ML042940715
| ML042940715 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/18/2004 |
| From: | Landis K NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | Christian D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| IR-04-004 | |
| Download: ML042940715 (34) | |
See also: IR 05000280/2004004
Text
October 18, 2004
Virginia Electric and Power Company
ATTN: Mr. David A. Christian
Sr. Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Innsbrook Technical Center - 2SW
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711
SUBJECT:
SURRY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
5000280/2004004, AND 5000281/2004004
Dear Mr. Christian:
On September 25, 2004, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed
an inspection at your Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection
report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 12, 2004, with Mr.
Blount and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
This report documents one NRC identified finding. The finding was determined to involve a
violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and
because the violation was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the
finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement
Policy. Additionally, two licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low
safety significance (Green) are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report. If you contest any non-
cited violation in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this
inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to
the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident
Inspector at the Surry Power Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
2
NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kerry D. Landis, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281
Enclosure:
Integrated Inspection Report 5000280,281/2004004 w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information
cc w/encl:
Chris L. Funderburk, Director
Nuclear Licensing and
Operations Support
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Richard H. Blount, II
Site Vice President
Surry Power Station
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Virginia State Corporation Commission
Division of Energy Regulation
P. O. Box 1197
Richmond, VA 23209
Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.
Senior Counsel
Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
Attorney General
Supreme Court Building
900 East Main Street
Richmond, VA 23219
3
Distribution w/encl:
S. Monarque, NRR
L. Slack, RII EICS
RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB
PUBLIC
OFFICE
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SIGNATURE
NXG
GJM1
WTL for
WTL
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NAME
NGarrett
GMcCoy
DArnett
LGarner
ETesta
WLoo
BDesai
DATE
10/18/2004
10/18/2004
10/15/2004
10/14/2004
10/14/2004
10/15/2004
E-MAIL COPY?
YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
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PUBLIC DOCUMENT
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\ORPCheckout\\FileNET\\ML042940715.wpd
Enclosure
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281
Report Nos.:
5000280/2004004, 5000281/2004004
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Facility:
Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2
Location:
5850 Hog Island Road
Surry, VA 23883
Dates:
June 27 - September 25, 2004
Inspectors:
N. Garrett, Senior Resident Inspector
G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Arnett, Resident Inspector
L. Garner, Senior Project Engineer
E. Testa, Senior Radiation Protection Inspector (Sections 2OS1and 3,
2PS1and 3, 4OA1,5,and 7)
W. Loo, Senior Radiation Protection Inspector (Sections 2OS1and 3,
2PS1and 3, 4OA1,5,and 7)
Approved by: K. Landis, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000280/2004004, IR 05000281/2004004, 6/27/2004 - 9/25/2004, Virginia Electric and
Power Co.; Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2, Routine Integrated Inspection.
The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors, a senior project
engineer, and an announced inspection by two senior radiation protection inspectors. One
Green non-cited violation (NCV) and two licensee identified violations were identified. The
significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply
may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A.
NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
Green. The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) which
requires the licensee to implement and maintain a respiratory protection program
that includes written procedures regarding training of respirator users. In
addition, this was related to the emergency planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) (10). Specifically, procedures were not in place to ensure that all
Control Room staff had demonstrated proficiency in changing Self Contained
Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) air cylinders during emergencies.
This finding is greater than minor because emergency workers who are required
to use respiratory protective equipment are not trained to use that equipment.
This finding is of very low safety significance because an adequate number of
SCBA qualified plant personnel/staff, which were designated emergency
responders, would have been available to respond in the event of an actual
emergency (Section 2OS3).
B.
Licensee-Identified Violations
Two violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee have
been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee
have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and
corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 and Unit 2 operated at or near rated power the entire reporting period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01
Adverse Weather Protection
.1
Hurricane Preparations
a. Inspection Scope
On July 19, 2004, early in the hurricane season, inspectors conducted a tour of all the
owner-controlled area. The purpose of the tour was to evaluate the licensees
preparedness for high winds and hurricane conditions well in advance of the approach
of any hurricanes. Emphasis was placed on the identification of any loose material
which would become airborne hazards to either the plant or the switchyard during high
winds. Inspectors toured the low level intake, the construction buildings, the sewage
treatment plant, the area outside the warehouse, and the vicinity of the gas turbines at
Gravel Neck.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2
Hurricane Charlie Preparations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the adverse weather preparation
procedures and compensatory measures prior to the arrival of Hurricane Charlie.
Inspectors reviewed Operations Checklist (OC) 21 Severe Weather Checklist,
Abnormal Procedure (AP) 37.01 Abnormal Environmental Conditions, and the
Dominion Hurricane Response Plan (Nuclear) (HRP-N). Inspectors assured that vital
systems and components were protected from high winds and flooding associated with
hurricanes. Additionally, the inspectors conducted walkdowns of the plant to check for
any vulnerabilities, such as inadequate sealing of water tight penetrations, inoperable
sump pumps, and other sources of potential internal and external flooding.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2
1R04
Equipment Alignment
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems to verify correct
system alignment. The inspectors checked for correct valve and electrical power
alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and breakers to the procedures
and drawings listed in the Attachment.
Unit 2 low head safety injection (LHSI) pump 2-SI-P-1B while LHSI pump 2-SI-P-
1A was tagged out for maintenance
Unit 1 motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps, 1-FW-P-3A and -3B
while the turbine drive auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump, 1-FW-P-2 was
tagged out for a modification and maintenance
Unit 2 MDAFW pumps, 2-FW-P-3A and -3B while the TDAFW pump, 2-FW-P-2
was tagged out for a modification and maintenance
Number 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) and number 3 EDG, 2-EE-EG-1
and 3-EE-EG-1 while number 1, EDG, 1-EE-EG-1 was tagged out for planned
maintenance.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05
Fire Protection
.1
Fire Area Walkdowns
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors toured eight risk significant areas to assess the adequacy of the fire
protection program implementation. The inspectors checked for the control of transient
combustibles and assessed the condition of the fire detection and fire suppression
systems using SPS Appendix R Report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed 0-FS-FP-
116, Loss Prevention Strategy to verify the necessary fire fighting equipment was in
place for the following areas:
Black battery house
Mechanical equipment room (MER) # 3
MER # 5
Fuel building
Unit 1 safeguards
MER # 1
Number 3 EDG room
Main control room
3
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06
Flood Protection Measures
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the
Individual Plant Examination of Non-Seismic External Events and Fires for analyzed
external and internal flooding events. Walkdowns were performed of the turbine
building internal and external walls to review compliance with external flooding. To
review internal flooding preparation, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 0-MPM-
1900-01, Periodic Inspection of Flood and Spill Protection Dikes, Dams, and Expansion
Joint Shields. In addition, the inspectors walked down various expansion joint throttle
shields in the turbine building and flood and spill control dams in the turbine and service
building. The inspectors compared observed equipment condition and documented
system deficiencies to determine system readiness for prevention of internal flooding.
The inspectors reviewed completed preventative maintenance and surveillance records
for the turbine building sump pump testing, station flood detection testing equipment,
and floor drain back water stop valve replacement. The documents reviewed are listed
in the Attachment of the report.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07
Heat Sink Performance
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the condition of the Unit 1 component cooling (CC) heat
exchangers, 1-CC-E-1A. The inspectors discussed the heat exchanger performance
monitoring program and historical heat exchanger performance with engineering
personnel. The inspectors reviewed the results of surveillance procedure 1-OSP-SW-
002, Measurement of Macrofouling Blockage of Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 1-
CC-E-1A. The inspector observed the condition of the 1A heat exchanger before and
after performance of tube scraping. The documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment of the report.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4
1R11
Licensed Operator Requalification Program
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed licensed operator performance during simulator training
session RQ-04.6-SP-1:PMS to determine whether the operators:
were familiar with and could successfully implement the procedures associated
with recognizing and recovering from a ruptured and faulted steam generator
with loss of unit 1 power;
recognized the high-risk actions in those procedures; and,
were familiar with related industry operating experiences.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12
Maintenance Effectiveness
a.
Inspection Scope
For the two equipment issues described in the plant issues listed below, the inspectors
evaluated the licensees effectiveness of the corresponding preventive and corrective
maintenance. For each selected item below, the inspectors performed a detailed review
of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition
reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work
practice problem. Inspectors performed walkdown of the accessible portions of the
system, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held
discussions with system engineers. Inspectors compared the licensees actions with the
requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), VPAP 0815, Maintenance Rule
Program, and the Surry Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria Matrix.
The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment of the report.
Component Cooling Chillers and
Charging Pump Service Water
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following six Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below
to verify the adequacy, accuracy, and completeness of plant risk assessments
performed prior to changes in plant configuration for maintenance activities or in
response to emergent conditions. When applicable, inspectors assessed if the licensee
5
entered the appropriate risk category in accordance with plant procedures. Specifically,
the inspectors reviewed:
POD for Week of 6/27 - 7/2, including failure of 1EP-BC-UPS-1A2
POD for Week of 7/24 - 30, including failure of 1-EE-P-1D, Unit 1 EDG fuel oil
transfer pump
POD for Week of 8/21-27, including extended outage time for 1-EE-EG-1, Unit 1
POD for Week 8/28 - 9/3
POD for Week 9/4 - 10
POD for Week 9/18 - 24, including declaration of main control room and auxiliary
building systems emergency ventilation out of service
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15
Operability Evaluations
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of five operability evaluations to
ensure that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system
remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The operability
evaluations were described in the plant issues listed below:
Plant Issue S-2004-2531, During quarterly performance test, number 2 EDG
speed could not be reduced below 935 rpm.
Plant Issue S-2004-2575, During leak test, 1-VS-FL-3B, charcoal filters failed to
prevent minimum bypass leakrate.
Plant Issue S-2004-2821, During monthly run, 1-SW-P-1B, emergency service
water pump (ESW) developed a coolant leak between the support plate and the
engine.
Plant Issue S-2004-2938, After receiving an annunciator, it was discovered that
the unit 2 uninteruptable power supply had switched to its alternate power supply
for an unknown reason.
Plant Issue S-2004-2935, 1-VS-E-4D, main control room chiller tripped due to a
condenser leak.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19
Post Maintenance Testing
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed five post maintenance test procedures and activities associated
with the repair or replacement of the following components to determine whether the
6
procedures and test activities were adequate to verify operability and functional
capability following maintenance of the following equipment:
Work Order (WO) 513031-02, Inspect and repair 1-CH-P-1C motor leads,
WO 515181-01, Replacement of Unit 1 plant protection relay PRB-YB,
WO 515598-01, Coolant leak found on B ESW Pump
WO 517518-02 thru -07, Adjust relays for 1-EE-EG-1, Unit 1 EDG start
sequence
WO 517385-01, Damper failed to close during 0-OPT-VS-007
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22
Surveillance Testing
a.
Inspection Scope
For the seven surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test
procedure and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine
whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was
functional and operable:
Surveillance Tests
0-NSP-CW-001, High Level Intake Structure Canal Probes Inspection
0-OP-4.2, Receipt and Storage of New Fuel
1-OPT-RX-006, Rod Position Verification Using the Incore Flux Mapping System
1-OPT-EG-008, Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Sequence Test
In-Service Test
0-OPT-EG-001, Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Start Exercise
Test
2-OPT-CH-003, Charging Pump Operability and Performance Test for 2-CH-P-
1C
Reactor Coolant Leakage Test
1-OPT-RC-10.0, Reactor Leakage - Computer Calculated
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
7
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6
Drill Evaluation
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed an unannounced emergency response training drill conducted
on August 25, 2004, to assess the licensees performance in emergency classification,
notification, and protective action recommendation development. This drill included the
response actions taken by the shift operating crew in the simulator as well as the
management team in the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility.
This drill evaluation will contribute to the Emergency Response Performance Indicator
statistics.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety (PS)
2OS1 Access Controls To Radiologically Significant Areas
a.
Inspection Scope
Access Controls
During the inspection the licensees program activities for monitoring workers and
controlling their access to radiologically significant areas and tasks were evaluated. The
inspectors evaluated the adequacy of procedural guidance, directly observed
implementation of administrative and physical controls, and assessed resultant worker
exposures to radiation and radioactive material.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees procedures for posting, surveying, and
controlling access to radiation areas, high radiation areas, and very high radiation areas,
against the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. During tours conducted June 7-9, 2004,
the inspectors evaluated radiological postings and barricades against the current
radiological surveys in areas of the auxiliary buildings to determine the appropriateness
of the established radiological controls. In addition, the inspectors independently
verified the dose rates recorded on current survey maps at various locations in plant
areas. General area dose rates were compared to licensee survey records. The
inspectors observed HP technician proficiency in performing and documenting the
radiation surveys for observed activities.
Access controls for locked high radiation areas were reviewed and discussed with
radiation protection management and supervision. The inspectors directly inspected the
licensees designated locked doors locations and reviewed documentation to verify the
8
condition and status of the locked doors. The inspectors also evaluated implementation
of key controls and postings for very high radiation areas (VHRAs) and locked high
radiation areas.
The inspectors observed radiological significant work areas within radiation areas and
high radiation areas as well as the spent fuel pool storage area. The licensees physical
and program controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored
within the spent fuel pool were also reviewed with licensee representatives. The
inspectors conducted independent radiological surveys of selected plant areas and
compared the results to the licensees surveys. Radiological postings and barricade
requirements were evaluated for the observed areas.
The inspectors reviewed the extent of airborne radiological hazards and associated
controls. Airborne radiological areas and resulting internal exposures since the last
NRC inspection were reviewed with the licensees technical staff. During observation of
selected tasks, the use of engineering controls to minimize airborne radioactivity was
evaluated
Radiation Protection (RP) program activities and their implementation were evaluated
against 10 CFR 19.12; 10 CFR Part 20; the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR) details in Section 12, RP; Technical Specification (TS), Section 6.4; and
approved licensee procedures. Licensee documents, records, and data reviewed within
this inspection area are listed in Section 2OS1 of the report Attachment.
Problem Identification and Resolution
Issues identified through RP departmental self-assessments and Corrective Action
Program (CAP) documents associated with radiological controls, personnel monitoring,
and exposure assessments were reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee
representatives. The inspectors assessed the licensees ability to resolve the issues
identified in this RP program area. Specific assessments and Plant Issue documents
reviewed and evaluated in detail for this inspection area are identified in Section 2OS1
of the report Attachment.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment
a.
Inspection Scope
Radiation Monitoring
During the inspection, the operability, availability, and reliability of selected area
radiation monitor (ARM) and continuous air monitor (CAM) equipment used for routine
and accident monitoring activities were reviewed and evaluated. The inspectors
observed material condition, installed configurations (where accessible), and results of
9
performance checks for selected ARMs and CAMs. The monitors which were inspected
are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
Program guidance, performance activities, and equipment material condition for the
direct radiation detection instrumentation and continuous air sampling equipment were
reviewed against details documented in TS, 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50, UFSAR
Chapter 11, and applicable procedures. Radiation detection and sampling equipment
required for use in accident monitoring also were reviewed against applicable sections
of NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements; and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess
Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident, Revision (Rev.) 3.
Licensee guidance documents, records, and data reviewed within this inspection area
are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
Personnel Survey Instrumentation
Current program guidance, including calibration and operation procedures, and its
implementation to maintain operability and accuracy of selected portable survey
instruments was reviewed and evaluated. The inspectors reviewed current calibration
data for selected personnel survey instruments and assessed operability of various
portable survey instruments staged or in use by the Health Physics (HP) staff.
Responsible staffs knowledge and proficiency regarding portable survey
instrumentation calibration activities were evaluated through interviews, record reviews,
and direct observation of daily performance checks of a Model RO-2A portable survey
instrument and a Teletector Model 6112B. The accuracy and operability determinations
for instrumentation used to perform surveys in high radiation or greater areas were
assessed.
Operability and analysis capabilities of the Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM)-1C
equipment and portal monitor (PM)-7 employed for surveys of individuals exiting the
radiologically controlled area (RCA) were evaluated. The inspectors examined current
calibration and selected performance check data, and directly observed daily functional
checks of one of each of the monitors.
Licensee activities associated with personnel radiation monitoring instrumentation were
reviewed against TS, 10 CFR 20.1501, and applicable licensee procedures listed in
Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
Respiratory Protection - Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)
The licensees respiratory protection program guidance and its implementation for
SCBA equipment use were evaluated. The SCBA units staged for Control Room
emergency use were inspected for material condition, air pressure, and number of units
available. Cognizant Control Room operations personnel were interviewed to determine
their knowledge of available SCBA equipment locations, proper use, and availability of
prescription lens inserts, if required.
Licensee activities associated with maintenance and use of SCBA equipment were
reviewed against TS; 10 CFR Part 20.1703; UFSAR Chapter 11; Emergency Plan
10
commitments; RG 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection, Rev. 1,
October 1999; ANSI-Z88.2-1992, American National Standard Practices for Respiratory
Protection; and applicable procedures listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
Problem Identification and Resolution
Selected licensee PI documents associated with ARMs and CAMs, portable radiation
detection instrumentation, and respiratory protection program activities were reviewed
and assessed. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize,
prioritize, and resolve the identified issues. Specific documents reviewed and evaluated
are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
b.
Findings
(Closed) URI 50-280, 281/2002003-01: Adequacy of procedures for the self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA) training program in that all designated users were not
required to demonstrate proficiency in changing SCBA air cylinders or backpacks.
Introduction. A Green NCV of 10 CFR 20.1703(e) was identified for the failure to
establish and implement adequate written procedures to train emergency workers on
respiratory protective equipment. This finding is also related to the emergency planning
standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Specifically, the licensees written and implemented
SCBA training program was incomplete in that it did not assure that all Control Room
staff demonstrate proficiency in the change out SCBA air cylinders during emergencies.
Description.
During the previous inspection in this program area (NRC Inspection Report 050-280,
281/2002003) the inspectors determined, through interviews with select Control Room
personnel and training supervisors, that not all Control Room staff were required to
demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders or backpacks. Specific
hands-on training in this area was provided to personnel trained for Fire Brigade, which
did not include all Senior Reactor Operators. Interviews with Control Room staff
regarding changing out air cylinders during an emergency yielded inconsistent
responses on bottle and/or pack replacement. This issue was entered into the
licensees Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Plant Issue S-2002-2768.
Analysis. During this inspection the inspectors determined that the licensees training in
the use of SCBAs did not require instruction of all SCBA qualified personnel, e.g.,
Senior Reactor Operators who were not fire brigade members, to demonstrate
proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders during emergencies. From a review
of select training records and discussions with cognizant licensee training and Control
Room representatives, the inspectors determined that the licensee had implemented
several training program changes to ensure that all worker disciplines with emergency
response workers demonstrate the change out of SCBA air cylinders. The licensees
continuing training program specifically included hands on training that individuals
demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders. This finding is greater
than minor because emergency workers who are required to use respiratory protective
equipment are not trained to use that equipment. This finding is of very low safety
11
significance because an adequate number of SCBA qualified plant personnel/staff,
which were designated emergency responders, would have been available to respond in
the event of an actual emergency. Therefore, the issue did not result in the failure to
meet a planning standard.
Enforcement. 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) requires that the licensee implement and
maintain a respiratory protection program that includes written procedures regarding
training of respirator users. Contrary to the above, as of August 19, 2002, the licensee
had not established and implemented adequate written procedures for training respirator
users. Specifically, the licensees written and implemented SCBA training program was
incomplete in that it did not assure that all designated SCBA users were required to
demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders. Because the failure to
train all Control Room staff in the use of respiratory protective equipment is of very low
safety significance and was entered into the CAP (Plant Issue S-2002-2768), this
violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section IV.A.1 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000280, 281/2004004-001: Failure to Implement and
Maintain a Respiratory Protection Program That Includes Written Procedures Regarding
Training of Respirator Users in Demonstrating Proficiency in the Change Out of SCBA
Air Cylinders.
2PS1
Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Monitoring Systems
a.
Inspection Scope
Radioactive Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems
The licensees Radioactive Effluent Release Report for Calendar Years (CY) 2002 and
2003 was reviewed and discussed. Report format, the radionuclides and quantities
released in liquid and gaseous effluents, and resultant doses to the public were
evaluated against applicable regulations. The inspectors reviewed the recent changes
to Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) and evaluated whether those changes were
technically justified and consistent with the regulatory guidance.
The inspectors toured the Surry Radwaste Facility (SRF) and assessed major
radioactive effluent process and monitoring equipment against descriptions documented
in the UFSAR and the ODCM. The material condition and operability of select SRF
liquid effluent monitors and ventilation stack gaseous effluent monitors were evaluated.
Compensatory sampling and analyses for three randomly selected effluent monitors
which were out-of-service at various times during the previous twelve months were
assessed. The inspectors reviewed the most recent calibration data for select effluent
monitors, a gaseous effluent sample flow rate monitor, and one gamma spectroscopic
instrument in the count room. Results of inter-laboratory comparisons for calendar
years 2002 and 2003 for samples typical of plant effluents were reviewed and evaluated.
During the inspection, the inspectors observed sampling and analysis of select
ventilation stack gaseous effluents in accordance with licensee release permit. The
inspectors assessed adherence to procedures and to dose limits for that release.
License procedures and activities related to plant effluents were evaluated for
consistency with TS; ODCM; UFSAR Chapter 11.0, Radioactive Wastes and Radiation
12
Protection; 10 CFR 20.1302, 10 CFR 50.36a, and Appendix I to 10 CFR 50; RG 1.109,
Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the
Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I; RG 4.15, Quality
Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams
and the Environment, December 1977; and NUREG-0133. Licensee plant effluent
related procedures, reports and records reviewed during the inspection are listed in
Section 2PS1 of the report Attachment.
Problem Identification and Resolution
The most recent audit of the effluent monitoring program and the Plant Issues
generated in response to the audit findings were selected for detailed evaluation and are
listed in Section 2PS1 of the report Attachment. The inspectors assessed the licensees
ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2PS3
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)
a.
Inspection Scope
Environmental Monitoring
The inspectors toured selected REMP air sampling equipment and direct radiation
monitoring stations. Inspectors observed verification/collection of eight weekly
particulate and charcoal samples, and assessed material condition of air sampling
monitoring equipment. The inspectors verified the location of forty three (43)
thermoluminescence dosimeter (TLD) locations including three control locations.
Calibration records for environmental air samplers were reviewed.
The inspectors reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel the results published in
the Surry Annual Radiological Environmental Operating report for CYs 2002 and 2003
and the land use census report for CY 2003. The inspectors reviewed and discussed a
quality assurance audit of the current vendor laboratory activities conducted by another
utility and documented as an Attachment to the most recent Environmental Operating
report.
The inspectors reviewed the operability of the meteorological monitoring equipment and
operator access to meteorological data. Current meteorological monitoring equipment
performance and calibration were reviewed with the system engineer. Licensee
technicians primarily responsible for equipment maintenance and surveillance were
interviewed by the inspectors concerning equipment performance, reliability and routine
inspections.
REMP guidance, implementation, and results were reviewed against TS; 10 CFR Parts 20 and Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 design criteria requirements; UFSAR details;
ODCM guidance; and applicable procedures listed in Section 2PS3 of the Attachment to
13
this report. Specific laboratory QC activities were evaluated against RG 1.21,
Measuring, Evaluating and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of
Radioactive Materials In Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water Cooled Nuclear
Power Plant, June 1974; and RG 4.15, Quality Assurance for Radiological Monitoring
Programs (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams and the Environment, December 1977.
The meteorological program implementation and activities were reviewed against
10 CFR Part 20, TS, UFSAR, ODCM, Safety Guide 23, and applicable procedures
documented in Section 2PS3 of the report Attachment.
Unrestricted Release of Materials from the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA)
The inspectors reviewed selected program procedures and observed surveys of
potentially contaminated materials released from the RCA to assess the licensees
effectiveness in preventing the improper release of radioactive material for unrestricted
use. The radionuclides identified within recent waste stream analyses were compared
against current calibration source radionuclide types and results to evaluate the
appropriateness and accuracy of release survey instrumentation. Licensee data to
evaluate survey requirements for hard-to-detect radionuclides were reviewed and
discussed with responsible personnel.
The licensee practices and implementation of their monitoring activities were evaluated
against 10 CFR Part 20, TS, UFSAR, and applicable procedures documented in the
Section 2PS3 of the report Attachment.
Problem Identification and Resolution
The most recent audit of the effluent monitoring program and the Plant Issues
generated in response to the audit findings were selected for detailed evaluation and are
listed in Section 2PS3 of the report Attachment.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1
Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Performance Indicator
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Unplanned Power Changes per 7000
Critical Hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors
reviewed this performance indicator from the third quarter of 2003 through the second
quarter of 2004. Inspectors evaluated whether the performance indicator was
calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory
14
Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. Documents reviewed included
applicable monthly operating reports, licensee event reports, and operator logs.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2
Safety System Functional Failure Performance Indicator
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Safety System Functional Failure
performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed this
performance indicator from the third quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of
2004. Inspectors evaluated whether the performance indicator was calculated in
accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
Performance Indicator Guideline. Documents reviewed included applicable monthly
operating reports, licensee event reports and operator logs.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3
Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal Performance Indicator
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat
Removal performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed
this performance indicator from the third quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of
2004. Inspectors evaluated whether the performance indicator was calculated in
accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
Performance Indicator Guideline. Documents reviewed included applicable monthly
operating reports, licensee event reports, Integrated inspection reports and operator
logs.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4
Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Occupational Exposure Control
Effectiveness PI for the period from December 2003 through August 2004. To verify the
accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance
contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
Rev. 2, were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.
15
The inspectors reviewed Plant Issue records generated from December 2003 through
August 2004 to ensure that radiological occurrences were properly classified per NEI 99-02. The inspectors also reviewed electronic dosimeter alarm logs, radioactive
material intake records, and monthly PI reports for CY 2004. In addition, licensee
procedural guidance for classifying and reporting PI events was evaluated. Reviewed
documents are listed in Section 4OA1 of the report Attachment.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5
RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluents Occurrence
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed records used by the licensee to identify occurrences of
quarterly doses from liquid and gaseous effluents in excess of the values specified in
NEI 99-02 guidance. Those records included monthly effluent dose calculations for CY
2004. The inspectors also interviewed licensee personnel that were responsible for
collecting and reporting the PI data. In addition, licensee procedural guidance for
classifying and reporting PI events was evaluated. Reviewed documents are listed in
Section 4OA5 of the report Attachment.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1
Daily Review of Plant Issues
a.
Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,
and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the
licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by a daily review of
hard copies of each plant issue and attending the daily Plant Issue Review Team
meeting.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
16
.2
Detailed Review of Individual Issues
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the failure of a power cable termination
for the 1G transformer in March 2004 and the 2G transformer in May 2004. The issues
are documented in the corrective action program as Plant Issues S-2004-0876 and S-
2004-2306 respectively. The review was performed to ensure the full extent of the issue
was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective
actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the plant issues against
the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as delineated in Station
Administrative Procedure VPAP-1601, Corrective Action, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
b.
Findings and Observations
No findings of regulatory significance were identified. The licensee performed an
apparent cause and a maintenance rule evaluation for each loss of the 1G and 2G bus.
In March 2004, one termination to the 1G transformer failed. The transformer was
supplied 4160 volts by a combination of underground and overhead lines from the main
switchyard to the low level intake area. The termination that failed had been in service
since 1994. The 1G failure root cause was determined to be workmanship in that the
assembly documents were not followed correctly. The corrective action consisted of
repairing the failed connector and writing a work order to remake the remaining five
terminations. In May 2004, a terminator on the 2G line to the low level area failed. This
was a new underground line installed to protect the low level intake power supply from
severe weather and animals. The 2G line had been in service approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />
when failure occurred. The licensee determined the root cause was workmanship in
that the assembly documents were not followed correctly. The corrective actions
specified were to repair the failed connector and develop and implement a special
procedure to return the power supply to service. The 2G apparent cause did not
address the need for a plant procedure for assembly of the terminations, however, the
maintenance rule evaluation included an assignment to develop a procedure with
appropriate inspection points. The 2G failure occurred within three months of the 1G
failure with the same root cause. The licensee did not view this as repetitive and did not
address corrective actions to prevent workmanship issues in the apparent cause
corrective actions. This is a Minor Finding that does not have regulatory significance.
The 1G and 2G transformers are non-safety related. The loss of the 1G or 2G
transformer is a transient initiator and the transformers are included in the maintenance
rule. Due to the unique design of the Surry intake canal the loss of one transformer
does not have an immediate impact on decay heat removal.
c.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
17
4OA3 Event Follow-up
.1
(Closed) LER 05000281/2003001-00, Electrical Conduit Bushing Failure Resulting in a
A Unit 2 reactor trip and resulting engineering safety feature activations on Unit 1 and 2
were attributed to a failed insulating conduit busing connection. The failed bushing
allowed damage to the Unit 2 main generator protective circuitry wiring which resulted in
the protective circuit actuating. The inspectors reviewed the licensee root cause
evaluation S-2003-03599 and corrective action taken and planned to be taken. The root
cause evaluation properly identified the root and contributing causes to be the bushing
failure and the corrective actions should be sufficient to preclude a similar event on
either Unit 1 or 2.
.2
(Closed) LER 05000280/2003002-00, Manual Steam Generator Level Control Results in
Power Ascension Reactor Trip.
The supplement LER 05000280/2003002-10 inspection activity documented in NRC
Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000280/2004009 sufficiently addressed the
original LER.
.3
(Closed) LERs 05000280, 281/2003004-00 and 05000280, 281/2003004-01, Manual Reactor Trips due to Loss of All Circulating Water Pumps.
These LERs are associated with the manual trip of both units due to the loss of all
circulating water pumps during Hurricane Isabel. The LERs also report the automatic
safety feature actuations that occurred as a result of the trips. The inspectors reviewed
Plant Issue S-2003-4165 and associated documents which document the events,
response of plant equipment, root and contributing cause evaluation results and
corrective actions. NRC Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000280/2004009
concluded that the planned actions for loss of power to the circulating water pumps was
appropriate. During the inspection, the inspectors verified that the licensee had
completed actions to install underground power cables to the transformers which
supplied power to the pumps. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee evaluation
concerning tripping of two of the emergency service water pumps during the event. The
inspectors agreed with the licencees cause determinations and actions taken to prevent
similar emergency service water pump trips in the future.
.4
(Closed) Apparent Violation (AV) 05000280, 281/2003008-002: Alternative Shutdown
Capability and Response Procedures Not Adequate to Ensure Safe Shutdown of Unit 1
and URI 05000281/2003008-001: Fire Response Procedures 2-FCA-4.00 And 0-FCA-
14.00 Not Adequate To Ensure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 2
The Final Significance Determination associated with the AV and the URI was issued in
a letter dated September 15, 2004. This issue regarding Surry fire response procedures
that were not effective in ensuring a safe shutdown of a unit following postulated fires
was determined to be a White finding and will be tracked as VIO 05000280,
281/2004008-001, Alternative Shutdown Capability and Response Procedures Not
Adequate to Ensure Safe Shutdown.
18
4OA5 Other Activities
.1
(Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/156, Offsite Power System Operational
Readiness
The inspectors have completed all onsite inspection as documented in NRC inspection
report 05000280,281/2004003, paragraph 4OA5.4. Consequently, based on completion
of the onsite review, this TI is closed. All further inspection related activities will
originate with NRC headquarters staff.
.2
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
Access controls and surveillance results for the licensees ISFSI activities were
evaluated. The evaluation included review of ISFSI radiation control surveillance
procedures and assessment of ISFSI radiological surveillance data. The inspectors
toured the ISFSI facilities and observed access controls, TLD locations and condition,
and radiological postings on the perimeter security fence. The inspectors conducted
independent radiation surveys of the Pad 1 cask and Pad 2 general area and compared
the data with licensee survey results.
Program guidance, access controls, postings, equipment material condition and
surveillance data results were reviewed against details documented in applicable
sections of the UFSAR, TS; 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72, and applicable licensee
procedures. Licensee guidance documents, records, and data reviewed within this
inspection area are listed in Section 4OA5 of the report Attachment.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
.1
Exit Meeting Summary
On October 12, 2004, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.
Blount and other members of his staff who acknowledge the findings.
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined
during the inspection.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violations of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the
licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI.A
of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.
Technical Specification 6.4.B requires that procedures for personnel radiation
protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20
19
and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving
personnel radiation exposure. Section 6.2.2, titled Plant Access Training to
Procedure VPAP-2101 titled Radiation Protection Program,states, in part, that
individuals who have completed only Plant Access Training shall not be allowed
unescorted access into an RCA unless Access Authorization to RCA for
Visitors/Non-Radiation Worker is completed and shall not perform any physical
work in the RCA. Furthermore, Section 6.8.1 titled Supervision and Monitoring
of Radiological Work to Procedure VPAP-2101, states, in part, that foremen
shall ensure that each worker is qualified to perform required task and have
appropriate training and experience. Contrary to the above, an individual gained
unescorted access to the RCA without an Access Authorization to the RCA for a
Visitor/ Non-Radiation worker and was allowed to performed work in the RCA.
This was identified in Plant Issue S-2003-5018. This finding is of very low safety
significance because the individual was assigned to conduct such activities in the
RCA with other experienced, trained and currently qualified Basic Radiation
Workers and under the supervision of a foreman.
10 CFR 71.5(a) requires, in part, that a licensee who transport licensed material
outside of the confines of its plant or delivers licensed material to a carrier for
transport comply with the applicable requirements of the regulations appropriate
to the mode of transport of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 49 CFR
Parts 170 through 189. 49 CFR 173.471(a) requires, in part, that the offeror of a
Type B package make the shipment in compliance with the terms of the
packaging approval. Section 7.1.6 of Certificate of Compliance No. 9168,
Revision 12, dated June 25, 2001, states, in part, when seals are replaced, leak
testing is required as specified in Section 8.2.2.2 titled Assembly Verification
Leak Test. Contrary to this, the licensee did not leak test a secondary lid seal
before shipping Shipment No. B2001-2 on June 28, 2001. This was identified in
Plant Issue S-2001-1863-E1. This finding is of very low safety significance
because the package did not have any indications of leakage upon receipt at the
burial site.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
R. Allen, Manager, Outage and Planning
R. Blount, Site Vice President
M.Gaffney, Director, Nuclear Station Safety and Licensing
B.Garber, Supervisor, Licensing
T. Huber, Manager, Engineering
L. Jones, Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry
D. Llewellyn, Manager, Training
R. MacManus, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
K. Sloane, Director, Nuclear Station Operations and Maintenance
B. Stanley, Manager, Maintenance
J. Swientoniewski, Manager, Operations
NRC
K. Landis, Chief, Branch 5, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
05000280, 281/2004004-001
Failure to implement and maintain a
respiratory protection program that includes
written procedures regarding training of
respirator users in demonstrating
proficiency in the change out of SCBA air
cylinders (Section 2OS3.b)
Closed
LER
Electrical Conduit Bushing Failure Results
in a Reactor Trip (Section 4OA3.1)05000280/2003002-00
LER
Manual Steam Generator Level Control
Results in Power Ascension Reactor Trip
(Section 4OA3.1)
05000280,281/2003004-00
LER
Manual Reactor Trips Due to Loss of All
Circulating Water Pumps (Section 4OA3.1)
05000280,281/2003004-01
LER
Manual Reactor Trips Due to Loss of All
Circulating Water Pumps (Section 4OA3.1)
A-2
5000280, 281/2002003-01
Failure of respiratory protection program to
include demonstration of proficiency in
changing SCBA air cylinders (Section
2OS3.b)05000281/2003008-001
Fire Response Procedures 2-FCA-4.00 And
0-FCA-14.00 Not Adequate To Ensure Safe
Shutdown Of Unit 2 (Section 4OA3)
05000280,281/2003008-002
Alternative Shutdown Capability and
Response Procedures Not Adequate to
Ensure Safe Shutdown of Unit 1 (Section
4OA3)
TI
Offsite Power System Operational
Readiness (Section 4OA5.1)
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Partial List of Persons Contacted:
R. Cramer, NSS Manager
B. Garber, Licensing Supervisor
L. Jones, Manager Radiological Protection
J. Keithley, Supervisor Health Physics Operations
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R04
Plant Procedures
2-OP-SI-001A, Safety Injection System Alignment
0-OP-EG-001A, EDG 3 System Alignment
2-OP-EG-001A, EDG 2 System Alignment
Plant Drawings
11548-FM-089A, Safety Injection System
11548-FM-089B, Safety Injection System
Section 1R06
Plant Drawings
11448-FM-55A
A-3
11448-FM-55B
Plant Procedures
0-EPM-0805-01, Station Flood Detection Testing
0-MPM-1900-02, Flood Protection Floor Drain Back Water Stop Valve Replacement
1/2-EPM-0805-01, Turbine Building Flood Control Testing
1-OSP-PL-001, Performance Test of Turbine Building Sump Pumps 1-PL-P-2A, 1-PL-P-2B,1-
PL-P-2C (Turbine Building Sump No. 1)
1-OSP-PL-002, Performance Test of Turbine Building Sump Pumps 1-PL-P-2D, 1-PL-P-2E,1-
PL-P-2F (Turbine Building Sump No. 2)
2-OSP-PL-001, Performance Test of Turbine Building Sump Pumps 2-PL-P-2A, 2-PL-P-2B, 2-
PL-P-2C (Turbine Building Sump No. 3)
0-AP-13.00, Turbine Building or MER 3 Flooding
0-AP-FCA-6.01, Uncontrollable Turbine Building Flooding
Work Orders
489929 01, 479493 01, 487910 01, 487911 01, 491419 01
Plant Issues
S-2002-4023, S-2004-1336, S-2004-1337, S-2004-1338, S-2004-1339
S-2004-1348, S-2004-1351, S-2004-1432, S-2004-1517
Root Cause Evaluation S-2004-1339, Internal Flooding Licensing Basis Compromise
Section 1R07
SSES-8.15, Controlling Procedure for Addressing Heat Exchanger Issues
Section 1R22
Technical Report No. NE-1381, Evaluation of Surry Power Station Reactor Coolant System
Leak Rate Calculation
2OS1 Access Controls To Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)
Procedures, Instructions, Lesson Plans, and Manuals
C-HP-1020.011, Radiological Protection Action Plan During Diving Activities, Rev. 3
C-HP-1032.020, Radiological Survey Criteria and Scheduling, Rev. 4
C-HP-1032.030, Radiation Surveys, Rev. 3
C-HP-1032.060, Radiological Posting and Controls, Rev. 1
C-HP-1032.061, High Radiation Area Key Control, Rev. 2
C-HP-1061.110, Radiological Control Areas, Rev. 3
C-HP-1071.020, Controlling Contaminated Material, Rev 3
C-HP-1081.020, Radiological Work Permits: RWP Briefing and Controlling Work, Rev 4
Audits
A-4
Audit 01-07:Radiological Protection/Chemistry, 08/16/01
Radiation Work Permit (RWP)
RWP - 04-1-0001, Rev. 1, General Entry
RWP - 04-2-1101, Rev. 2, Posted Locked High Radiation Areas and Hot particle Areas
RWP - 04-2-1506, Rev. 2, Auxiliary Building, Decon Building and Yard
RWP Briefings
RWP 04-2-1101, RWP Briefing Attendance Roster
RWP 04-2-1506, RWP Briefing Attendance Roster
Radiological Surveys
358, Gas Stripper/PDT Room - Gate 31, 06/08/04
375, Auxiliary Building 2 Elevation Overview, 06/09/04
384, PDT, Gas Stripper and Liquid Waste Tank Room - Gate 11, 06/08/04
512, Decontamination (Decon) Building 27 overview - Gate 27, 06/09/04
513, Decon Building 6 Overview - Gate 22, 06/09/04
516, Decon Building Roof Overview, 06/09/04
519, Unit 2 Safeguards 27 and 8 Overview, 06/09/04 (Survey of de-watering lines after resin
transfer from Blend Tank)
521, Unit 2 Valve Pit 12, 19 and 27 Overview, 06/09/04
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Documents
Plant Issue (PI) S-2002-2913-E1, CAT 2 Root Cause Evaluation s-2002-2913-E1 A protective
clothing hood was found on a coat rack in the NSS Electrical Prefab shop outside the
protected area. Discovery date: 09/11/2002
PI S-2002-3478-E1, CAT 2 Root Cause Evaluations S-2002-3478, Worker Exits Protected Area
with 120,000 dpm Discrete Radioactive Particle Embedded in Jacket. Discovery date:
11/05/2002
PI S-2003-1241-E1, CAT 3 Root Cause Evaluation Response, S-2003-1241-E1, Purple painted
crescent wrench found inside of tool box on vehicle 4183. Vehicle located outside the
protected area on the construction site. Discovery date: 03/28/2003
PI S-2004-2166-E1, Purple tools found in survey for free release of materials from the RCA
06/07/2004. Discovery date: 06/07/2004
PI S-2003-5439-E1, CAT 3 Root Cause Evaluation Response - S-2003-5439-E1, Purple 2
pound maul found outside the protected area. The tool was found on an air dryer in the
Construction side parking lot.
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03)
Procedures, Lesson Plans, and Manuals
C-HP-1032.020, Radiological Survey Criteria and Scheduling, Rev. 2
C-HP-1033.610, Eberline Air Monitor AMS-4 Calibration and Operation, Rev. 2
A-5
C-HP-1042.350, Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Use, Rev. 4
HP-1033.015, Contamination Monitoring Instrumentation Control, Rev. 8
HPAP-1042, Radiological Respiratory Protection Program, Rev. 3
Lesson Plan: SCBA Cylinder Exchange, Rev. 1 dated 07/18/2003
Nuclear Employee Training Manual, Volume II (included section on Respiratory Protection
Training), Rev. 10
0-AP-20.00, Main Control Room Inaccessibility, Rev. 6
0-AP-48.00, Fire Protection - Operations Response, Rev. 15
0-LSP-FP-005, Loss Prevention Surveillance Procedure (Attachment 4: Main Control Room
Emergency SCBA), Rev. 6
VPAP-1902, Industrial Respiratory Protection, Rev. 5
Area Radiation Monitors Evaluated
RM-RM-127/128, Unit 1 (U1) Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor (CHRRM), calibrated
10/22/2001
RM-RM-138, 139, Spent Resin Handling Area Monitor, calibrated 1994 (out of service)
RM-RM-227/228, Unit 2 (U2) CHRRM, calibrated 03/27/2002RM-RM-164, U1 In-Core
Instrument Transfer Area Monitor, calibrated 10/17/2001
RM-RM-264, U2 In-Core Instrument Transfer Area Monitor, calibrated 04/07/2002
RMS-RM-161, U1 Containment Personnel Hatch Area Monitor (CPHAM), calibrated 01/24/2001
RMS-RM-261, U2 CPHAM, calibrated 02/20/2002
RRM-RE-126, Radwaste Facility HIC Storage and Handling Area Monitor, calibrated
01/30/2002
Continuous Air Monitors Evaluated
AMS-4 Monitor (S/N 797) in Auxiliary Building, 27 elevation, calibrated 03/19/2002
AMS-4 Monitor (S/N 901) in Auxiliary Building, 13 elevation, calibrated 07/10/2002
CAP Documents
PI S-2002-0331, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator in a degraded condition, 02/06/2002
PI S-2002-0544, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator in an unstable condition because of an
apparent electrical short, 02/26/2002
PI S-2002-0715, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has a broken door-alignment latch, 03/11/2002
PI S-2002-1129, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has source exposed indicator light
malfunction, 04/02/2002
PI S-2002-1776, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator out of service because door-locking device
failed, 05/12/2002
PI S-2002-2203, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has a broken mechanical door latch,
06/22/2002
PI S-2004-2243, Review of Respiratory Protection records during the RP Audit 04-08
PI S-2002-2768, No guidance for sustained use of SCBAs in the Control Room
A-6
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Monitoring (71122.01)
Reports, Procedures, Instructions, and Manuals
Surry Power Station (SPS), 2002 and 2003 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports
SPS, Calibration, Procedure Number (No.) CAL-004, Revision (Rev.) No. 6, Process Radiation
Monitor Alarm Setpoint Calibration
SPS, Calibration, Procedure No. CAL-255, Rev. No. 7, Kaman Normal Range Gas Effluent
Monitor (RI-GW-130-1A)
SPS, Calibration, Procedure No. CAL-258, Rev. No. 5, Kaman Accident Range Gas Effluent
Monitor RI-VG-131-2A
SPS, Calibration, Procedure No. CAL-298, Rev. No. 3, Kaman Radiation Monitor Alarm
Setpoint Calibration
SPS, Health Physics (HP), Procedure No. HP-3030.031, Rev.12, Radioactive Gaseous Waste
Sampling and Analysis, Rev. 10
SPS, HP Periodic Test, Procedure No. 1-PT-50.17, Rev. No. 2, Health Physics Sampling
Condenser Air Ejector
SPS, HP Periodic Test, Procedure No. 1-PT-50.3, Rev. No. 1, Health Physics Sampling -
Ventilation Vent # 2
SPS, HP Surveillance Procedure, Procedure No. 0-HSP-RM-003, Rev. No. 4, Dose
Contributions from Station Effluents
SPS, Instrument Maintenance, Procedure No. IMP-C-RM-36, Rev. No. 27, Checking, Repairing
or Replacing a Component in the Radiation Monitoring System
SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-RM-G-001, Rev. No. 10, Digital
Ratemeter Model 942B Process Monitor Calibration
SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-CC-RRM-LIQD-001, Rev.
No. 4, Radwaste Facility Liquid Effluent Monitor Calibration
SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-CC-RRM-MISC-001, Rev.
No. 2-P1, Surry Radwaste Facility Radiation Monitor Setpoint Calibration
SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-CC-RRM-VENT-001, Rev.
No. 6, Radwaste Facility Vent Stack Effluent Monitor Calibration
Station Administrative Procedure, Procedure No. VPAP-2103S, Offsite Dose Calculation
Manual (Surry), Rev. 5
UFSAR Chapter 11.0 Radioactive Wastes and Radiation Protection
Calibration/Performance Data
Dominion Generation (DG), SPS, HP-1033.203, Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permits
40093.009.002.G, 40124.010.003.G, 40139.007.021.G, 40141.003.021.G, 40155.007.023.G,
and 40156.003.024.G dated 04/08/04, 05/11/04, 05/25/04, 05/26/04, 06/08/04, and 06/09/04
DG, SPS, HP-1033.203, Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permits 40083.032.002.L,
40102.030.007.L, and 40118.034.022.L dated 04/22/04, 05/22/04, and 05/31/04
Virginia Power, SPS, Cal-817, Rev. 22, Data Sheets for RMs 1-VG-RM-110, GW-RM-1-1,
GW-RM-102, and VG-RM-109 dated 10/09/03, 03/07/03, 03/07/03, and 10/09/03
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Audits
Audit 03-11: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), Radiological Environmental Monitoring
Program (REMP), and Environmental Protection Plan (EPP) dated 02/25/04
Dominion Nuclear Health Physics Procedure, C-HP-1091.273, Rev. 5, Radioactive Effluent
Control Program Evaluation for Surry Power Station for the period 2002 to 2003
Trend Evaluation Response S-2003-5601-E1, Gamma isotopic analysis results for # 1 Storm
Drain Composite dated 10/05/03 are anomalous in that Co-58 was identified in the sample
CAP Documents
PI S-2003-1425, During background performance check of detector # 3 in the Count Room an
anomaly occurred regarding the computer printout
PI S-2004-0577, A degrading trend on filter differential pressure was noted revealing a 0"
differential pressure and a high flow fault light lit
Plant Issue Resolution (PIR) S-2002-2596-R1, The Kaman process vent low range noble gas
effluent monitor did not respond to the 08/03/02 waste gas decay tank release until six hours
after the release
PIR S-2003-0402-R1, Insensitivity of U1 and 2 air ejector radiation monitor to </= 30 gallons per
day primary to secondary leakage during the start-up of U1 on 01/24/03 and 02/26/03 and U2
on 01/28/03
PIR S-2003-0847-R1, Moisture accumulation in the sample lines for the RM-RMS-259/260 skid
PIR S-2003-0876-E1, While releasing a Liquid Waste Monitoring tank, the SRF control room
received annunciator DCS-LSM-B1, Liquid Discharge Radioactivity HIGH
PIR S-2004-1027-R1, Analysis of the particulate filter for the effluent sample form the SRF Vent
from the week of 02/11-02/18/04 yielded positive results for gross alpha
PIR S-2003-1209-R1, January 2003 monthly liquid composite tritium values for the
miscellaneous batch and continuous pathways were unusually high
2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (71122.03)
Procedures, Instructions, Lesson Plans, and Manuals
Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, January 1 to December 31, 2002
Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, January 1 to December 31, 2003
Audit 03-11, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
and Environmental Protection Plan
C-HP-1091.100, Member Of The Public Dose Evaluation, Rev. 1
C-HP-1091.274, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program: Surveillance and Evaluation,
Rev. 1
HP-1033.015, Contamination Monitoring Instrument Control, Rev 8
HP-3051.010 Environmental Monitoring Program, Rev. 10
HP Periodic Test Procedure 0-HPS-REMP-002, Environmental Radiation Monitors, Rev.0
HP Procedure, HP-3051.010, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, Rev. 8
HP Surveillance Procedure 0-HPS-REMP-001, Land Use Census, Rev. 2,
0-HSP-SS-001 Storm Drain Sampling Using The American Sigma Ultrasonic Flow Meter,
Rev.5
UFSAR, Section 2.2, Meteorology and Climatology, Rev 33
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Instrument Calibration and Performance Data Records
CAL-93, Met Tower Delta T Loop Calibration, Rev. 6, Performed 08/03/04
CAL-133, Sigma Theta Loop, Rev. 4, Performed 07/30/04
CAL-155, Wind Speed Lower Loop, Rev.4, Performed 08/03/04
CAL-193, Wind Speed Upper Loop, Rev. 5, Performed 08/03/04
CAL-194, Wind Direction Backup Loop, Rev 5, Performed 08/03/04
CAL-195, Wind Direction Upper Loop, Rev. 5, Performed 08/03/04
CAL-196, Wind Direction Lower Loop, Rev 5, Performed 08/03/04
Calibration Certificates - Portable Air Samplers ID 7725 dated 01/20/04, ID 6827 dated
01/20/04, ID 6828 dated 01/20/04, ID 7121 dated 01/20/04, ID 4148 dated 01/20/04,
ID 7133 dated 01/20/04, ID 7130 dated 01/20/04, and ID 5022 dated 01/20/04
CAP Documents
PI S-2003-0612, Environmental TLD at Kingsmill location missing
PI S-2004-1248, Station sewage holding tank contaminated with I-131 from an individual with a
medical administration
PI S-2004-1313, The EMS monthly data base is incomplete - 2 weeks of effluent data from
March are missing - likely associated with primary drive crash
PI S-2004-1354, Failed to meet the required airborne I-131 LLD at the Fort Eustis 9/16-23/03
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
Procedures, Instructions, Lesson Plans, and Manuals
HPAP-2802, NRC Performance Indicator Program, Rev. 2
VPAP-1601, Corrective Action, Rev. 18
VPAP-1501, Deviations, Rev. 16
Plant Records
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicators, Radiological Protection, - December 2003,
January 2004, February 2004, March 2004, April 2004, May 2004, June 2004, and July 2004
Section 4OA5: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (60855)
Procedures, Instructions, Lesson Plans, and Manuals
HP Periodic Test, 0-HPT-ISFSI-001, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
Radiological Surveillance, Rev. 9
ISFSI Security Fence Survey, 04/07/04
ISFSI Perimeter Fence Survey, 04/07/04
Neutron and Noble Gas Dose Calculation Record C-HP-1031.022, Rev. 8
Surry ISFSI, Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 15, Docket 72-2, SNM-2501 Chapter 7,
Radiation Protection
Virginia Electric and Power Surry Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Technical
Specifications for Safety Licensee No. SNM-2501, Amendment 12
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CAP Documents