ML040490212

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Handouts from 01/28/04 Management Meeting
ML040490212
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 01/28/2004
From: Landis K
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To: Byrne S
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co
References
Download: ML040490212 (55)


Text

V. C. Summer Nuclear Station

SCE&G Attendees Steve Byrne -

Senior Vice President Jeff Archie -

Plant Manager Dave Lavigne - General Manager Organizational Effectiveness Alan Torres -

Manager Planning / Outage Ron Clary -

Manager Nuclear Licensing Brad Stokes -

Manager Design Engineering Larry Bennett - Plant Support Engineering Supervisor

Purpose of Meeting

  • Refuel - 14 Results
  • Corrective Action Program Update
  • Equipment Reliability Program Overview

Refuel -14 General Overview Alan Torres

Refuel-14 Goal Status

  • No Significant Safety Events (Actual 0)
  • Duration - 36 days (Actual 46 Days)
  • Dose Goal -70 REM (Actual 76 REM)
  • No Industrial Safety Events (Actual 2)

RF-14

  • Total Work

- MWRs - Scheduled 764 / Emergent 292

- STPs - Scheduled 1174 / Emergent 42

- PMs - Scheduled 2602 / Emergent 8

- ECRs - Scheduled 55 / Emergent 11

  • Total of 4948 Documents Worked
  • Scope Growth of 7.13%

Major Work Activities

  • Reactor Vessel

- Ten Year ISI

- Bare metal visual inspections - Head/BMI

  • Main Generator Inspection
  • ILRT of the Reactor Building
  • A Train Electrical Maintenance
  • B CCW Heat Exchanger Repair and Coating
  • Repair and Coat all 3 Auxiliary Condensers
  • C RCP Motor Replacement and Seal Work

Refuel-14 Modifications

  • Modifications

- RHR Pump Seal (Concern for Leakage)

- Complete RHR Miniflow Switch Relocation (EQ)

- RHR Vent Addition (Helps Reduce Dose)

- CW Pump Trip Circuitry (Operator Work Around)

- Feedwater Heater Level Transmitter Logic Change (Operational Challenge)

- Gravity Boration Flow Path (Operator Work Around)

  • PRA Review Indicates No Change in CDF

Brief Overview of RHR Project

  • A RHR Pump Modification

- Spacer Coupling

- Upper & Lower Hub Assembly

- Dose Estimated 2.75 REM (Actual 0.725 REM)

  • A RHR Vent Addition

- Dose Estimated 1.1 REM (Actual 0.590 REM)

Modified 8X20 WD/WDF 18 by 18 opening Support stand with an 18 X 18 opening seal Bearing Housing

The Spacer Coupling Upper (Driver)

Hub Assembly Lower (Pump)

Hub Assembly

Outage Challenges

  • Seal Injection Indications

- 40 Hours Additional Work to Critical Path

- Dose of 5.8 REM

- 55 Hours Delay to Startup and Critical Path

  • Water Clarity Issues Prior to Reload

- 66 Hour Delay for Core Reload to Critical Path

- 16 Hour Delay to Tie to the Grid

Conclusions

  • We Conducted a Safe Outage

- No Safety Significant Events

- Two Minor Personnel Injuries

- No Events During Startup

- Presently No Significant Challenges for Extended Run

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM Dave Lavigne

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

  • CER Status
  • Risk Review

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP) 30.45%

9.911%

4.072%

1.94%

1.768%

0.97%

Percent (%) Open:

1378 389 99 37 27 5

  • CERs Open:

12.434 10.783 6.6786 5.2247 4.1836 3.035 Average Per Day:

4526 3925 2431 1907 1527 516 CERs Initiated 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 A Look At The Numbers:

CER STATISTICS

  • Open CERs have a status of Screened, Unscreened or Ready for Approval.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

CAP History

  • NRC PI&R Inspection, March 2001.

Corrective Action Program Acceptable, however:

Corrective Actions not well documented or completed in a timely manner.

Risk insights not used when classifying issues.

Not effectively using repetitive condition identification.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

CAP HISTORY (continued)

  • NRC PI&R Inspection, March 2002 Improvements noted in corrective action process, however:
  • CERs not always generated at threshold expected by management.
  • Human performance issues not always addressed.
  • Need more management presence at screening committee meetings.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

CAP HISTORY (continued)

  • WANO/INPO Peer Review, May 2003
  • Station including more lo-level deficient conditions in the CAP.
  • Increasing backlogs in CAP.
  • Multiple extensions of corrective actions.
  • Lack of acceptance of corrective actions.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

CAP HISTORY (continued)

  • VCS Internal Assessments
  • QA GAP Analysis (August 2003)

VCS Program Meets Industry Stds.

  • Root Cause analysis on repeat events (September 2003)

Management ownership and oversight.

Need better screening review of identified conditions.

RISK INSIGHTS CERs Reviewed by PSA group for Risk Significance Results Reported in Quarterly Trend Report Presented at VP Performance Indicator Meeting

CAP CHANGES

CAP Changes (Contd)

  • Established Management Review Team (MRT)

-Composed of GMs and Managers.

  • Review Repetitive Events
  • Review Immediate Actions
  • Establish CER Ownership
  • Monitor Due Date Extensions

CAP Changes (Contd)

  • MRT to Review Deleted CERs
  • Separated Significance Determination from Condition Evaluation
  • Established Priority Vehicle for Actions

CAP Changes (Contd)

  • Reinforced Expectations

- Unit Evaluators

- Managers

- Corrective Action Group

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

SUMMARY

  • Continue to adjust CAP to meet/exceed industry stds.
  • Using Risk Insights to understand plant C/A issues
  • Mgmt team committed to self identify and learn from C/A process

V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Equipment Reliability Improvement Overview Larry Bennett

Overview Previous Activity Future plans

Benchmarking NEI Equipment Reliability Benchmarking in 2002 6 Plants Visited for Best Practices

- Prioritization

- Long Range Planning

- Plant Health Committee

Self Assessment

  • Gap Analysis to INPO AP-913 Completed in November 2002
  • Areas Noted for Improvement:

- System Health Reports do not effectively drive corrective actions and communicate long range plans

- Long term planning for SSCs needs improvement

- Equipment problems are not effectively prioritized

- Critical component classifications not well established

- PM program improvements needed

INPO Equipment Performance Assist Visit

  • Conducted in November of 2002
  • Validated Self Assessment
  • Developed Action Plans for Focus Areas

- Prioritization

- PM Program

- Predictive Maintenance

Plant Health Committee

  • PHC Created in November of 2002
  • Engineering, Operations, Maintenance, Scheduling, HP, Chemistry
  • Prioritization of Equipment Issues Completed January 2003
  • PHC Focus List Developed, Communicated to Site

- Initial list had 15 focus issues

- Presently have 10 focus issues

  • 8 removed, 3 added

2003 INPO Plant Assessment Areas for Improvement in Equipment Reliability

- Plant trips due to equipment issues

- Unresolved equipment issues

- Some reoccurring equipment issues

Plans for 2004 Equipment Reliability Improvement Project

Equipment Reliability Improvement Project (ERIP) 4 Integrated Phases of Work Aligned with Recognized Industry Standards:

- NEI Standard Nuclear Performance Model

- INPO AP-928, Work Management Process

- INPO AP-913, Equipment Reliability Process

- EPRI PM Basis Documents

Equipment Reliability Improvement Project ERIP Used at:

  • Susquehanna
  • Calloway
  • Columbia
  • Farley - in progress
  • Hatch - in progress

ERIP Change Goal Desired Outcome:

Lay a solid foundation on which to build a living long-term maintenance strategy where our processes and people are preventing equipment failures.

ERIP Scope of Work Phase 1 Scoping and Identification of Critical Components Phase 2 Preventive Maintenance Implementation and Feedback Improvement Phase 3 Preventive Maintenance Basis and Maintenance Optimization Phase 4 Performance Monitoring and Prioritization Improvement

ERIP - From Project to Process

  • Active Craft Feedback and Ownership
  • Proactive Engineering
  • High Level of Equipment Reliability
  • Optimizing Availability of SSCs.
  • Optimizing Maintenance Effectiveness.
  • Reduced Generation Lost
  • Reduced Operation and Maintenance Cost

Conclusions Steve Byrne