ML030780439
| ML030780439 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/2003 |
| From: | Pierson J FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | NRC/RGN-III |
| References | |
| 50-440/03-301 50-440/03-301 | |
| Download: ML030780439 (108) | |
Text
INITIAL SUBMITTAL OF THE SCENARIOS FOR THE PERRY EXAMINATION - JAN/FEB 2003
'K Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Perry Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at 100% power. RHR A is in secured status for preventive maintenance on the pump breaker. RHR A was declared inoperable five hours ago per Tech. Spec.3.5.1, Action A; 3.6.1.7, Action A; and 3.6.2.3, Action A. The OPRMs are functional but are inoperable per Tech. Spec. 3.3.1.3. Required Action A.3 has been implemented. HPCS System operation is scheduled to support flow rate testing. Control rods are at step 79, all rods out. 101-3, Section 4.5, Step 35.
Turnover: 1. BOP operator place HPCS in full flow test mode to the suppression pool. The RSE is standing by to take flow measurements locally. Suppression Pool water is Transfer Quality and a HPCS system flush at the completion of the test is not required. HPCS ESW and HPCS Pump Room Cooler are in operation. 2. Maintain 100% power.
Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N (BOP) Start HPCS in Full Flow Test Mode to the Suppression Pool (TS 3.5.1. B and C)
N (SRO) 2 CP03: C (BOP) HPCS Pump Flow Degradation/Shutdown HPCS (2 minute ramp) 1E22C0001 C (SRO) 100%
3 AD01N C (BOP) ADS/SRV B21-F047H Cycling (TS 3.5.1.E, F and H /TS 3.0.3)
C (SRO)
R (RO) Lower reactor power < 90% using Recirc flow R(SRO)
Reactor Narrow Range Level Transmitter C34-NO04A Offset High (3 minute 4 PT02: I (RO) ramp) (ORM 6.2.1.3) 1C34N0004A I (SRO) 17%
5 RF FW66 C (RO) RFPT A Spurious Trip/ Reactor Recirculation FCV B Runback Failure (TS 3.4.1)
TH12B C (SRO) 6 ED061 Loss of 480Vac Bus F-1-E TC05 Turbine Control EHC leak / Main Turbine trip and reactor scram 10%
7 RD15 M (All) ATWS (failure of RPS and ARI to automatically shutdown the reactor)
SL01A SLC Squib Valves Fail to Fire (includes indicating lamp overrides to support SLI01B failure mode)
CB01:
8 1N27CO001A C Loss of All Feedwater Capability (all RFBPs trip)
CB01:
1N27Co001B CB01:
1N27C0001C CB01:
1N27C0001D 9 M (All) RPV Emergency Depressurization / Inject with low pressure ECCS to maintain adequate core cooling k'1)ormal, [kl)eactivity, kI)nstrument, (I,)omponent, ljvl)ajor NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Start HPCS in Full Flow Test Mode to the Suppression Pool Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Direct BOP to place HPCS in Full Flow Test per SOI-E22A, Section 74 Declares HPCS inoperable due to operation in -t secondary mode (SOI-E22A P&L # 17)
- References Tech Spec 3.5.1..B & C (verifies RCIC is OPERABLE)
BOP Places HPCS in Full Flow Test
- Directs RO to record Maint Rule status in Plant Narrative Log
- Places HPCS OUT OF SERVICE Switch in INOP Expected Alarm H13-P601-16 (D4), HPCS OUT OF SERVICE
- Notify HP that a Suppression Pool evolution will be conducted
- Verifies HPCS ESW loop in operation
- Verifies HPCS Pump Room Cooling in operation
- Notifies SRO HPCS suction shift to the Supp Pool is required
- Performs SOI-E22, Section 5.2 as SRO directs Note: CST Suction automatically closes when Supp Pool Suction Valve opens. No expected alarms
- Verifies HPCS Supp Pool Suction Valve, 1E22-F015 is open
- Verifies HPCS CST Suction Valve, 1 E22-FOO1 is closed
- Place HPCS Pump control switch to start:
Observes rising pump discharge pressure Observes rising pump amps Expected Alarm, H13-P601-16 (A5), HPCS PUMP START SIGNAL RECEIVED Observes HPCS Min Flow Valve opens
- Hold HPCS Test Valve to Supp Pool, 1E22-F023 in open:
Flow approximately 6900 gpm on E22-R603 with Test Valve fully open E22-R616, Pump Amps, approximately 320 amps NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
HPCS Pump Flow Degradation/Shutdown HPCS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP E22-R601, Discharge Press, approximately 300 psig
- Verifies HPCS Min Flow Valve closes when flow is > 725 gpm BOP Responds to unexpected alarm H13-P601-16 (H5), HPCS WATER LEG PUMP DISCH PRESS LO Determines HPCS Pump flow is degrading Notify SRO that HPCS Pump flow is degraded, as indicated by discharge press slowly going to 0 psig / flow going to 0 gpm SRO Note: SRO may direct BOP to immediately shutdown HPCS SRO Acknowledge report of degraded HPCS Pump flow Directs BOP to shutdown HPCS per SOI-E22A, Section 7.4 SRO/BOP/RO Requests Maintenance and Responsible System Engineer (RSE) assistance to support troubleshooting SRO/BOP/RO NLO at HPCS Pump reports HPCS Pump is extremely noisy SRO Directs BOP to Shutdown HPCS to Standby Readiness in accordance with SOI-E22A, Section 7.4.
Notifies Operations Management of HPCS inoperability Directs BOP to place HPCS in Secured Status in accordance with SOI-E22A, Section 6.2 Note: May confer with Shift Manager prior to directing HPCS be placed in secured status
__ I___ I ______________ ii NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
HPCS Pump Flow Degradation/Shutdown HPCS Time] Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Inform SRO a Procedure Deviation is required because flow cannot be lowered to 500 to 600 gpm. (flow indicates 0 gpm)
SRO Authorizes a Procedure Deviation as required Note: May consult with Shift Manager prior to authorizing BOP Shutdown HPCS per SOI-E22A, Section 7.4
- Hold HPCS Test Valve to Supp Pool, 1 E22-F023 to Close and verify valve fully closed:
Alarm H13-P601-16 (H5), HPCS WATER LEG PUMP DISCH PRESS LO clears when 1 E22-F023 is closed
- Take HPCS Pump control switch to Stop:
Alarm, H13-P601-16 (A5), HPCS PUMP START SIGNAL RECEIVED clears Note: Candidate may check the Suppression Pool Level instruments on backpanel H13-P625. If requested, inform candidate that the Suppression Pool Level instruments indicate normal.
Places HPCS in Secured Status using SOI-E22A, Section 6.2 as directed Note: Placing HPCS in shutdown instead of secured status will not affect the scenario outcome.
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
ADS/SRV B21-F047H Cycling/Lower reactor power to <90% using Recirc flow
[ Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Reports unexpected alarms and consults ARIs:
H13-P601-19: (A7), SRV OPEN H13-P601-19: (B7), SRV OPEN SIGNAL RECEIVED H13-P680-7: (B8), SRV LEAKAGE RO Monitors RPV level, pressure, and power BOP Informs SRO/RO that ADS/SRV 1B21-F047H is cycling BOP May check SRV tailpipe temperatures on Hi 3-P614 to determine which SRV is cycling SRO Enters ONI-B21-1, SRV Inadvertent Opening/Stuck Open
- Directs RO/BOP to initiate evacuation of Containment
- Directs RO to reduce reactor power using recirc flow to _<90%
Note: Must reduce power to < 90% prior to attempting To close the SRV
- Directs BOP to attempt to close the SRV by placing both of its control switches from AUTO to OFF
- Coordinates with RO/BOP to complete applicable Supplemental Actions
- Directs BOP to de-energize the SRV solenoids by removing the applicable control power fuses RO/BOP Notifies SCC, Chem and HP of intent to lower reactor power (may occur after power reduction has begun)
SRO Provides SRO oversight for power reduction NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
ADS/SRV B21-F047H Cycling/Lower reactor power to <90% using Recirc flow Time Position ] Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Decreases reactor power to < 90% using Recirc Loop Flow Control Maintain Recirc loop flows matched within 10%
BOP Places both SRV control switches to Off:
Expected Alarm, H13-P601-19: (E7), SRV DIV 1/2 SWITCH IN OFF and Informs SRO/RO that SRV control switches are in Off Informs SRO/RO that SRV is still cycling open SRO/BOP Refer to ONI-B21-1 Attachment 1 and Attachment 2 to determine SRV fuses that must be pulled BOP Removes SRV control power fuses inside panel H1 3-P628 and in H13-P631 Informs SRO/RO that SRV control power fuses are removed Expect Alarms: H13-P601-19 (G9) (G11), ADS OUT OF SERVICE SRO References Tech Specs for a single, inoperable ADS SRV
- LCO 3.5.1, Enters Condition E, F, and H
- Enters LCO 3.0.3, due to ADS Valve and HPCS inoperable SRO Notifies OPS Management and NRC Resident of ONI entry and reason for entry, and of the various LCO entries and required TS 3.0.3 shutdown. Requests RSE and I&C assistance in the Control Room to support troubleshooting Review 101-3 for power reduction Contacts Rx Engineer for power reduction recommendations Begin preparations for required plant (TS 3.0.3) shutdown NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Reactor Narrow Range Level Transmitter C34-N004A Offset High Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Crew must be allowed to return both RFPTs to the MLC before tripping RFPT A in Event 4 RO/BOP/SRO Recognizes abnormal water level indication Refers to RPV Level Validation Screen on SPDS as necessary RO/BOP/SRO Requests I&C and Responsible System Engineer assistance in the Control Room to support troubleshooting RO Responds to and reports Alarm H13-P680-3 (B6), RX LEVEL CHANNEL ERROR HI BOP Supports RO by attending to alarm(s) and consulting ARI-H13-P680-3 (B6) and other ARIs as required SRO Enters ONI-C34, Feedwater Flow Control Malfunction.
- Directs RO to take manual control of RFPTs and maintain RPV level 192 to 200 inches (201" required for Level Program)
- After crew determines Rx Level Transmitter C34N004A has failed, directs RO to select NR Level Channel B
- Crew can place RFPTs back on MLC when NR Level Channel B is selected and level is returned to normal SRO - Directs RO to shift both RFPTs from their Manual Speed Control Dial to the MLC per SOI-C34, Sections 4.5, 4.9, and 4.10 I _ _______
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
Reactor Narrow Range Level Transmitter C34-NO04A Offset High Ti me Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO As directed, takes manual control of feedwater and maintains level As directed, selects NR Level Channel B SRO Directs RO to shift both RFPTs from their Manual Speed Control Dial to the Master Level Controller (MLC) per SOI-C34 RO Transfers RFPT A(B) from the Manual Speed Control Dial to Manual Flow Control per SOI-C34, Section 4.5
- Uses the RFP A(B) Flow Control, 1C34-R601A(B), manual pushbutton, to null the RFP DEV METER A(B), R426A(B)
- Takes RFPT A(B) GOV MODE Cont, 1 N27-S50(S52) to AUTO RO Transfers RFPT A(B) from Manual Flow Control to Master Rx Level Control per SOI-C34, Section 4.9
- Uses the MASTER RX LEVEL CONTROL, 1C34-R600, tapeset to null the controller deviation
- Places RFP A(B) on Master Level Control by placing RFP A(B) FLOW CONTROL, 1 C34-R601A(B), in AUTO Note: Alarm H13-P680-3 (A8), MAIN TURB & FEEDPUMP TRIP RCIC/L8 may occur as normal RPV water level is restored due to the failure of NR Channel A t__ I ____ L NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
Reactor Narrow Range Level Transmitter C34-NO04A Offset High Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Places a 2n" Feed Pump in AUTO on Master Level Control per SOI-C34, Section 4.10
- If the 2n" Feed Pump is RFP A(B), then verifies RFP B(A)
FLOW CONTROL, 1C34-R601B(A), is in MANUAL
- Places RFP B(A) FLOW CONTROL, 1 C34-R601 B(A), in AUTO SRO Notifies OPS Management and NRC Resident of ONI entry and reason for entry Refers to ORM 6.2.13, Action B Crew must be allowed to return both RFPTs to the MLC before tripping RFPT A in Event 4
__ ___ I ________________
4 i.
+
+
+
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
RFPT A Spurious Trip / Reactor Recirculation FCV B Runback Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Observes the loss of RFPT A Informs SRO/BOP of RFPT A trip Verifies expected automatic plant response
- Starts or verifies auto start of MFP
- Verifies Reactor Recirculation Flow Control Valves will runback to 48% loop flow position Informs SRO/BOP of failure of FCV B to runback Takes immediate actions per ONI-N27
- If required, reduce reactor power by reducing recirculation flow and/or inserting Cram Rods in accordance with FTI-B02 to maintain steam flow and feed flow balanced and reactor water level within the normal operating range of 192 to 200 inches BOP Assists RO by reviewing ARIs for annunciators received:
ARI-H13-P680-3 (A9), RX LEVEL HI/LO L7/L4 ARI-H13-P680-3 (D6), RFPT A TRIP ARI-H13-P680-4 (B4), RCIRC A FCV RUNBACK SRO Enters ONI-N27, Feedwater Pump Trip
- Verifies MFP auto started and shifted to the Master Level Controller
- Directs RO to maintain RPV level 192-200"
- May direct RFPT A shutdown using SOI-N27 Section 6.6, Shutdown to 1100 rpm and Section 6.7, Shutdown from 1100 rpm NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
RFPT A Spurious Trip / Reactor Recirculation FCV B Runback Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Enters ONI-C51, Unplanned Change in Reactor Power or Reactivity and references Section 4.2, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control Malfunction RO/BOP Complete ONI immediate and supplemental actions as directed Shutdown RFPT A using SOI-N27 if directed BOP/SRO Contact Maintenance and Responsible System Engineer Directs NLO investigate RFPT A trip RO Informs SRO that there is a > 5% loop flow mismatch Determines Reactor Recirculation FCV B failed to automatically runback and informs SRO.
(Note: RO may manually runback Recirc FCV B)
SRO References Tech Specs for a Recirc loop flow mismatch
- LCO 3.4.1 (Recirc Loops Operating) - Enters Condition A
- Reactor Engineering should be notified of the loop flow mismatch SRO Notifies OPS Management and NRC Resident of ONI entry and reason for entry and of entry into Tech Spec LCOs Reviews 101-3 for power decrease SRO/BOP/RO Notifies Chemistry, HP, and SCC of power change NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Loss of 480Vac Bus F-1-E. Turbine Control EHC leak / Main Turbine trip and reactor scram.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO/BOP/RO Recognize and report Alarms H13-P870-1 (E4), 480 VOLT BUS UNDERVOLTAGE and H13-P870-1 (E6), BUS F-1-E BREAKER TRIP SRO Enters ONI-R23-2, Loss of Non-Essential 480 Volt Bus Refers to Plant Data Book for list of affected loads (PDB-H0017):
CVCW deenergized RO/BOP Walk down panels and assess plant status:
Acknowledge and report alarm H13-P870-9 (G2), EHC STBY PUMP START-HEADER PRESSURE LOW; refer to ARI Determines EHC Pump B tripped; EHC Pump A auto started Note: EHC Pump B breaker remained closed when Bus F-1-E deenergized RO/BOP Acknowledge alarm H13-P870-9 (F2), EHC SYSTEM RESERVOIR HI/LO; refer to ARI and inform SRO SRO Directs reactor scram or enters and direct actions of 101-14, Fast Unload and Trip of Turbine NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Loss of 480Vac Bus F-1-E. Turbine Control EHC leak / Main Turbine trip and reactor scram.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO As directed, decreases reactor power using Recirc Flow Control Maintain Recirc loop flows matched within 10%
SRO/BOP Monitor EHC pressure and report lowering pressure trend SRO Direct RO to perform either a fast reactor shutdown or to manually scram the reactor prior to trip of the Main Turbine RO Complete reducing core flow to 58 x 1 0 6 Ibm/hr and then arm and depress RPS Manual Scram Pushbuttons or arm and depress RPS Manual Scram Pushbuttons prior to automatic Main Turbine trip 1
I_ _ __ ______
-I-
+/-
1-
+/-
I NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
ATWS/ SLC Squib Valves Fail to Fire Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes incomplete scram and APRMs not downscale and informs SRO/BOP SRO Directs RO/BOP actions per PEI-B1 3, RPV Control (Non-ATWS)
- Arms and depresses all RPS Manual Scram PBs
- Places the Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN
- Starts Hydrogen Analyzers
- Verifies ARI Initiated RO/BOP Executes PEI-B1 3, RPV Control (Non-ATWS) actions per SRO direction SRO Determines reactor is still NOT shutdown under all conditions without boron SRO Exits PEI-B13, RPV Control (Non-ATWS) and enters PEI-B13, RPV Control (ATWS)
- Directs initiation of Standby Liquid Control and ADS inhibited
- Directs RO to runback Recirc FCVs to minimum position, then trip Recirc Pumps
- Directs RO to use PEI-SPI 1.3 to insert Control Rods
- Directs BOP/RO to terminate/ prevent injection of inside the shroud systems using PEI-SPI 5.1 (HPCS Injection Prevention)
& 5.2 (LPCS & LPCI Injection Prevention) (DGs will auto start)
- Directs RO/BOP to line up at least two outside the shroud injection systems using PEI-SPI 6.2 (LPCI B Outside the Shroud)
& 6.3 (LPCS Runout Injection)
Note: RHR A is in secured status so PEI-SPI 6.1 is not performed NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
ATWS/ SLC Squib Valves Fail to Fire Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (cont.) PEI-B13, RPV Control (ATWS) actions:
- Directs actions to maintain MSIVs open per PEI-SPI 2.3 and 2.8
- Directs RPV level stabilized in a band of- 25 to +100"
- Directs pressure band of 800 to 1000 psig Note: RFPTs may trip on L8 following scram. When L8 is reset, water level should be stabilized above L2
"* HPCS may be in secured status
"* Crew should be able to maintain RPV level > -25 inches until loss of feedwater capability. RCIC will auto start at L2 (+130")
- Crew should maintain RPV level > Level 1 (+16.5 inches) to maintain MSIVs open RO Runback Recirc FCVs to minimum position, trips Recirc Pumps Insert Control Rods using PEI-SPI 1.3, Manual Insertion BOP Starts Hydrogen Analyzers Initiates SLC, reports squib valve failures to SRO/RO Inhibits ADS Aligns for outside the shroud injection using PEI-SPI 6.2 (bypasses E12-F053B) and PEI-SPI 6.3 (bypasses E21-F012)
Bypasses MSIV Li per PEI-SPI 2.3 and IA Isolations per PEI-SPI 2.8 Performs terminate/prevent actions per PEI-SPI 5.1 (HPCS Injection Prevention) & 5.2 (LPCS & LPCI Injection Prevention)
Maintains reactor pressure band directed by SRO NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
ATWS/ SLC Squib Valves Fail to Fire Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs Alternate Boron Injection per PEI-SPI 1.8 BOP Coordinates Alternate Boron Injection per PEI-SPI 1.8 BOP/RO Maintain level band directed by SRO using Condensate and Feedwater, CRD, and RCIC SRO/BOP/RO Monitor for power > 4% and RPV level > 0" and Supr Pool Temp
> 11 0°F and any SRV open or Drywell pressure > 1.68 psig SRO If ALL above monitored conditions are met, direct terminate and prevent all injection into the RPV except boron and CRD BOP/RO As directed, terminate and prevent injection per PEI-SPI 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 Depress RCIC Turbine Remote Trip pushbutton SRO When power < 4% or RPV level drops to 0" or all SRVs remain closed and Drywell pressure < 1.68 psig, direct RPV level band between -25" and the level to which RPV was lowered BOP/RO Maintain level band directed by SRO using Condensate and Feedwater, CRD, and RCIC NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Loss of All Feedwater Capability
[Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Report loss of all RFBPs and all Reactor Feed Pumps RO/BOP Monitor and trend reactor water level (decreasing)
SRO If not already running, directs RCIC initiation if permitted SRO Note: SRO may direct BOP to perform PEI-SPI 2.5, Bypass of RCIC Isolations and Suction Transfer BOP/RO As directed, start and maximize injection with RCIC BOP/RO Maintains reactor water level in the band specified by the SRO Using RCIC BOP/RO Notifies SRO of RPV level approach to -25" Note: If the crew is able to quickly lower reactor power by inserting control rods, then RCIC may be able to maintain reactor water level > -25 inches and ED would not be required SRO Determines RPV level cannot be maintained > -25" PEI-B13, Emergency Depressurization is entered and executed concurrently with PEI-B13, RPV Control (ATWS) 1
+/-
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 9 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
RPV emergency depressurization / Inject with low pressure ECCS to maintain adequate core cooling Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note: This Event will be a contingency Event. If the SRO determines that reactor water level cannot be maintained > -25 inches, then ED will be required SRO Directs BOP/RO actions per PEI-B13, Emergency Depressurization
- Directs terminate and prevent all injection except boron and CRD Must hold here until all injection into the RPV has been terminated (except boron and CRD)
BOP/RO As directed, terminate and prevent injection per PEI-SPI 5.3 Depress RCIC Turbine Remote Trip pushbutton SRO Verifies eight or more SRVs are not open Verifies Suppression Pool level is > 5.25 feet Directs all ADS valves opened to rapidly depressurize the RPV BOP/RO When directed, open all ADS valves Determine one ADS/SRV not open and report to SRO SRO Confirms all ADS valves are NOT open Directs additional SRVs be opened to obtain 8 SRVs open BOP/RO Monitor and trend reactor pressure
- Must hold here until RPV pressure is less than MARFP NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 9 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
RPV Emergency Depressurization / Inject with low pressure ECCS to maintain adequate core cooling.
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
_____SRO As soon as RPV pressure is < MARFP, direct injection with outside the shroud systems to restore and maintain RPV level > -25"
- LPCI B unavailable for injection outside the shroud BOP/RO Injects into the RPV to systems to restore and maintain RPV level using outside the shroud injection systems as directed
- Must hold here until the reactor is shutdown under all conditions without boron
+
+/-
+
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Scenario Termination Criteria Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. Control Rods are being inserted
- 2. RCIC is maintaining RPV level > -25 inches Note: If RCIC is not able to maintain RPV level > -25 inches, then the remaining termination criteria will be used:
- 3. The reactor has been emergency depressurized
- 4. Low pressure ECCS Systems are being used to restore RPV level > -25 inches NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Critical Task #1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task #1 - With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, initiate action to reduce power by inserting control rods
- 1. Safety Significance:
- Shutting down the reactor can preclude failure of Containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant
- 2. Cues:
- Procedural compliance
- 3. Measured by:
- Control Rod insertion before the end of the scenario
- 4. Feedback:
- Reactor power trend I
+ i 1* t i
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Critical Task #2
[Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task #2 - With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization and subsequent power excursion, inhibit ADS
- 1. Safety Significance:
- Precludes core damage due to an uncontrolled reactivity addition
- 2. Cues:
- Procedural compliance
- 3. Measured by:
- ADS logic inhibited prior to an automatic initiation of the ADS System unless all required injection systems are terminated and prevented
- 4. Feedback:
- RPV pressure and level trends
- ADS "Out of Service" annunciator status NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 9 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Critical Task #3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note: This is a contingent critical task Critical Task #3 - When RPV water level cannot be maintained
> -25" and the reactor is at pressure, initiate Emergency Depressurization
- 1. Safety Significance:
- Maintain adequate core cooling
- 2. Cues:
- Procedural compliance
- Level lowering without adequate high pressure injection available
- 3. Measured by:
- Observation - at least 5 SRVs open prior to re-establishing injection after terminate and prevent actions are completed
- 4. Feedback:
- Reactor pressure trend
- Suppression Pool temperature trend NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 9 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Critical Task #4
[Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note: This is a contingent critical task Critical Task #4 - During an ATVVS with Emergency Depressurization required, terminate and prevent injection, with the exception of SLC and CRD, into the RPV until reactor pressure is below MARFP
- 1. Safety Significance:
- Prevention of fuel damage due to uncontrolled feeding
- 2. Cues:
- Procedural compliance
- 3. Measured by:
- Observation - no injection into the RPV except for SLC and CRD prior to reaching the MARFP that causes a reactor short period alarm or power increase to APRM upscale alarms
- 4. Feedback:
- Reactor power trend, power spikes, reactor short period alarms NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 9 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Critical Task #5 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note: This is a contingent critical task Critical Task #5 - When RPV water level cannot be maintained during an ATWS, when RPV pressure is below the MARFP, slowly increase and control injection into the RPV to restore and maintain RPV level > -25"
- 1. Safety Significance:
- Establish adequate core cooling
- 2. Cues:
- RPV pressure trend
- Procedural compliance
- 3. Measured by:
- RPV level is established and controlled above -25"
- 4. Feedback:
- Lack of power excursion
- Lack of Hydrogen generation
- RPV level and pressure indications NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Perry NRC Exam LC 01-01 Scenario 2 Simulator Setui, and Cues Simulator Setup
- a. Initial Conditions
- 1) Reset to IC 19
- 2) Place RHR A in secured status per SOI-E 12, Section 6.5
- 3) Shift EHC Pumps from A to B per SOI-N32/39/41/51, Section 5.1.1
- 5) Start the HPCS Pump Room Cooler per SOI-M39, Section 4.3
- 6) Verify AGAFs
- 8) Update 101-3 to Section 4.5, Step 35
- 9) Update Simulator Startup Pullsheet - Step 79
- 10) Place red tag on RHR Pump A control switch
- 12) Perform annunciator test and acknowledge TURBINE PLANT SAMPLE TROUBLE alarm
- 13) Load Batch File LNCOIO1-2.txt
- 14) Load Event Trigger File EHCTANKLEVEL2
- 15) Verify no Triggers went active
- 16) Verify rod 42-19 is not magenta on the C91 Core Display. If so, return it to processing by typing in "RTP C1IMD048"
- b. Special Procedures
- 1) 101-4 (working copy)
- 2. Batch File 'LNC01OI-2.txt
- b. IMF TH 12B Active C. IMF ADOIN TRG 3 ADS/SRV F047H cycling
- e. IMF ED06I TRG 6 Loss of 480 Vac Bus F-1-E
- g. IMF RD15 Active ATWS 20% severity
- j. IMFCBO1:IN27COOO A TRG 8 RFBP A spurious breaker trip
- k. IMFCBO1:IN27COOOIB TRG 8 RFBP B spurious breaker trip
- 1. IMFCB01:1N27COOOIC TRG 8 RFBP C spurious breaker trip
- m. IMFCB01:1N27COOOD TRG 8 RFBP D spurious breaker trip
- n. IMF PT02:lC34N0004A TRG 4 NR Level Channel A drift low, 17% severity, 3 min ramp
- 0. IOR ZL1 C41F0004A-AMB Active Squib Valve A continuity light override on
- p. IOR ZL I C4 1F0004B-AMB Active Squib Valve B continuity light override on
- q. IORZLIC41DSIl-AMB Active Squib Valve A status light override off
- r. IOR ZLIC41DSI6-AMB Active Squib Valve B status light override off I
- 3. Event Trigger File
- a. EHCTANKLEVEL2 TCLEHCTANK .LE. 76
- 4. Commands/trigger assignments
- a. TRG 10 EHCTANKLEVEL2
- b. TRG 10 = MMF TC05 35 5:00 10 2
Instructor Cues:
Event 1 None Event 2 Insert TRG 2 one minute after HPCS flow is fully established.
As NLO, report that the HPCS Pump is extremely noisy.
Event 3 Insert TRG 3 when directed.
As I&C / RSE, report that a Work Order will have to be initiated in order to troubleshoot SRV F047H.
Event 4 Insert TRG 4 when directed.
As I&C / RSE, report that a Work Order will have to be initiated in order to troubleshoot Narrow Range Level Transmitter C34-NO04A.
As I&C / RSE, inform the SRO that RPV level control can be returned to the Master Level Controller after Narrow Range Level Transmitter B has been selected.
- Crew must be allowed to return both RFPTs to the MLC before proceeding to Event 5.
Event 5 Insert TRG 5 immediately after both RFPTs has been placed on the MLC.
As NLO / RSE, report that the cause of the trip of RFPT A is unknown. A Work Order will have to be initiated in order to troubleshoot the problem.
As NLO / RSE, report that a Work Order will have to be initiated in order to troubleshoot the failure of B33 FCV B to runback.
Event 6 Insert TRG 6 when directed.
As NLO, report that there is a lockout on 480V Bus F-I-E.
- When the EHC SYSTEM RESERVOIR HI/LO alarm comes in, malfunction TC05 will automatically increase to 35% severity on a 5 minute ramp. No Driver action is required.
As NLO, report that the local gauge for EHC Reservoir Level at the EHC skid is pegged low.
Event 7 As RSE / Maintenance, report that a Work Order will have to be initiated in order to troubleshoot the SLC System failure.
Event 8 Insert TRG 8 either one minute after RPV level is lowered to +100 inches or control rod insertion has commenced.
Event 9 None 35
Objectives and Significance Discussion for Scenario 2 Event I Start HPCS in Full Flow Test Mode to the Suppression Pool - The objective of this event is to evaluate the BOP's ability to perform control manipulations without error while performing a normal system evolution per plant procedures. Procedure usage/compliance and the ability to communicate and make reports to the control room team is evaluated.
This event is significant because a failure to accurately communicate with the SRO will cause Technical Specification requirements to be missed. Any mis-operation of controls could also result in unplanned Technical Specification entry. This event is intended to count as a Normal Evolution for the BOP and SRO.
Event 2 HPCS Pump Flow Degradation/Shutdown HPCS - The objective of this event is to evaluate the BOP's ability to diagnose a problem with the HPCS system, communicate with the SRO, and make corrective action recommendations. This event is significant because it will render HPCS inoperable for the remainder of the scenario and sets up a Technical Specification 3.0.3 entry in Event 3. Failure to perform any actions will cause a failure to properly identify Technical Specification requirements. This event is intended to count as a Component Failure for the BOP and SRO.
Event 3 ADS/SRV B21 -F047H Cycling/Lower reactor power to < 90% using Recirc flow - The objective of this event is to evaluate the BOP's ability to recognize a malfunctioning SRV and to accurately communicate the status to the crew. The SRO's ability to direct actions in accordance with the correct Off-Normal procedure is evaluated. The RO's ability to make a controlled power reduction using Reactor Recirculation Flow is evaluated. This event is significant because a cycling SRV affects core reactivity and requires a reactivity manipulation prior to taking action to maintain the valve closed. This event will also challenge containment parameters if no action is taken, resulting in an unplanned EOP and Technical Specification entry for Suppression Pool parameters, and a missed entry into LCO 3.0.3. This event in intended to count as a Component Failure for the BOP and SRO, and a Reactivity Event for the RO and SRO.
Event 4 Reactor Narrow Range Level Transmitter C34-NO04A Offset High- The objective of this event is to evaluate the RO's ability to correctly diagnose a problem with the Feedwater Control System, make reports to the SRO and to take Immediate Actions in accordance with the correct Off-Normal Instruction. His ability to operate feedwater controls in manual and to perform a feedwater shift in accordance with normal procedures is also evaluated. This event is significant because the failure affects normal reactor water level.
A mis-operation of controls by the RO could result in a reactivity excursion and/or reactor scram. Failure to take any action will cause the plant to operate at a reduce margin to Limiting Safety System Settings and a missed entry into the Operational Requirements Manual. This event is intended to count as an Instrument Failure for the RO and SRO.
Event 5 RFPT A Spurious Trip/Reactor Recirculation FCV B Runback Failure - The objective of this event is to evaluate the crew's ability to respond to an unplanned loss of feedpump and reactivity event. The RO is evaluated on his ability to diagnose and report the correct status of the Recirculation system. The SRO is evaluated on his recognition of Technical Specification entry for Recirculation Flow mis-match and Off-Normal instructions, and to take corrective actions in accordance with those instructions. This event is significant because it impacts core reactivity. Failure to take any action will cause a missed Technical Specification Action requirement. This Event is intended to count as a Component Failure for the RO and BOP.
Event 6 Loss of 48OVac Bus F-I-E/Turbine Control EHC leak/Main Turbine trip and reactor scram - The objective of this event is to evaluate the crew's ability to correctly diagnose a problem with the EHC system, and take appropriate action to remove the plant from service. Crew members are evaluated on their ability to use Alarm Response Instructions and to communicate accurately and effectively. The SRO is evaluated on Command and Control. This event is not intended to count as an individual failure, but instead to create a lead-in failure which necessitates a plant shutdown continuing into the next event.
Event 7 ATWS/SLC Squib Valves Fail to Fire - The objective of this event is to evaluate the crew's ability to mitigate a failure to scram condition. The RO and BOP must perform panel manipulations as directed by the SRO without error. The SRO is evaluated on his use of the correct PEIs (EOPs) and providing correct direction to the other operators.
Standby Liquid Control System will fail in this event requiring the crew to insert control rods in order to shutdown the reactor. This event is significant because the crew must take actions to mitigate the effects of an event that has a high PSA Core Damage Frequency. Failure to take any actions will results in a failure to shutdown the reactor.
This event is intended to count as the Major Event.
Event 8 Loss of All Feedwater Capability - The objective of this event is to evaluate the RO's ability to identify and notify the SRO when all feedwater is lost. The SRO is evaluated on his ability to make decisions within the PEIs based on this change in plant conditions.
An Emergency Depressurization will be required based on this event. This event is intended to count as a post-major component failure that changes the mitigation strategy of the major event.
Event 9 RPV Emergency Depressurization/Inject with low pressure ECCS to maintain adequate core cooling - The objective of this event is to evaluate the crew's ability to take actions to restore and maintain adequate core cooling. The SRO must direct the correct actions prior to RPV level decreasing below the PEI limit. This event is significant because failure to take any action, or take the correct action, could result in a loss of adequate core cooling and lead to core damage. This event is the change in mitigation strategy brought about by the previous event.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Perry Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Reactor startup is in progress with the plant at 5% of rated power. The OPRMs are functional but are inoperable per Tech. Spec. 3.3.1.3 (PLCO). Control Rods at step 48, Gangs 40 and 39 at position 08.
101-1, Section 4.9, Step 1. Service Water Pump C is tagged out for motor refurbishment.
Turnover: 1. Continue plant startup. Withdraw control rods to 10% power, transfer the Reactor Mode Switch to RUN, and continue power ascension. All required MODE change paperwork has been reviewed and approved. 2.
BOP operator shift NCC Pumps from A and B running, to A and C running.
Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N (BOP) Shift NCC Pumps from A and B running, to A and C running N (SRO) 2 RD01 :R1043 R (RO) Increase reactor power to 10% using control rods 8% R(SRO)
C (RO) Control rod 10-43 stuck at position 8 C (SRO) 3 NM02H I (RO) IRM H Failure Upscale 100% I (SRO) (TS 3.3.1.1 and ORM 6.2.3) 4 RD17A C (BOP) CRDH Pump A trip due to loss of lube oil / perform CRD Pump trip recovery 50% C (SRO)
RD05R5443 Accumulator fault HCU 54-43 (TS 3.1.5) (1 minute time delay)
RD05R2215 Accumulator fault HCU 22-15 (TS 3.1.5) (2 minute time delay) 5 CP02: C (BOP) Service Water Pump B trip due to shaft seizure OP41CO01B C (SRO) 6 bat M (All) Seismic Event or/seismic_2 TH02A / TH02B Recirc Loop pipe rupture and reactor scram 100% (TH02A - 6 minute time delay & 5 minute ramp)
(TH02B - 8 minute time delay & 5 minute ramp)
MV08: NCC Drywell Isolation Valve, P43-F215, fails closed OP43F0215 7 bat C Loss of all RPV level indication ms/losslevel2 Emergency Depressurization / RPV Flooding to restore and maintain adequate core cooling
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Shift NCC Pumps from A and B running, to A and C running Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Direct BOP to place NCC Pump C in service and secure NCC Pump B per SOI-P43 BOP Shift NCC Pumps per SOI-P43, Section 5.1
- Directs NLO to throttle NCC Pump C Discharge VIv, P43-F513C, to 10% open
- Take NCC Pump C control switch to START Observes P43-R352, Pump Amps Observes P43-R026C, Discharge Pressure
- Directs NLO to open NCC Pump C Discharge VIv, P43-F513C Observes P43-R352, change in pump amps Observes P43-R026C, change in discharge pressure
- Verify header pressure has stabilized between 94 and 123 psig
- Directs NLO to throttle NCC Pump B Discharge Vlv closed until it Is 2% open
- Immediately take NCC Pump B control switch to STOP
- Directs NLO to open NCC Pump B Discharge Vlv, P43-F513A
- Directs NLO to verify proper discharge check valve operation by confirming no reverse pump rotation BOP Verify NCC System parameters in accordance with SOI-P43 Section 5.0
.4. -4.
1- .4.
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Increase reactor power to 10% using control rods/ Control rod 10-43 stuck at position 8 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Conduct reactivity brief Provides SRO oversight for power ascension RO Withdraw control rods as directed in accordance with the approved rod withdrawal sequence RO Recognize Control Rod 10-43 will not move and inform SRO SRO Acknowledge report of immovable Control Rod 10-43 Enter and execute SOl-Cl 1 (RCIS), Section 7.9.2:
- Directs RO to raise CRDH drive water differential pressure in 50 psid increments until control rod motion is achieved RO Raise CRDH drive water d/p as directed, attempts Control Rod motion Reports Control Rod movement to SRO SRO Directs RO to return CRDH drive water d/p to normal band Directs RO to continue power increase to 10% with control rods Note: Initiate Event 3 during the power increase after rod 10-43 has been moved. Crew will then return to Event 2 to complete the power increase.
Note: Initiate Event 4 after power has been increased to 10%.
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
IRM H Failure Upscale Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes and reports IRM H failure upscale Recognizes and report RPS half-scram Recognizes and reports control rod withdrawal block Closely monitors remaining IRMs BOP Assists RO by consulting ARIs:
- ARI-H13-P680-6 (E3), IRM UPSCALE TRIP/INOP
- ARI.-H13-P680-6 (C2), ROD BLOCK IRM UPSCALE
- ARI-H1 3-P680-5 (B9), 1/1/2 SCRAM B/D
- ARI-H13-P680-5 (B7), RPS NEUTRON MON TRIP
- ARI-H13-P680-5 (E10), ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK SRO Acknowledge report of IRM failure, 1/2 scram, and rod block Suspends Control Rod withdrawal Directs IRM back panel indications checked SRO May enter ONI-C51 if he believes power or reactivity has changed SRO/BOP Requests I&C and Responsible System Engineer assistance in the Control Room to support troubleshooting Consults Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 and ORM 6.2.3 Direct RO to bypass IRM H and reset 1/2 scram Notifies Operations Management of IRM failure and actions taken RO Bypass IRM H per SOI-C51 (IRM), Section 7.1 Reset half-scram B/D per SOI-C71, Section 7.3 Observes IRM, Rod Block, and RPS alarms clear NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
CRDH Pump A trip due to loss of lube oil / perform CRD Pump trip recovery Time Position T Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Responds to, reports, and references ARIs for the following alarms:
H13-P601-22 (C3), CRD SYS CHARGING WATER PRESSURE LOW H13-P601-22 (D2), CRD PUMP AUTO TRIP H13-P601-22 (F2), CRD PUMP A TRIP OIL PRESS LOW H13-P877-1 (G3), Bus XH1 1 BREAKER TRIP Recognizes and reports CRDH Pump A trip/ Aux Oil Pump running RO/BOP Dispatches NLOs to CRDH Pump A and breaker to investigate ROIBOP/SRO Receives report from NLO of a lube oil leak on CRDH Pump A SRO May enter ONI-ZZZ-5, Spills and Unauthorized Discharges BOP Recognizes Aux Oil Pump is running and may request permission to immediately secure the Aux Oil Pump due to the lube oil leak BOP/RO/SRO Requests Maintenance and Responsible System Engineer assistance in the Control Room to support troubleshooting BOP Responds to, reports, and references ARIs for alarm H13-P601-22 (A3) CRD MECHANISM TEMP HIGH SRO Acknowledges CRDH Pump trip and receipt of unexpected alarms Enters ONI-CI1-1, Inability to Move Control Rods
- Directs plant parameters maintained as steady as possible
- Directs CRD Pump trip recovery per SOI-C1 1 (CRDH)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
CRDH Pump A trip due to loss of lube oil / perform CRD Pump trip recovery Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (cont.) - Directs RO to monitor for HCU accumulator fault alarms RO Observes and reports accumulator fault on HCU 54-43 Observes and reports accumulator fault on HCU 22-15 SRO Acknowledges accumulator faults on HCU 54-43 and HCU 22-15 Acknowledges that a CRD Pump must be started within 20 minutes or the reactor must be shutdown Declares control rod accumulators for rods 54-43 and 22-15 inoperable - References LCO 3.1.5 (Control Rod Scram Accumulators). Enters Action B BOP Performs CRD Pump trip recovery per SOl-Cl 1 (CRDH)
- Take CRD Aux Oil Pump B, 1C11-CO02B to Start
- Place CRD Hydraulics Flow Control, 1 C11-R600, in Manual
- Using CRD Hydraulics Flow Control, 1C1 1-R600, fully close Flow Control Valve, 1 C11-FO02B
- Take CRD PUMP B, 1C1 1-CO01B, to Start and observes:
increasing amps for CRD Pump B
- CHARGING WATER LOW PRESSURE alarm clears
- Slowly throttle open CRD Flow Control Valve until flow is returned to the pre-transient setting on CRD Hydraulics Flow Control, 1 C11-R600 Places CRD Hydraulics Flow Control, 1C11-R600, in Auto
__ [____ I__________________
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
CRDH Pump A trip due to loss of lube oil / perform CRD Pump trip recovery Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (cont.)
___ Secures CRD Aux Oil Pump A, 1C11-CO02A, (if not previously secured)
- Coordinate with NLO to complete CRD Pump trip recovery per SOI-C 11 (CRDH)
_SRO Notifies OPS Management and NRC Resident of ONI entry and reason for entry May direct CRDH Pump A and Aux Oil Pump breakers racked out RO Observes and reports that the accumulator faults on control rods 54-43 and 22-15 have cleared.
SRO Declares control rod accumulators for rods 54-43 and 22-15 OPERABLE. Exits LCO 3.1.5, Action B 4 4 4 4
- 4. 4
+ 4
.4. 4
.4. .4.
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Service Water Pump B trip due to shaft seizure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Responds to, reports, and references ARIs for alarms:
H13-P970-1 (B8), SW PUMP DISCH HEADER PRESSURE LOW H13-P877-2 (G3), BUS XH12 BREAKER TRIP Recognizes and reports Service Water Pump B trip Dispatches NLOs to Service Water Pump B and pump breaker BOP/RO/SRO Requests Maintenance and Responsible System Engineer assistance in the Control Room to support troubleshooting SRO Acknowledges report of Service Water Pump B trip Enters ONI-P41, Loss of Service Water
- Directs BOP to start the standby Service Water Pump per SOl-P40/41, Section 5.1 Notifies OPS Management and NRC Resident of ONI entry and reason for entry Directs BOP to complete shutdown of the Service Water Pump B per SOl-P40/41, Section 6.2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Service Water Pump B trip due to shaft seizure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Start standby Service Water Pump per SOI-P40/41 Section 5.1, Note: It would also be acceptable for the BOP to use S0l P40141, Sections 4.1 and 6.1, to restore the Service Water System.
Shifting Service Water Pumps
- Take SW Pump Discharge Valve control switch to Open and press the Stop button when the blue light comes on
- Take SW Pump control switch to START
- When SW Pump amps stabilize, take Discharge Valve control switch to Open
- Throttle NCC HX SW Bypass Valve, P41-F400, as necessary to maintain discharge pressure of all operating SW Pumps at 55-60 psig
- Notify Chemistry to place the Service Water Chlorination System in operation per SOI-P48 BOP Complete shutdown of Service Water Pump B per SOI-P40/41, Section 6.2:
- Take SW Pump Discharge valve control switch to Close and press the Stop button when the blue light comes on
- Take Discharge Valve control switch to Close (Note: Section 6.2 may not be performed to facilitate troubleshooting of Service Water Pump B trip)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
Seismic Event/Recirc Loop pipe rupture and reactor scram/NCC Drywell Isolation Valve, P43-F215, fails closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Responds to, reports, and references ARIs for alarms:
H13-P680-8 (B3), SEISMIC ALARM P969 H13-P680-8 (C3), SEISMIC MOMITOR TROUBLE H13-P680-8 (C4), LOOSE PARTS TRBL SRO Acknowledges Seismic Monitor alarms RO/BOP/SRO Receive multiple reports of earthquake from plant personnel SRO Enters ONI-D51, Earthquake:
- Verifies earthquake is greater than OBE by verifying amber and red lights on panel H13-P969
- Directs all Emergency Service Water Pumps started
- Directs all Plant Underdrain Pumps stopped
- Directs a walkdown of the M29 System
- Directs plant personnel to begin walkdown of plant areas
- Directs RO and BOP to check major plant variables
__ I. ___ _______________
I1
.4-
+/-
- 1*
.4-
.4-NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No,: 6 Page 2 of 4 Event
Description:
Seismic Event/Recirc Loop pipe rupture and reactor scram/NCC Drywell Isolation Valve, P43-F215, fails closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Check and monitor major plant variables BOP Checks panel H13-P969, informs SRO amber and red lights are on Starts all ESW Pumps, as directed by the SRO Contacts NLOs to secure Plant Underdrain Pumps BOP Responds to, reports, and references ARI for alarm:
H13-P601-18 (Cl) DW UNIDENTIFIED RATE OF CHANGE HIGH BOP/RO Report rising Drywell pressure RO/BOP Monitor and trend rising Drywell pressure SRO Due to rising Drywell pressure orders Rx scram, enters ONI-C71-1 If not manually scrammed, reactor automatically scrams at 1.68 psig (a LOCA signal also occurs at 1.68 psig)
RO If directed, arms and depresses RPS Manual Scram Pushbuttons prior to 1.68 psig Drywell pressure SRO Enters PEI-B13, RPV Control (Non-ATWS) due to RPV < L3 and Drywell pressure > 1.68 psig and enters PEI-T23, Containment Control due to Drywell pressure > 1.68 psig
_ _ I _ _I ___ _____
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 3 of 4 Event
Description:
Seismic Event/Recirc Loop pipe rupture and reactor scram/NCC Drywell Isolation Valve, P43-F215, fails closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs PEI-B13, RPV Control (Non-ATWS)
- Verifies reactor is scrammed
- Confirms Reactor Mode Switch is in SHUTDOWN
- Start Hydrogen Analyzers
- Verifies reactor shutdown under all condition without boron
- Verifies SRMs and IRMs inserted
- Directs pressure control band (to be determined by SRO)
- Restores and maintains RPV level between 185 and 215 inches
"* Feedwater - available
" CRD - available
" RCIC - available
" HPCS - available RPV Pressure Control
- Confirms no SRVs are cycling
- Attempt to maintain RPV pressure band using Bypass Valves
- Override low pressure ECCS Pumps per PEI-SPI 5.2
- Condensate and Feedwater will restore RPV level to 185 to 215" RO/BOP Executes PEI-B13, RPV Control (Non-ATWS) actions per SRO direction I.
_ _ I _ _ _ I _ _ _ __ _____
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 4 of 4 Event
Description:
Seismic Event/Recirc Loop pipe rupture and reactor scram/NCC Drywell Isolation Valve, P43-F215, fails closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs actions per PEI-T23, Containment Control, when Drywell pressure reaches 1.68 psig Drywell Temperature Control
- Operates all available DW cooling
- Restores NCC to the DW per PEI-SPI 2.1 Drywell & Containment Pressure Control
- Maintains Containment pressure below PSP Containment Temperature Control
- Operates all available Containment cooling
- Restores CVCW System per PEI-SPI 2.2
- Maintains Containment average temperature less than 185 0 F Suppression Pool Level Control
- Restores and maintains SP level between 17.8 and 18.5 ft Suppression Pool Temperature Control
- Maintains both SP average temperature and RPV pressure below HCL RO/BOP Executes PEI-T23 actions per SRO direction Reports P43-F215, NCC Containment Return Inboard Isolation Valve will NOT open (P43-F215 is failed closed)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Loss of all RPV level indication/Emergency Depressurization/RPV Flooding to restore and maintain adequate core cooling Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note: Loss of RPV level will be triggered when DW temp is 212 0 F, or if the SRO decides that Emergency Depressurization is "Anticipated".
BOP/RO Recognizes loss of all level indication and informs the SRO SRO Determines that RPV level cannot be determined and transitions to PEI-B13, RPV Flooding
- Verifies all Control Rods inserted
- Verifies Suppression Pool level greater than 5.25 feet
- Directs eight (8) ADS SRVs to be opened RO/BOP Open eight (8) ADS SRVs, when directed SRO Directs actions to isolate the reactor vessel RO/BOP Closes MSIV's, MSL drains and RCIC steam valves, when directed SRO Directs RO/BOP to inject to establish RPV pressure 60 psig greater than Containment pressure and at least five (5) SRVs open RO/BOP Operates designated systems and injects to vessel when directed:
RFBPs (PEI-SPI 2.7) or HPCS (PEI-SPI 2.4) are available and low pressure ECCS Systems are available
_ _ I __ I ________
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Loss of all RPV level indication/Emergency Depressurization/RPV Flooding to restore and maintain adequate core cooling Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Maintain RPV pressure 60 psig greater than Containment pressure and at least five (5) SRVs open SRO Enters PEI-M51/56, Hydrogen Control, due to RPV level unknown SRO Directs PEI-M51/56, Hydrogen Control
- Start Hydrogen Igniters RO/BOP Execute PEI-M51/56, Hydrogen Control actions per SRO direction
- Energize Hydrogen Igniters 1-
+
1- t.
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Scenario Termination Criteria Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. Control Rods are fully inserted
- 2. The reactor has been emergency depressurized
- 3. Low pressure ECCS Systems are being used to establish RPV pressure at least 60 psig above Containment pressure
- 4. Containment and Drywell parameters are being restored per PEI-T23, Containment Control I I 4 4
-4 4 T
+ 4
- 1-
.4- 4
+ 4 1- 4
+ 4 1 4 4- 4
+/- 4 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Critical Task #1
[Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task #1 - When RPV water level cannot be determined and the reactor is at pressure, initiate Emergency Depressurization
- 1. Safety Significance:
- Maintain adequate core cooling
- 2. Cues:
- Procedural compliance
- Loss of all water level indication
- 3. Measured by:
- Observation - at least 5 SRVs open prior to re-establishing injection after terminate and prevent actions are completed
- 4. Feedback:
- Reactor pressure trend
- Suppression Pool temperature trend i1 i 1 I I
1- t 1-1 t 1- I NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Critical Task #2
[ Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task #2 - When RPV water level cannot be determined with RPV pressure below the MRFP, increase and control injection into the RPV to restore and maintain RPV pressure above the MRFP
- 1. Safety Significance:
- Establish adequate core cooling
- 2. Cues:
- RPV pressure trend
- Procedural compliance
- 3. Measured by:
- RPV pressure is established and controlled above the MRFP
- 4. Feedback:
- Lack of water level indication
- Lack of Hydrogen generation
- RPV pressure indications 1* -t t *1-1- +
I~
I. +
1 I NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
Perry NRC Exam LC 01-01 Scenario 3 Simulator Setup and Cues Simulator Setup
- a. Initial Conditions
- 1) Reset to IC35
- 2) Using Simulator Startup Pullsheet, withdraw all rods in step 47
- 3) Unbypass IRM
- 4) Place the Off-Gas Adsorbers in service per SOI-N64/62, Section 4.6
- 5) Complete the Main Turbine warmup (pressurize the steam chest) per SOI-N32/39/41/5 1, Section 4.4, steps 24-27
- 6) Secure MSR Steam Blanketing
- 7) Rackout Service Water Pump C breaker and open it's discharge valve disconnect.
- 8) Verify Backup Drywell Purge is secured
- 10) Update 101-1 to Section 4.9, Step I and sign-off all applicable Mode Change steps
- 11) Update Simulator Startup Pullsheet, step 48, gang 40 and 39 at notch 08
- 14) Perform annunciator test and acknowledge TURBINE PLANT SAMPLE TROUBLE alarm
- 15) Load Batch File LNCOIOI-3.txt
- 16) Load Event Trigger Files CRDDRIVEP, CRDPUMPBSTART
- 17) Load Override File SEISMIC_2
- 18) Load Malfunction File LOSSLEVEL2
- 19) Verify no Triggers went active
- 20) Verify rod 42-19 is not magenta on the C91 Core Display. If so, return it to processing by typing in "RTP C11MD048"
- b. Special Procedures I) SOI-C I I(RC&IS) Attachment 11
- 2) 101-4
- 2. Batch File LNC0101-3.txt
- a. IMF RDO1RI 043 Active Control rod 10-43 stuck at position 08
- b. IMF MV08:OP43F0215 Active NCC Drywell Isolation Valve P43-F215 failure when fully closed
- e. IMF RD05R5443 TRG 4 HCU 54-43 accumulator fault 1 minute time delay
- f. IMF RD05R2215 TRG 4 HCU 22-15 accumulator fault 2 minute time delay
- f. IMF CP02: OP4C0003B TRG 5 Service Water Pump 'B' shaft seizure
- g. IMF TH02A TRG 6 Recirc Loop 'A' pipe break 100% severity, 6 minute time delay, 5 minute ramp
- h. IMF TH02B TRG 6 Recirc Loop 'B' pipe break 100% severity, 8 minute time delay, 5 minute ramp I
- 3. Event Trigger File
- a. CRDDRIVEP RDXMlCI 1N0008 .GT. 295
- b. CRDPUMPBSTART RD:lCI 1COOO1BMTR .EQ. 1
- 4. Override File
- a. SEISMIC_2
- 5. Malfunction File
- a. LOSSLEVEL2
- 6. Triggers/Trigger Commands
- a. TRG 6 = ROR SEISMIC_2
- c. TRG 2 CRDDRIVEP
- d. TRG 2 = DMF RDO1RI1043
- e. TRG 10 CRDPUMPBSTART
- f. TRG 11 CRDPUMPBSTART
- g. TRG 10 = DMF RD05R5443
- h. TRG 11 = DMF RD05R2215 2
Instructor Cues:
Event 1 None As NLO, perform operations to support NCC pump shift as directed.
Event 2 None
- Control Rod 10-43 malfunction will automatically delete itself when CRD drive water d/p is raised above 295 psig.
Event 3 Note: Ensure the BOP is not up at P680 when inserting the IRM failure.
Insert TRG 3 when directed during Control Rod withdrawal.
As I&C, report that a Work Order will have to be initiated in order to troubleshoot IRM H failure.
Event 4 Insert TRG 4 after power has been increased to 10%.
As NLO / RSE, report that CRD Pump A has a lube oil leak.
As NLO, report that HCU 54-43 accumulator pressure is 1400 psig, and HCU 22-15 accumulator pressure is 1450 psig.
Both Accumulator Faults will automatically clear when CRD Pump B is started. No Driver action is required.
Event 5 Insert TRG 5 when directed.
As NLO, report that breaker XH1203 for Service Water Pump B has tripped on overcurrent on all 3 phases.
Event 6 Insert TRG 6 when directed.
As various plant personnel, report that you have felt an earthquake within the plant.
As NLO, report that disconnect EFIC07-NN for 1P43-F215 has a blown main line on Phase A.
Event 7 Insert TRG 7 when Drywell temperature reaches 212 'F, OR if the SRO decides that Emergency Depressurization is "Anticipated".
3
Objectives and Significance Discussion for Scenario 3 Event 1 Shift NCC Pumps from A and B running, to A and C running - The objective of this event is to evaluate the BOP's ability to perform a normal equipment re-alignment in accordance with normal plant procedures. His ability to perform control manipulations without error, communication skills, and the directing of NLOs will also be evaluated. A control misoperation during this event could result in a degradation or loss of cooling to components located in the Containment and Drywell. This event is intended to count as a Normal Evolution for the BOP and SRO.
Event 2 Increase reactor power to 10% using control rods/ Control rod 10-43 stuck at position 8 The objective of this event is to evaluate the RO's ability to perform a normal reactivity addition using control rods in accordance with normal plant procedures. All requirements for the normal movement of control rods must be adhered to. Reactivity Management oversight by the SRO is also evaluated. The SRO will conduct a reactivity brief and will arrange for a person to verify control rod movements. During this event the crew will encounter a problem of a control rod failing to move. This is a typical problem encountered during plant startup and will be corrected by the crew using normal plant procedures. Use of procedures and the SRO's ability to properly direct the evolution is evaluated. This event is significant because incorrect performance could result in excessive rod speeds and a departure from the established control rod pattern.
This event is intended to count as a Reactivity Event and a Component Failure for the RO and SRO.
Event 3 IRM H Failure Upscale - The objective of this event is to evaluate the RO's ability to diagnose the correct cause of an unplanned half scram. His ability to make accurate reports to the SRO, and procedural compliance is also evaluated. The RO will correct the problem by bypassing the IRM and resetting the half scram as directed by the SRO. The SRO will evaluate Technical Specification and ORM requirements. This event is significant because the distraction of the failure could allow reactor power to reach the scram setpoint on the IRMs. Failure to take any action will result in keeping the plant in a prolonged half scram condition. This event is intended to count as an Instrument Failure for the RO and SRO.
Event 4 CRDH Pump A trip due to loss of lube oil / perform CRD Pump trip recovery - The objective of this event is to evaluate the crew's response to a loss of CRD Pump. The BOP must correctly diagnose the cause of the pump trip and start the standby pump using normal plant procedures. The SRO is evaluated in the use of the correct Off-Normal procedures and in command and control of the event. The SRO must also evaluate Technical Specifications due to the low pressure conditions on two HCU accumulators.
If the crew does not start the standby pump within 20 minutes, then Technical Specifications require a manual scram. This event is significant because failure to take correct action in a timely manner will result in a violation of Technical Specification requirements or an unnecessary plant scram. This event is intended to count as a Component Failure for the BOP and SRO.
Event 5 Service Water Pump B trip due to shaft seizure - The objective of this event is to evaluate the BOP response to alarms, diagnosis of plant conditions, and ability to make accurate reports to the SRO. The SRO must enter the correct Off-Normal instruction and direct actions for this event. This event is significant because it creates a degradation of all of the plant's closed cooling water systems. Failure to take any action could cause high temperatures in these systems leading to equipment damage or an unnecessary plant shutdown. Additionally, failure to correct the low header pressure condition would cause a loss of keep-fill pressure to all divisions of Emergency Service Water. The BOP will correct the condition by starting the standby Service Water Pump in accordance with normal plant procedures. This event is intended to count as a Component Failure for the BOP and SRO.
Event 6 Seismic Event/Recirc Loop pipe rupture and reactor scram/NCC Drywell Isolation Valve, P43-F215, fails closed - The objective of this event is to evaluate the crew's actions to respond to a seismic event. Initial actions involve responding to alarms and indications to determine that a plant shutdown is required. All loops of Emergency Service Water must be started. The RO and BOP are evaluated on their ability to make accurate and timely reports to the SRO, and to perform control panel manipulations without error. The SRO must prioritize and direct actions in accordance with the correct Off-Normal instruction. The crew must respond to a Recirculation System pipe break and mitigate that event in accordance with the correct PEIs (EOPs). This event is significant because of the threat to adequate core cooling, containment integrity, and the PSA risk to core damage frequency. The crew will not be able to restore Drywell cooling because of a valve failure. This event is intended to count as the Major Event.
Event 7 Loss of all RPV level indication/Emergency DepressurizationiRPV Flooding to restore and maintain adequate core cooling - The objective of this event is to evaluate the crew's ability to mitigate the loss of RPV level indication caused by the inability to restore Drywell cooling. The SRO must utilize EOP Contingency procedures to depressurize and flood the RPV to establish adequate core cooling. The RO and BOP are evaluated on their ability to perform steps as directed without error, and to make clear and accurate reports to the SRO. The SRO is evaluated on Command and Control, and procedure usage within the PEIs. This event is significant due to the challenge to core cooling without RPV level indication. Failure to take the correct action in a timely manner could result in core damage. This event is intended to count as a post-major component failure that changes the mitigation strategy of the Major Event.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Perry Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at 80% power. RHR A is in secured status for preventive maintenance on the pump breaker. RHR A was declared inoperable five hours ago per Tech. Spec.3.5.1, Action A; 3.6.1.7, Action A; and 3.6.2.3, Action A. The OPRMs are functional but are inoperable per Tech. Spec. 3.3.1.3. Required Action A.3 has been implemented. Performing a normal plant shutdown per 101-3, Section 4.6 step 2. 101-3, Step 4.6.4a, has been performed. Control rods are at step 62, position 36.
Turnover: BOP operator shift AEGTS trains from A to B running. Continue the plant shutdown by reducing power using Recirculation Flow to 58 Mlbm/hr. Hold power there for Reactor Engineering.
Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N (BOP) Shift AEGTS trains from A to B N (SRO) 2 R (RO) Reduce Reactor Power using Recirculation Flow R(SRO) 3 CN02: I (BOP) RFPT A Lube Oil Temp controller failure in Auto mode 1P44R0450 I (SRO) 0%
4 NM04D I (RO) APRM D failure upscale (TS 3.3.1.1.A and ORM 6.2.1.B) 125% I (SRO) 5 CN03:1C34R0 I (RO) Reactor Feed Pump B controller oscillations (1 minute ramp) 601B I (SRO) 20%
6 CP02: C(BOP) TBCC Pump A trip (start standby TBCC Pump) 1P44C0001A C(SRO)
SW03 TBCC System Process Piping Leakage (2 minute time delay and 5 minute ramp) 10% Fast Reactor Shutdown required 7 TH28 M (All) MSL Break in Drywell 1%
PC01A DW-CNTMT Bypass Leakage (to be modified in Event #8) 0%
CB04: C (BOP) RHR Pump B fails to auto start on Drywell high pressure (required for 1E12C0002B C (SRO) Containment Spray mode) 8 CB01: C RHR Pump B trips when flow is aligned to containment spray 1E12C0002B RPV emergency depressurization to control Containment pressure
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Shift AEGTS trains from A to B
[Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Direct BOP to shift AEGTS trains from A to B per SOI-M15 NOTE: During this evolution, the following expected alarms are received:
- H13-P800-1(A2), ANNULUS DIFF PRESS A LOW
- H13-P800-1 (Dl), ANNULUS EXH FAN B FLOW LOW BOP Shift AEGTS trains from A to B per SOI-M15, Section 5.1
- Confirms Backup Drywell Purge is not in operation by verifying valves M51-F090 and F110 are closed on panel H13-P800.
- De-energizes AEGT ELEC HT COIL A, 1M15-D001A, by taking its control switch to STOP
- After 5 minutes, start the standby AEGT FAN B, 1M15-CO01B, by placing the control switch in ON
- Energizes AEGT ELEC HT COIL B, 1M15-DOO1B, by taking its control switch to START
- Allows 1 to 2 minutes for the Train B dampers to reposition Checks ANNULUS DIFF PRESSURE RECORDERS, 1M15-RO16A and 1M15-R016B, for proper annulus pressure
- Confirms ANNULUS EXH FAN B FLOW LOW annunciator, window 1H13-P800-1 (DI), is reset I ________________ I ______________________________________________________________________________
I I~
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Shift AEGTS trains from A to B Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Cont) - Shutsdown AEGT Fan A as follows:
Holds AEGT FAN A, 1M15-CO01A, control switch in STOP After allowing 1 to 2 minutes for the Train B dampers to Reposition, checks ANNULUS DIFF PRESSURE RECORDER, 1M15-R016A, to ensure annulus pressure Is maintained between 0.75 and 1.0' H20 vacuum Confirms ANNULUS EXH FAN B FLOW LOW Annunciator, window 1H13-P800-1 D1, is reset Take AEGT FAN A, 1MI5-COO1A, control switch to STOP I t I 1" I t I
1 I 1-1 I t i t I t
I -r I i-1 -I-I +
I t I I-I 1-NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Reduce Reactor Power using Recirculation Flow Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO/RO/BOP Hold reactivity brief SRO Directs RO to reduce reactor power using Recirc flow until core flow is equal to 58MIbm/hr
- Verifies with Reactor Engineering that repositioning of control rods is not required to satisfy thermal limits
- Provides SRO oversight for power decrease RQ/BOP Notifies SCC. Chem and HP of intent to lower reactor power RO -Decreases reactor power using Recirc Loop Flow Controllers until Core flow equals 58 Mlbm/hr
- Maintains Recirc loop flows matched within 10%
NOTE: After power decreases approximately 5% power. continue scenario into next event.
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
RFPT A Lube Oil Temp controller failure in Auto mode Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Respond to, report, and reference ARI for Alarm H13-P870-8 (A2),
RFPT A LUBE OIL CLR OUTLET TEMP HIGH BOP Determine RFPT LUBE OIL TEMP CONTROL A, 1P44-R450 has failed in Auto mode SRO Acknowledge alarm report and RFPT A Lube Oil Temperature Controller failure in the Auto mode RO/BOP May report, respond, and reference ARI for Alarm H13-P680-7 (B14), RFPT A VIB/TEMP P823 BOP Place the RFPT LUBE OIL TEMP CONTROL A, 1 P44-R450, in Manual and increase cooling water flow Inform SRO that 1P44-R450 has been placed in Manual and cooling water flow has been increased to RFPT Lube Oil Cooler SRO In accordance with Operations Expectations:
- Assign BOP operator as clear "owner" to closely monitor RFPT Lube Oil temperature
- Consider placing an Information Tag on RFPT A LUBE OIL TEMP CONTROL, 1 P44-R450 BOP Closely monitor RFPT A Lube Oil temperature BOP/RO Request I&C and Responsible System Engineer assistance to support troubleshooting I _ I I NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
APRM D failure upscale F Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes and reports APRM D failure upscale Recognizes and report RPS half-scram Recognizes and reports control rod withdrawal block Closely monitors remaining APRMs BOP Assists RO by consulting ARIs:
-ARI-H13-P680-6 (E5), APRM D/H TRIP/INOP OPRM D/H TRIP
- ARI-H13-P680-5 (B9), 1/2 SCRAM B/D
-ARI-H13-P680-5 (B7), RPS NEUTRON MON TRIP
- ARI-H1 3-P680-5 (El 0), ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK
- ARI-H13-P680-6 (C4), ROD BLOCK APRM UPSCALE SRO Acknowledge report of APRM failure, half-scram, and rod block Directs APRM back panel indications checked SRO/BOP Requests I&C and Responsible System Engineer assistance in the Control Room to support troubleshooting SRO Consults Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 and ORM 6.2.1 Direct RO to bypass APRM D and reset half-scram Notifies Operations Management of APRM failure & actions taken RO Bypass APRM D per SOI-C51 (APRM), Section 7.1 Reset half-scram B/D per SOI-C71, Section 7.3 Observes APRM, Rod Block, and RPS alarms clear
_ _ I __ I _ _______
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Reactor Feed Pump B controller oscillations Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Reports Feed Flow I Steam Flow mismatch Reports reactor water level oscillations Reports RX LEVEL HI/LO L7/L4 alarm (H13-P680-3 (A9))
BOP Supports RO by consulting ARI-H13-P680-3 (A9)
SRO Acknowledges receipt of unexpected alarm Enters ONI-C34 due to malfunction of feedwater level control
- Directs RO to transfer control of the affected RFPT(s) to the Manual Speed Control Dial and maintain reactor water level 192 to 200 inches
- Directs RO to place RFP A(B) FLOW CONTROL for the affected RFPT(s) to Manual
- Coordinates with RO/BOP to complete applicable Supplemental Actions RO Transfers control of the affected RFPT(s) to the Manual Speed Control Dial and maintains reactor water level 192 to 200 inches RO/BOP Requests Responsible System Engineer and I&C assistance in the Control Room to support troubleshooting SRO Notifies OPS Management and NRC Resident of ONI-C34 entry and reason for entry
_ _ _ _ I ________ i NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Reactor Feed Pump B controller oscillations Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Evaluates feedwater level control options SRO Note: If only RFPT B is transferred to the Manual Speed Control Dial, then the following actions will be NA SRO Directs RO to transfer RFPT A (B) from the Manual Speed Control Dial to the Startup Level Control per SOI-C34, Section 4.6
- Provides SRO oversight during feedwater level control shift One RFPT will be on the SULC and the other RFPT will be base loaded SRO Directs BOP to monitor reactor power and reactor pressure during the feedwater level control shift BOP Monitors reactor power and reactor pressure RO Transfers RFPT A (B) from the Manual Speed Control Dial to the Startup Level Control
- Verifies RFPT B (A) is being controlled by RFPT B (A)
Manual Speed Control Dial NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
TBCC Pump A trip/TBCC System Process Piping Leakage/Fast Reactor Shutdown required
[Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes and reports TBCC Pump A trip Responds to alarm. Consults ARI-H13-P870-1 (B6)
BOP Dispatches NLOs to TBCC Pump A and pump breaker BOP/RO/SRO Requests Maintenance assistance to support troubleshooting SRO Acknowledges report TBCC Pump A trip Enters ONI-P44, Loss of Turbine Building Closed Cooling
- Directs BOP to start the standby TBCC pump per SOI-P44 Notifies OPS Management of ONI entry and reason for entry BOP Starts standby TBCC Pump per SOI-P44, Section 4.2.
- Directs NLO to throttle closed standby TBCC Pump discharge valve to 20% open
- Takes standby TBCC Pump control switch to start
- Directs NLO to fully open standby TBCC Pump discharge valve May direct NLO to reset overcurrent trip BOP Responds to, reports, and references ARIs for alarms:
- ARI-H13-P870-2 (H2), TBCC SURGE TANK LEVEL LOW
-ARI-H13-P870-2 (H4), TBCC PUMP SUCTION FLOW LOW May dispatch NLO to open the manual bypass valve around the auto makeup valve in order to fill the TBCC surge tank BOP/RO I Receives report bypass valve is open and surge tank level is continuing to decrease NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
TBCC Pump A tripITBCC System Process Piping Leakage/Fast Reactor Shutdown required Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Recognizes and reports loss of TBCC SRO Acknowledges report of loss of TBCC Re-enters ONI-P44, Loss of Turbine Building Closed Cooling
- Orders fast reactor shutdown, enters ONI-C71-1, Rx Scram
- Will also enter PEI-B13, RPV Control (Non-ATWS) due to < L3 PEI-B13 RPV Control actions are described in Event six (6)
- Directs ONI-C71-1 Supplemental Actions
- Directs ONI-P44 Supplemental Actions as time permits
- Any component or system served by the TBCC System that reaches its temperature limit shall be placed in the secured status per its applicable SOI SRO/BOP/RO May direct NLO to walkdown TBCC System SRO/BOP/RO If NLO was directed to perform system walkdown, receives report of water in Turbine Building at Elevation 605 RO Respond to, report, and reference ARIs for Alarms:
H13-P680-9 (D1), ISOPHASE BUS CLG TRBL H13-P680-7 (B131), GENERATOR TEMP P811 H13-P680-7 (D 9), H2 SEAL/STATOR CLG TRBL RO/BOP Carry out ONI-C71-1 actions as SRO directs RO/BOP Carry out ONI-P44 actions as SRO directs NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
MSL Break in Drywell/DW-CNTMT Bypass Leakage/RHR Pump B fails to auto start on Drywell high pressure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO/RO/BOP Recognize rising Drywell Pressure condition SRO Enters PEI-B13 RPV Control (Non-ATWS) due to < L3, high RPV press, and Drywell pressure > 1.68 psig.
Enters PEI-T23, Containment Control due to Drywell pressure
> 1.68 psig SRO Directs PEI-B13, RPV Control (Non-ATWS)
- Verifies reactor is scrammed
- Confirms Reactor Mode Switch is in SHUTDOWN
- Start Hydrogen Analyzers
- Verifies reactor shutdown under all condition without boron
- Verifies SRMs and IRMs inserted
- Directs pressure control 700 to 900 psig using SRVs RPV Pressure Control
- Stabilizes RPV pressure 800 to 1000 psig (Note: As Containment pressure rises, SRO may direct RPV rapidly depressurized to the Main Condenser using Main Turbine Bypass Valves)
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 2 Event Description MSL Break in Drywell/DW-CNTMT Bypass Leakage/RHR Pump B fails to auto start on Drywell high pressure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Cont.) RPV Level Control
- Restores and maintains RPV level between 185 and 215 inches
- CRD - available
- RCIC - available
- HPCS - available
- Reactor Feedwater Booster Pumps and Motor Feed Pump Should be unavailable for level control due to loss of TBCC RO/BOP Executes PEI-B1 3, RPV Control (Non-ATWS) actions per SRO direction RO/BOP Verifies automatic plant response is as expected BOP Recognizes failure of RHR Pump B to auto start on high Drywell pressure and manually starts RHR Pump B BOP When conditions allow, informs SRO of failure of RHR Pump B to auto start and subsequent manual start SRO Acknowledges failure of RHR Pump B to auto start SRO Directs actions per PEI-T23, Containment Control, when Drywell press reaches 1.68 psig (described in Event 7)
__ I ___ [________________
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
RHR Pump B trips when flow is aligned to containment spray/RPV emergency depressurization to control Containment pressure
[ Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs actions per PEI-T23, Containment Control, when Drywell pressure reaches 1.68 psig Drywell and Containment Temperature Control
- Operates all available DW cooling
- Restores NCC to the DW per PEI-SPI 2.1
- Operates all available Containment cooling
- Restores CVCW System per PEI-SPI 2.2
- Attempts to maintain Cont. average temperature less than 185 0 F Drywell & Containment Pressure Control
- Attempts to maintain Containment pressure below PSP
- Directs RHR Loop B in the Containment Spray Mode when Containment pressure exceeds 2.25 psig per PEI-SPI 3.1 Suppression Pool Level Control
- Restores and maintains SP level between 17.8 and 18.5 ft Suppression Pool Temperature Control
- Maintains both SP average temperature and RPV pressure below HCL RO/BOP Executes PEI-T23 actions per SRO direction Recognizes RHR Pump B trips when flow is aligned to Spray Containment and immediately informs SRO NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
RHR Pump B trips when flow is aligned to containment spray/RPV emergency depressurization to control Containment pressure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP),
exits PEI-B13, RPV Control (Non-ATWS), RPV Pressure Leg and enters PEI-B13, Emergency Depressurization SRO Executes PEI-B13, RPV Control (Non-ATWS), RPV Level Control Leg concurrently with PEI-B13, Emergency Depressurization SRO Directs RO/BOP actions per PEI-B13, Emergency Depressurization
- Confirms that the reactor is shutdown under all conditions without boron
- Verifies Drywell pressure is > 1.68 psig
- Verifies no low pressure ECCS are required for adequate core cooling
- Prevents injection from LPCS and LPCI
- Verifies eight or more SRVs are not open
- Verifies Suppression Pool level is > 5.25 ft
- Opens all ADS valves to rapidly depressurize the RPV
- Crew should continue to restore and maintain RPV level 185-215" using available injection systems during Emergency Depressurization RO/BOP Executes PEI-B13, Emergency Depressurization actions per SRO direction
_ _ I __ I _ _______
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Scenario Termination Criteria Timee Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. Control Rods are fully inserted
- 2. The reactor has been emergency depressurized
- 4. Containment and Drywell parameters are being restored per PEI-T23, Containment Control
-F 4- 4 1- -F
+ 4 1-NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:- 7 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Critical Task #1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task #1 - With Containment pressure exceeding 2.25 psig, and prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure, attempt to initiate Containment Spray
- 1. Safety Significance:
- Precludes an unrequired Emergency Depressurization
- 2. Cues:
- Containment pressure increase
- Procedural compliance
- 3. Measured by:
- Observation - With Containment pressure at least 2.25 psig, Containment Spray is manually initiated prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure
- 4. Feedback:
"-"Containment Spray Start Signal Received" alarm status NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Critical Task #2
[7Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task #2 - When Containment pressure cannot be maintained below the Pressure Suppression Pressure, initiate Emergency depressurization of the RPV prior to exceeding PSP
- 1. Safety Significance:
- Precludes degradation of a fission product barrier
- 2. Cues:
- Increasing Containment pressure
- Procedural compliance
- 3. Measured by:
- Observation - At least 5 SRVs must be open prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure
- 4. Feedback:
- RPV pressure decreasing
- SRV status indications 1 t +
I t I 1-i i t I I I t I NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Perry NRC Exam LC 01-01 Scenario 4 Simulator Setup and Cues
- 1. Simulator Setup
- a. Initial Conditions
- 1) Reset to IC 27
- 2) Shift M15 trains to A running, B in standby
- 3) Place RHR A in secured status per SO]-E 12, Section 6.5
- 4) Verify AGAFs
- 5) Reduce reactor power to 80% with recirc flow
- 6) Move control rods as required to achieve the correct rod pattern for step 62, rods @ 36 in the Shutdown pullsheets
- 7) Adjust reactor power to 80% with recirc flow as required
- 8) Close N21-F220
- 10) Update 101-3 to Section 4.6, Step 2 and 4a
- 11) Update Simulator Shutdown Pullsheet - Step 62, rods @ 36
- 12) Place red tag on RHR Pump A control switch
- 14) Perform annunciator test and acknowledge TURBINE PLANT SAMPLE TROUBLE alarm
- 15) Load Batch File LNC0101-4.txt
- 16) Load Event Trigger Files TBCCPUMPC, E12F537B2, and RXPRESS500
- 17) Verify no Triggers went active
- 18) Verify rod 42-19 is not magenta on the C91 Core Display. If so, return it to processing by typing in "RTP C 11MD048"
- b. Special Procedures
- 1) None
- 2. Batch File LNC0101-4.txt
- b. IMF NM04D TRG 4 APRM D fails upscale, 125% severity C. IMF CN03:1 C34R060 lB TRG 5 RFPT B Controller Oscillations, 20% severity, I minute ramp
- d. IMF CP02: 1P44C0001 A TRG 6 TBCC Pump A trip
- f. IMF PCOIA Active DW/CNTMT Bypass Leakage, 0% severity
- g. IMF CB04: E I2CO002B Active RHR Pump B failure to Auto start
- h. IMF SW03 TRG 10 TBCC system leakage, 2 min. delay, 5 minute ramp
- 3. Event Trigger File
- a. TBCCPUMPC ZDIP44COOOC(2) .EQ. 1.0
- b. E12F537B2 RHVP1E12FO537B .EQ. 1.0 C. RXPRESS THPSTDOMEGD .LT. 500.00
- 4. Commands/trigger assignments
- a. TRG 10 TBCCPUMPC
- b. TRG 8 E12F537B2
- c. TRG 9 RXPRESS500
- d. TRG 9 =MMFPCOIA25 I
Instructor Cues:
Event I None Event 2 None Event 3 Insert TRG 3 when directed As I&C, report that a Work Order will have to be initiated in order to troubleshoot the failure of the RFPT A Lube Oil Temperature Controller in the Auto mode.
Event 4 Insert TRG 4 when directed.
As I&C / RSE, report that a Troubleshooting Log will have to be initiated in order to troubleshoot the APRM D failure.
Event 5 Insert TRG 5 when directed.
As I&C / RSE, report that a Troubleshooting Log will have to be initiated in order to troubleshoot the FDW Level Control System.
As I&C / RSE, inform the SRO that the problem is in the C34-R601B controller only. The Startup Level Controller, or RFPT A operation on the Master Level Controller in not affected.
Event 6 Insert TRG 6 when directed.
As NLO, report that breaker FIB 10 for TBCC Pump A tripped on overcurrent on all 3 phases.
- TBCC System Process leak will automatically initiate when the BOP starts TBCC Pump C.
As NLO, if directed back to the TBCC Pumps, report that the TBCC Pumps are cavitating (reason is unknown).
- Location of the break is TB 605' (west).
Event 7 Insert TRG 7 five (5) minutes after the reactor is manually scrammed in Event 6.
Event 8 *RHR Pump B will automatically trip when E12-F537B opens during Containment Spray initiation.
As NLO, report that the reason for the trip of RHR Pump B is unknown, There are no tripped relays on the breaker cubicle.
- TRG 9 automatically activates when reactor pressure decreases to 500 psig in order to modify PCOIA to 25% which will require the crew to exceed PSP if Emergency Depressurization is not performed.
2
Objectives and Significance Discussion for Scenario 4 Event I Shift AEGTS trains from A to B - The objective of this event is to evaluate the BOP operator's ability to perform a shift of running equipment using normal plant procedures. He is evaluated on his ability to follow procedural steps and manipulate panel controls without error.
Communication with the SRO is evaluated as he responds to expected alarms in accordance with plant procedures. If this evolution is not performed correctly, an unplanned ESF actuation can occur if the standby fan automatically starts. This event is intended to count as a Normal Event for the BOP and SRO.
Event 2 Reduce Reactor Power using Recirculation Flow - The objective of this event is to evaluate the RO and SRO as they conduct a planned reduction of reactor power using the normal recirculation flow method. The SRO will conduct a reactivity brief and perform oversight. The RO is evaluated on his ability to manipulate reactivity controls in a safe and conservative manner, and to maintain recirculation system parameters within Tech Spec limits. This event is intended to count as a Reactivity Event for the RO and SRO.
Event 3 RFPT A Lube Oil Temp controller failure in Auto mode - The objective of this event is to evaluate the BOP's and SRO's ability to diagnose and correct an instrument failure that has caused a loss of lube oil temperature control for an operating feed pump. Response to unexpected alarms, and diagnostic skills is evaluated. The BOP will refer to Alarm Response Instructions and take actions as directed to control temperature using manual control. This event is significant because if no action is taken, bearing temperature and vibration levels will increase to the point that permanent damage to the feed pump could occur. This event is intended to count as an Instrument Failure for the BOP and SRO.
Event 4 APRM D failure upscale - The objective of this event is to evaluated the RO's and SRO's response to an APRM failure causing an RPS Half Scram. The RO must correctly determine that a full scram should not have occurred. He must identify and notify the SRO of the cause of the half scram signal and must not take any inappropriate actions. The SRO must direct bypassing the failed APRM, and reset the half scram. The SRO is evaluated on his command and control and his evaluation of Tech Specs and the ORM requirements for OPERABILITY. This event is significant because if no action is taken the plant will be operating with a prolonged half scram signal, reducing the margin to an unplanned plant trip. This event is intended to count as an Instrument Failure for the RO and SRO.
Event 5 Reactor Feed Pump B controller oscillations - The objective of this event is to evaluate the RO's and the SRO's ability to take corrective actions to stabilize RPV level in accordance with plant procedures. The RO is evaluated on his ability to diagnose and report a problem with feedwater level control and identify the affected pump. The SRO is evaluated on directing actions in accordance with the correct Off-Normal Instructions, and performing management notifications.
The RO must take Off-Normal Instruction Immediate Actions from memory. The RO must demonstrate his ability to manipulate feedwater controls in manual without causing a reactor scram. The RO must also return the feedwater control system back to an automatic mode without error. Use of Normal, Off-Normal, and Alarm Response Instructions are evaluated in this event. This event is significant because if no actions are taken RPV level will oscillate outside of normal operating bands causing perturbations in load and power. If the RO incorrectly operates feedwater controls, he may cause a plant scram. This event is intended to count as an Instrument Failure for the RO and SRO.
Event 6 TBCC Pump A trip/TBCC System Process Piping Leakage/Fast Reactor Shutdown required The objective of this event is to evaluate the BOP's and SRO's response to a loss of a running Turbine Building Closed Cooling Pump. The BOP must utilize Alarm Response Instructions and his knowledge of equipment power supplies to identify the loss of the TBCC pump, and then start the standby pump. Failure to perform these actions would result in elevated temperatures on components cooled by the system and ultimately result in equipment damage. This event includes a postulated piping failure initiated by the pressure surge of starting the standby pump.
The SRO must identify the loss of TBCC, enter the correct Off-Normal Instruction and direct the plant to be shutdown. Use of procedures and SRO command and control is evaluated. The RO is evaluated on his response to the direction to shutdown the reactor as ordered. This event is intended to count as a Component Failure for the BOP and SRO, and serve as the lead in event for the major event.
Event 7 MSL Break in Drywell/DW-CNTMT Bypass Leakage/RHR Pump B fails to auto start on Drywell high pressure - The objective of this event is to evaluate the crew's response to a plant scram, and to stabilize conditions in the containment when an abnormal temperature and pressure situation is presented to them. The SRO is evaluated on his ability to enter all appropriate PEIs (EOPs) and to direct corrective actions. The RO and BOP are evaluated on their ability to perform actions as directed without error, and to maintain RPV parameters within the required bands. The crew is evaluated on their ability to recognize degrading conditions in containment in a timely manner and take additional corrective actions for a high containment pressure. The RO/BOP must recognize a failure of RHR Pump B to automatically start as required and take actions to start the pump. This event is significant because the crew must take manual actions to maintain adequate core cooling and maintain Containment integrity. This event is intended to count as the Major Event.
Event 8 RHR Pump B trips when flow is aligned to containment spray/RPV emergency depressurization to control Containment pressure - The objective of this event is to evaluate the crew's ability to respond to a failure of the previous attempts to control Containment parameters. The RO and BOP is evaluated on their control board awareness to recognize a loss of the only running Containment Spray pump. The SRO must correctly follow PEI direction and utilize his judgement to determine that an Emergency Depressurization is required. The SRO is evaluated on his correct transition to contingency EOPs to perform this action. The RO and BOP are evaluated on their ability to perform actions from memory as required. The crew is evaluated on their ability to perform all actions in accordance with approved procedures and begin the Emergency Depressurization process prior to Containment pressure exceeding Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP). This event is significant because the pressure suppression capacity of containment may be lost if the crew performs actions incorrectly or allows PSP to be exceeded without first conducting an Emergency Depressurization. This event is intended to count as a post major Component Failure that affects the mitigation strategy of the major event.
1,1 ý,
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Perry Scenario No.: 5 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at 45% power. SLC Pump A is Red Tagged OOS for a coupling alignment. SLC A was declared inoperable per Tech Spec 3.1.7, Condition A, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago.
SPCU is operating through the SPCU Demineralizer, returning via RHR A. SOI-G42, Sections 4.1 and 5.1 were performed. The OPRMs are functional but are inoperable per Tech Spec 3.3.1.3. Required Action A.3 has been implemented. Performing a normal plant startup per 101-3, Section 4.5, step 8.
101-3, steps 4.5.13 and 4.5.15 have been performed. Control Rods are at step 71, position 36 Turnover: Secure from SPCU operations per SOI-G42. Continue the plant startup per 101-3. Withdraw control rods to 50% power and hold for Reactor Engineering.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N(BOP) SPCU Pump Shutdown from the Normal SPCU to Suppression Pool Return Line N(SRO) 2 R(RO) Withdraw Control Rods to increase reactor power to 50%
R(SRO) 3 RD02R5431 C(RO) Uncoupled Control Rod 54-31 (TS 3.1.3)
C(SRO) 4 MC04A C(BOP) Cirw Pump A Suction Chamber Low Level / Cirw Pump A shutdown C(SRO) 5 MS1 1 C(BOP) Steam Seal Header Pressure Control Valve failure closed / Manual control of C(SRO) Steam Seal Header pressure 6 MV08, MV03 C Loss of NCC Cooling Water flow to Drywell loads (P43-F400 fails closed) 0P43F0400 7 RY02:1C71 I(RO) Failure of RPS to shutdown the reactor/Manual initiation of ARI K14A, C, E, G I(SRO) 8 RD15 M(AII) ATWS - 50%
9 MS05A,B,C, C MSIV closure / Loss of Main Condenser D,E,F,G,H MV03:1 B21 F 0016,19 S(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
SPCU Pump Shutdown from the Normal SPCU to Suppression Pool Return Line Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs BOP to shutdown the SPCU System in accordance with SOI-G42, Section 6.1.
BOP Shutdown SPCU System per SOI-G42, Section 6.1
- Establishes communications between the Control Room and the operator at SPCU Pump Discharge to Return Header 1G42-F511
- Confirms SPCU DEMIN OUTLET ISOL, 1G42-F080, is open
- Performs the following to remove the demineralizer from service:
- Transfers system flow to short cycle recirc by concurrently performing the following:
Directs NLO to throttle open SPCU Pump Discharge to Return Header, 1G42-F51 1, to 1 / turns open Throttles closed SPCU PUMP DISCH TO SPCU DEMIN, 1G42-F070, on 1H13-P870, until closed
- Directs NLO to throttle SPCU Pump Discharge to Return Header, 1G42-F511, as necessary to obtain a flowrate of 950 to 1000 gpm as read on SPCU PUMP DISCH FLOW, G42-R053, on 1H13-P870
- Directs the Radwaste Operator to perform Removing the Suppression Pool Demineralizer from Service per RWI-G42
- Takes SPCU DEMIN OUTLET ISOL, 1G42-F080, control switch on P870 to CLOSE
-Verifies SPCU Pump Discharge to Return Header, 1G42-F511, is throttled to obtain a flowrate of 950 to 1000 gpm as read on SPCU PUMP DISCH FLOW, G42-R053, on 1H13-P870 Note: The SPCU Pump, IG42-CO01, must be deenergized as soon as 1E12-F610 closes to avoid prolonged operation at shutoff head
- Takes SPCU TO RHR FIRST OTBD ISOL, 1E12-F610, on P870 to CLOSE
- Takes SPCU PUMP, 1G42-C001, control switch on P870 to STOP I. t I. t NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
SPCU Pump Shutdown from the Normal SPCU to Suppression Pool Return Line Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (cont) - Takes the following control switches on P870 to CLOSE:
SPCU PUMP SECOND SUCT ISOL, 1G42-F020 SPCU PUMP FIRST SUCT ISOL, 1G42-F01 SPCU TO RHR SECOND OTBD ISOL, 1E12-F609
- Closes the following valves:
Directs the NLO to close SPCU Pump Discharge to Return Header, 1G42-F511 Directs the NLO to close RHR Loop A to FPCC Stop Check, 1E12-F552A
- Performs independent verification of the required components using SOI-G42, Attachment 5
- Performs the following to shift HPCS suction from the Suppression Pool to CST:
Takes HPCS SUPR POOL SUCTION VALVE, 1E22-F015, control switch on ECCS Benchboard, 1H13-P601, to CLOSE When HPCS SUPR POOL SUCTION VALVE, 1E22-F015, indicates closed, takes HPCS CST SUCTION VALVE, 1E22-FOO1, control switch on P601 to OPEN t
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NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Withdraw Control Rods to increase reactor power to 50%
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO SRO continues the plant startup per 101-3, Section 4.5, Step 8 Note: The following alarm is expected to occur (and clear) several times during this Event due to the 4 notch rod withdrawal limit above the LPSP:
H13-P680-5 (EI0), ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK Note: The following alarm is expected to occur (and clear) during this event due to increasing reactor power and Condensate System flow:
H13-P870-4 (A3), CONDENSATE F/D DIFF PRESS HI Note: Event #3 for an uncoupled Control Rod will occur during this power increase from 45% to 50%. When Event #3 is completed, then the crew will return here to complete Event #2 RO/BOP Notifies SCC, Chem and HP of intent to raise reactor power SRO Conducts reactivity brief Provides SRO oversight for power ascension from 45% to 50% power Directs RO to withdraw Control Rods in order to raise reactor power to 50% in accordance with the approved rod withdrawal sequence Note: SRO may contact Reactor Engineering to verify thermal limits should remain within limits during this power increase RO Withdraws control rods as directed in accordance with the approved rod withdrawal sequence and SOl-C11(RCIS), Section 5.2 SRO May perform additional steps in 101-3, Section 4.5 to support power increase
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NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Uncoupled Control Rod 54-31 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Responds to, reports, and references ARI for Alarm H13-P680-5 (D9),
ROD OVERTRAVEL RO Depresses ROD UNCOUPLED pushbutton and determines that Control Rod 54-31 is uncoupled by observing the red LED on the Rod Status Display RO Informs SRO that the uncoupled Control Rod is 54-31 SRO Acknowledges alarm report SRO Enters ONI-C1 1-2, Uncoupled Control Rod
- Directs RO to stop control rod withdrawal RO Stops control rod withdrawal SRO Coordinates applicable Supplemental Actions
- Notifies a Reactor Engineer
- Directs Reactor Engineer to determine if any local/gross power limits have been exceeded
- Declares Control Rod 54-31 inoperable References Tech Specs for an uncoupled control rod LCO 3.1.3 (Control Rod OPERABILITY) - enters Condition C Note: Control Rod 54-31 is not required to be bypassed before an attempt at recoupling can be performed
- Obtains recoupling guidance from the Reactor Engineer Note: Reactor Engineer will direct Control Rod 54-31 be inserted to position 46 during the recoupling attempt NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Uncoupled Control Rod 54-31 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Cont) - Directs RO to attempt to recouple Control Rod 54-31 by inserting the Control Rod to position 46 RO Selects Control Rod 54-31 in the Individual Drive mode
- Inserts Control Rod 54-31 to position 46
- Reports ROD OVERTRAVEL alarm has cleared SRO Acknowledges alarm clearance report
- Directs RO to verify Control Rod 54-31 is recoupled RO Verifies Control Rod 54-31 is recoupled as follows:
Note: There will be no noticeable changes in flux levels
- Selects and fully withdraws Control Rod 54-31
- Verifies that the Control Rod position changes as the Control Rod is withdrawn
- Performs a coupling check on the Control Rod at position 48 RO Informs the SRO that Control Rod 54-31 has been successfully recoupled SRO Declares Control Rod 54-31 OPERABLE and exits LCO 3.1.3 SRO Exits ONI-Cl 1-2, Uncoupled Control Rod SRO Notifies OPS Management and NRC Resident of ONI entry, reason for entry, and ONI exit Note: Crew returns to Event #2 to complete the power increase NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Cirw Pump A Suction Chamber Low Level / Cirw Pump A shutdown Time Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Responds to, reports, and references ARI for Alarm H13-P870-3 (El),
CIRW PUMP SUCT CHAMBER LEVEL LOW SRO Acknowledges alarm report BOP Determines alarm is not caused by low cooling tower basin level by observing COOLING TOWER BASIN LEVEL, 1P41-R415 Note: Cooling tower basin level will actually increase due to the suction chamber blockage BOP Monitors all operating Cirw Pump discharge pressures and motor currents for fluctuations BOP/RO Monitors Circulating Water Process Computer Screen to determine that Cirw Pump A is affected by the low level BOP/RO Monitors Main Condenser vacuum for degradation Note: Crew is not expected to enter ONI-N62, Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum, because vacuum degradation is minimal Note: BOP will not have time to attempt to clean the affected suction chamber screen before fluctuations are observed for Cirw Pump A BOP Observes fluctuations in the discharge pressure and motor current for Cirw Pump A. Informs SRO SRO Directs BOP to shutdown Cirw Pump A BOP Takes Cirw Pump A control switch to STOP and then releases the control switch
- Confirms Cirw Pump A Discharge Valve, 1 N71 -F020A, auto closes NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Cirw Pump A Suction Chamber Low Level / Cirw Pump A shutdown Time Position [ Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Adjusts operating Cirw Pump discharge pressures and motor currents in accordance with SOI-N71, Section 5.0, Step 1 SRO/BOP/RO Requests Maintenance and Responsible System Engineer assistance to support troubleshooting and Cirw Pump inspection Note: Alarm H13-P870-3 (El) will clear after Cirw Pump A is shutdown due to the accumulated trash and debris falling off the suction chamber screen. This allows the suction chamber to slowly refill I I
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Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Steam Seal Header Pressure Control Valve failure closed / Manual control of Steam Seal Header pressure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note: This Event will result in a significant increase in Off-Gas System flowrate due to the short-term loss of steam seals. The following alarms are expected to occur and will automatically clear after normal steam seal header pressure is re-established:
H13-P604 (A2), OG PRE-TREAT PRCS RAD RCDR P600 H13-P845 (A3), PREFILTER DIFF PRESS HI H13-P845 (B3), MOISTURE SEP OUTLET TEMP HI H13-P845 (D1), RECOMBINER A/B TEMP HIGHILO H13-P845 (D5), AFTER FILTER FLOW HI HI H13-P845 (E5), AFTER FILTER FLOW HIILO H13-P845 (FI), PREHEATER A/B INLET PRESS HI H13-P845 (F5), AFTER FILTER DIFF PRESS HI H13-P870-7 (C2), STEAM SEAL EXHAUST SYS VACUUM LOW Note: The following alarms are expected to occur and will clear after normal Steam Seal Header pressure is re-established and Operator action(s) are performed:
H13-P845 (B8), HOLDUP LINE DRN LOOP SEAL LEVEL LOW H13-P845 (D8), COOLER CNDR DRN LOOP SEAL LEVEL LOW H13-P870-7 (G2), SJAE B INTERCONDENSER LEVEL HI(LO BOP Reports, responds to, and references ARI for Alarm H13-P870-7 (Cl),
STEAM SEAL HEADER PRESSURE LOW SRO Acknowledges alarm report Note: There is no valve position indication for Steam Seal Header Press Control Valve, 1N33-F070, on H13-P870 BOP Determines that Steam Seal Header Pressure Control Vlv, 1N33-F070, has malfunctioned (failed closed)
BOP/RO Monitors Main Condenser vacuum for degradation NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Steam Seal Header Pressure Control Valve failure closed / Manual control of Steam Seal Header pressure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs BOP to manually control Steam Seal Header pressure in accordance with SOI-N33, Section 7.3 Note: Since Steam Seal Header pressure is at 0 psig, the BOP will not be able to procedurally comply with Steps 1, 2, and 3 of SOI-N33, Section 7.3 BOP Manual Control of Steam Seal Header Pressure per SOI-N33, Section 7.3
- Informs SRO that he will need a procedure deviation for SOI-N33, Section 7.3, Steps 1, 2, and 3 SRO Grants procedure deviation BOP (Cont) - Throttles closed ST SEAL EVAP TO HDR SUPPLY VLV, 1N33-F065
- Throttles open ST SEAL EVAP TO HDR SUPPLY BYPASS, 1N33-F075, to obtain 4 to 6 psig on STEAM SEAL EVAPORATOR HDR PRESS, 1N33-R083, on P870
- Throttles ST SEAL EVAP TO HDR SUPPLY BYPASS, 1N33-F075, as necessary to maintain Steam Seal Header pressure at 3 to 5 psig BOP/RO Requests Maintenance and Responsible System Engineer assistance to support troubleshooting Note: This Event will cause Main Condenser vacuum to slowly degrade. Therefore, the crew may enter ONI-N62, Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum but it is not required in order to correct the Steam Seal problem I_ 1 I__ __ ______
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Loss of NCC Cooling Water flow to Drywell loads (P43-F400 fails closed)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note: It is expected that the crew will enter ONI-P43, Loss of NCC, perform a fast reactor shutdown, and then trip the Recirc Pumps Note: The ARIs will direct that the Recirc Pumps either be tripped or shutdown. This would then require the crew to enter ONI-C51, Unplanned Change in Reactor Power or Reactivity, and perform a manual reactor scram due to the Reactor Mode Switch being in RUN with no Recirc Pumps in operation Note: The following alarms will occur on panel 1H13-P680-4 due to the loss of NCC to the Drywell and will require entry into ONI-P43:
CI - RCIRC A SEAL CLR FLOW LO CIO - RCIRC B SEAL CLR FLOW LO Dl - RCIRC A UPPER BRG FLOW LO D2 - RCIRC A MOTOR CLR FLOW LO D8 - RCIRC A/B TEMP HI DI0 - RCIRC B UPPER BRG FLOW LO D1I - RCIRC B MOTOR CLR FLOW LO El - RCIRC A LOWER BRG FLOW LO E7 - NCC UNIT 1 HDR FLOW LO E10 - RCIRC B LOWER BRG FLOW LO RO Reports, responds to, and references various ARIs for Recirc Pump related alarms on panel 11H 13-P680-4 BOP Reports, responds to, and references ARI for Alarm H13-P601-18 (A3),
NS4 INBD ISOLATION OUT OF SERVICE BOP Confirms NCC DW RETURN INBD DW ISOL, 1P43-F400, has lost position indication
- Dispatches NLO to EF1C07, Compt PP to check fuses.
SRO Acknowledges RO and BOP alarm reports
_ _ i __ I ________ i NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
Loss of NCC Cooling Water flow to Drywell loads (P43-F400 fails closed)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note: The following additional alarms will occur on panel H13-P601 and H13-P800 due to rising Drywell pressure as a result of the loss of drywell cooling:
H13-P601-17 (El), SUPR POOL LEVEL B HI/LO H13-P601-17 (E4), CNTMT I DW DIFF PRESS B HIGH H13-P601-20 (D4), CNTMT / DW DIFF PRESS A HIGH H13-P601-20 (E2), SUPR POOL LEVEL A HIILO H13-P800-3 (F4), DW RECORDER TEMPERATURE HIGHILOW I I BOP Monitors Recirc Pump temperatures on RCIRC PUMP/MOTORS TEMP MONITORING RECORDER, 1B33-R601, on 1H13-P614 SRO Enters ONI-P43, Loss of Nuclear Closed Cooling
- Determines a complete loss of NCC has occurred
- Directs the RO to perform a fast reactor shutdown Note: The reactor is shutdown due to the loss of cooling to the Recirc Pump bearings RO Performs a fast reactor shutdown as follows:
- Closes both RCIRC Loop A & B Flow Control Valves, 1B33-FO60A & B, until core flow has been decreased to 58 Mlbm/hr Note: this step may not be performed since core flow is already approximately 58 Mlbm/hr
- Arms and depresses the RPS MANUAL SCRAM CH A, B, C & D PBs Note: The failure of RPS to shutdown the reactor is continued in Event # 7 SRO Coordinates with RO/BOP to complete applicable ONI-P43 Supplemental Actions
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NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 6 Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
Loss of NCC Cooling Water flow to Drywell loads (P43-F400 fails closed)
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Completes ONI-P43 Supplemental Actions as directed
- Verifies shutdown of the Reactor Recirculation Pumps per SOI-B33 Note: Continued operation of the Recirc Pumps will eventually result in pump seal failure 1-4- 4 4- 4 4- 4 4- -I.
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4 4-NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.2Q13-lScenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Failure of RPS to shutdown the reactor / Manual initiation of ARI Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes incomplete scram and APRMs not downscale and informs SRO/BOP SRO Directs PEI-B13, RPV Control (Non-ATWS)
- Confirms all RPS Manual Scram PBs were armed and depressed
- Confirms Reactor Mode Switch is in SHUTDOWN
- Starts Hydrogen Analyzers
- Verifies all ARI Manual Initiation PBs are armed and depressed RO/BOP Execute PEI-B13, RPV Control (Non-ATWS) actions per SRO direction RO Informs SRO that all Control Rods are not fully inserted (ATWS)
Note: Event #8 will be a continuation of the ATWS EE, I NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Determines reactor is still NOT shutdown under all conditions without boron Note: The SRO will execute all 3 legs of PEI-B13, RPV Control (ATWS) concurrently SRO Exits PEI-B13, RPV Control (Non-ATWS) and enters PEI-B13, RPV Control (ATWS)
RPV Power Control
- Confirms Turbine Generator is online
- Confirms RFPTs are operating
- Runback Recirc FCVs to minimum position
- Trips Recirc Pumps
- Performs the following steps concurrently:
Inserts Control Rods using PEI-SPI 1.3 Injects boron into the RPV using SLC A Inhibits ADS RO/BOP Executes PEI-B1 3, RPV Control (ATWS), RPV Power Control actions per SRO direction SRO RPV Level Control
- Verifies all initiations and isolations occurred
- Inhibits ADS (if not previously performed)
- Terminates and prevents injection into the RPV for:
HPCS Injection Prevention per PEI-SPI 5.1 LPCS and LPCI Injection Prevention per PEI-SPI 5.2
- Prepares the following for injection:
LPCI A Outside the Shroud Injection per PEI-SPI 6.1 LPCI B Outside the Shroud Injection per PEI-SPI 6.2 NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Cont) Note: The MSIVs may fail closed prior to the performance of the next step. MSIV closure is discussed is Event #9
- Confirms any Main Steam Line is open
- Maintains the MSIVs open:
Bypasses MSIV Low Level Isolation per PEI-SPI 2.3 Bypasses Instrument Air Isolation per PEI-SPI 2.8
- Determines Emergency Depressurization is not required Note: The crew should be able to maintain RPV level > -25 inches using RCIC and the MFP
- Determines that except for boron and CRD, termination and prevention of all injection into the RPV is not required at this time Note: The Suppression Pool will slowly heatup due to the isolation of the MSIVs. However, Suppression Pool will be less than 110 OF at this time
- Determines reactor power is greater than 4%
- Maintains RPV level -25 in. to +100 in.
Note: SRO will set the RPV level band (typically 50 in. to 100 in.
initially in order to maintain the MSIVs open (MSIVs close at 16.5 in.))
Note: As RPV level is lowered, RCIC will initiate at 130 inches (and cause the RFPTs to trip). HPCS will also initiate at 130 inches unless it was previously overridden
- Injects slowly into the RPV using RCIC and the MFP Note: as previously stated, the RO should be able to maintain RPV level > -25 inches such that Emergency Depressurization will not be required RO/BOP Executes PEI-B13, RPV Control (ATWS), RPV Level Control actions per SRO direction Note: The RO is expected to report when APRM downscale indications occur (4% reactor power). This will determine the upper limit for a new RPV level band NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 8 Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
ATWS Time J Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note: RPV Pressure Control actions will be discussed in Event #9 Note: PEI-T23, Containment Control, actions will be discussed in Event #9 t i I t t t I i f
I 1- *1-I T I f f 1-t I.
t I I. I
- i. i I
I t
- 1-
- 1*
t I
________ _____________ I. ________________________________________________________________
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 9 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
MSIV closure / Loss of Main Condenser Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Observes MSIV closure and cycling SRVs. Informs SRO Note: MSIVs will not be re-opened for the remainder of this scenario BOP/RO Places all MSIV control switches in CLOSE SRO Acknowledges closure of the MSIVs and cycling of SRVs SRO (Cont) RPV Pressure Control
- Determines RPV level can be determined
- Determines Drywell pressure is < 1.68 psig
- Determines Emergency Depressurization is not required at this time Note: HCL is not expected to be exceeded during this Event
- Determines SRVs are cycling Opens SRVs manually to initially decrease RPV pressure to less than or equal to 900 psig
- Determines that Suppression Pool temperature can be maintained below HCL Note: Based on plant priorities and time constraints, the next step may not be performed as determined by the SRO
- Determines that boron is required and any Main Steam Line is closed Determines the Main Condenser is available Determines there is no indication of a steam line break Opens MSIVs as follows:
Bypasses MSIV Low Level Isolation per PEI-SPI 2.3 Bypasses Instrument Air Isolation per PEI-SPI 2.8
- Stabilizes RPV pressure to less than 1000 psig Establishes a RPV pressure band of 700 to 900 psig using SRVs NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 9 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
MSIV closure / Loss of Main Condenser Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO (Cont) - Determines the reactor is not shutdown under all conditions with boron Note: A controlled depressurization of the RPV is not allowed until the reactor is shutdown under all conditions with boron Note: From this point on, the SRO may change the RPV pressure band as required to maintain RPV pressure below HCL RO/BOP Executes PEI-B13, RPV Control (ATWS), RPV Pressure Control actions per SRO direction Note: From this point on, the SRO may change the RPV pressure band as required to maintain RPV pressure below HCL SRO Directs actions per PEI-T23, Containment Control, when Suppression Pool temperature reaches 95 OF Suppression Pool Temperature Control Note: Due to plant priorities, the next step may not be completed until manpower resources are available
- Operates all available Suppression Pool cooling
- Maintains both SP average temperature and RPV pressure below HCL Note: HCL is not expected to be exceeded during this Event Suppression Pool Level Control
- Restores and maintains SP level between 17.8 and 18.5 ft Drywell Temperature Control
- Operates all available DW cooling Drywell & Containment Pressure Control
- Maintains Containment pressure below PSP
__ I ___ I________________ j NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.:2003-301Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 9 Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
MSIV closure / Loss of Main Condenser Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Containment Temperature Control
- Operates all available Containment cooling RO/BOP Executes PEI-T23 actions per SRO direction RO/BOP Monitor Heat Capacity Limit (HCL) due to adding heat to the Suppression Pool I +
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NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Scenario Termination Criteria Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 1. SLC is injecting into the RPV and Control Rods are being inserted
- within a band of -25 to 100 inches, or
- within a band as determined by the SRO
- within a band of 700 to 900 psig, or
- below HCL, or
- within a band as determined by the SRO
- 4. Containment and Drywell parameters are being restored per PEI-T23, Containment Control
_ I _ _ _ _ ~~I ________
1-4 .4-4 +
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I I NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of I Event
Description:
Critical Task #1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task #1 - With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, initiate action to reduce power by injecting boron (prior to 110 OF Suppression Pool temp) and/or inserting control rods
- 1. Safety Significance:
- Shutting down the reactor can preclude failure of Containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant
- Incorrect reactivity control
- 2. Cues:
- Suppression Pool temperature monitoring
- Procedural compliance
- 3. Measured by:
- SLC Pump control switches taken to ON prior to S110 'F in the Suppression Pool by SPDS and control rod insertion before the end of the scenario
- 4. Feedback:
- Reactor power trend
- Rod position indications T I
________ .1. _______________ 1 ______________________________________________________________________
NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement I
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: _8 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Critical Task #2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task #2 - With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization and subsequent power excursion, inhibit ADS
- 1. Safety Significance:
- Precludes core damage due to an uncontrolled reactivity addition
- 2. Cues:
- Procedural compliance
- 3. Measured by:
- ADS logic inhibited prior to an automatic initiation of the ADS System unless all required injection systems are terminated and prevented
- 4. Feedback:
- RPV pressure and level trends
- ADS "Out of Service" annunciator status i i 3 4.
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NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2003-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: 9 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Critical Task #3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Critical Task #3 - If RPV pressure and Suppression Pool temperature cannot be maintained below the Heat Capacity Limit (HCL), then initiate Emergency Depressurization prior to exceeding HCL
- 1. Safety Significance:
- Precludes failure of Containment
- 2. Cues:
- Procedural compliance
- 3. Measured by:
- At least 5 SRVs are open before HCL is exceeded
- 4. Feedback:
- RPV pressure trend
- SRV open status indications
- Suppression Pool temperature rate of increase NUREG-1021, Revision 8, Supplement 1
Perry NRC Exam LC 01-01 Scenario 5 Simulator Setup and Cues
- 1. Simulator Setup
- a. Initial Conditions
- 1) Reset toIC 16
- 2) Insert rods, using the Startup Pullsheet in reverse order, to step 71, all rods at position 36.
- 3) Adjust APRM Gains
- 4) Bump up R/R flow to 45% reactor power
- 7) Verify RFPT A & B Recirc Flow Controllers at 100%
- 8) Verify M51 H2 Analyzer B selected to Channel 3
- 9) Place SPCU in service per SOI-G42, Section 4.1
- 10) Place SPCU Demin in service per SOI-G42, Section 5.1
- 11) Start a CBP and make N23/24 equal to 5 and 4
- 13) Place Red Tag on SLC Pump A control switch
- 14) Update 101-3 to Section 4.5, Step 8. Steps 13 and 15 also performed. (12K)
- 15) Update Startup Pullsheets to Step 71, all rods at position 36
- 17) Perform annunciator test and acknowledge TURBINE PLANT SAMPLE TROUBLE alarm
- 18) Load Batch File LNCO101-5.txt
- 19) Load Event Trigger File ARIINITIATED2, N71AVALVE
- 20) Verify no triggers went active
- 21) Verify rod 42-19 is not magenta on the C91 Core Display. If so, return it to processing by typing in "RTP CI 1MD048"
- b. Special Procedures
- 1) None
- 2. Batch File LNCO101-5.txt
- a. IMF RD15 Active ATWS, 50% severity
- b. IMF RD02R5431 Active Rod 54-31 Uncoupled
- c. IMFRY02:1C7lKl4A Active RPS Relay K14A Fails to trip
- d. IMF RY02:IC7IK14E Active RPS Relay K14E Fails to trip
- e. IMFRY02:IC71K14C Active RPS Relay K14C Fails to trip
- f. IMF RY02:1 C71K14G Active RPS Relay K14G Fails to trip
- g. IMF MC04A TRG 4 Circulating Water Pump Suction Chamber Low Level, 100% severity, 5 minute ramp
severity
- i. IMF MV08:0P43F0400 TRG 6 P43F400 Fails when full closed
- j. IMF MV03:0P43F0400 TRG 6 P43F400 Spurious closure
- k. IMF MS05A TRG 9 MSIV B21-F022A Fails closed, 2 minute delay I. IMF MS05B TRG 9 MSIV B21-F022B Fails closed, 2 minute delay
- s. IMF MV03:IB21F0016 TRG 9 B21-F016 Fails closed, 2 minute delay
- t. IMF MV03:IB21F0019 TRG 9 B2 1-F019 Fails closed, 2 minute delay
- 3. Event Trigger File
- a. ARIINITIATED2 ZL C221 DS23 NE. 0
- b. N71AVALVE ZL1N71F0020A(2) .EQ. 0
- 4. Commands/Trigger Assignments
- a. TRG 3 = DMF RD02R5431
- b. TRG 9 ARIINITIATED2
- c. TRG 10 = DMF MC04A
Instructor Cues:
Event 1 Remote Functions SW071(18%), SW072, RH39 As NLO, perform valve operations as directed.
Event 2 None Event 3 Insert TRG 3 when rod 54-31 is inserted to position 46 for the re-coupling attempt. This will re-couple the rod.
As Rx. Engineer, inform SRO that position 46 is the desired position for the re-coupling attempt.
Event 4 Insert TRG 4 when power has been increased to 50%, or when directed.
TRG 10 will automatically delete the malfunction to allow trash to settle and suction chamber to refill.
As NLO, report trash/debris on and around the screens for Circ Water Pump A suction chamber.
As N71 RSE, inform SRO that you want to inspect the pump prior to restarting it.
Event 5 Insert TRG 5 when directed As NLO, Report SJAE Intercondenser Loop Seal level is low. Restore level as directed. (RF MC 17)
DRIVER NOTE: SJAE Loop Seal level will be difficult to stabilize until Off-Gas flow begins to decrease to normal.
As NLO, report Off-Gas Loop Seal levels are low. Restore levels as directed.
(RF OG06, OG07)
As NLO, adjust SPE Suction Damper as directed. (RF MS01)
As NLO, report that N33-F070 is closed.
Event 6 Insert TRG 6 when directed As NLO, report all main line fuses blown in MCC EFIC07-PP, for valve P43-F400.
Event 7 None Event 8 As NLO, perform actions in the plant as directed.
Event 9 None Note: The MSIVs will automatically fail closed two minutes after ARI is initiated
Objectives and Significance Discussion for Scenario 5 Event 1 SPCU Pump Shutdown From The Normal SPCU To Suppression Pool Return Line - The objective is to evaluate the BOP's ability to perform a normal shutdown of the Suppression Pool Cleanup System per plant procedures. This task will include a transfer of the HPCS System suction path. Procedure usage/compliance and ability to communicate effectively with NLOs and Control Room personnel is evaluated. This event is significant because a mis-operation of controls may cause the HPCS System to be inoperable while shifting suction paths. This event is intended to count as a Normal Event for the BOP and SRO.
Event 2 Withdraw Control Rods To Increase Reactor Power To 50% - The objective is to evaluate the RO's ability to conduct a controlled power increase using control rods. The SRO will conduct a brief and provide oversight. This event is significant because it impacts core reactivity and a mis-operation may misposition control rods. This event is intended to count as a Reactivity Event for the RO and SRO.
Event 3 Uncoupled Control Rod 54 The objective is to evaluate the RO and SRO response to an uncoupled control rod while withdrawing control rods during the power increase. The SRO is evaluated on his entry into the correct Off-Normal Instruction and subsequent direction of plant activities. The SRO must also evaluate entry into Technical Specifications. As directed, the RO will correct the condition using the off-normal procedure. This event is significant because an uncoupled control rod is a possible precursor to a rod drop event. If no actions are taken, the plant will not comply with Technical Specification requirements for control rod operability. This event is intended to count as a Component Failure for the RO and SRO.
Event 4 Cirw Pump A Suction Chamber Low Level / Cirw Pump A Shutdown - The objective is to evaluate the BOP's ability to respond to alarms and diagnose a problem with the Circulating Water System. Knowledge of the Plant Process Computer is evaluated while the BOP/RO identifies the affected suction chamber. Ability to make accurate and timely reports to the SRO is also evaluated. The BOP must secure the affected Circ Water Pump immediately when fluctuations in pressure and amps occur, in order to prevent pump damage. This event is significant because failure to take prompt action could result in significant damage to the pump and limit available generating capacity. This event is intended to count as a Component Failure for the BOP and SRO.
Event 5 Steam Seal Header Pressure Control Valve Failure Closed / Manual Control of Steam Seal Header Pressure - The objective is to evaluate the BOP's and SRO's ability to diagnose and take corrective actions for the loss of Steam Seal System pressure. Utilizing Alarm Response Instructions and System Operating Instructions, the BOP will restore Steam Seal System pressure using the bypass valve. Procedure usage, communications and SRO oversight is evaluated. The SRO must correctly prioritize alarms and diagnose their cause in order to stabilize Off-Gas parameters in a timely manner. This event is significant because if no action is taken, the unit will ultimately trip due to low condenser vacuum, and plant radiation levels could increase due to the loss of Off-Gas Loop Seals. A prolonged loss of steam seals will also produce turbine seal damage. This event is intended to count as a Component Failure for the BOP and SRO.
Event 6 Loss of NCC Cooling Water flow to Drywell Loads (P43-F400 fails closed) - The objective is to evaluate the RO's ability to respond to alarms and diagnose the high temperature condition affecting Recirculation Pump A and B. The SRO's ability to direct actions in accordance with Alarm Response Instructions is also evaluated. The RO must trip the Recirculation Pumps when required by plant procedures. The SRO must enter the correct Off-Normal Instructions and direct the unit shutdown. This event is significant because it produces a condition that requires the SRO to prioritize alarms, and to exercise his judgement to scram the plant and then secure the Recirculation Pumps. Failure to take any actions will cause the Recirculation Pumps to overheat, ultimately leading to seal failure. This event is not intended to count as any individual component failure, but rather to act as the initiating cause for the Major Event.
Event 7 Failure of RPS to Shutdown the Reactor / Manual Initiation of ARI - The objective of this event is to evaluate the RO's ability to respond to the failure of the Reactor Protection System. His ability to take immediate corrective actions in accordance with Operations Policy and the conditions of an RO license is evaluated. This event is the continuation of the previous event.
The RO is required to initiate Alternate Rod Insertion in order to produce any rod motion. This event is significant because failure to take any action will produce a higher-powered ATWS in the next event and increase the threat to containment. This event is intended to count as an Instrument Failure for the RO and SRO.
Event 8 ATWS - The objective is to evaluate the crew's ability to respond to an ATWS and to mitigate the event in accordance with the correct plant procedures. The SRO is evaluated on his ability to direct actions in accordance with plant PEIs (EOPs). The RO and BOP are evaluated on their ability to make accurate and timely reports to the SRO, to communicate to each other, and to manipulate controls without error. The SRO is evaluated on his ability to prioritize and direct power, pressure, and level control actions to maintain parameters within limits. The RO and BOP are evaluated on their ability to manipulate controls and execute procedure steps, in order to maintain parameters within the desired bands. This event is significant because the crew must stabilize conditions after a major transient and maintain critical parameters within specified bands. Standby Liquid Control System will be partially effective, thus the crew must manually insert control rods in order to shutdown the reactor under all conditions without boron. This event is also significant because an ATWS has a relatively high PSA probability for contributing to core damage. This event is intended to count as the Major Event.
Event 9 MSIV Closure / Loss of Main Condenser - The objective is to evaluate the crew's ability to control critical plant parameters within specified bands following the loss of the normal pressure control system. The closure of the MSIVs will require the SRO to re-direct Pressure Control actions away from the Main Condenser, and onto SRVs, which will complicate level control actions due to shrink and swell. SRV operation will add heat to the Suppression Pool, requiring the crew to be vigilant to Containment parameters. This event is significant because maintaining critical parameters within bands and within limits, is a WANO and Operations focus area, and prevents an unnecessary Emergency Depressurization. This event is intended to count as a post major component failure that affects the mitigation strategy of the major event.