Text

Proposed License Amendment Request Deletion of TS 3.7.13 - Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room Bottled Air System from Technical Specifications
	ML080800364
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	03/19/2008
From:	Gerald Bichof; Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	08-0080
	Download: ML080800364 (91)
	v • d • e

10 CFR 50.90 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 March 19. 2008 u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No. 08-0080 Attention: Document Control Desk NL&OS/ETS RO Washington, D.C. 20555 Docket Nos. 50-338/339 License Nos. NPF-4/7 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY (DOMINION)

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST DELETION OF TS 3.7.13 - MAIN CONTROL ROOM/EMERGENCY SW'ITCHGEAR ROOM BOTTLED AIR SYSTEM FROM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Dominion requests amendments, in the form of changes to the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License Numbers NPF-4 and NPF-7 for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, respectively. The proposed amendment would delete the Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Bottled Air System from Technical Specifications. Operation of the Bottled Air System will be controlled by the UFSAR.

The proposed changes will revise the TS equipment operability requirements to be consistent with the assumptions of the current dose analysis of record (AOR),

performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.67, Accident Source Term and the results of the non-pressurized Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) envelope tracer gas testing. Specifically, the Accident Source Term AOR does not require the MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System to meet the inleakage limits for dose mitigation. Furthermore, the MCR/ESGR envelope tracer gas testing was performed in a non-pressurized mode with the measured leakage well within the AOR assumed values confirming that the MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System was not necessary to meet requirements. Attachment 1 provides a discussion of and the basis for the proposed amendment.

The marked-up and proposed Technical Specifications pages are provided in Attachments 2 and 3, respectively. The associated marked-up Bases changes are provided in Attachment 4 for information only and will be implemented in accordance with the Technical Specification Bases Control Program.

The proposed changes have been reviewed and approved by the Facility Safety Review Committee.

Dominion requests approval of the license amendments by June 30, 2009 with a 90-day implementation period following NRC approval of the license amendments.

Serial No. 08-0080 Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Bottled Air System Amendment Page 2 of 3 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, with attachments, is being provided to the appropriate designated officials of Virginia.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Thomas Shaub at (804) 273-2763.

Very truly yours, G~~~/~-6 Vice President - Nuclear Engineering Attachments

1. Discussion of Change

2. Marked-up Technical Specifications Changes

3. Proposed Technical Specifications Pages

4. Marked-up Technical Specifications Bases Changes Commitments made in this letter: None.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA COUNTY OF HENRICO The foregoing document was acknowledged before me, in and for the County and Commonwealth aforesaid, today by Gerald T. Bischof, who is Vice President - Nuclear Engineering, of Virginia Electric and Power Company. He has affirmed before me that he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing document in behalf of that Company, and that the statements in the document are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Acknowledged before me this / 97J1day of .d(,fy(/z , 2008.

My Commission Expires: ~ 31, .7010 VICKI L. HUU NotcIfy PublIc I;;A.;(~

Commonwealth of VIfIInIa Notary Public (SEAL) 1.-.1 Comml.lon ...... _",1010

Serial No. 08-0080 Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Bottled Air System Amendment Page 3 of 3 cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. J. E. Reasor, Jr.

Old Dominion Electric Cooperative Innsbrook Corporate Center 4201 Dominion Blvd.

Suite 300 Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 State Health Commissioner Virginia Department of Health James Madison Building - yth floor 109 Governor Street Suite 730 Richmond, Virginia 23219 NRC Senior Resident Inspector North Anna Power Station Mr. S. P. Lingam NRC Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Mail Stop 0-8 G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. R. A. Jervey NRC Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Mail Stop 0-8 G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852

Attachment 1 (Serial No. 0080)

Discussion of Change North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 1 of 18 Discussion of Change 1.0 Introduction Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion) requests an amendment to Facility Operating License Numbers NPF-4 and NPF-7 in the form of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes will revise the TS equipment operability requirements to be consistent with the assumptions of the current dose Analysis of Record (AOR), performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.67, Accident Source Term and the results of the non-pressurized Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) envelope tracer gas tes1ting.

The following TS changes are being proposed: 1) eliminate TS 3.7.13, "Main Control Room (MCR)/Emergency Switchgear Room (ESGR) Bottled Air System," 2:) add TS 3.3.6, "MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," to establish operability requirements for the MCRIESGR envelope isolation function; and, 3) incorporate TS 3.7.14, "MCR/ESGR Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) during Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies," into 3.7.10, "MCRIESGR Emergency Ventilation System," which will contain the requirements for all applicable Modes or conditions consistent with Improved Technical Specifications.

TS Bases changes, reflecting the proposed Technical Specification changes discussed above, are included for information only. The TS Bases will be revised in accordance with the TS Bases Control Program, following NRC approval of the license amendment.

The proposed changes qualify for categorical exclusion from an environmental assessment as set forth in 10 CFR 51 .22( c)(9). Therefore, no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment is needed in connection with the approval of the proposed change.

2.0 Proposed Changes The change will: 1) establish operability, required actions, completion times and surveillance requirements for the MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation (new TS 3.3.6); 2) remove TS 3.7.13, "Main Control Room (MCR)/Emergency Switchgear Room (ESGR) Bottled Air System," 3) modify and incorporate the operability requirements of TS 3.7.14, "MCR/ESGR EVS - During Movement Of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies," into TS 3.7.10, "Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCRIESGR) EVS Modes 1, 2,3, and 4."

The following provides a description of the changes.

Create - TS 3.3.6, "MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," which will include the following functions: Manual Initiation and Safety Injection. These functions are

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 2 of 18 credited in the AOR for dose mitigation. The new TS section will be structured consistent with ITS as follows:

3.3.6 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCRIESGR) Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 The MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.

ACTIONS

~()lrE: ------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

II CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION I TIME A. One or more Functions with A.1 Isolate the MCRIESGR 7 days one train inoperable. envelope normal I.

ventilation.

B. One or more Functions with B.1 Isolate the MCR/ESGR Immediately two trains inoperable. envelope normal ventilation.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time for Condition A or B not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months D. Required Action and D.1 Isolate the MCR/ESGR Immediately associated Completion Time envelope normal for Condition A or B not met ventilation.

during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

OR Immediately D.2 Suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 3 of 18 SURVEILLANCE FREOUENCY SR 3.3.6.1

- NOTE-Verification of setpoint is not required.

Perform TADOT. 18 months Table 3.3.6-1 MCRIESGR Enve ope Iso IatiIon Actuation Inst rumen t arIon APPLICABLE MODES OR REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE TRIP FUNCTION OTHER CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS SETPOINT SPECIFIED CONDITIONS

1. Manual Initiation 1, 2, 3, 4, (a) 2 trains SR 3.3.6.1 NA

2. Safety Injection Refer to LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation," Function 1, for all initiation functions and requirements.

(a) DUring movement of recently Irradiated fuel assemblies.

Revise TS 3.7.10, Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) EVS Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 o Delete the Mode Applicability from the title since the Modes and Conditions of Applicability are addressed in TS 3.7.10.

o Revise the Applicability of TS 3.7.10, MCRIESGR to include "during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies." The operability requirements from TS 3.7.14 are being revised and incorporated into TS 3.7.10 and TS 3.7.14 is being deleted.

o Include Modes 1,2,3,4 in CONDITION B to establish applicability of Condition B, now that TS 3.7.10 addresses all Modes and Conditions of Applicability.

o Add a REQUIRED ACTION for CONDITION D during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies consistent with the new TS 3.3.6, which requires isolation of the MCRIESGR envelope and start a train of EVS within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . These actions will provide adequate protection for the MCR/ESGR room occupants during a fuel handling accident and not impact fuel handling operations. Incorporate the CONDITIONS, REQUIRED ACTIONS, and COMPLETION TIMES for an inoperable MCRIESGR envelope boundary or two EVS trains when moving recently irradiated fuel. The following CONDITIONS, REQUIRED ACTIONS and COMPLETION TIMES are being added as described below.

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 4 of 18 D. Required Action and 0.1.1 Isolate the Immediately associated Completion Time MCRIESGR envelope for Condition A not met during normal ventilation.

movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies. AND 0.1.2 Place OPERABLE Immediately EVS train in outside filtered air supply mode.

OR 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 0.2 Suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

E. One or more required E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately MCR/ESGR EVS trains recently irradiated fuel inoperable due to inoperable assemblies.

MCR/ESGR envelope boundary during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

OR Two required MCR/ESGR EVS trains inoperable during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies for reasons other than Condition B.

F.-f>.Two required MCRIESGR F.1 Enter 3.0.3 Immediately EVS trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 for reasons other than Condition B.

Delete - TS 3.7.13, Main Control Room (MCR)/Emergency Switchgear Room (ESGR)

Bottled Air System. Operation of the Bottled Air System will be controlled by a licensee controlled document (e.g., UFSAR) and 10 CFR 50.59.

Relocate the operability requirements of TS 3.7.14, Main Control Room (MCR)/Emergency Switchgear Room (ESGR) Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) during Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies into TS 3.7'.10 as discussed

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from T8 Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 5 of 18 above and delete TS 3.7.14. This includes establishing CONDITIONS, REQUIRED ACTIONS, and COMPLETION TIMES for 1) an inoperable EVS train, 2) an inoperable boundary and 3) two inoperable EVS trains when moving recently irradiated fuel.

Remove the discussion of the Emergency Habitability System (EHS) and Bottled Air System from the first paragraph in TS 5.5.16 MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program.

The Bottled Air System is no longer required to be included in the TS, thus the EHS only consists of the MCR/ESGR EVS.

Remove the "18 month" frequency from the "assessment" requirement of TS 5.5.16.d for the MCR/ESGR delta pressure testing (MCR/ESGR Habitability Program) to avoid confusion with the MCR/ESGR habitability 3-year assessment frequency established by the Regulatory Guides incorporated into TS 5.5.16.c. The test results will be evaluated, trended and used during the 3 year MCR/ESGR envelope assessment.

The TS Bases are being revised to reflect the proposed changes and are provided for information. The Bases changes will be incorporated into the TS in accordance with the Bases Control Program after NRC approval of the proposed TS changes.

3.0 Background MCRIESGR EVS and MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System - [UFSAR Section 9.4, (Ref. 2)]

During normal operation, the Service Building Ventilation System supplies fresh air to the MCR/ESGR envelope by supply fan (1-HV-AC-4) and exhausts air to outdoors by an exhaust fan (1-HV-F-15), located on the Service Building roof.

The MCR/ESGR Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) was designed as four 100% capacity redundant trains that can filter and recirculate air inside the MCR/ESGR envelope, or supply filtered outside air to the MCRIESGR envelope. The two MCR/ESGR EVS trains on the accident unit actuate automatically in recirculation on a safety injection signal. With the exceptions described below, either of these trains can also be aligned to provide filtered outside air for pressurization approximately 60 minutes after the event. If necessary, a train from the other unit can be manually actuated to provide filtered outside air to meet the pressurization requirement.

In case of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies, an automatic actuation or manual actuation, of airflow from the bottled air banks is initiated. Actuation of airflow from the bottled air banks also automatically: 1) isolates the normal ventilation for the MCRIESGR envelope to maintain positive pressure in the envelope and 2) starts all available EVS trains in recirculation mode.

The required EVS trains can be aligned to provide filtered outside air and pressurization approximately 60 minutes after the event. Due to the location of the air intake for 1-HV-F-41, it can not be used to provide filtered outside air. Two of the three remaining trains (1-HV-F-

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 6 of 18 42, 2-HV-F-41, and 2-HV-F-42) are required for independence and redundancy. Only one EVS train is required to perform the safety function of supplying outside filtered air.

Each filter train assembly consists of an electric heating coil, a moisture separator (demister),

charcoal filter, high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, a fan, related ductwork, and two MODs. Two filter train assemblies serve the MCR and two serve the ESGR (one for the Unit 1 side and one for the Unit 2 side). The filter train assemblies are desiqned to reduce the concentration of radioactivity entering the Control Room envelope after accidents. The heaters and moisture separators (demisters) are used to control humidity and, thereby, preclude degrading the charcoal filters.

The compressed, dry air bottles are arranged in four banks (two per unit) to provide breathing air, which also pressurizes the envelope, for a 1-hour period. The Bottled Air System consists of 69 bottles per bank with two banks per unit. Three of four banks are aligned for service with the fourth bank manually isolated but available. Two trains provide the air required for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of pressurization.

Upon manual initiation or receipt of a Safety Injection signal or Hiqh-Hiqh radiation signal from the fuel building radiation monitors with the Fuel Building Radiation Automatic Interlock key switch in the enable position, the MCRIESGR envelope for Units 1 and 2 is isolated and the Bottled Air System is actuated. The following actions occur:

1. MCR/ESGR Normal makeup and exhaust air dampers are automatically closed.

2. Supply Fan 1-HV-AC-4 and Exhaust Fan 1-HV-F-15 shut down.

3. Air from three of four banks (each unit has two banks) of compressed air bottles is released.

4. Two fans from the EVS start automatically in the recirculation mode on a Safety Injection Signal. All four fans start on a High-High Radiation signal.

5. After air from the compressed air bottles has been used, a fan from the MCRIESGR EVS is manually realigned from the recirculation mode or placed in service to provide filtered outside makeup air, which also pressurizes the MCRIESGR envelope to reduce inleakage.

Licensing Bases In license amendments 231 and 212, dated April 5, 2002, North Anna converted to Improved TS and separated the MCR/ESGR Emergency Ventilation System and Bottled Air System into separate TS. The following TS were implemented and considered the Emergency Habitability System (EHS): TS 3.7.10, "MCR/ESGR EVS - Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4," TS 3.7.13, "MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System," and, TS 3.7.14, "MCR/ESGR EVS - During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies." The Analysis of Record (AOR) for a LOCA at that time established the system operability requirements, which included automatic isolation and recirculation and filtration of the MCRIESGR envelope air with a train of EVS on a Safety Injection signal. The Bottled Air System was required to limit inleakage to less than the 10 cfm assumed in that AOA. The MCR/ESGR EVS was then aligned to the pressurization mode to provide filtered outside air to the MCR/ESGR prior to depletion of the bottled air

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 7 of 18 supply (approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ). Although available, recirculation of the MCI~/ESGR envelope air was not required for a fuel handling accident.

License amendments 240 and 221 approved on June 15, 2005, permitted implementation of an Alternative Source Term (AST) consistent with 10 CFR 50.67. The AST dose assessment modified the assumptions in the ADR, which in turn permitted a change to the operability requirements of the Emergency Habitability Systems (EHS). However, Dominion chose not to significantly alter the operability requirements for the MCR/ESGR EHS at that time.

Prior to the AST amendment, the system operated as described above and the ADR (LDCA/FHA) credited the following mitigative actions in the dose analysis.

Isolation of the MCR/ESGR envelope - automatically on Safety Injection and manually for FHAs,

Pressurization of the MCR/ESGR envelope with the Bottled Air System for one hour to meet assumed inleakage limit of 10 cfm.

Recirculation of the MCRIESGR envelope with the EVS for the first hour for filtration, and

Pressurization of the MCR/ESGR envelope after one hour with the EVS to limit inleakage and supply filtered outside makeup air.

After the AST amendment, the systems continued to operate as described above. However, the ADR (LDCA/FHA) credited only the following mitigative actions in the dose analysis:

For LDCA/Fuel Handling Accidents the MCRIESGR envelope inleakage is assumed at 250/400 cfm, respectively.

Automatic isolation of the MCR/ESGR envelope on Safety Injection and manual isolation for FHAs.

Pressurization of the MCR/ESGR envelope is not required to limit inleakage to less than ADR limits (tracer gas test performed in non-pressurized mode with 150 cfm +/-3 cfm inleakage result).

Recirculation and filtration of the MCR/ESGR envelope air is not required or credited.

Initiation of filtered outside make up air to the MCRIESGR envelope within one hour with the EVS is required.

For the MSLB, SGTR, and RCP Locked Rotor, the MCR/ESGR envelope is assumed operating with normal ventilation flow and 500 cfm of additional inleakage.

Dominion submitted a TS change request on May 29, 2007 (Ref. 1) to modify the North Anna TS requirements related to Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) envelope habitability. The changes were consistent with the NRC-approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-448, Hevision 3, Control Room Habitability (TSTF-448). The availability of the TS improvement was published in the Federal Register on January 17, 2007, as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLlIP). The TS change request included a revision to the MCR Bottled Air System TS requirements contained in TS 3.7.13 to include the actions to be taken for an inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope similar to those included for the MCRIESGR EVS in 3.7.10. The TS

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 8 of 18 change was approved as amendments 251 and 231 to the North Anna Units 1 and 2 TS, respectively on October 31, 2007.

4.0 Technical Analysis 4.1 Radiological Consequences Tracer gas testing was performed with the MCR/ESGR envelope in a non-pressurized configuration. During normal operation, the non safety-related (NS) supply and exhaust systems maintain the MCR/ESGR envelope at a slight positive pressure relative to adjacent spaces by providing supply air in excess of exhaust air. The Bottled Air System and MCR/ESGR EVS provide a means of maintaining the positive pressure when the NS ventilation system is isolated during a design basis accident. The MCRIESGR-adjacent space pressure differentials may also be directly affected by the operation of ventilation systems in the adjacent spaces. These systems are not powered from SR buses and would, therefore, not operate following a DBA with LOOP.

In order to conservatively bound the MCR/ESGR envelope inleakage, the adjacent space ventilation systems were aligned in the worst credible configuration for the tracer testing. The MCR/ESGR envelope was maintained at a negative pressure relative to the Turbine Building, and a positive pressure to the Cable Vault. This created a pressure differential across the entire MCRIESGR envelope. Also, neither the MCR/ESGR envelope normal supply/exhaust nor the MCRIESGR EVS was operated. In this configuration, the measured inleakage, which was approximately 150 cfm +/- 3 cfm and included numerous door openings, was much less than the 250/400 cfm (LOCA/FHA) assumed by the AST analyses. The MCR/ESGR Habitability Systems are not credited in any other DBAs analyzed in the AOR.

Therefore, the MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System is no longer required to mitigate the consequences of the most limiting design basis accident fission product release presented in the UFSAR (LOCA). The analysis results (dose) for each accident are less than the limit stipulated in 10 CFR 50.67, when using the assumed MCRIESGR envelope inleakage values, which are greater than the inleakage results of the tracer gas in leakage test performed in response to GL 2003-01. Tracer gas test inleakage results were 150 cfm while the AST AOR assumed inleakage of 250 cfm for LOCA and 400 cfm for a FHA. The MCR/ESGR Habitability Systems are not credited for any other analyzed DBAs. The AST AOR for LOCA and a FHA credits only MCR/ESGR isolation and subsequent (within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of isolation) filtered make up air flow, when the MCR/ESGR EVS is manually realigned, to limit the dose within regulatory limits. The dose analysis assumptions and results were reviewed and approved by the NRC in amendments 240 and 221 dated ,June 15, 2005 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 9 of 18 4.2 Toxic Gas and Smoke Hazardous chemical events are evaluated on the basis of no action being taken by the control room operator (i.e., no ventilation changes). The nominal flow provided by either the normal supply or MCRIESGR envelope EVS fan is approximately twice that of the unfiltered inleakage allowed for radiological events. In addition, SCBAs are available for the control room operators, but are not necessary for protective action following a toxic gas event or radiological event.

There are several combinations of systems available to shut down the reactor and cool the core of either/both unit during and after a fire, coincident with a loss of offsite power. Safe shutdown analyses have been performed for each fire area using Appendix R guidelines, identifying the safe shutdown systems that would remain unaffected by the worst-case fire in that area. Based on these analyses, North Anna complies with the specific requirements of Appendix R Sections III.G, III.J, III.L, and 111.0 with exemptions as noted in the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Report.

Passive fire protection systems are provided to minimize fire damage. The MCR/ESGR envelope is divided into three fire areas (MCR, U1 ESGR, U2 ESGR), separated by walls, floors, ceilings, fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals rated at 2~-hours. Conduits penetrating fire barriers are sealed internally if the conduit terminates within 5 feet of the fire barrier.

Smoke detectors and fixed and portable fire suppression systems are provided to minimize the effects of smoke and fire. The cable tray rooms above the MCR are protected by a CO 2 system. Halon systems protect the ESGRs and the MCR underfloor (cable) area. Both ESGRs and the MCR are provided with smoke detectors. The MCR underfloor is sealed so that actuation of the Halon system will not require MCR evacuation. Portable fire extinguishers and air bottles are available in, and just outside, the MCR for operator use.

In the unlikely event of an MCR fire or smoke event, equipment and procedures are available to ensure safe shutdown of the units. In the case of an external fire/smoke event, the MCR/ESGR envelope normal supply/exhaust systems can be manually isolated. For internal fires or smoke, an auxiliary shutdown panel is located in each ESGR, and can be easily reached via a stairwell in the MCRIESGR envelope, or by going outside to the Turbine Building. The stairwell connects the MCR with the ESGRs below, and is provided with fire-rated doors at each end. SCBAs are available in and just outside the control room to facilitate evacuation to the ESGRs. The potential for smoke migration from the MCR to the ESGRs through the normal supply/exhaust ductwork has been reviewed and determined to be inconsequential. Specific smoke and fire response actions (e.g., portable exhaust fans, door and ventilation configuration, etc.) will depend on the nature of the fire, and will be made by the fire brigade as necessary.

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 10 of 18 4.3 Justification for Deletion of TS 3.7.13, MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System The MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System consists of four banks of air bottles with associated piping, instrumentation, and controls. Two banks are capable of providing the control room area with one hour of pressurized air following any event with the potential for radioactive releases. During normal operations, the MCRIESGR Bottled Air System is maintained in standby. Consistent with the approved AST implementation analyses, the requirements contained in the Bottled Air System Technical Specifications do not meet any of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) criteria on items for which Technical Specifications must be established. This can be justified as follows:

Technical Specification 3.7.13 currently provides operability requirement, required actions, and surveillance requirement for the MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System. Pressurization of the MCR/ESGR is no longer necessary to limit the dose to the operators within the limits established in the AOR. Therefore, the MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System is no longer credited in the accident analyses as described in Section 3. Additionally, this specification does not meet any of the criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) contains the requirements for items that must be in Technical Specifications. This regulation provides four (4) criteria that can be used to determine the requirements that must be included in the Technical Specifications.

Criterion 1 Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Specification TS 3.7.13 provides criteria used in determining operability of the MCRIESGR Bottled Air System. This specification does not cover installed instrumentation that is used to detect and indicate in the control room a significant degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Therefore, this specification does not satisfy Criterion 1" Criterion 2 A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a DBA or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

Specification TS 3.7.13 provides criteria used in determining operability of the MCRIESG R Bottled Air System. This specification does not cover a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. Therefore, this specification does not satisfy Criterion 2.

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 11 of 18 Criterion 3 A System, Structure, or Component (SSC) that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

Specification TS 3.7.13 requires MCRIESGR Bottled Air System to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 through 4, and during recently irradiated fuel movement. Pressurization of the MCR/ESGR is no longer necessary to limit the dose to the operators within the limits established in the AOR.

The change in status of this system provides the basis for removing Technical Specification 3.7.13, because the MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System is no longer credited in the accident analysis for limiting operator dose. Therefore, this feature does not cover a System, Structure, or component that is part of the primary success path which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. This specification does not satisfy Criterion 3.

Criterion 4 A SSC which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

Specification TS 3.7.13 which provides the criteria used in determining operability of the MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System has not been shown to be risk significant to public health and safety by either operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment. The subject system is not credited to ensure radiological dose criteria for the EAB, LPZ, or control room is met.

This specification does not satisfy Criterion 4.

In conclusion, the proposed deletion of TS 3.7.13 does not impact plant equipment, which is credited to function in the event of a DBA. Additionally, the requirements contained in this current Technical Specification do not meet any of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) criteria regarding items for which Technical Specifications must be established. Therefore, the proposed change to delete Technical Specification 3.7.13 is consistent with regulation.

5.0 Regulatory Safety Analysis 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration The proposed changes will: 1) remove TS 3.7.13, Main Control Room (MCR)/Emergency Switchgear Room (ESGR) Bottled Air System, 2) add TS 3.3.6, "MCRIESGR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," and, 3) modify and incorporate TS 3.7.14, "MCR/ESGR EVS during Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies," into 3.7'.10, "MCR/ESGR Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) Modes 1,2,3, and 4 and during Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies." The proposed changes will revise the TS equipment operability

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 12 of 18 requirements to be consistent with the assumptions of the current dose Analysis of Record (AOR), performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.67, and the results of ihe non-pressurized MCR/ESGR tracer gas inleakage testing. The AST accident analysis does not credit the MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System for dose mitigation, but continues to credit the MCRIESGR envelope isolation function. Dominion has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed changes by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of Amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions of the facility. The proposed changes do not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from performing their required safety function of mitigating the consequences of an initiating event within the established acceptance limits. The proposed changes to the MCRIESGR Bottled Air System and Emergency Ventilation System do not affect the probability of an accident previously evaluated because the subject SSCs are not an initiator or precursor to any accident previously evaluated. The Technical Specifications changes noted above will ensure the SSCs are operable to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Deletion of the MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. The other proposed changes do not alter the operability requirements of the MCRIESGR emergency ventilation system or MCIR/ESGR isolation.

Therefore, the control room habitability systems remain operable to mitigate the consequences of a DBA. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant systems credited in the accident analysis (i.e., no new or different type' of equipment will be installed) or a significant change in the methods governing normal plant operation.

The MCRIESGR EVS is maintained in a standby mode and its operation does not generate any new accidents or accident precursors.

Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The current dose analysis acceptance criteria are not affected by these changes. The proposed changes will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the analyses or design basis.

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 13 of 18 The proposed changes do not adversely affect systems that are required to respond for safe shutdown of the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe operating condition.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, Dominion concludes that the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

5.2 Regulatory Requirements General Conformance with General Design Criteria (GDC)

North Anna was originally designed to meet the draft GDC published in 1967. Construction permits for Units 1 and 2 were issued on February 19, 1971. The GDC, Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, were published February 20, 1971. Dominion attempted to comply with the intent of the newer criteria to the extent practical, recognizing previous design commitments. As a result, the NRC review assessed the plant design against the GDC published in 1971 and concluded that the design conformed to the newer criteria. The North Anna Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0053) was issued in June 1976.

Criterion 1 - Quality Standards and Records Structures, systems and components (SSCs), which support Control Room Habitability (CRH), have been designed, fabricated, erected, tested and maintained as safety-related.

The MCR/ESGRs and associated CRH systems are located within a Seismic Category 1 building. Portions of the normal ventilation systems associated with the control room isolation function are classified and maintained as safety-related. The emergency filtration systems and cooling systems are safety-related. The classification of individual components is noted in the electronic equipment database. Safety-related SSCs are designed, constructed, operated and maintained in accordance with the Dominion Quality Assurance Program Manual.

North Anna is considered to be in full compliance with Criterion 1.

Criterion 2 - Protection against Natural Phenomena North Anna's MCR/ESGR Ventilation System has been designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, seiches, and floods, as described in Chapters 2 and 3 of the UFSAR. Tsunamis are not applicable to the North Anna site. The MCRIESGRs and battery rooms are in Seismic Class 1 and tornado missile-protected structures. The MCR/ESGR envelope, air-conditioning system, Bottled Air System, and emergency ventilation system are designed to remain functional following a seismic event. The chiller rooms, although not in the MCRIESGR envelope, are located in Seismic Class 1 and missile-protected areas.

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 14 of 18 North Anna is considered to be in full compliance with Criterion 2.

Criterion 3 - Fire Protection North Anna conforms to the guidance of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP)

APCSB 9.5-1 as described in NRC's Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report dated February 1979, and complies with the applicable sections of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.

Structures, systems and components important to safety are designed and located to minimize the fire hazard. Fire Protection systems are designed to minimize the effects of fires on SSCs important to safety. Adequate means are provided to mitigate the fire hazard encountered in the plant.

Non-combustible and fire resistant materials are used wherever practical throughout the MCR/ESGR envelope and three-hour rated fire barriers are used to isolate the MCR/ESGR envelope from other areas. Penetrations in fire barriers, such as doorways, cable tray or conduit penetrations, and ventilation penetrations are protected as required. Three-hour rated dampers and fire doors are installed in ventilation ducts and doorway penetrations of fire barriers. Cable tray penetrations of fire barriers have a three-hour fire rating. Piping and conduit penetrations are sealed around the piping and conduit to prevent smoke transmittal.

Conduits penetrating fire barriers are sealed internally if the conduit terminates within 5 feet of the fire barrier. Conduits that penetrate the CR pressure boundary are sealed internally in accordance with original plant design specifications and current procedures. Materials used for air sealing of the control room boundary were selected to be compatible with applicable fire barrier requirements.

The North Anna control room is equipped with portable fire extinguishers and an underfloor Halon suppression system for a fire that might occur in that area. The underfloor area is isolated from the MCR air space. Each ESGR is protected with a total flooding Halon system.

For North Anna, "Alternate Shutdown" is generally intended to describe that series of manual actions that are taken independently of the control room to achieve sate shutdown for a postulated exposure fire in the control room. Procedures are provided for alternate shutdown of either unit using the respective Alternate Shutdown Panels in each ESGR. Appropriate procedures and equipment are available and staged for use by the station fire brigade in coping with a fire in either the MCR or ESGRs.

North Anna is considered to be in full compliance with Criterion 3.

Criterion 4 - Environmental and Missile Design Bases The MCR and ESGRs are located within the envelope, which is designed for missile impact.

In addition, all MCR entrances can be protected by missile barriers. Concrete walls and slabs surrounding the MCR are at least 18 inches thick and also serve as radiation shielding.

The control room habitability systems are also protected against missiles through similar

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 15 of 18 building design features.

During any postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA), the safety-related air conditioning systems maintain the MCR/ESGR envelope temperature within limits for both emergency equipment operability and personnel occupancy. The system design is based on the combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 heat gain from safety-related control room equipment, occupancy, wall transmission, and lighting load.

The effects of various pipe breaks outside containment on the MCRIESGR envelope and associated facilities are discussed in Appendix 3C of the North Anna UFSAR. In all cases, the MCR/ESGR envelope will remain habitable and provide the capability for safe shutdown and cooldown of the plant.

North Anna is considered to be in full compliance with Criterion 4.

Criterion 5 - Sharing of Structures, Systems and Components As noted previously, North Anna Units 1 and 2 share a common control room. The ESGRs, although in the MCRIESGR envelope and adjacent to each other, are separate rooms and separate fire areas, and have separate AHUs for air cooling and recirculation. The MCR and ESGRs share common normal supply/exhaust ventilation systems. TheSE3 systems are not needed for accident mitigation and automatically isolate the MCR/ESGR envelope from the adjacent areas post-accident. However, the normal supply/exhaust ducts (within the envelope) that connect the ESGRs and the MCR to each other are not automatically isolated in the event of a MCR fire. A fire in either ESGR, with the resulting Halon discharge, will close the fire dampers in these ducts. Each of the four major areas in the MCR/ESGR envelope (MCR U1, MCR U2, ESGR U1, and ESGR U2) is equipped with an emergency supply fan/filter system. Only one of these fan/filter assemblies is required to be operating for the entire MCRIESGR envelope following radiological events.

North Anna is considered to be in full compliance with Criterion 5.

Criterion 19 - Control Room The control room habitability systems include radiation shielding, redundant emergency air filtering and air conditioning systems, radiation monitoring, lighting, and fire protection equipment.

The North Anna control room is common to both units. Sanitary facilities and potable water are located in the control room, and food can be brought to the control room as needed.

Radiation protection is provided by shielding (walls and slabs), radiation monitoring, emergency filtration, and separate and independent control room isolation and pressurization systems.

The control room is designed to operate the nuclear power unit safely under normal conditions and to maintain it in a safe condition under accident conditions. Adequate

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 16 of 18 radiation protection has been provided to ensure that radiation exposures to personnel occupying the control room during the 30-day period following a DBA will not exceed 5 rem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE).

Evaluations of the LBLOCA and Fuel Handling accidents, using Alternate Source Term, demonstrate that North Anna meets the GDC 19 criterion of 5 rem TEDE with 250 cfm for LOCA and 400 cfm for fuel handling accident of unfiltered inleakage. The evaluations illustrate that the thyroid portion of the TEDE dose is the limiting concern for unfiltered inleakage in excess of design basis assumptions. A submittal of DBA analyses using the AST methodology was approved by the NRC on June 15, 2005 in amendments 240 and 241 for North Anna Units 1 and 2, respectively. The Large Break LOCA is the limiting radiological event. The design basis accidents, dose analyses, and consequences are described in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR.

Toxic Gases and Smoke The design of the North Anna MCR/ESGR envelope meets the guidance outlined in Regulatory Guides 1.78, Rev 0 and 1.95, Rev O. The compliance of North Anna with these documents is described in detail in Sections 2.2 and 6.4 of the UFSAR, and summarized below:

No gaseous chlorine is stored on site. Liquefied chlorine is not stored on site except in small quantities for laboratory use, which is limited to 20 pounds or less, as allowed by the Regulatory Guide. Therefore, North Anna complies with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.95.

The potential for offsite toxic chemical events was assessed in 1982 and again in 1994.

There are no manufacturing plants, chemical plants and storage faciliities, major water transportation routes, major rail lines, or oil and gas pipelines within 5 miles of the plant site.

Several secondary roads pass within 5 miles of the site. However, consiidering the lack of chemical and industrial facilities along the roads and the distance from the plant site to the roads, it is unlikely that there are chemicals shipped along these routes at a frequency and amount great enough to pose a significant hazard to the habitability of the control room. A postulated seismic event, concurrent with transport failure of toxic gas offsite, is not considered a credible event.

The North Anna UFSAR describes potentially hazardous chemicals stored onsite in quantities greater than 100 lb. These include hydrogen, sulfuric acid, sodium hydroxide, hydrazine, ethanolamine, and sodium hypochlorite. Evaluations for accidental release of these chemicals indicate that the worst-case concentrations at the control room intake would be expected to be less than their respective toxicity limit. The assessments were evaluated on the basis of no action being taken by the control room operator (i.e., normal or emergency supply system remains operating). The nominal flow of an emergency supply fan is 1000 cfm. In contrast, the maximum allowable unfiltered inleakage for a radiological event is 400 cfm (FHA). Therefore, the radiological event, not a toxic gas event, is limiting from an inleakage perspective.

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 17 of 18 In the event of fire/smoke external to the control room, equipment and procedures are available to maintain habitability of the control room. Smoke detectors are installed in the normal AHU return ducts and MCRIESGR EVS supply ducts, as well as other numerous locations in the ESGRs and MCR. If smoke is detected, the normal ventilation supply can be manually isolated. The fire response procedures provide direction for removing smoke from the MCR or ESGRs.

Shutdown Outside the Control Room In the event that the control room must be evacuated due to internal fire/smoke, equipment is provided at appropriate locations outside the control room, including necessary instrumentation and controls to maintain the unit in a safe condition (Hot Standby). A remote shutdown panel in each ESGR (located in the lower level of the MCRlESGR envelope) provides the capability to safely shut down the respective unit outside of the control room.

The panel is designed to Seismic Category 1 requirements and is located in a Seismic Category 1 area. Portable air packs and multiple egress paths are available to facilitate evacuation to the ESGRs.

North Anna is considered to be in full compliance with Criterion 19.

Based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's requlations, and (3) the approval of the proposed change will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.3 Precedents First Energy Nuclear Operating Company requested the elimination of the TS requirements for the control room emergency bottled air pressurization system for Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Units 1 and 2 as part of their implementation of the AST. The NRC approved the request in their safety evaluation report for License Amendments 257 and 139 for BVPS Units 1 and 2, respectively, dated September 10, 2003 (Ref. 3).

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. requested the elimination of the control room envelope pressurization system TS requirements for Millstone Power Station (MPS) Unit 3 as part of its implementation of the AST. The NRC approved the request in their safety evaluation report for License Amendment 232 for MPS Unit 3 dated September 15, 2006 (Ref. 4).

Serial No 08-0080 Proposed TS Change to Relocate the Bottled Air System from TS Docket Nos. 50-338/339 Page 18 of 18 6.0 Environmental Assessment This amendment request meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) as follows:

(i) The amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

As described above, the proposed change involves no significant hazards consideration.

(ii) There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

The proposed change does not involve the installation of any new equipment, or the modification of any equipment that may affect the types or amounts of effluents that may be released offsite. Therefore, there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

(iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupation radiation exposure.

The proposed change does not involve physical plant changes. The current dose Analysis of Record does not assume pressurization of the control room or the operation of the Bottled Air System to maintain operator dose below the regulatory limit for a DBA.

Therefore, there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Based on the above, Dominion concludes that the proposed changes meet the criteria specified in 10 CFR 51.22 for a categorical exclusion from the requirements of 10 CFR 51.22 relative to requiring a specific environmental assessment by the Commission.

7.0 References

1. Dominion Letter dated May 29, 2007 - Proposed License Amendment Request Control Room Envelope Habitability In accordance with TSTF-448, Revision 3, using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, Serial No. 07-0361.

2. UFSAR - Section, 9.4.1 Main Control Room and Relay Rooms.

3. Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 And 2 - Issuance of Amendment Re: Selective Implementation of Alternate Source Term and Control Room Habitability Technical Specification Changes (TAC Nos. MB5303 and MB5304), dated September 10, 2003.

4. Millstone Power Station Unit 3 - Issuance of Amendment Re: Alternate Source Term (TAC MC3333), dated September 15,2006.

Attachment 2 (Serial No. 0080)

Marked-up Technical Specifications Changes North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION . . 1.1-1 1.1 Definitions . . . . 1.1-1 1.2 Logical Connectors 1.2-1 1.3 Completion Times 1.3-1 1.4 Frequency 1.4-1 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 2.0-1 2.1 SLs . 2.0-1 2.2 SL Violations. 2.0-1 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY 3.0-1 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY 3.0-4 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS . . . . . 3.1.1-1 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) . . . . . . 3.1.1-1 3.1.2 Core Reactivity . 3.1.2-1 3.1.3 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) 3.1.3-1 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits 3.1.4-1 3.1.5 Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits . 3.1.5-1 3.1.6 Control Bank Insertion Limits . . 3.1.6-1 3.1. 7 Rod Position Indication . . . . . 3.1.7-1 3.1.8 Primary Grade Water Flow Path Isolation Valves 3.1. 8-1 3.1. 9 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE 2 . 3.1.9-1 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS . 3.2.1-1 3.2.1 Heat Fl ux Hot Channel Factor (FQ(Z)) . 3.2.1-1 3.2.2 Nucl ear Enthal py Ri se Hot Channel Factor (F~H ) 3.2.2-1 3.2.3 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) . . . 3.2.3-1 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR) . . . . 3.2.4-1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1-1 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation 3.3.1-1 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation . 3.3.2-1 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation 3.3.3-1 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.4-1 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Start Instrumentation . 3.3.5-1 3.3.6 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Roo~

_~RlESGR) Envelope Isolation Actuation

-Instrumentation

-_. _. . 3.3.6-1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) . 3.4.1-1 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits . 3.4.1-1 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality. 3.4.2-1 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits 3.4.3-1 3.4.4 RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2 3.4.4-1 3.4.5 RCS Loops-MODE 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.5-1 3.4.6 RCS Loops-MODE 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.6-1 North Anna Units 1 and 2

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued) 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) . . 3.7.9-1 3.7.10 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) MODES 1, 2, 3, afid 4 . .3.7.10- 1 1 3.7.11 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Air Conditioning System (ACS) .3.7.11-1 3.7.12 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS) . . . . .3.7.12-1 3.7.13 !'JQ.LV~~.Q ~4ai 19 Cel9trel Remtl/Effiergel9cy S',,,; tcl9gear Reeffi 04CR/ ESGR) Be tt 1ed Air Sy5 t effi 7.-'.:---:-. . . . 3.7.13 1

--=-.""':".----:."""--:.----:---=--:-:t--:+-:-H----t 3.7.14 Not Used Mail9 Cel9trel Reeffi/Effiergel9cy Switcl9gear Reeffi

~~~~t:~~~~fi:ffi~:;~::~tV~~t~~::~~~ySysteffi Irradiated Fuel Asseffiblies ~.--:.~.~.~~~:---:~~~~~~r-t .3.7.14 1 3.7.15 Fuel Building Ventilation System (FBVS) .3.7.15-1 3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level . . . . .3.7.16-1 3.7.17 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration .3.7.17-1 3.7.18 Spent Fuel Pool Storage . . . . . . .3.7.18-1 3.7.19 Component Cooling Water (CC) System .3.7.19-1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . 3.8.1-1 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating . 3.8.1-1 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown . . . . . . . 3.8.2-1 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil and Starting Air 3.8.3-1 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating . 3.8.4-1 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown . . . . . 3.8.5-1 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters . 3.8.6-1 3.8.7 Inverters-Operating . 3.8.7-1 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown . . . . . . 3.8.8-1 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating 3.8.9-1 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown .3.8.10-1 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS ..... 3.9.1-1 3.9.1 Boron Concentration . . . . . . ... 3.9.1-1 3.9.2 Primary Grade Water Flow Path Isolation Valves-MODE 6 . . . . . . . . 3.9.2-1 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation . 3.9.3-1 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations . 3.9.4-1 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level 3.9.5-1 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level 3.9.6-1 3.9.7 Refueling Cavity Water Level 3.9.7-1 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES . 4.0-1 4.1 Site Location 4.0-1 4.2 Reactor Core 4.0-1 4.3 Fuel Storage 4.0-1 North Anna Units 1 and 2 iii

MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 The MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.

ACTIONS

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NOTE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQU IRED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more Functions A.l

- Isolate the MCR!ESGR 7 days with one train envelope normal inoperable. ventilation.

-B. One or more Functions -

B.l Isolate the MCR!ESGR Immediately with two trains envelope normal inoperable. ventilation.

-C. Required Action and C.l Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time for Condition A AND or B not met in MODE I, 2, 3, or 4. -C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months

-D. Required Action and -0.1 Isolate the MCR!ESGR Immediately associated Completion envelope normal Time for Condition A ventilation.

or B not met during movement of recently OR irradiated fuel assemblies. 0.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-1

MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6

~_l1BJIL~.l~.NC~ REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY_

SR 3.3.6.1 --------------------NOTE-------------------

Verification of setpoint is not required.

Perform TADOT. 18 months North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-2

MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 Tabl~_.. ~.3.6-1 (page 1 of 1)

MCR!ESGR~ny~lQQe Isolation Actuation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECI FI ED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE TRIP FUNCTION .CONDITIONS

CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS SETPOINT

1. Manual Initiation 1.1._ 2 , 3, 4..Lill 2 trains SR 3.3.6.1

2. Safety Injection Refer to LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation,"

Function I, for all initiation functions and requirements.

1~ During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-3

MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 LCO 3.7.10 Two MCR/ESGR EVS trains shall be OPERABLE.

- - - - - - - - - - - - NOT E- - - - - -- - - - - - - -

The MCR/ESGR envelope boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4~

During __r1J_Qy_emenJ__ ..QLx~cently irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQU IRED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME A. One required MCR/ESGR A.1 Restore MCR/ESGR EVS 7 days EVS train inoperable train to OPERABLE for reasons other than status.

Condition B.

B. One or more required B.1 Initiate action to Immediately MCR/ESGR EVS trains implement mitigating inoperable due to actions.

inoperable MCR/ESGR enve lope boundary lll__ -AND MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

B.2 Verify mitigating 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months actions ensure MCR/ESGR envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits.

AND B.3 Restore MCR/ESGR 90 days envelope boundary to OPERABLE status.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.10-1

MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUI RED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND or B not met in MODES I, 2, 3, or 4. C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months D.

Required Action and 0.1.1 Isolate the MCR!ESGR Immediately associated Completion envelope normal Time for Condition A ventilation.

not met during movement of recently AND irradiated fuel assemblies. -0.1.2

- Place OPERABLE EVS 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months train in emergency (outside filtered air supply) mode.

OR D.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

E. One or more required -

E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately MCR!ESGR EVS trains recently irradiated inoperable due to fuel assemblies.

inoperable MCR!ESGR envelope boundary during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

(continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.10-2

MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. (continued)

-OR Two required MCR!ESGR EVS trains inoperable during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies for reasons other than Condition B.

Fe. Two required MCR/ESGR rcs.i Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately EVS trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 for reasons other than Condition B.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEI LLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1 Operate each required MCR/ESGR EVS train 31 days for 2 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating.

SR 3.7.10.2 Perform required MCR/ESGR EVS filter In accordance testing in accordance with the Ventilation with VFTP Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.3 Not Used North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.10-3

MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.10.4 Perform required MCR/ESGR Envelope In accordance unfiltered air inleakage testing in with the accordance with the MCR/ESGR Envelope MCR/ESGR Habitability Program. Envelope Habitability Program North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.10-4

MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System 3.7.13 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Mai~ Co~trol Room/Emerge~cy Switc~gear Room (MCR/ESGR) Bottle~ Air System LCO 3.7.13 T~ree ~1CR/ESGR bottle~ air system trai~s s~all be OPERABLE.

- - - - -- - - - - - - - NOT E- - - - - - - - - - - - -

The ~1CR/ESGR e~vel oJ=le bOI:l~~ary may be oJ=le~e~ i ~termi tte~tl y I:l~~er a~mi~istrative co~trol.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, a~~ 4, Dl:lri~g moveme~t of rece~tly irra~iate~ fl:lel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION Cm1PLETION TH1E A-;- O~e refl:lire~ ~1CR/ESGR A-;-!- Restore ~1CR/ESGR ;' ~ays bottl ed air system bottl e~ air system trai~ i~of3el"able for trai~ to OPERABLE I"easo~s otlger tl9a~ statl:ls.

Co~~iti o~ B.

B-;- O~e or more refl:lire~ B-;-!- I~itiate actio~ to ~[lftffie~i atel y

~1CR/ESGR bottl e~ air imJ=lleme~t mitigati~g sj'stem trai~s actio~s.

i ROJ=lerabl e ~I:le to il96f3el"aele ~1CR/ESGR -AN9 e~veloJ=le bOI:l~~ary i ~

~lODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. B-;-r Verify miti gati ~g i~4 1901:ll"s actio~s e~sl:lre

~1CR/ESGR e~\!el oJ=le occl:lf3a~t eXf3osl:lres to ra~i 01 ogical, c~emical, a~~ smoke

~azar~s Hill ROt excee~ limits.

-AN9 (co~ti ~1:le1)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.13-1

MCRjESGR Bottled Air System 3.7.13 ACTIONS cmlD IT ION REQUIRED ACTION Cm4PLETION TH4E s- (cel9ti 191:JeJ) B-;-3 Restel"e ~4CR/ESGR 90 eaY~f el9velepe sel:Jlgeal"Y te OPERABLE statl:Js.

-;- T',w el" ffiel"e l"efll:Jil"ee -;-l- Il9itiate actiel9 te Iffiffieei irfe+:y

~4CR/ESGR settlee ail" iffipleffiel9t ffiitigatil9g systeffi tl"ail9s actiel9s.

ilgepel"asle il9 ~40DE 1, 2, 3, el" 4 fel" l"easel9S ANB eU,el" tt:lal9 Celgeiti el9 B. &d Restel"e at 1east hw 24 t:lel:Jl~

~4CR/ESGR settlee ail" systeffi tl"ail9s te OPERABLE statl:Js.

B-;- Refll:Jil"ee Actiel9 alge B-;-+/- Be il9 ~40DE 3. 6 t:l el:J 1":;-

asseciatee Ceffipletiel9 Tiffie ef Celgeiti el9 A, B ANB-el" C I98t ffiet il9

~40DE 1, 2, 3, el" 4. &d Be il9 ~40DE 5. 36 t:lel:Jl"'S" North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.13-2

MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System 3.7.13 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION Cm4PLETION TH4E f7 Re~uirecl Actie~ a~cl ~ Sus~e~cl meveme~t ef -J[mmecli ately asseciatecl Cem~letie~ rece~tly irracliatecl Time ef Ce~clitie~ A fuel assemBlies.

Ret met cluri~g meveme~t ef rece~tly i rracli atecl fuel assemBlies.

THe er mere re~uirecl

~CR/ESGR Bettlecl air system traiFlS i~e~eraBle cluri~g meveme~t ef rece~tly irracliatecl fuel assemBlies.

O~e er mere re~uirecl Bettlecl air system trai~s i~e~erable clue te a~ i Re~eraBl e

~CR/ESGR e~vele~e Beu~clary cluri~g meveme~t ef rece~tly irracliatecl fuel assemBlies.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRE~ENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.13.1 Verify each re~uirecl ~CR/ESGR Bettlecl air 31 clays Ba~k is ~ressurizecl te > 2300 ~sig.

SR 3.7.13.2 Veri fy each re~ui recl ~1CR/ESGR Bettl ecl ai r 31 clays ba~k maFlual valve ~et leckecl, sealecl, er etherHise securecl a~cl re~uirecl te be e~e~

cluriFlg accicle~t ce~clitie~s is e~e~.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.13-3

MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System 3.7.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE fRfQUENCY SR 3.7.13.3 Vel"i fy eac~ I"elui feel ~~CR/ESGR ~ottl eel ai I" 18 fflol'ltffi systeffl tl"ail'l actuates 01'1 al'l actual Of sifflulatee actuatiol'l si§l'Ial.

SR 3.7.13.4 Vel"i fy tHO l"eEjui 1"eE':1 ~~CR/ESGR ~ottl eel ai I" 18 fflORt~S OR a systeffl tl"ail'ls caR fflaiRtaiR a ~ositive STAGGERED TEST

~l"essul"e of > 0.05 iRc~es Hatel" §au§e, BAS-I-£ I"elative to t~e aEljacel'lt al"eas fol" at least 60 ffliRutes.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.13-4

MCRjESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies 3.7.14 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.14 Mai~ Co~trol Rooffi/Effierge~cy Switc~gear ROOffi (MCR!ESGR) Effierge~cy Ve~tilatio~ Systeffi (EVS) D~ri~g MOYeffie~t of Rece~tly Irra~iate~ Fuel Asseffil9lies LCO 3.7.14 Two MCR/ESGR EVS trai~s s~all 1ge OPERABLE.

- - - - - - - - - - - - NOTE - - - - - - - - - - - - -

T~e ~4CR/ESGR e~Yelo~e 19ou~~ary ffiay 1ge o~e~e~ i~terffiitte~tly

~~~er a~ffii~istratiYe co~trol.

APPLICABI LITY: D~ri~g ffiOYeffie~t of rece~tly irra~iate~ f~el asseffil91ies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION Cm4PLETION TH4E fJr.- O~e require~ ~4CR/ESGR fJr.--l- Restore ~4CR/ESGR EVS ~7 ~ays EVS trai~ i AO~eral91 e trai~ to OPERABLE for reaso~s ot~er t~a~ status.

i AO~eral9l e ~4CR/ESGR e~Yelo~e 19ou~~ary.

B-;- Req~ire~ Actio~ a~~ B-;-l- Sus~e~~ ffiO'o'effie~t of ~[ffiffie~i ately associate~ COffi~letio~ rece~tly irra~iate~

Tiffie of Co~~iti o~ A fuel asseffil9lies.

~ot ffiet.

00 T',;o require~ ~4CR!ESGR EVS trai~s i~o~eral9le.

00 O~e or ffiore require~

~4CR/ESGR EVS trai~s i~o~eraI91e ~~e to i AO~eraBl e ~4CR/[SGR e~velo~e Bou~~ary.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.14-1

MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies 3.7.14 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE ffiEQUENCY SR 3.7.14.1 O~erate eac~ re~uire~ MCR/ESGR EVS trai~ 31 ~ays*

for> 10 co~ti~uous ~ours wit~ t~e ~eaters o~erati~g.

SR 3.7.14.2 Pcrforffi rc~uirccl MCR/ESGR EVS filtcr 1ft accorclaftcc tcsti~g i~ accorcla~ce wit~ t~e Vefttilatio~ wi tR vr-Tfl Filter Testi~g Prograffi (VFTP).

SR 3.7.14.3 Perforffi re~uire~ MCR!ESGR eftYelo~e I~ accor~aftce u~filterecl air i~leakage testiftg i~ ~I'i t ~ the-accor~a~ce wit~ t~e MCR/ESGR [ftvelo~e ~4CR/ESGJt.

Ilabi tabil ity Prograffi. E~velope Ilabi tabil i ty PrograA~

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.14-2

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.15 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued)

d. Leakage Rate acceptance criteria are:

1. Prior to entering a MODE where containment OPERABILITY is required, the containment leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

~ 0.60 La for the Type B and Type C tests on a Maximum Path Basis and ~ 0.75 La for Type A tests.

During operation where containment OPERABILITY is required, the containment leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

~ 1.0 La for overall containment leakage rate and ~ 0.60 La for the Type B and Type C tests on a Minimum Path Basis.

2. Overall air lock leakage rate testing acceptance criterion is ~ 0.05 La when tested at ~ Pa.

e. The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

f. Nothing in these Technical Specifications shall be construed to modify the testing Frequencies required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

5.5.16 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Envelope Habitability Program A MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program shall be established and implemented to ensure that MCR/ESGR envelope habitability is maintained such that, with an OPERABLE EmergeAcy lIaBitaBility System (i .e., MCR/ESGR EVS aAcl MCR/ESGR Bottlecl Air System}, MCR/ESGR envelope occupants can control the reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain it in a safe condition following a radiological event, hazardous chemical release, or a smoke challenge. The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protection is provided to permit access and occupancy of the MCR/ESGR envelope under design basis accident conditions without (continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 5.5-15

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.16 ear Room Envelo e Habitability personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 5 rem total effective dose equivalent for the duration of the accident. The program shall include the following elements:

a. The definition of the MCR/ESGR envelope and the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary.

b. Requirements for maintaining the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary in its design condition including configuration control ilnd preventive maintenance.

c. Requirements for (i) determining the unfiltered air inleakage past the MCR/ESGR envelope into the MCR/ESGR envelope in accordance with the testing methods and at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197 s "Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors s" Revision Os May 2003 s and (ii) assessing MCR/ESGR envelope habitability at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197 s Revis"ion o.

The following is an exception to Section C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197 s Revision 0:

2.C.1 Licensing Bases - Vulnerability assessments for radiological s hazardous chemical and smokes and emergency ventilation system testing were completed as documented in the UFSAR. The exceptions to the Regulatory Guides (RG) referenced in RG 1.196 {i.e. s RG 1.52 s RG 1.78 s and RG 1.183)s which were considered in completing the vulnerability assessments s are documented in the UFSAR/current licensing basis. Compliance with these RGs is consistent with the current licensing basis as described in the UFSAR.

d. Measurements at designated locations s of the MCR/ESGR envelope pressure relative to all external areas adjacent to the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary during the pressurization mode of operation by one train of the MCR/ESGR EVS s operating at the flow rate required by the VFTP s at a Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The results shall be trended and used as part of the 18 mOAths assessment of the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary.

(continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 5.5-16

Attachment 3 (Serial No. 0080)

Proposed Technical Specifications Changes North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION . . 1.1-1 1.1 Definitions . . . . 1.1-1 1.2 Logical Connectors 1. 2-1 1.3 Completion Times 1. 3-1 1.4 Frequency 1.4-1 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 2.0-1 2.1 SLs . 2.0-1 2.2 SL Violations. 2.0-1 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY 3.0-1 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY 3.0-4 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS . . . . . 3.1.1-1 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) . . . . . . 3.1.1-1 3.1.2 Core Reactivity . 3.1.2-1 3.1.3 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) 3.1.3-1 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits 3.1.4-1 3.1.5 Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits . 3.1.5-1 3.1.6 Control Bank Insertion Limits . . 3.1.6-1 3.1. 7 Rod Position Indication . . . . . ... 3.1.7-1 3.1.8 Primary Grade Water Flow Path Isolation Valves 3.1.8-1 3.1.9 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE 2 . . . 3.1.9-1 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1-1 3.2.1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (FQ(Z)) . . . . . 3.2.1-1 3.2.2 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (F~H) 3.2.2-1 3.2.3 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) . . . 3.2.3-1 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR) . . . . 3.2.4-1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1-1 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation 3.3.1-1 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation . 3.3.2-1 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation 3.3.3-1 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.4-1 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Start Instrumentation . 3.3.5-1 3.3.6 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation . 3.3.6-1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) . 3.4.1-1 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits . 3.4.1-1 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality. 3.4.2-1 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits 3.4.3-1 3.4.4 RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2 3.4.4-1 3.4.5 RCS Loops-MODE 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.5-1 3.4.6 RCS Loops-MODE 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.6-1 North Anna Units 1 and 2

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) (continued) 3.4.7 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled

3.4.7-1 3.4.8 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled

3.4.8-1 3.4.9 Pressurizer .

3.4.9-1 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves . .3.4.10-1 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) . .3.4.11-1 3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)

System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.4.12-1 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE . .3.4.13-1 3.4.14 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage .3.4.14-1 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation .3.4.15-1 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity . . .3.4.16-1 3.4.17 RCS Loop Isolation Valves . .3.4.17-1 3.4.18 RCS Isolated Loop Startup . .3.4.18-1 3.4.19 RCS Loops-Test Exceptions . .3.4.19-1 3.4.20 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity .3.4.20-1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.1-1 3.5.1 Accumulators . 3.5.1-1 3.5.2 ECCS-Operating . 3.5.2-1 3.5.3 ECCS-Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.3-1 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) 3.5.4-1 3.5.5 Sea1 Inj ect ion Flow . . . . 3.5.5-1 3.5.6 Boron Injection Tank (BIT) 3.5.6-1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS . . . 3.6.1-1 3.6.1 Containment . . . . . 3.6.1-1 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks

3.6.2-1 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3-1 3.6.4 Containment Pressure . . . . 3.6.4-1 3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature. 3.6.5-1 3.6.6 Quench Spray (QS) System . . . 3.6.6-1 3.6.7 Recirculation Spray (RS) System 3.6.7-1 3.6.8 Chemical Addition System . . . 3.6.8-1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7.1-1 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) 3.7.1-1 3.7.2 Main Steam Trip Valves (MSTVs) . 3.7.2-1 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs), Main Feedwater Pump Discharge Valves (MFPDVs),

Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs),

and Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves (MFRBVs) . 3.7.3-1 3.7.4 Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs) . 3.7.4-1 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System . 3.7.5-1 3.7.6 Emergency Condensate Storage Tank (ECST) 3.7.6-1 3.7.7 Secondary Specific Activity . 3.7.7-1 3.7.8 Service Water (SW) System . 3.7.8-1 North Anna Units 1 and 2 ii

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued) 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) . . 3.7.9-1 3.7.10 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room

~~~~{E~G~) .E~e~g~n~y.v~n~i~a~i~n.S~s~e~ .3.7.10-1 I 3.7.11 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Air Conditioning System (ACS) . .3.7.11-1 3.7.12 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS) . . . . .3.7.12-1 3.7.13 Not Used 3.7.14 3.7.15 Not Used Fuel Building Ventilation System (FBVS) .3.7.15-1 I

3.7.16 Fue1 Storage Pool Water Level. . . . .3.7.16-1 3.7.17 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration .3.7.17-1 3.7.18 Spent Fuel Pool Storage . .3.7.18-1 3.7.19 Component Cooling Water (CC) System .3.7.19-1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . . . 3.8.1-1 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating . 3.8.1-1 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown . . . . . . . 3.8.2-1 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil and Starting Air 3.8.3-1 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating . 3.8.4-1 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown . . . . . . 3.8.5-1 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters . 3.8.6-1 3.8.7 Inverters-Operating . 3.8.7-1 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown . . . . . . 3.8.8-1 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating 3.8.9-1 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown .3.8.10-1 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS . . . . . . 3.9.1-1 3.9.1 Boron Concentration . 3.9.1-1 3.9.2 Primary Grade Water Flow Path Isolation Valves-MODE 6 . . . . . . . . 3.9.2-1 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation . 3.9.3-1 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations . 3.9.4-1 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level 3.9.5-1 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level 3.9.6-1 3.9.7 Refueling Cavity Water Level 3.9.7-1 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES . 4.0-1 4.1 Site Location 4.0-1 4.2 Reactor Core 4.0-1 4.3 Fuel Storage 4.0-1 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.1 Responsibility . . 5.1-1 5.2 Organization 5.2-1 5.3 Unit Staff Qualifications 5.3-1 North Anna Units 1 and 2 iii

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS 5.4 Procedures . 5.4-1 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5-1 5.6 Reporting Requirements 5.6-1 5.7 High Radiation Area . . 5.7-1 North Anna Units 1 and 2 iv

MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 The MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.

ACTIONS

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NOTE - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQU IRED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Isolate the MCR/ESGR ? days with one trai n envelope normal inoperable. ventilation.

B. One or more Functions B.1 Isolate the MCR/ESGR Immediately with two trains envelope normal inoperable. ventilation.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. I) hours associated Completion Time for Condition A AND or B not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months D. Required Action and 0.1 Isolate the MCR/ESGR Immediately associated Completion envelope normal Time for Condition A ventilation.

or B not met during movement of recently OR irradiated fuel assemblies. 0.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-1

MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1 --------------------NDTE-------------------

Verification of setpoint is not required.

Perform TADDT. 18 months North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-2

MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.6 Table 3.3.6-1 (page 1 of 1)

MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECI FI ED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS SETPOINT

1. Manual Initi ati on 1, 2, 3, 4, (a) 2 trains SR 3.3.6.1 N/A

2. Safety Injection Refer to LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation,"

Function 1, for all initiation functions and requirements.

(a) During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-3

MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Emergency Ventilation System (EVS)

LCO 3.7.10 Two MCR/ESGR EVS trains shall be OPERABLE.

- - - - - - - - - - - - NOTE - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The MCR/ESGR envelope boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required MCR/ESGR A.1 Restore MCR/ESGR EVS i' days EVS train inoperable train to OPERABLE for reasons other than status.

Condition B.

B. One or more required B.1 Initiate action to Immediately MCR/ESGR EVS trains implement mitigating inoperable due to actions.

inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope boundary in AND MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

B.2 Verify mitigating l~4 hours actions ensure MCR/ESGR envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits.

-AND B.3 Restore MCR/ESGR 90 days envelope boundary to OPERABLE status.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.10-1

MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 ACTIONS CONDITION REQU IRED ACTI ON COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.l Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND or B not met in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4. C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months D. Required Action and D.1.1 Isolate the MCR/ESGR Immediately associated Completion envelope normal Time for Condition A ventilation.

not met during movement of recently AND irradiated fuel assemblies. D.1.2 Place OPERABLE EVS 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months train in emergency (outside filtered air supply) mode.

OR D.2 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

E. One or more required E.l Suspend movement of Immediately MCR/ESGR EVS trains recently irradiated inoperable due to fuel assemblies.

inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope boundary during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

(continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.10-2

MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. (continued)

OR Two required MCR/ESGR EVS trains inoperable during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies for reasons other than Condition B.

F. Two required MCR/ESGR F.l Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately EVS trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 for reasons other than Condition B.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1 Operate each required MCR/ESGR EVS train 31 days for ~ 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating.

SR 3.7.10.2 Perform required MCR/ESGR EVS filter In accordance testing in accordance with the Ventilation with VFTP Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.3 Not Used North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.10-3

MCR/ESGR EVS I 3.7.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.10.4 Perform required MCR/ESGR Envelope In accordance unfiltered air inleakage testing in with the accordance with the MCR/ESGR Envelope MCR/ESGR Habitability Program. Envelope Habitability Program North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.10-4

3.7.13 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Not Used North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.13-1

3.7.14 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.14 Not Used North Anna Units 1 and 2 3.7.14-1

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.15 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued)

d. Leakage Rate acceptance criteria are:

1. Prior to entering a MODE where containment OPERABILITY is required, the containment leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

~ 0.60 La for the Type B and Type C tests on a Maximum Path Basis and ~ 0.75 La for Type A tests.

During operation where containment OPERABILITY is required, the containment leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

~ 1.0 La for overall containment leakage rate and ~ 0.60 La for the Type B and Type C tests on a Minimum Path Basis.

2. Overall air lock leakage rate testing acceptance criterion is ~ 0.05 La when tested at ~ Pa.

e. The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

f. Nothing in these Technical Specifications shall be construed to modify the testing Frequencies required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

5.5.16 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Envelope Habitability Program A MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program shall be established and implemented to ensure that MCR/ESGR envelope habitability is maintained such that, with an OPERABLE MCR/ESGR EVS, MCR/ESGR envelope occupants can control the reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain it in a safe condition following a radiological event, hazardous chemical release, or a smoke challenge. The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protection is provided to permit access and occupancy of the MCR/ESGR envelope under design basis accident conditions without (continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 5.5-15

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.16 ear Room Envelo e Habitability personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 5 rem total effective dose equivalent for the duration of the accident. The program shall include the following elements:

a. The definition of the MCR/ESGR envelope and the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary.

b. Requirements for maintaining the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary in its design condition including configuration control and preventive maintenance.

c. Requirements for (i) determining the unfiltered air inleakage past the MCR/ESGR envelope into the MCR/ESGR envelope in accordance with the testing methods and at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, "Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors," Revision 0, May 2003, and (ii) assessing MCR/ESGR envelope habitability at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision O.

The following is an exception to Section C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0:

2.C.1 Licensing Bases - Vulnerability assessments for radiological, hazardous chemical and smoke, and emergency ventilation system testing were completed as documented in the UFSAR. The exceptions to the Regulatory Guides (RG) referenced in RG 1.196 (i.e., RG 1.52, RG 1.78, and RG 1.183), which were considered in completing the vulnerability assessments, are documented in the UFSAR/current licensing basis. Compliance with these RGs is consistent with the current licensing basis as described in the UFSAR.

d. Measurement, at designated locations, of the MCR/ESGR envelope pressure relative to all external areas adjacent to the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary during the pressurization mode of operation by one train of the MCR/ESGR EVS, operating at the flow rate required by the VFTP, at a Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The results shall be trended and used as part of the assessment of the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary.

(continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 5.5-16

Attachment 4 (Serial No. 0080)

Marked-up Technical Specifications Bases Changes (For Information Only)

North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES TABLE OF CONTENTS B 2.1 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 2.1.1-1 B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs . B 2.1.1-1 B 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL B 2.1.2-1 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO)

APPLICABILITY . . B 3.0-1 B 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY .B 3.0-12 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS . . . . . B 3.1.1-1 B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) . . . . . . B 3.1.1-1 B 3.1.2 Core Reactivity . B 3.1.2-1 B 3.1.3 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) B 3.1.3-1 B 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits B 3.1.4-1 B 3.1.5 Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits B 3.1.5-1 B 3.1.6 Control Bank Insertion Limits B 3.1.6-1 B 3.1.7 Rod Position Indication . . . . . B 3.1.7-1 B 3.1.8 Primary Grade Water Flow Path Isolation Valves . B 3.1.8-1 B 3.1.9 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE 2 . . . B 3.1.9-1 B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS . . . . . . . . B 3.2.1-1 B 3.2.1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (FQ(Z)) . . . . . B 3.2.1-1 B 3.2.2 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (F~H) B 3.2.2-1 B 3.2.3 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) . . . B 3.2.3-1 B 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR) . . . . B 3.2.4-1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.3.1-1 B 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation B 3.3.1-1 B 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation . . B 3.3.2-1 B 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)

Instrumentation . B 3.3.3-1 B 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System . . . . . . . . . . . B 3.3.4-1 B 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Start Instrumentation . B 3.3.5-1 B 3.3.6 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear-,~g.QJ:D iMCR/ESGR) Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation . B 3.3.6-1 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) . B 3.4.1-1 B 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits . B 3.4.1-1 B 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality. B 3.4.2-1 B 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits B 3.4.3-1 B 3.4.4 RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2 . . . . B 3.4.4-1 B 3.4.5 RCS Loops-MODE 3 . . . . . . B 3.4.5-1 B 3.4.6 RCS Loops-MODE 4 . . . . . . B 3.4.6-1 B 3.4.7 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7-1 B 3.4.8 RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8-1 B 3.4.9 Pressurizer. . . . ..... B 3.4.9-1 North Anna Units 1 and 2

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.7.10 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) MODES 1, 2, 3, a~d 4 . .B 3.7.10-11 B 3.7.11 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Air Conditioning System (ACS) .B 3.7.11-1 B 3.7.12 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS) . .B 3.7.12-1 B 3.7.13 Not Used Mai~ Co~trol Rooffi/Effierge~cy Switchgear Rooffi 01 CR/ [ SGR) Bo tt 1ed Air Sy 5 t effi -=-.---:.:---:-.----=-.--:-.-::-.---=.----=-----=-Br--:t--:+-:-H--t

. . B 3.7.13 1 B 3.7.14 Not Used Mai~ Co~trol Rooffi/Effierge~cy Switchgear Rooffi

~~~~~:6~~~~~ffi~:;~::~tV~;t~~::::~ySysteffi Ir radi ated Fue1 Ass effie 1i e 5 ---:-.-.,.........,..--:-.~-:--.:--,.........,.--:-i+-:r-:-+..,..-t-I:r--t

.B 3.7.14 1 B 3.7.15 Fuel Building Ventilation System (FBVS) .B 3.7.15-1 B 3.7.16 Fue1 Storage Pool Water Level. . . . .B 3.7.16-1 B 3.7.17 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration .B 3.7.17-1 B 3.7.18 Spent Fuel Pool Storage . . . . . . .B 3.7.18-1 B 3.7.19 Component Cooling Water (CC) System .B 3.7.19-1 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . B 3.8.1-1 B 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating . B 3.8.1-1 B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown . . . . . . . B 3.8.2-1 B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil and Starting Air B 3.8.3-1 B 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating . B 3.8.4-1 B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown . . . . . . B 3.8.5-1 B 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters . B 3.8.6-1 B 3.8.7 Inverters-Operating . B 3.8.7-1 B 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown . . . . . . B 3.8.8-1 B 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9-1 B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown .B 3.8.10-1 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS . B 3.9.1-1 B 3.9.1 Boron Concentration . B 3.9.1-1 B 3.9.2 Primary Grade Water Flow Path Isolation Valves-MODE 6 . . . . . . . . B 3.9.2-1 B 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation . B 3.9.3-1 B 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations . B 3.9.4-1 B 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level B 3.9.5-1 B 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level B 3.9.6-1 B 3.9.7 Refueling Cavity Water Level B 3.9.7-1 North Anna Units 1 and 2 iii

MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6

.~ }~~_J.N~I.RlJ~.~.NIf\ILQ.N

~.J.~~_~ Main Control...B9QIn/Emergency Swi tchgear Room_.H1~BLs.~_~1~LJnvelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation function provides a protected environment from which operators can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity.

During normal operation, the MCR and Relay Room Air Condition System provides unfiltered makeup air and cooling.

Upon rec~ of an MCR/ESGR Envelope Iso 1at -, on actuation signal from either unit Safety Injection (SI), High Badiatjgn or manuallt- the Unit 1 and 2 contl:Q.Lroom_lJormaL yg.D.tilation intake and exhaust ducts are isolated to ~en.i..

unfiltered makeup ai r from enteri ng the control room ...In.

Ci.d_qttjon to MCR/ESGRenvelope isolatioJL,.~SI signal also

~uto~ti.~ start the affected uQJ1:'.l'1CR1!:SGR EVS fans to .

.QIgvi d~mmfj ltered reci rcul ated ai r withi n the MCR/ESG_R

~r1.Y~JQP~~ The Fuel Building High Radiation or manual initiation starts both units available EVS train fans in the rfclrf~tlJation mode ~. Manual operator action 1 s requrred--t6--

CiJJgn-.1he MCR/ESG~ EVS to provi ded tiltfred makeup ai r. The MCR/ES~B EVS is descri bed in the Bases for LC01,-L~JQ.L~~1'1aiJ}...

CO_r1t:r:QJ_Boom/Emergeru~Y Swi tchgear ROQ.!!LEmergency Venti 1at i OIl

~.Y5t~m~."

Ib~r~m.CiTe four independent and redundant t ra ins of manu~L 9.s:1LJiJ,liQQ instrumentation for the _~_lliESGR Envelope Isolation. Each manual actuation train consists of two actuatI9D~~~~itches (chan~~l s), and the rnfej~c::Qnnecti ng wi.rin9_to the ac.1.!L~tion circuitr.Y. Only one switch 1f.b.~LDnell.

p~_r_Jr_C!.LIl.i!.QfLtwo of the four trai ns ar~ requi red for the..

~.Y s t em_tQ_In.i!Jnt ai n i ndep~_n dence and r.E?_cll1n.ci(~JL<:L The MCR!ESGR Envelope Isolation is actuated on a SI signal from either unit, a Fuel building High Radiation signal or manual switches in the MCR. The Safety Injection Function is discussed in LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation. 1I APPLICABLE The CQILtr.:9l room musJ be kept habitable._for the oper~tors_

SAFETY ANALYSES

... ~-- _ _-

.. statiotl~g there during accident recov.ery and post accident Q.PeratJQns. The.MCRjESGR Envelope I?olation actuation acts tQ..9.!1.!OfT)at i cal] y on a SI signal termi nate the suppl y of (continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.6-1

MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES APPLICABLE unfiltered outside air to the control room and initiate sAF'IT'{-ANALYS ES filtration in the rec-hculation mode. Manual actions are (C9Dt i nueJ!l requi red t~~]j gn the MCR/ESGItJVS to provi de fi 1 tered -make up air to_th~_.!"1CR!ESGR envelope~_

The safel:1.__ ?:D~J"ysis for a loss of coolaQL_.0scidenLi!L MODES 1-4 a?_~~_Q1es automatic i sol ati on of the MCR!ESGR .

_,?-nvelope on a 51 signal and manual initiation of.Jiltered outside air flow within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . No credit is taken for filtered reclfculation or pressurization provided by the.

~CR!ESGR EVS. The safety analysis for a fuel hand~

accident (FHA) assumed manual isolation of the MCR!ESGR env_~J._QQ.EL . .~l1_q_1lJ..(l nuaLin i t i~ t i_Q!:LQI._.11 0 sit ion i ng 0 f the MCR/ESG_R_IY.$_mt_o supply filtered air flow within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . For the remainillg_cl~~j_gn basi sacci dents> MCR!ESGR envelQP_~_

isolation is not assumed. Normal ventilation inflow with

~Q]__c:.fm_g~[:~~-~lti oll~l __LLQ_fj 1tered i nl eakage is assumed.

The ac_~t(t~n.t __ ?Jl~.hsis assumes normal ventilation during a_

toxic gas o!:, ?moke incident. The MCR!ESGR envelope isolation is not requiI~d to mitigate the consequences of these events.

T~MCRa5§R_JVS actuation instrumentation satisfies Cri teri on .3 __ QL 10 CFR 50. 3~_L?Jl.iiL_

The LCO requirements ensure that instrumentation necessary to initiate isolation of the MCR!ESGR envelope is OPERABLE.

Manual Initiation T~_~_.b~_Q_.rNl:!.Lr~_one channel per t ra in and two t ra ins QPERA~1f. The operator can initiate the MCRjESGR isolalipn at any ti~e by using anyone of the two switches in a train from the control room. This action wlIL_~~0se act uat ion 0 f Comp 0 nentLjn__th~ __?~I1l_~_:fll'§!l!l~~

as th~automatic actuation signal.

Ib~~~QJ9IM~Dq~JJDttt~ttQD~D._?\:lr~?Jh~pr9P~L

~m9~Dt9ft~Qqng~D.~yt?m~jnt~jn~gjnth~[T1~rlLJ9J

~~tlJ9tjQn~jr~v.ttr.Y.t9~D?LJT~th~QP~r~.t.gr.h9..?.m9..D.LJ.9.J iQjti~tjQD.~9P~piJjty~

Ea~b.._lrain consists of two switches (channe]s) and the ir:Lter_GQQDi=_<::Jing wiring to the actuation circuitry._

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.6-2

MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES LCO 2 .~_~t~J1.-_ I nj ect ion

---Tcont i nued)

Refer to LeO 3.3.2. Function 1. for an initiati!l9"_

F~nctions and_r~uirements.

APPLICABILITY

...........******* _----_.._ ._-- The MCRjESGR Envelope Isolation Functions must be operable in MODES 1. 2. 3, and 4 and during the movement of recently_

irradiated fuel assemblies to provide the required MCR!ESGR

~nv~lQP~ isolation initiation assumed in the applicable

.?_~~!y ~nalyses. In MODES 5 and 6. when no fuel mov~!TI~nt_

inv~1yjng recently irradiated fuel {i .e'-L-fuel that has occupj"~"g_ part of a cri t i ca 1 reactor __~or:e wi thi n the previ ous__

}QQhQ\:!r~1t~t~kjD9pl~~~"~""""t..h~r~~r~nQr~qqjr~m~n!~f9r M(Rl~~GR~V~Jn~tr.ym~nt~ttQnQPf.:.RA~L~JIY~Qn~j?".t~n.t~jtb.th~

~?J~ty~n~Jy.?~?(l??qmptjQD?""""~ppJjl:;:~pJ~jnt.h~~~MQPI$~

JD~QgjtJQDLth~m~DI,!(lJ~b(lnn~I?i1r~r.~ql,!jrl~q OPERABLE when

!119yj"n"g"""""""r"E;"c:~t.:lJJ""y"""""""trtSlgti1tE;9J\:!E;J~

ACTIONS

~_Note has been added to the ACTIONS indicating that separate (Q!ldillifl entry is allowed for eachJunction. The Conditions of this_Specification may be entered independently for each_

Functi9...D_listed in Table 3.3.6-1 in the accompanying LCQ-=-__

The COJJ:1J;lletion Time{s) of the inoperable train(s) of a_

Fun"~tj_Q.O-l'{ilL_Re tracked separately for_each Function"

.?-tar:ttDQ from the time the Condition was entered for that Function A.I.

A.l CC?-o~LtJgrtJt app1i es to the Manual Funct i qn of the MCWSG8_

EVS.

lLQne train is inoperable, in one or more Functions. 7 days 9.x~_permi tted to restore it to OPERABLf.:._ status. The 7 day CompJ_~tion Time is the same as is allowed if one train otJ~

M~_81D~K_~_YS is inoperable. The basis for this Completion_

Time_t?_ the same as provided in LCO 3.7.10. If the train

_<:;'~lJlJQJ--.1?~_r.~stored to OPERABLE statusJ.. the l1orma..l_

ventLlation to the MCR!ESGR envelope must be isolated. This accomp}ishes the actuation instrumentation Function arr~

pJ~~?Jhe unit in a conservative mode oLJ2'peration.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.6-3

MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES I\CT IONS B.l.l, B. 1. 2_l_!1nd _~_~

--Cf90fi nued)

Condition 8 applies to the failure of two MCR!ESGR Envelope.

Isolation actuation trains.LQ.f two manual trains. The first.

Required ActiQn is to isolate the normal ventilation to the MCR!ESGR envelope immediately. This accomplishes the

~<j:J!at i QD.tQ?tT!Jmentati on Function that may have been LQ.~L_

and places th~_unit in a conservative mode of operation.

C.l and C.2

~ond_ittq.!L_~._.iiP.Qlies when the Required Action and associated CompletioQ__Ii!D~_ for_ Condition A or: B have not been met and the unit is in MODE I, 2, 3, or 4. The unit must be brought tQ__ ~_Jv1QP~_ill_lNbjch the LCD reQQirements are not ~pplicable.

To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Comple_tiQ.!J__UmfS are_reasonable, based on operati1ill-

~xper.i enc~_ reach the requi red unit cond; t; ons from full power_ conditions in an orderly manner and without chall engiQ5L_I,L1:L~stems.

D.l and D.2

.[9ndiJiot'l Q_?'pplies when the Required Action and associated

~ompletion T_ime for Condition A or B have not been met when recently irradiated fuel assemblies are _being Jnoy_t:_cL~ __s.i:th~_

the normal_Y~ntJlat;on to MCR/ESGR envelope must be isolated or movement of recently ;rradiatedJuet_~?~~.!1l9l;es must be_

suspended immediately to reduce the risk of accidents that woul_d require_MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation a_ctuation.

SURVEI LLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that R~QVIREl'1 ENTS Table 3.3.6-1 determines which SRs apply to which MCR!ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Functions.

SR 3.3.6.1 SR 3.3.6.1 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and includ~the master relay coils. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all

.(continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.6-4

MCR/ESGR Envelope Isolation Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE .~K._.~.~).6.1 (continued)

B"EQUIREMENTS 9f the Clther required contacts of the relay are verified by.

other..Iechni ca1 Specifi cat ions and non-Techni cal

~s;tfi cati ons tests...at 1east once lL~r refuel i n9 i nterva 1

~ith applicable extensions. In some instances, the test.

i ncl udes actuati on of the eDd devi ce (i '.~_~.L"pump starts,-_

y-~lve cycles, etc.).The Frequency is based on the known re 1 i abjJ.i!.Y...9J the Functi on. and the reg~ndancy avail abl e..L_

9nd has been shown to be acceptable thr2~ operatin9-

~.:<j).~r..tence .

The_.~.R_is modi fi ed by a .Note that excl udes veri fi cati on of

.?_etQ.Qjnts duri n9 the.. TADOT. The Functi ons tested* have no

~tt.QQioJ.s ass_Q.~jated wi th them.

REFERENCES None North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.6-5

MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.10 Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) P100ES 1, 2, 3, aAd 4 BASES BACKGROUND The MCR/ESGR Emergency Ventilation IlabitabH-Hy System (EyHS) provides a protected environment from which occupants can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity, hazardous chemicals, or smoke. The MCR!ESGR EHS COAsists of the P1CR/ESGR bottled air system (LCO 3.7.13) aAd the MCR/ESGR EVS (LCO 3.7.10 aAd LCO 3.7.14). The MCR/ESGR EVS consists of four 100% capacity redundant trains (2 per unit) that can filter and recirculate air inside the MCR/ESGR envelope or supply filtered mak~~~_air to the MCR/ESGR envelope, and a MCR/ESGR boundary that limits the inleakage of unfiltered air. Each train consists of a heater, demister filter, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section for removal of gaseous activity (principally iodines), and a fan LRet~_JJ. Ductwork, valves, dampers, doors, barriers, and instrumentation also form part of the system. One EVS train is capable of performing the safety function of supplying outside filtered air. In the event of a Safety Injection_

JSI) , i:fhe two MCR/ESGR EVS trai ns on the acci dent uni t-eee actuate automatically in recirculation. 8lLA!.'ailable tr~jn?

QLf'.1~BIESGR EVS sta,rt automaticallY on a fuel building radi.?:tiQfI monitor si9.Dal or manual actuation of the MCRjESGR Bottl~.~L~tr System. Either of tThese trains can also be aligned to provide filtered outside air when appropriate.

Either train from the other unit can be manually actuated to provide filtered outside air approximately 60 minutes after the event. However, due to the location of the air intake for 1-HV-F-41, it can not be used to satisfy the requirements of LCO 3.7.10. Two of the three remaining trains (1-HV-F-42, 2-HV-F-41, and 2-HV-F-42) are required for independence and redundancy.

The MCR/ESGR envelope is the area within the confines of the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary that contains the spaces that control room occupants inhabit to control the unit during normal and accident conditions. This area encompasses the control room, and may encompass other non-critical areas to which frequent personnel access or continuous occupancy is not necessary in the event of an accident. The MCR/ESGR envelope is protected during normal operation, natural (continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-1

MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES BACKGROUND events, and accident conditions. The MCR/ESGR envelope (continued) boundary is the combination of walls, floor, roof, ducting, doors, penetrations and equipment that physically form the MCR/ESGR envelope. The OPERABILITY of the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary must be maintained to ensure that the inleakage of unfiltered air into the MCR/ESGR envelope will not exceed the inleakage assumed in the licensing basis analysis of design basis accident (DBA) consequences to MCR/ESGR envelope occupants. The MCR/ESGR envelope and its boundary are defined in the MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program.

Upon receipt of .9IL-'Hte actuating signal(s)_~ 51, fuel puiJding ra_9iation monitors or manual, normal air supply to and exhaust from the MCR/ESGR envelope is isolated, at least two trai ns of MCR/ESGR EVS recei ve a ~jg!}i!JJ~_o._actuate to recirculate air, and airflow from the bottled air banks QIovides breatbi~.quali1Y~ffiai~tai~s a ~esitive ~~ess~~e in the MCR/ESGR envelope. Approximately 60 minutes after actuation of the MCR/ESGR bottled air system, a single MCR/ESGR EVS train is manually actuated or aligned to provide filtered outside air to the MCR/ESGR envelope through HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. The demisters remove any entrained water droplets present, to prevent excessive moisture loading of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. Continuous operation of each train for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months per month, with the heaters on, reduces moisture buildup on the HEPA filters and adsorbers. Both the demister and heater are important to the effectiveness of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

Although fl.9L.0ssumed in the analysis of record, QPressurization of the MCR/ESGR envelope minimizes infiltration of unfiltered air through the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary from all the surrounding areas adjacent to the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary.

A si~gle t~ai~ ef the MCR!ESGR EVS, e~e~ati~g at a flew~ate ef < 1100 Cfffi, will ~~ess~~ize the MCR/ESGR e~vele~e te

> 0.04 i ~ches ~t'ate~ ga~ge ~el ati 'Ie te e)(te~~al a~ea-s-adjace~t te the MCR/ESGR e~vele~e ~e~~da~y. The MCR/ESGR EHS e~e~atie~ i~ ffiai~tai~i~g the P1CR/ESGR e~'1ele~e ha~ita~le is disc~ssed i~ the UFSAR, Sectie~ 6.4 (Ref. 1).

Redundant MCR/ESGR EVS supply and recirculation trains provide the required ~~ess~~izatie~ a~d filtration of out~;jde air should an excessive pressure drop develop across the other filter train. Ne~ffially clesed iselatie~ daffi~e~s (continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-2

MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES BACKGROUND are arraAged iA series ~airs so that the fail~re of OAe (continued) dam~er to o~eA will AOt res~lt iA aA iAa~ility of the system to ~erform the f~ActioA ~ased OA the ~reseAce of the red~AdaAt trai A. The MCR/ESGR EVS8+£ is des oj gned in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements. Any of tfhe actuation signal~ will isolate the ~~R!ESGR envelope efl+y and start the MCR/ESGR EVS trai ns for the affected uni t-.J1L reci reu] at ion.. Requi ri ng two of the three MCR/ESGR EVS trains provides redundancy, assuring that at least one train is available to be realigned to provide filtered outside ai r.

The MCR/ESGR EVS8+£ is designed to maintain a habitable environment in the MCR/ESGR envelope for 30 days of continuous occupancy after a DBA without exceeding the control room operator dose limits of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC-19 (Ref. 3) for alternative source terms.

APPLICABLE The MCR/ESGR EVS components are arranged in redundant, SAFETY ANALYSES safety related ventilation trains. The location of most components and ducting within the MCR/ESGR envelope ensures an adequate supply of filtered air to all areas requiring access. The MCR/ESGR EVS8+£ provides airborne radiological protection for the MCR/ESGR envelope occupants, as demonstrated by the MCR/ESGR envelope accident dose analyses for the most limiting DBA (LOCAl desigA ~asis accideAt fission product release presented in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2). The accident analysis assumes that at least one train is aligned to provide filtered outside air to the MCR/ESGR envelope approximately 60 minutes after MCR!ESGR envelope isolation act~atioA of ~ottled air, but does not take any credit for automatic start of the trains in the recirculation mode or any filtration of recirculated air.

Since, the MCR/ESGR EVS train associated with I-HV-F-41 can not be used to provide filtered outside air (due to the location of its air intake with respect to Vent Stack B)i it can not be used to satisfy the requirements of LCO 3.7.10.

The North Anna UFSAR describes potentially hazardous chemicals stored onsite in quantities greater than 100 lb.

These include hydrogen, sulfuric acid, sodium hydroxide, hydrazine, ethanolamine, and sodium hypochlorite.

Evaluations for accidental release of these chemicals indicate that the worst-case concentrations at the control room intake would be expected to be less than their (continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-3

MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES APPLICABLE respective toxicity limit (Refs. 1 and 4). The assessment SAFETY ANALYSES assumed no action being taken by the control room operator (continued) (i .e., normal or emergency supply system remains operating).

In the event of fire/smoke external to the MCR/ESGR envelope, equipment and procedures are available to maintain habitability of the control room. Smoke detectors are installed in the return ducts to the MCR Air-Handling Units (AHUs), in the near vicinity of the ESGR AHUs, and in the MCR/ESGR EVS supply ducts, as well as other numerous locations in the ESGRs and MCR. Smoke detectors are also installed in the MCR/ESGR chiller rooms, which are ventilated with air from the Turbine Building, and the Mechanical Equipment rooms. If smoke is detected, the MCR/ESGR normal and EVS supply can be manually isolated. The fire response procedures provide direction for removing smoke from the MCR or ESGRs. (Ref. 5) for the remaj.D.flJ?-I.2Lthe DBAs, MCR/ESGR envelope :i_5..olation is not assumed. Normal ventilation with 500 cfm of additional infeakage is assumed. The safety analy~;Ts for a fuel handli.D~_9ccident (FHA) assumes isolation of the MC R! ES~.R.J~.DY.~J~

The worst case single active failure of a component of the MCR/ESGR EVS, assuming a loss of offsite power, does not impair the ability of the system to perform its design function.

The MCR/ESGR EVS MODES 1, 2, 3, aRd 4 satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Two independent and redundant MCR/ESGR EVS trains are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one train is available to be manually aligned to provide outside filtered air to the MCR/ESGR envelope, if a single active failure disables one of the two required OPERABLE trains. Total system failure, such as from a loss of both required EVS trains or from an inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope boundary, could result in exceeding the control room operator dose limits of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC-19 (Ref. 3) for alternative source terms, in the event of a large radioactive release.

(continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-4

MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES LCO The MCR/ESGR EVS MODES 1, 2, 3, aAd 4 is considered OPERABLE (continued) when the individual components necessary to limit MCR/ESGR envelope occupant exposure are OPERABLE in the two required trains of the MCR/ESGR EVS ~mDES 1, 2, 3, arltl-4. 1-HV-F-41 can not be used to satisfy the requirements of LCO 3.7.10.

An MCR/ESGR EVS train is OPERABLE when the associated:

a. Fan is OPERABLE;

b. Demister filters, HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and

c. Heater, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air flow can be maintained.

The MCR/ESGR EVS is shared by Unit 1 and Unit 2.

In order for the MCR/ESGR EVS trains to be considered OPERABLE, the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary must be maintained such that the MCR/ESGR envelope occupant dose from a large radioactive release does not exceed the calculated dose in the licensing basis consequence analyses for DBAs, and that MCR/ESGR envelope occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke.

The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. This Note only applies to openings in the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary that can be rapidly restored to the design condition, such as doors, hatches, floor plugs, and access panels. For entry and exit through doors the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls should be proceduralized and consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the operators in the MCR/ESGR envelope.

This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening and restore the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary to a condition equivalent to the design condition when a need for MCR/ESGR isolation is indicated.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-5

MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, MCR/ESGR EVS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the MCR/ESGR envelope will remain habitable during and following a DBA.

The ~1CR!ESGR ~VS mu~J be OPERABLE. to respond to the re tease from a FHA involving recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

The MCR!ESGR E~~ is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling invo1.Yi.!illJecently irradiated fuel assemblies (i .e., fuel_~.??embl.ies that have occupied part of a cri.:t~

reactor core__~yithin the previous 300 hours0.00347 days 0.0833 hours 4.960317e-4 weeks 1.1415e-4 months ) due to rad i 0 a..~tiY~ 9..~f_~

ACTIONS A.1 When one required MCR/ESGR EVS train is inoperable, for reasons other than an inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope boundary, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining required OPERABLE MCR/ESGR EVS train is adequate to perform the MCR/ESGR envelope occupant protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the required OPERABLE EVS trains could result in loss of MCR/ESGR EVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining trains to provide the required capability.

B.1. 8.2, and 8.3 If the unfiltered inleakage of potentially contaminated air past the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary and into the MCR/ESGR envelope can result in MCR/ESGR envelope occupant radiological dose greater than the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences (allowed to be up to 5 rem total effective dose equivalent), or inadequate protection of MCR/ESGR envelope occupants from hazardous chemicals or smoke, the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary is inoperable. Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE MCR/ESGR envelope boundary within 90 days. During the period that the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary is considered inoperable, action must be initiated to implement mitigating actions to lessen the effect on MCR/ESGR envelope occupants from the potential hazards of a radiological or chemical event or a challenge from smoke. Actions must be taken within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to verify that in the event of a DBA, the mitigating actions will ensure that MCR/ESGR envelope occupant (continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-6

MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) radiological exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences, and that MCR/ESGR envelope occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. These mitigating actions (i.e., actions that are taken to offset the consequences of the inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope boundary) should be preplanned for implementation upon entry into the condition, regardless of whether entry is intentional or unintentional.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and the use of mitigating actions. The 90 day Completion Time is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions will ensure protection of MCR/ESGR envelope occupants within analyzed limits while limiting the probability that MCR/ESGR envelope occupants will have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA. In addition, the 90 day Completion Time is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary.

C.1 and C.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable required MCR/ESGR EVS train or the inoperable MCR/ESGR envelolPe boundary cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes accident risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonab1e, based on operating experi ence, .to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

D.l and D.2 Q.ldtJo..9...JDovement of recently irradiated_ fuel, if the i!lQQerC!P_le MC_BLI~G!L~VS train cannot be res tored to OPERA..l?JJ__

status within the.Je.n..uired Completion Time, the MCRjESGR erJ.vel.9J2~ must be isolatedmtmmediately and the remaining OPERAJL~J MCR!ESGR trai n placed in servi ce withi n one hour.~...

lhese __actions will ensure that the MCR!ESGR envelope i~_i.!lE.:.

fonft9.!1l:.?t i on that woul d protect the occupants from radioactive exposure ~osistent with the DB~ assumptions and ensure that any active failures would be readily detected.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-7

MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES An alternatiye. to Requireg ActiQn 0.1 is to immediately_

suspend activities that present a potential for releasing r:.~9i oacttyjJ.LJhat mi ght requi re i sol at i on of the control room . .lb~Ji!.ces the unit in a ~ondition that minimizes acciQ..~.nt risk ..lt.lis does... llot preclude tb~ mov~lJ:1~.o..Lof...fuel to.._

~ilf~._J2Q.~.:Lt:LQn~

E.1 During llJovement of recent ly irradjated fuel assemblies, iiJL requi.r.::.~-.9_ traLD of MCR!ESGR EVS trai n becomes i noperabl e due to an inopera~Je MCR/ESGR envelope boundary or tw(~uired MCR1I$~R_E.~~._.:trains.jJloperable, a.ction mu.~t be tal~~J:L immediatel.Y.mt9...suspend activities that could resuH in a release of X:..ggioactivity that might require i?9lation of the contJ::'.QI._room. This places the unit in a condition that mi ni [Ilt?~~.d~~. This does not JlIecl ude the.r:D.ovemell.Lof fuel to a safep.95jJion ..

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-8

MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES ACTIONS FB.1 (continued)

When two required MCR/ESGR EVS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 for reasons other than an inoperable MCR/ESGR envelope boundary (i.e., Condition B), the MCR/ESGR EVS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses.

Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on the MCR/ESGR EVS are not too severe, testing each required train once every month provides an adequate check of this system. Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal and HEPA filters from humidity in the ambient air. Each required train must be operated for ~ 10 continuous hours with the heaters energized. The 31 day Frequency is based on the reliability of the equipment and the one train redundancy.

SR 3.7.10.2 This SR verifies that the required MCR/ESGR EVS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing the performance of the demister filter, HEPA filter, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum and maximum flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.10.3 Not Used SR 3.7.10.4 This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary by testing for unfiltered air inleakage past the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary and into the MCR/ESGR envelope.

The details of the testing are specified in the MCR/ESGR Envelope Habitability Program.

(continued)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-9

MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The MCR/ESGR envelope is considered habitable when the radiological dose to MCR/ESGR envelope occupants calculated in the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences is no more than 5 rem TEDE and the MCR/ESGR envelope occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. This SR verifies that the unfiltered air inleakage into the MCR/ESGR envelope is no greater than the flow rate assumed in the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences. When unfiltered air inleakage is greater than the assumed flow rate, Condition B must be entered. Required Action B.3 a11 ows time to res tore the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary to OPERABLE status provided mitigating actions can ensure that the MCR/ESGR envelope remains within the licensing basis habitability limits for the occupants following an accident.

Compensatory measures are discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.196, Section C.2.7.3, (Ref. 6) which endorses, with exceptions, NEI 99-03, Section 8.4 and Appendix F (Ref. 7).

These compensatory measures may also be used as mi t t qat i nq actions as required by Required Action B.2. Temporary analytical methods may also be used as compensatory measures to restore OPERABILITY (Ref. 8). Options for restoring the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary to OPERABLE status include changing the licensing basis DBA consequence analysis, repairing the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary, or a combination of these actions. Depending upon the nature of the problem and the corrective action, a full scope inleakage test may not be necessary to establish that the MCR/ESGR envelope boundary has been restored to OPERABLE status.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.

2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.

4. Control Room Habitability Study (Supplement to 1980 Onsite Control Room Habitability Study - North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, January 1982.

5. Letter from L.N. Hartz (Virginia Electric and Power Company) to the USNRC, dated March 3, 2004, Response to Generic Letter 2003-01, "Control Room Habitability -

Control Room Testing &Technical Information."

6. Regulatory Guide 1.196.

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-10

MCR/ESGR EVS B 3.7.10 BASES REFERENCES 7. NEI 99-03, "Control Room Habitability Assessment,"

(continued) June 2001.

8. Letter from Eric J. Leeds (NRC) to James W. Davis (NEI) dated January 30, 2004, "NEI Draft White Paper, Use of Generic Letter 91-18 Process and Alternative Source Terms in the Context of Control Room Habitability." (ADAMS Accession No. ML040300694)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.10-11

MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTE~S B 3.7.13 ~aiR CORtrol Rooffi/EffiergeRcy Switc~gear ROOffi (~CR/ESGR) Bottle~ Air Systeffi BACKGROUND Hie P4CR/ESGR EffiergeRcy Ilabi tabi 1i ty Systeffi (EllS) ~rovi e1es a

~rotecteel eRviroRffieRt froffi w~ic~ occu~aRts caR cORtrol t~e Ul'lit follO'ldRg aR uRcoRtrolleei release of rilelioacti'v'ity,

~azar~ous c~effii cal s, or sffioke. IRe PKR/ESGR EllS cORsi sts of t~e ~CR/ESGR bottle~ air systeffi (LCD 3.7.13) aR~ t~e

~CR/ESGR EffiergeRcy VeRtilatioR Systeffi (EVS) (LCD 3.7.10 aR~

LCD 3.7.14).

T~e ~CR/ESGR bottleel air systeffi CORsists of four traiRS of bottleel air liRe~ u~ to ~rovi~e air to t~e ~CR/ESGR eRvelo~e al'lel a ~CR/ESGR el'lvelo~e boul'leiary t~at liffiits t~e il'lleakage of ul'lfiltereei air. T~e air is ~rovieleel via four trail'ls w~ic~

feeel a COffiffiOI'l ~eaeler, su~~lyiRg air to t~e URit 1 aRei URit 2 ESGRs. T~e ~eaeler is also ca~able of beiRg aligRe~ to su~~ly air e1irectly to t~e ~CR. Eac~ traiR is ~rovideel air by ORe of t~e bottle~ air baRks. URit 1 aR~ URit 2 eac~ ~rovi~e two traiRS of bottle~ air. Two bottle~ air traiRs are ca~able of

~rovi eli Rg ~ry ai r of breatRi Rg Iual i ty to ffi,ai Rtai R a

~ositive iRterior ~ressure iR t~e ~CR/ESGR eRvelo~e for URi t 1 aR~ URi t 2 for a ~eri oel of ORe ~our fEll 1owi Rg a Desi gR Basis AccieleRt (DBA).

T~e ~CR/ESGR eRvelo~e is t~e area wit~il'l t~e cOl'lfil'les of t~e

~CR/ESGR eRvelo~e bouRe!ary t~at cORtaiRS t~e s~aces t~at cOl'ltrol rOOffi occu~aRts iR~abit to cORtrol t~e uRit e!uriRg Rorffial aR~ accie!eRt cOR~itioRS. T~is area eRcoffi~asses t~e cORtrol rOOffi, aRe! ffiay eRcOffi~ass ot~er ROR critical areas to w~ic~ frelueRt persoRRel access or cORtiRUOUS occupaRcy is Rot Recessary iR t~e eveRt of al'l accie!el'lt. T~e ~CR/ESGR eRvelo~e is ~rotectee! e!uriRg Rorffial o~eratiDR, Ratural evel'lts, aRe! accie!el'lt cORe!itioRS. T~e ~CR/ESGR el'lvelo~e bouRe!ary is t~e cOffibiRatioR of walls, floor, roof, e!UCtiRg, e!oors, pel'letratiol'ls aRe! elui~ffiel'lt t~at ~~ysically forffi t~e

~CR/ESGR eRvelo~e. T~e OPERABILITY of t~e ~CR/ESGR eRvelo~e bouR~ary ffiUSt be ffiaiRtaiRee! to eRsure t~at t~e iRleakage of uRfilteree! air iRto t~e ~CR/ESGR eRvelo~e will ROt excee~

t~e iRleakage aSSUffiee! iR t~e liceRsiRg basis aRalysis of DBA cORselueRces to ~CR/ESGR eRvelo~e occu~aRts. T~e ~CR/ESGR eRvelo~e aRe! its bouR~ary are e!efiRee! iR t~e ~CR/ESGR ERvelo~e Habitability Prograffi.

(col'ltil'lueel)

North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.13-1

MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 BASES BACKGROUND I19 ~40DES 1, 2, 3, Ell" 4, uJgel9 l"ecei J9t ef tlge actl:lat~

(cel9til9ueEl) si§l9al(s), 19eFffia1 ail" SI:lJ9J91y tEl al9a exl9al:lst fl"Elffi 1~

MCR/ESGR el9veleJge is iselateEl, twe tl"ail9s ef MCR/ESGR EVS actuate te l"ecil"culate ail", al9El ail"flew fl"effi tlge ~Bttlea ail"

~al9l ~~0.05 il9clges watel"~~

~~§al:l§e. Tlge ~4CR/ESGR EllS eJgel"atiol9 il9 ffiail9tail9il9§ "Efl.e--~~

~~MCR/ESGR el9veleJge 19a~ita~le is Eliscl:lsseEl il9 tlge UrSAR, Secti lI9 6.4 (Ref. 1).~~

~~T1ge ~4CR/ESGR EllS is Elesi §lgeEl i 19 accel"Elal9ce wi tl9 Sci sffii c Cate§el"Y I fell:lil"effiel9ts.~~

~~T1ge ~4CR/ESGR EllS is Elesi §lgeEl te ffiai I9tai 19 a 19a~i talT1-e--~~

~~el9vi l"el9ffiel9t i 19 tlge ~4CR/ESGR el9vel eJge fEll" 30 Elays I*-~~

~~cel9til9l:lol:lS eccl:lJ9al9cy aftef a DBA witlgel:lt exceeElil9§ tlge cel9tl"ol feeffi eJgel"atel" Elose liffiits af 10 CFR 50, ApJgel9Elix A, GDC 19 (Ref. 2) fEll" altefl9ative sel:ll"ce tefffiS.~~

APPLICABLE Tlge MCR/ESGR ~ettleEl ail" systeffi is al"l"al9§eEl il9 fecll:ll9Elal9t, SAFETY ANALYSES safety felateEl tl"ail9s J9l"eviElil9§ J9fessl:ll"izeEl ail" freffi tlge l"ell:li l"eEl ~ettl eel ai 1" ~al9ks te ffiai I9tai 19 a 19a~i ta~ll~

~~el9Vifel9ffiel9t il9 tlge MCR/ESGR el9veleJge.~~

Tlge MCR/ESGR EHS J9l"eviEles ail"~el"lge faEliele§ical J9retectiel9 for tlge MCR/ESGR el9veloJge occl:lJ9al9ts, as Eleffiol9stl"ateEl ~y tlge cel9tl"el l"eeffi acciElel9t Elose al9alyses fol" tlge ffiest liffiitil9§ Elesi§19 ~asis acciElel9t fissial9 J9reEll:lct release J9resel9teEl il9 tlge UFSAR, Cl9aJ9tef 15 (Ref. 4).

~~-(cel9ti I9l:leEl)~~

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.13-2~~

MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 BASES APPLICABLE T~e Nert~ Al'll'la UFSAR ~escri~es ~etel'ltially hazar~eus SAFETY MIALYSES c~emicals stere~ el'lsite il'1 ~ual'1tities §reater t~al'1 100 l~.

~~(cel'ltiI'lUN!) T~ese il'lclu~e ~y~re§el'1, sulfuric aci~, se~ium ~y~rexi~e,~~

~~~y~razil'le, et~al'lelamil'1e, al'l~ se~ium ~y~ec~lorite.~~

Evaluatiel'ls fer acci~el'ltal release ef t~ese c~emicals il'l~icate t~at t~e werst case cel'lcel'ltratiel'ls at t~e cel'ltrel reem il'ltake weul~ ~e ex~ecte~ te ~e less t~al'l t~eir res~ective texicity limit (Refs. 1 al'l~ 5). T~e assessmel'lt assume~ I'le actiel'l beil'l§ takel'l ~y t~e cel'ltre"1 reem e~erater (i.e., I'lermal er emer§el'lcy su~~ly system remail'ls e~eratil'l§).

~~11'1 t~e evel'lt ef fi re/smeke exterl'1al te t~e 14CR/ESGR el'lvele~e, e~ui~mel'lt al'l~ ~rece~ures are availa~le te mail'ltail'l~~

~a~ita~ility ef t~e cel'ltrel reem. Smeke ~etecters are i I'lstall e~ i I'l t~e returl'l ~ucts te t~e ~4CR Ai If' Ilal'l~l i I'l§ Ul'li ts (AIIUs), il'l t~e I'lear vicil'lity ef He ESGR AIIUs, al'l~ il'l t~e MCR!ESGR EVS su~~ly ~ucts, as well as et~er I'lumereus lecatiefls ifl t~e ESGRs al'l~ MCR. Smeke ~etecters are alse iflstalle~ il'l t~e MCR/ESGR c~iller reems, w~ic~ are vel'ltilate~ wit~ air frem t~e Turbil'le Buil~i~§, al'l~ t~e Mec~al'lical E~ui~mel'lt reems. If smeke is ~etecte~, t~e

~~~4CR/ESGR I'lermal al'l~ EVS su~~ly cal'l ~e mal'lually iselate~. T~e fire res~el'lse ~rece~ures ~revi~e ~irectiel'l fer remevil'l§ smeke frem t~e MCR er ESGRs. (Ref. 6)~~

T~e werst case sil'l§le active failure ef a com~el'lel'lt ef t~e MCR/ESGR ~ettle~ air system, assumil'l§ a less ef effsite Jge...*er, ~ees flet im~ai r He a~i 1i ty ef He system te Jgerferm its ~esi§1'l fUl'lctiel'l.

~~T~e MCR/ESGR ~ettle~ air system satisfies Criteriel'l 3 ef 10 CFR 50.36 (c) (2)(i i) .~~

T~ree iAde~eAdeAt aAd reduAdaAt MCR/ESGR ~ettled air system traiAs are re~uire~ te be OPERABLE te el'lsure t~at at least twe are availa~le assumil'l§ a sil'l§le failure ~isa~les el'le trai A. letal system fail ure, suc~ as frem a 1 ess ef twe re~uire~ ~ettle~ air system trail'ls er frem dl'l il'le~erable

~4CR/ESGR el'lvel e~e beul'l~ary, ceul ~ resul t i I'l excee~i I'l§ t~e cel'ltrel reem e~erater ~ese limits ef 10 CFR 50, A~~el'l~ix A, GDC 19 (Ref. 2) fer alterAative seurce terms, il'l t~e evel'lt ef a lar§e ra~ieaetive release.

~~Eac~ MCR/ESGR ~ettle~ air system trail'l is cOl'lsi~ere~~~

~~OPERABLE w~eA t~e iA~ivi~ual cem~eAeAts I'lecessary te limit MCR/ESGR el'lvele~e eceu~aAt ex~esure are OPERABLE.~~

~~(eel'ltiAue~)~~

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.13-3~~

~~MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 BASES ttB A ~4CR/ESGR Bettl ee ai 1" s:)'steffi tl"ai I'l is OPERABLE ~d~~~

~~(eefttiftl:lee) ft7 Ol'le OPERABLE Bettlee ail" Bal'lk et 69 Bettles is~~~

~~sel"viee; tr.- A tl mt 19aU, , i I'lell:lei I'l§ asseei atee val yes al'le 19-j 19i I'l§, is OPERABLE; afte 7 IAe eeffiffiel'l eXAaust Aeaeel" is OPERABLE.~~

~~IAe MCR!ESGR Bottlee ail" systeffi tl"ail'ls al"e sAal"ecl By Ul'lit 1 al'lcl Ul'lit 2.~~

~~II'l el"clel" tOl" He ~4CR/ESGR EVS tl"ai I'lS to Be eol'ls i cl(~~~

OPERABLE, tAe ~4CR/ESGR el'lvelolge BOl:ll'lclal"Y ffil:lSt Be FAai I'ltai I'lecl sueA tAat tAe MCR/ESGR el'lvelolge oeel:ll9al'lt close tl"Offi a lal"§e l"aclioaetive l"elease clees I'let exeeecl tAe ealel:llated clese il'l tAe lieel'lsil'l§ Basis eel'lse~uel'lee al'lalyses tel" DBAs:, al'lcl tAat MCR/ESGR el'lvelelge oeeul9al'lts al"e 191"eteetecl tl"effi Aazal"clel:ls eAeffiieals al'lcl sffieke.

IAe LCO is ffiocli fi ecl By a Note all mti I'l§ tAe ~~CR/ESGI{ el'lvelolge Bel:ll'lclal"y te Be elgel'lecl il'ltel"ffiittel'ltly ul'lclel" aclffiil'listl"ative eOl'ltl"els. IAis Note el'lly a19191ies te olgel'lil'l§s il'l tAC MCR/ESGR el'lvelelge Beul'lclal"Y tAat eal'l Be l"al9iclly l"estel"ecl te tAe clesi§1'l eel'lclitiel'l, Sl:leA as cloel"s, AateAes, tleel" 1911:l§S, ancl aeeess 19aftels. Fel" efttl"Y afte exit tAl"el:l§A eeel"s tAe aeffiinistl"ative eOl'ltl"el et tAe elgel'lil'l§ is 1ge1"fol"ffiecl By tAe 1ge1"Sel'llP.rr-el'ltel"il'l§ el" exitil'l§ tAe al"ea. Fel" etAel" elgel'lil'l§s, tAese eel'ltl"els sAoulcl Be 191"0eecll:ll"alizee al'lcl eOl'lsist of statiol'lil'l§ a cleclieatecl il'leivicll:lal at tAe olgel'lil'l§ wAe is il'l eOl'ltil'll:lol:ls eeffiffil:lfti eati el'l ~/i tA tAe olgel"atel"s i ft tAe ~4CR!ESGR cl'lvel olge.

IAis il'lcliviclual will Aave a ffietAocl to l"al9iclly elose tAe ol9cl'lil'lg al'ld l"cstOl"C tAC MCR/ESGR Cl'lvclol9c to a conditiol'l e~uivalel'lt te tAe clesi§1'l eOl'lclitiel'l WAel'l a I'leecl for MCR/ESGR el'lvelelge isolatiol'l is il'lclieatecl.

APPLICABILITY II'l MODES 1, 2, 3, al'lcl 4, al'lcl clul"il'l§ ffiOVeffiel'lt of l"ceel'ltly il"l"acliatecl fl:lel asseffiBlies, MCR/ESGR Bottlecl ail" systeffi ffil:lSt Be OPERABLE te el'lSUl"e tAat tAe MCR/ESGR el'lvelolge will l"effiail'l AaBi taBl e clul"i I'lg al'lcl foll mti I'lg a DBA.

DUl"il'lg ffiOVeffiel'lt of l"eeel'ltly il"l"acliatecl fuel asseffiblies, tAe MCR!ESGR Bottlecl ail" systeffi ffiUSt Be OPERABLE to l"cslgel'lcl to tAe l"elease fl"effi a fuel Aal'lcllil'lg aeeiclel'lt il'lvelving Aal'lcllil'lg

~~-(eel'lti I'luecl)~~

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.13-4~~

MCRjESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 BASES APPLICABILITY receflt1y irra~iate~ f\:le1. T~e MCR/ESGR ~ett1e~ air systeffi is (ceflti fl\:leEl) efl1y re~\:lire~ te ~e OPERABLE ~\:lrifl~ f\:le1 ~aA~lifl~ iflve1vifl~

~~~afl~lifl§ receflt1y irra~iate~ f\:le1 (i.e., f\:lc1 t~at ~as ecc\:l~ie~ ~art ef a critical reacter cere wit~ifl t~e ~revie\:ls 300 ~e\:lrs), ~\:le te ra~ieactive ~ecay.~~

ACTIONS W~efl efle re~\:lire~ MCR/ESGR ~ett1e~ air SYStCffi traifl is ifle~era~le, fer reaseflS et~er t~afl afl ifle~era~le MCR/ESGR eflve1e~e ~e\:lfl~ary, actiefl ffi\:lSt ~e takefl te restere OPERABLE stat\:lS wit~ifl 7 ~ays. Ifl t~is Cefl~itiofl, t~c reffiaiflifl~

~~re~\:lire~ OPERABLE MCR!ESGR bett1e~ air SyStCffi traifls are a~e~\:late te ~erferffi t~e ~4CR/ESGR efl'te1 e~e eCC\:l~aflt~~

~rotectiofl f\:lflctiol'l. Ilowever, He overall reliability is re~\:lce~ beca\:lse a sifl§le fail\:lre ifl ol'le of t~e reffiaiflifl§ re~\:lire~ OPERABLE traifls cO\:ll~ res\:llt ifl 105s of MCR/ESGR bottle~ air systeffi f\:lflctiofl. T~e 7 ~ay COffi~letiofl Tiffie is base~ Ofl t~e low ~rebability of a DBA oCC\:lrrifl§ ~\:lrifl§ t~is tiffie ~erio~, al'l~ ability of t~e reffiaiflil'l§ traiflS to ~revi~e t~e re~\:lire~ ca~ability.

~~If tRe \:lflfiltere~ iflleaka§e of ~otel'ltially cefltaffiiflate~ air~~

~ast t~e ~4CR!ESGR el'lvel o~e be\:lfl~ary afl~ i fltl9 He ~4CR/ESGR el'lvelo~e cafl res\:llt ifl MCR/ESGR el'lvelo~e occ\:l~al'lt ra~iolo§ical ~ose §reater t~afl t~e calc\:llate~ ~ese of t~e licel'lsil'l§ basis aflalyses of DBA CeflSe~\:leflCe5 (allowe~ to be

~~\:l~ to 5 reffi teta1 effective ~ese e~\:livaleflt), er ifla~e~\:late~~

~rotectiofl ef MCR/ESGR eflvele~e eCC\:l~aflts freffi ~azar~o\:ls c~effiicals er sffieke, t~e MCR!ESGR eflvele~e ~19\:lfl~ary is iflo~erable. Actiofls ffi\:lSt be takel'l to restore afl OPERABLE MCR/ESGR el'lvelo~e be\:ll'l~ary witRil'l 90 ~ays.

D\:lri I'l§ t~e ~eri o~ t~at t~e ~4CR/ESGR eflvel e~e be\:lfl~ary is cOl'lsi~ere~ il'lo~erable, actiol'l ffi\:lSt be il'litiate~ to iffi~leffiel'lt ffiiti§atil'l§ actiol'ls to lessefl t~e effect Ofl MCR/ESGR eflvelo~e occ\:l~al'lts froffi tRe ~otefltial Razar~s of a ra~iolo§ical er c~effiical eveflt or a c~allel'l§e freffi sffioke. Actiofls ffi\:lSt be takefl h*it~ifl 24 ~o\:lrs to verify tRat ifl He e'veflt ef a DBA, t~e ffiiti§atifl§ actiel'ls will el'lS\:lre t~at MCR!ESGR eflvelo~e OCC\:l~aflt ra~iolo§ical ex~os\:lres will flOt excee~ t~e calc\:llate~ ~ose of t~e liceflsifl§ basis aflalyses of DBA cOI'lSe~\:leflCeS, afl~ tRat MCR/ESGR el'lvelo~e OCC\:l~aflts are

~~~rotecte~ froffi ~azar~o\:ls cReffiicals al'l~ sffioke. T~ese (col'ltil'l\:le~)~~

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.13-5~~

MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 BASES ACTIONS U (cel9til9tleel) mitigatil9g actiel9s (i.e., actiel9s t~at are takel9 te effset t~e cel9sefltlel9ces ef t~e i 1ge1=leral9l e ~~CR/ESCR el9vel,~

~~eetll9E1ar:'f) s~etll EI ee I=lrel=ll al9lgeEl fer iml=ll emel9tati el9 tll=lel9 el9tr)'~~

i I9te He cel9e1i ti el9, regarEil ess ef ~,'~eHer el9tr:'f is-il9tel9tiel9al er tll9il9tel9tiel9al. T~e 24 ~etlr Ceml=lletiel9 Time is reasel9al9le 19aseEi el9 t~e lew I=lrel9al9ilit:'f ef a DBA ecctlrril9g eltlril9g t~is time l=lerieEl, al9E1 t~e tlse ef mitigatil9g actiel9s.

~~T~e 90 ela:'f Ceml=lletiel9 Time is reasel9al9le 19aseEi el9~~~

eletermi 19at i el9 t~at t~e mit i gat i I9g act i el9 5 ~ti 11 el9!Tt::tr'e-I=lretectiel9 ef MCR/ESCR el9velel=le eCCtll=lal9ts wit~il9 al9al:'fzeel limits w~ile limitil9g t~e I=lrel9al9ilit:'f t~at MCR/ESCR el9vele~e ecctl~al9ts will ~ave te im~lemel9t ~retective meastlres t~at ma:'f aelversel:'f affect t~eir al9ilit:'f te cel9trel t~e reacter al9e1 mail9tail9 it il9 a safe s~tltElewl9 cel9e1itiel9 il9 t~e evel9t ef a DBA. 119 aElelitiel9, t~e 90 Ela:'f Ceml=lletiel9 Time is-a-reasel9al9le time te eliaglgese, 1=l1a19 al9E1 I=lessiel:'f re~air, al9E1 test mest I=lrel9l ems ~ti t~ t~e ~~CR/ESCR el9'/el el=le eetl!flElar:'f.

W~el9 twe er mere refltlireel trail9s ef t~e MCR/ESCR 1gettleel air s:'fstem are ilgel=leral9le il9 MODE 1, 2, 3, er 4 fer reasel9s et~er Hal9 al9 i 1ge1=leral9l e ~~CR/ESCR 1getll9e1ar:'f (i. e., Cel9e1iti el9 B) ,

~~actiel9 mtlst 1ge takel9 te restere at least twe ef t~e refltlireel~~

~~CR/ESCR eeHl eel ai r s:'fstem trai 195 te OPERABLE stattlS ~ii t~i 19 24 ~etlrs. Dtlril9g t~e I=lerieel t~at twe ar mere refltlireel trail9s ef t~e MCR/ESCR 1gettleEi air s:'fstem are ilgel=leraele, al=l~rel=lriate cem~el9satar:'f meaStlres (cel9sistel9t wit~ t~e il9tel9t ef CDC 19) s~atllel 1ge tltilizeel te ~retect cel9trel ream e~eraters trem ~etel9tial ~azarels StlC~ as raelieact~

cel9tamil9atiel9. Pre~lal9lgeel meaStlres sAetllei 1ge availal9le te aelelress t~ese cel9cerl9s fer il9tel9tiel9al al9e1 tll9il9teAtial9al el9try il9te the cel9e1itiel9. The 24 hetlr Cem~letiel9 Time is reasal9al9le 19aseel el9 t~e le~t I=lral9al9ility af a DBA Dcctlrril9g eltlril9g t~is time I=lerieel, al9E1 t~e tlse af caml=lel9sat~

~~meastlres. T~e 24 Aatlr Cam~letiel9 Time is a t:'f~ica~~~

~~reasal9al9le time ta eliaglgese, ~lal9, restare, al9e1 ~Dssil9ly re~air, al9e1 test mest I=lrel9lems wit~ t~e MCR/ESCR 19attleel air s:'fstem, StlC~ as rel=lresstlrizil9g t~e s:'fstem after a~~~

~~il9aelvertel9t acttlatiel9.~~

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.13-6~~

~~MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 BASES ACTIONS 0.1 al'lEl 0.2 (cel'ltil'lt:JeEl)~~

~~II'l MODE 1, 2, 3, er 4, if t~e il'le~era~le reqt:JireEl MCR/ESGR~~

~~~ettleEl air systeffi trail'ls er t~e il'le~era~le MCR/ESGR~~

~et:JI'lElary cal'll'let ~e restereEl te OPERABLE statt:Js wit~il'l t~e re~t:JireEl Ceffi~letiel'l Tiffie, t~e t:Jl'lit ffit:JSt ~e placeEl il'l a MODE t~at ffiil'liffiizes acciElel'lt risk. Te ac~ieve t~is statt:Js, t~e t:Jl'lit ffit:JSt ~e ~laceEl il'l at least MODE 3 wit~i~ 6 ~et:Jrs, al'lEl il'l MODE 5 wit~il'l 36 ~et:Jrs. T~e alleweEl Ceffi~letiel'l Tiffies are reasel'la~le, ~aseEl el'l e~eratil'l~ ex~eriel'lce, te reac~ t~e re~t:JireEl t:Jl'lit cel'lElitiel'ls freffi ft:Jll ~ewer cenElitiel'ls il'l al'l orElerly ffial'll'ler al'lEl wit~et:Jt c~allel'l~il'l~ t:Jl'lit S)'steffis.

Dt:Jril'l~ ffieVeffiel'lt ef recel'ltly irraEliateEl ft:Jel asseffi~lies, if t~e re~t:JireEl il'le~era~le MCR/ESGR ~ettleEl air systeffi trail'l cal'll'let ~e restereEl te OPERABLE statt:Js wit~in t~e re~t:JireEl Ceffi~letiel'l Tiffie, two er ffiere re~t:JireEl MCR/ESGR ~ettleEl air systeffi trail'ls are il'le~era~le, er el'le er ffiere ~ettleEl air systeffi trail'ls il'le~era~le Elt:Je te al'l il'le~era~le MCR!ESGR el'lvele~e ~et:JI'lElary, actiel'l ffit:JSt be takel'l te "iffiffieEliately st:Js~eI'lEl activities t~at cet:J1El rest:Jlt il'l a release ef raElieactivity t~at ffii~~t re~t:Jire isolatiel'l af t~e MCR/ESGR el'lvele~e. T~is ~laces t~e t:Jl'lit il'l a cel'lElitiel'l t~at ffiil'liffiizes risk. T~is lees I'let ~reclt:JEle t~e ffieVeffiel'lt et ft:Jel te a safe J:lesitiel'l.

~~SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.13.1 REQU IRH4ENTS T~is SR verifies t~at eac~ re~t:JireEl MCR/ESGR ~ettleEl air~~

~al'lk is at t~e ~re~er J:lresst:Jre. T~is el'lst:Jres t~at w~el'l ceffibil'leEl wit~ t~e re~t:JireEl l'lt:Jffi~er ef OPERABLE air ~ottles, t~e ffiil'liffiUffi requireEl air flow will be ffiail'ltail'leEl to el'lsure t~e re~uireEl MCR/ESGR el'lveleJ:le J:lresst:Jrizatiol'l fer aJ:lJ:lrexiffiately 60 ffiil'lt:Jtes w~el'l t~e MCR/ESGR ~ettleEl air systeffi is actt:JateEl. T~e 31 lay Fre~t:Jel'lcy is ~aseEl el'l el'l~il'leeril'l~ jt:JEl~effiel'lt.

~~SR 3.7.13.2 T~is SR verifies t~at t~e ~reJ:ler l'lt:Jffi~er of MCR/ESGR air~~

~~~ettles are il'l service, wit~ el'le ~al'lk ef 69 air ~ettles il'l eac~ reqt:JireEl trail'l. T~is SR re~t:Jires verificatiel'l t~at eac~~~

~~~ettleEl air ~al'lk ffial'lt:Jal valve I'let leckeEl, scaleEl, er et~erwise sect:JreEl al'lEl re~t:JireEl te ~e oJ:lel'l Eluril'l~ acciElel'lt (cel'ltil'lt:JeEl)~~

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.13-7~~

~~MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 BASES SURVEI LLANCE SR 3.7.13.2 (coRtiR~es)~~

~~REQUI RD4ENTS cORsitioRS is o~eR. T~is SR ~el~s to eRs~re t~at t~e ~ottles air ~aRks re~~ires to ~e OPERABLE to ~ress~rize t~e HCR!ESGR~~

~~~o~Rsary are iR service. T~e 31 say Fre~~eRcy is bases OR eR~i Reeri R~ j ~s~ffleRt aRs Has c~oseR to ~ro'ti se aSE~~~

~~ass~raRce of t~e correct ~ositioRS. T~is SR soes ROt a~~ly to valves t~at are lockes, seales, or ot~erHise sec~res iR t~e o~eR ~ositioR, siRce t~ese Here verifies to ~e iR t~e correct~~

~~~ositioR ~rior to 10ckiR~, sealiR~, or sec~riR~.~~

SR 3.7.13.3 T~is SR verifies t~at eac~ re~~ires HCR!ESGR ~ottles air systeffl trai R act~ates ~y veri fyi R~ t~e fl mt' ~aH 'j s o~eRes aRs t~at t~e Rorfflal air s~~~ly to aRs ex~a~st from t~e HCR!ESGR eRvelo~e is isolates OR aR act~al or sifflulates act~atioR si~Ral. T~e Fre~~eRcy of 18 fflORt~S is cORsisteRt

~~~t'it~ ~erforffliR~ t~is test OR a ref~eliR~ iRterval ~asis.~~

~~SR 3.7.13.4 T~is SR verifies, ~y ~ress~riziR~ t~e HCR/ESGR eRvelo~e, t~e i Rte~rity of He ~4CR/ESGR eRvel o~e, aRs t~e ass~ffll+~~

~~iRleaka~e rates of t~e ~oteRtially cORtaffliRates air. T~e~~

~~~4CR/ESGR eRvel o~e ~osi ti ve ~ress~re, ~t'i t~ res~ect-t-e~~

~oteRtially cORtaffliRates asjaceRt areas, is ~eriodically testes to verify ~ro~er f~RctioRiR~ of t~e HCR/ESGR ~ottles air systeffl. D~riR~ t~e effler~eRcy fflose of o~eration, t~e HCR/ESGR ~ottles air systeffl is sesi~Res to ~ress~rize t~e HCR/ESGR eRvelo~e to > 0.05 iRc~es Hater ~a~~e ~ositive

~~~ress~re Hit~ res~ect to asjaceRt areas iR orser to ~reveRt~~

~Rfilteres iRleaka~e. T~e HCR/ESGR ~ottles air systeffl is sesi~Res to fflaiRtaiR t~is ~ositive ~ress~re wit~ two traiRs for at least 60 ffliR~tes. TestiR~ two traiRS at a tiffle at t~e Fre~~eRcy of 18 fflORt~S OR a STAGGERED TEST BASISt-s-cORsi steRt ',d t~ t~e ~~i saRce ~rovi ses i R NUREG 081}G--

~~(Ref. 3).~~

~~REFERENCES f7 UFSAR, SectioR 6.4.~~

~~~ 10 CFR 50, A~~eRsix A.~~

~~37 NUREG 0800, Rev. 2, J~ly 1981.~~

~~47 UFSAR, C~a~ter 15.~~

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.13-8~~

MCR/ESGR Bottled Air System B 3.7.13 BASES REFERENCES 5-:- C619tf6l R66ffi IlaBi taBi 1i ty Stl-JEly (Sl-J\9\9l effiCl9t t6 1980 (C6l9ti 19l-JeJ) Ol9si te C619tf6l R66ffi !laBi taBi 1i ty Stl-JEly N6ftR Al9l9a P6'i~ef Stati619 Ul9its 1 al9E1 2, Jal9l-JafY 1982.

6-:- Lettef ff6ffi L.N. Ilaftz (Vif§il9ia Electfic alge P6Hef C6ffi\9aI9Y) t6 tRe USNRC, eatee HafcR 3, 2004, ReS\96I9Se t6 Gelgefi c Lettef 2003 01, "C6l9tf6l R66ffi Ilabi taBi 1i ty C619tf6l R66ffi Testil9§ & TecRl9ical 1I9f6fffiati619."

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.13-9~~

MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.14 MaiA COAtrol Rooffi!Effier§eAcy Switc~§ear ROOffi (MCR/ESGR) Effier§eAcy VeAtilatioA Systeffi (EVS) D~riA§ MoveffieAt of ReceAtly Irradiated Fuel Asseffiblies BACKGROUND IRe ~KR!ESGR Effier§eAcy Ilabi tabi 1i ty Systeffi (EllS) ~rovi des a

~~~rotected eAvirOAffieAt froffi w~ic~ occu~aAts caA cOAtrol t~e UAit foll owi A§ aA uAcoAtroll ed rel ease of rildi oacti vity ,~~

~~~azardous c~effii cal s, or sffioke. T~e ~KR/ESGR EllS cOAsi sts of t~e MCR/ESGR bottled air systeffi (LCO 3.7.13) aAd t~e MCR/ESGR EVS (LCO 3.7.10 aAd LCO 3.7.14).~~

T~e MCR/ESGR EVS cOAsists of four iAde~eAdeAt, reduAdaAt traiAs t~at caA filter aAd recirc~late air iAside t~e MCR/ESGR eAvelo~e, or su~~ly filtered air te t~e MCR!ESGR eAvelo~e aAd MCR!ESGR bO~Adary t~at liffiits t~e iAleaka§e of uAfiltered air. Eac~ traiA COAsists of a ~eater, deffiister filter, a ~i§~ efficieAcy ~artic~late air (HEPA) filter, aA activated c~arcoal adsorber sectioA for reffieval of §aseo~s acti vity (~ri Aci ~all y i odiAes), aAd a faA. Ouch/ork, valves aAd daffi~ers, doors, barriers aAd iAstruffieAtatioA also forffi

~art of t~e systeffi. OAe EVS traiA is ca~able of ~erforffiiA§ t~e safety f~ActioA of s~~~lyiA§ filtered outside air. T~ere are AD restri eti OAS OA t~e use of 1 IIV F 41 i A t~e recirculatioA ffiode. Ilowner, due to t~e locatioA of He air i Atake for 1 IIV F 41, it caA ADt be used to sati sfy He re~~ireffieAts of LCO 3.7.14. Two of t~e t~ree reffiaiAiA§ traiAS (l II'/ F 42, 2 IIV F 41, aAd 2 IIV F 42) are re~uired for iAde~eAdeAce aAd redUAdaAcy.

~~T~e MCR/ESGR eAvelo~e is t~e area wit~iA t~e cOAfiAes of t~e~~

~4CR/ESGR eA~!el 0l3e bO~Adary t~at cOAtai AS t~e sl3aces t~at cOAtrol rOOffi occu~aAts iA~abit to cOAtrol tAe uAit duriA§ ADrffial aAd accideAt cOAditioAS. T~is area eAcoffi~asses He cOAtrol rOOffi, aAd ffiay eAcOffi~ass ot~er AOA critical areas to w~ic~ fre~~eAt ~ersoAAel access or cOAtiAuOUS occ~~aAcy is AOt Aecessary i A He e'teAt of aA acci deAt. TRe ~4CR/ESGR eAvelol3e is I3rotected d~riA§ Aorffial ol3eratioA, Aatural eveAts, aAd accideAt cOAditioAS. T~e MCR/ESGR eAvelol3e bO~Adary is He cOffibi AatiOA of \/all s, floor, roof, ducti A§ ,

~~doors, l3eAetratioAs aAd e~~i~ffieAt t~at ~~ysically forffi t~e MCR/ESGR eAvelo~e. T~e OPERABILITY of t~e MCR/ESGR eAvelo~e bO~Adary ffi~St be ffiaiAtaiAed to eAsure t~at t~e iAleaka§e of~~

~~~Afiltered air iAtO t~e MCR/ESGR eAvelo~e will AOt exceed (coAtiA~ed)~~

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.14-1~~

MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 BASES BACKGROUND t~e iflleaka§e assl:lme~ ifl t~e liceflsifl§ ~asis aflalysis of (COfl t i fll:leEj) ~esi§fl ~asis acci~eflt (DBA) COflSe~l:leflCeS to ~4CR/E~~

~~eflveloJge OCCl:lJ9aflts. IRe ~4CR/ESGR eflvel oJge afl~ i ts ~Ol:lfl~aI"Y al"e ~efi fleEl i fl t~e ~4CR/ESGR Efl'tel oJge lIa~i ta~i 1i ty Pl"o§l"am.~~

Ifl case of a DBA Ell:ll"ifl§ movemeflt of l"ecefltly il"l"aEliateEl fl:lel assem~lies, afl al:ltomatic (si§flal fl"om t~e fl:lel ~l:lilElifl§ l"aEliatiofl mOflitol"s) 01" mafll:lal actl:latiofl of ail"flow fl"om t~e

~~~ottleEl ail" ~aflks is l"e~l:lil"e~. Actl:latiofl of ail"flo\i fl"om t~e~~

~ottle~ ail" ~aflks also al:ltomatically isolates t~e HCR/ESGR eflveloJge to maifltaifl J90sitive J9l"essl:ll"e ifl t~e HCR/ESGR eflveloJge afl~ al:ltomatically stal"ts all availa~le EVS tl"aiflS ifl l"ecil"cl:llatiofl mo~e.

~~AJ9J9l"oximately 60 mifll:ltes aftel" actl:latiofl of t~e HCR/ESGR~~

~~~ottleEl ail" system, a sifl§le HCR/ESGR EVS tl"aifl is mafll:lally actl:lateEl 01" ali§fleEl to J9l"oviEle filtel"e~ ol:ltsiEle ail" to t~e~~

~~~4CR/ESGR eflvel oJge t~I"Ol:l§~ IIEPA fi 1tel"S aflEl C~aI"COi~~~

a~sol"~el"s fol" J9l"essl:ll"izatiofl. T~e Elemistel"s l"emove aflY efltl"aifle~ watel" ~l"oJ9lets J9l"eSeflt ifl t~e ail", to J9reveflt excessive moistl:ll"e loa~ifl§ of t~e HEPA filtel"s afld c~al"coal a~SOI"~el"s. COfltifll:lOl:lS 0Jgel"atiofl of eac~ tl"aifl fol" at least 10 ~Ol:lI"S Jgel" mOflt~, wit~ t~e ~eatel"s Ofl, l"eEll:lces moistl:ll"e

~~~l:li 1~l:lJ9 Ofl tt:!e IIEPA fi 1tel"S aflEl aElsol"~el"s. Bott:! t~e Elemi stel" afl~ ~eatel" al"e imJ90l"taflt to He effectivefless of He HEPA filtel"s aflEl ct:!al"coal aElsol"~el"s.~~

~~Pl"essl:ll"izatiofl of tt:!e HCR/ESGR eflveloJge miflimizes iflfiltl"atiofl of l:lflfiltel"e~ ail" fl"om t~e al"eas a~jaceflt to He eflveloJge.~~

~~A sifl§le tl"aifl of t~e HCR/ESGR EVS will J9l"essl:ll"ize t~e~~

~4CR/ESGR eflveloJge to > 0.04 i fldes ~iatel" §al:l§e. IRe ~4CR/ESGR EllS 0Jgel"ati Ofl i fl mai fltai fli fl§ t~e ~4CR/ESGR eflvel oJge ~a~i ta~l e is Eliscl:lsseEl ifl tt:!e UFSAR, Sectiofl 6.4 (Ref. 1).

ReEll:lflElaflt HCR/ESGR EVS sl:lJ9J9ly tl"aiflS J9l"oviEle t~e l"e~l:lil"eEl filtl"atiofl st:!ol:llEl afl excessive J9l"essl:ll"e ElI"OJ9 EleveloJ9 acl"OSS t~e ot~el" filtel" tl"aifl. NOl"mally close~ isolatiofl ~amJgel"s al"e al"l"afl§eEl ifl sel"ies J9ail"s 50 t~at t~e faill:ll"e of Ofle ElamJgel" to oJgefl will flOt l"esl:llt ifl afl ifla~ility of tt:!e system to Jgel"fol"m tt:!e fl:lflCtiofl ~aseEl Ofl tt:!e J9l"eSeflCe of tfte-l"e~l:lfl~aflt tl"aifl. IRe ~4CR/ESGR EllS is ~esi§fle~ ifl aCCOI"~aflCe witt:! Seismic Cate§ol"Y I l"e~l:lil"emeflts.

~~(cofltifll:leEl)~~

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.14-2~~

MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 BASES BACKGROUND HIe ~1CR/ESGR EllS is ees i !jlgee te ffiai I9tai 19 a ~lal3ital31 e (cel9til9l:lee) el9Virel9ffiel9t il9 t~e MCR/ESGR eRvele~e fer 30 eays ef cel9til9l:lel:ls eccl:l~al9cy after a DBA wit~el:lt exeeeeil9!j t~e cel9trel reeffi e~erater eese liffiits ef 10 CFR 50, A~~elgeix A, GDC 19 (Ref. 2) fer alterl9ative sel:lrce terffi~~

APPLICABLE T~e ~1CR/ESGR EVS ceffi~eRel9ts are arraR!jee il9 reel:llgeal9t, SAFETY ANALYSES safety relatee vel9tilatiel9 trail9s. T~e lecatiel9 ef ffiest Ceffi~elgel9ts alge el:lctiR!j wit~il9 t~e MCR/ESGR el9vele~e el9Sl:lres al9 aee~l:late sl:l~~ly ef filteree air te all areas re~l:liril9!j access. T~e P1CRjESGR EllS ~re'o'i ees ai rl3erlge raei el e!ji cal

~retectiel9 fer t~e MCRjESGR el9vele~e eccl:l~ants, as eeffiel9stratee l3y t~e MCRjESGR eRvele~e accieel9t eese al9alyses fer t~e ffiest liffiitil9!j eesi!j19 l3asis accieeRt fissiel9 ~reel:lct release ~resel9tee il9 t~e UFSAR, C~a~ter 15 (Ref. 4).

~~T~e Nert~ Al9l9a UFSAR eescril3es ~etel9tially hazareel:ls c~effiicals steree el9site il9 ~l:lal9tities !jreater t~al9 100 113.~~

~~T~ese il9cll:lee ~yere!jel9, sl:llfl:lric acie, seeiuffi ~yerexiee,~~

~~~yeralilge, et~algelaffiilge, alge Seeil:lffi ~y~ec~lorite.~~

Evall:latiel9s fer accieel9tal release ef t~ese c~effiicals ilgeicate t~at t~e werst case cel9cel9tratiel9s at t~e cel9trel reeffi il9take wel:lle l3e ex~ectee te l3e less t~al9 t~eir res~ective texicity liffiit (Refs. 1 alge 5). T~e aSSeSSffiel9t aSSl:lffiee 1ge actiel9 l3eil9!j takel9 l3y t~e cel9trel reeffi e~erater (i.e., 1gerffial er effier!jel9cy sl:l~~ly systeffi reffiail9s e~eratil9!j.

~~119 t~e evel9t ef firejsffieke exterl9al te t~e MCRjESGR el9vele~e, e~l:li~ffieRt alge ~receel:lres are availa131e te ffiail9tail9~~

~al3ital3ility ef t~e cel9trel reeffi. Sffieke eetecters are i I9stall ee i 19 t~e retl:lrl9 el:lcts te t~e P1CR Ai r Halgel i 19!j Ul9i ts (AIIUs), i R t~e Rear vi ci Rity ef t~e ESGR AIIUs, alge i 19 He MCRjESGR EVS sl:l~~ly el:lcts, as well as et~er I9l:lffierel:lS locatiel9s in t~e ESGRs alge MCR. Sffioke cletecters are alse il9stallecl il9 t~e MCRjESGR c~iller reeffiS, w~ic~ are vel9tilatecl wit~ air freffi t~e Tl:lrl3ilge Bl:lilein!j, alge t~e Mec~al9ical E~l:li~ffiel9t reeffiS. If sffieke is cletectee, t~e MCR/ESGR 1gerffial al9cl EVS sl:l~~ly cal9 l3e ffial9l:lally iselatee. T~e fire res~el9se ~rececll:lres ~revicle clirectiel9 fer reffieviR!j sffieke freffi t~e MCR er ESGRs. (Ref. 9)

T~e werst case sil9!jle active faill:lre ef a COffi~elgel9t ef t~e MCR/ESGR EVS, assl:lffiil9!j a less ef effsite ~ewer, clees 1get iffi~air t~e al3ility ef t~e systeffi te ~erferffi its clesi!j19 fl:ll9ctiel9.

~~(cel9til9l:lecl)~~

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.14-3~~

MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 BASES APPLICABLE T~e MCR/ESGR EVS Ou~il9§ Movemel9t of Recel9tly I~~a~iate~ Fuel SAFETY ANALYSES Assemblies satisfies C~ite~iol9 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(e)(2) (ii).

~~(COI9 t i 19 uee::I)~~

~~THO i 19~e~eI9Elel9t al91 ~eElul9Elal9t ~4CR/ESGR EllS t~ai I9S-a-t"'e-~~

~~~e~ui~eEl to be OPERABLE to el9su~e t~at at least OAe is available if a sil9§le active failu~e ~isables t~e ot~e~~~

~~t~ail9. Total system failu~e suc~ as f~om a loss of bot~~~

~e~ui~e~ vel9tilatiol9 t~ail9s o~ f~om al9 il9o~e~able ~4CR/ESGR el9velo~e boul9~a~y coul~ ~esult il9 excee~il9§ t~e cOl9t~ol ~oom o~e~ato~ lose limits of 10 CFR SO, A~~eI9Elix A, GO(;..- +9-(Ref. 2), fo~ alte~l9ative sou~ce te~ms il9 t~e eveAt of a la~§e ~aElioactive ~elease.

A MCR/ESGR EVS Ou~il9§ Movemel9t of Recel9tly 1~~aEliateEl Fuel Assemblies t~ail9 is cOl9siEle~eEl OPERABLE w~el9 t~e il9EliviElual com~olgel9ts 1gecessa~y to 1imit ~4CR/ESGR occu~al9t ex~osu~e a~e OPERABLE.

~~AI9 ~4CR/ESGR E)lS t~ai 19 is OPERABLE ~i~el9 He associ I~~~

~~ft7 Fal9 is OPERABLE,~~

~~~ Oemiste~ filte~s, HEPA filte~s al91 c~a~coal aElso~be~s a~e 190t excessively ~est~ictil9§ floH, al91 a~e ca~able of~~

~~~e~fo~mil9§ t~ei~ filt~atiol9 fUl9ctiol9s; al9~~~

~~-;- Heate~, ~uch'o~k, valves, al9~ ~am~e~s a~e OPERABLE, al9~~~

~~ai~ floH cal9 be mail9tailge~.~~

~~T~e MCR/ESGR EllS is s~a~eEl by Ul9it 1 al91 Ul9it 2.~~

~~119 o~Ele~ fo~ t~e ~4CRjESGR EllS t~ai I9S to be cOl9si ElI:=i"'e6--~~

~~OPERABLE, t~e MCR/ESGR el9velo~e boul9Ela~y must be mail9tailgeEl suc~ t~at t~e MCRjESGR el9velo~e occu~al9t lose f~om a la~ge~~

~aElioactive ~elease Eloes 190t excee~ t~e calculated ~ose il9 t~e licel9sil9§ basis cOl9se~uel9ce al9alyses fo~ OBAs, al91 t~at MCR/ESGR el9velo~e occu~al9ts a~e ~~etecteEl f~om ~ala~~ous c~emicals al91 smoke.

T~e LCO is mo~ifieEl by a Note alloHil9§ t~e MCR/ESGR el9velo~e boul9Ela~y to be o~elgeEl il9te~mittel9tly ul9Ele~ aElmil9i5t~ative cOl9t~ols. T~is Note ol9ly a~~lies to o~el9il9§s il9 t~e MCR/ESGR el9velo~e boul9Ela~y t~at cal9 be ~a~iElly ~esto~eEl to t~e Elesigl9 cOI9Elitiol9, suc~ as Eloo~s, hatc~es, floo~ ~lugs, aAEl access

~~-(col9ti 19ueEl)~~

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.14-4~~

MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 BASES tB l3algels. For el9try al9s exit Hrol:J!j19 soors tl9c asmil9istrative (col9til9l:Jes) cOl9trol of tlge 0l3e19i19!j is l3erformea ey tlge l3ersol9(s) el9teril9!j or exitil9!j tlge area. For otlger 0l3eni19!js, tlgese cOl9trols sl9ol:Jla ee I3rOCeal:Jralizea al9s cOl9sist of statiol9il9!j a aeaicatea il9sivisl:Jal at tlge 0l3e19i19!j wl90 is il9 cOl9til9l:Jol:JS comml:Jl9i cati 019 witl9 tlge ol3erators i 1'1 tlge ~1CR/ESGR el'lvel 0l3e.

119is il9sivisl:Jal will 19ave a metl90a to ra13is1y close tlge 0l3e19i 19!j al9s restore tlge ~1CR/ESGR el9velol3e BOl:Jl9aary to a cOl9sitiol9 e~l:Jivalel9t to tlge sesi!j19 cOl9sitiol9 wlgel9 a 1gees for MCR!ESGR isolatiol9 is il9sicates.

APPLICABI LIlY Dl:Jril9!j movemel9t of recel9tly irrasiates fl:Jel assemBlies, MCR/ESGR EVS Dl:Jril9!j Movemel9t of Recel9tly Irraaiatea Fl:Jel Assemelies ml:Jst ee OPERABLE to el9Sl:Jre tl9at ilge MCR!ESGR el9velol3e will remail9 19aeitaele sl:Jril9!j al9a followil9!j a DBA.

~~Dl:Jril9!j movemel9t of recel9tly irraaiatea fl:Jel assemelies, tlge~~

~1CR/ESGR EVS ml:Jst ee OPERABLE to resl3019a to tlge release from a fl:Jel 19a19alil9!j acciael9t il9volvil9!j 19a19alil9!j recel9tly irraaiatea fl:Jel. 11ge MCR/ESGR EVS is 0191y rC~l:Jirea to ee OPERABLE al:Jril9!j fl:Jel 19a19alil9!j il9volvil9!j 19a19dlil9!j recel9tly i naai atea fl:Jel (i. e., fl:Jel Hat 19as occl:Jl3i ca l3art of a critical reactor core witl9il9 tlge I3reviol:Js 300 1901:Jrs), al:Je to rasioactive aecay.

~~Re!jarail9!j tlge MCR/ESGR EVS, it sl9ol:Jla ee 190tes tl9at tlgey are re~l:Jirea to Be OPERABLE By otlger LCOs il9 other MODES.~~

ACTIONS Wlgel9 olge re~l:Jirea MCR!ESGR EVS trail9 is il9ol3eraBle, for reasol9s otlger tl9al9 al9 il9ol3eraele MCR!ESGR el9velol3e eOl:Jl9aary, actiol9 ml:Jst Be takel9 to restore OPERABLE statl:JS witl9il9 7 lays. 119 tl9is COl9aitiol9, tlge remail9il9!j re~l:Jirea OPERABLE MCR/ESGR EVS trail9 is aae~l:Jate to l3erform the MCR!ESGR el9velol3e I3rotecti 019 fl:Jl9cti 019. Hmiever, tlge overall reliaBility is real:JCea Becal:Jse a sil9!jle faill:Jre il9 tlge re~l:Jirea OPERABLE MCR/ESGR EVS trail9 cOl:Jla resl:Jlt il9 loss of

~4CR/ESGR EVS fl:Jl9ctiol9. 11ge 7 lay Com131etio19 lime is Basea 019 tlge low I3roeaeility of a DBA occl:Jrril9!j al:JriA!j tl9is time l3eriOa, al9a aeility of tlge remail9il9!j trail9s to I3roviae tlge re~l:Jirea cal3aeility.

~~North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.14-5~~

~~MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 BASES ACTIONS ~~~

~~(col9til9l::Jes)~~

~~Dl::J~il9~ ffiOyeffiel9t of ~ecel9tly i~~asiates fl::Jel asseffihlies, if tl'le nEll::Ji ~es i 19of3e~ael e P4CR/ESGR EVS t~ai 19 caMot-ee-~~

~~~esto~es to OPERABLE statl::JS ~itl'lil9 tl'le ~eEll::Ji~es CSffif3letiol9 Tiffie, two ~eEll::Ji~es MCR!ESGR EVS t~ail9s a~e il9of3e~aele, O~~~

ORe O~ ffio~e MCR!ESGR EVS t~ail9s a~e il9of3e~aele Sl::Jf to al9 il9of3e~aele MCR/ESGR el9yelof3e eOl::Jl9sa~y actiol9 ffil::JSt ee takeR to iffiffiesiately Sl::JSf3e19s activities tl'lat cOl::Jls ~esl::Jlt il9 a

~elease of ~asioactivity tl'lat ffii~l'lt ~eEll::Ji~e isolatiol9 of tl'le P4CR/ESGR el9velof3e. Tl'lis f3laces tl'le l::Jl9it il9 a cOl9sitiol9 tl'lat ffiiRiffiizes ~isk. Tl'lis soes Rot f3~ecll::Jse tl'le ffiOVeffieftt of fl::Jel to a safe f3ositioR.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.14.1 REQU IRD4ENTS StaRsey systeffis sl'lol::Jls ee cl'leckes f3e~iosically to eRSl::J~e tl'lat tl'ley fl::JRCtioR f3~of3e~ly. As tl'le eRvi~oRffieRt afis RO~ffial of3e~atiR§ CORsitioRS OR tl'le MCR/ESGR EVS a~e ROt too seve~e, testiR§ eacl'l ~eEll::Ji~es t~aiR ol9ce eve~y ffiORtl'l f3~ovises aR aseEll::Jate cl'leck of tl'lis systeffi. MOl9tl'lly I'leate~ of3e~atiol9s s~y Ol::Jt aRy ffioi stl::J~e accl::Jffil::Jl ates i 19 tl'le cl'la~coal al9s II+EPA--

filte~s f~offi l'll::Jffiisity il9 tl'le affieiel9t ai~. Eacl'l ~eql::Ji~es t~ail9 ffil::JSt se of3e~ates to~ > 10 cOl9til9l::Jol::JS I'lOl::J~S ~itl'l tl'le I'leate~s elge~~izes. Tl'le 31 say F~eEll::Jel9cy is eases SI9 tl'le

~~~eliasility of tl'le eEll::Jif3ffie19t al9s tl'le ORe t~ail9 ~e~l::Jl9sal9cy a'tai 1aei 1i ty.~~

~~SR 3.7.14.2 Tl'lis SR ve~ifies tl'lat tl'le ~eEll::Ji~es MCR/ESGR EVS testiR~ is f3erfo~ffies il9 acco~sal9ce witl'l tl'le Vel9tilatioR Filte~ TestiR~~~

P~o~~affi (VFTP). Tl'le VFTP il9cll::Jses testil9~ tl'le f3e~fO~ffiaRce of tl'1e deffii ste~ ti 1tel", IIEPA ti 1tete, cl'1al"coal adsel"se-r-efficiel9cy, ffiil9iffil::Jffi aRs ffiaxiffil::Jffi flow ~ate, al9s tl'le f3l'lysical f3~ef3e~ties et tl'le activates cl'la~coal. Sf3ecific te~

~~F~eEll::JeRCies al9s assitiol9al iRfo~ffiatiol9 a~e siscl::Jsses il9 setai 1 i 19 He VFTP.~~

SR 3.7.14.3 Tl'lis SR ve~ifies tl'le OPERABILITY of tl'le MCR/ESGR el9velof3e eOl::Jl9sa~y ey testiR~ fo~ l::JRfilte~es ai~ il9leaka~ef3ast tl'le P4CR/ESGR el9yel of3e eel::JRSa~y al9s i I9tO tl'le P4CR/ESGR el9vel ef3e.

~~Tl'le setails ef tl'le testiR~ a~e sf3ecifies il9 tl'le MCR/ESGR EI9'lel ef3e Ilasi tasi 1i ty P~o~~affi.~~

~~(col9ti Rl::Jes)~~
North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.14-6
MCR/ESGR EVS-During Movement of Recently Irradiated Fuel Assemblies B 3.7.14 BASES SURVEI LLANCE SR 3.7.14.3 (eeMtiM~es)
REQUIRD~ENTS T~e MCR/ESGR eMvele~e is eeMsiseres ~a~ita~le w~eM t~e rasiele§ieal sese te MCR/ESGR eMvele~e eee~paMts eale~lates iM t~e lieeMsiM§ ~asis aMalyses ef DBA eeMse~~eMees is Me ffiere t~aM 5 reffi tetal effeetive sese e~~ivaleMt aMs t~e MCR/ESGR eMvele~e eee~~aMts are ~reteetes freffi ~azarse~s e~effiieals aMs sffieke. T~is SR verifies t~at t~e ~Mfilteres air iMleaka§e iMte t~e MCR/ESGR eMvele~e is Me §reater t~aM t~e flew rate aSS~ffies iM t~e lieeMsiM§ ~asis aMalyses ef DBA eeMse~~eMees. W~eM ~Mfilteres air iMleaka§e is §reater t~aM He ass~ffies fl mi rate, CeMsiti eM B ffi~St be eMteres. Re~~i res AetieM B re~~ires s~s~eMsiMg t~e ffieveffieMt ef reeeMtly irrasiates f~el asseffi~lies iffiffiesiately te res~ee t~e risk ef ex~es~re te t~e ~~CR/ESGR eMvele~e eee~~aMts s~riM§ a f~el
~aMsiMg aeeiseMt.
REFERENCES f7 UFSAR, SeetieM 6.4.
~ 10 CFR 50, A~~eMsix A.
37 NUREG 0800, Rev. 2, J~ly 1981.
40 UFSAR, C~a~ter 15.
5-:- CeMtrel Reeffi lIa~ita~ility St~sy (S~~~leffieMt te 1980 OMsi te CeMtrel Reeffi Ila~i ta~i 1i ty St~sy Nert~ AMM Pewer StatieM UMits 1 aMs 2, JaM~ary 1982.
67 Reg~latery G~ise 1.196.
~~j-;. NEI 99 03, "CeMtrel Reeffi Ila~itability AssessffieMt,"~~
J~Me 2001.
&:- Letter freffi Eri e J. Leess (NRC) te Jaffies \L Davi 5 (NEI) sates JaM~ary 30, 2004, "NEI Draft W~ite Pa~er, Use ef GeMerie Letter 91 18 Preeess aMs AlterMative Se~ree TerffiS i Mt~e CeMtext ef CeMtrel Reeffi lIabi tabi 1i ty. (ADA~~S II AeeessieM Ne. ML040300694).
9-;- Letter freffi L. N. Ilartz (Vi rgi Mi a El eetri e aMs Pe\ier Ceffi~aMY) te t~e USNRC, sates Mare~ 3, 2004, Res~eMse te GeMeri e Letter 2003 01, CeMtrel Reeffi lIa~ita~il i ty II CeMtrel Reeffi Testi Mg & Tee~Mi eal IMferffiati eM. II North Anna Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.14-7

v t e Letter Sequence Request
TAC:MD8354, (Open)
Initiation Request Acceptance... Administration Questions 24 September 2008 Answers Results Approval... Other:
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ML080800364

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