IR 05000400/2011010

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NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/183 Inspection Report 05000400/2011010
ML111330088
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/13/2011
From: Randy Musser
NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB4
To: Burton C
Carolina Power & Light Co
References
IR-11-010
Download: ML111330088 (25)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES May 13, 2011

SUBJECT:

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/183 INSPECTION REPORT (05000400/2011010)

Dear Mr. Burton:

On April 29, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris, using Temporary Instruction 2515/183, Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on May 10, 2011, with Mr. E. Kapopoulos and other members of your staff.

The objective of this inspection was to promptly assess the capabilities of Shearon Harris to respond to extraordinary consequences similar to those that have recently occurred at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station. The results from this inspection, along with the results from this inspection performed at other operating commercial nuclear plants in the United States will be used to evaluate the U.S. nuclear industrys readiness to safely respond to similar events. These results will also help the NRC to determine if additional regulatory actions are warranted.

All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this report. The NRCs Reactor Oversight Process will further evaluate any issues to determine if they are regulatory findings or violations. Any resulting findings or violations will be documented by the NRC in a separate report. You are not required to respond to this letter.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of

CP&L 2 NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Randall A. Musser Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000400/2011010 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63 Report No.: 05000400/2011010 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location: 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562 Dates: March 23, 2011 - April 29, 2011 Inspectors: J. Austin, Senior Resident Inspector P. Lessard, Resident Inspector Approved by: Randall A. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000400/2011010, 03/23/2011 - 04/29/2011; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant;

Temporary Instruction 2515/183 - Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event This report covers an announced Temporary Instruction inspection. The inspection was conducted by Resident inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,

Revision 4, dated December 2006.

INSPECTION SCOPE

The intent of the TI is to provide a broad overview of the industrys preparedness for events that may exceed the current design basis for a plant. The focus of the TI was on

(1) assessing the licensees capability to mitigate consequences from large fires or explosions on site, (2)assessing the licensees capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions,
(3) assessing the licensees capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events accounted for by the stations design, and
(4) assessing the thoroughness of the licensees walk downs and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipments function could be lost during seismic events possible for the site.

If necessary, a more specific follow-up inspection will be performed at a later date.

INSPECTION RESULTS

All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this report. The NRCs Reactor Oversight Process will further evaluate any issues to determine if they are regulatory findings or violations. Any resulting findings or violations will be documented by the NRC in a separate report.

03.01 Assess the licensees capability to mitigate conditions that result from beyond design basis events, typically bounded by security threats, committed to as part of NRC Security Order Section B.5.b issued February 25, 2002, and severe accident management guidelines and as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.54(hh). Use Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), Section 02.03 and 03.03 as a guideline. If IP 71111.05T was recently performed at the facility the inspector should review the inspection results and findings to identify any other potential areas of inspection. Particular emphasis should be placed on strategies related to the spent fuel pool. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to:

Licensee Action Describe what the licensee did to test or inspect equipment.

a. Verify through test or inspection Licensee actions included the identification of equipment (active and passive) utilized for that equipment is available and implementation of B.5.b actions and any additional equipment used in Incident Stabilization functional. Active equipment Guidelines (ISGs) and Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). Permanent shall be tested and passive plant equipment (i.e., in situ equipment) was not considered in the scope, since it is equipment shall be walked down normally in service, subjected to planned maintenance, and/or checked on operator rounds.

and inspected. It is not The licensee then identified surveillances/tests and performance frequencies for the expected that permanently identified equipment, and reviewed the results of recent tests. Active equipment within the installed equipment that is scope defined above that did not have recent test results was tested. Passive equipment tested under an existing within the scope was inventoried and inspected.

regulatory testing program be retested.

Describe inspector actions taken to confirm equipment readiness (e.g., observed a test, reviewed test results, discussed actions, reviewed records, etc.).

This review should be done for a reasonable sample of mitigating strategies/equipment.

A portion of the licensees actions as discussed above were completed prior to the issuance of NRC TI 2515/183. The inspectors assessed the licensees capabilities by conducting a review of the licensees walkdown activities. In addition, the inspectors walked down and inspected all major active and passive B.5.b contingency response equipment staged throughout the site. Deficiencies and improvements identified are outlined below.

Specific actions completed by the inspectors include:

  • Reviewed completed inspection and testing records for B.5.b components
  • Observation of a functional test of the Emergency Diesel Makeup Pump (EDMP)
  • Performed a partial walkdown of the licensees ORT-3001, Fire Equipment Inspection Monthly Interval
  • Performed a partial walkdown of the licensees ORT-8002, ISG Materials Semiannual Interval The inspectors accompanied the licensee to inspect the physical condition of selected portable equipment used to mitigate B.5.b events associated with spent fuel pool mitigating strategies.

Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

Discrepancies were entered into the licensees corrective action program. No discrepancy was evaluated as significant enough to impact any overall strategy. Discrepancies deemed noteworthy are listed below;

  • Action Request (AR) 459882 was written to document that emergency response equipment (EDMP, trailers, fire hoses and nozzles, radios, self contained breathing apparatuses, satellite phones and turnout gear) were stored in locations susceptible to seismic events.
  • AR459478 was initiated to address the need for spare keys to the EDMP.
  • AR 459541 was initiated to allow the licensees radios to interface with local emergency responders through a bridge network.
  • AR 461885 documents the fact that only one set of adapters is available that could be needed to perform ISGs. This AR will explore the value of fabricating a spare set of adapters in case the others are damaged or lost.

Describe the licensees actions to verify that procedures are in place and can be executed Licensee Action (e.g. walkdowns, demonstrations, tests, etc.)

b. Verify through walkdowns or Licensee actions included the identification of those procedures utilized to mitigate the demonstration that procedures consequences of a B.5.b related event and severe accidents. The licensee then compiled to implement the strategies verification documentation for procedure validations and identified any procedures not associated with B.5.b and 10 issued or validated and any with open change requests. Open change requests were CFR 50.54(hh) are in place and reviewed for potential impacts on procedure functionality. Licensee personnel were then are executable. Licensees may dispatched to walk down all applicable procedures to verify the ability of the procedures to choose not to connect or be executed.

operate permanently installed equipment during this Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed. Assess whether verification.

procedures were in place and could be used as intended.

This review should be done for a The inspectors performed table top exercises with operations personnel on the following reasonable sample of mitigating procedures (Procedures that the inspectors walked down are marked with an *):

strategies/equipment.

  • ISG-FAFC, Function Availability Flow Chart*
  • ISG-CC, Containment Cooling*
  • ISG-CVCS, Chemical And Volume Control System
  • ISG-DC, DC Power
  • ISG-FP, Fire Protection*
  • ISG-HS, Heat Sink
  • ISG-SAC, Safety AC Power*
  • ISG-SFP, Spent Fuel Pool*
  • ISG-SS, Spray Scrubbing
  • EDMG-001, Extreme Damage Event Initial Actions
  • EOP-EPP-001, Loss of AC Power to 1A-SA and 1B-SB Buses Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

Discrepancies were entered into the licensees corrective action program. No discrepancy was evaluated as significant enough to impact any overall strategy. Discrepancies deemed noteworthy are listed below;

  • AR 459485 was initiated to create an additional external spray capability that does not require offsite support.
  • AR 459816 was written to develop a calculation to evaluate the radiological conditions that may affect the licensees mitigating strategies in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) during lowering Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) level.
  • AR 459224 was written to include a caution in the ISGs to consider radiological conditions for responders.
  • AR 461883 was initiated to include the capabilities of the Alternate Seal Injection Diesel Generator (ASIDG) to support the mitigating strategies of the ISGs.
  • AR 461875 was written to develop procedures for opening a closed tornado door which could provide an additional entry path into the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB).
  • AR 461901 documented the need for guidance to direct offsite emergency responders to the designated staging area in the event that they are not immediately needed onsite.

Describe the licensees actions and conclusions regarding training and qualifications of Licensee Action operators and support staff.

c. Verify the training and The licensee reviewed the qualification and training requirements of the operators and qualifications of operators and support staff in the emergency response organization (ERO). Additionally, the licensee the support staff needed to reviewed the current qualification status of those operators and support staff. No implement the procedures and qualification discrepancies were noted.

work instructions are current for activities related to Security Order Section B.5.b and severe accident management Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed to assess training and guidelines as required by 10 qualifications of operators and support staff.

CFR 50.54 (hh).

The inspectors reviewed selected training materials and qualification records for the following ERO positions:

  • Senior Reactor Operator
  • Reactor Operator
  • Fire Brigade
  • Site Emergency Coordinator
  • Shift Technical Advisor
  • Medical Response Personnel
  • Site Incident Commander
  • Local Emergency Response Fire Departments The inspectors observed that there were no specific qualifications for B.5.b for operators.

However, the licensee incorporates this material into the training program, both as initial and continuing training. The continual training is conducted during their respective training sessions. The training sessions consists of classroom instructions, simulator instructions, plant walkdowns and practical sessions of equipment operations.

Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

No discrepancies were identified.

Describe the licensees actions and conclusions regarding applicable agreements and Licensee Action contracts are in place.

d. Verify that any applicable The licensee confirmed that memorandums of understanding, letters of agreement, and agreements and contracts are in contracts are in place to provide aide in combating beyond design basis events.

place and are capable of meeting the conditions needed to mitigate the consequences of For a sample of mitigating strategies involving contracts or agreements with offsite entities, these events.

describe inspector actions to confirm agreements and contracts are in place and current (e.g., confirm that offsite fire assistance agreement is in place and current).

This review should be done for a reasonable sample of mitigating The inspectors reviewed the letters of agreements/understanding and verified the licensee strategies/equipment.

had confirmed their contents with the various stakeholders. The inspectors did not identify any content concerns which would negatively impact a mitigation strategy.

Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

No discrepancies were identified.

Document the corrective action report number and briefly summarize problems noted by the licensee that have significant potential to prevent the success of any existing mitigating Licensee Action strategy.

e. Review any open corrective No problems were identified that have significant potential to prevent the success of any action documents to assess existing mitigating strategy.

problems with mitigating strategy implementation identified by the licensee.

Assess the impact of the problem on the mitigating capability and the remaining capability that is not impacted.

03.02 Assess the licensees capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions, as required by 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current Power, and station design, is functional and valid. Refer to TI 2515/120, Inspection of Implementation of Station Blackout Rule Multi-Plant Action Item A-22 as a guideline. It is not intended that TI 2515/120 be completely reinspected. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to:

Describe the licensees actions to verify the adequacy of equipment needed to mitigate an Licensee Action SBO event.

a. Verify through walkdowns and Licensee actions included the identification of equipment utilized/required for mitigation of a inspection that all required SBO. The licensee then conducted walkdowns of this equipment to ensure they were materials are adequate and adequate and equipment was properly staged.

properly staged, tested, and maintained.

Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees actions and independently walked down the ASIDG and support equipment to verify no material conditions were present that would impact the availability of the ASIDG. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the capability of the ASIDG to be used to power station batteries in the event of an SBO.

Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

The inspectors reviewed the following open action request generated as a result of the licensees reviews and walkdowns;

None of the identified issues would significantly impact the success of the licensees mitigation strategies.

Licensee Action Describe the licensees actions to verify the capability to mitigate an SBO event.

b. Demonstrate through walkdowns that procedures for The licensee walkdowns included the following procedures; response to an SBO are

  • OP-101, Sampling System executable.
  • OP-148, Essential Services Chilled Water System
  • OP-155, Diesel Generator Emergency Power System
  • OP-169, Containment Cooling And Ventilation
  • OP-185, Alternate Seal Injection
  • EOP- Path-1
  • AOP-002, Emergency Boration Describe inspector actions to assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.

The inspectors independently verified through walkdowns, interviews and procedure reviews that the following procedures could be used to implement the planned strategy:

  • EOP- Path-1
  • AOP-025, Loss of One Emergency AC Bus (6.9 kV) or One Emergency DC Bus (125V)

Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

The inspectors reviewed open action requests generated as a result of the licensees reviews and walkdowns, the issues included items such as the following;

  • AR 459454 was developed to add training and procedures to provide direction for manually charging and closing 6.9 kV breakers.
  • AR 461888 was written to identify and add guidance to establish a means to vent containment in the event of an SBO.

None of the identified issues would significantly impact the success of the licensees mitigation strategies.

03.03 Assess the licensees capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events required by station design. Refer to IP 71111.01, Adverse Weather Protection, Section 02.04, Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding as a guideline. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to verify through walkdowns and inspections that all required materials and equipment are adequate and properly staged. These walkdowns and inspections shall include verification that accessible doors, barriers, and penetration seals are functional.

Describe the licensees actions to verify the capability to mitigate existing design basis Licensee Action flooding events.

a. Verify through walkdowns and External Flooding inspection that all required materials are adequate and The licensee reviewed their design documents to confirm the following regarding the threat properly staged, tested, and of external flooding to the site.

maintained.

Seismic Category I structures, systems, and components whose failure could prevent safe shutdown of the plant or result in uncontrolled release of significant radioactivity are protected from the effects of the design basis flood levels or flood conditions by the following methods:

a) Designed to withstand effects of the design basis flood level or flood condition.

b) Positioned to preclude effects of the design basis flood level or flood condition.

c) Housed within structures which satisfy method "a" or "b" above.

The plant grade has been established at a minimum elevation of 260 ft. which is 21.1 ft.

above the maximum main reservoir still water level of 238.9 ft. and 4.0 ft. above the maximum auxiliary reservoir still water level of 256.0 ft. Maximum wave run-up and wind setup level along the plant site in the Main and Auxiliary Reservoirs are expected to be at elevation 240.2 ft. and 257.7 ft. respectively. The design basis of the plant site drainage is a storm of five in. per hour rainfall intensity. The maximum net accumulated water on the plant grade due to the probable maximum precipitation (PMP) for the project drainage area of 71.0 sq. mi. is approximately 6 inches. The maximum net accumulated water on the plant island due to a more severe PMP computed for a drainage area of one sq. mi. is approximately 15 in. All structures on the plant site are protected to at least Elevation 261 ft. and no structure has any access openings below Elevation 261 ft.

The maximum elevation to which water will pond on the plant site during a PMP event assuming the entire drainage system became blocked would be 261.27 ft. The storm runoff will flow freely into the Main and Auxiliary Reservoirs through the open channels and flow over the plant roads (crown elevation 261.0 ft.). However, ponding to elevation 261.27 ft.

will not impact on the plant ability to safely shutdown, if necessary. All safety-related structures which have entrances at elevation 261 ft. are protected against any ponding during a PMP event by the following features:

a) Artificial barriers such as watertight or airtight doors, or b) Low structural barriers, i.e., curbs. The minimum curb elevation is 262.0 ft.

The rain storm water collected in the area between the Retaining Wall and the FHB will be pumped out to the storm drainage system by using sumps and pumps. In addition to the direct rainfall and groundwater infiltration through the retaining wall, this area will collect storm water as overflow from the Waste Processing Building and the FHB if the drains are assumed to be plugged during the PMP occurrence. If the failure of pumps is postulated, the water will accumulate to a level below elevation 236 ft. in this area. All openings in the FHB and the Waste Processing Building below elevation 236 ft. have been closed and other penetrations sealed to preclude access of storm water to safety related areas inside the buildings. The storm water from the cancelled Unit No. 2 RAB and the Containment Building drains in to the centrally located sump and is pumped into the plant drainage system. The sump and pump are sized for the design basis rain fall intensity. However, the wall heights are adequate to accommodate the PMP considering that the pump has failed. All openings below EL 243.00 ft. have been closed and waterproofed to minimize water seepage from this area into Unit No. 1 structures.

Internal Flooding The licensee reviewed their series of calculations performed to evaluate the impact of flooding on the plant and the equipment and processes used to mitigate the flooding are identified. The calculations include all systems in the plant that have the capability of releasing fluid to plant areas that could result in failure of equipment that would affect the frequency of core damage. The most limiting source of internal flooding was determined to be the 36 Normal Service Water (NSW) pipes in the 236 level of the RAB. The evaluation concludes the magnitude of the break is such that the RAB sump extra high level lights on the Main Control Board (MCB) would come in within a few minutes. The licensee concluded that thirty minutes from break initiation to break isolation is reasonable. Assuming the water drains away, there will be no significant accumulation of water. Conservatively assuming the water does not drain and instead pools in an area, the deepest depth of the water after thirty minutes would be 11.5 inches. Based upon this height of water, the licensee concluded that no safety related equipment would be damaged by flooding. However, as documented below, the basis for this conclusion was not readily available when requested by the inspectors. This was documented in CAP as AR 461904.

Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable. Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.

The inspectors performed an independent review of the external and internal flooding vulnerabilities documented in the sites design documents. The inspectors reviewed the assumptions identified in the site flooding analysis and did not note any additional vulnerabilities in the licensees mitigation capabilities.

The inspectors performed independent walkdowns of areas throughout the RAB. The purpose of the walkdowns was to assess artificial barriers (such as watertight or airtight doors), low structural barriers (such as curbs) and floor drains designed to mitigate flooding accidents. The inspectors performed independent walkdowns of storm drains within the Protected Area (PA) to assess drainage capability.

Additionally, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of AOP-022, Loss of Service Water.

This procedure is designed to aid the operators in isolating significant internal flooding events. The inspectors observations were that the internal flood mitigation strategy in the auxiliary building was adequate.

Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

The inspectors reviewed open action requests generated as a result of the licensees reviews and walkdowns, the issues included items such as the following;

  • AR 461904 was developed to track the inspectors question regarding the basis for concluding that no safety related equipment will be damaged as a result of the maximum internal flood level of 11.5 inches in the RAB.
  • AR 458651 was initiated to document inconsistent assumptions in one of the flooding calculations. These inconsistencies were determined to not affect the conclusion of the calculation.

None of the identified issues would significantly impact the success of the licensees mitigation strategies.

03.04 Assess the thoroughness of the licensees walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipments function could be lost during seismic events possible for the site. Assess the licensees development of any new mitigating strategies for identified vulnerabilities (e.g., entered it in to the corrective action program and any immediate actions taken). As a minimum, the licensee should have performed walkdowns and inspections of important equipment (permanent and temporary) such as storage tanks, plant water intake structures, and fire and flood response equipment; and developed mitigating strategies to cope with the loss of that important function. Use IP 71111.21, Component Design Basis Inspection, Appendix 3, Component Walkdown Considerations, as a guideline to assess the thoroughness of the licensees walkdowns and inspections.

Describe the licensees actions to assess the potential impact of seismic events on the Licensee Action availability of equipment used in fire and flooding mitigation strategies.

a. Verify through walkdowns that The licensee identified the components used to mitigate fire and flood events using plant all required materials are drawings, design basis documents and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The adequate and properly staged, licensee performed walkdowns of the fire and flood mitigating systems and procedures to tested, and maintained.

assess their adequacy. The licensee noted the fire protection system (pumps, fire main, headers, etc.) is non-seismic and this vulnerability is beyond the design basis for the plant.

Additionally, the licensee identified that some mitigating equipment is stored in locations that could be vulnerable to seismic activity. This issue was documented in CAP as AR 459882, listed below.

Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable. Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.

The inspectors conducted multiple walkdowns, both independently and in conjunction with licensee personnel, of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipments function could be lost during a seismic event.

This equipment included, but was not limited to:

  • Major B.5.b contingency response equipment staged throughout the site
  • Fire protection and suppression equipment throughout the site
  • Artificial barriers (such as watertight or airtight doors), low structural barriers (such as curbs) and floor drains Licensee flood and fire mitigation procedures were reviewed to verify usability. The results of the inspectors reviews aligned with the licensees conclusions that there were a number of seismic vulnerabilities that potentially need to be addressed, listed in the AR below.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed OP-180, Plant Communications Systems as it related to the licensees command and control capabilities during accident mitigation scenarios.

Multiple improvements were identified and listed below.

Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. Briefly summarize any new mitigating strategies identified by the licensee as a result of their reviews.

The inspectors reviewed the following open action request generated as a result of the licensees reviews and walkdowns;

  • AR 459882 was written to document that emergency response equipment (EDMP, trailers, fire hoses and nozzles, radios, self contained breathing apparatuses, satellite phones and turnout gear) were stored in locations susceptible to seismic events.
  • AR 459541 was initiated to allow the licensees radios to interface with local emergency responders through a bridge network.
  • AR 458827 was initiated to require additional items to be added to applicable inventories to allow site radios to be directly connected to the bridge network.

Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. E. Kapopoulos and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 10, 2011.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

C. Burton, Vice President Harris Plant
P. Chriscoe, Supervisor, Civil and Mechanical Design
J. Cook, Acting Manager, Outage and Scheduling
D. Corlett, Supervisor, Licensing/Regulatory Programs
J. Dufner, Manager, Engineering
J. Dunlap, Senior Engineer
E. Kapopoulos, Plant General Manager
D. Griffith, Training Manager
B. McCabe, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
A. OTuel, Nuclear Shift Manager
M. Parker, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
L. Parks, Manager, Support Services
J. Price, Manager, Design Engineering
J. Robinson, Superintendent, Environmental and Chemistry
T. Slake, Manager, Security
B. Stephenson, Senior Reactor Operator
J. Warner, Acting Manager, Operations

NRC personnel

R. Musser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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