability and resources to accomplish this training, they may look to the licensee and the Federal government (FEMA) for assistance in this training.

0.1A SNEP Each organization shall assure the training of appropriate Ch 9 Sec 9.1.1 Individuats.

a. Each facility to which the plant applies shall provide site speciffic emergency response training for those offsite emergency organizations who may be called upon to provide assistance in the event of an emergency. 1/

1/ Training for hospital personnel, ambulance/res'cue, police and fire departments shall include the procedures for notification, basic radiation protection, and their expected roles. For those local services support organizations who willenter the site, training shall also include site access procedures and the identity (by position and title) of the individual in the onsite emergency organization who will control the organizations'upport activities. Offsite emergency response support personnel should be provided with appropriate kfentification cards where required.

0654 RESP GRP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS 0.1.b SNEP Each organization shall assure the training of appropriate Ch 9 Sec 9.1.1 individuals.

b. Each offsite response organization shall participate in and receive training. Where. mutual aid agreements exist between local agencies such as fire, police and ambulance/rescue, the training shall also be offered to the other departments who are members of the mutual aid district..

1/ Training for hospital personnel, ambulance/rescue, police and fire departments shall include the procedures for notication, basic radiation protection, and their expected roles. For those local services support organizations who

• will enter the site, training shall also Include site access procedures and the identity (by position and title) of the.

individual in the onsite emergency organization who will control the organizations'upport activities. Offsite emergency response support personnel should be provided with appropriate Identificatiion cards where required.

0.2 . SNEP The training program for members of the onsite emergency organization shall, besides classroom training, include practical drills in which each individual demonstrates ability to perform his assigned emergency function. During the practical drills, on-the-spot correction of erroneous performance shall be made and a demonstration of the proper performance offered by the Instructor.

0.3 SNEP Training for individuals assigned to licensee first aid teams shall include courses equiva! ent to Red Cross Multi-Media.

0654 RESP ORP DESCRIPTION REQD FREO LAST OEMO COMMENTS 0.4 SNEP Each organization shall establish a training program for instructing and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emergency response plans.2/ The specialized initial training and periodic retralng programs (including the scope, nature and frequency) shall be provided in the folowing categories:

a. Oirectors or coordinators of the response organizations; 2/ If State and local governments lack the capability and resources to accomplish this training, they may look to the" licensee and the Federal government (FEMA) for assistance in thIs training.

0.4.1 SNEP Each organization shall establish a training program for instructing and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emergency response plans.2/ The specialized initial training and periodic retraing programs (including the scope, nature and frequency) shall be provided in the folowing categories:

b. Personnel responsible for accident assessment; I

2/ If State and local governments lack the capability and resources to accomplish this training, they may look to the licensee and the Federal government (FEMA) for assistance in this training.

0654 RESP ORP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS OA.c SNEP Each organization shall establish a training program for instructing and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emmergency response plans'/ The specialized initial training and periodic retraing programs (including the scope, nature and frequency) shall be provided in the-folowing categories:

c. Radiological monitoring teams and radiological analysis personnel; 2l If State and local governments lack the capability and resources to accomplish this training, they may look to the licensee and the Federal government (FEMA) for assistance in this training.

" 6 YRN OA.d SNEP Each organization shall establish a training program for instructing and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emergency response plans.2/ The specialized initial training and periodic retraing programs (including the scope, nature and frequency) shall be provided in the folowing categories:

~

d. Police, security and fire fighting personnel; 2l If State and local governments lack the capability and resources to accomplish this training, they may look to the licensee and the Federal government (FEMA) for assistance in this training.

RESP GRP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS SNEP Each organization shall establish a training program for instructing and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emergency response plans.2/ The specialized initial training and periodic retraing programs (including the scope, nature and frequency) shall be provided in the folowing categories:

e..Repair and damage control/correctional action teams (onslte);

2/ If State and local governments lack the capability and resources to accomplish this training, they may look to the licensee and the Federal government (FEMA) for assistance in this training.

SNEP Each organization shall establish a training program for 6 YRN and qualifying personnel who will implement 'nstructing radiological emergency response plans.2/ The specialized initial training and periodic retraing programs (including the scope, nature and frequency) shall be provided in the folowing categories:

f. First aid and rescue personnel; 2/ If State and local governments lack the capability and resources to accomplish this training, they may look to the licensee and the Federal government (FEMA) for assistance in this training.

0654 RESP ORP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS 0.4.g SNEP Each organization shall establish a training program for Instructing and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emergency response plans.2/ The specialized initial training and periodic retraing programs (including the scope, nature and frequency) shall be provided in the folowing categories:

g. Local supportt services personnel including Civil Defense/Emergency Service personnel; 2/ If State and local governments lack the capability and resources to accomplish this training, they may look to the licensee and the Federal government (FEMA) for assistance in this training.

0.4.h SNEP. Each organization shall establish a training program for 6 YRN instructing and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emergency response plans.2/ The specialized initial training and periodic retraing programs (including the scope, nature and frequency) shall be provided in the folowing categories:

h. Medical support personnel; 2/ If State and local governments lack the capability and resources to accomplish this training, they may look to the licensee and the Federal government (FEMA) for assistance in this training.

0.4.I SNEP Each organization shall establish a training program for 6 YRN instructing and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emergency response plans.2/ The specialized initial training and periodic retraing programs (including the scope, nature and frequency) shall be provided. in the folowing categories:

i. Ucensee's headquarters support personnell; 2/ If State and local governments lack tlie capability and resources to accomplish this training, they may look to the licensee and the Federal government (FEMA) for assistance in this training.

Fjj'j"":

0654 RESP GRP DESCRIPTION REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS OA.j SNEP Eachbrganization shall establish a training program for Instructing and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emergency response plans.2/ The specialized initial training and periodic retraing programs (including the scope, nature and frequency) shall be provided in the folowing categories:

j. Personnel responsible for transmission of emergency information and instruction;

~ 2/ If State and local governments lack the capability and resources to accomplish this training, they may look to the licensee and the Federal government (FEMA) for assistance in this training.

0.5 SNEP ~

Each organization shall provide for the initial and annual retraining of personnel with emergency response responsibilities.

P.1 SNEP Each organization shall provide for the training of individuals Ch 9 Sec 9.1.1 responsible for the planning effort.

P.10 SNEP Each organization shall provide for updating telephone Ch9Sec9.2 numbers in emergency procedures at least quarterly.

PN SNEP Each organization shall identify by title the individual with tIIe overall authority and responsibility for radiological emergency response planning.

P.3 SNEP Each organization shall designate an Emergency Planning Coordinator with responsibility for the development and updating of emergency plans and coordination of these plans with other response organizations.

P4 ~ SNEP . Each organization shall update its plan and agreements as Ch 9 Sec 9.1 2 needed, review and certify it to be current on an annual basis. The update shall take into account changes Identified by drills and exercises.

0654 RESP QRP DESCRIPTlON REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS P.5 SNEP The emergency response plans and approved changes to the plans shall be forwarded to all organizations and appropriate individuals with responsibility for implementation of the plans. Revised pages shall be dated and marked to show where changes have been made.

P6 - SNEP Each plan shall contain a detailed listing of supporting plans and their source.

P.7 SNEP Each plan shall contain as an appendix listing, by title, procedures required to implement the plan. The listing shall include the section(s) of the plan to be implemented by each procedure.

P.8 SNEP Each plan shall contain a specific table of contents. Plans submitted for review should be cross-refereneced to these criteria.

P.S SNEP Each licensee shall arrange'for and conduct independent reviews of the emergency preparedness program at least every 12 months. (An independent review is one conducted by any competent organizationn either internal or external to the licensee's organization, but who are not immediately responsible for the emergency preparedness program). The review shall include the emergency plan, it's implementing procedures and practices, training, readiness testing, equipment, and interfaces with State and local governments.

Management controls shall be implemented for evaluation and correction of review findings. The result of the review, along with recommendations for improvements, shall be documented, reported to appropriate licensee corporate and plant management, and involve Federal, State and local organizations, and retained for a period of five years.

DESCRIPTION RESP ORP REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS E.7 Each organization shall provide written messages LPIM YRLY 2/28/95 Scenario InJects will be written to test this function.

intended for the public, consistent with the licensee's This obJectlve Is normally satlsf led In conJunction classification scheme. ln particular, draft messages to with the State. Ch 7 Sec 7.1.1 the public giving instructions with regard to specific protective actions to be taken by occupants of affected areas shall be prepared and included as part of the State and local plans. Such messages should include the appropriate aspects of sheltering, ad hoc respiratory protection, e.g., handkerchief over mouth, thyroid blocking or evacuation. The role of the licensee is to provkle supporting information for the messages. For ad hoc respiratory protection see "Respiratory Protective Devices Manual" American lndustltal Hygiene Association, 1963 pp. 123-126.,

O.1.a, Each organization shall provide a coordinated periodic (at LPIM YRLY 10/31/84 This obJectlve ls not demonstrated during an least annually) dissemination of information to the public exercise. This obJectlve ls aatlsf led with Telephone regarding how they will be notified and what their actions Book Inserts that are prepared every year.

should be in an emergency. This information shall include, but not necessaily be limited to: .

a. educational information on radiation; Means for accomplishing this dissemination may Include, but not necessarily limited to: information in the telephone book; periodic informatiion in utilitybills; posting in public areas; and publications distributed on an annual basis.

0.1.b b. contact for additional information; LPIM YRLY 10/31/84 ThIs obJectlve Is not demonstrated during an exercise. This obiectlve la satlsf led with Telephone Book Inserts that are prepared every year.

" LPIM YRLY 10/31/94 This obJectlve ls not demonstrated during an O.1.c c. protective measures, e,g., evacuation routes, exercise. This obJectlve Is satisfied with Telephone and relocation centers, sheltering, respiratory protection, Book Inserts that sre prepared every year..

radioprotective drugs; O.1.d d. special needs of the handicapped. LPIM YRLY 10/31/94 This obJectlve Is not demonstrated during an exercise. This obJectlve Is satlsf led with Telephone Book Inserts that are prepared every year.

DESCRIPTION RESP 0RP REQD FREQ LAST DEM'0 COMMENTS The public information programm shall provide the LPIM YRLY 10/31/94 This obfectlve ls not demonstrated during an permanent and transient adult populatiion within the exercise. This objective ls satlsf led with Telephone plume exposure EPZ an adequate oportunityy to become Book Inserts that are prepared every year.

aware of the information annually. The programs should include provision for written material that ls likely to be available in a residence during an emergency. Updated information shall be disseminated at least annually.

Signs or other measures (e.g, decals, posted notices or other means, placed in hotels, motels, gasoline stations and phone booths) shall also be used to disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate information that would be helpful if an emergency or accident occurs. Such notices should refer the transient to the telephone directory or other source of local information and guide the visitor to appropriate radio and television. frequencies.

0.3.a .

Each principal organization shall designate the points of LPIM 2YR 2/28/95 The obJectlve ls demonstrated during each drill and contact and physical locations for use by news media exercise and ls cons!dered a basic element of the during an emergency. emergency response organlzatlon.

It Is Intended to have outside players partlclpate as mock media representatives to ask questions of the media staff at the MOC. It la also Intended to have a mock NRC media peraori respond to the MOC as part of the NRC Region I response team. The State ls expected to partlclpate ln the exercise with an Indlvldual acting as the State media representative.

0.4.a Each principal organization shall designate a LPIM 2YR 2/28/95 The obiectlve ls demonstrated during each drill and exercise and Is considered a basic element of the spokesperson who should have access to all necessary emergency response organlzatlon.

information.

It Is Intended to have outside players partlclpate as mock media representatives to ask questions of the media staff at the MOC. It Is also Intended to have a mock NRC media person respond to the MOC as part of the NRC Region I response team. Ch 6 Sec 6.

==3.2

DESCRIPTION==

RESP GRP REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS OA.b Each organization shall establish arrangements for timely LPIM 2YR 2/28/9$ The obJectlve ls demonstrated during each drill and exchange of information among designated exercise and Ia considered a basic element of the spokespersons. emergency response organixatlon.

It la Intended to have outside players participate aa mock media representatives to ask questions of the media staf at the MOC. It ls also Intended to have a mock NRC media person respond to the MOC aa part of the NRC Regton I response team.

0.4.c Each organization shall establish coordinated LPIM 2YR 2/28/95 The obJectlve ls demonstrated during each drill and arrangements for dealing with rumors. exercise and la considered a basic element of the emergency response organization.

It Ia Intended to have outside players partlclpate as mock media representatives to ask questions of the media staff at the MOC. It la also Intended to have a mock NRC media person respond to the MOC aa part of the NRC RegIon I response team.

Each organization shall conduct coordinated programs at LPIM YRLY 11/18/94 This obJectlve Ia not demonstrated during an least annually to acquaint news media with the exercise. The obJectlve Ia satlsf led by a media day emergency plans, information concerning radiation, and that Ia hosted at the Information Center.

points of contact forr release of public information in an emergency.

E.3 The licensee in conjunction with State and local LRPC -

. YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by Operations dlssemlnatlng organizations shall establish the contents of the initial Initial communications to state and local emergency messages to be sent from the plant. These organizations. The remainder of the emergency messages shall contain information about the class of response organlxation (TSC, EOFl will provide the required coommunlcatllons at the appropriate time emergency; whether a release is taking place, potentially based on scenario events.

affected population and areas, and whether protective measures may be necessary.

E.4.(I d. type of actual or projected release (airborne, LRPc YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by Control Room, TSC, and waterborne, surface spill), and estimated duration/impact EOF using simulated data derived from condltlons times; Indicated In slmuhtor control room. The simulated radlologlcal data aa found by the onslte participants and offslte monitors la theoretically tied to the plant events.

E.4.e . e. estimate of quantity of radioactive material LRPC YRLYN Actual demonstration by Control Room, TSC, and released or being released and the points and height of ~ EOF using simulated data derived from condltlons releases; Indicated In simulator control room. The simulated radlologlcal data as found by the onslte participants and offslte monitors Is theoretically tied to the plant events.

DESCRIPTION RESP QRP REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS

g. meteorological conditions at appropriate 'RPc YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by Control Room, TSC, and levels (wind speed, direction (to and from), indicator of EOF using simulated data derived from conditions stability, precipitation, if any]; Indicated In simulator control room. The simulated I radiological data as found by the onslte participants snd offslte monitors ls theoretically tied to the plant events.

h. actual or projected dose rates at site LRPC YRLYN Actual demonstration by Control Room, TSC, and boundary; projected integrated dose at site boundary; EOF using simulated data derived from conditions indicated In simulator control room. The simulated radiological data as found by the onslte partlclpants and offalte monitors ls theoretically tied to the plant events.

L projected dose rates and integrated dose at LRPC YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by Control Room, TSC, and the projected peak and at 2, 5, and 10 miles, including EOF using simulated data derived from condltlons sector(s) affected; . Indicated In simulator control room. The simulated radiological data as found by the onslte partlclpants and offslte monitors ls theoretically tied to the plant events.

j. estimate of any surface radioactive LRPC YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by Control Room, TSC, and contamination.lnplant, onsite or offsite; EOF using simulated data derived from condltlons Indicated ln simulator control room. The simulated radlologlcal data aa found by the onslte partlclpanta and offslte monitors Is theoretically tied to the plant events.

k. licensee emergency response actions LRPC YRLYN 2/28/95 Actual demonstration by Control Room, TSC, and underway; EOF.

Onsite capability and resources to provide initial values LRPC YRLYN 2/28/95 The simulator Control Room accident Instruments and continuing assessment throughout the course of an will Indicate for accident assessment by responding accident shall include post-accident sampling capability, to transients Induced for the exercise. The PASS radiation and effluent monitors, in-plant iodine located In the Tralnlng Center will be used for instrumentation, and containment radiation monitoring in sampling during the practice and the NRC Observed exercise. Ch 7 Sec 7.1 accordance with NUREG 0578, as elaborated in the NRC letter to all power reactor licensees dated October 30, 1979.

Each licensee shall establish methods and techniques to LRPc 5YR 2/28/95 The objective Is demonstrated during each drill and be used for determining: exercise and ls considered a basic element of the emergency response organization. The plant system

b. the magnitude of the release of parameters and effluent monitors Indicate based on the scenario source term. Ch 7 Sec 7.1 radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitors..

DESCRIPTION RESP ORP REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS Each licensee shall establish methods and techniques to LRPC 5YR 2/28/95 be used for determining:

b. the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and eNuent monitors.

1. Reactor Building Release Each licensee shall establish methods and techniques to LRPC 2/28/95 be used for determining:

b. the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitors.

, 2. Turbine Building Release Each licensee shall establish methods and techniques to LRPC 2/28/95 be used for determining:

the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitors.

3. Rad Waste Building Release Each licensee shall establish methods and techniques to LRPc 2/28/95 be used for determining:

b. the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitors.

4. Unfiltered Release Each licensee shall establish methods and techniques to LRPc 5YR 2/28/95 be used for determining:

b.: the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitors.

5. Filtered Release Each licensee shall provide for radiological monitoring of LRPC YRLYN 9/13/94 This obfectlve willbe demonstrated during the people evacuated from the site. practice exercise only. A group of selected Indlvlduals will be evacuated from the site during the practIce exercise,

0654 DESCRIPTION E~

RESP GRP REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS J.4 Each licensee shall provide for the evacuation of onsite". LRPC 5YR 9/13/94 Actual demonstration Inltlated by events ln the non~ential personnel in the event of a Site or General scenario. The emergency response organization will Emergency and shall provide a decontamination Inltlate evacuation of selected on site areas, capability at or near the monitoring point specified ln J.3. evacuation of the radloioglcaiy controlled area, an accountsblllty and lastly an evacuation of all non-essential site personnel.

J.6.a Each licensee shall, for individuals remaining or arriving LRPC YRLYN 10/25/84 InJects will be created to teat this obJectlve by onsite during the emergency, make provisions for: . almulatlng the arrival of an offslte resource and the

'. Individual respiratoly protection; organlzatlon having to get the Indlvldual onalte.

J.6.b b. Use of protective clothing; and LRPC YRLYN 10/25/94 InJects will be created to test this obJectlve by simulating the arrival of an offslte resource and the organlzatlon having to get the Indlvhdual onslte.

J.6.c c. Use of radioprotective drugs, (e.g., LRPC YRLYN 10/25/94 It Ia planned to test this obJectlve by almulatlng the individual thyroid protection)... arrival of an offslte resource and the organlzatlon having to get the lndlvldual onslte. Ch 6 sec 62.1 e K.1.a Each licensee shall establish onsite exposure guidelines LRPC YRI.YN 10/19/84 The obJectlve Is demonstrated as driven by the consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Ufesaving scenario during'each drill and exercise and ls Activity Protectve Actions Guides (EPA 520/1-75/001) considered a basic element of the emergency response organization. (A table top was held on (now EPAA00) for:

l 9/13/84 that covered this obJectlve.) Ch Sec 7.3.1

a. Removal of injured persons; K.1.b b. undertaMng corrective actions; LRPC YRI.YN 2/28/95 The obJectlve ls demonstrated as driven by the scenario during each drill and exercise and ls considered a basic element of the emergency response organlzatlon. (A table top was held on 9/13/84 that covered this obJectlve.)

K.1.c c. performing assessment actions; LRPC YRLYN 2/28/95 The obJectlve ls demonstrated aa driven by the scenario during each drill and exercise and ls considered a basic element of the emergency response organlzatlon. (A table top was held on 9/13/84 that covered this obJectlve.)

K.1.d .d. providing first aid; LRPC . YRLYN 10/19/94 The obJectlve ls demonstrated aa driven by the scenario during each drill and exercise and ls considered a basic element of the emergency response organlzatlon. (A table top was held on 9/13/94 that covered this obJectlve.)

0654 DESCRIPTION RESP ORP REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS K.1.e e. performing personnel decontamination; LRPC YRLYN 10/19/94 The obJectlve Is demonstrated as driven by the scenario during each drill and exercise and Is considered a basic element of the emergency response organlzatlon. (A table top was held on 9/13/94 that covered this obJectlve.)

f. providing ambulance service; LRPC YRLYN 10/19/94 The obJectlve ls demonstrated aa driven by the scenario during each drill and exercise and Is considered a bash element of the emergency response organlzatlon. (A table top was held on 9/13/94 that covered this obJectlve.)

K.1.g g. providing medical treatment services. LRPC YRLYN 10/19/94 The obJectlve la demonstrated as driven by during each drill and exercise and Is the'cenario considered a basic element of the emergency response organlzatlon. (A table top was held on 9/13/94 that covered this obJectlve.)

Each licensee shall provide an onsite radiation protection LRPC YRLYN 2/28/95 Demonstatlon of obJectlve by simulated events program to be implemented during emergencies, generated by the scenario. Ch 7 Sec 7Z including methods to implement exposure guidelines.

The plan shall identify individual(s), by position or title, who can authorize emergency workers to receive doses in excess of 10CFR Part 20 limits. Procedures shall be worked out in advance for permitting onsite volunteers to receive radiation exposures in the course of carrying out lifesaving and other emergency activities. These procedures shall include expeditious decision making and a reasonable consideration of relative risks.

m K.3.a Each organization shall make provision for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per LRPC YRLYN 2/28/95 The proper dosemetry will be used as determined by day capability to determine the doses received by the scenario condltlons. Appendix C emergency personnel involved in any nuclear accident, including volunteers. Each organization shall make provisions for distribution of dosimeters, both self-reading and permanent record devices, K.3.b Each organization shall ensure that dosimeters are read LRPC YRLYN 2/28/95 Dosemetry will be used as required by scenario at appropriate frequencies and provide for maintaining conditions and results provided io participants will dose records for emergency workers involved in any be recorded. Any readings from TLDs will be nuclear accident. simulated.

K.S.a Each organization, as appropriate, shall specify action LRPC YRLYN 2/28/95 Contamlnatlon llmlts willbe exceeded and levels for determining the need for decontamination. appropriate action will be required.

DESCRIPTION RESP ORP REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS Each organization, as appropriate, shall establish the LRPC YRLYN Scenario does not Include a medical emergency. No means for radiological decontamination of emergency equipment willbe deconned.

personnel wound, supplies, instruments and equipment, and for waste disposal.

Each licensee shall provide onsite contamination control LRPc YRLYN 12/13/94 Actual demonstration for first Individual entering an measures including:. airborne/contaminated area.

'I

a. area access control; K.6.b b. drinking water and food supplies; LRPC YRLYN 2/28/95 Demonstrated by simulated events generated by the scenario.

K.6.c c. criteria for permitting return of areas and items LRPc YRLYN 2/28/95 Demonstrated by simulated events generated by the to normal use, see Draft ANSI 13.12. scenario.

,Each licensee shall provide the capability for LRPC 5YR 2/28/95 Appendix Dtlve will be demonstrated using InJects decontaminating relocated onsite personnel, including which simulate contaminated workers which need provisions for extra clothing and decontaminants suitable decontamination attention.

for the type of contamination expected, with particular attention given to radioiodine contamination of the skin.

C.3 Each organization shall identify radiological laboratories LRsM 5YR 12/18/90 This obJectlve will be simulated by slmulatlng the and their general capabilities and expected availability to =-

dispatch of a carrier to transport a sample to an provide radiological monitoring and analyses services outside laboratory for analysis.

r which can be used in'an emergency.

H.12 Each organization shall establish a central point LRSM 2YR 2/28/95 The.obJectlve will be demonstrated during the (preferably associated with the licensee's nearwite exercise by samples simulated to be contaminated, Emergency Operations FaciTity), for the receipt and brought back to the EOF. This requirement ls considered a basic element of the emergency analysis of all field monitoring data and coordination of sample'media. response organization. Ch 6 Sec 6.3.1.1 H.8 Each licensee shall provide meteorological LRSM 5YR 2/28/95 The obJectlve will be demonstrated during each drill Instrumentation and procedures which satisfy the criteria and exercise and ls considered a basic clement of in Appendix 2, and provisions to obtain representative the emergency response organization. Real weather current meteorological information from other sources. conditions are used when specific areas of contamination are not required to meet obJectlves.

For the FEMA Observed excrclse canned weather will be used. Appendix D Enc 3

DESCRlPTION

~3 REsP GRP REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS Each organization shall establish means for relating the The obJectlve ls demonstrated during each drill and various measured parameters (e.g., contamination levels, exercise and ls considered a basic element of the water and air activity levels) to dose rates for key isotopes emergency response organization. The radiation (i.e., those given in Table 3, page 18) and gross monitors are driven by the simulator control room radioactivity measurements. Provisions shall be made for and indicate at the emergency response faclllltles In real time. The field data ls derived based on the estimating integrated dose from the projected and actual accident scenario Indicated In the simulator control dose rates and for comparing these estimates with the room. Ch 7 Sec,7.1.1 protective action guides. The detailed provisions shall be descrild in separate procedures.

Each licensee shall establish methods and techniques to LRSM 5YR 10/25/94 The obJectlve ls demonstrated during each drill and be used for determining: exercise and Is considered a basic element of the emergency response organization. Ch 7 Sec 7.1

a. the source term of releases of radioactive material within plant systems. An example is the relationship between the containment radiation monitor(s) reading(s) and radioactive material available for release from containment.

!.3.a.1 Each licensee shall establish methods and techniques to LRsM 5YR 2/28/95 be used for determining: Fuel melt.

l.3.a2 Each licensee shall establish methods and techniques to LRSM 5YR 2/28/95 be used for determining: Clad Damage.

l.3.a.3 Each licensee shall establish methods and techniques to LRSM 2/28/95 be used for determining: Gap Release.

L4 Each licensee shall establish the relationship between LRSM 5YR 2/28/95 The obJectlve ls demonstrated during each drill and exercise and ls considered a basic element of the effluent monitor readings and onsite and offsite emergency response organlzatlon. The MIDAS exposures and contamination for various meteorological program Is used by the radlologlcal responders to conditions.. determine proJected offslte exposures. Ch 7 Sec 7.1

0654 DESCRIPTION RESP ORP REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS Each licensee shall have the capability of acquiring and LRSM 5YR 2/28/9$ The obJectlve ls demonstrated during each drill and evaluating meteorlogical information sufficient to meet the exercise snd Is considered a bash element of the criteria of Appendix 2. There shall be provisions for emergency response organization. The state has access to meteorlogical information by at least the access to the met data via the NRC ERDS snd via nearsite Emergency Operations Facility, the Technical telephone communications with the utlllty Support Center, the Control Room and an offsite NRC radiological staff.

center. The licensee shall make available to the State suitable meteorological data processing interconnections which will permit independent analysis by the State, of facility generated data ln those States with the resources to effectivel use this information.

I.6 Each licensee shall establish the methodology for LRsM 5YR 12/13/94 The obJectlve will be demonstrated to a certain determining the release rate/projected doses if the extent during the FEMA Obserrved exercise. A instrumentation used for assessment are offscale or portion of the release from the plant willbe an inoperable. Drill or exercise using vent monitoring unmonltored pathway. Ch 7 Sec 7.1.1.3.2 Instrumentation which Is offscale.

I.6a Each licensee shall establish the methodology for LRSM 5 YR 2/28/95 determining the release rate/projecte'd doses if the instrumentation used for assessment are offscale or inoperable. Drill or exercise with vent monitoring Instrumentation bypassed by release.

l.7 Each organization shall describe the capability and LRSM 2 YR 2/28/95 The obJectlve Ia demonstrated during each drill and resources for field monitoririg within the plume exposure exercise and ls considered a basic element of the Emergency Planning Zone which are an intrinsic part of emergency response organlzatlon.

the concept qf operations for the facility.

The FEMA Observed exercise will provide the organization an opportunity to do Ilmlted environmental sampling In preparation for turnover of data to the simulated FRMAC.

I.8 Each organization, where appropriate, shall provide LRsM 2YR 2/28/95 The obJectlve ls demonstrated during each drill and methods, equipment and expertise to make rapid exercise and ls considered a basic element of the assessments of the actual or potential magnitude and emergency response organlzatlon.

locations of any radiological hazards through liquid or The FEMA Observed exercise will provide the gaseous release pathways. This shall include activation, organization an opportunity to do limited notification means, field team composition. transportation, environmental sampling In preparation for turnover communication, monitoring equipment and estimated of data to the simulated FRMAC.

deployment times.

DESCRIPTION RESP ORP REQD FREQ LAST DEMO COMMENTS 1.9 Each organization shall have a capability to detect and LRSM 2YR The obJectlve ls demonstrated during each drill and measure radioiodine concentrations in air in the plume exercise and ls considered a basic element of the exposure EPZ as low as 10-7'CVcc (microcuries per emergency response organization.

cubic centimeter) under field conditions. interference The FEMA Observed exercise will provide the from the presence of noble gas and background radiation organization an opportunity to do llmlted air shall not decrease the stated minimum detectable activity. sampling to demonstrate thIs obJectlve In preparation for turnover of data to the simulated FRMAC. Appendix D Enc 4 J.10m The bases for the choice of recommended protective LRsM 2YR 10/25/94 The obJectlve ls demonstrated during each drill and actions from the plume exposure pathway during exercise and Is considered a basic element of the emergency conditions. This shall include expected local emergency response organization. The obJectlve Is demonstrated by InJects to the scenario by actors protection afforded in residential units or other shelter for asking appropriate questions. Ch 8 Sec 8.5.4 direct and inhalation exposure, as well as evacuation time estimates.

M.4 Each plan shall establish a method for periodically LRSM 5YR This obJectlve as a mlnlmum, will be discussed estimating total population exposure.- during the practice and the observed exercise.

F.2 Each organization shall ensure that a coordinated LSc YRLYN 10/27/94 A medical emergency will not be Included In the scenario. Ch 7 Sec 7.4.2 communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists.

J.4 Each licensee shall provide for the evacuation of onsite LSC 5YR 9/13/94 Actual demonstration Inltlated by events In the scenario. The emergency response organlzatlon will non-essential personnel in the event of a Site or General lnltlate evacuation of selected on site areas, Emergency and shall provide a decontamination evacuation of the radlologlcaly controlled area, an capability at or near the monitoring point specified in J.3. accountablllty and lastly an evacuation of all non-essential site personnel.

5YR 2/28/95 Actual demonstration Inltlated by events ln the J.5 Each licensee shall provide for a capability to account for LSC scenario. The emergency response organlzatlon will all individuals onsite at the time of the emergency and Inltlate evacuation of selected on site areas, ascertain the names of missing individuals within 30 evacuation of the radlologlcaly controlled area, an minutes of the start of an emergency and account for all accountablllty and lastly an evacuation of all non-onsite fndividuals continuously thereafter. essential site personnel. Ch 7 Sec 7.3.1.3 LTSCC YRLYN 10/19/94 Exercise lnJects will be written fo test this function.

E.4m m. request for any needed onsite support by offsite organizations; and LTSCC YRLYN 2/28/95 Exercise InJects will be written to test this function.

E.4.n n. prognosis for worsening or termination of event based on plant information.

SECTION III GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCT OF EhhERGENCY EXERCISE THIS SECTION HAS BEEN REPLACED BY THE REFEREE NtANUALSENT WITH THE REFEREE SELECTION LETTER

SECTION IV REFEREE LOCATION AND PHONE NUMBERS

e CHIEF REFEREES POSITION INDIVIDUAL(S) PHONE NUMBER Chief Referee R.H. Halm ext. 3782 CONTROL ROOM (Simulator)

POSITION INDIVIDUAL(S) PHONE NUMBER Lead Control Room Referee W.G. DiDomenico .. ext. 3782 Control Room Referee SRO L. Cas erson ext. 3782 Simulator Instructor. J.J. Petrilla ext. 3782 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER POSITION INDIVIDUAL(S) PHONE NUMBER Lead OSC Referee AUS M. Kirk atrick ext. 3907 .

In-Plant Team Referee Maint/l&C M.R. Sherman ext. 3907 In-Plant Team Referee. Maint/l8C G.J. Abram ext. 3907 In-Plant Team Referee 0 s/NPO A.J. Ulitchne ext. 3907 In-Plant Team Referee 0 s/NP,Q In-Plant Team Referee Rad .

B.D. McGou D.P. Ledd h..., .,ext. 3907.

ext. 3907 In-Plant Team Referee Rad M.R. Bell ext. 3907 In-Plant Team Referee Rad S.J. Strelecki ext. 3907 Lead Securit Referee. R.E. Gaudreau.' ", ext. 3115 ..

Securit Referee G.E. Galla her ext. 3115 Securi Referee R.L. Kishbau h ext. 3115 Reactor Coolant Sam le Team Referee G: Cam bell ext. 3907 .

IV-2

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER POSITION INDIVIDUAL(S) PHONE NUMBER Lead TSC Referee M.A. Friedlander ext. 3530 TSC Comm Referee includes data flow ext. 3530 TSC Tech Referee M.M. Golden ext. 3530 In-Plant Team Referee Coordinator L.L. Kittelson ext. 3530 TSC Rad Referee M. Rochester ext. 3530 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY POSITION INDIVIDUAL(S) PHONE NUMBER Lead EOF Referee J.R. Miltenber er ext. 3605 EOF Technical Referee T.J. Nork ext. 3605 EOF Communications Referee W.W. Williams ext. 3605 E.S. Horstman ext. 3605

'OF Rad Referee .

Simulated NRC ENS Referee '." C.T. Coddin ton Simulated NRC HPN Referee Barcla '.K.

ETN 220-4721 RADIOLOGICALMONITORING TEAMS POSITION INDIVIDUAL(S) PHONE NUMBER OSCAR Referee . D. Galla her Field Nearsite Team Referee T.R. Cl mer Field Offsite Team Referee J.G. Feno Field Offsite Team Referee T.L. Furler Field Offsite Team Referee State J.S. Fields Field Offsite Team Referee State T.M. DeBortoli Field GENERAL OFFICE POSITION INDIVIDUAL(S) PHONE

'NUMBER W.J. Rhoades ext, 7550

MEDIA OPERATIONS CENTER POSITION INDIVIDUAL{S) PHONE NUMBER Lead MOC Referee J.J. Sco eltiti ext. 3561 MOC Assistant Referee N.N. Gemmiti ext. 3561 Rumor Control - person(s) to call in rumors and questions EVACUATIONGROUP None IV-4

'4 SECTION V - TIMEL!NE PART A - Summary

DRILL

SUMMARY

The following is an overview describing the events of the detailed timeline and

'redicted response of the Emergency Organization.,

SCENARIO OVERVIEW The exercise will be an afternoon shift exercise, starting for the organization in the simulator control room with a shift turnover/briefing. The affected unit will be unit 1.

The first event, a call made at 1530 to Security, will place the plant on an upgraded security alert status and initiate a classification at an UNUSUAL EVENT level ~

Between 1600 and 1615, security events, related to the initial message at 1530, will occur escalating the situation to an ALERT classification.

A security breach of the plant will occur at about 1715 which will be the basis for a classification at the SITE AREA EMERGENCY level.

At 1830 there will be a plant transient causing minor fuel damage, an overfill of the reactor. vessel on the reactor scram, and a resultant unisolable steam line break.

Approximately 10 minutes after the reactor scram, a seized Reactor Recirculation pump causes flow blockage, and a portion of one fuel bundle begins to melt. The fuel bundle begins to overheat due to the lack of cooling and the containment post accident .

radiation monitors start to increase. The classification for a GENERAL EMERGENCY wilt be approximately 191 5.

The exercise will be terminated when the correct protective action recommendations have been made and all the onsite and offsite objectives have been fulfilled. This is expected to occur about 2230.

INITIALCONDITIONS Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 has been at 100% power since the refuel outage with the exception of:

~ the normal surveillance testing (MSIV and Turbine Valve testing, rod swaps,,

etc.)..

~ Recirc MG Set Brush changeout.

~ a Reactor Feedpump seal problem.

V-2

Unit 1 'C'eactor Feed Pump Shaft Seal Leakage Problems After the end of the Unit 1 refueling outage in May, Mechanical Maintenance had to investigate and repair the shaft seals on the 'C'eactor Feed Pump (RFP). During the last refuel and inspection outage, segmented floating seals were to be replaced with fixed seals. This was the last of the station's six RFPs to receive this upgrade. During the initial replacement window in the outage, alignment problems between the shaft and the new fixed seals led to the decision to reinstall the older, segmented seals. A misleading drawing in the segmented seal installation procedure resulted in their improper installation and excessive leakage. The decision was made to reduce power so the 'C'FP could be taken out of service. The pump ultimately had to be totally disassembled for critical dimensional checks. The two end heads of the pump were shipped to a hot machine shop in South Carolina where stuffing box machining was necessary,to correct the shaft/seal misalignment root cause. The stuffing boxes that the shaft seals slide in to were not perpendicular to the pump head flanges. The RFP was reassembled and placed'back in service with no problems noted since.

Reactor power was reduced to 60% on Monday; August 14th to permit I &C Technicians to inspect and repair the ¹3 Control Valve. A loose connection on the LVDT for position indication was found and repaired. Oscillations of the ¹3 turbine control valve had been observed by the Control Room operators and ILC had investigated. The oscillations had been minor, but reactor power was noted to swing with the valve oscillations.

Other problems not requiring power reductions but ongoing are:

~ The RCIC system is out'of service to replace the steam line drain pot level switch.

~ The 'A'HRSW radiation monitor is out of service for maintenance and calibration during the RHRSW work window,

~ Level control problems associated with the cooling tower basin.

~ CSTs split due to Unit 2 high oxygen, degassifier running on Unit 2.

~ Investigation of the 'A'ontainment Instrument Gas compressor is ongoing'ue to a failure to maintain pressure.

~ The 'A'HRSW loop is out of service'for a planned maintenance window.

Recently when the 'C'iver Water Makeup Pump was taken out of service at the request of the System Engineer to put the system in a 2 pimp configuration, a level transient in the cooling tower basin level was observed. (The 'BD'umps were in service.) Several hours after the 'C'ump was shut down, the 'A'WMU pump was V-3

started by the operators due to an observed decreasing discharge pressure. Two hours later it was reported that the cooling tower basin was overflowing. The level control valve had failed to maintain level. Blowdown flow was opened to 300% and level control was re-established.

There has been an information notice received from the NRC indicating that there is a potential for terrorist activities directed at some utility located on the east coast. The information was received last week and a heightened security awareness has been initiated for SSES.

The remainder of the items under investigation are listed on the priority list along with the other plant scheduled work.

'HIFT TURNOVER The above initial conditions will be given to Operations'during a turnover process. The Operators will be given a shift turnover by the Control Room Referees. The turnover will discuss the status of the above items as shown on the Station Priority List. (See Initial Conditions Section Vl.) The Security participants will also be given a set of initial conditions delineating the actions taken to support the heightened security awareness.

The remainder of the participants will be given, the Priority list and the, Daily Report which provide the initial conditions for the station.

SCENARIO ~ 'he first event, a call made to security at 1530 from a simulated Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA), builds on the initial'conditions and provides a basis for:

later events. The caller reports information that was recently received from a source.

The information is to coincide with information that the NRC provided to all'ower plants during the previous week. The source is reported of overhearing talk about an unidentified group intent on disrupting electrical generation, transmission, and distribution. The information that was passed to the LLEA is: it is believed that some individuals may be targeting PP8L as the. utility to be made an example of.

This first phone call is expected to cause a classification at an UNUSUAL EVENT level and initial notifications to the onsite and offsite emergency response organizations.

At 1605 a door tamper alarm is received in the Turbine Building. The intent of this Inject is to provide security with information to initiate an investigation of the tamper alarm by dispatching an officer to the source of the alarm. The officer dispatched. will then become part of the scenario as a hostage. The information that the security officer has been taken hostage will be called into the Special Office of the President. It is expected that the security controller in the Alternate Security Control Center (ASCC) will become concerned when radio contact *with the dispatched officer is, not maintained.

V-4

I At 1615 a call will be made to the Special Office of the President (SOP) which will be the trigger for an Alert Classification. The call to the SOP will be from the Radwaste Building by the individual that has taken the Security Officer hostage. The intruder is calling to take credit for the situation.

The staff at the SOP will be following their policies and report the information obtained from the caller to security. Having received the earlier call from the LLEA plus the information from the NRC, the Security Shift Supervisor will be fairly certain the situation is credible.

Security will begin an investigation and notify the Operations Shift Supervisor of the information received and present situation. The Operations Shift Supervisor will review with Security the information obtained and investigate the EALs to determine if a classification at the ALERT level is warranted. It is expected that a classification will be made at the ALERT level and upgrade notifications will be made.

The next event will also be a security event leading to a classification at the Site Area Emergency level. A perimeter alarm will be received in the ASCC at 1735: The alarm will prompt security actions that will reveal a vehicle penetration of the perimeter fence.

The vehicle will be followed by security cameras and noted to crash through the Unit 1 Reactor Building Railroad Bay Door. This information fed back to the emergency response organization will prompt a classification at the SITE AREA EMERGENCY level.

After the vehicle penetration through the Reactor Building door at 1830, the simulated intruder in the Turbine Building attempts to move to the Reactor Building and is blocked in his attempt. The simulated intruder is cornered by the Instrument and Service air compressors and shuts off the air compressors. The loss of the air compressors is the initiating event for the plant transient which will ultimately cause fuel damage.

A detailed discussion of the security response will not be provided as a part of this package, in part, due to the sensitivity of the safeguards information. The security processes and procedures associated with the drill events, other than the notifications/communications for emergency plan objective demonstration, are not objectives to be demonstrated and are for Security Training purposes only.

At 1840 the. plant transient resulting from the loss of instrument air b'egins. The

'Indication in the Control Room resulting fromm the air compressors being shut off will be a decreasing instrument air pressure. When the operators recognize the irripending.

loss of instrument air, the reactor will be manually scrammed. On the scram, water level increases due to a failure of the feedwater control system failing high and an inadvertent start of the HPCI Turbine, The HPCI Turbine fails to trip at the high level trip setpoint and continues to feed reactor water level up to the main steam lines.

V-5

When the water enters the steam lines it causes a water hammer severe enough to break the 'D'team Line in the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel. The inboard and outboard isolation valves fail to fully close. The release of energy into the steam tunnel causes the pressure of the tunnel volume to increase. The increase in pressure causes the blow out panels to lift, allowing the energy to vent directly.to atmosphere.

The panels are designed to limit the pressure rise in the steam tunnel and relieve to atmosphere to maintain building integrity.

In conjunction with the increasing reactor water level and water down the steam lines, the HPCI steam line will isolate on indicated high flow. The high flow isolation is assumed to occur as a result of the pressure perturbations caused by the water hammer and not an actual steam line break. Indications in the HPCI room, room temperature and radiation levels confirm that a steam line break in the HPCI room has not occurred.

The mechanical forces associated with the water hammer/steam line break and resultant core differential pressure are postulated to cause some clad failure and a release of gap fission products. The gap release associated with the mechanical perturbations of the fuel is relatively minor compared with the fuel damage to occur later in the scenario. The'release of the gap fission products to the steam tunnel and then to atmosphere will be unmonitored and untreated. A small portion of the activity released into the steam tunnel will eventually leak into the Turbine Building and Radwaste.

The Turbine*Building,ventilation radiation monitor will indicate an increased release rate as a result of the steam leakage into the building. The indicated release from the ventilation system is only a fraction of what is actually released from the blow out panels and not indicative of what the field monitoring readings indicate.

The release from the site at this time is well below the levels that would cause a classification at the GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE) level. Field monitoring data will support not making a classification at the GE.

At the point of the steam line break and water hammer in the steam lines, a high vibration alarm is received from the 'A'ecirc pump. The high vibration alarm is indication-of a serious problem which results in a seized recirc pump shaft and subsequent trip on over current. The scenario supposes the failure of the Recirc pump causes fiow blockage in a fuel bundle and resulted fuel melt due to a loss of flow. The release of the fuel melt fission products will follow the path mentioned before which will be: reactor vessel to steam line, steam line to steam tunnel, and out the steam tunnel blow out panel to atmosphere.

The emergency response organization will have several indicators of a significant fuel damage situation, Field Monitoring Team radiation levels will disclose a change in release rate and composition. The containment post accident radiation monitors will

show an increase of containment readings with no corresponding change in containment pressure, indicating a change in amount and/or type of fuel damage. The Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors will also show an increase due to the leakage into the steam tunnel.

The containment radiation monitors will begin to increase approximately 20 to 30 minutes after the Recirc pump failure and will increase to the point of requiring a classification at the GENERAL EMERGENCY level.

Due to the increased background ladiation level in the Turbine Building resulting from the steam leak,- the Personnel Contamination Monitors (PCMs) and air samplers in the Turbine Building go into alarm. The high airborne levels in the Turbine Building also cause the count labs in the control structure to be inoperable due to high background.

All samples that need to be counted will have to be taken to the Health Physics and/or EOF chem lab.

The drill will be terminated when the objectives for extent of play have been fulfilled, ~

which is expected to occur about 2230.

SUMMARY

TIMELINE 1500 Control Room briefing.

1530 Call to Security from the LLEA reporting insider information of a possible plot against

. the PP8L electrical generation and distribution system. Trigger for an UNUSUAL EVENT classiTication.

Classification at an UNUSUAL EVENT level and initiation of offsite and onsite notifications.

1600 Offsite and onsite UNUSUAL EVENT notifications complete.

1615 Call to the Special Office of the President (SOP) simulating a hostage situation.

Trigger for an ALERT classification.

1630 ALERT classification and initiation of upgrade notifications.

1645 Offsite and onsite ALERT notifications complete.

1735 Security receives alarms indicating a problem with the. perimeter fence and Reactor Building Railroad Bay Door. Trigger for an SITE AREA EMERGENCY classification.

U 1800 SITE AREA EMERGENCY classification and initiation of upgrade notifications.

1815 Offsite and onsite SITE AREA EMERGENCY notifications complete.

1840 The initiation of high vibration on the 'A'ecirc Pump to indicate a seized shaft.

~

1900 Indication of increasing containment radiation levels due to flow blockage resulting from recirc pump failure. Trigger for GENERAL EMERGENCY cIassification.

1930 GENERAL EMERGENCY classification and initiation of upgrade notifications.

1930 Offsite and onsite GENERAL EMERGENCY notifications complete.

1945 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION made by the licensee based on the release to the environment and/or the GENERAL EMERGENCY Classification.

2230 The NRC Graded Exercise is terminated.

V-8

SECTION V - TIMELINE t

PART 8 - Detailed Timeline V-9

1500 - Control Room Operators The Control Room Operators will review the following for set up IS-1 to set up initial conditions. for the scenario in of the simulator the simulator.

1. Operations turnover sheets

2. Plant priority lists

3. NSAG Daily Report NOTE: The above material is located in the INITIAL CONDITIONS SECTION of the REFEREE MANUAL 1500 f - Equipment set up, Phone company personnel to perform switching in the Service IS-2 initiate activation of the emergency exercise and Administration Building phone room and hook up in the phones, radio, and plant page for the simulator control room.

simulator control room.

Lead Referee to swap simulator, radio and check if the NRC hone is activated.

1500 -S The initial plant conditions are contained in the simulator IC. IS-3

~.L initialize the simulator to IC ¹1 36. (NOTE: Place the simulator in RUN and execute batch file "EPLAN95IPE¹1." Ensure 4 passive failure malfunctions have loaded and one event tn er.

1500 dS Syd 4 TP t iyd 'ty dttt P td dt td P dt tP t IS-4 to provide initial conditions to Security for a complete understanding of the initial security conditions artici ants. and lo istics.

1530 - Plant page Plant page announcement to be made from Control Room IS-5 announcement for start of 1995 NRC Annual indicating the start of the 1995 NRC Annual Graded Exercise.

Graded Exercise.

1530 - Call from the LLEA, to -An actor who is simulating a representative of a local law IS-6 Security at the ASCC, providing information enforcement agency calls to report that an informant has concerning security alert provided by NRC. provided information that PP&L may be the target of a group r intendin to disru t normal electric service.

1535 The Controller in the ASCC will receive the The Security Shift Supervisor will review the information and

. informatioq from the LLEA and inform the make a determination on whether or not to declare a Security Security Shift Supervisor.... Condition and then pass the results of the decision to the Shift Su ervisor.

1540 The Ops Shift Supervisor will receive the The Ops Shift Supervisor will confer with security for input on information from security and review the the classification of the situation. It is expected that a Emergency Action Levels (EALs). classification will be made at the unusual event level based on the Security Event EAL which reads as follows:

Trigger for UNUSUAL EVENT.

A. A report from Security of a security threat, attempted entry, or attempted sabotage of the owner controlled area adjacent to the site.

OR B. Any attempted act of sabotage which is deemed legitimate in the judgment of the SHIFT SUPERVISOR/EMERGENCY DIRECTOR and affects lant o eration.

1545 The Shift Supervisor, after conferring with The ED will classify the emergency based on the EAL 16.1 security and other management personnel, SECURITY EVENT.

will declare an UNUSUAL EVENT.

The ED will initiate initial notifications to offsite and internal organizations, initiate staffing of the OSC, and maintain communications with Securit and Station Mana ement.

, 1550 Duty Manager and Operations Coordinator 'Shift Supervisor provides status of plant event, actions taken, report to Control Room for briefing of and plans for future actions.

incident.

1555 Public Information Manager and Recovery . The Public Information Manager will need to have the required Manager briefed by Operations Shift details for preparation and distribution of information Supervisor as to extent of incident. concerning the events at the plant.

The Shift Supervisor will pass on to the Recovery Manager all the emergency events and issues which the site NERO is addressin .

1600 ~

The Control Room Communicator completes The communicator has provided all the required information to notifications to the off-site agencies for the the offsite. agencies so that they will be able to take actions as UNUSUAL EVENT classification. re uiredb theiremer enc lans.

1600 Responders arrive at the OSC and begin The OSC begins to set up and muster the people arriving for

,activation process. accountability reporting., The OSC Coordinator is briefed by the Control Room and in turn briefs the OSC res onders.

1600 -. If the Shift Supervisor The timeline must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of IS-7 DOES NOT make an UNUSUAL EVENT all the applicable offsite objectives. If the UE classification is classification based on the information not made by this time in the scenario, referee intervention will provided, he will be prompted to,do so. be required. If referee intervention is required, it will be noted for the criti ue rocess.

1605 - A door alarm is received The ASCC Controller will acknowledge the door alarm and IS-8 for the unit 1 Reactor Building to Turbine dispatch an officer to investigate.

Buildin door on 676'.

1605 - A Security Officer is The Security Officer will respond to the door alarm and be taken IS-9 dispatched to investigate Reactor Building hostage by the intruder. The intruder will move into the door alarm. Radwaste building and call the Special Office of the President SOP .

1615 OSC is activated and reports to the The OSC will be manned and take directions from the Control 0 erations Shift Su ervisor. Room as events ro ress.

1615 ~R - Call from the Radwaste An actor who is simulating taking a security officer as a hostage IS-10 Building to the Special Office of the contacts the Special Office of the President to report President by an actor simulating taking a responsibility. The actor has overpowered a security officer.

hosta e.

1615 - A contact with Federal A Controller who is simulating a representative of the Federal IS-11 Law enforcement will be simulated to be set law enforcement agency will table top the anticipated actions, u withtheASCC. res onse andinterface ex ected durin asecurit event.

1620 The information received at the Special The individual that takes the call will report the call to the Office of the President is relayed to appropriate responsible individuals and then inform either Securit . securit or o erations in the control room.

1620 The Controller in the ASCC will receive the The Security Shift Supervisor will review the information and information from the Special Office of the make a determination on whether or not to declare a Security President and inform the Security Shift Condition and then pass the results of the decision to the Shift SU efvisor. Su ervisor.

1620 -C lit \h R 4 An actor who is simulating a Radwaste Operator calls the IS-12 Control Room to the Simulator Control Simulator Control Room to report what appears to be a security Room reporting that a Security Officer and officer-as a hostage. The Shift Supervisor will contact the an individual were seen walking from the ASCC to relay the information if the ASCC has not already Decon area, down the corridor past the Rad called.

Waste Control Room and out into the Turbine Building toward the instrument/service air corn ressors.

1620 - The ASCC Controller A Security officer will be dispatched to investigate and interview IS-13 will dispatch a Security Officer to investigate the individual that talked to the intruder to glean as much and interview the individual who received information as possible. The information obtained will be used the hosta e call at the SOP. in dealin with the intruder.

1625 The Ops Shift Supewisor will receive the The Ops Shift Supervisor will confer with security for input on information from security and review the the classification of the situation. It is expected that a Emergency Action Levels (EALs). classification will be made at the ALERT level based on the Security Event EAL which reads as follows:

Trigger for ALERT Classification.

A.. A report from Security of a security compromise is at the site but no penetration of protected areas has occurred.

OR B. Any act of sabotage which results in an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant as judged by the SHIFT SUPERVISOR/EMERGENCY.

DIRECTOR.

1630 M -ALLRAP lith AC t II h I I Itlh P ttl 4th I ll I ~ 14 simulated to arrive and be on site. enforcement agency will table top the anticipated actions, response, and interface expected during a security event of this nature.

1630 - The ASCC Controller A Security Controller in the ASCC will attempt to contact the IS-15 will attempt to contact the intruder on the individual to glean as much information as possible and ensure radio. that the security officer is safe. The information obtained will be used in dealing with the intruder.

The intruder will volunteer his location and indicate that he will make his demands known at a later time.'he 1640 The Shift Supervisor, after conferring with ED will classify the emergency based on the EAL 16.1 security and other management personnel, SECURITY EVENT.

.will declare an ALERT.

The ED will initiate upgrade notifications to offsite and internal organizations, initiate activation of the TSC and Interim EOF Staff, and maintain communications with Security and Station Management.

The Shift Supervisor will confer with Security and station management on the best possible methods to activate the TSC and initiate and perform an accountability due to the security threat.

1640 Re m - lf the Emergency The timeline and the classifications must be maintained to IS-f6 Director makes a classification higher facilitate demonstration ot all the applicable offsite than an ALERT the ED willbe prompted objectives. Ifthe classification is greater than an ALERT, to classify the emergency as an ALERT. referee Intervention willbe required. Ifreferee Intervention Is ie ulred it willbe noted for the criti ue rocess.

1640 f - The Security Section will The site accountability will be performed and the results will be IS-17 erform a site accountabilit . re orted to the 0 erations Shift Su ervisor.

1645 Duty Manager and Operations Coordinator Shift Supervisor provides status of plant event, actions taken, in the Control Room for briefin of incident. and lans for future actions.

1645 The Alternate Security Control Center will The security officer dispatched to the EOF for access control dispatch an officer to control access to the will check the individuals already in the building and help the EOF. E&S set up crew as requested to prepare the EOF for activation.

1645 ere Pr m - If the Shift Supervisor The timeline must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of IS-18 DOES NOT make an ALERT classification all the applicable offsite objectives. If the ALERT classification based on the information provided, he will is not made by this time in the scenario, referee intervention will be prompted to do so. be required. If referee intervention is required, it will be noted for the criti ue rocess.

1650 Public Information Manager and Recovery The Public Information Manager will need to have the required Manager briefed by Operations Shift details for preparation and distribution of information as to extent of incident. 'upervisor concerning the events at the plant.

The Shift Supervisor will pass on to the Recovery Manager all the emergency events and issues which the site NERO is addressin .

1655 The Control Room Communicator completes The communicator has provided all the required information to notifications to the off-site agencies for the the offsite agencies so that they will be able to take actions as ALERT classification. re uiredb their emer enc lans.

1655 Responders arrive at the TSC and begin the The TSC people start to check communication links, start up process of preparing to take over equipment, determine plant status in preparation for turnover.

management of the emergency from the Control Room.

1655 Interim EOF responders arrive and begin The EOF people start to check communication links, start up the process of taking over management of equipment, determine plant status in preparation for turnover.

the emer enc from the Control Room.

1710 S -S 'ty P I II .S Sy Ptt td tf tt St df td IS-19 of site accountability to the Operations Shift accountability.

Supervisor and takes required action for any missing individuals. -.NOTE: When the accountability is corn piete, have the Emergency Director release all non-exeicise related people to return to their normal assigned tasks.

1715 General Office personnel will be called and The General Office responders begin set up of the facility and res ond to General Office. data collection for su ort of the emer enc .

1735 - Security receives alarms The Security Controller will swing the applicable cameras to IS-20 indicating a problem with the perimeter view the location of the fence where the alarms have been fence. generated. The officer will note a hole in the fence and be able to track a vehicle headed toward the Unit 1 Reactor Buildin .

1735 - Security receives, a The Security Controller will already have a camera lined up to IS-21 tamper alarm associated with the Unit 1 view the Unit 1 Reactor Building door.

Reactor Building Railroad door.

The controller will notify the Security Shift Supervisor who will make a determination on whether or not to upgrade the Security Condition and pass the information to the Security Coordinator in the TSC.

1740 - Security will investigate Investigation of the vehicle entering the Reactor Building will IS-22 the vehicle that has driven through the determine that the driver has been fatally injured by the impact Reactor Building Railroad Bay Door. of the railroad bay door. The information will be passed to the Security Shift Supervisor and then to the TSC Security Coordinator.

1740 .TSC takes control of the emergency from The TSC will make the offsite notifications/communications and the Operations Shift Supervisor. be responsible for making any classifications and required rotective action recommendations.

1745 The TSC Emergency Director will receive The TSC Emergency Director will confer with security for input the information. from Security and review the on the classification of the situation. It is expected that a fmergency Action Levels (EALs). classification will be made at the SITE AREA EMERGENCY level based on the Security Event EAL which reads as follows:

Trigger for SITE AREA EMERGENCY

.Classification. A. A report from Security that the security of the plant vital area is threatened by unauthorized (forcible) entry into the protected area.

OR B. Any act of sabotage which results in an actual or likely major failure of plant functions needed for protection of the public as judged by the SHIFT SUPERVISOR/EMERGENCY DIRECTGR.

1800 TSC Emergency Director classifies the The ED will initiate upgrade notifications to offsite and internal,

'mergency situation as a SITE AREA initiate evacuation of non-essential personnel, staffing of the EMERGENCY. EOF and General Office, and dispatch the OSCAR monitoring team.

The discussion of the simulated evacuation of the site when ordered will take into account the security and how the safety of the eo lewillbeensured.

1800 ~fff f .Ifll E g f The timeline and the classifications must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of all the applicable offsite IS-23 Director makes a classification higher than a SITE AREA EMERGENCY the ED obJectives. Ifthe classsification is greater than a SITE willbe prompted to classify the AREA EMERGENCY, referee Intervention willbe required.

emergency as a Site Area Emergency. Ifreferee Intervention is required, it willbe noted for the criti ue rocess.

1800 Public Information Manager briefed as to The Public Information Manager will need to have the required extent of events. details for preparation and distribution of information concemin the events at the lant.

1800 ~Rt II - Th tlt ROTI The Security Coordinator will be instructed to initiate a site IS-24 evacuation of any site personnel. The . evacuation. The Security Coordinator will acknowledge the evacuation will be simulated. request and after an appropriate period of time will report the status of the evacuation.

'ecurity will confer with the TSC to determine best method of conductin site evacuation.

1800 . The Engineering Support Manager initiates The Engineering Support Manager initiates an accountability to an accountability for General Office determine if all the key positions are filled.

N ersonnel.

1810 .Itth E I fhl The timeline must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of IS-25 DOES NOT make a SITE AREA all the applicable offsite objectives. If the SITE AREA EMERGENCY classification based on the EMERGENCY classification is not made by this time in the information provided, he will be prompted to scenario, referee intervention will be required. If referee do So. intervention is re uired, it will be noted for the criti ue rocess.

1815 The TSC Communicator completes upgrade The communicator has informed the offsite agencies of the notifications to the offsite agencies for the upgrade of the emergency classification so that the agencies SITE AREA EMERGENCY classification. ma res ondasre uiredb their Emer enc Plans.

1815 The Enginee'ring Support Manager contacts The Engineering Support Manager contacts the TSC the TSC. Emergency Director for plant status and what support is needed from Allentown.

-1830 - The intruder and Security responds to the intruders attempted move from the hostage attempt to move from the Turbine Turbine Building and the intruder is cornered by the instrument Building to the Unit 1 Reactor Building. air and service compressors.

The intruder shuts off the instrument and service air compressors causing a decrease in the instrument air pressure and turns himself over to the security officers present.

Interrogation of the intruder will reveal that the truck in the Reactor Building was part of the plan and there was never any intention of usin ex losives.

1830 - The Simulator Instructor The indication in the Control Room will be a decreasing to initiate the plant transient for data instrument air pressure. When the operators recognize the generation from the simulator to the other impending loss of instrument air, the reactor will be scrammed.

emergency facilities.

The decay of the instrument air header pressure takes Simulator instructor to initiate Instrument air approximately 10 minutes. When the indicated pressure drops shutdown by placing their local panel control to 65 psig, the plant will be scrammed (approximately 1840

.switches to off: 'A'nst. Air Comp Switch hours).

Off - QDIHS125002A2 and 'B'nst. Air .

Com Switch Off- QDIHS12500282

1840 The Control Room Operators will manually On the scram, water level increases due to a failure of the scram the plant due to low indicated feedwater control system failing high and an inadvertent start of Instrument Air pressure. the HPCI Turbine. The HPCI Turbine fails to trip on high level and feeds reactor. water level up to the main steam lines.

The Control Room Operators will follow the emergency operating procedures as required by the indications presented b the lant transient.

1840 Referee Message - Simulator instructor, Due to the increasing water level a water hammer in the main IS-28 when reactor water level reaches steam lines causes a break of the 'D'team Line in the Turbine approximately+140", initiate batch file: Building Steam Tunnel. The inboard and outboard isolation "EPLAN95 IPE¹2"; valves fail to fully close which provides a leak path from the primary to the secondary and out the blow out panels in the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel.

In conjunction with the increasing reactor water level and water down the steam lines, the HPCI steam line will isolate on indicate high flow. It is postulated that the high flow isolation is a result of the pressure perturbations and not an actual steam line break. The room temperature and radiation indications will not be elevated.

The mechanical forces associated with the water hammer and steam line break are postulated to cause some clad failure and a release of gap fission products. The release will largely be unmonitored with a small portion going into the Turbine Building and Radwaste.

The Control Room Operators will follow the emergency operating procedures as'required by the indications presented

'b the lant transient.

1840 - A portion of the file The indication in the Control Room will be a high vibration IS-29 initiated previously (EPLAN95IP E¹2) causes alarm on the 'A'ecirc Pump and subsequent shaft seizure with a high vibration alarm on the a high current trip.

Pump and subsequent shaft

'A'ecirculation seizure. The failure of the Recirc pump causes flow blockage in a fuel bundle and postulated fuel melt. The release will be out the steam tunnel blow.out panel and into the Turbine Building and Radwaste. Field Team data will disclose a change in release rate due to the fuel melt as will the increasing containment radiation monitors.

The containment radiation monitors will begin to increase approximately 20 to 30 minutes after the Recirc Pump failure.

The Control Room Operators will follow the emergency operating procedures as required by the indications presented 1840 ~llf P ffN E .I Director makes a classification at the Y

b the lant transient.

The timeline and the classifications must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of all the applicable offsite IS-30 GENERAL EMERGENCY level the ED will objectives. Ifthe Emergency Director makes a be prompted to not classify the classification greater than a SITE AREA EMERGENCY, emergency greater than a Site Area referee Intervention willbe required. Ifreferee Intervention Emer enc . Is re ulred it willbe noted for the criti ue rocess.

1840 - Security will not receive There are no tamper alarms associated with the Turbine IS-31 any tamper alarms indicating a blow out Building Steam Tunnel Blow out panels. If the Security panel lifting. Controller in the ASCC moves the applicable camera to view the area of the Turbine Building blowout panels, a vapor will be visible. If the vapor is noted by the Security Controller the information will be passed to the Security Shift Supervisor and then to the TSC Securit Coordinator.

1840 f - The Security Officers in .The security officers will be informed by the referee that a loud IS-32

'the Turbine Building at the Instrument Air noise is heard which is the steam line break in the Turbine compressor skid will report a loud noise Building Steam Tunnel. The information will be passed to the emanating from the east wall of the Turbine Security Shift Supervisor and then to the TSC Security Buildin at 699'. Coordinator.

1840 f re M - The TSC responders will The TSC responders will be informed by the referee that a loud IS-33 be informed of several loud noises and noise is heard which is the steam line break in the Turbine roaring sound appearing to come from the Building Steam Tunnel.

1845 ~-S Steam Tunnel adjacent to the Control Structure.

'ty i'll pp h d the individual in the Turbine Building at the air corn ressor skid.

The security officers will apprehend the intruder at the air compressor skid. The information will be passed to the Security Shift Su ervisor and then to the TSC Securit Coordinator.

lS-34 1845 M ~

C t IR Ch Operator dispatched to investigate HPCI speed control IS-35 operator to HPCI Room to investigate problems. The operator will report back to the control room the indications of turbine speed control results of the investigation. of the HPCI.

roblems.

.1845 - Control Room directs Operator dispatched to investigate the temperature indication in IS-36 operator to the Turbine Building Steam the steam tunnel. The operator will report back to the control Tunnel to investigate the high temperature room the results of the investigation of the Turbine Building reading resulting from the steam line break Steam Tunnel.

in the turbine buildin .

1845 e r - The. Simulator Instructor A portion of the vapor released from the broken main steam line IS-37 to initiate the Turbine Building Area will discharge into the Turbine Building causing the building to Radiation Monitor and SPING Files for data go airborne.

generation from the simulator to the other emergency facilities. Water draining from the steam line break will go into the steam tunnel sump and eventually into radwaste. The radwaste tank Activate Malfunction File: vent system will discharge the collected vapor and gases from "EPLAN95IPERAD" the collection tanks and discharge into the turbine building ve'nt as indicated b an increasin turbine buildin SPING.

1845 - The portal monitors, A portion of the vapor released from the broken main steam line IS-38 friskers, and portable air samplers in the will discharge into the Turbine Building causing the building to Turbine Building go into alarm. go airborne.

All the sensitive radiation monitoring instruments in Turbine Building and first floor of the Control Structure go into alarm.

The Count Rooms in the Control Structure first floor are inoperable as a result of high back ground.

Multi le PCRs are re ortedb Health h sics.

1845 - Control Room directs a The operator will walk down the Turbine Building. The report IS-39 NPO and a HP to investigate the increase back to the control room will indicate increased radiation and ARM readings in the Turbine Building. airborne'levels throughout the Turbine Building. The operator will report back to the control room the results of the investi ation.

1845 ~RI ~

D t IR Pt d Th P I Illp t th PP I y t 'fyth IS-40 NPO the increase ARM readings in the Turbine Building ARM readings. The operator will report back Turbine Building by going to the upper relay to the control room the results of the investigation.

room.

1845 dydt p t h d Th Pt t lldt p t hDSDARt I t th I t IS41 the OSCAR team'is dispatched from the site indicated for the Turbine Building vent monitors.

to begin offsite monitoring of indicated release.

1900 .Th R It I t t Th tht tt I th g t IR Ith I Ig IS-42 to initiate a ramp of the containment, containment radiation monitor reading. The increase will reach radiation monitors to simulate failed fuel.. the General Emergency Trigger point at approximately 1815 hours0.021 days <br />0.504 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.906075e-4 months <br />.

Activate malfunction file: "EPLAN95IPEPC" This file is a trigger for a GENERAL The release will be unmonitored and detected by the field team EMERGENCY classification based on the monitors as the plume leaves the site. A small portion of the Fuel Damage EAL release will enter the turbine building and radwaste via the steam tunnel drains.

The containment radiation levels will peak at approximately 4$ R/hr.

P&o The Control Room Operators will follow the emergency operating procedures as required by the indications presented b the lant transient.

~Rt R ~ Th Et t RERIBRP The TSC Rad Protection Coordinator will refer the caller to the IS-43 1900 representative in Harrisburg calls the TSC EOF and the EOF Rad Support Manager will assist in Rad Protection Coordinator asking for coordination of the additional offsite teams.

assistance in coordinating the offsite sam lin effort of the State and RAP Teams.

1915 Interim EOF.Staff takes over management of The EOF will make the offsite notifications/communications and the emergency from the TSC. be responsible for making any classifications and required rotective action recommendations.

1915 .The Containment Post Accident Radiation The Containment Post Acciderit Radiation Monitors will exceed Monitors will reach the GENERAL .. 400 R/hr which is the trigger radiation level for a GENERAL EMERGENCY'Tri er oint. EMERGENCY classification.

- The Control Room will The Chemistry Coordinator will respond to the sample request IS-44 1925 er request Chemistry to obtain a reactor by initiating setup of the Chem Lab and a briefing for the coolant sam le. Chemists for obtainin a coolant sam le.

1930 The EOF declares a GENERAL The Recovery Manager will classify the emergency based on ElNERGENCY and begins consideration of the EAL, FUEL CLADDING DEGRADATION at the General Protective Action Recommendations. Emergency level, the FUEL DEGRADATION EAL states: .

(A or 8)

Loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers (fuel cladding and reactor coolant pressure boundary) with potential loss of the third barrier (primary containment) indicated by:

A. (1 and 2) Valid containment post accident monitor indication on panel 1C601 (2C601) greater than 400 R/hr.

and

2. (aorborc)

a. Containment pressure greater than 40.4 PSIG, indicated on panel 1C601 (2C601).

oF

b. A visual inspection of the containment indicates a potential for loss of containment (e.g. a crack in containment concrete at teridon and anchorage or penetration failure).

OF

c. Other indications of potential or actual loss of primary containment DR

1930 cont'd B. (1 and2)

1. Reactor Coolant activity greater than 1000 pCI/cc of equivalent I-131 as determined by sample analysis.

and

2. Actual or potential failure of Reactor coolant isolation valves to isolate a coolant leak outside containment as determined by valve position indication on panel 1C601 (2C601) or visual inspection.

The ED will initiate upgrade notifications to offsite and internal, review the radiological consequences of the emergency, and make a Protective Action Recommendation.

1930 Allentown responders start arriving at the The EOF staff will begin the process of turnover from the EOF. interim staff and review plant status/problems with the TSC staff.

1930 - The Offsite Monitoring The Offsite Monitoring teams will receive direction from the teams will be dispatched from the EOF. Emergency Monitoring Team Director on where to go and when and what to sam le.

1940 Public Information Manager briefed as to The Public Information Manager will need to have the required extent of events. details for preparation and distribution of information concerning the events at the plant.

1945 r - If the Recovery Manager The timeline must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of DOES'NOT make a GENERAL all the applicable offsite objectives. If the GENERAL EMERGENCY classification based on the EMERGENCY classification is not made by this time in the information provided, he will be prompted to scenario, referee intervention will be required. If referee do So. intervention is re uired it will be noted for the criti ue rocess.

1950 The Recovery Manager will make a The Recovery Manager will discuss with the radiological and Protective Action Recommendation. technical staffs in the EOF the conditions supporting a Protective Action Recommendation. When the PAR decision process is completed, the Recovery Manager will communicate the recommendation to the EOC in Harnsbur .

1950 The EOF Communicator completes upgrade The communicator has informed the offsite agencies of the notifications to the offsite agencies for the upgrade of the emergency classification so that the agencies GENERALEMERGENCYclassification. ma res ondas re uiredb their Emer enc Plans.

1945 fr - If the Recovery Manager The timeline must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of IS-47 DOES NOT make a PROTECTIVE ACTION all the applicable offsite objectives. If the PROTECTIVE RECOMMENDATION(PAR) based on the ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR) classification is not made information provided, he will be prompted to by this time in the scenario, referee intervention will be do So. required. If referee intervention is required, it will be noted for the criti ue rocess.

2000 EOF takes control of the emergency. The EOF takes over offsite notification, dose projection, classification, and protective action recommendation

-Th DSCAII '

res onsibilities.

h t Shit Ct th 't

~.TR 2000 M it it S I ill 4 IS-48 team will re ort the field data, consistent with the actions taken.

2500 M It I t t ThiCI ti illh th R C SIICIS <<Citi I I IS-49 will insert File to simulate the Reactor increasing in the RHR room which has shut down cooling in Building RHR room area radiation levels service.

increasing due to Shut Down Cooling being:

placed in service.

Activate malfunction file:

"EPLAN95IPESDC"

2200 Conference call between the Recovery The conference call will cover the major events that have Manager, Em'ergency Director, Engineering occurred to this point in the timeline and all issues should be Support Manager, and Public Information identified with priorities set and action plans established and Manager. understood by the entire NERO.

The managers will discuss the status of the plant and the radiological conditions on- and off-site. They will discuss their short and lon term oals and strate

2230 - The NRC Annual Termination of the exercise will occur when the offsite Graded Exercise is terminated. objectives have been met and the utility Emergency Response organization has answered or addressed the following:

~ The cause of the reactor scram and the indicated fuel damage

~ The failure of the Main Steam Line

1. The reason for the failure and resultant indications, i.e.

over feed of the reactor vessel by HPCI, subsequent water hammer, isolation of HPCI due to pressure perturbations, not a steam leak.

2. The ramifications of a break at that location, i.e. no radiological monitoring or treatment of the release.

3. Identification of the potential leak paths and release points, Turbine Building blow out panels, leakage into the Turbine Building atmosphere, leakage into drains and Radwaste.

~ Extent of contamination, airborne activity in the Plant, extent of offsite contamination, action plans for off- & on-site monitoring/clean-up.

~ Habitability checks made for the TSC and EOF and an

. understanding of plume direction/effects on responders.

SECTION V - TIMELINE PART C - BASIS OF TIMELINE EVENTS Section 1 - Basis and Detailed Discussion for Initial Classification Trigger V-29

4 BASIS AND DETAILED DISCUSSION FOR INITIALCLASSIFICATION TRIGGER The initial events to initiate classifications for the 1995 NRC Observed Exercise are security related which have a semblance to an event which occurred at a nuclear facility requiring an emergency classification at a Site Area Emergency. The events used in this scenario are unlikely to occur due to the training of the security officers, the screening process for access authorization, the procedures that are in place, and physical modifications that have been added or are in the process of being added. The participants are expected to be. challenged with difficult decisions concerning the safety of the emergency responders and station personnel.

The initial conditions of the exercise provide key management, including Security and the Operations Shift Supervisor with security information that has already been provided by the NRC to all the operating facilities in their jurisdiction. The simulated information notice sent out by the NRC provides sensitive information concerning activities of groups monitored by different Federal Agencies. The dispatch indicates that information has been obtained which indicates subversive activities may be directed at electric utilities that own and operate nuclear facilities. As a result of the information provided by the NRC, the security awareness at the nuclear facilities has been heightened.

The first event, a call. made to security at 1530 from a simulated Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA), builds on the initial conditions and provides a basis for later events. An actor simulating the LLEA reports information that was recently received from a source. The simulated notification is to coincide with information that the NRC provided to all power plants during the previous week. The source reports overhearing talk about'an unidentified group intent on disrupting electrical generation, transmission and distribution. The content of the information that was passed to the LLEAwas that some individuals may be targeting PP&L as the utility to disrupt.

This first phone call is expected to cause a classification at an UNUSUAL EVENT level and initial notifications to the onsite and offsite emergency response organizations.

At 1605 a door tamper alarm is received in the Turbine Building. The intent of this inject is to provide Security with information to initiate an investigation of the tamper alarm by dispatching an officer to the source of the alarm. The officer dispatched will then become part of the scenario as a hostage. The information that the Security Officer has been taken hostage will be called into the Special Office of the President. It is expected that the Security Controller in the ASCC will become concerned when radio contact with the dispatched officer is not maintained.

The alarm received by the ASCC is on the Unit 1 Reactor to Turbine Building door at 676'ndicating a problem, The scenario is expected to play:out with Security dispatching an officer to the scene. Once at the scene, the officer is taken hostage and V-30

taken to the Radwaste Decon/laundry facility where the intruder calls the Special Office of the President (SOP).

At 1615 a call will be made, by a referee/actor, to the Special Office of the President (SOP) which will be the trigger for an ALERT Classification. The call to the SOP will be from the Radwaste Building by the individual that has taken the Security Officer hostage. The intruder is calling to take credit for the situation.

The ASCC will be attempting to reach the officer via the radio and via the plant page and will become concerned when the officer does not answer the radio or the page. It is assumed that Security will dispatch another officer to the site of the last transmission of the officer. When the second Security Officer finds nothing and reports back to the

. ASCC, the ASCC will start to think there may be a hostage situation.

The intruder for this scenario has been placed in the Turbine Building by the air compressor skids to stay away from vital areas to preclude the orga'nization from classifying the event as a Site Area Emergency.'lacing the intruder in Turbine Building also allows for a form of an accountability to take place and later an evacuation of non-essential personnel. It is expected that the organization will have many discussions concerning both the accountability and the evacuation.

Upon classification at the ALERT the organization will activate the TSC and initiate an accountability as required by procedures. It is expected that there will be significant discussion between Operations, Security, and station management on how to provide personnel safety while performing an accountability and activating the TSC. The discussion of the decision for activation of the TSC and accountability of site personnel will most likely include the content of the page announcements to be made, the route method of activation of the TSC, and methods/instructions to be given for the

'nd accountability. The 'discussions will probably include instructions for individuals entering the site, such as the TSC Communicators and others coming up from the training center to man and activate the TSC. - Several alternatives for notification will be discussed such. as using the Telenotification System, plant page system, and possibly the telephones.

The staff at the SOP will follow their policies for security related threats when the call from. the simulated intruder is'received. Notes will most likely be taken of the conversation and the information obtained from the caller will be passed to Security.

When Security receives word of the event at the SOP; and compiles that information with the earlier call from the LLEA, the information dispatch from the NRC, and the known hostage situation, the Security Shift Supervisor will certainly recommend upgrade of the station security awareness.

Security will begin an investigation and notify the Operations Shift Supervisor of the information received and present situation. Part of the security investigation will be to

interview the individual that took the call and obtain as much information as possible about the caller.

I A security event of this nature would have an immediate response from the State Police (PSP) which will be simulated by an actor playing the various roles of the PSP and a response by the FBI. A controller will provide simulated interface and information from both the PSP and FBI.

The Operations Shift Supervisor will review with security the information obtained and investigate the EALs to determine if a classification at the ALERT level is warranted. It is expected that a classification will be made at the ALERT level and upgrade notifications will be made after a carefully thought out plan for activation of the TSC and accountability is set up.

The next event will also be a security event leading to a classification at the Site Area Emergency level. A perimeter alarm will be received in the ASCC at 1735. The alarm will prompt security actions that will reveal a vehicle penetration of the perimeter fence.

The vehicle will be followed by security cameras and noted to crash through the Unit 1 Reactor Building Railroad Bay Door. This information fed back to the emergency response organization will prompt a classification at the SITE AREA EMERGENCY level.

The penetration of the'eactor Building with a vehicle will probably cause the organization to immediately think of a "car bomb" and potentially scenario disrupting actions. It is anticipated that the Control Room may well want to scram the unit 1 and possibly the unit 2 reactor due to the situation in the Reactor Building coupled with the intruder in the Turbine Building. After the actual events in Oklahoma City, the intruder on the White House lawn, arid the precautions taken at Pennsylvania Avenue for the White House, Security and the station will be very anxious with two known intruders inside the plant. If the Control Room attempts to shutdown the. units they will be stopped due to the timeline requirements. If referee intervention is required it will be noted for discussion during the critique process.

The penetration of the fence and Reactor Building Railroad Bay door is not a probable circumstance considering modifications in progress for the fence line. The fictitious vehicle that penetrates the Reactor Building is described as an army 2 and a.half ton flat bed with a canvas cover (Deuce and a half). The information provided to security will allow security to eliminate the possibility of a truck load of explosives inside the Reactor Building but will necessitate investigation.: The information provided concerning the truck is that the door flung open on impact and swung closed onto the cab of the vehicle keeping the flatbed portion of the truck outside with the cab inside the Reactor Building. For the scenario the participants will be told that there is not a clear view from the outside of the cab of the truck. Information will be provided that the doors of the vehicle can be observed but have not been opened, indicating that the driver is still inside the truck. Observation from the outside also indicates that there is V-32

no leaking fuel inside the Reactor Building, precluding a fire/explosion in the Reactor Building. For a security event such as this scenario it would be expected that offsite assistance would be requested from Indian Town Gap to support the possibility of ordinance onboard the truck.

It is expected that a significant amount of discussion will be initiated between the technical, operations, and security groups concerning "what if."

The intruder in the Turbine Building will attempt to exit the area, but it is expected that Security will have that area of the Pant secured and the intruder will not be able to go anywhere other than behind the air compressor skids. It is at this point in the scenario that the simulator instructor will initiate a malfunction simulating the instrument air compressors being shut off. The simulator models what the plant response would be in this situation and it shows the instrument air header starting to decay. The loss of the air compressors is the initiating event for the plant transient which will ultimately cause fuel damage.

At the time the plant scram is announced over the plant page system, the actor/referee controlling the hostage portion of the'scenario will report via Security that the intruder has been apprehended. Security will discuss the events that would occur in a table top fashion for the remainder of the required security actions and interfaces with outside agencies. Information that will be fed back to the emergency organization resulting from the apprehension of the intruder will be that the incident at the Reactor Building Railroad Bay Door is related and that no explosives are involved.

The Security Officers that have responded to the hostage incident in the Turbine '

Building will be told that they hear a loud noise coming from the direction of the unit 1 Reactor Building. The information will be transmitted to the ASCC and then to the TSC.

For information input to the Public Information Group it will be reported by Security that the individuals involved with the security event are found to be loosely tied with activists in Europe attempting to stop fuel shipments and shutdown European nuclear power plants.

The security incident in the Reactor Building will be concluded when Security Officers investigate the area of the vehicle penetration. Information will be provided to the investigating officers that the. driver of the vehicle will have received a fatal injury when the vehicle penetrated the Reactor Building and the vehicle does not contain any explosive devices. Security will also discuss the associated actions as a table top which will include simulating the contacts and interfaces that would be made for an event of a similar nature.

The security incident will be completed at this point to allow the plant normal access to the equipment required to support the shutdown and subsequent cooldown.

V-33

A detailed discussion of the security response will not be provided as a part of this package due to considerations of safeguards materials. The security processes and procedures associated with the drill events, other than the emergency notifications/communications, accountability and evacuation, are not objectives to be demonstrated and are for Security Training purposes only.

V-34

SECTION V - TIMELINE PART C - BASIS OF TIMELINE EVENTS Section 2 - Basis and Detailed Discussion for Initial Plant Transient V-35

BASIS AND DETAILED DISCUSSION FOR INITIALPLANT TRANSIENT STEAM LINE RUPTURE AND FUEL DAMAGE 'AIN MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK As mentioned in the previous section when the intruder in Radwaste attempts to exit the area via the Turbine Building he will not be able to go anywhere other than behind the air compressor skids. The simulator instructor will initiate a malfunction simulating the instrument air compressors being shut off. The simulator models what the plant response would be in this situation and it shows the instrument air header starting to decay. The loss of the air compressors is the initiating event for the plant transient which will ultimately cause fuel damage.

The indication in the Control Room will be a decreasing instrument air header pressure.

There are no Control Room alarms activated when the local control switches are placed in off, the only indication would be locally or in the Control Room. When the instrument air header pressure decreases to 80 pounds an alarm will be activated in the Control Room. The alarm will prompt the operators to monitor the decreasing air pressure and prepare for a manual scram. The operators will transfer electrical loads to the offsite power supplies and decrease recirculation flow to minimum as they prepare for a manual scram. When the instrument air header pressure reaches 65 psig the mode switch will be placed to shutdown and the plant will scram.

On the scram, water level increases due to a failure of the feedwater control system failing high and an inadvertent start of the HPCI Turbine. The reactor feed pumps will trip when the water level reaches +55" but the HPCI turbine will continue to feed the vessel. The failure of the HPCI Turbine to trip on high level causes the water level to increase to the main steam lines.

Industry events (Dresden) show that water in the main steam lines causes severe water hammer which is the postulated event for this scenario. The water hammer in the main steam lines causes a break of the 'D'team Line in the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel.

The inboard and outboard isolation valves fail to fully close which provides a leak path from the primary to the secondary and out the blow out panels in the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel.

It can be expected (based on noise heard when opening MSIVs with <100 psig delta) that water hammer and a break of the main steam line would be felt and heard in the Control Room, TSC, and a portion'of the Turbine Building, The simulator when the steam line fails will produce sound effects, and the participants in the TSC and the Turbine Building will be given information indicating they, would have heard a noise/roar indicating a steam line break.

V-36

Other indications to the participants of the steam line break will be: continued flow in the affected line, high temperature in the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel and not the Reactor Building Steam Tunnel, Steam Tunnel sump high level alarms, increased input to radwaste collection, Security input from camera if used (simulated), field team data if deployed, and an increasing radiation/airborne level in the Tuibine Building. The Main Steam L'ine Radiation Detectors would probably not show an increase since the activity in the steam tunnel would not equate to 100% power Nitrogen 16 at this time.

The MSIV failure to close is taken in part from industry events (see attached Nuclear Network Report OE 7161 I). The SSES FSAR section 3.6A discusses a steam line b'reak in the Turbine Building portion of the Steam tunnel. Part of the assumptions in the FSAR is closure of the MSIVs. In this postulated incident the MSIVs do not fully close.

As discussed in the FSAR, for this scenario the blow out panels in the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel lift allowing energy to be released to the atmosphere. The breach of the building provides the leak path from the fuel to the environment. At this point in the scenario there is not any major fuel damage, there is a gap release postulated at this time.

'he mechanical forces associated with the water hammer pressure surges and the differential pressures created by the steam line break are postulated to cause some clad failure and a small release of gap fission products. The release will largely be unmonitored with a small portion going into the Turbine Building and Radwaste. The radiological effects of the scenario are discussed in the, following section.

The water hammer which causes the failure of the steam line is postulated to also cause pressure surges in the HPGI Steam line. The high flow isolation instrumentation is assumed to be affected by the pressure surges and initiates a closure of the outboard isolation valve on indicated high steam flow. It is postulated that the high flow isolation is a result of the pressure perturbations and not an actual steam line break.

The room temperature and radiation indications will not be elevated, nor will there be any fire detection or activation alarms associated with the HPQI room.

Since there is minimal fuel damage at this time and theoretically none would have reached the HPCI room, the radiation levels in the room are normal. The radiation levels throughout the Reactor Building are also assumed to be normal.

REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMP SHAFT SEIZE To support the required timeline and offsite objectives, the following Reactor Recirculation event is postulated to occur which prov"des the source'term for the offsite V-37

release. The event is based on an event which has been used during SSES exercises previously, and occurred in Japan (see attached OE3224 and OE3225).

The Simulator Instructor will initiate a high vibration annunciator at about the same time that there is water in the main steam lines. The indications in the Control Room will be a high vibration alarm on the 'A'ecirc Pump. The operators will acknowledge consult the appropriate procedures, and start to shutdown the pump, but the the'larm, pump will trip on over current due to a postulated seized shaft.

The scenario assumes that debris from the failure of the Recirc pump causes flow blockage in a fuel bundle and a portion of the fuel to melt. The plant is shutdown when the flow blockage occurs so it is assumed to take at least 30 minutes for the fuel bundle to heat up enough to cause melting. When the fuel melt does occur, the containment radiation levels will begin to increase dramatically. The Post Accident Containment Radiation Monitors will increase to approximately 2000 R/hr, level off, and then show a normal fission product decay curve.

The Post Accident Containment Radiation Monitors will not read equally when the postulated fuel melt occurs. The radiation elements are positioned approximately 180 degrees. from each other. The 'B'lement is on 709'levation of the containment toward the outside wall and monitors the shine from the 'B'ecirculation loop. The is located on the other side of the reactor vessel on elevation 709', 'A'etector approximately halfway between the containment wall and the reactor vessel biological shield. The position of the 'A'adiation element causes it to be shielded from the piping while monitoring the 'A'ecirculation loop. The 'A'ecirculation loop 'B'ecirculation is shutdown with no flow, while the 'B'oop is in service. Because of the positions of the radiation elements and the differences in flow between the two recirc loops there will be a difference in radiation readings, The release will be out the steam tunnel blow out panel and into the Turbine Building and Radwaste. Field Team data will disclose a change in release rate due to the fuel melt as will the increasing containment radiation monitors. The main steam tunnel radiation monitors will show an increase as the steam carries the failed fuel fission products reaches the steam tunnel and the monitoring area of the radiation elements.

The containment and main steam line radiation monitors will. begin to increase approximately 20 to 30 minutes after the Recirc Pump failure.

V-38

OE 7161 I WILLIAMS.RANDY'21-MAR-9508:18 EST COMMONWEALTH EDISON (CWE)

Subject:

Failure of Main Steam Isolation Valves to Close During Control Reactor Shutdown Operating Plant Experience Report Unit Name: LaSalle County Station Unit 2 Year Commercial: October 19, 1984 Reactor Type'(Size): BWR (1135 MWe)

Reactor Manufacturer: General Electric Company Event Date: February 18, 1995 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On February 18, 1995, Unit 2 was in Operating Condition 3 (Hot Shutdown), shutting down for its sixth refuel outage (L2R06). At approximately 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br />, the hand switch for the "D" outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), 2B21-F028D, was placed in the CLOSED position. It was observed that the valve failed to close. The hand switch was cycled several times from AUTO to CLOSED to AUTO with the same results. The valve was eventually closed at 1353 hours0.0157 days <br />0.376 hours <br />0.00224 weeks <br />5.148165e-4 months <br /> by placing the hand switch in the OPEN SLOW TEST position and depressing the Slow Test push-button. This slowwlosed the valve, and the pilot air was isolated.

At 2250 hours0.026 days <br />0.625 hours <br />0.00372 weeks <br />8.56125e-4 months <br />, the hand switch for the "A" outboard MSIV, 2B21-F028A, was placed in the CLOSED position. It was observed that this valve also failed to close. The hand

'switch was placed in the OPEN SLOW TEST position, and the Slow Test push-button was depressed. It was observed that the valve would also not slow-close. The hand switch was returned to the CLOSED position, and the valve still did not close. At approximately 2400 hours0.0278 days <br />0.667 hours <br />0.00397 weeks <br />9.132e-4 months <br />, a second attempt'to slow close the valve failed. At 0050 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> on February 19, 1995, the hand switch was returned to the CLOSED position. It was later observed that the "A" Outboard MSIV had fast closed at 0059 hours6.828704e-4 days <br />0.0164 hours <br />9.755291e-5 weeks <br />2.24495e-5 months <br />. The other six MSIVs of Unit 2 operated as designed.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT The pneumatic manifold assemblies were removed from the 2B21-F028A and 2B21-F028D MSIVs, and functionally bench tested.. The apparent cause of the MSIVs failure to close was determined to be sticking of the solenoid pilot valve. This sticking prevented the pilot valve from changing state, and did not allow the pilot air to vent.

The failure of the pilot air to vent results in air being ported to the under side ~f the MSIV operating piston, holding the MSIVs in the open position. The sticking solenoid V-39

pilot valves. were disassembled and inspected. Foreign material was observed on several internal parts of the solenoid pilot valve. It was also observed that the interfacing surface of the core assembly and plugnut of the "B" solenoid appeared to have a thin coat of foreign material. When the core assembly and plugnut were pressed together, which is the normal configuration when the solenoid is energized, the film acted as an adhesive. This adhesive was strong enough so that when the plugnut was lifted up, the core assembly adhered to it and was also lifted. The parts with foreign material were chemically analyzed, and the material was determined to be Nyogel 775A. This material is used during assembly as a thread/lubricant on the solenoid cover, under the star washer on the disc holder which is internal to the valve, and at the interface of the solenoid base and housing assembly. Depending on how cautious the assembler is, some residual lubricant may be transferred to the core assembly and/or the plugnut as they are installed into the solenoid base. Nyogel 775A is essentially DOW 710 lubricant with a silicon thickener. According to information from Nye Lubricants Inc., the gel time for DOW 710 is 1200-1500 hours at 500 deg. F.

According to the EQ Binder, at 120 deg. F ambient temperature, the coil of the "B"

~

solenoid will operate at 320 deg. F, which is the temperature that the DOW 710 will be exposed to. It is believed that gelling (becoming more sticky) will occur earlier with Nyogel 775A, because it is,a tacky substance to begin with. Due to the AC electric field in the solenoid coil, the core assembly vibrates slightly in relation to the plugnut. This results in fretting of the mating surfaces of the core assembly and the plugnut causing the creation of microscopic wear particles. These wear particles may then accumulate in the filler of the Nyogel 775A. As with any grease, the Nyogel 775A should become more tacky as the viscosity of the grease increases.

SAFETY ANALYSIS The safety consequences of this event were minimal. The Primary Containment Isolation function through the main steam lines remained operable. The two outboard MSIVs, which failed to close, were in different Main Steam Lines, and the inboard MSIVs in each of these lines operated as designed.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The ASCO 8323A20V solenoid valves for -the Unit 2 outboard MSIVs are being replaced. This was previously scheduled during the current refuel outage, L2R06. The Unit 1 outboard MSIVs are scheduled for replacement during the next Unit 1 refuel outage, L1 R07. The Unit 2 Inboard MSIVs are scheduled for replacement during refuel outage L2R07. The Unit 1 inboard MSIVs are scheduled for replacement during refuel outage L1 R08. Four of the ASCO Model NP8323A20V solenoid valves currently in the storeroom are being sent to ASCO for disassembly and inspection. The valve internals will be cleaned of any foreign material, or replaced with new parts which are grease free, before reassembling the parts. These cleaned solenoid valves'will be installed on V-40

the Unit 2 inboard MSIVs during the current refuel outage (L2R06); The testing frequency of the Unit 1 MSIVs has been increased to every 60 days to provide additional margin to the threshold at which the sticking will occur. Since the potential for sticking will have been removed, a quarterly testing frequency for the Unit 2 MSIVs will be maintained.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES None.

COMPONENT FAILURE DATA Manufacturer. ASCO Nomenclature: Dual Solenoid Valve Model Number. NP8323A20V MFG Part Number. NP8323A20V Information

Contact:

Jeffrey Bryant (815) 357761 X2319

'V-41

OE 3224 I HOSHIZAWA (CRIEPI) 09-MAR-89 21:01 EST 0

SUBJECT:

Power Descent at Fukushimadaiichi Unit 5 Unit: Fukushimadaiichi Unit 5 (BWR)

Event Date: February 26, 1989 NSSS/AE: Toshiba, Ltd. /Toshiba, Ltd.

Rating: 784 MWe Date of Commercial Operation: April 18, 1978 Event

Description:

While Fukushimadaiichi Unit 5 of Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. was operating at 770 MWe, one of two Primary Loop Recirculation (PLR) Pumps was stopped with the actuation of protection relay installed at electrical circuit of PLR Pump Motor at 19:27 JST on February 26, 1989.

So the plant power was descended manually to 390 Mwe.

Although'investigation showed no anomaly in PLR Pump Motor and generator of its driving system, the unit was brought to shutdown manually at 17:00 JST on February 27, 1989 for detailed investigation. "

So the unit commenced the annual refueling and maintenance scheduled originally to perform from March 2, 1989.

INFORMATION CONTACT: K.HOSHIZAWA (I,PR)

OE 3225 I HOSHIZAWA(CRIEPI) 09-MAR-89 21:08 EST

SUBJECT:

Update Information of OE ¹3117, OE ¹3187 Unit: Fukushimadaini Unit 3 (BWR) Event Date:

Subject:

Damage of Primary Loop Recirculation Pump Submerged Bearing NSSS/AE,: ToshiBa, Ltd. /

ToshiBa, Ltd. Rating ': 1,100MWe Date of Commercial Operation: June 21, 1985 Event

Description:

White Fukushimadaini Unit 3 of Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. was operating at 990 SlWe, the vibration of Primary Loop Recirculation Pump (PLR pump¹B) increased at .

4:20 JST on January 6, 1989.

So the slow descent of plant power to 750 MWe was made manually. Further, the unit was continued to descend the plant power manually for 'shutdown in order to

commence the 3rd annual refueling and maintenance scheduled originally to perform from January 7, 1989.

Overhauling of PLR pump ¹B showed the damage of submerged bearing and impeller.

As a result of further investigation for PLR pumps, jet pumps and the 'piping of PLR system, a part of broken impeller, 5 lost bolts, 3 lost washers and a metal piece like a part of washer were discovered and removed. Thereafter inspection/investigation with underwater TV for Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and so on was commenced, resulting in discovery/removal of 10 metal pieces and 13 metal pieces at RPV bottom and jet pumps respectively. These metal pieces are presumed to be due to the wearing of impeller and submerged bearing disk and detailed analysis/investigation is going to be done. And besides, metal-worn powder was observed at RPV bottom.

Observation of fuel assembly with underwater TV, which was just started, found small foreign material in the lower structure of some fuel assemblies. Detailed investigation is to be performed. P The investigation of inside RPV and piping, etc. are to be continued and great effort is to be made to discover and,remove the remaining washers and metal pieces, etc.

Kashiwazakikariwa Unit 1 was brought to shutdown manually at 16:58 JST on February 4, 1989 for the inspection of similar-type submerged bearing as described in OE 3187.

The investigation showed submerged bearing had no anomaly. The concerned submerged bearing were replaced with improved ones for integrity. So the Kashiwazakikariwa Unit 1 came back to line at 0:00 JST on March 4, 1989.

V-43

1 SECTION V - TIMELINE PART C - BASIS OF TIMELINEEVENTS Section 3 - Basis and Detailed Discussion for Radiological Impacts V-44

BASIS AND DETAiLED DISCUSSION FOR RADIOLOGICALIMPACTS The plant transient initiating fuel damage is a main steam line break. The initial fuel damage that occurs is due to the plant transient causing mechanical stress of the fuel.

It is postulated that a large differential pressure across the core develops as a result of the Main Steam Line Break in the Turbine Building., The fuel damage is simulated to be a gap release of approximately 0.5% as a result of the mechanical forces associated with the steam line break. Because of the timing of the fuel damage there will not be radiation indications in the Reactor Building at HPCI, RCIC, and the scram discharge volume as would normally be expected. There will be an increase of radiation levels in the Turbine Building due to the location of the steam line break. The containment post accident radiation monitors will show a slight increase due to the gap release, The leak path for the radioactivity is from the fuel pin to the coolant, which is released as steam into the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel which causes the blow out panels to lift allowing energy to be released to the atmosphere. The breach of the building provides the leak path from the fuel to the environment. At this point in the scenario there is no major fuel damage, there is a gap release simulated at this time.

The release path from the coolant to.the atmosphere is an unmonitored, untreated path. The organization will receive several indications that will need to be reviewed to understand that an unmonitored, u'ntreated release is in progress.

Indications for the participants that there is fuel damage will be:

~ The Containment Rad monitors which will indicate approximately 60 R/hr.

~ The Main Steam Rad Monitors which will show a slight increased radiation level but then decrease after the MSIVs are closed.

~ The Turbine Building Area Rad Monitors will show increases due to radioactive .

steam being transported to various locations of the building. The Turbine Building general area will show positive values due to leakage from the steam tunnel into the ventilation system.

~ The Offsite teams will have positive readings for a period of time at the EPB due to the initial release from the Turbine Building. There will be a continuing release from the plant,via the Turbine Building vent as the building processes the contaminated air leakage from the steam tunnel.

The initial source term is not very large, 0.5% fuel clad damage which is a half of a percent of the, gap activity (approximateiy 1.5E7 curies) which reads about 60 R/hr on the Containment Rad monitor. The weather conditions used for the drill are simufated V45

and located in the radiological section of the Referee Manual. Based on wind direction and wind speed, the initial readings found in the field will be fairly small..

Approximately an hour. after the initial plant transient, the Containment post accident radiation monitors will indicate an increasing trend. The increase is a result of postulated fuel melt which has occurred., The source term is assumed to be a portion of one fuel bundle which has undergone partial melt.

The leak path is the same as mentioned previously, from the fuel to the coolant and out the main steam line break to atmosphere. The release will continue to be unmonitored and untreated..

Unlike the initial source term, the fuel melt source term will cause an increase of the containment radiation monitors to about 2000 R/hr. Due to the geometry caused by the recirculation pumps, i.e. one pump in service the 0'ther tl'Ipped, the two containment radiation monitors will not provide similar readings. The 'B'eading will be about twice the readings shown on the 'A'ince the 'B'ecirculation loop remains in service after the 'A'ripped.

There will also be indication of an increased radiation level in the Main Steam Tunnel which in'dicates the additional fission products being released from the core. The increase will be seen on the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors.

The Field Monitoring Teams will see a marked increase when the fuel melt activity arrives in the field. The field monitoring teams will also see a changed fission product distribution. The different fission product mix will be reflected by particulate activity instead of just noble gas activity.

When the field monitoring team data is reported to the onsite participants the field values will not coincide with those calculated. The failure to correlate is because the major portion of the release is going out the side of the Turbine Building unmonitored.

Turbine Building A portion of the release into the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel will leak into'the.

Turbine Building ventilation system and the entire Turbine Building will be airborn.

The increase in airborne levels will cause all of the portal monitors, friskers, and air samplers in the Turbine Building to alarm. The high airborne levels in the Turbine Building will also cause the count labs in the control structure to be inoperable because of high background. All samples that need to be counted will have to be taken to the Health Physics or EOF chem lab.

V-46

The contamination and radiation levels in the Turbine Building will not impact the manning and activation of the TSC but will impact the conduct and management of the emergency. Areas for consideration by the TSC emergency organization will be:

~ continued habitability of the TSC with people coming in and out of the. facility;

~ dispatch of the INDIA Teams from a contaminated area, i.e. the first floor'of the Control Structure;

~ the relief shift coming onsite and into the TSC through.a contaminated area;

~ the ability to determine contamination levels in the Turbine Building and the Control Structure; and

~ the ability to do isotopic analysis with the counting equipment in the Control Structure.

A protective action recommendation will be made when the organization upgrades the classification to a General Emergency. The General Emergency declaration will be an anticipatory classification based on plant conditions indicating severe fuel damage.

The field monitoring tearri data will confirm the severity of the release. The managers will discuss the status of the plant and the radiological conditions on- and off-site. They will discuss their short and long term goals and strategy.

Reactor Building Initially there will be no radiological impacts in the Reactor Building, As mentioned previously there will be no increased indications on the area radiation monitors, Radiation levels in the Reactor Building RHR room will increase when the RHP loop is placed in Shutdown cooling, When RHR is placed in shutdown cooling, reactor coolant will be circulated outside of the primary containment and will indicate on the room area radiation monitors. Until shutdown cooling is placed in service there will be no sources of radiation outside of the secondary containment. It is normally expected when RHR is placed in suppression pool cooling there are increased radiation levels in the RHR rooms. The increase is attributed to the blow down of steam to the suppression pool as the operators remove decay heat. During this scenario the operators will not open the Safety Relief Valves for decay heat removal due to the steam line break causing a decreasing temperature and pressure.

V-47

SECTION,VI - INITIALCONDITIONS PART A - ISES DAILYREPORT

PPBL INDEPENDENT SAFETY EVALUATIONSERVICES SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION DA'ILYREPORT DATE: 08/1 5/95 Report period: 0800 hrs 06/08/95 to 0800 hrs 08/1 5/95 Unit 1 Plant Parameters:

Plant Condition -1 Power -100% Megawatts Gross -1136 Total Core Flow - 106.9 Million Ibs/hr

. Primary Coolant Conductivity - 0.15 umho/cm HP Condenser Backpressure- 3.9 in Hga Offgas Pretreatment Rate - 100 pCI/sec Flow - 24 scfm Number of Control Room Alarms Lit - 9

'nit 2 Plant Parameters:

Plant Condition - 1 Power - 100% Megawatts Gross - 1120 Total Core Flow - 98.4 IV!IllionIbs/hr Primary Coolant Conductivity - 0.18 umho/cm HP Condenser Backpressure- 3,4 in Hga Offgas Pretreatment Rate -100 pCI/sec Flow-24 scfm Number of Control Room Alarms Lit - 8 Unit Common Plant Parameters:

Number of Control Room Alarms Lit - 9 Major Work In Progress/Completed and Problems - Unit 1

1. Reactor power was reduced to 60% at 1552 Monday to permit l&C Technicians to inspect and repair the ¹3 Control Valve. A loose connection on the LVDTfor position indication was found, The connection was repaired, Apowerincreaseto85%wasbegunat1852. The Unitwasat85%by.1852. The

¹3 Control Valve was stroked and shown to be operating properly. Reactor power was raised to 100% at 1948 hours0.0225 days <br />0.541 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.41214e-4 months <br />. The total dose received for the ¹3 CV job was 460 mRem. (0730 mtg., Unit 1 log)

VI-2

. 2. The RCIC system is out of service to replace the steam line drain pot level switch.

The LCO is in effect. (0730 mtg.)

3. The 'A'ontainment Instrument Gas (CIG) compressor was found running, but unloaded at 2020. The 'B'IG compressor was cycling to maintain CIG pressure.

The 'A'IG compressor was shutdown. The 'B'ompressor remains in service. A problem with the 'A'IG compressor is suspected. (Unit 1'log)

An abandoned cable was found in the lower cable spreading room. The cable was properly secured, separated, or installed on a cable tray section. The concern

'ot is that the cable s weight may compromise loading of the seismic supports.

(CR 95-0248)

Major Work in Progress/Completed and Problems - Unit 2:

Reactor power was reduced to 97% at 1355 to scram test 3 control rods. HCUs 46-47, 4643, and 46-11 were tested and returned to service. The LCOs are cleared. Reactor power was returned to 100% at 1540. (Unit 2 log)

2. Control rods 34-39, 42-55, and 38-55 were'inserted and their associated HCUs taken out of service for maintenance. Other control rods were withdrawn to maintain 100% power. LCOs for the HCUs are in effect. (Unit 2 log)

The 'D'HR pump was placed in the Suppression Pool Cooling mode at 0440 Monday morning to support HPCI system testing. The 'D'HR pump was shutdown at 2039. (Unit 2 Iog)

The HPCI quarterly flow surveillance was performed. The HPCI turbine was started at 1134 and manually tripped at 1159. The LCO was cleared at 1245. (Unit 2 log)

5. There were no Unit 2 Condition reports issued during the report period.

Major Work in Progress/Completed and Problems - Unit Common:

Transformer OX201 is to be de-energized briefly today for breaker work and deluge testing. (0730 mtg,)

2. The 'B'rain of SBGT was run to support the Unit 2 HPCI testing. (Unit 1 log)

3. The Diesel Driven Fire pump is out of service for maintenance. The LCO is in effect. (LCO Iog)

4. There were no Unit Common Condition Reports issued during the report period.

Short Term Schedule - Unit 1: 1. Continue power operation Short Term Schedule - Unit 2: 1. Continue power operation II ISES Management Attention: None

SECTION Vl - INITIALCONDITIONS PART B - PRIORITY L'ISTS VI-5

8/14/95 THROUGH 8/15/95 k UNIT 1/COMMON/UNIT 2 PRIORITY. LISTS k U1 'A'HRSW WORK WINDOW SCHEDULE

> RADWASTE SCHEDULE k SULFATE REDUCTION PLAN k RWMU INTAKE STRUCTURE ACTIVITIES

> U2 'B'OND DEMIN PMR SCHEDULE

> U2 HCU MAINTENANCELOAD SCHEDULE

> U2 HCU ON-LINE MAINTENANCESCHEDULE

> U2 RHRSW WORK PLANS UNIT1 UNIT2

AUG 14 15 16 17 18 19 W T F UNIT 1 PRIORITY LIST AROUND THE CLOCK 153330004 EM-REPL LOW WTR FLOW LIGHT ON 1K102A TB CHILLER REQUIRE CHILLER OOS EXTENDED HOURS 150030004 EIA4lM PERF RHRSW 'A'RIORITY1 & 2 WORK 153430049 EM-REPL WHITE PWR AVAILLGT ON B RXBLDG CHLR REMOVES CHILLER FROM SERVICE NORMALHOURS 150030001 MISC UNIT 1 PRIORITY 1 & 2 WORK 'A'IG PSV 151301012 MM-PERF 3 YR FLOW TEST SM-113403 153430036 Eh5CAL CAPACITY CONTRL FOR 110FULL LOAD 1K206A DOES NOT TAKE CHILLER OOS 151105030 MM-PERF U1 'O'ERVICE WATER PUMP ANNL 1

PM'S 151905200 MM-PERF U1 'B'/A COMP PM'S 151905300 MM-PERF U1 'O'/A COMP PM'S PROBLEMS/ISSUES NONE CHEM PROBLEMS/

ASSOC WORK 157605006 CHEM-PERF U1 PASS SEMI-ANNLF UNCTIONAL TEST NUCLEAR DEPARTMENT NORMAL OPERATIONS SCHEDULE PAGE AUG 14 THRU AUG 20 VI-7

AUG 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 M T W F S S UNIT COMMON PRIORITY LIST AROUND THE CLOCK 351330030 l&C-SIMPLEXFIRE PROTECTION SYS BAUD CHANGE INOPS THE SIMPLEX PANEL 353030035 MM/SYSE-PERF 'B'REOASS CHARCOAL FLTR OF125B - EAB TO SUPPORT AIR FLOW TEST SE-030-B09 FOLLOWING CHARCOAL SAMPLE SE-030-B10 356930015 RADWASTE PROCESSING & DISCHARGE OUTAGE NORMALHOURS 351305010 MMPERF DSL FIRE PP OP511/OS554 6MO/18MO PM/SURV 356530007 l7C REWORK STEP CONTROLLER 352705200 MISC - 'A'UXBOILER MISC MAINT 356101001 FLOOR FIRE PENETRATIONS MOD CLOSURE 351330007 E&SMCOMMON FIRE PROT MISC MAINT 157502001 SCC FAN OV914 (ROOM C-119), OV912 (ROOF)

COR MAINT/PMa RADWASTE PROBLEMS/ASSOC WORK 356905060 CHEM WASTE TANK(OT314) SLUDGE BUILDUP DETERMINATION GENERAL 158124056 818'CTIVITIES - SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE 357001207 OPS PERF S047M1B SBGT 'B'RAIN START NUCLEAR DEPARTMENT NORMAL OPERATIONS SCHEDULE PAGE AUG 14 THRU AUG 20 Vl-8

AUG 14 15 16 17 18 19 W T F UNIT 2 PRIORITY LIST AROUND THE CLOCK 213941009 ESS BUS 2B ALT FEEDER BREAKER SWAP EXTENDED HOURS 250030001 '8'X BLDG CHILLER 2K206B OOS FOR EVAP CIRC PP SEAL LEAK REPAIR NORMALHOURS 259305041 REFUEL PLATFORM MISC MAINT/MODWORK 253450210 'B'OND DEMIN MISC MOD/MAINTWORK 252064001 LPRM CAL0 256101001 RX BLDG CRANE 2H213 CORR MAINT 259302401 'A'NST AIR DRYER SKID OOS FOR PMs/CORR MAINT 257502211 '8'ERV WATER PP OOS FOR PM0 PROBLEMS/ISSUES 256064201 RPV LEVEL SPIKING CONCERN CHEM PROBLEMS/

ASSOC WORK 257905001 TB SPING OOS FOR CALIBRATION NUCLEAR DEPARTMENT NORMA'L OPERATIONS SCHEDULE PAGE AUG 14 THRU AUG 20 VI-9

SECTION Vl - INITIALCONDITIONS PART C - OPERATOR TURNOVER SHEETS Vl-10

PENNSYLVANIA POWER 8c LIGHT COMPANY SUSQUEHANNA SES UNIT 1 SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT STATUS Date oO o1 ao

~

Shjft SHIFT INITIALCONDITIONS Power Level (Mwth) sVVC =~ jv'/Mt'tsesponsibte Pco Condition t 't'trvi Additional PCO t

Mode Switch Positiori rcstnt $

'hL s Completed by Reviewed by (Unit Supervisor)

Reviewed by (Shift Supervisor) 1C668 SYSTEM STATUS PROBLEMS & COMMENTS

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ e ~~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~

I/S avl unavl auto h draulic fluid A h draulic fluid B turbine va or extr STEAM SEALING I/S avl unavl ali ned mackin exhauster A

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C mnL F C va or extr VE-11 Form OP.AOOO31. Rev. 0, DUPLEX. Pago 1 ot 12 (Ft4 Number N/A)

1C668 SYSTEM STATUS PROBLEMS & COMMENTS OFF QA$ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~~~~~

I/$ ay) unavl main aux SJAE MVP CIRC WATER "" "" I/S avl unavl min full pump A pump B pump C pump D SERVICE WATER """ '/$ avl unavl auto pump A pump B pump C Pn'a RBCCW ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ )/$ ay) unavl pump A pump B TBCCW ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ )/$ ay) unavl pump A pump B INST AIR "" """ auto unavl compressor A compressor B dryer A dryer 8 dryer C

$ ERV A)R ~~~~0~~ I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ auto unayl compressor A compressor B VI-12 Form OP-AO403 1, Aar. 0, OUPLH4 Pago 2 tA 12 (Fgo Number NIA)

UNIT 1 SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT STATUS 1C651 SYSTEM STATUS PROBLEMS 8c COMMENTS R'gU ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

I/S avl unavl pump A pump B filter dern A filter dern 8 CONDENSATE '""'"" I/S avl unavl pump A pump B pump C pump D RFPT ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e e I/S. avl unavl auto man b/ A

'urb/pump B p p low load bypass DC L-0 pp A DCLO B DC L-0 pp C RECIRC ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ e I/S avl unavl drive motor/pp A drive motor/pp B RECIRC AUXILIARIES '/S avl unavl auto vent fan A B

AC L-0 pp A-1 AC LW pp A-2 AC L-0 pp B-1 AC LW pp 8-2 DC L-0 pp A DC L&pp B RECIRC CONTROL auto man controller A ++ ea Speed controller B ee Speed VI-13 c~ no.anne.e oe i n nnoe cv o~ s a eo eei ee.~e eeeei

1C651 SYSTEM STATUS PROBLEMS 8c COMMENTS BYPASS SWITCH POS " norm inst byp list bypassed instrument in inst column RBM A/B APRM AIC/E flow A/C IRM A/C/E/G APRM B/D/F flow B/D IRM B/D/F/H

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SRM AIB/CI D auto RMCS ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 e 0 ~ ~ t I/S B/P snop B/P RWM RBM RSCS list rods bypassed MAIN TURB EHC A pressure set in control MAIN TURB" I/S avl unavl auto lift.pumps turning gear OIL SYSTEMS """"4 I/S avl unavl auto lock TGOP Mn L-0 suet pp EBOP

'ESOP GEN EXCITATION """ auto man.

voltage regulator VI-14 Form OP-AD403.t. Rev. 0, OUPLEX, Paye e ot 12 (File Number N IA)

UNIT 1 SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT STATUS 1C601 SYSTEM STATUS PROBLEMS & COMMENTS e ~ ~ ~ oe ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

C Rp ~

I/S avl unavl pump A pump B flow contr A flow contr B

$ BLC ~ e e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

squib continu~it out squib A squib B D/W FLOOR SUMPS "" i avl unavl sump A pump A sump A pump 8 i

I sump B pump A sump B pump B RCIC ~ o e e ~ e ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ e e ~ e ~ ~ unavl turb/pump status RCIC control i GPM auto man controller CORE SPRAY DIV I """  ! I/S avl unavl tape setpoint value ~~X GPM pump A pump C RHR plV I ee ~ ~ eee ~ ~ ~ e ~ e ~ I/S avl unavl pump A pump C RHR SW DIV I I/S avl unavl pump A l4 K M z eo An <<t ApS ~ e e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ avl unavl system

$ POTMO$ e ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~~ ~~~

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system B MSIV STATUS LIGHT off light indication

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close open valve indication I VI-15 Form O~D4g3.1, Rev. 0, DUPLE Page S ol 12 (Rle Humbler NIA)

1C601 SYSTEM STATUS PROBLEMS & COMMENTS CONTAINMENT Ha/Oa " Hz% 0 AR15746A SS AR15746B SUPP POOL FILTER PP " ~

I/S 3 3,'/

avl unavl pump INST GAS ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ unavl r ~vey7t)$ 7rM compressor A compressor B STORAGE BOTTLES "" close open PCV-12643 P CV-12648 CORE SPRAY PIV II I/S avl unavl pump B pump D 0~~~~~~~~~~

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I/S avl unavl pump B pump D RHRS'Ih/ Ply II ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I/S avl unavl pump B

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HPCI I/S avl unavl turb/pump status HPCI control GPM auto man controller . W tape setpoint value ~+ GPM OOS ECCS/BIS STATUS" es no oos li hts tested ~ ~

all oos lights off list oos systems A P/f85'e VI-16 Form OP.AO403->, Aev. 0, OUPLEX, Pago 0 ot 12 (File Number NIA)

UNIT 1 SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT

'TATUS T-10 llA 118 12A 128 T-20 BUS 10 BUS 20 12 13.8KV 0 ~ O ~

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Circle those boxes which represent unavailable breakers.

VI-17 Form OP~I. Rev. 0 DUPLEX, Page 7 oI 12 (Fiie Number NIA)

OC653 SYSTEM STATUS PROBLEMS & COMMENTS COND TRANSF I/S avl unavl pump A pump B REFUEL TRANSF ~ I/S avl unavl pump A.

pump B MAKE UP CHEMIN e ~ ~ i ~ ~ I/S avl unav pump A pump 8 jockey pp AUX BOILER ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I/S avl unavl boiler A H h r'AAT.

boiler B RIVER WATER M.U I/S unavl pump A pump B pump C

, pump D E gy I ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

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UNIT 1 SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT STATUS Miscellaneous MISCELL SYSTEM , STATUS PROBLEMS & COMMENTS e ~~~0 ~ e1 1 0e ~~~e ~e ~~

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~Aee feed B gen feed A alt feed B alt feed EXCESS FLOW CH"""""" es no all vlv open GEN LOCKOUTS es no lockouts reset no relay flags CONT ATMOS MON """ anal S/B off samp zero span 1C690B 1C690A

'B MSIV LEAKAGE I/S avl unavl avail oil off

'ower light indicates OB MSIV LEAKAGE I/S avl unavl system PASS SYS ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ off on isol vlv permiss switch CONT RAD MONT '/S avl unavl lower upper supp A motor ¹1 A motor ¹2 8 motor ¹1 B motor ¹2 FIRE PROTECT I/S avl unavl diesel pp Ppe'0 AC pp smoke rem fan A smoke rem fan B OC697 MOV BYPASS "" "" es no switches in normal VI-21

Nliscellaneous MIS CELL SYSTEM STATUS PROBLEMS &

COMMENTS'ECOMBINER'"""""

I/S avl unavl unit 1 unit 2 common 'unit select switch position-unit CCW pp 1P145 CCW pp 2P145 CCW pp OP145

. UNIT 2 ECCS I/S avl unavl U-2 RCIC U-2 RHR pp A U-2 RHR pp C U-2 RHR sw pp A U-2 core spray pp B U-2 core spray pp D U-2 RHR pp B U2 RHR pp D U-2 RHR sw pp B U-2 HPCI CROSSTIED SYS no es common S.W. from U-2 CRD U-1/U-2 IA U-1/U-2 SA U-1/.U-2 CST U-1/U-2 VI-22

INSTRUCTIONS SECTION: OPERATIONS INST. NO. OI-AL-0017 Revision 3

SUBJECT:

UNIT 1 CONTROL ROON Prepared By:

~

ANNUNCIATOR Reviewed By:

Approved By: Date 7 i~ I Expiration Date: Effective Date

,r yQ9, FORM AD-QA-101-5, Rev. 1, Page 1 of 1 VI-23

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tLL R

i

',UNIT 1 CONTROL ROON Meek Beginning $ '/ /V/ 9W NCIATOR LOG 3 ' '

N N N N N "CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 103 1C651 D

F AR 104 1C651 E

G V I-25

-FORM OI-AL-0017 Rev. 3, Page 2 of 17

UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM Week Beginning 8'/ lg/ 9S "NNUNC IATOR LOG N N N N "CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 105 IC651 D

AR 106 IC651 cia- MpH 55o f ( 7 F

'G VI-26

. FORM OI-AL-0017 Rev. 3, Page 3 of 17

UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM Week'eginning S'/ ~V/ 9$

NUNC IATOR LOG N N N N N N "CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 107 1C601 F

G AR 108 1C601 F

VI-Z7 FORMOI-AL-0017 Rev. 3, Page 4 of 17

UNIT' CONTROL ROOM Week Beginning P/ i V'/9$

<NNUNCIATOR LOG N N N N . N N "CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 109 1C601 0

F AR 110 1C601 G

VI-28 FORM Ol-AL-0017 Rev. 3, Page 5 of 17

Il ItL rL Ii ItL t

UNIT I CONTROL ROOM Week Beginning ~/~l/~5 ENUNCIATOR LOG N N N ~

"CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 113 1C601 A

G AR 114 1C601 H

VI-30 FORM GI-AL-0017 Rev. 3, Page 7 of 17

,, UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM Week Beginning 8 / ~V/'9S UNCIATOR LOG N N N N, N N

"CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" C.I 5 OO AR 015 OC653 A

C D

G 57 xTico AR 016 OC653 t, lS 5 oos W 7u aP Lou B K ba TK Lv( C IX CiSee l.SH CJra'A D Elg Erd PET'4P . +5 lk fine'p e~ J4i 7a

/ /g, ~T ffalfo Aic ca~ os% G VI-31 FORM OI-AL-0017 Rev. 3, Page 8 of 17

UNIT 1 CONTROL ROON Meek Beginning 8 / ~+/95

'ENUNCIATOR LOG N N N N: N N "CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 117 1C668 F

G AR 118 1C668 A

F G

FORM OI-Al-0017 Rev. 3, Page 9 of 17

'I IT 1 CONTROL ROOM Meek Beginning %"/ I'/'95 NUNCIATOR LOG N N N ~

N: N N

"CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 119 1C668 D

G 8 RfP. Tcu s~r ~~~- Fo AR 120 1C668 la 'c,'PFP 7c.u sr~( a Te ~

Fo A

'D G

VI-33 FORM OI-AL-0017 Rev. 3, Page 10 of 17

UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM Week Beginning g / /0/ 9'S

'INUNCIATOR LOG N N N N: N N "CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 121 IC668 A

G

-3 Hc-~8 S s sos. AR 122 1C668 L ~w ge (ul D

VI-34 FORM OI-AL-0017 Rev. 3, Page 11 of 17

, UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM . Meek Beginning $ '/ l// 9S UNCIATOR LOG N N N N . N N N "CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 123 1C668 A

D AR 124 1C668 D

VI-35 FORM OI-AL-0017 Rev. 3, Page 12 of 17

UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM Week Beginning P'/ ~$ /'VS '

'ENUNCIATOR LOG N N N N "CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 029 OC681 AR 030 OC681

~

A C

VI-36 FORM OI-AL-0017 'Rev. 3, Page 13 of 17

" IT 1 CONTROL ROOM Week Beginning 7'/ l9'/'VS NUNCIATOR LOG N N .N N N N N

/

"CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 127 1C681 D

AR 128 1C681 B

C D

VI-37 FORM OI-AL-0017 Rev. 3, Page 14 of 17

UNIT I CONTROL ROOM Week Beginning 8 / ~'I/ 'VS

'NNUNCIATOR LOG N N N N:' '

"CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 125 IC692 AR 126 IC692 AR 148 IC644 AR 147 IC645 FORM OI-AL-0017 Rev. 3, Page 15 of 17

NIT 1 CONTROL ROOM Meek Beginning $ "/ l'f/ 9$ ,

NUNCIATOR LOG N N N N . N N. N "CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 146 1C693 A

AR 045 OC693 AR 036 -.OC650 VI-39 FORM OI-AL-0017 Rev. 3, Page 16 of 17

UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM

'ENUNCIATOR LOG J* N N N N: N N

"CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION" AR 131 OC673 A

D AR 031 OC673

,r C

(DATE) Jd JJ , dJ JJ 'dJ JJ JJ PCO Nightshift (time)

PCO Dayshi ft (time)

US Nightshift (time)

US Dayshift (time)

VI-40 FORM OI-AL-0017 Rev. 3. Paqe 17 oF 17

PLANT CONTROL OPERATOR TURNOVER SHEET UNIT I DATE >

1900 SHIFT 0700 to 1 900 SHIFT to Start End Start End PLANT TAT AT TURNOVER PLANT STATUS AT TURNOVER CONDITION CONDITION POWER LEVEL 0 POWER LEVEL GENERATOR OUTPUT ~I30 MWe GENERATOR OUTPUT MWe TOTAL CORE FLOW~0M /og (

Ib/hr TOTAL CORE FLOW M Ib/hr PSIG RX PRESSURE PSIG RX PRESSURE REMARKS:

UNIT J Co'>

'o5' 5 aJ C. + n n ~A ~~ 'A C 8/(as~ A'/u ~ ~ (c C 57 6ca 8~iw w cA

/rib/J e ~ l2F /e'r. See/

X u Jcs7i ee7')w 5r - c.re e4I aAcP

~3 r. U(U

~

C 5 7 Cl(krt T (1'C.b g jgEF 7 t: P1 ]g Je5T - r O

~6(e e 2 Ac/catt 7' C.d AT C COMMON L &'S 'ieae L uE 0 2 Pn as issue Inr A ~w Lw o mM ~/p 8>7 Z'odium ~~~( Aj 1- ~ oQI~ Q4 )oyTe S/ / . ('ES= dpi VI-41 FORM OP.AO403-9, Rev. 0, OUPLEX, Page 1 or 2 (File Nueber R5-5)

OFFGOING PLANT CONTROL OPERATOR CHECKLIST; 1900- 0700-0700 1900

1. Information in Unit Log is complete and has been discussed with the oncoming PCO.

2. All testable lights tested and every indicator pair shows at least one light.

3. Evolutions in progress and items to be completed during next shift as noted in remarks, have been discussed with oncoming PCO.

4. Problems encountered during past shift and abnormal plant conditions as noted in remarks, have been discussed with oncoming PCO.

5. All Control Room instrumentation malfunctioned or failed indicated on turnover sheet.

6. Lighted control room annunciators logged and discussed with oncoming PCO.

7. All control room annunciators tested successfully

8. System and Equipment status sheets attached.

9. Unit log signed.

1900 - 0700 Offgoing PCO 0700 ~ 1900 Offgoing PCO ONCOMING PLANT CONTROL OPERATOR CHECKLIST:

0700- 1900-1900 0700

1. Unit Log reviewed,

2. LCO Log reviewed.

3. Reactor Engineering Instructions reviewed.

4. Front and back panels walked down with offgoing PCO.

5. Non-Routine Training current.

6. Permit status reviewed.

0700 - 1900 Oncoming PCO 1900 - 0700 Oncoming PCO FORM OP<fM034, Rev. 0, OUPLEX, Page 2 of 9 (FQe Number R5-5l

UNIT SUPERVISOR TURNOVER SHEET 0 UNIT 1 Date 9$ .

'IBM ta 0700 SHIFT 07OO to sian End CONDITION COND IT ION POWER LEVEL GENERATOR OUTPUT II4 MWe GENERATOR OUTPUT MWe REMARKS:

UNIT A Seel A TQ Wi((~ v'n M ~~ ~ ~ <<7~-

Rasram& n) o'L4)

~ i~ C.ST SERA 5 c.na JcD C Mo~ lan HS(tl u A "Lt'jon To I4 2 So s a u Ze 0 rfli ATi+ X'Sa gg p< d'2 eh nw 5~

COMMON CW Pf Oi S ~ 7o ve>ti Ti $ 8c> 4l ( 0 V I-42 Farm Ap AtwxL%7 Rav 0 DUPLEX. Paoe 7 ol 2 (FAr Numb'S S)

OFFGOING UNIT SUPERYISOR CHECKLIST:

1900 0700.

0700 1900 Evolutions in progress and items to be completed during next shift, as noted in remarks, have been discussed with oncoming Unit Supervisor.

2. Problems encountered during past shift and abnormal plant conditions, as noted in remarks, have been discussed with oncoming Unit Supervisor.

1900%700 0700-1 900 Offgoing Unit Supervisor ONCOMING UNIT SUPERVISOR CHECKLIST:

0700. 1900.

1900 0700

1. LCO Log reviewed.

0700-1900 19$ M700 Oncoming Unit Supervisor POST RELIEF 0700 1900

1. Walk down Control Room panels'with Unit Responsible PCO.

2. Unit Log reviewed.

3. Non&outine Training current.

Form OP~7, Rev. 0, DUPLEX, Pago 2 et 2 {F& Number RS4)

SECTION Vli - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS PART A - OFFSITE RELEASE DATA 0 Section 1 - Weather and Met Data Log ote: The weather conditions for the exercise are the actual conditions which existed on

~

~

June 6, 1995. The weather forecasts used for the exercise are the actual weather forecasts

~

published on June 6th.,

SYSTEM WEATHER FORECAST for 08/14/95 UPDATE Issued: 1112 Hours From: PCC Monday - Mostly sunny today and partly cloudy tonight.

Tuesday - Increasing clouds with a chance of showers developing at night.

TEMPERATURES WINDS TUESDAY @ 1100 0400 1100 Min Time Max Time

~

Allentown 63 74 63 0400 79 1400 SE 7 Harrisburg/Lane. 65 74 63 '0600 79 1400 SE 5 Hazleton/Scranton 60 73 57 0600 79 1500 SE 6 Williamsport 59 73 56 0600 80 1500 SE 5 Wednesday - Showers and thundershowers.

Average Max Temp 77 Min 63 Thursday - Partly cloudy with a chance of a shower or thundershower at night.

AverageMax Temp 83 Min 62 Friday - A few early showers and thundershowers, then partly cloudy.

Average Max Temp 80 Min 60 NOTE: THE 0130 AND 1130 WEATHER FORECASTS ARE FILED IN THE PUBLIC. FILE UNDER

¹WTHR2Q91, ¹WTHR3Q91, ETC.

l l

Note: The weather conditions for the exercise are the actual conditions which existed on June 6, 1995. The weather forecasts used for the exercise are the actual weather forecasts published on June.6th.

VII-2

SYSTEM WEATHER FORECAST for 08/1 5/95 Issued: 0300 Hours From PCC uesday - Increasing clouds with some showers tonight. SE- 7 TEMP E RATU RES Tuesday Wednesday 1100 Max Time 1100 Min Time Max Time Allentown 73 75 1300 69 63 0500 78 1700 Harrisburg/Lancaster 74 76 1300 70 64 0500 79 1700 Hazleton/Scranton 70 75 1400 67 62. 0500 75 1700 Williamsport 73 80 1500 70 62 0500 78 1500 Wednesday.- Showers ending during the day followed by partial clearing. Partly cloudy at night.

NW-5.

NOTE: THE 0130 AND 1130 WEATHER FORECASTS ARE FILED IN THE PUBLIC FILE UNDER WTHR2Q91, ¹WTHR3Q91, ETC.

Dispatch PCC ote: The weather conditions for the exercise are the actual conditions which existed c."

June 6, 1995. The weather forecasts used for the exercise are the actual weather forec=s's published on June 6th.

Vll-3

SYSTEM WEATHER FORECAST for 08/1 5/95 UPDATE Issued: 1130 Hours 'From: PCC 1

TUESDAY - Partly to mostly sunny and warm today. Increasing clouds by late in the day and tonight with showers or some drizzle possible.

WEDNESDAY - Showers ending during the day followed by partial clearing. Partly cloudy at night.

TEMPERATURES WINDS WEDNESDAY 1'I 00 0400 1100 Min Time Max Time Allentown 64 69 63 0500 . 78 1700 NW6 Harrisburg/Lane. 65 70 64 0500 79 1700 NW 5 Hazleton/Scranton 63 67 62 0500 75 1700 W 6 Williamsport 63 70 62 0500 78 '500 W 6 THURSDAY - Variably cloudy during the day and at night.

Average Max Temp 84 Min 63 FRIDAY' An early shower or some clouds. A bit cooler. Becoming partly cloudy.

Average Max Temp 78 Min 59 SATURDAY - Partly cloudy and seasonable.

Average Max Temp 80 Min 57.

NOTE: THE 0130 AND 1130 WEATHER FORECASTS ARE FILED IN THE PUBLIC FILE UNDER

¹WTHR2Q91, ¹WTHR3Q91, ETC.

Dispatch PCC Note: The weather.conditiorIs for the exercise are the actual conditions which existed on June 6, 1995. The weather forecasts used for the exercise are the actual weather forecasts published on June 6th.

VII-4

10 METER 60 METER 15 MIN AVG SIGMA WIND MPH SIGMA WIND AMB. PRECIP. MIXING ERIOD THETA FROM THETA FROID TEMP DEPTH ENDING AT 1400 23 139 44 18 145 7.6 81 1900 1415 28 134 6.1 18 138 8.3 81 1900 1430 24 90 41 18 109 8.1 81 .1900 1445 28 105 5 18 119 6.6 81 1900 1500 28 88 3.3 23 122 7.0 80 1900 1515 33 152 4.4 21 149 7.8 80 1900 1530 24 156 4.6 17 159 9.6 81 1900 1545 22 129 48 12 129 7.5 81 1900 1600 24 140 3.5 21 5.5 81 1900 1615 26 147 5.7 19 149 10.5 80 1900 1630 18 148 54 11 162 8.4 80 1900 1645 20 145 5.4 16 149 9.4 80 1900 1700 16 157 4.4 10 160 8.3 80 1900 1715 23 143 53 13 138 9.2 80 1900 1730 23 142 38 19 155 7.6 80 1900 1745 29 152 36 13 169 6.9 80 1900 1800 '25 167 4.5 10 171 7.6 80 1900 1815 157 37 10 160 8.3 80 1900 1830 25 145 43 12 150 9.1 79 1900 20 148 4.8 8 157 9.7 78 1900 1900 17 155 39 6 161 8.6 78 1900 1915 19 157 3.1 7 163 6.3 77 1900 1930 19 151 2.8 7 160 6.3 77 1900'.

'1945 15 150 2.8 4 155 8.0 77 1900 2000 16 150 2.5 4 159 7.3 76 1900 2015 13 151 23 4 156 6.9 75 1900 2030 18 80 1.1 10 129 6.1 74 1900 2045 17 124 39 8 122 10.1 74 1900 2100 16 130 . 4.7 6 129 9.4 74 1900 2115 13 119 4.3 6 123 10.2 73 1900 2130 28 40 1.5 17 89 4.1 72 1900 2145 22 39 2.5 23 55 4.6 71 1900 2200 15 24 31 18 38 4.8 71 1900 2215 20 23 14 33 71 1900 2230 22 19 29 10 35 4.8 71 1900 2245 13 17 2.7 10 32 5.4 70 1900 2300 18 30 1.9 17 42 3.3 70 1900 ote: The weather conditions for the exercise are the actual conditions which existed on June 6, 1995. The weather forecasts used for the exercise are the actual weather forecasts

~

published on June.6th.

VII-5

SECTION VII - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS PART A - OFFSITE RELEASE DATA Section 2- Plume Trajectory and Field Monitoring Team Data Filed Monitoring Thyroid Dose Rate Ground Contamination Projected Dose Summary Air Concentration Ingestion Summary Depleted and Un<epleated XIQ

SITZ: SSES UNIT: UNIT MENU 4 TITLE: FIELD MONITOR THYROID DOSE RATE MODEL: PROJECTED-PLUME SEGMENT PERIOD: 6.98 HOUR PROJECTION BSQLj4~KS CURRENT TIME:, 96/19/95 16:11 RUN TIHE: 96/19/95 15:Si HET: FROM SCENARIO 18 1ST MET: WS= 4MPH, WD=145,ST=A END DATE OF 15 HINUTZ RATE COMPUTATION: 86/19/95 28:53 START RELEASE: 86/19/95 IS: 23 ZND RELEASE: 86/19/95 28: 53 RELEASE: MONITOR V ALUES FROM SCENARIO 18 ACCIDENT TYPE 93 1ST RgL .RATE< CI/SEC>: 1. 2K+98 TOTAL CI: NG: 1.2K+86, P:1.2K+83 I: l. 5K+84 PEAK FM TH <MRKM/HR>: 1.4K+84 DIR<TO>: NW DIST<MILKS>: 8.7

)

~4 CONTOUR LEGEND THY RATE CARTRDGE FILTER

---

<CPH> 'CPH>

)

+"

fh 1 2 ~ 5E+84 8 ~ +98 8 BE+ 88

~

2 1.8K+84 8. 88 8. 8K+98, 3 S.BE+13 S. +Be e. BE+88.

teak 2.5E+83 8 BE+88 8 8K+88

~ ~

5 1eBE+83 Q.BE+88 8 8K+88

~~M)"

6' 5.BE+82

~

8. BE+88 8. BE+88

4. 2.5E+92 B.BE+89 Q. BE+98

~~VI 8 1.BE+82 e. BE+Be. e. 8K+Be 9 5.BE+81 Q.BE+Be e. 8K+88 18 1.BE+Bi Q.BE+98 S. BE+ 88

'C 11 5..BE+98 8. BE+88 8. 8K+ 88 12 1 BE+88 S.8K+98 8. BK+ BB 13 5 BE-81 B.BE+Be e. 8K+98 14 1. BE-81 8 BE+88 8 BE+88 ~

15 5. QE-92 8 9K+98 8 8K+88 ~

SITE: ES UNIT: UNIT MENU A ISOTOPE: I-131 TITLE: G ROUND CONTAMINATION MODEL: PROJECTED-PLUHE SEGMENT PERIOD: 6.88 HOUR PROJECTION Q Q Pf~ES CURRENT.'IME: 86/19/95 16:14 RUN TIHE: 16/19/95 15: 81 HET: FROM SCENARIO 18 Ygq 1ST MET: WS= 4HPH WD=145,ST=A

~R), START OF INTEG: 96/19/95 14:53 END OF I NTEG 86/19/95 28: 53

) START RELEASE 96/19/95 18: 23

+~~a)

END RELEASE: 96/19/95 29: 53 RELEASE; MON I TOR V A LU KS FROM SCENARIO 18 ACCIDENT TYPE 93

'"kj TOTAL CI 'GP: 1. 2E+83 1ST REL RATE< CI/SEC>: 1 . 2K+88 1 ~ 2E+86, I ll.. 5E+84 PEAK CONC, <UCI/H~2>: 4. 8 E 92 DIR<TO>: NNW DIST <HI LES >: S. 6 EXCEEDS CONTOUR CONCENTRATION l.lFi98 'M2 LEGEND <UCI/H2> UC: I 4+BE+83+

!m 5

2.BE+83-4.BE+93 ieBE+83 U SE+83 7 BE+92-ioQE+83 4 BE+82-7 'E+82 6 2.BE+92-4.BE+82 7 BE+92-2 BE+92 8 7 BE+81-1.8K+82 '

9 BE+81-7.BE+11 19 2. BE+91-4. BE+Bi 11 1 BE+91-2.8K+81,

~

12 7.BE+88-1 BE+91 13 4.8K+88-7.BE+88 14 2.BE+18-4.BE+18 15 l 1 . BE+88-2. BE+98

GROUND CONTAMINATION SITE: SSES UNIT: UNIT 1 MENU: A 'DATE: 86/19/95 16: 31 START OF RELEASE: 86/'19/'95 18: 23 START OF I NTEGRATI ON: 86/19/95 14: 53 END OF RELEA GROUND SZ: 86/1 9/'95 28: 53

'CONTAMINATION (UCI/M2) FOR 6. 88 ZND OF INTEGRATION: 86/19/95 HR PROJECTION T I NE ISOTOPE:

28: 53 DISTANCE (MILES)

DIR 8. 86 8. 19 8. 31 e. 44 e. 56 e. 69 8. 81 TOW ARD N 3. 2E+82 8 'Z+88 4. Sz-81 1 . SE-81 1. ez-ei 1 e 7E-81 3. 7E-ei N 2 3. 3K+81 9. BZ-Si e. QE+ee 8. BE+88 8. BE+88 8. BE+88 5. 1Z-83 NNE 3 2.7E+88 8. BE+88 8. QE+BB B.BE+88 8. 8K+Be 8 BE+89

~ 8. BE+88 SM 48 2. SE+81 8. BE+88 B.BE+88 B.BE+88 e. ez+ee 8. BE+88 8 BE+88

~

SW 41 2 Sz+81

~ 7 . 2K+88 S.BE+88 e.eE+ea B.BE+88 8, BE+88 8 BE+ 88

~

Sll 42 1 ~ 4E+ 82 7.2E+88 8 'E+88 8. BE+Be B.BE+88 8. 9K+88 8 BE+ 88

~

WSW 43 1 4E+ 82

~ 4 BE+81

~ 8, QE+BQ BeaE+88 8. BE+98 8. BE+88 8. QE+88 WSM '5 4.BE+92 4.ez+ei Qeaz+88 B.BE+88 9. BE+98 8. BE+88 8. eE+ee WSW 4e BE+82 1 e 2K+82 5.2K+88 9. SE-ai 8 BE+ 88

~ BeBE+88 a. ez+ee WSW 46 4. BE+82 1. 2E+82 5. 2K+89 9. 5E-Si 8, BE+88 B.BE+89 8 BE+88

~

47 4 BE+ 82

~ 1. 2E+82 1 . SE+Bi 5. 2E+88 5 '9E-81 Q.BE+88 8 BE+ 88

~

M 48 4 BE+ 82

~ 1 2E+82

~ 1 ~ 5E+Bi 3. 2K+88 3 2E+Be

~ 4.5z-ei 8 BE+ 88

~

W 49 4e 1K+82 4, BE+81 1 ~ Sz+81 9 . 4E+BQ 3 ~ 2E+88 4e SE-81 B.BE+88 M 59 1. Sz+82 4. BE+81 5 . 5E+Be 9. SE+88 2.5E+Be 4 5E-81

~ 8 Qz+ 88

~

WNM 51 1. 5E+82 4. 2E+91 6. 5E+89 9. SE+88 7 ~ 2E+88 2 5E+89

~ 3. 1E-81 WNM 52 1 8E+82

~ 9 ~ 9E+88 6. 6E+88 3 2E+88

~ 7 ~ 6E+88 4. 3E+88 9. 2E-81 WNW 53 3 Sz+82 e 1 ~ SE+81 2 ~ 3K+88 3 ~ 2E+88 8 e 1 E+88 1 6K+Bi e 1 8Z+88 e

WNW 54 4 3E+82

~ 1.3E+82 8 ~ 6E+ 88 7,. 4E+88 "

2 ~ 1 E+81 1 9E+Si

~ 5. 3E+Be NM S5 1. 7E+83 1 7E+ 82

~ 7. 4E+Qi 1 . BE+81 2 2E+91

~ 4. 6E+81 1 3E+ 91

~

NM 56 1 7E+83

~ 6. 9K+82 3. SE+82 5. 7K+81 3. 9E+81 4. 7E+81 1 4K+ 81

~

NW 57 4e 9E+83 6. 9E+82 3. 8E+82 ' 4K+82 1 ~ 7E+82 7 e SE+81 3. BE+81 NM NNM 58 59

4. 9E+83 4 9E+93

~

2. BE+83 2 BE+ 83

~

1. QE+83

i. 1E+83

~

2,. 7E+92 7 1E+92

~

i. 9E+82

5. BE+82 1 6E+82

~

4. 2E+82

i. 4z+e2

1. 5E+82 NNM 68 4 9E+83

~ 2 BE+83

~ 1 . 1E+83 7 1E+e2

~ 5 ~ BE+82 4e4E+82 4. 2K+82 NNW 61 4e 9E+83 7 ~ BE+82 3 e 8K+82 2 5E+82

~ 1 ~ 7E+82 1 ~ 5E+82 4. 2E+82 NNM 62 2. 2E+83 6 ~ 9E+82 3. 8E+82 7. 3K+81 3 ~ 8E+81 1 e 4E+ 82 1. 5K+8 GROUN D CONTANINATION-S ITE: SSES UNIT: UNZT 1 MENU ' DATE: 86/19/95 16: 38 START OF RELEASE'6/19/95 18: 23 START OF Z NTEGRAT I 0 N: 86/19/95 14: 53 END OF RELEASE: 86/19/95 28: 53 END OF INTEGRATION 86/1 9/'95 29: 53 GROUND. CONTANINATION (UCI/N2) FOR 6.88 HR PROJECTION e

TINE I SOTOPE: I-131 DIRECTION SECTOR SITZ BOUNDARY 2 NI 5 NI 19 NI 2S NI 58 MI TOMARD NI UCI/N2 UCZ/N2 UCZ/N2 UCZ/N2 UCI/N2 UCIr M2 N A ( Be 59) 4 4E+BS 5 ~ 7E-81 2 ~ 8E-82 B, 9K+Be Q.ez+89 9 QE+ ea

~

NNK B ( 9 79) Q 9K+89 7 3E-83 8 9K+99 8 BE+89 B, BE+88 8 BE+ Be

~

NK . C < e.61) B. SR+89 8 9K+88 8. 9K+Be 8 9K+89 Q. 9K+89 8. BE+Be ZNE D ( 9.53) e. BE+as Q.BE+88 8 BE+Be 9 BE+88 9, 9K+88 9 BE+ BQ

~

z z C Se53) Se BE+89 9, BE+89 8 BE+Be 9 BE+89 a. ez+ee 8. 8E+88 ESE F ( Be 49) 9 9K+89 S. BE+89 8. 9K+89 8. BE+89 9>> 8K+Be 8. BE+88 sz G C 9 42) Q. 8K+89 8. BE+Be 8. BE+89 9. BE+89 S. 9K+88 8. BE+98 SSZ H ( Q. 34) Qe 8K+84 8 BE+88 8. QK+BQ 8 BE+Be B BE+88 8. BE+Be S J ( Se 34) Se BE+88 8, BE+Be 8. BE+Be 8, BE+88. 9 BE+Be 8 BE+ es SSM K C 8>> 42) 8. 9K+89 8 BE+Be S. BE+89 9, BE+89 Q. BE+89 8. BE+88 SM L C Q. 82) B. 9K+99 B. BE+89 8. 8K+89 8. 9K+89 9. 9K+89 Q.ez+ee WSM . N C 1>> 22) a. ax+ca B,BE+89 9, BE+Be 9 BE+89 Se BE+89 Q.BE+88 M N ( 1 82) B. BE+88

~ 8 e Qz+BB Q. BE+89 B, BE+89 Qe BE+88 8. QE+88 MNM P < S.62) 2.9K+Bi 8 BE+89 9. BE+99 .Q. Qz+89 9, 9K+89 e. BE+Be NM Q c 9.64) 1.7K+82 6 5E-83 e 5 ~ 1K-88 B. BE+89 Q. 9K+as 9. BE+88 NNM R ( Se 59) 4.8K+82 6 3E-81

~ 1. 1E-92 Be 9K+88 9 'BE+89 e. BE+Be VII-8

PROJECTED DOSE SUNNA RY

SUMMARY

OF DOSE PROJECTION FROM.START DATE OF INTEGRATION t

SITE: SSES UNIT: UNIT 1 MENU: A DATE: 86/19895 15; 54 DATE OF RUN: 86/'19i95 15: 81 START DATE OF RELEASE: 86819/'95'8: 23 DATE OF NET: 86/19/'95 18: 38 END DATE OF RELEASE, >> 86/'19/95 22: 53 PAG EXCEEDED MAX PROJECTION TINE AFFECTED LOCATION OF PEAK DOSE AT LIMIT DIR DIST CHRS> HR:NN CST> ORGAN DIRCTO> DISTCNI> PEAK(NREM> (NREM> ~ CTO>

1.88 15;53 TEDE-4DAY 1-N 8>> 59 B.eE+ee i.ez+e3 NOT EXCEEDED THY CDE 1-N S. 59 8 QE+ BB

~ 5 SE+ 83

~ NOT EXCEEDED 4 88 18:53

~ TEDE-4DAY 59-NNW ~ 8. 59 4. 8E+BB 1 BE+83

~ NOT EXCEEDED THY CDE 59-NNM B. 59 9 . SE+81 5 BE+83

~ NOT EXCEEDED 6.88 28:53 TEDE-4DAY 68-NNW 8.81 3. 6E+83 1.8E+e3 68-NNM 1 12

~

THY CDE 68-NNM 8.59 3. 9E+84 5.BE+83 59-NNl4 1. 12 F 88 23:53 TEDE-4DAY THY CDE 68-NNW 68-NNM

+ 8. 81

~8.59 3.'6E+83

3. 9E+84 1.BE+83 68-NNW 5.BE+83 59-NNi4 1 12

~

1 12

~

FM EXCEEDED MAX SNAPSHOT TINE AFFECTED LOCATION OF PEAk PEAK RATE LIMIT DIR DIST HR: NN HR'N CST> ORGAN, DIRCTO> DIST CMI > C NREM/HR) CMREMJ'HR) CTO> (MI >

15:38 15:53 1-N e. QE+ee 5. BE+81 TEDE THY CDE '-N 8>> 59 8>> 59 8 BE+Be 5>> BE+82 NOT EXCEEDED NOT EXCEEDED 18 '38 .18: 53 TEDE 8>> 94 1 ~ 2E+81 5>> BE+81 54-WNW Q. 86 THY CDE 8. 94 3 6E+82

~ U SE+82 58-NW B. 44

,.28 38 28 53 TEDE THY CDZ 61-NNM 56-NM 1 ~ 38 8.69 i.

i. 4E+83 4E+84 5 ~ BE+Bi 58-NW s.'eE+e2 s7-NM 1.62 1 '2 23:38 23 53 TEDE 38-SSM 2>>88 5. BE+Bi 5 ~ BE+81 38-SSM 2>>87 THY. CDE 38-,SSM 2.88 9. BE+82 5 SE+82 38-SSi4 U 2.87 PROJECTED PATHWAY DOSE SUNMARY SUNMARY OF PATHWAY'OSE PROJECTIONS FROM START DATE OF"INTEGRATION SITE: SSES UNIT: UNIT MENU: A DATE: 86/19/'95 1 5 55 DATE OF RUN: 86819/'95 15: 81 START DATE OF RELEASE>> 86/'19/'95 18: 23 DATE OF NET: 86/19/'95 18: 38 END DATE OF RELEASE: 86819i95 22: 53 PROJECTION TINE AFFECTED GRID PT NEAR PEAK PATHWAY DOSE (MREN)-------

(HRS) HR: MN(ST) ORGAN DIRC TO) DIST C NI ) TOTAL PLUME INHALATION GROUND F 88 15:53 TZDE-4DAY 1-N 8, 69 8 BE+Be 8, BE+Be 8, BE+88 8. BE+88 THY CDE 1-N 8>> 69 8>> BE+88 8>> BE+88 4 BS 18 53 TEDE4DAY 59-NNM 8 69 4 BE+Be 9 ~ 9E-81 1 ~ 7E+88 1. 3E+ee THY CDE 59-NNW 8 69 8 ~ 2K+Bi 8>> 2E+81 F 88 28:53 TEDE-4DAY 68-NNl4 8>> 81 3, 6K+83 2 ~ BE+83 1 . BE+83 5 . 5K+82 THV CDE 68-NNl4 8>> 69 3 'K+84 3.5E+84 9 ~ 88 23:53 TEDE-4DAY 6B-NNM, 8 81 3 ~ 6E+83 2 ~ BE+83 1, BE+83 5.5E+82 68 NNW 8 69 3 ~ 5K+84 3,5K+84 SNAPSHOT TINE THY CDE AFFECTED GRID PT NEAR PEAK -PATHi4AY DOSE RATE(NREM/HR>

HR'NN HR'NNCST> ORGAN DIRCTO> DISTCMI> TOTAL PLUME INHALATION GROUND 15:38 - 15:53 TEDE 1-N 8. 69 8. BE+88 8. 8K+Be 8, BE+Be B. BE+88 THY CDE 1-N 8>> 69 Q. BE+Be 8, SZ+BB 18'38 18'53 TEDE 68-NNW e.94 1 ~ 2K+81 4>> 4E+88 7 ~ 5E+BS 3. 1E-Q3 THV CDE 68-NNM 8 94 3>>6E)82 3.6E+82 8>>38 28:53

~ ~ TZDZ 61-NNM 1.38 1>> 4~Z83 1. 1K+83 3 ~ 8K+ 82 2. 3E-81 THY CDE 56-NM B>>69 1 'K+84 1. 4E+84 23 3$ '- 23 '53 TZDZ 3$ -SSM F 88 5 ~ BE+81 2. 2E+81 2. 8E+e1 4. 3E-92 THY CDE 38 Ssi4 2.88 9 BE+82

~ U SE+82 VII-9

SITE: SEES UNIT: UNIT HENU A ISOTOPE: I-131 HODEL: PROJECTED-PLUME SEGMENT TITLE: AZR CONCENTRATION PERIOD: 6.99 HOUR PROJECTION SQLP(~ZS CURRENT TIHZ RUN TIME:

96/19/95 16 96/19/95 15: Si

'5 HET: FROH SCENARIO 19 LST HET: NS= 4'HPH, WD=L45, ST=A

' START OF I NTZG: 96/19/95 14:

ZND OF INTEG: 96/19/95 29 START RELEASE: 96/L9/95 18.

ZND RELEASE: 96/19/95 29:

RELEASE: MONZ TOR VALUES FROM SCENARIO 18 ACCIDENT TYPE 93 LST REL RATECCI/SEC>: 1. 2K+99 TOTAL CI: NG: L. 2E+96, I: 1. 5K+94 P: 1. 2E+93 PEAK CONC ~ CUCI/M~3>: 7. 2K+98 DI R(TO>: NNlI DIST C HI LES >: B. 6 EXCEEDS CONTOUR CONCENTRATION 1.9E-94 LEGEND (UCI/H3 > VCI /H3

!8 4

5

7. BE+91+

4. BE+91-7 BE+91

~

2 ~ BE+81-4 BE+Bi 1 ~ BE+91-2. BE+Bi

?, BE+98-1 BE+el 4.eE+98-?.eE+ee 6

7 2.BE+Be-4oBE+BB 8 L.BE+98-2.BE+99 9 7 BE- Qi- 1 QE+ 9 9

~ ~

18 4.9E-91-7 QE-91 2 'E-81-4.8E-QL 12 1 BE-81-2 QE-91

~ ~

13  ? QE-92-1 BE-QL 14 4. BE-82-7. QE-92 L5 2 QE-82-4 QE-92

---AIR CONCENTRATION S ZTE: SSES UNIT: UNIT HENU: A DATE: 86/L9/95 16:27 START OF RELEASE:

~ 96/19/95 18: 23 START OF INTEGRATION: 86/19/95 14'3 END OF RELEASE: 96/19/95 28: 53 END OF INTEGRATION: 86/19/95 28 53 AIR CONCENTRATION <UCI/H3> FOR 6. Be HOUR PROJECTION TINE ISOTOPE: I-131 DI RECT I ON SECTOR S I TZ BOUNDARY 2 HI 5 NI Le HZ 25 NI 59 HI TOlIARD NI UCI/N3 UCI /M3 UCI /N3 0CI /H3 UCI/N3 UCZ/H3 N A C Be 59> 6 ~ 6E-82 8. 5E-83 3 ~ 9K-84 8 BE+99 s. BK+'ea 8 BE+ Be

~

NNE B C 8.79> 8 BE+98 1 BE-84

~ 8. BE+Be S. BE+88 8 BE+Be s. BE+Be NE C C e.61> 9. eE+ee B.QKiee 8. 8K+Be 8 BE+Be e. SK+es e. BE+Be ENE D C 8.53> 8. BE+98 B.BE+98 8. 9E+BS 8. QE+98 8. BE+as e.eE+Be K E C 8. 53> B. BE+88 B.BE+BB B. 9E+BS 8 9E+BS 8, BE+88 e. BE+Be ESE F C 8. 49> 8, BE+99 B. BE+89 Q. BE+88 8, BE+88 Qe BE+88 B.eE+BS SE G C '8.42> 8. BE+89 Q.BE+99 8. BE+Be 8 BE+Be 8. BE+98 S.BEiee SSE H C 8. 34> 8". BE+Be 9.8K+99 8. 9E+Qs S. BE+48 Q. BE+88 B.BE+Be

'S J '

Bo 34> 8. BE+98 Q. BE+Be ee BE+88 Qe BE+88 8 BE+Be S.BE+Be SSl4 K C 8. 42> 8. BE+Be 8. BE+Be 9. ez+ee Q. eE+ee B. BE+as S.BE+Be SI4 L C Q. 82> Q. BE+98 B. BE+99 S. BE+88 8. BE+Be. So QE+BB e.BE Be ASM N,' 1.22> 8. BE+98 8. BE+99 8. BE+88 8 QE+Bs S. BE+Be B. BE+Be M N C 1. 82> 8. BE+Be 8 BE+98

~ e. BE+ac Bo BE+88 8 BE+99 B.BE+Be WNM P C .62> 2. 8E-Qi B.BE+99 B. QE+BQ Q.BE+88 8. BE+88 S.BEiBS NlI Q C 8 64> 2.5E+BS 1 QE-94

~ 6. 4E-89 Q.BE+88 8. BE+98 B.BE+Be NNM R C e. 59> 7 'K+88 9. 5E-83 1. 6E-84 8, BE+88 8. BE+89 e.vE+

VI?-10

AIR CONCENTRATION SITE: SSES UNIT: UNIT HEHU A DATE: 86/29895 L6'28 START OF RELEASE: 86/29/'95 18: 23 START OF INTEGRATION: 96i19/'9$ 14:53 END OF RELEASE 86/'29/'95 28: 53 END OF INTEGRATION : 86/'29/'95 28:$ 3 AIR CONCENTRATION C UCI/'N3) FOR 6.89 HOUR PROJECTION TINE ISOTOPE: I-131 DISTANCE C MI LES)

e. e6 8. 19 8. 31 B. 44 e. 56 9. 69 8. 81 TOWARD

<<N 63 2. 6E+81 3.2E+99 1.3E+88 6. 9E-81 3. 6E-92 4 ~ 1 E-82 2 2 E+88

~

64 2. 5E+82 2 BE+ 88

~ 1 7E- Bi

~ 3. 6E-82 2. 8E-e3 2 . 4E-82 4 QE-81

~

DIR TOI4ARD B. 94 1.13 1 ~ 38'>>63 DISTANCE CNILES) 1.88 2 '3 2 '8 N 2 6. 3E-83 1. 6E-Bi 3. 5E-92 3. 4E-83 2>> 8E-83 2 ~ LE-83 1 . 3E-83 N 2 8. BE+88 5. 8E-82 7 . 6E-94 8. 9E-84 4 7E-84

~ 3. 5E-84 3. 5E-84 NNE 3 8 BE+ 88

~ 8. BE+88 8. BE+88 1>> 8E-84 1 2E-84

~ 8>> 7E-85 1 LE-84

~

WNM 52 3 2E-83

~ B.BE+88 8. BE+88 B.ez+ee B. BE+88 8. BE+88 e.ez+ee WNW 53 1 LE-82

~ 4 8 E-83

~ 2. BE-83 2 . BE-83 B.BE+89 8 BE+88

~ 8. BE+88 l4NM 54 5 3E-82

~ 2 3 E-82

~ 1. 4E-82 3 ~ 1E- 83 B.ez+ee B.BE+88 e. BE+88 NW 55 5 3E-82

~ 2 3E-82

~ 1>> 4E-82 2 . 7E-82 8 BE+88

~ 8;BE+Be 8 BE+ 89

~

NW "

56 1 5E-81

~ 7 7E-82

~ 4. 8E-82 8>> BE+Be B.BE+88 B.BE+Be B.BE+88 NM 57 1. 3E-Bi 7. 8E-82 L . 4E-81 3. 3E-82 e.eE+ee 8. BE+88 B A BE+88 NW 58 4>> 5E-81 3 8E-81

~ 2 ~ BE-81 8. 3E-82 3>> 4E-84 3 3 E-85

~ B.BE+88 NHM 59 2 ~ 2E+88 1 ~ 4E+ BS 2 ~ 3E-82 2, 3E-82 1 4E-93

~ 5>> 1E-84 2 8E- 84

~

NNM 68 6. 2E+88 1.4K+88 9 ~ BE-81 2. 7E-82 3. 7E-83 2 3 E-83

~ 1 4E-83

~

HHM 61 aLE+Be 3. 9E+88 5 ~ 8E-81 1 $ E-82

~ 8>> 3E-83 3>> 2E-93 2 6E-83

~

NHW 62 1 . 7E+88 2 6K+88

~ , 5.6z-ei 1 9E-82

~ 1. Lz-82 8 3E-83

~ 5 ~ 1 z-83 N 63 1 6E+88

~ 8. 9E-81 2 BE-81

~ L 6E-92

~ 8. 7E-83 8 ~ 3E-83 5 7E-93

~

N 64 3 2E-81

~ 1 ~ 7E-Bi 1 ~ 9E-81 6. 6E-93 3>> 8E-83 2 ~ 8E-83 2 ~ 8 E-93 AIR CONCENTRATION-SITE: SSES UNIT: UNIT NEHU: A DATE: 86829f'95 16: 27 START OF RELEASE: 86/29/95 18: 23 START OF INTEGRATION'6/'29i95 14: 53 END OF RELEASE: 868'29/'95 28 $ 3 END OF I NTEGRATI ON.. 86/'29i95 28: 53 A'I R CONCENTRAT I ON C 0 CI ~3) FOR 6~ 88 HOUR PROJECTION TINE ISOTOPE. I-.131 DISTANCE CNILES)

DIR 8. 86 8>>19 Q. 31 8. 44 8.56 8.69 8. 81 TOMARD N 4. 8E+98 L. 2z-ei 7 ~ 2E-83 2>>4E-83 1 . 6E-93 2 ~ 6E-83 5 .? E-93 N 2 4. 8E-ei 1 5Z-82

~ Q. BE+88 B.BE+88 8. 8K+Be 8, BE+Be e. eE+Be NNZ 3 4. 3E-82 B. BE+88 8. BE+88 8 BE+88

~ 8. BE+88 8. BE+88 8. BE+ BB SM 4e 3 5E-Si

~ 8. 8K+Be S.eE+Be 8 BE+88

~ e. ez+ee 8>> BE+89 e. ez+Be SW 41 3>> 5E-81 1 ~ BE-81 Q. BE+Be 8>>BE+Be 8>> BE+Be 8. QE+BB 9 BE+99 1 'Bz-Si

~

SM 42 1. 9E+BQ 8, BE+88 B.BE+88 Q.BE+Be 8. BE+88 8; BE+89 WSM 43 1. 9E+88 5.6z-ei e.ez+ee B.BE+Be B.SR+88 8>> BE+88 B. BE+ BB MSW 44 5 ~ 6E+BS 5 ~ 6E-81 8 SE+89 B.BE+Be e.ez+88 8. BE+88 8 BE+ BB 7 'E-82 U

~

MSM 45 5 6E+89

~ 1 6K+Be 1 ~ 3E-82 8, BE+Be S.ez+ee S.BE+89 WSM 46 5. 6E+BS 1 ~ 6E+88 7 'E-82 1 ~ 3E-82 8. BE+88 ' 8 BE+Be

~ B.BE+98 W 47 5. 6Z+88 1. 6K+88 2.1Z-81 7. 4E-92 8 2E-83

~ 8. BE+Be B.BE+98

.M 48 5 ~ 7E+89 1 ~ 6E+99 2>>LZ-Bl 4 5E-82

~ 5E-82 6 3E-83

~ Q.BE+88 M .49 5 ~ 7E+BQ 5 ~ 6E-81 2 2E-81

~ 1 3E-81

~ 4. 5E-82 6 3E-83

~ S.BE+Be

~

M 59 2. BE+Be 5 ~ 6E-81 7. 7E-82 1. 3E-81 3 6Z-82 6 3E-83

~ B.BE+Be WNM 51 2 ~ 8K+Be 5. 9Z-QL. 9 ~ 2Z-82 1>> 3E-81 BZ-81 3 4E-82 4. 3E-B3 WNM 52

$3

2. 5E+98 5 ~ 3E+88

i. 4z-ei 2 BE-91 9 ~ 2Z-82 3 ~ 1E-82 4>> 5E-82 4 5E-82 1 1E-81

~

1>> LE-Si

~

6'. BE-92 2 3E-81

1. 3E-82 MHW ~ 2. 6E-92 2 'E+88

~

WHM 54 6 4E+88 1 ~ 2E-81 1 BE-91

~ 2 9E-Bi

~ 2 7Z-81

~ 7. 4E-92 NM 55 2. 6z+ei 2. 5K+88 1 ~ 1K+88. 1 SE-81

~ 3 LZ-SL, 6 5E-81

~ ~ 1 . 8E-91 NW 56 2 ~ 6K+82 1. BE+Bi 5 ~ 4E+88 8 . 4E-81 5 7E-81

~ 6>> 6E-81 L. 9E-81 NW 57 7 4E+ Bi

~ 1 BE+81

~ 5 ~ 8E+89 3 ~ 7E+88 2>> 6E+89 1>> LE+88 4 4E-92

~

NM 58 7. 4E+81 3 BE+ Bi

~ 6E+Si 4. BE+88 2. 8E+88 2.4E+BQ 2. LE+89 NHI4 59 7. 4E+81 3. BE+81 1 ~ 7E+81 1 LE+81

~ 7.4E+88 6>>3E+88 2.2K+88 NNM 69 7 4E+81

~ 3. BE+81 1.7E+82 1 1 K+81

~ 7.5K+88 6 'K+88 6. 2K+98 NHM 61 7 4E+81

~ 1 LE+81

~ 5>>8E+BB 3 7E+99

~ 2 ~ 6E+88 2 'K+98 6 . 2E+89 NNM 62 3 ~ 3E+81 2 ~ BE+Bi 5 7K+88

~ 1 ~ 1K+Be 5 ~ 7E 81 2 'E+88 2. 2E BQ

PROJECTED I NGEST ION SUNNA RY-SUNMARY OF DOSE PROJECTION FROM START DATE OF INTEGRATION SITE: SSES UNIT: UNIT MENU: A DATE: 96/19i95 16: 19 DATE OF RUN: 96/19i95 15: 91 '96/19895 14: 53

'ERCENT START DATE OF INTEGRATION:

DATE OF NET: 96/'19/'95 18: 38 RELEASE: 96/'19/'95 18 '3 PROJECTION TIME CHRS>=

AFFECTED I SOTOPE

9. 98 LOCATION START DATE OF EHD DATE OF RELEASE PROJECTED LIMIT 96/19i95 22 LIMZ T EXCEED

~

ORGA N/ DIR DIST AT OF DIR DIST PATHI4AY CTO> (HI > PEAX LIMIT (TO> C NI >

COI4 CONC.

MILK I-131 CS-134 68-NNI4 69-NNW Q. 59

8. 59

4. SE+81

1. 3E+98 1 ~ 5E-Bi

1. 5E+98 2 ~ 98E+84

8. 66E+81 37-SSW 3 NOT EXCEEDED

'5 C UCI /L> CS-137 69-NNW e.s9 8. 6E-81 2. 4E+88 3 6 BE+81

~ NOT EXCEEDED SR-89 68-NNM e.s9 2 6E-95

~ 1.4E+98 1 88E-83

~ NOT EXCEEDED SR-98 69-NNW 8.59 2. 3E-96 9.8E-82 2 '4E-83 NOT. EXCEEDED HEAT I-131 69-NHW 8 59 2 2E+81

~ 4. sE-ei 4 8 1E+93

~ 63-N F 88 CONC>> CS-134 68-NNW e.s9 4 3E-81

~ 4.5E+98 9 '3E+BS NOT EXCEEDED CUCI~G> CS-1'37 69-NNW 8. 59 2. 8E-81 7 'E+eS 3.98E+BB NOT EXCEEDED SR-89 68-NNW 8,59 1. 9E-85 2 'E-Qi 7. 83E-83 NOT EXCEEDED SR-98 69-NNW 8 59

~ 1>>7E-96 4.2K+98 4 88E-BS

~ NOT EXCEEDED VEGETATION CONCENTR.

I-131 CS-1 34 68-NNI4 68-NNW B. 59

8. 59

1. 5E+82 6 ~ 9E+98

i. 3E-91

2. 6E-91

1. 15E+BS 2.67E+83 53-WNW 62-NNW 6.25 2.88 C UCI /ICG> CS-137 68-NHW 8. 59 4>> 3E+88 2 'E-91 1 '9K+83 68-NNW 1>>38 SR-89 69-NHM 8. 59 5>> 8E-84 2.9K+88 2.92E-82 NOT EXCEEDED SR-98 68-NHI4 B. 59 4 6E-85

~ 2 'E-82 1.83E-81 NOT EXCEEDED PROJECTED INGESTION SUNMARY-

SUMMARY

OF DOSE PROJECTION FROM START DATE OF INTEGRATION SITE: SSES UNIT: UNIT 1 NENU: A DATE: 96/'19/'95 DATE OF RUN 96/'19/'95 15: 91 START DATE OF INTEGRATION: 86/19@'95 DATE OF HET: 96/'19/'95 18 '38 START DATE OF RELEASE:,86/'19/'95 18>> 23 PROJECTION TINE CHRS>= 9 '8 END DATE OF RELEASE

\ >>

96 j'198'95 22 '3 AFFECTED ISOTOPE LOCATION PROJECTED LIMIT PERCENT LIMIT EXCEEDED ORGAN/ DIR DIST AT OF DIR DIST, PATHMAY CTO> CNI > PEAK LZHIT CTO> CNI >

TEDE 4-DAY CMREM> 68-NNM 9>>81 3. 6E+83 1 BE+83 3 '4E+92 63-N 2.88 THY CDE C NREM> 68-NNW 9>>59 3 ~ 9K+84 5 'E+83 7 '5K+92 NOT EXCEEDED SKIN DE 1-YR CNREN> 68-NHM Q>>59 3 ~ 5K+84 5 'E+84 6.91E+ei . HOT EXCEEDED AIR CONC 1-131 61-NHM 1 ~ 38 3. 6E-81 1 ~ QR-84 3.55K+85 53-WNW 8.88 CUCZ~~3> CS-134 61-NHM 1,38 1. 4E-Si 4 BE-84 3 '3K+84 51-l4NW 7. 38 CS-137 SR-89 61 NNM 61-NHM i>>38 1 ~ 38 8>> 8E-82

1. 2E-85 5 'E USE-84 84 1 ~ 75E+84 4.16K+88 Si-WNW 7. 38 HOT EXCEEDED SR-9$ 61-NNW 1 '8 9 ~ 3E-87 3.9E-BS 3.19K+98 NOT EXCEEDED GROUND CONT>>

CUCIPN~2>

I-131>>

CS-134 6e-NNW 68-NHM Q. S9 Q>>59

3. 7K+82 1.7E+91 1 'K+89 2.BE+81 2 '7E+84 8.66E+Bi 37-SSW NOT 3 '5 EXCEEDED CS-137 68-Nt6i 9.59 1 1E+81

~ 3 ~ BE+81 3.69E+81 NOT EXCEEDED SR-89 68-Ntoi 8>> 59 1 . 5E-83 8 ~ BE+81 1 83E-83

~ NOT EXCEEDED SR-9$ 69-NHM 8>> 59 1 ~ 1E-84 5 ~ BE+Be 2 29K 83 HOT EXCEEDED VII-12

PROJECTED I NGEST I ON

SUMMARY

OF DOSE PROJECTION FROM START DATE OF INTEGRATION SITE: SSES UNZ T: UNZ T,1 HENU: A DATE: 86/19/'95 16: 19 DATE OF RUN: 86/'19/'95 15: 81 START DATE OF INTEGR*TZON: 86/'19/'95 14: 53 DATE OF NET: 86/'19i95 18: 38 START DATE OF RELEASE: 86/'19'5 18: 23 PROJECTION TINE CHRS>= 9.88 END DATE OF RELEASE .,: 86/19/'95 22: 53 GROUND SHINE DOSE LOCATION PERCENT PAG LINI T COMMITMENT OF PEAK DOSE PAG OF EXCEEDED TINE PERIOD UNITS DIRCTO> DISTCHI> AT PEAK LIHZT ,. LIHIT DIRCTO> DZSTCNI>

1 DAY C NREM) 68-NNW 8,59 5.4E+Qi N/'A N/'A N/'A N/'A 4 DAYS C HREN> 68-NNW So59 1 9E+82

~ NIIA NiA N/'A NI A YEAR CHREM> 68-NNM 8.59 3 5E+83

~ 2. BE+83 1 7E+82

~ 61-NNM 1.13 2ND YEAR CMREN), 68-NNW 8.59 2. 3E+83 5.BE+82 4 6E+ 82

~ 61-NNM 1.13 58 YEARS CNREN> 68-NNW 8.59 2 8E+ 84

~ 5.BE+83 5 6E+82

~ 61-NNM 1.13 PEAK GROUND SHINE A I R DOSE RATE CMRADI/HR) 68-NNW B. 59 5. BE+88 AT PRO J. TINE OF: 86II19I/95 22: 53 AT 1 N I NSTRU NENT LEVEL TEDE GROUND SHINE DOSE = . PEAK TEDE CMREH> TOTAL POPULAT I ON COMNITMENT TINES CPLUHE+INHALATION+GROUND) DIRCTO> DIST CMZ > TEDE <HANREN>

9 ~ 88 HOURS CPROJ. TIME> 3 ~ 2E+ SB 68-NNW 8 o 81 1. 7K+82 1 DAY 3. 1K+88 68-NNM 8. 81 1.7K+82 4 DAYS 3 3E+88

~ 68-NNM 8.81 1.7E+82 YEAR 6 'E+QS 59-NNM 8,59 3.7K+82 2ND YEAR 5 'K+88 59-NNM 8,59 2.9E+82 58 YEARS 3. 1K+Bi 68-NNM 8.59 1 'E+83 POPULATION TEDE IS BASED ON TOTAL POPULATION IN SITE REGION VI[>>13

UNDEPLETED X/Q SITE'SES UNIT: UNIT 1 MENU: A DATE: 86/19/95 16: 16 START OF RELEASE: 86/19/95 18:23 START OF I NTEGRAT I 0 N: 86/19/95 14: 53 END OF RELEASE: 96/19/95 22: 53 END OF INTEGRATION 86/19/95 23: 53 UNDEPLETED X/Q C SEC/N3> FOR 9 88 HOUR AUERAGE

~ RELEASE POI NT DIRECTION SECTOR,S I TE BOUNDARY 2 NI 5 MI 19 NI 25 MI Ss N TOWARD NI SEC/N3 SEC/M3 'SEC/M3 SEC/N3 SEC/M3 SEC/M3 N A c e. s9> >> 2E-87 2>> 9E-87 1 'E-88 8 BE+98

~ 8. BE+88 8. QE+88 NNE B C 8.79> E-BS 1'1E-BS 8. BE+88 8 BE+89

~ . 8. BE+98 8 BE+98

~

NE C C 8. 61> .sz-es 2 4E- 89

~ 8. BE+98 e. eE+eB 9 BE+98

~ Q.9K+98 ZNE D C 8. 53> 6 ~ 7E-89 9 7E-19

~ 8. BE+98 8. BE+89 8. BE+89 8>> 8K+98 E E C 9>> 53> 6>> 7E-99 5>> Sz-18 8. QE+88 8 BE+88

~ 8,8E+98 8.BE+88 ESE F C 8. 49> 7.4E-89 9. SE-18 8. BE+Be 9. BE+89 B.ez+88 Q.QE+98 SE G C 9>> 42> 1 1E-98

~ 1. 4E-99 8. BE+Be 8>> BE+88 8. BE+88 8. BE+88 SSE H C 8. 34> S 1E-QS

~ 3>> SE-89 9>> BE+88 e. eE+ee 8, BE+88 8. QE+88 S J C 8>> 34> 3>>2E-86 2>> 2E-97 8>> QE+98 8. BE+98 9, BE+88 8. 8E+98 SSW K, C S. 42> 5>>9E-96 7 ~ QE-87 1 ~ 3E-89 e. ez+eB 8. BE+98 8. QE+88 SM ~

L C 8. S2> 6 'E-87 1 ~ 4E-87 3. BE-BS Q. QE+98 8>> BE+Be 8. BE+98 WSW M C f.22> 4.5E-QS 5. SE-es 2 ~ 3E-QS 8, 9K+98 8 BE+98 8 BE+88

~

W N C 1.82> 1 iz-87

~ 3>> 3E-QS 1 ~ 2E-QS 8>> BE+98 8. BE+98 8. 8E+88 WNM P C S. 62> 2 9E-96

~ 7 ~ 3E-BS 2 3E-BS 6. 7E-18 B.BE+88 8 'E+99

'E-96

~

NW Q C Q. 64> 3 1 9E-87

~ 1>>7E-QS 4. 4E-19 B.eE+es e.sz+es NNW R C 8. 59> 6.sz-e6 3 4E-87

~ 1 BE-88

~ 2 6E-11

~ 8, BE+98 8. BE+Be DEPLETED X/Q-SITE SSES UNIT; UNIT 1 MENU ~ A DATE: 86/19/95 16 17 START OF RELEASE: 86/19/95 1S: 23 START OF INTEGRATION: 86/19/95 14: 53 END OF RELEASE: 86/19/95 22: 53 END OF INTEGRATION: 86/19/95 23: 53 DEP, VEL, = 8. 8188 C M/SEC>

DEPLETED X/Q C SEC/N3 > FOR 9>>BB HOUR AUERAGE RELEASE POI NT 3 DIRECTION SECTOR SITE BOUNDARY 2 NI 5 MI 18 NI 25 NI 59 NI TOMARD NI SEC/N3 SEC/N3 . SEC/M3 SEC/N3 SEC/N3 SEC/N3

.N A C 8 59> 5 'Z-87 2 ~ 5E-B7 1>>iz-es 8, BE+88 s. BE+Be B.BE+98 NNX B Q>>79> 1>>7X-QS S 4E-89 B.8K+Be 8. BE+Be B. BE+88 Q.BE+98 NZ ENE C

D C

C C

Q>>61> i.

S>>53> s. ez-e9 ix-es

~

1 8 E-89

~

7.4z-ie B.BE+Be Q>>BE+Be 8>> BE+QB e.BE+ca

s. ex+ac B BE+Be e.ez+98 8>> QE+99 E E C B.53> 5 ~ QZ-89 4. 2E-18 e.ez+ea B. BE+Be S. BE+Be B. BE+98 ESX F C a>>49> 5 'X-'89 7 3Z-18

~ 8 BE+Be S. 9K+89 Q.BE+89 Q.BE+98 sz C C B>>42> ST 6X-89 1 BE-89

~ B.BE+BQ 8 BE+89 8 BE+ BB 9 BE+99

~

SSE H C Q>>34> USE-88 2 5E-89

~ 8 BE+88 8 QE+88. 8>> BE+88 8.8K+88 S J C 8>>34) 3 'Z-86 1 9E-87

~ 9>>BE+88 8, 9K+88 S. BE+88 8. QE+88 SSW K C 8 42) 5.4X-B6 5 9E-87

~ 1 ~ 1Z-89 B. BE+88 Q. SZ+BB B. 9K+99 SM L C B S2) 6 ~ 1X-87 1 2E-87 2.5Z-BS 8>> BE+Be S. SZ+98 8. 8K+98 MSM N C 1.22) 3 'E-QS 4>> 7E QS 1 ~ 9E-BS 8 BE+88 S BE+88 B. QE+88 M N C 182) 9 'Z-BS 2 ~ SE-QS 9>>6Z-89 8>> SE+BS B. BE+Be S.BE+98 WNM P C B>>62) 2 ~ 5X-86 6 ~ 2E-BS 1.>>SZ-BS 5.9z-ie Q. BZ+BQ Q.BE+98 NM Q C a.64) 3 ~ 1E-96 1 ~ 5Z-87 .1>>4Z-BS 4. BE-18 B.'E+88 9 BE+ Be

~

NNW R 'C 8 59) 6 ~ iz-86 2 ~ SE 97 ST 7E-89 2.5E-11 Q. BE+88 9. BE+98 VIE-14

SECTION Vll - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS PART A - OFFSITE RELEASE DATA Section 3 - Release Rate Data VII-15

Assumptions for determining radiological data for 1995 NRC Observed Exercise Volume of Reactor Coolant -16,900Cu Ft Source Term The following are the Curies in the core in the three categories, in Curies per megawatt thermal.

Gases 3.5E5 Ci/MWT Halogens 3.8E5 Ci/MWT Solids 3.5E6 Ci/MWT The core contains 764 Fuel Bundles The core is assumed to be rated at 3300 MWT.

To determine curies released to the coolant from one fuel bundle, The activity in Curies, (Ci/MWT) is multiplied by the core rating (3300) and the result divided by number of fuel bundles (764) all of which is divided by the coolant volume (16,900 Cu Ft),

Gases'.5E5 Ci/lVlWTX 3300 MWT/764/5.1EScc = 2,935pC/cc:

Halogens, 3.8E5 Ci/MWT X 3300 MWT/764/ 5.1EScc = 3,130pC/cc Solids 3.5E6 Ci/MWTX 3300 MWT/764/ 5.1ES'cc = 29,350pC/cc The accident scenario simulates partial fuel melt of one fuel bundle which is assumed that 10% of the available curies are released from the bundle.

Gases 2935 pC/cc X 10% ="293pC/cc (1.5E11pCi available for release)

Halogens 3130 pC/cc X 10% = 313 pC/cc (1.6E11pCi available for release)

Solids . 29,350 pC/cc X 10% = 2,935 pC/cc (1.5E11pCi available for release)

The loss of reactor coolant is assumed to be 30% over a period of two hours.

The first hour of the coolant release is primarily a gap release of fission gases. For the second hour of the release the rate of coolant discharging is decreased but the coolant activity is increased due to the fuel melt.

Ventilation flow from the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel - 11,400 SCFM Ventilation discharge flow from Turbine Building Filtered Exhaust - 42,760 SCFM Steam Tunnel Volume 76,707 Cu Ft Turbine Building Volume 1E15Cu Ft The release rate from the plant is assumed to be:

Total NOBLE Total Total IODINE Release GAS Release Part. Release TIME Cifsec for time Cilsec for time Cilsec for time 1830 to 1930 1.30E+05 4.68E+08 1.10E+06 3.96E+09 0.00E+01 O.OOE+01 1930 to 1945 1.30E+07 1.17E+10 1.10E+09 9.90E+11 1.10E+06 9.90E+08 1945 to 2000 1.10E+06 9.90E+08 1.00E+08 9.00E+10 1.00E+05 9.00E+07 2000 to 2015 1.00E+06 9.00E+08 9.00E+07 8.10E+10 8.00E+04 7.20E+07 2015 to 2030 5.50E+05 4.95E+08 7.80E+07 7.02E+10 7.00E+04 6.30E+07 2030 to end 1.00E+05 3.60E+08 1.00E+06 3.60E+09 O.OOE+01,,0.00E+01 TOTAL 1.49E+10 1.24E+12 1.22E+09 RELEASED IN Ci TOTAL 1.60E+12 1.50E+12 1.50E+13 AVAILABLEIN pCI STEAM TUNNEL CONCENTRATIONS TIME IODINE NOBLE Part.

1830 to 1930 1.30E-01 1.10E-01 0.00E+01 1930 to 1945 1.30E+02 1.10E+02 1.10E+03 1945 to 2000 1.30E+01 1.00E+01 1.00E+01 2000 to 2015 1.00E+01 1.00E+01 1.00E-OO 2015 to 2030 3.00E-01 4.00E-OO 1.00E-OO 2030 to end 1.00E-02 1.00E-01 O.OOE+01 VII-17

TURBINE BUILDINGCONCENTRATIONS TURBINE TIME pCilco ~re Release GAS -- Release pCifco ~re Release for for time pCifcc for time (pQ%0n) t]me 1830 to 1930 1.00E-08 1.20E+01 4.32E+04 1.00E-06 1.20E+03 4.32E+06 0.00E+01 0.00E+01 0.00E+0.1 1930 to 1S45 1.00E-06 1.20E+03 1.08E+06 1.00E-05 1.20E+04 1.08E+07 1.00E-07 1.20E+02 1.08E+05 1S45 to 2000 1.30E-05 1.56E+04 1.40E+07 1.10E-04 1.32E+05 1.19E+08 1.00E46 1.20E+03 1.08E+06 2000 to 2015 1.00E-06 1.20E+03 1.08E+06 4.00E-05 4.80E+04 4.32E+07 1.00E-07 1.20E+02 1.08E+05 2015 to 2030 3.00E-07 3.60E+02 3.24E+05 1.00E45 1.20E+04 1.08E+07 1.00E-08 .1.20E+01 1.08E+04 2030 to end 1.00E8 1.20E+01 4.32E+04 1.00E-06 1.20E+03 4.32E+06 0.00E+01 0.00E+01 0.00E+01 TOTAL 1.66E+07 1.92E+08 1.31E+06 ~

RELEASED IN CI TOTAL- 1.60E+12 1.50E+12 1.50E+13 M

M I

AVAILABLE 00 IN pCI Note: The indicated release rates from the Turbine building are only a small fraction of the actual release rate from the plant. The Health Physics personnel will use the indicated release rates to perform dose calculations. The results will not coincide with the readings found in the field and back calculations will need to be done or study case calculations will have to be performed.

PART Vll - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS II PART B - REACTOR WATER ISOTOPIC VII-19

PENNSYLVANIA POWER LIGHT COMPANY DRILL$ 95NRC2

.REVISION 0$ 05/16/9S Reactor Mater Concentrations (pCi/ml)

~Zsoto e 18$ 30. 19$ 00 19$ 30 20$ 00 20$ 30 21$ 00 21$ 30- 22$ 00 I-131 2.30E+02 3.30E+02 2.29E+02 2.29E+02 2.29E+02 2.28E+02 2.28E+02 2.27E+02

.I-132 4.56E+02 3.92E+02 3.36E+02 2.89E+02 2.48E+02 2.13E+02 1.83E+02 1.57E+02 1-133 5.21E+02 5.12E+02 5.04E+02 4.95E+02 4.87E+02 4.79E+02 4.72E+02 4.64E+02 I-134 8.25E+02 5.55E+02 3.74E+02 2.51E+02 1.69E+02 1.14E+02 7.66E+01 5.16E+01 I-135 4.56E+02 4.33E+02 4.11E+02 3.90E+02 3.70E+02 3.51E+02 3.33E+02 3.16E+02 Kr-83m 3.08E+02 2.55E+02 2.11E+02 1.75E+02 1.45E+02 1.20E+02 9.91E+01 8.20E+01 Kr-85m 1.18E+03 1.09E+03 1.01E+03 9.36E+02 8.66E+02 8.02E+02 7.42E+02 6.87E+02 Kr-85 4.07E+00 4.07E+00 4.07E+00 4.07E+00'.60E+02 4.07E+00 4.07E+00 4.07E+00 4.07E+00 Kr-87 1.50E+03 1.14E+03 8.68E+02 5.02E+02 3.82E+02 2.91E+02 2.21E+02 Kr-88 2.67E+03 2.36E+03 2.09E+03 1.86E+03 1.64E+03 1.46E+03 1.29E+03 1.14E+03 Kr-89'e-131m 1.60E+02 2.38E-01 .3.55E-04 5.28E-07 7.86E-10 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 2.96E+01 2. 95E+01 2.95E+01 ~ 2.95E+Ol 2.94E+01 2.94E+Ol 2.94E+01 2.93E+Ol Xe-133m 1.42E+02 1.41E+02 1.40E+02 1.40E+02 1.39E+02 1.38E+02 1.37E+02 1 36E+02 Xe-133 5.93E+03 5.91E+03 5.90E+03 5.88E+03 5.87E+03 S;85E+03 5.83E+03 5.82E+03 Xe-135m 2.73E+02 6.95E+01 1.77E+01 4.50E+00 1.15E+00 2.92E-01 7.43E-02 1.89E-02 Xe-135 5.27E+03 5.08E+03 -4.89E+03 4.70E+03 4.53E+03 4.36E+03 4.20E+03 4.04E+03 Xe-137 2.55E+02 1.08E+00 4 61E-03 1.96E-OS 8.35E-OB 3.55E-10 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 Xe-138 1.06E+03 2.42E+02 5.55E+01 1.27E+Ol 2.92E+00 6.68E-01 1 53E-01 3.51E-02 Cs-137 3.21E+Ol 3.21E+01 3.21E+01 3.21E+Ol 3.21E+Ol 3.21E+Ol 3.21E+01 3.21E+01 Cr-51 4.20E-03 4.20E-03 4.-20E-03 4.19E-03 4.19E-03 4.19E-03 4.19E-03 4.18E-03 Mn-54 5.20E-OS 5.20E 5. 20E-05 5.20E"05 5.20E-05 5.20E-OS 5.20E-OS S.20E-OS Co-58 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 Fe-59 2.20E-OS 2.20E-05 2.20E-OS 2.20E-05 2.20E-OS 2.20E-OS 2.20E-05 2.20E-OS Co-60 2.90E-04 2.90E"04 2.90E-04 2.90E-04 2.90E-04 2.90E-04 2.90E-04 2 '0E-04 Zn-65 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 1.50E-04 Sr-89 7.40E-OS 7.40E-05 7.40E-OS 7.40E-05 7.40E"05 7.40E-OS 7.40E-05 7.40E-05 Sr-90 S.OOE-06 S.OOE-06 5.00E-06 S.OOE-06 5 OOE-06 5 OOE-06 5.00E-06 5 ~ OOE-06 Sr-91 3.00E-03 2.89E-03 2.79E-03 2.70E-03 2.60E-03 2.51E-03 2 42E-03 2.34E-03 Cs-134 2.20E-OS 2.20E-05 2-20E-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-OS 2 20E-05 2+20E-OS 2.20E-OS

.Ba-140 3.00E-04 3.00E-04 2.99E-04 2.99E-04 2.99E-04 2.98E-04 2.98E-04 2.98E-04

SECTION Vll - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS PART C - SUPPRESSION POOL WATER ISOTOPIC VII-21

PENNSYLVANIA POWER fc LIGHT COMPANY DRILL: 95NRC2 REVISION 0: 05/16/95 Su ression Pool Concentrations (pCi/ml)

~Isete e 18:30 19:00 19:30 20:00 20: 3.0 21:00 21:30 22:00 I-131 O.OOE+00 0-OOE+00 O.OOE+00. 0.008+00 ~

0.008+00 0.008+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 I-132 O.OOE+00 0.008+00 O.OOE+OO O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.008+00 I-133 0.008+00 O.OOE+00 0.008+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.008+00 O.OOE+00 0.008+00 I-134 O.OOE+00 O.OOEt00 O.OOE+00 0.008+00 .0.008+00 O.OOE+00 0.008+00 0.008+00 I-135 0:008+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.008+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.008+00 Kr-83m 2.488-01 2.06E"01 1.70E-01 1.418-01 1.17E-01 9.64E-02 7.988-02 6.60E>>02 Kr-85m 9.518-01 8.808-01 8.14E-01 7.548-01 6.988-01 6.46E-01 5.98E-01 5. 53E-01 Kr-85 3.288-03 3.28E-03 3.2&E-03 3.2&E-03 3.28E-03 3 '&E-03 3.288-03 3.288-03 Kr-87 1.21E+00 9.19E-01 6.99E-01 5.328-01 4.05E-01 3.08E-Q1 2.34E-01 1.788-01 Kr-88 2.15E+00 1.90E+00 1.69E+00 1.49E+00 1.328+00 1.178+00 1.04E+00 9.20E-01 1.298-01 1-928-04 2.86E-07 4.258-10 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.008+00 Xe-131m 2.3&E-02 2-3&E-02 2.3&E-02 2.378-02 2.378-02 2.37E-02 2.368-02 2.368-02 Xe-133m 1.15E-Ol 1.148-01 1.138-01 1.128-01 1.12E-01 . 1.118-01 '1.108-01 1.09E-ol Xe-133 4.788+00 4.76E+00 4.75E+00 4.748+00 4.738+00 4.71E+00 4.70E+00 4.69E+00 Xe-135m 2.20E-01 5.60E-02 1.428-02 3.63E-03 9.248-04 2.35E-04 S.99E-OS 1.52E-OS Xe-135 4.258+00 4.09E+OQ 3.94E+00 3.79E+00 3.65E+00 3.51E+00 3.38E+00 3.25E+00 Xe-137 2.058-01 8.74E-04 3.728-06 1.5&E-08 0.008+00 O.OOE+00 0.008+00 0.008+00 Xe-138 &.SOE-01 1.95E-01 4.47E-02 1.02E-02 2.358-03 5.3&E-04 1.23E-04 2.&3E-OS Cs-137 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.008+Qo O.OOE+OO 0.008+00 O.OOE+00 0-008+00 O.OOE+00 Cr-51 2.20E<<05 2.20E-OS 2.208-05 2.20E-05 2.20E-05 2.19E-05 2.19E-OS 2.19E-OS Mn-54 2.50E-07 2.50E-07 2.50E-07 2.50E-07 2.50E-07 2.50E-07 2.50E-07 2.50E-07 Co-58 7.00E 07 7.00E-07 7 OOE-07 7.00E-Q7 6.998-07 6.99E-07 6.99E-07 6.99E-07 Pe-59 1.00E-07 1 OOE-07 9.99E-08 9.998-08 9.99E"08 9.9&E-08 9.988-08 9.988-08 Co-60 1.50E-06 1.508-06 1.50E-06 1.508-06 1.50E-06 1.50E-06 1.50E-06 1.508-06 Zn-65 7 7.008-07 7.00E-07 7.00E-Q7 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 7.008-07 Sr-89 OOE-07'.00E-07 3.008-07 3.00E-07 3.00E-07 3.00E-07 3.008-07 3.008-07 3.00E-07 Sr-90 2.00E-OB 2 'OE-O& 2.00E-O& 2.00E-O& 2.00E-08 2.008-08 2.00E-08 2.00E-08 Sr-91 1.50E-OS 1.458-05 1.40E-05 1.35E-OS 1.30E-05 1.25E-OS 1.21E-QS 1.17E-05 Cs-134 1.008-07 1.00E-07 1.008-07 1.00E-07 1.00E-07 1.00E-07 1.00E-07 1.00E-07 Ba-140 1.50E-06 1.508-06 1.508-.06 1.49E-06 1.498-06 1.49E"06 1.49E-06 1.498-06

SECTION Vll - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS PART D - DRYNtELL AIR ISOTOPIC USE AS FOUND VII-23

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY DRILL: 95NRC2 REVISION 0: 05/16/95 D well Air S ace Gas Sam le Data (pCi/cc)

~Isoto 8 18:30 19: 00 19:30 20:00 20: 30 21:00 21:30 22:00 I-131 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OQE+00 I-132 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 I-133 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00

'-134 O.OOE+00 O-QOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 I-135 O.OOE+00 0 OOE+00 O.OQE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OQE+00 O.OQE+00 O.OOE+00 Kr-83m . O.OOE+00 O.OQE+00 O.OQE+00 O.OOE+OO Q.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+OO O.OOE+00 Kr-85m O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 Kr-85 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.QOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 Kr-87 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OQE+00 0;OOE+00 O.QOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 M

Kr-88 O.OOE+00 O.OOEWOO O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O,.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00

~I Kr-89. O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OQE+00 Q.OOE+00 0;OOE+00 O.OOE+00 w Xe-131m O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OQE+00 O.OOE+00 Q.OOE+00 Xe-133m O.OOE+00 0 OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00. O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 Xe-133 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00. O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 Xe-135m O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 Xe-135 O.QOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.QOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 Xe-137 O.OOE+00 O.OOEtoo O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OQE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 Xe-138 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.QOE+00 O.OQE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 Cs-137* O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00

SECTION Vll - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS

~

PART E - WETWELL AIR ISOTOPIC VII-25

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY DRILLS 95NRC2 REVISION 0: 05/16/95 Wet(sell Air S ace Gas Sam le Data (pCi/cc)

~Isoto e 18:30 19:00 19:30 20: 00 20:30 21:00 21:30 22:00 I-131 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.QOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OQE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 I-132 O.OOE+00 O-OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.QOE+00 I-133 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 Q.OQE+00 O.OQE+00 O.OQE+00 O.QOE+00 I-134 O.QOE+00 O.OQE+00 O.OOE+00 Q.OOEt00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OQE+QQ I-135 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OQE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 Kr-83m 2.13E+01 1 '76E+Ol 1.46E+Ol 1.21E+Ol 9.99E+00 8.26E+00 6.84E+00 5.66E+QQ Kr-85m 8.15E+01 7.54E+Ol 6.98E+Ol 6.46E+01 5.98E+01 5.53E+01 5.12Et01 4.74E+01 Kr-85 2.81E-01 2.81E-Ol 2.81E-01 2.81E-01 2.81E-01 2.81E-01 2.81E-01 2.81E-Ol Kr-87 1.04E+02 7.88E+Ol 5.99E+01 4.56E+Ol 3.47Et01 2.64E+01 2.01E+Ol 1.53E+01 Kr-88 1.84E+02 1.63E+02 1.45E+02 1.28E+02 1.13E+02 1.01E+02 8.91E+01 7.89E+01

~ Kr-89 1 ~ llE+01 1.65E-02 2.45E-05 3.65E-08 O.OQEt00 O.QOE+00 O.QQE+00 O.OQE+00 M Xe-131m 2.04E+00 2.04E+00 2.04E+00 2.03E+00 2.03E+00 2.03E+00 2.03E+00 2.02E+00

~~xe-133m 9.83E+00 9.76E+00 9.70E+00 9.64E+00 9.57E+00 9.51E+00 9.45E+00 9.38E+00 Xe-133 4.10E+02 4.08E+02 4.07E+02 4.06E+02 4.05E+02 4.04E+02 4.03E+02 4.02E+02 Xe-135m 1.88E+01 4.80E+00 1-22E+00 3.11E-Ol 7.92E-02 2.02E-02 5.13E-03 1.31E-03 Xe-135 3.64E+02 3.50E+02 3.37E+02 3.25E+02 3.13E+02 3.01E+02 2.90E+02 2.79E+02 Xe-137 1.76E%01 7.49E-02 3.19E"04 1.36E-06 5.76E-09 O.OOE+00 Q.OOE+00 =O.OOE+00 Xe-138 7.29E+01 1.67E+01 3-83E+00 8 '8E-Ol 2.01E-01 4.61E-02 1 06E-02 2.42E-03 Cs-137 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0-OOEtDO O.OOE+00 O.QOE+OQ Q.OOE+00

SECTION Vll - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS PART F - CONTAINMENTPOST ACCIDENT RADIATIONMONITOR READINGS VII-27

CONTAINMENTPOST ACCIDENT RADIATION MONITOR READINGS 4

TIME 'A'ONITOR 'B'ONITOR READING R/Hr READING R/Hr 18'30 150 2280 19:00 116 1770 19:30 98 1500 20:00 85 1310 20:30 75 1160 21'00 65 1030 21'30 58 929 22:00 53 840 VII-28

SECTION Vll - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS PART G - REACTOR BUILDINGARM VII-29

Reactor Building Area Radiation Monitors LEVEL 645 LOCATION NORMAL RANGE 18j30 19j00 19j30 20j00 20j30 21joo 21j30 ARH-Ol RHR Room B 9.20 .1-1000 9. 9.20 9.20. 9.20 9.20 9.20 9.20 ARH-25 RHR Room A 12.20 .1-1000 20'2.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20 ARM-02 RCIC Room 0.21 .01-100 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 ARM-03 HPCI Room 1.65 F 01-100 1. 65 1. 65 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 ARM-04 . RB/RM Sump Area 1.80 .1-1000 l. 80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80 LEVEL 670 ARH-16 REM SHDN Room O.ll .01-100 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 ARM-36 U-1 RR Access Bay 0 11 .01-100 0 ~ 11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 LEVEL 719 ARM-05 CRD North 0.40 .1-1000 0. 40 0.40 0.40 0. 40 0.40 0. 40 0 '0 ARH-06 CRD South 1 00 .1-1000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 ~ 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 ARM-26 IG(TIP Drive Area 0.50 .1-1000 0.50 0.5Q 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 ARM-41 TIP Chamber Shld 0.40 .1-1000 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 ARM-09 CRD Repair Room 0.70 .1-1000 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 LEVEL 749 ARH-08 RHCU Recirc Area 0.24 .1-1000 0.24 0.24 0-24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 ARH-10 Fuel Pool PP Area 1.00 .1-1000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 LEVEL 779 ARM-ll Sample Room 1.06 .01-100 27.00 21 20 18.20 16.00 14.2Q 12-8Q 11.60 LEVEL 799

• ARM-12 Recirc Fan Room 0.08 .01-100 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 . 0.08 0.08 0.08 LEVEL 818 ARH-14 Spnt Fuel Crit Mon 1 20, .1-1000 1.20 1.20 1-20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1 ~ 20 ARH-15 Refuel Flr-North 0.16 .01-100 0. 16. 0.16 0.16 0. 16 0.16 0.16 0.16 ARH-35 Samp Cask Stor 0.34 .01-100 0. 34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 hSH 1'$ Nuu Fuu1 Cr i t Hon 0.25 .1-1000 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 hhjj a: j u a: I 1 1 j' Wa! s j. 0.40 .01-100 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0

uuiiuiug sr~a aaaxation Monitors LEVEL 645 LOCATION NORMAL RANGE 22:00 ARH-Ol RHR Room B 9.20 .1-1000 9.20 ARM-25 RHR Room A 12.20 .1-1000 12.20 ARM-02 RCIC Room 0.21 ;01-100 0.21 ARM-03 MPCI Room 1.65 .01-100 1.65 ARM"04 RB/RW Sump Area 1.80 .1-1000 1.&0 LEVEL 670 ARM-16 REH SHDN Room O.ll .01-100 0.11 ARM-36 U-l RR Access Bay 0.11 .01-100 0.11 LEVEL 719 ARH-05 CRD North 0.40 .1-1000 0.40 ARM-06 CRD South 1.00 .1-1000 1.00 ARM-26 IG(TIP Drive Area 0.50 .1-1000 Q.50 ARH-41 TIP .Chamber Shld Q.4Q .1-1000 0.40 ARM-09 CRD Repair Room 0.70 .1-1000 0.70 LEVEL 749 ARM-08 RWCU Recirc Area 0.24 .1-1000 ~

0.24 ARH-10 Fuel Pool PP Area 1.00 .1-1000 1.00 "LEVEL 779 ARM-11 Sample Room 1.06 .01-100 10.60 ARM-12: Recirc Fan Room 0.08 .01-100 0.08 LEVEL 818 ARM~14 Spnt Fuel Crit Mon 1.20 .1-1000 1.20 ARH-15 Refuel Fir-North 0.16 F 01-100 0 16 ARM-35 Samp Cask Stor 0.34 .01-100 0.34 ARH-13 NeM Fuel Crit Mon ~

0.25 .1-1000 0.25 ARH-42 Refuel Flr-West 0. 40 .01-100 0.40

Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 15 Paint Display Services Current Time: 1&:30 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion state Now Last Limit Limit Vsits PAR04 ARM-04-RB/RW Sump Area 1.80 1.80 15.00 NONE mR/hs PAR25 ARM-25-RHR Room A 12.20 12.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR01 ARM-01-RHR Room B 9 '0 9.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR02 ARM-02-RC1'C Room 0 '1 0.21 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR03 ARM>>03-HPCI Room 1 ~ 65 1. 65 8.00 NONE mR/hr PAR36 ARM-36-U-1,RR Access Bay 0.11 0.11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR16 ARM-16-REM SHDN Room 0.11 0.11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR06 ARM-06-CRD South 1.00 1.00 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR09 ARM-09-CRD Repair Room 0.70 0.70 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAROS ARM-05-CRD Narth 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR41 ARM-41-TIP Chamber Shld 0 '0 0.40 300,00 NONE R/hr PAR26 ARM-26-IG/TIP Drive Area 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR10 ARM-10-Fuel Pool PP Area 1.00 1.00 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAROB ARM-08-RWCU Recirc Area 0 '4 0.24 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR13 ARM-13-New Fuel Crit Mon 0.25 0.25 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR11 ARM-11-Sample Room 27.00 1.06 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR12 ARM-12-Recirc Fan Room 0.08 0.08 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR14 ARM-14-Spnt Fuel Crit Mon 1.20 1 ~ 20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR15 ARM-15-Refuel Flr-North 0.16 0.16 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR42 ARM-42-Refuel Flr-West 0.40 0.40 4.00 NONE mR/hr Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 15 Point Display Services Current Time: 19:00 Alarm Zs Was High Law Point No. Descri tian state Naw Last Limit Limit vesta PAR04 ARM-04-RB/RW Sump Area 1. 80 1.80 15.00 NONE mR/hrs PAR25 ARM-25-RHR Room A 12.20 12.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAROl ARM-01 RHR Room B 9.20 9.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR02 ARM-02-RCZC Room 0. 21 0. 21 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR03 ARM-03 HPCZ Room 1.65 1.65 8.00 NONE mR/hr PAR36 ARM-36-U-1, RR Access Bay 0. 11 0. 11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR16 ARM 16 REM SHDN Room 0.11 0. 11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR06 ARM 06 CRD South 1.00 1 00 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR09 ARM-09-CRD .Repair Room 0.70 0.70 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR05 ,

ARM 05 CRD North 0.40 0 40 15 00 NONE mR/hr PAR41 ARM-41-TIP Chamber Shld 0.40 0.40 300.00 NONE R/hr PAR26 ARM-26-IG/TZP Drive Area 0.50 0 50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR10 ARM-10-Fuel Pool PP Area 1.00 1.00 15.00 'ONE mR/hr PAROB ARM-08-RWCU Recirc Area 0.24 0-24 . 4.00 , NONE mR/hr PAR13 ARM-13-New Fuel Crit Mon 0.25 0.25 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR11 ARM-ll-Sampl'e Room 21.20 27.00 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR12 ARM-12-Recirc Fan Room 0.08 0.08 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR14 ARM-14<<Spnt Fuel Crit Mon 1.20 1.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR15 ARM-15-Refuel Flr-North 0.16 0.16 4.00 ~ NONE mR/hr PAR42 ARM-42-Refuel Flr-West 0.40 4.00 NONE mR/hr

Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 15 Pdint Display Services.

Current Time: 19:30, Alarm Is Was High Low nt No. Descri tion State Nss Last 'imit Limit Units PAR04 ARM-04-RB/RW Sump Area 1.80 1.80 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR25 ARM-25-RHR Room A 12.20 12.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR01 ARM-01-RHR Room B 9.20 9.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR02 ARM-02-RCIC Room 0.21 0.21 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR03 ARM-03-HPCI Room 1.65 1.65 8.00 NONE mR/hr PAR36 ARM-36-U-1 RR Access Bay 0.11 0.11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR16 ARM-16-REM SHDN Room 0.11 0.11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR06 ARM-06-CRD South 1.00 1.00 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR09 ARM-09-CRD Repaiz Room 0.70 0.70 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR05 ARM-05-CRD North 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR41 ARM-41-TIP'- Chamber Shld 0.40 0.40 300.00 NONE R/hr PAR26 ARM-26<<ZG/TIP Drive Area 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR10 ARM-10-Fuel Pool PP Area 1.00 1.00 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAROB ARM-08-RWCU Recirc Area 0.24 0.24 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR13 ARM-13-New Fuel Crit Mon 0.25 0.25 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR11 ARM-11-Sample Room 18.20 21.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR12 ARM-12-Recirc Fan Room 0.08 0.08 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR14 ARM-14-Spnt Fuel Crit, Mon 1.20 1.20 15.00 NONE 'mR/hr PAR15 ARM-15-Refuel Flr-North 0.16 0.16 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR42 ARM-42-Refuel Flr-West 0.40 0.40 4.00 NONE mR/hr Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 15 Point Display Services Current Time: 20:00 Alarm Zs Was High Low Point No. Descri tion stats ,Nns Last Limit Limit Uni~s PAR04 ARM-04-RB/RW Sump Az;ea 1.80 1 ~ 80 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR25 Room A 'RM-25-RHR 12.20 12. 20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAROl ARM-01-RHR Room B 9.20 9.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR02 ARM-02-RCIC Room 0.21 0.21 4.00 NONE mR/hr, PAR03 ARM-03-HPCI Room 1.65 1. 65 8.00 NONE mR/hr PAR36 ARM-36-U-1 RR Access Bay 0. 11 0.11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR16 ARM-16-REM SHDN Room 0. 11 0.11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR06 ARM-06-CRD South F 00 1.00 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR09 ARM-09-CRD Repair Room 0 '0 0.70 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAROS ARM-05-CRD North

• 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR41 ARM-41-TZP Chamber Shld 0.40 0 40 300..00 NONE R/hr PAR26 ARM-26-ZG/TZP Drive Area ARM-10-Fuel Pool 0 '0 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr

'ARIO PP Area 1.00 1.00 15.00 NONE mR/hr 08 ARM-08-RWCU Recirc Area 0.24 0.24 " 4.00 NONE mR/hr 13 ARM-13-New. Fuel Crit Mon 0.25 0.25 ll ARM-11>>Sample Room ARM-12-Recirc Fan Room 16.00 18. 20 15.00 4.00 NONE NONE mR/hr mR/hr PAR12 0.08 0.08 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR14 ARM-14-Spnt Fuel Crit Mon 1.20 1.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR15. ARM-15-Refuel Flr-North 0. 16 0 ~ 16 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR42 ARM-42-Refuel F lr-West 0.40 0 '0 4.00 NONE mR/hr

Reactor'uilding Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Croup 15 Point Display Services Current Time: 20:30 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit linits PAR04 ARM-04-RB/RW Sump Area 1.80 1. 80 15.00 NONE en/ha PAR25 ARM-25-RHR Room A 12.20 12.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR01 ARM-01-RHR Room 8 9.20 9. 20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR02 ARM-02-RCIC Room 0.21 0 ~ 21 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR03 ARM-03-HPCI Room 1.65 1.65 8.00 NONE mR/hr PAR36 ARM-36-U-1 RR Access Bay 0 ~ 11 0. 11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR16 ARM-.16-REM SHDN Room 0.11 0.11 4.00 'ONE mR/hr PAR06 ARM-06-CRD South 1.00 1 ~ 00 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR09 ARM-09-CRD Repair Room 0.70 0.70 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAROS ARM-05-CRD North 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR41 ARM>>41-TIP Chamber Shld 0.40 0.40 300.00 NONE R/hr PAR26 ARM-26-IG/TIP Drive Area 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR10 ARM-10-Fuel Pool PP Area 1.00 1.00 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAROB ARM-08-RWCU Recirc Area 0.24 0.24 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR13 ARM-13-New Fuel Crit Mon 0.25 0.25 15.00 NONE mR/hr PARll ARM-11-Sample Room 14.20 16.00 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR12 ARM-12-Recirc Fan Room 0.08 0.08 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR14 ARM-14-Spnt Fuel Crit Mon 1 ~ 20 1.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR15 ARM-15-Refuel Flr-North 0.1'6 0.16 4.oo NONE mR/hr

'0 PAR42 ARM-42-Refuel Flr-West 0 0.40 4.00 NONE mR/hr Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 15 Point Display Services Current Time 21 t 00 s

Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion state Nnw Last Limit Limit Units PAR04 ARM-04-RB/RW Sump Area 1.80 1.80 15 F 00 NONE mh/he PAR25 ARM-25-RHR Room A 12.20 12.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR01 ARM-Ol-RHR Room B 9.20 9.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR02 ARM-02-RCIC Room 0. 21 0.21 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR03 PAR36 ARM-03-HPCI Room ARM-36-U-1 RR Access Bay

l. 65 1.65 8.00 NONE mR/hr 0 ~ 11 0 11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR16 ARM-16-REM SHDN Room 0. 11 0. 11 4.00 . NONE mR/hr PAR06 ARM 06-CRD South 1.00 1.00 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR09 ARM-09-CRD Repair Room 0.70 0.70'. 15.00 .NONE mR/hr PAROS ARM-05-CRD North 0.40 40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR41 ARM-41-TIP Chamber Shld 0.40 0. 40'.50, 300.00 NONE R/hr PAR26 ARM-26-IG/TIP Drive Area 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR10 ARM-10-Fuel Pool PP Area 1 00 1.00 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR08 ARM-08-RWCU Recirc Area 0.24 0.24 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR13 ARM-13-New Fuel Crit Mon 0 25 0.25 15.00 NONE mR/hr

'AR11 ARM-ll-Sample Room 12.80 14 20 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR12 ARM-12-Recirc Fan Room 0.08 0.08 4 00 NONE mR/hr PAR14 ARM-14-Spnt Fuel Crit Mon 1.20 1.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR15 ARM-15-Refuel Flr-North 0.16 0.16 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR42 ARM-42-Refuel Flr-West 0.40 0.40 4.00 NONE mR/hr VII-34

Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 15 Point Display Services Current Time: 21: 30 s

Alarm Is Was High Low int No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR04 ARM-04-RB/RW Sump Area 1.80 1.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR25 ARM-25-RHR Room A 12.20 12 '0 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR01 ARM-01-RHR Room B 9.20 9.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR02 ARM-02-RCIC Room 0.21 0.21 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR03 ARM-03-HPCI Room 1.65 1.65 8.00 NONE mR/hr PAR36 ARM-36-U-1 RR Access Bay. 0.11 0.11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR16 ARM-16-REM SHDN Room 0.11 0.11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR06 ARM-06-CRD South 1.00 1 ~ 00 15 F 00 NONE mR/hr PAR09 ARM-09-CRD Repair Room 0.70 0.70 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR05 ARM-05-CRD North 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR41 ARM-41-TIP Chamber Shld 0.40 0.40 300.00 NONE R/hr PAR26 ARM-26-IG/TIP Drive Area 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR10 ARM-10-Fuel Pool PP Area 1.00. 1 ~ 00 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAROS ARM-08-RWCU Recirc Area 0.24 0.24 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR13 ARM-13-New Fuel'rit Mon 0.25 0.25 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR11 ARM-11-Sample Room 11.60 12. 80 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR12 ARM-12-Recirc Fan Room 0.08 0.08 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR14 ARM-14-Spnt Fuel Crit Mon 1-20 1 ~ 20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR15 ARM-15-Refuel Flr-North 0.16 0.16 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR42 ARM-42-Refuel Flr-West 0.40 0.40 4.00 NONE mR/hr Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 15 Point Display Services Current Time: 22:00 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Nsw Last Limit Limit Units PAR04 ARM-04-RB/RW Sump, Area 1.80 1. 80 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR25 ARM-25-RHR Room A 12.20 12.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR01 ARM-01-RHR Roam B 9.20 9.20 50.00 NONE mR/hr PAR02 ARM-02-RCZC Room 0.21 0.21 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR03 ARM-93-HPCZ Room 1.65 1.65 8.00 NONE mR/hr PAR36 ARM-36-U-1 RR Access 0.11 0. 11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR16 SHDN Room Bay'RM-16-REM 0.11 0. 11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR06 ARM 06~ South 1.00 1.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR09 ARM-09CRD Repair Room 0. 70'.40 0.70 ..15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR05 ARM-05-CRD North 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR41 ARM-41-TZP Chamber Shld 0.40 0.40 300 00F NONE R/hr PAR26 ARM-26-ZG/TZP Drive Area 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR10 ARM-10-Fuel Pool PP Area 1.00 1.00 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAROS ARM-08-RWCU Recirc Area 0.24 0.24 4.00 NONE mR/hr AR13 ARM-13-New Fuel Crit Mon 0.25 0.25 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR11 ARM-ll-Sample Room 10.60 11.60 4.00 NONE mR/hr'R/hr PAR12 ARM-12-Recirc Fan Room 0.08 0.08 4.00 NONE PAR14 ARM-14-Spnt Fuel Crit Mon 1.20 1.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR15 ARM-15-Refuel Flr-North 0.16 0.16 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR42 ARM-42-Refuel Flr-West 0.40 0.40 4.00 NONE mR/hr VII-35

SECTION VII - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS I

PART H - REACTOR BUILDING Hl RANGE ARM Vjl-36

PENNSYLVANIA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY DRILL$ 95NRC2 .

REVISION 0$ 05/16/95 Hi-Range Reactor Building Area Radiation Monitors LOCATION NORMAL RANGE 18$ 30 19$ 00 19$ 30 20$ 0(l 20$ 30 21$ 00 21$ 30 ARH-56 RHR Room B 0.44 .1-1000 0. 44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0. 44 0.44 ARM-55 RHR Room A 0.36 .1-1000 0.36 0.36 0.36 ~ 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 ARM-57 RCIC PP Turb Rm 0.38 .1-1000 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 ARH-48 HPCI PP Turb Rm, 0.23 .1-1000 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 ARH-53 REM SDN Pnl Rm 0.31 .1-1000 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 ARM-50 CRD North (SDV's) 0.28 .1-1000 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 ARH-51 CRD South (SDV's) 0.41 .1-1000 0.41 0.41 0. 41. 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 ARM-52 CLUP Recirc Pmp AC 0.50 .1-1000 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 ARH-54 Fuel Pl Pmp Rm 0.21 .1-1000 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 ARH-49 Refuel Flr Area 0.41 .1-1000 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 H

H I LOCATION NORMAL RANGE 22$ 00 ARH-56 RHR Room B 0.44 .1-1000 0.44 ARld-55 RHR Room A 0.36 .1-1000 0.36 ARH-57 RCIC PP Turb Rm 0.38 .1-1000 0.38 ARM-48 HPCI PP Turb Rm 0.23 .1-1000 0.23 ARM-53 REM SDN Pnl Rm 0.31 .1-1000 0.31 ARH-50 CRD North (SDV's) 0.28 .1-1000 0.34 ARM-5 1 CRD South (SDV's) 0.41 .1-1000 0.41 ARM-52 CLUP Recirc Pmp AC 0.50 .1-1000 0.50

~ ARM-54 Fuel Pl Pmp Rm 0.21 .1-1000 0.21 ARM-49 Refuel Flr Area 0.41 .1-1000 0.41

PENNSYLVANIA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY DRILL: 95NRC2 REVISION 0: 05/16/95 Hi-range Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 10 Point Display Services Current Time: 18:30 Alarm, Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR49 ARM-49-Refuel Flr Area 0.41 0.41 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR56 ARM-56-RHR Room B 0.44 0.44 15 F 00 NONE R/hr PAR55 ARM-55-RHR Room A 0.36 0.36 15. 00 NONE R/hr PAR57 ARM-57-RCIC PP Turb Rm 0.38 0.38 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR48 ARM-48-HPCI PP Turb Rm 0.23 0.23 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR53 ARM-53-REM SDN Pnl Rm 0.31 0.31 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR50 ARM-50-CRD North (SDV's) 0.34 0.28 15 F 00 NONE R/hr PAR51 ARM-51-CRD South (SDV') 0.41 0.41 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR52 ARM-52-CLUP Recirc Pmp AC 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR54 ARM-54-Fuel Pl Pmp Rm' 0.21 0.21 15.00 NONE R/hr Hi-range Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 10 Point Display Services Current Time: 19:00 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion "State Now Last Limit Limi.t ,Units PAR49 ARM-49-Refuel Flr ARM-56-RHR Room B Area 1.50 ~ ~ 0 '1 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR56 0.44 0.44 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR55 ARM-55-RHR Room A 0.36 0.36 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR57 ARM-57-RCIC PP Turb Rm 0.38 0.38 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR48 ARM-48-HPCI PP Turb Rm 0.23 0.23 15 F 00 NONE R/hr PAR53 ARM-53-REM SDN Pnl Rm 0.31 0.31 15.00 NONE 'R/hr PAR50 ARM-50-CRD North (SDV's) 0.34 0.34 15.00 NONE R/hr PARS 1 ARM-51-CRD South (SDV's) 0.41 0. 4'1 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR52 ARM-52-CLUP Recirc Pmp AC 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE ~

R/hr PAR54 ARM-54-Fuel Pl Pmp Rm 0.21 0.21 15.00 NONE R/hr VII-38

PENNSYLVANIA POWER& LIGHT COMPANY DRILL: 95NRC2 REVISION 0: 05/16/95 Hi-range Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 10 Point Display Services Current Time: 19: 30 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR49 ARM-49-.Refuel Flr Area 1. 50 1.50 15.00 NONE R/hr PARS 6. ARM-56-RHR Room B 0.44 0.44 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR55 ARM-55-RHR Room A 0 '6 0.36 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR57 ARM-57-RCI PP Turb Rm 0.38 0.38 15 00 F NONE R/hr PAR48 ARM-48-HPCI PP Turb aRm 0.23 0.23 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR53 ARM-53-REM SDN Pnl Rm 0.31 0.31 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR%0 ARM-50-CRD North (SDV's) 0.34 0.34 15.00 NONE R/hr PARS 1 ARM-51-CRD South (SDV's) 0.41 0.41 15.00 NONE R/hr.

PAR52 ARM-52-CLUP Recirc Pmp AC 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR54 ARM-54-Fuel Pl Pmp Rm" 0.21 0.21 15.00 NONE R/hr Hi-range Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 10 Point Display Services Current Times 20:00 Alarm Is Was High Low Descri tion Limit Limit Units

'oint No. State caw Last PAR49 ARM-49-Refuel Flr .Area 1.60 1.50 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR56 ARM-56-RHR Room B 0.44 0.44 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR55 ARM-55-RHR Room A 0.36 0.36 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR57 ARM-57-RCIC PP Turb Rm 0.38 0.38 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR48 ARM-48-HPCI PP Turb Rm 0.23 0.23 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR53 ARM-53-REM SDN Pnl Rm 0.31 0.31 15.00 NONE R/hr PARSO ARM-50-CRD North (SDV's) 0.34 0.34 15.00. NONE R/hr PAR51 ARM-51-CRD South (SDV's) 0.41 0.41 15.00 NONE R/hr.

PAR52 ARM-52-CLUP Recirc Pmp AC 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR54 ARM-54-Fuel Pl Pmp Rm 0.21 0.21 15.00 NONE R/hr vsse-3,9

PENNSYLVANIA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY DRILL: 95NRC2 REVISION 0: 05/16/95 Hi>>range Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 10 Point Display Services Current Time: 20:30 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Nsw Last Limit Limit Units PAR49 ARM-49-Refuel Flr Area 1.40 1.60 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR56 ARM-56-RHR Room B 0.44 0.44 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR55 ARM-55-RHR Room A 0.36 0.36 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR57 ARM-57-RCIC PP Turb Rm 0.38 0.38 1,5. 00 NONE R/hr PAR48 ARM-48-HPCI PP Turb Rm 0.23 0.23 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR53 ARM-53-REM SDN Pnl Rm 0.31 0.31 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR50 ARM-50-CRD North (SDV's) 0.34 0.34. 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR51 ARM-51>>CRD South (SDV's) 0.41 0.41 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR52 ARM-52-CLUP Recirc Pmp AC 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR54 ARM-54-Fuel Pl Pmp Rm., 0.21 0.21 15.00 'NONE R/hr Hi-range Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 10 Point Display Services Current Time: 21:00 Alarm Is Was High 'ow Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR49 ARM-49-Refuel Flr Area 1.30 1.40 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR56 ARM-56-RHR Room B 0.44 0.44 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR55 ARM-55-RHR Room A 0.36 0.36 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR57 ARM-57-RCIC PP Turb Rm 0.38 0.38 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR48 ARM-48-HPCI PP Turb Rm 0.23 0.23 15 F 00 NONE R/hr PAR53 ARM-53-REM SDN Pnl Rm 0.31 0.31 15.00 NONE R/hr PARSO, ARM-50-CRD North (SDV's) 0.34 0.34 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR51 ARM-51-CRD South (SDV's) 0.41 0.41 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR52 ARM-52-CLUP Recirc Pmp AC 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR54 ARM-54-Fuel Pl Pmp Rm 0.21 0.21 15.00 'NONE R/hr V[(-40

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY DRILL: 95NRC2 REVISION 0: 05/16/95 Hi-range Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E"Plan Display)

Group 10 Point Display Services Current Time: 21: 30 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Lilllit Raits PAR49 ARM-49-Refuel Flr Area 1 ~ 20 1.30 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR56 ARM-56-RHR Room B 0.44 0.44 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR55 ARM-55-RHR Room A 0.36 0.36 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR57 ARM-57-RCIC PP Turb Rm 0.38 0 '8 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR48 ARM-48-HPCI PP Turb Rm 0.23 0.23 15'. 00 NONE R/hr PAR53 ARM-53-REM SDN Pnl Rm 0.31 0.31 15.00 NONE R/hr

. PAR50 ARM-50-CRD North (SDV's) 0.34 0.34 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR51 ARM-51-CRD South (SDV's) 0.41 0.41 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR52 ARM-52-CLUP Recirc Pmp AC 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE R/hr

'PARS 4 ARM-54-Fuel Pl Pmp Rm 0.21 0.21 15.00 NONE R/hr Hi-range Reactor Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 10 Point Display Services Current Time: 22:00 Alarm Is Was High Low.

Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR49 ARM-49-Refuel Flr Area 1. 10 1.20 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR56 ARM-56-RHR Room B 0.44 0.44 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR55 ARM-55-RHR Room A 0.36 0.36 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR57 ARM-57-RCIC PP Turb Rm 0.38 0.38 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR48 ARM-48-HPCI PP Turb Rm 0.23 0.23 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR53'ARSO ARM-53-REM SDN Pnl Rm 0.31 0.31 15.00 NONE R/hr ARM-50-CRD North (SDV's) 0.34 "0. 34 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR51 ARM-51-CRD South (SDV's) 0.41 0.41 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR52 ARM-52-CLUP Recirc Pmp AC 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE R/hr PAR54 ARM-54-Fuel Pl Pmp Rm 0.21 0.21 15.00 NONE R/hr

SECTION VII - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS PART I - TURBINE BUILDINGARM VIIQ2

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY DRILL: 95NRC2 REVISION 0- 05/16/95 urbine,Building Area Radiation Monitors

'** DATA MANUALLY ENTERED **~*

LOCATION NORIIAL RANGE 18I30 19:00 19:30 20:00 20:30 21IOO 21:30 RH-17 COND Pump Area 0. 59 .01-100 0.59 1. 90 1.70 1.70 1.40 1.00 ] 45 rRH-07 Offgas Bypass Area 2.00 .1-1000 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00

-rRH-18 RFPT Area 0.43 .01-100 0.43 3.60 3.30 3.40 3.01 3.10 2.32 ARH-40 Turb Bldg Access 0.05 .01-100 0.95 0.'05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 ARH-19 hir Ejector Room 102.00 .1-1000 102.00 102.00 102.00 102.00 102.00 102.00 102.00

'RH-20 Fdwtr Heater Area 0.20 .1-1000 0.20 1.60 1.50 1.50 1.30 1.31 1.44 ARM-21 Reer Hg Set Area 0.38 .01-100 0.38 1.40 1.20 1.20 1.10 1.55 1.40 ARH-27 Turb Access Route 0.10 .01-100 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 ARI)-24 Turbine Front End 0.12 .01-100 0.12 1.80 1.60 1.70 1.72 1.54 1.56 ARH-22 Gen Bay Area 0.20 .01-100 0.20 1.20 1.10 1.10 1.11 0.90 1.10 ARH-23 HVAC Equip Room 0.07 .01-100 0.07 2.00 2.20 2.20 2.01 1.88 2.34

~ urbine Building Area Radiation Monitors M ** DATA MANUALLY ENTERED ****

H I

C LOCATIOlT ITOIUIAL RANGE 22:00

~ RH-17 COND Pump Area . 0. 59 .01-100 1. 80

RH-07 Offgas Bypass Area 2.00 .1-1000 2.00

RH-18 RFPT Area 0.43 .01-100 3.20 ARH-40 Turb Bldg Access 0. 05 .01-100 0. 05 ARH-19 Air Ejector Room 102.90 .1-1000 102.00 ARH-20 Fdwtr Heater Area 0.20 .1-1000 1.55 ARH-21 Reer Mg Set Area 0.38 .01-100 1.32 hlltl-27 Turb Access Route 0.10 .01-100 0.10 hl'l1 2 l

~ Turlrine Front Errd 0.12 .01-100 1.75 A I'l Gr rr

~

liny brea 0.20 .01-100 1.10 AITII-23 llVAC Equip Room 0.07 .01-100 2.20

PE4:"'SYLVA'l A POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY DRILL: 95NRC2 REVlSION 0: 05/16/95 Turbine Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 16 Point Display Services Current Time: 18:30 Alarm Is Was . High Low Point No. Descri tion , State Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR17 ARM<<17-COND Pump Area 0.59 0.59 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR07 ARM-07-Offgas Bypass Area 2.00 2.00 30.00 NONE mR/hr PAR18 ARM-18-RFPT Area 0.43 0.43 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR40 ARM-40-Turb Bldg Access ' 0.95 0.05 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR19 ARM-19-Air Ejector Rocm 102 00 F 102.00 200.00 NONE mR/hr PAR20 ARM>>20-Fdwtr 'Heater Area 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR21 ARM-21-Reer Mg Sec Area 0.38 0.38 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR27 ARM-27-Turb Access Route 0.10 0.10 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR24 ARM-24-Turbine Front End 0.12 0.12 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR22 ARM-22-Gen Bay Area 0.20 0.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR23 ARM-23-HVAC Equip Room 0.07 0.07 4.00 NONE mR/hr Turbine Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 16 Point Display Services Current Time: 19:00 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion S~aea Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR17 ARM-17-COND Pump Area 1;90 0.59 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR07 ARM-07-Offgas Bypass Area 2.00 2.00 30.00 NONE mR/hr PAR18 ARM-18-RFPT Area 3.60 0.43 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR40 ARM-40-Turb Bldg Access 0.05 , 0.95 4.00 NONE. mR/hr PAR19 ARM-19-Air Ejector Room 102.00 102.00 200.00 NONE mR/hr PAR20 ARM-20-Fdwtr Heater Area 1.60 0.20 15 F 00 NONE mR/hr PAR21 ARM-21-Reer Mg'Set Area 1.40 0.38 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR27 ARM-27-Turb Access Route 0.10 0.10 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR24 ARM-24-Turbine Front End 1.80 0.12 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR22 ARM-22-Gen Bay Area 1.20 0.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR23 ARM-23-HVAC Equip Room 2.00 0.07 4.00 NONE mR/hr VII-44

PE!!NSYLVAtlIA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY DRILL: 95NRC2 REVISION 0: 05/16/95 Turbine Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 16 Point Display Services Current Time: 19:30 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion 9

State Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR17 ARM-17-COND Pump Area 1 ~ 70 1.90 4.00 ~ NONE mR/hr PAR07, ARM-07-Offgas Bypass Area 2.00 2.00 30.00 NONE mR/hr PAR18 ARM-18-RFPT Area 3.30 3.60 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR40 ARM-40-Turb Bldg Access 0.05 0.05 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR19 ARM-19-Air Ejector Room 102.00 102.00 200.00 NONE mR/hr PAR20 ARM-20-Fdwtr Heater Area 1.50 1.60 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR2 1 ARM-21-Reer Mg Set Area 1.20 1.40 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR27 ARM-27-Turb Access Route 0.10 0.10 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR24 ARM-24-Turbine Front Encl 1.60 1.80 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR22 ARM-22-Gen Bay Area 1.10 1.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr

'AR23 ARM-23-HVAC Equip Room 2.20 2.00 4.00 NONE mR/hr Turbine Bui)ding Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 16 Point Display Services Current Time: 20:00 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR17 ARM-17-COND Pump Area 1.70 1.70 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR07 ARM-07-Offgas Bypass Area 2.00 2.00 30.00 NONE mR/hr PAR18 ARM-18-RFPT Area 3.40 3.30 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR40 ~ ARM-40-Turb Bldg Acce s 0.05 0.05 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR19 ~

ARM-19-Air Ejector Room 102.00 102.00 200.00 NONE mR/hr PAR20 ARM-20-Fdwtr Heater Area 1.50 1. 50'.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR21 ARM-21-Reer Mg Set Area 1. 20. 4.00 NONE mR/hr" PAR27 ARM-27-Turb Access Rout- 0.10 'O.l0 '4. 00 NONE mR/hr PAR24 ARM-24-Turbine Front Entl 1.70 1.60 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR22 ARM-22-Gen Bay Area 1.10 1.10 4. 00'.00 NONE mR/hr PAR23 ARM-23-HVAC Equip Room 2.20 2.20 NONE mR/hr VII-45

PER":SYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANy DRILL: 95NRC2 REVISION 0: 05/16/95 Turbine Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Croup 16 Point Display Services Current Time: 20:30 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No'. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Osits PAR17 ARM-17-COND Pump Area 1.40 1.70 4.00 NONE mR/tr PAR07 ARM-07-Offgas Bypass Area 2.00 2.00 30.00 'ONE mR/hr PAR18 ARM-18-RFPT Area 3.01 3.40 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR40 ARM-40-Turb Bldg Access 0.05 0. 05 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR19 ARM-19-Air Ejector Room 102.00 102.00 200.00 NONE mR/hr PAR20 ARM-20-Fdwtr Heater Area 1 ~ 30 1 ~ 50 15.00 NONE mR/hr

.PAR21 ARM-21-Reer Mg Set Area 1. 10 1.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR27 ARM-27-Turb Access Route 0.10 0.10 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR24 ARM-24-Turbine Front End 1.72 1.70 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR22 ARM-22-Gen Bay Area 1.11 1.10 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR23 ARM-23-HVAC Equip Room 2.01 2.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr Turbine Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Croup 16 Point Display Services Current Time: 21:00 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR17 ARM-17-COND Pump Area 1.00 1.40 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR07 ARM-07-Offgas Bypass Area 2.00 2.00 30.00 NONE mR/hr PAR18 ARM-18-RFPT Area 3.10 3.01 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR40 ARM-40-Turb Bldg Access 0.05 0.05 4.00 ~

NONE mR/hr PAR19 ARM-19-Air Ejector Roon> . 102.00 102.00 200.00 NONE mR/hr PAR20 ARM-20-Fdwtr Heater Area 1.31 1.30 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR21 ARM-21-Reer Mg Set Area 1.55 1.10 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR27 ARM-27-Turb Access Route 0 '0 0.10 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR24 ARM-24-Turbine Front, End 1.54 1.72 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR22 ARM-22-Gen Bay Area 0.90 1.11 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR23 ARM-23-HVAC Equip Room 1.88 2.01 4.00 NONE mR/hr

PLEN isSvLVANIA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY DRILL: 95NRC2

/I SION 0: 05/16/95 Turbine Bld'ng Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Croup 16 Point Display Services Current Time: 21:30 Alarm Is Was High Low .

Point No. Descri tion State Nss Last Limit Limit Units PAR17 ARM-17-COND Pump Area 1.45 1.00 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR07 ARM-07-Offgas Bypass Area 2.00 2.00 30.00 NONE mR/hr PAR18 ARM-18-RFPT Area 2.32 3.10 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR40 ARM-40-Turb Bldg Ac"e.=.s 0.05 0.05 4.00 NONE mR/hr.

PAR19 ARM-19-Air Ejector Room 102 00 F 102.00 200.00 NONE mR/hr PAR20 ARM-20-Fdwtr Heater Ar.'ai 1 44

~ 1.31 15.00 NONE mR/hr

. PAR21 ARM-21-Reer Mg Set Area 1.40 1.55 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR27 ARM-27-Turb Access Route 0.10 0.10 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR24 ARM-24-Turbine Fronr. End 1.56 1.54 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR22 ARM-22-Gen Bay Area 1.10 0.90 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR23 ARM-23>>HVAC Equip Room 2.34 1.88 4.00 NONE mR/hr Turbine Building Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Croup 16 Point Display Services Current Time: 22:00 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR17 ARM-17-COND Pump Area 1.80 l. 45 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR07 ARM-07-Offgas Bypass Area 2.00 2.00 30.00 NONE mR/hr PAR18 ARM-18-RFPT Area 3.20 2.32 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR40 ARM-40-Turb Bldg Access 0.05 0.05 4.00. NONE mR/hr PAR19 ARM-19-Air Ejector Room 102.00 102.00 200.00 NONE mR/hr PAR20 ARM-20-Fdwtr Heater Area 1.55 1.44 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR21 ARM-21-Reer Mg Set Are:i 1.32 1.40 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR27 ARM-27-Turb Access Rcure 0 '0 0.10 ~ 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR24 ARM-24-Turbine F rona End 1.75 1.56 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR22 ARM-22-Gen Bay Area 1.10 1.10 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR23 ARM-23-HVAC Equip Rocm 2.20 2.34 4.00 NONE mR/hr

SECTION Vll - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS PART J - CONTROL STRUCTURE.ARM VII48

PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY DRILL! 95NRC2 REVISION 0! 05/16/95 ontrol Structure & Radwaste Area Radiation Monitors

+~* DATA MANUALLY ENTERED ***+

LOCATION NORl VLL RANGE 18!30 19!00 19!30 20!00 20!30 21!00 21!30 RH-38 hRH-39 Rad Chemlab Control

0. 03

0. 20

.01-100

.01-100 0.03 0.20 1.50 1.50 1 '0 1.40 1 ~ 30 l. 20 Room 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 MAR-Ol* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-A 8.00 1-1E7 8-00 1.11E3 2.23E3 1.31E3 1.16E3 1.03E3 929 00 F

HhR-02* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-B 5.00 1-1E7 5 00 75.00 150.00 85.00 75.00 65.00 58.00 ARM 37 Stby Gas Treat .Rm 0.03 .01-100 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 ARH-31 RW 646 Corr-South 0.40 .1-1000 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 ARM-29 RW 646 Corr-North 0.30 .1-1000 0:30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 ARM-30 RW 646 Corr-West 0.50 .1-1000 0.50 -

0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 ARM-32 Ctrl Zone Shop 0.20 .1-1000 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 ARH-34 Stor & Equip Area 0.20 .1-1000 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 ARH-33 Radwaste Ctrl Rm 0.40 .1-1000 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0. 40 ARH-28 RW Dr to 2 Fl Sa 0.30 .01-100 0.30 0;30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 M

H c

I LOCATION NORMAL RANGE 22!00 RM-38 Rad Chemlab 0.03 .01-100 l. 10

'ARM-39 Control Room 0.20 F 01-100 0.20

-lAR-Ol" Cntm Acc Mi Rad-A 8.00 l-lE7 840.00 HAR-02* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-B 5.00 1-1E7 53.00 ARH-37 Stby Gas Treat -Rm 0.03 .01-100 0.03 ARH-31 RW 646 Corr-South 0.40 .1-1000 0.40 ARH-29 RW 646 Corr-North 0.30 .1-1000 0.30 ARH-30 RW 646 Corr-.West 0.50 .1-1000 0.50 ARH-32 Ctrl Zone Shop 0.20 .1-1000 0.20 ARH-34 Stor & Equip Area 0.20 .1-1000 0.20 hRM-33 Radwaste Ctr'1 Rm 0.40 .1-1000 0.40 hRtf" 28 RW Dr to 2 Fl Sa 0.30 .01-100 0.30

PENNSYLVANIA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY DRILL: 95NRC2 REVISION 0: 05/16/95 Control Structure E. Radwaste Area Rad Monitors (E>>Plan Display)

Group 17 Point Display Services Current Time: 18:30 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR38 ARM-38-Rad Chemlab 0.03 0.03 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR39 ARM-39-Control Room 0.20 0.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr MAR01* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-A 8.00 8.00 NONE NONE R/hr MAR02* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-B 5.00 5.00 NONE NONE R/hr

'AR37 ARM~37-Stby Gas Treat Rm 0.03 0.03 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR31 ARM-31-RW 646 Corr-South 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR29 ARM-29-RW 646 Corr-North 0.30 0.30 ,15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR30 ARM-30-RW 646 Corr-Nest 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR32 ARM-32-Ctrl Zone Shop 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR34 ARM-34-Stor 6 Equip Area 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR33 ARM-33<<Radwaste Ctrl Rm 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR28 ARM-28-RW Dr to 2 Fl Sa 0.30 0.30 4.00 NONE mR/hr Control Structure 6. Radwaste Area Rad Monitors (E>>Plan Display)

Group 17 Point Display Services Current Time: 19:00 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Units PAR38 ARM-38-Rad Chemi ab 1.50 0.03 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR39 ARM-39-Control Room 0.20 0.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr MAR01* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-A 1.11E3 8.00 NONE NONE R/hr MAR02* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-8 75.00 5.00 NONE NONE R/hr PAR37 ARM-37-Stby Gas Treat Rm 0.03 0.03 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR31 ARM-31-RW 646 Corr-South 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR29 ARM-29-RW 646 Corr-North 0.30 0.30 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR30 ARM<<30-RW 646 Corr-Aest 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE "

mR/hr PAR32 ARM>>32-Ctrl Zone Shop 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR34 ARM-34-Stor 6 Equip Area 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE'ONE mR/hr PAR33 ARM>>33-Radwaste Ctrl Rm 0.40 0.40 15.00 mR/hr PAR28 ARM-28-RW Dr to 2 Fl Sa ~

0.30 0.30 4.00 NONE mR/hr VII-50

PEl!!!SYLVANIA POWER !N LIGHT COMPANy DRILL: 95NRC2 REV1SION 0: 05/16/95 Control Structure S Radwaste Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)'roup 17 Point Display Services Current Time: 19: 30 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Nnits PAR38 ARM-38-Rad Chemlab 1.50 1. 50 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR39. ARM-39-Control Room 0.20 0.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr MAR01* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-A 2.23E3 1.11E3 NONE NONE R/hr MAR02* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-B 150.00 75.00 NONE . NONE R/hr PAR37 ARM-37-Stby Gas Treat Rm 0.03 0.03 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR31 ARM-31-RW 646 Core-South 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR29 ARM-29-RW 646 Corr-North 0.30 0.30 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR30 ARM-30-RW 646 Corr-West 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR32 ARM-32-Ctrl Zone Shop 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr

'PAR34 ARM-34-Stor 6 Equip Area 0.20 0.20 15:00 NONE mR/hr PAR33 ARM-33-Radwaste Ctrl Rm 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR28 ARM-28-RW Dr to 2 Fl Sa 0.30 0.30 4.00 NONE mR/hr Control Structure 6 Radwaste Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 17 Point Display Services Current Time: 20:00 Alarm, Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit unit.s PAR38 ARM-38-Rad Chemi ab 6.60 1.50 4.00 NONE mR/hr

'AR39 ARM-39-Control Room 0.20 0.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr MAROl* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-A 1.31E3 2.23E3 NONE NONE R/hr MAR02* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-B 85.00 150.00 NONE NONE .R/hr PAR37 ARM-37-Stby Gas Treat Rm 0.03 0.03 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR31 ARM-31-RW 646 Corr-South 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR29 ARM-29-RW 646 Corr-t!orth 0.30 0.30 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR30 ARM-30-EW,646 Corr-West 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR32 ARM-32-Ctrl Zone Shop 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR34 ARM-34-Stor & Equip Area 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR33 ARM-33-Radwaste Ctrl Rm 0.40 0.40 15.'00 NONE rhR/br PAR28 ARM-28-RW Dr to 2 .Fl Sa 0.30 0.30 4.00 NONE mR/hr vier.-51

PE!!!!SYLVANIA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY DRILL: 95NRC2 REVISION 0: 05/16/95 Control Structure  !; Radwaste Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 17 Point Display Services Current Time: 20:30 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit L mit Units PAR38 ARM-38-Rad Chemi ab 1.40 1.60 4.00 NONE .mR/hr PAR39 ARM-39-Control Room 0.20 0 '0 4.00 NONE mR/hr MAR01* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-A 1.16E3 1.31E3 NONE NONE R/hr MAR02* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-B 75.00 85.00 NONE NONE R/hr PAR37 ARM-37-Stby Gas Treat Rm 0.03 0.03 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR31 ARM 31-RW 646 Corr<<South 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr

'AR29 ARM-29-RW 646 Corr-Nore.h 0.30 0.30 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR30 ARM-30-RW 646 Corr-West 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR32 ARM-32-Ctrl Zone Shop 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR34 ARM-34-Stor 6 Equip Area 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE . mR/hr PAR33 ARM-33-Radwaste Ctrl Rm 0 ~ 40, 0 . 4'0 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR28 ARM-28-RW Dr to 2 Fl Sa 0.30 0 . 30 4.00 NONE mR/hr Control Structure a Radwaste Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan, Display)

Group 17 Point, Display Services Current Time: 21: 00 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now . Last Limit Limit NR1.ts PAR38 ARM-38-Rad Chemlab 1.30 1.40 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR39 ARM-39-Control Room 0.20 0.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr MAR01* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-A 1.03E3 1.16E3 NONE NONE R/hr MAR02* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-B 65.00 75.00 NONE NONE R/hr PAR37 . ARM-37-Stby Gas Treat Rm 0.03 0.03 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR31 ARM<<31-RW 646 Corr-South 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR29 ARM-29-RW 646 Corr-,North 0.30 0.30 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR30 ARM-30-RW 646 Corr-West 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR32 ARM-32-Ctrl Zone Shop 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR34 ARM-34-Stor 6 Equip Area 0.20 . 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR33 ARM>>33-Radwaste Ctrl Rm 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR28 ARM-28-RW Dr to 2 Fl Sa 0 30

~ 0.30 4.00 NONE mR/hr VII-52

P~R ~ !iSyLi/AMIA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANy DRILL: 95NRC2 REVISION 0: 05/16/95 Control Structure 8 Radwaste Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Croup 17 Point Display Services Current Time: 21:30 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State NON Last Limit Limit Units PAR38 ARM-38-Rad Chemlab 1.20 1.30 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR39 ARM-39-Control Room 0.20 0.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr MAR01 + Cntm Acc Hi Rad-A 929.00 1.03E3 NONE NONE R/hr MAR02* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-B 58.00 65.00 NONE NONE R/hr PAR37 ARM-37-Stby Gas Treat Rm 0.03 0.03 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR31 ARM-31-RW 646 Corr-South 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR29 ARM-29-RW 646 Corr-North 0.30 0.30 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR30 ARM-30-RW 646 Corr-West 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR32 ARM-32-Ctrl Zone Shop 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR34 ARM-34-Stor 6 Equip Area 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR33 ARM-33-Radwaste Ctrl Rm ~

0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR28 ARM-28-RW Dr to 2 Fl Sa 0.30 0.30 4.00 NONE mR/hr Control Structure E, Radwaste Area Rad Monitors (E-Plan Display)

Group 17 Point Display Services.

Current Time: 22:00 Alarm Is Was High Low Point No. Descri tion State Now Last Limit Limit Vtits PAR38 ARM-38-Rad Chemlab 1.10 1.20 4.00 NONE mR/ht PAR39 ARM-39-Control Room 0.20 0.20 4.00 NONE mR/hr MAR01* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-A 840.00 929.00 NONE NONE R/hr MAR02* Cntm Acc Hi Rad-B 53.00 58.00 NONE NONE R/hr PAR37 ARM-37-Stby Gas Treat Rm 0.03 0.03 4.00 NONE mR/hr PAR31 ARM-31-RW 646 Corr-South 0.40 0.40 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR29 ARM-29-RW 646 Corr-North 0.30 0.30 15-00 NONE mR/hr PAR30 ARM-30-RH 646 Corr-Hest 0.50 0.50 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR32 ARM-32>>Ctrl Zone Shop 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE mR/hr PAR34 ARM-34-Stor & Equip Area 0.20 0.20 15.00 NONE'ONE mR/hr PAR33 ARM-33-Radwaste Ctrl Rm 0.40 0.40 15.00 mR/hr ms ARM=28-RW Dr to 2 Fl Sa 0.30 0.30 4.00 NONE mR/hr VII-53

SECTION Vll - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS PART K - PASS SAMPLE INFORMATION Vll-54

PENNSYLVANIA PONER & LIGHT COMPANY DRILLS 95NRC2 REVISION Ot 05/16/95 PASS Drywell 15 ml Gas Sample Data mR/hr RE-507 RE-704 Monitor Monitor Vnshield Unshield Unshield Unshield Shielded Shielded Shielded Shielded

!me Beadino 0 adiag at 2" at 6- at 18" . at 36" .. at 2" at 6" at 18" at 36"

30 naOOC~ 00 0.000+00 0. OOE< 00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE400 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00

"" 00 O.OOF+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 9:30 O.OOE+00 O.OOEi00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00

. 0:00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE400 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00

0: 30 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 21:00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0 ~ OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 21:30 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 22:00 O.OOE400 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0-OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 M

M PASS Drywell Iodine Sample Data I

mR/hr Vl RE-507 RE-704

!monitor Mo:>i tor. Unshield Vnshield Unshield Unshield Shielded Shielded Shielded Shielded Ra!aadino Reading at 2" at 6" at 38- at 36" at 2" at 6" at 18" at 36-

3(l O.OOE+00 O.OOE<00 0. OOEN 00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 H/A H/A H/A ll/A "00

~:30 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0;OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 N/A N/A N/A '/A O.OOEi00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 H/A N/A ~

H/A H/A 0:00 0 OOE+00

~ O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0 OOE+00

~ O.OOE+00 H/A N/A H/A N/A

. 0:30 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 H/A N/A H/A H/A 1 00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 N/A N/A H/A N/A

1:30 O.VUE<00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 H/A N/A H/A N/A 22:00 O.OOE400 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 N/A N/A N/A H/A

PENNSYLVANIA POWER fc LIGHT COMPANY

- DRILLt 95NRC2 REVISION 01 05/16/95 PASS Wetwell 15 ml Gas Sample Data mR/hr RE-507 RE-704 Monitor Monitor Unshield Unshield Unshield Unshield Shielded Shielded Shielded Shielded ai Ille Readinq Readince at 2" at 6". at 18" at 36" at 2" at 6" at 18" at 36" 30 3.05E+00 1 ~ 75E+02 1.29E+03 2.10E+02 2.63E+01- 6.83E+00 1.99E+02 3.25E+01 4.06E+00 1.06E+00 9 00 2.95E+00 1.34E+02 9.85E+02 1 61E+02 2.01E+01 5.23E+00 1.52E+02 2.49E+01 3.11E+00 8.08E-Ol 9:30 2.54E+00 1.15E+02 8.48E+02 1.38E+02 1.73E+01 4.50E+00 1.31E+02 2.14E+Ol 2.68E+00 6. 96E-01 Oe00 2.25E+00 1.02E+02 7.50E+02 1.23E+02 1.53E+01 3.98E+00 1.16E+02 1.89E+01 0 "'0 2.37E+00 6.15E-01 2.0lE+00 9.13E+Ol 6.71E+02 1.10E+02 1.37E+Ol 3.56E+00 1.04E+02 1.69E+01 2.12E+00 1:00 5 50E-01 1.DOE+00 8.20E+Ol 6.03E+02 9.84E+01 1.23E+01 3.20E+00 9.32E+Ol 1.52E+Ol 1.90E+00

~,) 1-i33E+00 4.95E-01 3

7. 40Et 01 5.ICE+02 8.89E+01 1.11E+01 2.89E+00 8.41E+01 1.37E+01 1.72E+00 22:00 1.48Et00 4.46E-01 6.71E+01 4.93E+02 8 'SE+01 1 01E+Ol 2 '2E+00 7.62E+01 1.24E+01 1.56E+00 4 04E-01 M PASS Wetwell Airborne Iodine Sample Data M mR/hr I

5J3 RE-507 RE-704 Monitor Monitor Unshield Unshield Unshield Unshield Shielded Shielded Shielded Shielded Reaal i>ia Readine at 2" at e" at 18" at 36" at 2" at 6" at 18" at 36" 3.85E+00 8.75E+02 5.38E+03 1.02E+03 1.38E+02 3.68E+01 N/A N/A N/A N/A 00 2.95E+00 6.70E+02 4.12E+03 7.79E+02 1.06E+02 2.81E+Ol N/A N/A N/A N/A

~ 3 ~ 0 2.54E+00, 5.77E+02 3.54E+03 6.70E+02 9 12E+01 2.42E+Ol N/A ,. N/A N/A N/A 0..00 2.25E+00 5.11E+02 3.14E+03 5.93E+02 8.07E+Ol 2.14E+01 N/A N/A N/A N/A ai -5) 2.C')E 00 . 4.553E+02 2.80E+03 5.3OE+02 7.21E+01 1.92E+01 N/A N/A N/A N/A

'::/0 1.80E+00 4.10E+02 2.52E+03 4e77E+02 6.48E+01 1.72E+Ol N/A N/A N/A N/A

... 5) l . (i.iEi 5.') 3 ~ g 0E< 02 2.27E+03 4e30E+02 5.85E+01 1.55E+Ol N/A N/A N/A N/A 22:00 1.48E+00 3.35E+02 ' '6E+03 3.90E+02 5.30E+Ol 1.41E+Ol N/A N/A N/A N/A a

PENNSYLVANIA POWER 0 LIGHT COMPANY DRILLs 95NRC2 REVISION Os 05/16/95 PASS Suppression Pool Small Volume Liquid mR/hr RE-507 RE-664 Monitor Monitor Unshield Unshield Unshield Unshield Shielded Shielded Shielded Shielded Readina P.eadinca at 2" at 6" at 18" at 36" at 2" at 6" at 18" at 36" 1.518-02 7 '68+00 1.00E-Ol 1.63E-02 2.04E-03 5.31E-04 2.67E-03 4.36E-04 5.45E-OS 1.42E-05

.": 00 1.16E-02 5.94E+00 7.66E-02 1.25E-02 1.56E-03 4.06E-04 2.048-03 3.34E-04 4.17E-OS 1 OSE-05 Ps 30 9.968-03 5.128+00 6.60E-02 1.08E-02 1.35E"03 3.50E-04 1.768-03 87E-04 3.59E-05 9.33E-06

~ ~ ~

a) 4 .." .!':. 00

~ 5.848-02 9.53 -03 1.19E-03 '3.108"04 1.56E-03 2.548-04 3. 18 '-05 8.268-06 a pa~ fal 5 '71;. no 8.528-03 1.0 ..-03 ".77 -94 1.39E-03 2.27i:-04 2. 8 i:.-05 7.38E-06

}.'ii3 3.6},: 4.698-02 7.668"03 2:00 a ~ ) 7 0 5.798-03 00 J ~

e ~ 0 " a.O J a

,) ~ 9$ '3 9.578-04

8. 6 }8-01 2 ~ 498-e}4 2.25E-J4 1.25E-03

'.13E-03 2.048-04 1.S4E-04

~~

5rSE-05 2.30i.-05 6.648-06 5.998-06 2.97E+00 3.838-02 6.268-03 7.83E-04 2 '38-04 1.028-03 1.678-04 2.09E-OS 5.43E-06 c

M" M

I PASS Suppression Pool Large Volume Liquid Vl mR/hr RE-507 RE-664

.'monitor 'Monitor Unshield Unshield Unshield 'Unshie1d Shielded Shielded Shielded Shielded

'me He i'no Readina at 2" at 6" at 18" at 36" at 2" aa e" at 18" at 36"

], )1

'..0'.s:::-n2 1.768+00 )'.008+01 1.63E+00 2.048-01 5.318-02 3.34E-03 5.45E-04 6.81E-05 1.778-05

, 9 }8~00 7.668+00 1 ~ 25E+00 1 568-01

~ 4.06E-02 2.558-03 4.17E-04 5.21E-05 1.35E-05

"~ ii 7 c. Gn:dnO aenO ) . 088< 00

'1 1- 358-01 3.508-02 2.20E-03 ea ea a

~

3.59E-04 4.49E-05 1.17E-O5

.'. - }. ~ I el) 0 r.'g 1. 1":-Ol 3. ] 0:--02 1.95 .-03 3.18E-04 3.97E-05

~

I 1.03.;-05

~ ~ ~ i a') .a'. '..'!.:-01 2.06"."01 1.7}8-03 2. S.'}. -04 3.558-05 "- 23!'.-06 0 . '>3 ~:+ 0<.) 4.6 l.~:n 7.66='-Ol 9 r57i 02 ". 49:.:-02 1.568-03 2.558-04 3.198-05 8. '98-06 Jv 1 . 418-03 2.308-04 'Pi -05

~

1 2  ! 438-06

~

':UO )98-O3 2.978+00 3.838i00 6.2bE-01 7.83E-02 2.038-02 1.288-03 2.09E-04 2.61E-OS 6.78E-06

PENNSYLVANIA POWER fc LIGHT COMPANY DRILL! 95NRC2 REVISION Oa 05/16/95, PASS Reactor Mater Small Volume Liquid mR/hr RE-507 RE-664 llonitox Monitor rUnshirld Unshield Unshield Unshield Shielded Shielded Shielded Shielded .

"pp Peudinc Rr.adinq . at 2" at 6" at 18" 'at 36" at 2" at 6" at 18" at 36"

. I- C)" fl) 1.33E+04 1. 7:?Er02 '.81E+01 3.51E+00 9.12E-Ol 4.58E+00 7.48'-Ol 9.35E-02 2.431:-02 0'} 01E. ~ .,'P. 1.03E+04 1. 3:3)'.+02 2.18K+01. 2.72E+00 7.07E-Ol 3.55E+00 r SOE 01 7.25E-02 1.898-02

~ ~ I I ,SE!03 3.3: ~.t2 3.8.":L+01 2.33K".00 6).03E-O'.:. 3.02E+00  !'. 93'=-01 6.16L'-02 1. E'I.."02 i, I )Er ~ ' 61.":+01 2.03E+00 E-03. 2.63E+00 4.308-01 5I.37E-02 1 4 }E-02 7~: t~ 3 0

ar ~ i x

~l1 1. 4 ".:-'+Ol 1 78r'00 l.;I:;-Ol 2. 33.=.+ 00 3.80..-01 ) 7r:-. 02 1 ~ 2.1 E-02

~ r'

7. 7...':. C)1 .2'"'+01 l. 5":=< 00 4. 1:):.-Ol 2.08:F00 3.39:-01 4.24E-02 1 30E-02

. 3') 3 ..;=t'.)1 5. ' +t)3 7.00"+01 '.li +01 1.438+00 3.72 -01 1.87E+00 3.05: -Ol 3. 81E-02 9 '3E-03 ii: 00 9.b7E+00 4.91Ei03 6.34E+01 1.03E+Ol 1.29E+00 3.36E-01 1.69E+00 2.76E-01 3.45E-02 8 96E-03 M

PASS Reactor Water Large Volume Liquid M mR/hr I

Vl C)

RE-507 RE-664 Monit'r)r l)onitor Unshield Unshield Un shield Unshield Shielded Shielded . Shielded Shielded Rea;? i>>o t)I atdino at 2 at 6" Bt 18" at 36)" at 6" at 38" at 36"

~ ~ '""~0) l. )2- 04  : .Si.=:+03 3.51F+02 ':. 12E l}1 t 5. 13?'+00 9- 35E-i}1 1. 1 iL'-c)3 3. 0 )E-02 2'( '-, ~

3 '. (ISEI 04 1, 33)',e c)4 2.18E+03 2.72E+02 i .07i)~ P)l 4. 4.)" <00 7.25E-Ol 9.06E-02 2.36E-02

~ ~~ c' I } '3 l. 13':"0 ) 3.8r.:i03 2 ..';. '.-. 02 ~-

Ol .~ ') 3. 17:-F00 16E,!3 7.70E-02) 2.0!IE-02 3.- ~

3 9 > ~

I g3 .'.6 "='3 rPO) "., 2) 4:: IiZ p 3.:i'3.:~ 00 r.. 37E-I.! 1 6.7:?E-02 1 ~ 7'. "-02

} 3 'i7:;:I)3 8.73);+03 1.43=+03 l. 7"'+02 ~ ).63::C01 2.91ECOO 4.75E-01 5.94E"02 1. 5 '. =.-02 3

~ I 'r.t3 7 Pcl. )CJ3 3.2"= 03 1.5" +02 3:+ .}1 2.:r J +00 4 . 2.) E-rJ 1 5.30E-02 1 3-:.-02

~

-33 l. 0:.:: I:33 ~

.: 3::+03 7 CUE+03 03 1.43E+02 3. 72E+Ol 2.338+00 3.81E-01 4.76E-02 1.2)E-02 22:00 9.57E+00 4.93E403 6.34E+03 1.03E+03 1.29E+02 3.36E+Ol 2.3.1E+00 3.45E-01 4 '1E-02 1.12E-02 l

SECTION Vll - RADIOL'OGICALCONDITIONS PART L - IN-PLANT RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS Vll-59

ELEVATION 645 TIME. AREAA AREA B AREA AREAD AREAE AREAF AREA AREA AREA AREA RHRA RHR B C RCIC HPCI CORE SUMP E&F E&F E&F mR/Hr mRlHr SPRAY IODINE IODINE NG NG C/ML DAC CIML DAC 15:00 NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAI'ORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL to, 21'00

. 21'30 8000 NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL 22'00 8000 8000 NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAI NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL The dose rates in the Reactor Building will be normal with the exception of the RHR rooms when RHR is placed in

'hutdown Cooling. It is not expected that RHR will be used for suppression pool cooling at any time during the scenario.

Only one loop will be used for Shutdown Cooling, and the radiation levels will indicate that loop from the simulator.

TURBINE BUILDING RAD LEVELS E.

At 18:40 noon all areas in communication with the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel and the Condenser Area:

Condensate Pump Room Condensate Demin Pipe Way and Demin Rooms RFP Area Feed Heater Areas Lube Oil Purifier Room Off Gas Areas Will be between 1 and 2 mR/hr as a result of the leakage into the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel and subsequent recirculation in the Turbine Building areas.

The Rad levels in the Control Structure will increase to approximately 0.5 mR/hr by 18:40 as a result of shine from the Reactor Building and the Turbine Building. This will cause any friskers set up to alarm and inop the PCMs.

SECTION Vll - RADIOLOGICALCONDITIONS PART M - SPEC ANALYSIS DATA SHEETS VII2

8/15/95 AIR SAMPLE ANALYSIS REPORT File Number C: 01089401.drl Team: Drill Sample, OSCAR Sector/Distance:

Sample Start Time: 15-Aug-95 Sample Start Time: 15-Aug-95 Air Volume Sampled in (cc): 566336.9 Isotope Activity Concentration Concentration Dose Rate (pCI) (pCi/CC) (%MPCs*) (mrem/hr) 31 1.0E-02 1.8E-08 200.0 6.30E+01

-132 NUCLIDE NOT DETECTED I-133- NUCLIDE NOT DETECTED I-134 HALF LIFE TOO SHORT I-135 NUCLIDE NOT DETECTED Total MPC Concentration (%) = 200.0 Total Dose Rate (mrem/hr) = 6.30E+01 Total Concentration (pCI/cc) = 1.8E-08

• Occupational MPCs VII%3

8/15/95 AIR SAMPLE ANALYSIS REPORT Number C: 01089401,drl 'ile Team: Drill Sample, OSCAR Sector/Distance:

Sample Start Time: 15-Aug-95 Sample Start Time: 15-Aug-95 Air Volume Sampled in (cc): 566336.9 Isotope , Activity Concentration Concentration'ose Rate (pCI) (pCI/CC) (%MPCs*) (mrem/hr)

I-131 I-132 1.0E-01 1.8E-07 2000.0'000 NUCLIDE NOT DETECTED I-133 NUCLIDE NOT DETECTED

', I-134 HALF LIFE TOO SHORT I-135 NUCLIDE NOT DETECTED Total MPC Concentration (%) = 2000,0 Total Dose Rate (mrem/hr) =1.0E+03 Total Concentration (pCi/cc) ' = 1.8E7 Occupational MPCs VII%4

8/1 5/95 AIR SAMPLE ANALYSIS REPORT File Number C: 01089401.drl Team: Drill Sample, OSCAR Sector/Dista'nce:

Sample Start Time: 15-Aug-95 Sample Start Time: 15-Aug-95 Air Volume Sampled in (cc): 566336.9

~

Isotope Activity Concentration Concentration Dose Rate (vCI) (pCI/CC) (%MPCs ) (mrem/hr) 5.1E-02 9.2E-08 1000.0 ,510 =

I-132 NUCLIDE NOT DETECTED I-133 NUCLIDE NOT DETECTED I-134 HALF LlfE TOO SHORT I-135 NUCLIDE NOT DETECTED Total MPC Concentration (%) = 1000.0 Total Dose Rate (mrem/hr) =5,1E+02 Total Concentration (pCi/cc) = 9,2E-08

• Occupational MPCs

'II%5

8/15/95 AIR SAMPLE ANALYSIS REPORT File Number C: 01089401.drl Team: Drill Sample,, OSCAR Sector/Distance:

Symple Start Time: 15-Aug-95 Sample Start Time: 15-Aug-95 Air Volume Sampled in (cc): 566336.9 Isotope Activity Concentration Concentration Dose Rate (pCI) (pCI/CC) '%MPCs*)

(mrem/hrl I-131 3.4E-02 6.1E-08 670 340 l-132 NUCLIDE NOT DETECTED I-133 NUCLIDE NOT DETECTED I-134 HALF LIFE TOO SHORT I-135 NUCLIDE NOT DETECTED Total MPC Concentration (%) = 670.0 Total Dose Rate (mrem/hr) = 3.4+02 Total Concentration (pCI/cc) = 6.1 E-08

• Occupational MPCs

SECTION VIII MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEETS

IS No. 1 Time: 1500 NIESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Operations Personnel in Control Room

~MEE ARE FRQII: C I I ~ R I LOCATION: Training Center Simulator E

~ME'l'i~AiE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The Initial Conditions of the plant which is the material under the tab of INITIAL CONDITIONS SECTION Vl of the exercise manual. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: This material provides the initial conditions of the plant for the participants. Included in this section are the NSAG Daily Report, previous logs and turnover sheets, and Station Priority List.

F EXPECTED A Tl N: The participants will process the information as a normal shift.

'riefing.

VIII-2

IS No. 2 Time: 1500 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Phone Company Personnel MESSAGE FROM: Lead Referee LOCATION: S&A Phone Room and Simulator Control Room

'ESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." S&A phone room telephone number - 3999. Hook up the Exercise communications equipment in the S&A phone room and the simulator control room, both the page and the telephones.

Ensure the NRC red phone is hooked up and the plant radio is activated in the simulator control room. 'THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY

~REFERRER TEE:TF t tt ~ tP t d t E t PPt t td start of the exercise.

EXPECTED A TIONS: The systems will be checked out prior to the start of the exercise.

VIII-3

IS No. 3 Time: 1500 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Simulator Instructor MESSAGE FROM: Referee lVIanual LOCATION: Simulator Control Room MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." Initialize the simulator to IC 136, run and execute batch file "EPLAN95IPE¹1". Ensure 4 passive failure malfunctions have loaded and one event trigger. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY

~REPEREE MOTE: Tb IO t tb I 1 I d1 pp ~ d by tb operator logs, turnover sheets, etc.

EXPECTED A TIONS: Check the alarms against the annunciator .Iog, check equipment status of simulator versus status sheets, verify

~

SPDS rad points active, verify weather conditions per

. Radiological section, verify ARMs are active and Unit 2 electrical line up.

IS No. 4 Time: 1500 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE F R: Security MESSAGE FROM: Security Lead Referee LOCATI N: ASCC

~MENSA E: "THIS IS A DRILL." The initial conditions for the present securitY situation are as follows:

Previous Security logs as required to support initial conditions-Copy of NRC security notice-Security Condition-Check lists that have been completed to date-Number of Security personnel on site-Placement of Security Personnel-Communications in place-

"THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY

~REFEREE MOTE: TR f f tl F ld d t ltf tll F f~ td d l f conducting the exercise with the information that would normally be passed at shift change to the oncoming shift.

EXPECTED A Tl N: The SeCurity participants will review the information received from the briefing as would normally be done during a shift change and ask questions to clarify any of the information provided.

IS No. 5 Time: 1530 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET

~ME GANEF tl. 'C t tR EO tt P MESSAGE FROM: Operations in the Plant Control Room

~LOCATt N: C t t R

~MES A E: "THIS IS A DRILL." The 1995 NRC GRADED EXERCISE haa begun. All drill communications shall begin with "This is a Drill"and end with "This is a Drill," Line 3 of the plant page system is to be used for the drill. Drill Referees please mark the time as . "THIS IS A DRILL."

REPEAT ABOVE MESSAGE.

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: This message is to be passed over the PA system by Operations to note the beginning of the drill~

The time should be obtained from the Security Referee at the ASCC.

The Control Room should contact the NRC Operations Center via the ENS.

EXPE TED A TIONS: Message to be announced over plant page system on line 3.

The message shall be announced from the actual Control Room.

Vill-6

IS No. 6 Time: 1530 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Security Controller in the ASCC MESSAGE FROM: Referee Simulating an Individual with the LLEA ATI A: ACCC

~MES A E: "THIS IS A DRILL." This is at the to provide you with information that was recently received from one of our sources. This information may or may not coincide with the information that came across the wire late last week from'the NRC talking about an unidentified group intent'on disrupting electrical generation, transmission and distribution. The information passed to our organization was that, it is believed from our conversations which were overheard, that there is a group of individuals targeting PP&L:as the utility to be made an example of, "THIS IS A DRILL."

This event leads to the trigger for an'UNUSUAL EVENT emergency classification.

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The intent of this inject is to provide Security with information that in conjunction with the initial conditions provides enough information to make a classification. This event is to lead Security personnel to believe that there is a credible threat to the site.

EXPECTEDACTIONS: The ASCC Security Controller will pass the information received to the Security Shift Supervisor who will initiate an investigation and pass the received information to the Operations Shift Supervisor.

VIII-7

IS No. 7 Time: 1600 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Shift Supervisor MESSAGE FROM: Control Room Referee LOCATION: Simulator Control Room ME~l~AE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The security event that has been evolving and reported needs to be classified as an UNUSUAL EVENT based on EAL 16.1 Security Events. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The timeline must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of all applicable offsite objectives. If the UE cIassification is not made by this time in the scenario referee intervention will be required. If referee intervention is required, it will be noted for the critique process.

EXPECTED A Tl N: The Shift Supervisor will make the classification and follow

'he Position Specific Procedure initiating and notifying the emergency response organization.

IS No. 8 Time: 1605 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET

~IlE SAGE ION S ItyC t II I tI ASCC MESSAGE FROM: Referee in ASCC

~ICATION: A!ICE

~ESEAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." You have received a tamper alarm on door "TKIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The intent of this inject is to provide Security with information to initiate an investigation of the alarm by dispatching an officer to the source of the alarm. The officer dispatched will then become part of the scenario as a hostage. The alarm is on the Unit 1 Reactor "Building to Turbine Building 676'oor.

A EXPECTED A Tl N: The ASCC Security Controller will contact the patrol officer to investigate the alarm and report findings back to the ASCC.

Vill-9

IS No. 9 Time: 1605 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Security Investigating Reactor/Turbine Building Door Alarm MESSAGE FROM: Actor/Referee Simulating a Hostage Situation in the Radwaste Building.

ATI N: T Hi B ilCh g ME~(iA(~E: "THIS IS A DRILL." The Security Officer that is dispatched to investigate the Reactor/Turbine Building door alarm is simulated to be taken hostage.

"THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The Security Officer will respond to the door alarm and be taken hostage by the intruder. The intruder will move into the Radwaste Building in the decon area to call the Special Office of the President (SOP),

EXPE TED A Tl N: The Security Controller in the ASCC will become concerned due to the lack of radio contact with the officer dispatched to the Turbine Building and will inform the Security Shift Supervisor of the concern.

VIII-10

IS No. 10 Time: 1615 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: The Special Office of the President MESSAGE FROM: Actor/Referee Simulating a Hostage Situation in the Radwaste Building.

LOCATION: Special Office of the President d'ESSAGE:

Say two times and clearly, "THIS IS A DRILL, THIS IS A DRILL." I have a message for you. This call is to let you know that we have apprehended one of your security officers and we are now holding him hostage! We don't want you to do anything silly and put this innocent individual's safety in jeopardy, so please just do as we say. First off, we do not want to cause anyone any harm but we will use whatever means necessary to

~

attain our goals. We have no intention of disrupting the electrical output of this facility, in fact, we expect that you will do whatever is required to maintain full output of this power station. If you do anything to change the electricity coming out of this place the second person to know will be the security individual, but he will know only for a short time. We also have a statement that we will get to you in a short time. That will be all for now.

"THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY

~REFEREE MOTE: Tb II III t Iib ty b Fid d F by tb F I~ d t take the Public Information Managers phone, calls.

EXPECTED A TIONS: The individual taking the call will pass the information on to the senior manager available. The senior manager will call Security with the information or possibly contact operations. It is expected that Security will be contacted. When Security is contacted an evaluation and investigation will be started and notification made to operations with any pertinent recommendations.

IS No. 11 Time: 1615.

MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Security Controller in the ASCC MESSAGE FROM: Referee Simulating Contact with the FBI

~TCCATI M: AECC

~ME~i~AlE:. "THIS ISA DRILL." The controller is to provide information and interface as if he, the controller, were an individual from the FBI. "THIS IS A DRILL.'OR REFEREE USE ONLY

~REFEREE MOTE: TR C t II III F Id I I tt t td I F dt IF as if he were an individual representing the FBI. The intent of the Controller is for training and exercise control so that the participants do not have to "make up" this important interface.. The individual needs to be well versed in the expected FBI response to a power plant security event.

EXPE TEDA Tl NS: The ASCC Security participants will pass any information E received to the emergency organization as required.

VIII-12,

IS No. 12 Time: 1620 INESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Shift Supervisor in Simulator Control Room MESSAGE FROM: Referee Simulating a Radwaste Control Room Operator LOCATION: Simulator Control Room

'MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." This is down in Radwaste, one of the guys just came in here and said he saw a security Officer and an individual walking from the Decon/Laundry area, down the corridor past the Radwaste Control Room and out into the Turbine Building toward the instrument/service air compressors. It appeared that the Security Officer had a gun in his back. Is Security doing some, kind of training or drills

. down here'? "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREENOTES:An actor who is simulating a, Radwaste Operator calls the Simulator Control Room to report what appears to be a Security Officer as a hostage. The message is to provide a verification of the call from the SOP so that it is clear a hostage situation exists.

The message also shows exactly where the intruder is located so that a significant amount of time is not spent attempting to ascertain the intruders location.

EXPECTEDA TIONS: The Shift Supervisor will contact the ASCC to relay the information: The ASCC Security participants will pass any information received to the emergency organization as required.

VIII-13

IS No. 13 Time: 1620 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Secu'rity Officer at the Special Office of the President M~EBSAGEFR M: R f tth Sp I IOIII fth P td

~LO ATION: Sp I IOR'th P td

~ME ~SA g "THIS IS A DRILL." The information provided to the officer investigating the call will only be from the participants. All the information available was provided by the actor making the call. Whatever information that the investigating officer can obtain from the interview of the individual that took the call is "fair game. "THIS IS A DRILL.

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The information sheet does not provide any additional information for the participants. The information will come from the interview process of the individual taking the call.

EXPECTED A TION: The investigating Security Officer will pass the information obtained during the interview to the ASCC who will pass the received information to the Operations Shift Supervisor.

VIII-14

IS No. 14 Time: 1630 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET.

MESSAGE FOR: Security Controller in the ASCC I~IE RAGE FRQII.'R I Et I tt ~ I dt td I ttd II LLEA LOCATION: ASCC

~MESSA E: "THIS IS A DRILL." The controller is to provide information and interface as if he, the controller, were an individual from the LLEA. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The Controller will provide information to the exercise participants as if he were an individual of the LLEA. The intent of the Controller is for training and exercise control so that the participants do not have to "make up" this important interface. The individual needs to be well versed in the expected LLEA response to a power plant security event, EXPECTEDA TI N: The ASCC Security participants will pass any information received to the emergency organization as required.

VIII-15

IS No. 15 Time: 1630 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET

~IIE SA EF R: S ItyC t II I th AIICC MESSAGE FROM: Referee Simulating the intruder with the hostage SLLCATI R: ASCC

'~ME l~AE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The ASCC Controller will attempt to contact the intruder on the radio. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY

~REFEREE R TES: Th S Ity C t II I ~ th ASCC tlt It pt t t I th individual to glean as much information as possible and ensure that the security officer is safe. The information obtained will be used in dealing with the intruder. The actor simulating the intruder will provide minimal information and tell the ASCC that he will call when he needs something otherwise don't bother him.

EXPECTEDA TION: The ASCC Security participants will pass any information received to the emergency organization as required.

VIII-16

IS No. 16 Time: 1640 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Shift Supervisor MESSAGE FROM: Lead Control Room Referee LOCATION: Simulator Control Room MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." If the Shift Supervisor makes the decision to declare an emergency classification greater than an ALERT, he will be prompted to remain at the ALERT level. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE.ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The timeline must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of all the applicable offsite objectives. If the classifications are not stepped, the offsite agencies will not be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate their objectives in an, orderly fashion for the FEMA Evaluators. Therefore if a greater classification than ALERT is attempted at this time in the scenario, referee intervention will be required. If referee intervention is required, it will be noted for the critique process.

EXPECTED A TIONS: The Shift Supervisor will make the ALERT classification and follow the Position Specific Procedure. initiating and notifying the emergency response organization.

VIII-17

IS No. 17 Time: 1640 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Simulator Control Room and ASCC personnel MESSAGE FROM: Referee Manual LOCATION: Simulator Control Room and ASCC

• MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." . The accountability alarm wilt be sounded by the ACTUAL Control Room when called to do so by the Control Room Communicator. The accountability message will also be announced over the plant page system from the actual Control Room instead of the simulator control room. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY

~REFEREE R TE: yyh th Ehllt E p t d t l th t t tl'llty l required by the Position Specific Procedure, the Control Room Communicator in the simulator will contact the actual Control Room to make the accountability announcement and sound the station alarm, F

EXPECTED A Tl NS: The site personnel will report to their accountability stations and fill out the accountability rosters for pick up by Security.

VIII-18

IS No. 18 Time: 1645 MESSAGE INFORNIATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR Shift Supervisor MESSAGE'FROM: Lead Control Room Referee LOCATION: Simulator Control Room MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." If the Shift. Supervisor DOES NOT make an ALERT classification based on the information provided, he will be prompted to do so. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The timeline must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of all the applicable offsite objectives. If the ALERT classification is not made by this time in the scenario, referee intervention will be required. If referee intervention is required, it will be noted for the critique process.

EXPECTED A TIONS: The Shift Supervisor will make the classification and follow the Position Specific Procedure initiating and notifying the emergency response organization.

VIII-19

IS No. 19 Time: 1710 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR; Shift Supervisor/TSC Emergency Director MESSAGE FROM: Simulator/TSC Lead Referee LOCATION: Simulator Control Room/TSC MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." When the accountability is reported complete allow the people.not required for exercise participation to be released back to their normal work assignments. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: With the accountability complete, the workers may return to their normal assignments.

EXPE TED A TION: The announcement to secure from the accountability will be made.

VIII-20

IS No. 20 Time: 1735 MESSAGE INFORNIATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Security Controller in the ASCC MESSAGE FROM: Referee in ASCC LOCATION: ASCC MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." You have received "E" Field alarms on When the officer places the surveillance camera on the affected section of the fence, the picture shows that the fence has been damaged by what appears to be a vehicle having driven through the fence. Approximately 45 seconds after the fence alarm is received, a tamper alarm for the Unit 1 Railroad Bay, Door will be received. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The intent of this inject is to provide Security with information that indicates a breach of the perimeter fence by a vehicle. Following the vehicle with the camera will show the vehicle going into and through the Unit 1 Reactor Building Railroad Bay Door.

. EXPECTED A TIONS: The ASCC Security Controller will contact the mobile patrol to investigate the fence alarms and report findings back to the ASCC.

IS No. 21 Time: 1735.

MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Security Controller in the ASCC MESSAGE FROM: Referee in ASCC LOCATION: ASCC

~ME SA E: "THIS IS A DRILL." You have received a temper aIarm on the Unit Building Railroad Bay Door. When the ASCC controller places a 1'eactor surveillance camera on the unit 1 railroad door, the picture shows that a vehicle has driven through the door and the door has partially returned to the closed position. The vehicle is what appears to be a deuce and a half army vehicle with a canvas top and open back. "THIS IS A DRILL."

'I FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The intent of this inject is to provide Security with information that indicates a breach of the Unit 1 Reactor'uilding Railroad Bay Door. The location of the vehicle is partially inside the building with the bed of the vehicle sticking out of the building and the cab on the inside. The view of the cab is obstructed from the outside and the driver cannot be seen. The back of the vehicle appears to be empty with what looks like a folded up tarp and pieces of fence in the back. The driver can only be seen from the inside of the railroad bay and not from the outside. It is intended to'provide information to.the participants that indicates the breach is not a truck bomb. It is not expected the participants'will totally rule out the possibility of explosives.

r EXPECTED ACTIONS: The ASCC Security Controller will contact the mobile patrol to investigate the situation at the Reactor Building Railroad Bay Door and report findings back to the ASCC.

II VIII-22

IS No. 22 Time: 1740, MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Security Officer at the Reactor Building MESSAGE FROM: Security Referee at the Reactor Building LOCATION: Reactor Building MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." Investigation of the vehicle entering the Reactor Building will 'determine that the driver has been fatally injured by the impact of the railroad bay door. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The investigation of the vehicle crashing through the Reactor Building Railroad Bay Door will find that the intruder has been fatally injured.

It is expected Security will approach the vehicle with caution and may attempt to look at the vehicle from above. The above information will not be given, until a plan for investigation is laid out and,logistics are simulated or acted out.

The intent of this information is to begin close out of the security portion of the scenario to allow the participants to deal with the plant events and the up coming radioactive release. It is expected that Security would confer with the local law enforcement officials and possibly the FBI as to the actions that would be required from this point on. The security event will be considered 'complete when the intruder in the Turbine Building is apprehended.

EXPECTED ACTIONS: The information will be passed to the Security Shift Supervisor and then to the TSC Security Coordinator.

VIII-23

IS No. 23 Time: 1800 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Shift Supervisor/TSC Emergency Director MESSAGE FROM:, Lead Control Room Referee/TSC Referee LOCATION: Simulator Control Room/TSC

~ME SAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." If the Shift Supervisor/TSC ED makes the decision to declare an emergency classification greater than an SITE AREA EMERGENCY, he will be prompted to remain at the SITE AREA EMERGENCY level. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The timeline must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of all the applicable offsite objectives..lf the classifications are not stepped, the offsite agencies will riot be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate their objectives in an orderly fashion for the FEMA Evaluators. Therefore if a greater classification than SITE AREA EMERGENCY is attempted at this time in the scenario, referee intervention will be required. If referee intervention is required, it will be noted for the critique process.

EXPECTED ACTION: The Shift Supervisor will make the SITE AREA EMERGENCY classification a'nd follow the Position Specific Procedure initiating and notifying the emergency response organization.

VIII-24

IS No. 24 Time: 1800 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: ASCC Security Controller MESSAGE FROM: Security Referee LOCATION: ASCC MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." There Will Oat be an actual site evacuation. The SINUlated evacuation process and methods will be reported back to the TSC or the Control Room, whichever is appropriate. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The objectives for site evacuation ARE NOT required to be fulfilled for this exercise.

EXPECTED A TIONS: The ASCC Controller will acknowledge the request to initiate site evacuation and will inform the Control Room when the simulated evacuation is complete.

VIII-25

IS No. 25 Time: 1810 lNESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Control Room/TSC Emergency Director MESSAGE FROM: Lead Control Room/TSC Referee LOCATION: Simulator Control Room/TSC

'~MESSA E: "THIS IS A DRILL." If the Control Room/TSC Emergency Dtrector DOES NOT make a Site Area Emergency classification based on the information provided, he wilt be prompted to do so. "T8IS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY

~RFFBREEfl TEB:Th ti Ii tb gati dt f ilitt d t ti f the applicable offsite objectives, If the Site Area Emergency classification is not made by this time in the scenario, referee intervention will be required.. If referee intervention is required, it will be noted for the critique process.

EXPECTED A TION: The Control Room/TSC Emergency Director will make the classification and follow 'the Position Specific Procedure initiating and notifying the emergency response organization.

VIII-26

IS No. 26 Time: 1830 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Security Officer and Actor in the Turbine Building MESSAGE FROM: Referee in Turbine Building LOCATION: Turbine Building 676' Air Compressors,

~MESSA E: "THIS ISA DRILL." The intruder and hostage begin to move from the air compressor area in the Turbine Building toward the Reactor Building.

The intruder calls the ASCC on the radio and informs the Security Controller that he and the officer are moving to meet up with his partner in the Reactor Building and that no one should get in his way. When the hostage taker sees he is cornered, he.will shut off the air compressors and turn himself over to the officers on scene. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The Security Officers which have set up to monitor the ingress and egress points of the Turbine Building will monitor the intruder's movement. The hostage taker will go to the Instrument air compressors and trip the operating and standby Ihstrument air compressors and the station begins to loss instrument air. The Control Room will receive alarms and take the proper actions as required by the off normal procedures. The intruder will then give himself up by turning the weapon over to his hostage; Interrogation of the intruder will reveal that there was an intended accomplice to work through the Reactor Building. Questioning will reveal that the use of explosives was never intended and the truck was just a means of getting into the Reactor Building.

The individuals involved with the security event are found to be loosely tied with the activists in Europe attempting to stop fuel shipments and shutdown European nuclear power plants.

EXPECTED ACTIONS: The Security Officers in the area of the air compressors will apprehend the intruder and report same to the ASCC..

VIII-27

IS No. 27 Time: 1830 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Simulator Control Room Operators MESSAGE FROM: Referee Manual

~LCCATI M: El I t C t I R

~ME SAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The Simulator Instructor to initiate the plant transient for data generation from the simulator to the other emergency facilities.

Simulator instructor to initiate instrument air shutdown by placing their local panel control switches to off: 'A'nst. Air Comp Switch Off-QDIHS125002A2 and 'B'nst. Air Comp Switch Off - QDIHS125002B2 "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY

~REFEREE METE: TR I dt tt I td C t I R Ill ~ d I R I air header pressure. There are no alarms activated when the local control switches are placed in off. When the instrument air header press'ure decreases to 80 pounds an alarm will be activated in the Control Room. The alarm will prompt the operators to monitor the decreasing air pressure and prepare for a manual scram.

On the scram, water level increases due to a failure of the feedwater control system failing high and an inadvertent'start of the HPCI Turbine. The HPCI Turbine fails to trip on high level and feeds reactor water level up to the main steam lines..

EXPECTED ACTIONS: The Control Room Operators will enter the Loss of Instrument Air Off Normal Procedure ON-118-001, which requires the reactor to be manually scrammed when the 'instrument air header pressure approaches 65 pounds.

The operators 'will enter Off Normal ON-100-101 Reactor Scram procedure and manually scram the reactor.

VIII-28

IS No. 28 Time: 1840 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Simulator Control Room Operators MESSAGE FROM: Referee Manual LOCATION: Simulator Control Room MESSAGE: 'THIS IS A DRILL." The Simulator Instructor to initiate the plant transient for data generation from the simulator to the other emergency facilities.

Simulator instructor to initiate "EPLAN95 IPE¹2, when reactor water level reaches approximately +1 40", initiate batch file. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: Due to the increasing water level, a water hammer in the main steam lines causes a break of the 'D'team Line'in the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel. The inboard and outboard isolation valves

, fail to fully close which provides a leak path from the primary to the secondary'and out the blow out panels in the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel.

In conjunction with the increasing reactor water. level and water down the steam lines, the HPCI steam line will isolate on indicate high flow. It is postulated that the high flow isolation is a result of the pressure perturbations and not an actual steam line break.

The room temperature and radiation indications will not be elevated.

The mechanical forces associated with the water hammer and steam line break are postulated to cause some clad failure and a release of gap fission products. The release will largely be unmonitored with a small portion going into the Turbine Building and Radwaste.

The Control Room Operators will follow the emergency operating procedures as required by the indications presented by the plant transient.

I EXPECTEDACTIONS: The Control Room Operators will attempt to control water level and monitor Control Room indications to maintain'he plant in a safe configuration.

VIII-29

IS No. 29 Time: 1840 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Simulator Control Room Operators MESSAGE FROM: Referee Manual LOCATION: Simulator Control Room MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The Simulator Instructor initiated a high vibration on the 'A'ecirc Pump in the previous file which will indicate a seized shaft for data generation from the simulator to the other emergency facilities.

This file will eventually lead to the trigger for a General Emergency classification based on the Fuel Damage EAL. "THIS IS A DRILL."

P FOR REFEREE USE'ONLY

-REFEREE NOTES: The indication in the Control Room will be a high vibration alarm on the 'A'ecirc Pump and subsequent shaft seizure with a trip.

high'urrent The failure of the Recirc pump is postulated to cause flow blockage in a fuel bundle and resultant fuel melt. The release will be out the steam tunnel blow out panel and into the Turbine Building and Radwaste. Field Team. data will disclose a change in release rate due to the fuel melt as will the increasing containment radiation monitors.

The containment radiation monitors will begin to increase approximately 20 to 30 minutes after the Recirc pump failure. The time delay is to simulate the heatup time required to melt the fuel.

EXPECTED ACTION: The Control Room Operators will enter the Loss of Recirc Off Normal Procedure, which requires the reactor recirc pump to have the discharge valve closed. The remaining recirc pump will remain in service.

VIII-30

IS No. 30 Time: 1840 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Shift Supervisor/TSC Emergency Director MESSAGE FROM: Lead Control Room Referee/TSC Referee LOCATION: Simulator Control Room/TSC MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." If the Shift Supervisor/TSC ED makes the decision to declare an emergency classification greater than an SITE AREA EMERGENCY, he will be prompted to remain at the SITE AREA EMERGENCY level. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The timeline must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of all the applicable offsite objectives. If the classifications are not stepped, the offsite agencies will not be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate their objectives in 'an orderly fashion for the FEIVIA Evaluators. Therefore if a greater classification than SITE AREA EMERGENCY is attempted at this time in'the scenario, referee intervention will be required. If referee intervention is required, it will be noted for the critique process, EXPECTED ACTIONS: The Shift Supervisor will make the SITE AREA EMERGENCY classification and follow the Position Specific Procedure initiating and notifying the emergency response organization.

VIII-31

lS No. 31 Time: 1840 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: ASCC Security Controller/Mobile Security Officer MESSAGE FROM: Security Referee LOCATION: ASCC/West Side of Turbine Building MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The Security Officers in the ASCC will NOT receive any alarms resulting from the Main Steam Line failure. If a Security Officer is dispatched to check the Turbine/Reactor Building area, it will be noted that there is vapor plume rising from what appears to be the CST Berm area. If the ASCC uses cameras to determine if there is a steam leak they will see a vapor from the Unit 1 CST Berm area. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The. break of the main steam line in the Turbine Building is postulated to cause the blow out panels in the Turbine Building steam tunnel to lift. These panels relieve into the Unit 1 CST berm area and a plume would be visible'.

EXPECTED A Tt N: The Security Controller in the ASCC will inform the Security Shift Supervisor who will inform theControl Room of the situation.

VIII-32

IS No. 32 Time: 1840 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Security Officer in Turbine Building MESSAGE FROM: Security Referee LOCATION: Turbine Building

'ESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The Security Officers in the Turbine Building at the Instrument Air compressor skid will be told that they hear a loud noise emanating from the east wall of the Turbine Building at 699'. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The break of the main steam line in the Turbine Building is t postulated to cause the blow out panels in the Turbine Building steam tunnel to lift. The Security Officers will be informed by the referee that a loud noise is heard which is'the steam line break in the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel.

EXPECTED A TIONS: The information will be passed to the Security Shift Supervisor and then to the TSC Security Coordinator.

VIII-33

IS No. 33 Time: 1840.

MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: TSC MESSAGE FROM: TSC Referee LOCATION: TSC MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The TSC responders will be informed of several loud noises and a roaring sound appearing to come from the Steam Tunnel adjacent to the Control Structure. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The break of the. main steam line in the Turbine Building is postulated to cause the blow out panels in the Turbine Building steam tunnel to lift. The TSC responders will be informed by the referee that a loud noise is heard which is the steam line break in the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel.

EXPECTED ACTION: The information will confirm the Control Room report of a steam line break in the Turbine Building.

Vill-34

IS No. 34 Time: 1845 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET

~IIE GAGE F II: I lygfg I y II E IIII g MESSAGE FROM: Security Referee LOCATION: Turbine Building MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The Security Officers in the Turbine Buildin'g at the Instrument Air compressor skid will apprehend the intruder. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The intent of this information is to close out of the security portion A

of the scenario to allow the participants to deal with the plant events arid the radioactive release. The security event will be considered complete.

EXPECTED A TION: The information will be passed to the Security Shift Supervisor and then to the TSC Security Coordinator.

~ ~

Vill-35

IS No. 35 Time: 1845.

MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Plant Operator Investigating HPCI Control Problems MESSAGE FROM: In-Plant Team Referee LOCATION: Reactor Building

'MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The radiation levels in the Reactor Building will be reported as normal as the operator proceeds to the HPCI Room. The operator will note that the governor valve and stop valve are full open during the investigation. The operator will not be able to determine the cause for both valves being open. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: By the time that an operator is dispatched to investigate the speed control problems with HPCI, the system will already have isolated due to water hammer in the steam line which is postulated to cause a high flow isolation signal. The simulated failures in HPCI are electrical in nature confined to DC control power.

EXPECTED A Tl N: The operator dispatched to investigate HPCI will report the above information. The response organization will not have HPCI restoration as a high priority.

Vill-36

IS No. 36 Time: 1845 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Plant Operator Investigating Turbine Building Steam Tunnel Indications MESSAGE FROM: In-Plant Team Referee LOCATION: Turbine Building MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The radiation levels in the Turbine Building steam tunnel will be reported as elevated as the operator proceeds to the steam tunnel. The operator will note that there is noise inside of the steam tunnel and that the access door is hot to the touch. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The operator dispatched to investigate the temperature indication ~

'n the steam tunnel will not be able to enter the steam tunnel for at least an hour after the steam line break due to high temperatures and the on going leak.

EXPECTED A Tl N: The operator will report back to the Control Room the results of the investigation of the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel.

Vill-37

IS No. 37 Time: 1845 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Simulator Control Room Operators MESSAGE FROM: Simulator Instructor LOCATION: Simulator Control Room

~ME SA E: ".THIS IS A DRILL." The Simulator Instructor to initiate malfunction file:

EPLAN95IPERAD. The file increases the area radiation and SPING indications for data generation from the simulator to the other emergency facilities. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: A portion of the vapor released from the break in the steam tunnel will be drawn into the Turbine Building Filtered Exhaust Ventilation System causing an increased release rate from the SPING monitors. In addition a portion of the leakage is postulated to leak into the general area of the Turbine Building causing an increased general area airborne with resulting increased general area radiation levels increasing slightly.

EXPE TED A Tl N: The operators in the Control Room will monitor the radiation levels in the plant and attempt to determine where the increase is originating from.

VIII-38

IS No. 38 Time: 1845 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Health Physics Personnel MESSAGE FROM: In-Plant Referees LOCATION: Turbine Building and First Floor of Control Structure

~ME SAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The portal monitors, friskers, and portable air samplers in the Turbine Building, and Control Structure go into alarm.

"THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: A portion of the leakage is postulated to leak into the general area

'of the Turbine Building causing an increased general area airborne with resulting increased general area radiation levels increasing slightly.

All the sensitive instruments in the Turbine and Control Structure go into alarm. The Count Rooms in the Control Structure first floor are inoperable as a result of the back ground.

The increased airborne activity in the Control Structure and the Turbine Building occurs after the staffing and activation of the TSC and should not have any adverse affects.

Multiple PCRs are reported by Health Physics.

EXPE TED A TIONS: The access to the Control Structure will be addressed since the PCM at the entrance will be out of" service as will the PCMs for the Unit 1 8 2 access control points.

VIII-39

IS No. 39 Time: 1845 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Operator/INDIA Team Investigating Turbine Building Rad Levels MESSAGE FROM: In-Plant Team Referee LOCATION: Turbine Building 676'MES AGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." Investigation of the radiation levels in the Turbine Building will indicate higher than the average levels throughout the building. The increased rad levels are due to leakage from the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The radiation levels are not a major problem in the Turbine Building,other than the contamination and high background in the Chemistry count lab which will require the use of the Health Physics count lab or the EOF sample facilities.

EXPECTED A Tl N: The INDIA Team will walk down the Turbine Building. The report back to the TSC/Control Room will be an above normal airborne and radiation level for the entire building.

Vill-40

IS No. 40 Time: 1845 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Operator Investigating Turbine Building Rad Levels MESSAGE FROIVI: In-Plant Team Referee LOCATION: Upper Relay Room

~ESSA(EE: "THIS IS A DRILL." Investigation of the ARM readings in the Upper Relay Room for the Turbine Building will indicate higher than the average levels throughout the building. The increased rad levels is due to leakage from the Turbine Building Steam Tunnel The readings are obtained in the

~

Radiological Section of the Referee Manual. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY

~REPEREENRTE:TR P t t t p I dt dt p td p t t d dt the ARM readings on the local panel in the Upper Relay Room.

The radiation levels are not a'major problem in the Turbine Building other than the contamination and high background in the Chemistry count lab which will require the use of the Health Physics count lab or the EOF sample facilities.

EXPECTEDACTIONS: The operator will report back to the TSC/Control Room indicating an above normal radiation level for the entire building.

IS No. 41 Time: 1845 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: OSCAR Monitoring Team MESSAGE FROM: OSCAR Monitoring Team Referee LOCATION: In Field MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The radiological data for the OSCAR teams is located in section seven (7) of the exercise manual. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The monitoring teams will be given information (raw data) based on procedures/techniques, location in the field relative to 'ampling plume centerline, and questions asked.

I The TSC, when dispatching the OSCAR Team, will note any change in the wind direction and the resultant risk to the site.

EXPECTED A TION: The TSC HP Radioman is expected to dispatch OSCAR down.

wind from the plant.

Vill-42

IS No. 42 Time: 1900 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Simulator Control Room Operators MESSAGE FROM: Simulator Instructor LOCATION: Simulator Control Room

'ESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The Simulator Instructor to initiate malfunction file:

EPLAN951PEPC. The file increases the containment post accident radiation monitors for data generation from the simulator to the other emergency facilities. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY

~REFERRER TEE:TR Ill Ill R I p p II EIE g I f bundle and postulated fuel melt. Field Team data will disclose a change in'release rate due to the fuel melt as will the increasing containment radiation monitors.

The increasing containment radiation levels are to indicate the damage in the flow blocked fuel bundle. The radiation levels will not indicate the same for both rad monitors in the, containment due to the 'A'ecirc loop being out of service. Due to the geometry and the proximity of the rad monitors to the recirc system piping the

'B'ad monitor will read significantly greater than the 'A'.

EXPECTED ACTIONS: The operators in the Control Room will monitor the radiation levels in the containment and attempt to determine where the increase is originating from.

I Vill-43

IS No. 43 Time: 1900 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: TSC Rad Protection Coordinator MESSAGE FROM: Actor Simulating DER/BRP Rep in Harrisburg LOCATION: TSC MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The State DER/BRP representative in Harrisburg calls the TSC Rad Protection Coordinator asking for assistance in coordinating the offsite sampling effort of the State and RAP Teams.

"THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The call from the actor simulating DER/BRP in Harrisburg is a potential situation the TSC might find themselves in before the EOF Interim Staff has taken over control of the field monitoring teams. '

The TSC, when dispatching the OSCAR Team, will. note any change in the wind direction and the resultant risk to the site.

EXPECTED A TIONS: The TSC Rad Protection Coordinator will refer the caller to the EOF and the EOF Rad Support Manager will assist in coordination of the additional offsite teams.

Vill-44

IS No. 44 Time: 1925.

MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Chemistry PASS Sample Team MESSAGE FROM: Chemistry Referee LOCATION: Reactor Building

~ME SAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The chemiatry count lab will be contaminated by the time a sample is obtained and will not be used to determine the coolant activity. When the sample is obtained, it will be taken to the EOF or to the Health Physics count lab to determine results. The PASS information

[located in the Rad Section (Vll) of the Exercise Manual] is to be given to the chemistry team when they have demonstrated the ability to obtain, prepare, and count a PASS sample. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The PASS information can be obtained if the EOF or Health Physics counting equipment is used. There should be a discussion of how the sample is to be transported to the EOF and what if any additional precautions need to be taken if it is determined to use the EOF. Ensure that any information given out is earned by the individuals obtaining the sample. The correct counting time needs to be simulated, the proper procedures and location for obtaining the sample need to be discussed if applicable for training purposes.

The sample team will proceed to the Training Center and use the PASS to obtain their sample.

EXPECTEDACTIONS: The Chem team will report to the TSC for a briefing and simulate proceeding to the Sample Station to'obtain a sample When the sample is obtained it will be taken to the EOF.

Vill-45

IS No. 45 Time: 1930 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Offsite Monitoring Teams MESSAGE FROM: Offsite Monitoring Team Referee LOCATION: In Field

~ME SAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The radiological data for the offsite teams is (ocated in section seven (7) of the exercise manual. 'THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The monitoring teams will be given information (raw data) based on sampling procedures/techniques,. location in the field relative to plume centerline, and questions asked.

EXPECTED A TION: The EOF Emergency Monitoring Team Director is expected to have the teams dispatched to the down wind sectors.

Vill<6

IS No. 46

'Time: 1945 MESSAGE INFORlNATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: TSC Emergency Director/Recovery Manager MESSAGE FROM: Lead TSC/EOF Referee LOCATION: TSC/EOF

'ESSAGE: "THIS IS'A DRILL." If the TSC Emergency Director/Recovery Manager DOES NOT make a General Emergency classification based on the information provided, he will be prompted to do so. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The timeline must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of all the applicable offsite objectives. If the General Emergency classification is not made by this time in the scenario, referee intervention will be required. If referee intervention is required, it will be noted for the critique process.

EXPECTEDACTIONS: The Control Room/TSC Emergency Director will make the classification and follow the Position Specific Procedure initiating and notifying the emergency response organization.

Vill<7

IS No. 47 Time: 1945 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: . TSC Emergency Director/Recovery Manager MESSAGE FROM: Lead TSC/EOF Referee LOCATION: TSC/EOF

~ME SAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." If the TSC Emergency Director/Recovery Manager DOES NOT make a Protective Action Recommendation based on the information provided, he will be prompted to do so. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The timeline must be maintained to facilitate demonstration of all the applicable offsite objectives. If the Protective Action Recommendation is not made by this time in the scenario, referee intervention will be required. If referee intervention is required, it will be noted for the critique process.

EXPE TEDA Tl N: The Control Room/TSC Emergency Director will make the recommendation and follow the Position Specific Procedure for notifying the emergency response organization.

Vill-48

IS No. 48 Time: 2000.

MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: OSCAR Monitoring Team MESSAGE FROM: OSCAR Monitoring Team Referee LOCATION: In Field

~ME SA E: "THIS IS A DRILL." The radiological data for the OSCAR teams is located in section seven (7) of the exercise manual. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY

~REFEREEN Tgg TR it i gt iiid gi it ti ( d t)R d sampling procedures/techniques, location in the field relative to plume centerline, and questions asked.

The weather for this exercise will be "canned" data to support the State objectives.

EXPECTED A TION: The TSC HP Radioman is expected to dispatch OSCAR down wind from the plant.

VIIIP9

IS No. 49 Time: 2100 NIESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: Simulator Control Room Operators MESSAGE FROM: Simulator Instructor LOCATION: Simulator Control Room MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The simulator instructor will activate malfunction file:

EPLAN95IPESDC, to simulate the RHR Shut Down Cooling (SDC) system in service. "THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The Reactor Building RHR Room ARMs for the loop of Shut Down Cooling which is placed in service will indicate an increasing level.

The increase of radiation levels will be a result of the fission products which are circulating throughout the coolant system as a result of the melted fuel.

EXPE TED A Tl N: The Control Room Operators will monitor the ARM indications and ask for chemistry or health physics to interpret the indications. It is expected that the organization will understand the increase is due to RHR Shut Down Cooling being placed in service.

VIII-50

IS No. 50 Time: 2230 MESSAGE INFORMATION SHEET MESSAGE FOR: All Areas Via the Plant Page

~llE GAGE FRAM: FECC I tt R I dAII F titty t dR I LOCATION; Plant Control Room and All Emergency Response Facilities MESSAGE: "THIS IS A DRILL." The following page announcement is to be made from the plant Control Room: "The 1995 NRC GRADED EXERCISE is now terminated; the 1995 NRC GRADED EXERCISE is now terminated."

'he Facility Lead Referees shall ensure that the exercise records are tumed in and key individuals attend the area debriefing. Ensure that the telephone system and the plant page system are restored. Transfer the simulator radio back to the training condition and restore the simulator computer to normal operation. Ensure the response facilities are picked up and ready to respond to an'actual emergency.,"THIS IS A DRILL."

FOR REFEREE USE ONLY REFEREE NOTES: The page announcement is to be made in the following areas:

The Simulator Control Room The TSC The Plant The OSC The EOF The MOC The General Office EXPECTED A TIONS: Ensure that all the previously notified offsite agencies are informed that the exercise is terminated.

d NII-51

Ij

'I

SECTION IX - DRILL QOESTIONS PART A - NRC QUESTIONS

SSES EMERGENCY DRILL NRC QUESTIONS Wheri the Control Room Communicator calls for the initial notification, the simulated on-duty NRC Operations Center individual will ask if the Control Room is prepared tp maintain an open line. The Control Room should respond with an affirmative.

The following is a list of questions that can be asked of the Control Room/TSC/EOF Communicators.

These questions can be asked periodically during the DRILL to determine if the participants are aware of plant conditions.

Refer to the timeline for when significant events occur and note the time the Communicator provides updated information.

Verification of the information provided by the Communicator can be done by reviewing the print out of information from the simulator. The print out is located in the EOF next to the Offsite Dose overhead projector.

~ What was the initiating event of the emergency?

~ What is the expected duration of the emergency?

~ Has there been any injuries to plant personnel?

1

~ Have the NRC residents report to the Control Room yet?

~ What emergency operating procedures are presently in use?

~ Has a news release been initiated?

~ What is the Control Room ventilation line up?

~ What is the Reactor Building ventilation line up?

~ Is the electric plant line up normal?

~ Is the Reactor completely shutdown?

~ Has boron been injected in the reactor vessel?

ls the plant responding in a normal fashion?

~

Give me the values for the following parameters:

Steam Flow-Core Flow-Recirc Pump Flow-Reactor Pressure-Reactor Level-Recirc Loop Temperature-Gross Coolant Activity-Dose Equivalent lodine-Drywell Pressure-Drywell Temperature-Drywell Radiation Levels-Drywell Oxygen Concentration-Drywell Hydrogen Concentration-Suppression Pool Pressure-Suppression Pool Temperature-Suppression Pool Level

'-'hat ECCS is in operation?

HPCI ADS Core Spray LPCI

'SW Diesel Generators Batteries

'entilation

~ ls the TSC being manned?

~ Is the EOF being manned?

~ Has any outside support been requested?

~ Has the stability of the grid been affected by the unit coming off line?

~ Due to grid stability, what are the chances for a toss of offsite power?"

~

Review the values of the parameters given previously:

Steam Flow-Core Flow-Recirc Pump Flow-Reactor Pressure-Reactor Level-Recirc Loop Temperature-

.Gross Coolant Activity-Dose Equivalent lodine-Drywell Pressure-Drywell Temperature-Drywell Radiation Levels-Drywell Oxygen Concentration-Drywell Hydrogen Concentration-

'uppression Pool Pressure-Suppression Pool Temperature-Suppression Pool Level-

~ Has the answer to any of the other questions changed?

SECURITY EVENT QUESTIONS.

1. How many individuals are attempting to penetrate the site?

2.. Are any of the individuals armed?

3. Have you notified the local law enforcement authorities?

4. Has outside assistance been requested?

5. Have any of the individuals been apprehended?.

ADDITIONALQUESTIONS

1. Are there any abnormal inplant radiation levels?

2. What is the radiation level in the containment?

Is there a release in progress; if so, what are the current levels at the EPB, what is the current trend, how tong do you expect to continue?

SECTION IX - DRILL QUESTIONS PART B - QUESTIONS/TOPICS OF DISCUSSION FOR HPN COMMUNICATOR I

IX-5

SSES EMERGENCY DRILL QUESTIONS/TOPICS OF DISCUSSION FOR HPN COMMUNICATOR The following questions to be asked by the individual playing the NRC Health Physics are generic in nature and can be made more specific and pointed depending'n the type of scenario.

This particular scenario has seasonal met conditions, including snow. IVlany different questions should be asked as a result of a release with precipitation; see the DOSE CALCULATOR.and LICENSEE OFFSITE MONITORING sections.

IN-PLANT QUESTIONS

1. Which unit is the affected unit'?

K

2. What is the present classification?

a. What is the classification based on?

b: ls there a release in progress?

c. Is the release monitored?

d. Is the release being filtered?

e. Is there fuel damage?

3. What is the Containment Radiation levels?

4. What is the airborne concentrations inside the containment?

5. What is the suppression pool activity?

6. What are the results of the reactor coolant samples? Is this a PASS sample?

What is the dose of the 10 ml PASS sample?

7. Has there been any emergency exposures?

a. How many people?

b. To what exposure level?

c. What are the reasons for the emergency exposures? .

8. What actions are being. taken to terminate the release?

a. What actions are being taken to miriimize the release?

b. Is there any way to hold up the release for decay?

c. Is there any liquid release in progress?

10. Have all the non-essential people been evacuated from the site?

11. Was everyone accounted for during the accountability?

a. Was search and rescue required to find any of the missing individuals?

b. Is anyone still missing?

12. Are the counting labs on site operable?

13. What is the operating status of your ventilation systems?

14. What areas of the plant are affected radiologically by the accident?

15. Are there any areas of the site that are inaccessible?

16. What are the contamination levels in the plant and around the site?

17. What are the airborne levels in the plant and around the site?

18. Has Kl been distributed or administered to the onsite emergency workers?

19. Who or what group are your consulting physician(s)?

20. At what time was the TSC activated?

21. At what time was the EOF activated?

22. Who is the Radiation Protection Manager on duty?

23. Who is the Emergency Director?

24. Have there been any security events?

25. Have there been any injuries or fatalities?

26. Has there been anyone transported offsite to an area hospital?

27. Are you prepared to grant unfettered access to our NRC Response Team?

28. What protective action recommendations have been made for the site personne.

and/or the offsite populace at this time?

IX-7

29 What is the basis for making or not making a protective action recommendation at this time?

30 Have any of the area sirens been sounded?

31. Have any surface sources such as the Spray Pond or lakes and reservoirs been affected by the release?

32. Are these bodies of water used for drinking water by anyone?

33. Have environmental teams been dispatched at this time?

34. Are there any protective action recommendations being considered as a result of the environmental samples?

J

35. Are there any damage control teams presently dispatched in the plant? What is the damage control team attempting to do at this time?

Have any traffic patterns around the plant been changed due to the plume path?

Are, there any delays expected as a result of the plume path?

37 Has the site requested any additional offsite response support such as fire company, ambulance, police, outside contractors?

E 38 Have you established communications with DER/BRP? Who?

39. Is anyone from DER/BRP beirlg dispatched to the site? Who?

40. At what time will the organization make a shift change? Who is your relief?

DOSE CALCULATORQUESTIONS Is there a release in progress in excess of the tech spec limit or causing offsite doses?

V What are the dose rates at the EPB?

What are the projected doses at the EPB?

b. What are the projected thyroid doses at the EPB?

c. What are the integrated doses at the EPB?

d. How long are you expecting to release through the present release path?

e, Is that time the same as what you are using for your projected doses?

What sectors are affected by the release? How many people live in the affectec sectors?

IX-8

4. What is the present weather and what is the weather forecast?

5. What isotope is the primary contributor to the dose at the EPB?

6. Is the thyroid dose or whole body dose limiting?

7. Is any particutate being released?

8. Are the field monitoring teams and dose calculations in agreement? What are the relative errors to one another?

9. What is the source term in the primary containment?

10. What is the source term in the secondary containment?

11. What would the dose rates at the EPB be if the source term in either the primary or secondary containment were immediately released?

12. Is the release monitoring instrumentation working properly? Is the instrumentation expected to remain in service? What is the backup if the instrumentation dose not remain in service?

13. What is the trend of the noble gases and iodine releases? (Increasing, decreasing, no change).

14. Is this an analyzed accident scenario as found in the FSAR? If so what are the predicted releases and offsite consequences?

C

15. How do your dose calculations take into account the snow and the resultant washout? What would be the difference if the precipitation turned.to rain; would the dose projections be different?

16. Does your dose calculation model take into account the runoff when the snow melts?

LICENSEE OFFSlTE MONITORING

1. What is the distance from the plant that your onsite team is doing it's monitoring~

2. What method does the offsite team use to calculate iodine activity, particulate activity?

3. Are the individuals that are offsite m'onitoring wearing respirator protection, have they been given Kl?

IX-9

4. What type of respirators are the team members wearing, what is the protecticn factor~

~

5. What exposures are the offsite monitoring teams allowed to receive? What is their present exposure? Is that value all from today?

6. Where are the offsite teams located?

7. What are the results of the environmental samples'? Where and when were the environmental samples taken?

8. Is the area around the EOF contaminated, was the area surveyed prior to activation?

9. Have any of the field monitoring teams experienced any radio interference by any offsite source?

10. How are the monitors collecting air samples in the snow?

11. What efficiency are they using for the detectors in the field?

f

12. Is there a lower limit of temperature for use of your field monitoring instruments?

13. Would you please explain how you take snow samples'?

.14. What factor are you using for shielding from the deposited radioactivity or how much is the snow affecting the ground contamination reading?

IX-10

SECTION IX - DRILL QUESTIONS C

PART C - GENERAL OFFICE QUEST!ONS/PROJECTS

SSES EMERGENCY DRILL GENERAL OFFICE QUESTIONS/PROJECTS The following areas/topics should be covered/investigated by the General Office Staff at some time during the emergency DRILL.

A. General Office Questions to be researched:

1. To what extent has the core been damaged?

2. What are the possible causes of the fuel damage?

3. Given the extent of the fuel damage, should RHR shutdown cooling mode be placed in service?

4. What, if any, precautions should be taken prior to placing RHR in the shutdown cooling mode of operation?

\

5. Develop a strategy to deal with the effects of the SBGTS fire and associated release of contamination.

6. What alternate means are available for isolating the RHR leakage?

7. What, if anything, should be done to contain the RHR leakage?

8. What alternatives are available to reduce the long term releases from the Reactor Building ventilation system?

9. How much of.a reduction in the RHR leak rate and environmental release can be expected from reducing RPV level and pressure?

B. General Office Modifiications.to be considered:

1. Shielding for RHR shutdown cooling mode piping.

2. Modification needed to stop the RHR leak.

3. Piping changes to contain the RHR leakage and return it to some other location such as the drywell.

IX-12

4. H'i/AC mods (filters/monitors/shielding) to contend with a long term release NOTE The followjn items need to be considered for an ro osed mod

~acka e:

Purpose Temperature/pressure requirements Redundancy Welding requirements Shielding requirements Tie-in with operating systems Leak-tightness Review and approval authority Power supply Testing requirements Material availability Constructability Instrumentation C. It is expected that NE will make the following phone contacts to collect information.

a. Reactor Coolant Activity Level (isotopic)

b. Suppression Pool Activity Level

c. Main Steam Line radiation levels prior to scram

d. Drywell leakage prior to and following the scram

e. Radiation levels throughout the plant

f. Magnitude of RHR system leakage

2. ~EF

a. Protective Action Recommendation

b. Contacts with State, Federal, and local public officials

c. What and when is the expected Federal support

d. What are the plans for recovery/re-entry D. NE will be asked questions by various groups and the expected question topics are listed below.

1. ~P

a. What is status of SSES?

b, Can the PCC be of assistance with any aspect of the emergency?

2. 'NR

a. What is current plant status?

.b. What are planned activities?

C. Arrangements for NRC Team consisting of 12 individuals, 6 for the General Office, 6 responding to the site.

SECTION IX - DRILL QUESTIONS PART D - MOC Questions/Rumors IX-14

SSES EMERGENCY DRILL QUESTIONS/TOPICS OF DISCUSSION FOR MEDIA OPERATIONS CENTER/SPECIAL OFFICE The following questions are generic in nature and can be asked for any ORILL. The questions are to be asked by individuals simulating members of the general public.

news media, public officials, local residents, plant workers and their families and others.

Attached to the list of questions is a listing of names and their occupation. Use these names and the appropriate type of question when calling the MOC/Special Office.

, The questions are generic in nature but can be made more pointed depending on the type of scenario. When calling and asking questions of the staff at the MOC/Special Office press for as much detail as possible and be specific requesting a call back if necessary.

What was initiating event for the emergency'?

2. What caused (specific) initiating event?

3. What is the expected duration?

4. What is present classification and what is it based on?

5. Which is the affected unit?

6. Have there been any injuries to plant personnel?

7. Is the NRC at the plant'?

8. Is the reactor completely shutdown? What is'power level?

9 Is the plant still producing electricity?

10. Shouldn't the plant be shutdown? Or the unaffected unit?

11. Who is in charge of the emergency? How many people are involved?

I

12. How/where can I get news releases?

13. Is the plant responding in a normal fashion to the emergency?

14. Is the fuel covered? If not, how will it be covered?

IX-15

15. What is current water level above fuel in the reactor?

16. How is reactor being cooled? Are there backup cooling systems? Status?

17. Is there fuel damage?

18. What is the reactor temperature and pressure?

19. Do you have abnormal radiation inside the plant?

20. What is the radiation level in the containment? What is normal?

21. 's anyone inside the containment?

22. Is a release in progress? If so, please provide additional information.

23. How long will the release continue?

24. Is the release being filtered, monitored?

25. What are radiation levels on the site?

26. Is there airborne contamination inside containment?

27. Have any plant employees been exposed to radiation because of emergency?

28. How many people?

29. To what exposure level? Is that dangerous?

30. What actions are being taken to minimize the release?

31. Is there a way to hold up the release for decay?

32. Is a liquid release in progress? Pathway(s)?

33. How much radiation is needed before I start getting sick?

Do radiation leaks from power plants increase infant mortality & cancer?

35. Can you compare the heath risks of nuclear versus coal?

'w How does radiation get out of the plant?

37 What is first downstream. community that uses water for domestic purposes~

IX-16

t '8.

39.

How do liquid releases get to the river?

How long would it take to get to Danville?

40. What is the potential for increased radioactive releases?

41. What is the magnitude of the release?

42. What is the dose projection?

43. What is'the prognosis for ending the release?

44. What is the potential for increased release levels?

45.. Has airborne radioactivity been evaluated to determine if protective action is required for area residents?

46. What area around the site is affected by the release?

47. What can you tell me about radioactive releases off site?

t 48.

49.

Who measures and how is it done? How are they protected?

What actions have you taken to stabilize the problem?

50. Is anyone attempting to penetrate the site?

51. Are any of the individuals armed?

52. Oo you have adequate security?

53. Oo you have backup from local police? If so, who?

54. Have you asked for their assistance?

55. Has anyone been apprehended?

56. Is there a connection between the would-be saboteurs and plant problems?

j

57. Has anyone been evacuated from the plant?

58. Are plant buildings habitable?

59. Can you account for all plant employees? If not, what is the problem?

IX-17

60. Are there areas of the site that are inaccessible.

61. Has anyone been taken to a hospital? Who or number which hospital{s)?

62. Have protective action recommendations been made? If so, what are they?

63. What is the basis for making protective actions?

64. How many sirens are there'? Who sounds them and what is public to do?

65. In which direction is the plume headed?

66. Has offsite support (fire, ambulance, police, etc.) been requested?

67. Have state officials been contacted? What are they doing?

68. How many people live in the Emergency Planning Zone {EPZ)?

Are you distributing potassium iodide?

70. What radio-TV stations will provide accurate information on what to do?

1

71. Where do I go when I evacuate? What do I take?

72. N/here do I pick up my children from school?

'3. What does sheltering mean?

74. When I evacuate, what do I do with my pets?

75. What kind of insurance does PP8L have to cover damages? .

76. Where will replacement power come from and who will pay?

77. Who is the NRC contact for information? Phone. number?

78. What facility is used when Y is evacuated? How do I get there?

79. What are the emergency classifications and which one are you in?

80. Do the operators have to leave the control room?

81. What is the purpose of the containment?

82. How good can the containment be if you have a release?

84. What will you do with the damaged plant?

85. How are you able to determine the amount of fuel damaged?

86. When will be public be allowed to return?

87. What does the public do if they don't have transportation?

4 1

88. Has the NRC been notified? Time?

89. Has an emergency organization been established to deal with the problem?

90. How many people are involved? Describe the organization?

91. What is the status of your key plant safety systems?

92. What steps are being taken to correct the. problem?

93. Does the weather have any affect on the plant emergency?

94. How will public be reimbursed for unusable property?

95. For contaminated animals that are destroyed?

96. Who is representing the State? Is the governor there?

97. Where is your backup emergency facility? How do you get there?

98. What is the special filtering system that I was told out on a tour?

99. What is its status?

100. What affect might high radiation fields have on equipment?

101. Will this result in increased amounts of high/low radioactive waste?

102. Can the undamaged components function in present environment?

103. Any special shielding being employed to reduce exposures?

104. Will the NRC allow you to restart the undamaged unit?

105. What is the sequence of key events in this emergency?

IX-19

106. When did these units first begin operation?

107. last?. How long will plant last?

How long doe's the license las 108. What kind of toxic gases are kep e tat the plant?

109. What if the sirens don't work'?

110. Will my electric rates be affected by the emergency?

111. How does this compare to Chernoby ob I?.

112. Is this worse than TMI?

113. Is there an emergency back up for shutt' huttin the reactor down?

114. Explain in more detail automatic depressurization system.

115. Has boron been used for shutting the reactor down? Why?

116.'hat is cold shutdown'?

117. How is containment vented'? Why?

118. What is decay heat and why is it significant?

119. How many fuel assemblies are there. e? Where do they. come from?

120. Is this what is called a "LOCA'"?

121. Are the main steam isolation valves operating?

122. Is the suppression pool playing an intinte g ral p art in the emergency'?

123. Howmany people wo rk there? ere How many are needed for the emergency'? .

124. Have any buildings been damage a ed?. Ifso,what?

125. What is the generating capacity off the p lant? Percentage of system?

126 How much did it cost to build? Original cost.? H ow lon g did it take'?

127. How mu'ch water is required to run the plant' 128. Who owns the plant?

IX-20

129. What kind of reactor is it? Who manufactured the system?,

130. How much uranium is required for the reactor?

131. How big are the cooling towers?

132. What do the cooling towers do?

133. How radioactive is the steam in the cooling towers? Explain!

134. What are the largest communities in the EPZ?

135. How far is Wilkes-Barre from the plant?

136. Ever have an emergency before at the plant? If so, when and details?,

137. Have you ever been fined by the NRC? If so, when and why?

138. Where are the nearest hospitals?

139. What kind of training do the operators have'?

140. Has this ever caused a problem before? When'? What happened'?

141. Was search and rescue required to find any of the missing individuals?

142. Is anyone still missing'?

143. Oo patients have to be evacuated from hospitals/nursing homes'?

144. Has highway traffic in the general plant area been affected'?-

145. Are there any existing threats to continued containment integrity'?

146. What is potential for further degradation?

147.. What is NRG phone number at MOC?

148. Who can I call for information on county preparedness'? Phone number?

4 149. Who can I call for information on state preparedness? Phone number?

150. Who are the resident NRG inspectors? Phone number?

151..Are,all major plant safety systems available?

IX-21

152. Is stability of power grid affected by unit coming off line?

153. Is there a chance offsite power could be lost? What happens then?

154. How much spent fuel is on site?

155. Where is it stored and how much space is left?

156. What happens when you run out of space for the spent fuel?

157. Why use dangerous uranium when we have so much safe, clean coal?

158. Why doesn't my homeowners insurance policy cover losses resulting from an accident at SSES?

159. Why even use nuclear power when accidents like this can happen?

160. Is plutonium deadly?How much is at SSES? Why use it?.

161. How do you get rid of it?

162. Isn't this used for making bombs?

163. What safeguards are there to prevent theft by terrorists?

164. Isn't this accident going to affect property values?

r 165. How does this nuclear plant differ from TMI?

166. What is the most serious type of accident you can have?

.167. What would happen if a bomb were dropped on SSES?

h 168. Is the plant designed to withstand a serious earthquake?

169. What's to prevent an employee with an. emotional or mental illness from taking over the plant or blowing it up?

170. I remember you were recently fined because of certain equipment not being certified to perform in a harsh environment. What is the story?

171. Is it safer to work at SSES compared to a coal plant? Explainl IX-22

172. I understand the older a plant gets, the more it leaks radiation. Is the Press-Enterprise correct? Explain!

. 173. How can you operate this plant when a National Research Council committee of radiation experts states that well demonstrated health effects from low-level radiation "include the induction of cancer, genetically determined ill-health, developmental abnormalities, and some degenerative diseases....."

174. If they are building safer nuclear plants, why aren't you using them?

I 175. Isn't there anything you can do to neutralize the radiation?

Match the questions to the appropriate category (REPORTERS, POLITICIANS, AREA RESIDENTS, and ANONYMOUS CALLERS). For example, question ¹48 would be more appropriate coming from one of the REPORTERS than from the others.

REPORTERS (Call 759-2285)

Dawn Capewell - Press Enterprise Bob Salitza - Hazleton Standard Speaker Dawn Shurmaitis - Times Leader Fred Ney - Sunday Independent Tim Vincent - WHLM Nolan Johannes - WNEP-TV Dave DeCosmo - WYOU-TV Andy Mahatchic - WBRE-TV Jerry Keller - WARM Mark Lawrence - WKOK POLITICIANS (Call 75~957)

Mike Carroll - Aide to Congressman Kanjorski Lou Biacchi - Berwick Mayor Walt Sokolowski - Nanticoke Mayor Oscar Welsh - Briar Creek Borough Mayor Rep. George Hasay - Shickshinny Abe Spaide - Nescopeck Mayor Don Graves - Shickshinny Mayor Lemmond - State Senator .'harles Dave Robinholt - Nescopeck Township Supervisors Chairman Artie Dawson - SSES Citizens Committee Member (sometime politician)

IX-23

CALLERS (Call 759-2281)

AREA RESlDENTS/ANONYMOUS Neighbor Bill Johnson - Plant Neighbor George Petruskin Plant Neighbor Harold Robins - Plant

- Neighbor Tom Reynolds Plant

- Neighbor Betty Seivert Plant IX-24

SECTION X

~ SIMuLATOR INFORMATION

FILE: EPLAN95ZPESDC (malf file)

NAME: JOHN PETRZLLA ZZI SCENARIO- INGESTION PATHWAY EXERCZSEi AUG. 15, 1995 REVISION / DATE 0 / 5-26-95 DESCRZpTZON: This malf file simulates fission product rad shine when RHR LOOP(s) A(B) are placed in service for shutdown cooling operations.

NOTEs MONITOR which loop is being readied for SDC operation and modify this malf file so that rad shine is initiated for that loop only.

RAMPS RHR LOOP A HZ RANGE ARM (PT.25)

ZMF TR02$ RZT13725 1000 1:30 1.9 RAMPS RHR LOOP B HZ RANGE ARM (PT. 1)

ZMF TR02 s RZT13701 1000 1: 30 1. 553 RAMPS RHR LOOP A LOW RANGE ARM (PT 55)

ZMF TR02:RIT13755 (none 50 0) 7.9 6:00 0.37 RAMPS RHR LOOP B LOW RANGE ARM (PT. 56)

ZMF TR02:RZT13756 (none 50 0) 7.9 6:00 0.41

FILE: EPLAN95ZPE¹1 (batch file)

NAME: JOHN PETRZLLA ZZZ

¹ SCENARIO INGESTION PATHWAY E DRILLg AUG 1 5 g 1 99 5 REVISION/DATE: 0 / 5-22-95 DESCRZPTZION: This BATCH FILE loads the initial passive malfunctions and event triggers to begin the IPE EXERCISE. (Note: IC-136 is first reset to).

FAILS THE HPCZ TURB TRIP AUX RELAY PREVENTING HPCZ,s TRIP IMF RLOlsE411K12 FAILS HPCZ TURB SPEED CONTROL AT 4200 rpm ;(NOTE: This prevents MAN 6 AUTO CONTROL via FC-E41-1R600).

IMF HP152008 4200 .0 0 FAILS 'D'SL OB MSZV (F028D) ZN OPEN POSITION ZMF AV04!HV141F028D 100 0 100 FAILS 'D'SL'B MSZV (F022D) CAUSING VLV LEAKAGE IMF AV05:HV141F022D 100 0 100 This trigger is based on MODE SWITCH POSITION and FAILS the FW MASTER CONTROLLER HIGH and causes HPCZ INADVERTANT INITIATION TRG El EPLANMSTOSD TRG E1MZMF CN02:LZCC32R600 TRG E1~IMF HP152004 mfs 0

X-3

FILE: EPLAN951PE¹2 (batch file)

NAME: JOHN PETRILLA III SCENARIO: INGESTION PATHWAY EXERCISE; AUG. '15, 1995 REVISION/DATE: 0 / 5-26-95 DESCRIPTION: This BATCH FILE simulates MSL 'D'ailure and the coincident failure of REACTOR RECZRC PUMP

¹ '1A'ue to impeller failure. This sets the stage for fuel bundle heatup/melt as the recirc pump

¹ impeller debris blocks the flow thru it.

NOTE: Since the RX. is S/D when this event occurs, the fuel failure malf is not used.

Instead, the fuel failure is simulated by ramping the affected g CONTAZNMENT RAD MONITORS (using malf file EPLAN95ZPEPC)

TB SPZNG 6 ARMs (using malf file EPLAN95IPERAD RHR ARMs (using malf file EPLAN95ZPESDC) .

ISOLATES HPCZ BY ENERGIZING STM LINE HZ DP RELAY E411K33 ZMF RL02:E411K33 INITIATES FAILURE OF MSL 'D'N THE TURB BLDG

~

ZMF MS183008 (none 2:00 0) 20 0 AsZs INITIATES FAILURE OF RX RECIRC PUMP '1A'MPELLER ZOR AN:AR102H01 (none 5s00 0) AZJQM ON ZMF PM06clP401A (none 6:00 0) 100 0 0 X-4

FILE: EPLAN95ZPEPC (ma 1 .f file)

NAME: JOHN PETRZLLA ZIZ SCENARIO INGESTZON PATHWAY EXERCISE J AUG 15 g 1 99 5 FXVZSZON/ DATE: 0 / F 22-95 DESCRZPTZON: This'ALFUNCTION FILE initiates the ramp of containment rad monitors over 45 minutes following the failure of the 'A'eactor Recirc pump impeller.

IMF TR02:RZTS15720A 150 45:00 2.773 ZMF TR02:RZTS15720B 2228 45:00 2.874

FILE: EPLAN9SZPERAD (malf. file)

NAHE: JOHN PETRZLLA IZI SCENARIO: INGESTION PATHWAY EXERCISE; AUG. 15,1995

+. <<r>> REVISION/s DATE 0'/. 5-22-95

.DESCRIPTION: TEis'ALFUNCTIOlf'FZI'E initiates ramps of the variours turbine bhilding'ARMs'"and the TURB.

BLDG. SPZNG channels to simulate fission product dispersion caused by the MSL BREAK".

ZHF RD02:RE16510Al 4.'54e-05 30:00 3.025e-05 ZHF'RD02:RE16511'A 1;Se-05 30:00 1.222e-05 IHF RD02-RE16512A 1000 30:00 34.62 XHF. TR02:.RIT03713 0 56 0 0.56

~

IMF,'TiL02:RZT13717 1.9 30:00 1.282 XMF . TROL t RZTX3 /18 3. 16 0 3 16

~

ZMF TR02:RZT13721 1~45 30:00 1.119 ZMF TR02-RZT13722 1.2 30s00 0.9939 ZMF TR02tRZT13723 2 30:00 0.9 ZMF TR02:RIT13724 1.8 30:00 0 1248

.ZMF TR02 s RZT13719 1. 5 30: 00 0. 9739

, .'MF TR02:RXT1'3707 1.3 30:00. AsIs

'MF TR02'RIT13720, 1,.6 30!00 0.6732

~ r I

OP r;i . ~

X-6