LR-N05-0419, LER 05-04-00 for Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Regarding Operation in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification - Containment Isolation Valves

LER 05-04-00 for Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Regarding Operation in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification - Containment Isolation Valves

ML052360235
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	08/15/2005
From:	Joyce T Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N05-0419 LER 05-04-00
Download: ML052360235 (4)

Text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 0 PSEG NluclearLLC AUG 15 2005 LR-N05-041 9 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 311/05-004-00 SALEM - UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 This Licensee Event Report, 'Required post maintenance testing not performed on Containment Isolation Valves," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

The attached LER contains no commitments.

Sincerely, Thomas P Jo Site Vice President Salem Generating Station Attachment(l) 95-2168 REV. 7/99

FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0613012007

,6-2004) _ EsUtmated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated Into the licensing process and fed back to Industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) \ Ze-mail Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washingt on, DC 20555001, or by Int ernet to Infocollectsenrc.gov. and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. NE8 B-10202. (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget. Washington, DC 20503.If a means used to Impose an information (See reverse for required number of coOlion does not display acurrently vald 0MB control number, the NRC may digitscharacters for each block) sponsor and a person Is not required to respond to. the

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUM PAGE Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 0500031 1 OF 3

4. TITLE Operation in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification- Containment Isolation Valves

5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED

. FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR S EQUENTIALREV MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06 15 05 2005 04 00 08 15 2005 9.OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply) 0 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3Xi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(1)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2Xvii) 1 0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3Xii) 0 50.73(a)(2XiiXA) El 50.73(aX2Xviii)(A) 0 20.2203(aXl) 0 20.2203(aX4) 0 50.73(a)(2Xii)(B) 0 50.73(aX2)(viii)(B)

0) 20.2203(aX2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1XiXA) E 50.73(a)(2XIii) 0 50.73(aX2)(ixXA)

10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(aX2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1Xii)(A) D 50.73(a)(2Xiv)(A) E 50.73(aX2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(Iii) 0 50.36(cX2) 0 50.73(a)(2XvXA) 0 73.71(aX4)

El 20.2203(a)(2Xiv) 03 50.46(aX3Xii) D 50.73(a)(2XvXB) 0 73.71(a)(5) 100 0 20.2203(a)(2Xv) El 50.73(aX2)(iXA) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vXC) a3 OTHER 0 20.2203(a)(2Xvi) ED 50.73(aX2)(i)(B) El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify In Abstract below nr in NPr~ Fnrm RAA

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Justin Wearne, Senior Licensing Engineer 856-339-5081

13. COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-FACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FCUE MANTU REPOREABLE OEI A KN ISV No

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION 0 YES (Ifyes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0D NO DATE ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On June 15 and June 17, 2005 Salem Generating Station identified two containment isolation valves (CIVs) that did not have the required post maintenance testing performed following corrective maintenance. This was discovered during an extent of condition investigation for a related issue regarding post-maintenance testing of valves. Because of their particular system location and configuration these valves could not be retested in their as-found condition.

The valves were declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification actions were taken.

The apparent cause of this event was the failure of the Maintenance Planning organization to incorporate a leak rate testing (LLRT) activity into the work order after the scope of the order had become defined. A contributing cause of this event was these activities were handled as WIN (Work ITNow) activities.

Planned corrective actions are to perform the LLRT in the fall 2006 refueling outage. Inthe interim the flow path is isolated per TS 3.6.3 action statements. The procedure used by planners has been revised to include an activity for the in-service testing group (IST) to assist with determining work instructions and post maintenance testing requirements. The procedure used by the WIN team and the procedure used by the planning department will be combined.

This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications...'

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER NRC 366(6-2004)

FORM 366 NRCFOReM (6-2004) PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

• NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 l 05000311 2005 - 04 - 00 *2 OF 3

17. NARRATIVE (If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Reactor Coolant Sampling System {KN/ISV}*

• Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear in the text as {SSICCC3.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: May 24, 2004 Discovery Date: June 15, 2005 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (OPERATIONS) at 100% power at the time of the event. No structures, systems or components were inoperable at the time of the occurrence that contributed to the event.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On June 15 and June 17, 2005 during an extent of condition investigation for an issue regarding post-maintenance testing of valves, it was identified that two containment isolation valves (CIV's) had not received the required post maintenance local leak rate test (LLRT) following corrective maintenance.

On May 22, 2004 a boron buildup on the packing gland of the post-LOCA reactor coolant system (RCS) inside sample Containment Isolation valve 21SS182 from the 21 Hot Leg {KN/ISV} was identified. On May 24, 2004 a work order was issued to clean and tighten the packing gland.

On August 11, 2004 boron buildup on the packing gland of the Pressurizer liquid sampling outside containment isolation valve 2SS49 was identified. On November 18, 2004 a work order was issued to clean and tighten the packing gland.

At 1732 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.59026e-4 months <br /> on June 15, 2005, the operating shift was notified that no as-left LLRT was performed after maintenance on 2SS49 in November 2004. The valve was declared inoperable and Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS) 3.6.3, ACTION a, was entered to restore the valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or isolate. At 1819 hours0.0211 days <br />0.505 hours <br />0.00301 weeks <br />6.921295e-4 months <br /> the 2SS49 valve was mechanically isolated to comply with TSAS 3.6.3, ACTION c.

On June 17, 2005, at approximately 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br /> the operating shift was notified that no as-left LLRT was performed after maintenance on valve 21 SS182 in May 2004. The valve, which was already isolated, was declared inoperable to comply with TSAS 3.6.3, ACTION c.

The configuration of these ClVs is such that they cannot be tested at power to confirm that the as-left valve LLRT is acceptable. Therefore, this event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B),

"Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications..."

NRC FORM 366A(1-2001)

'NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE SEOUENTIAL REVISION YEAR N ER NUMBER Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 05000311 2005 - 04 00 3 OF 3

17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES Salem Generating Station LERs for years 2002 through 2005 were reviewed for similar occurrences of lack of proper post-maintenance testing causing inoperability of a component. None were identified.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE Neither of these corrective maintenance activities went through the normal planning process. They were handled as WIN activities. The WIN organization is chartered with performing simple and routine maintenance activities. Since these activities were planned as WIN maintenance, the level of detail in the planning was not sufficient to ensure the proper post maintenance testing was performed. Contributing to this was a lack of detailed written direction and poor communication between the planners, operations and IST.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event. Inthe case of the two valves that have not been adequately retested following corrective maintenance, there was an OPERABLE containment isolation valve in series with the inoperable containment isolation valve. Additionally, once the inoperable containment isolation valve was discovered (on June 15 and 17, 2005), actions were taken to isolate the process line lAW Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.3. These actions remove the potential release path via the inoperable CIV.

This event does not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Containment Isolation valves 2SS49 and 21 SS182 were isolated per TS.

2. Leakrate tests of ClVs 2SS49 and 21SS182 are scheduled for the fall 2006 refueling outage.

3. Planning Departments Desk Guide has been revised to ensure activities that involve CIV's receive a review by the IST group for planning and testing purposes.

4. The WIN team desk guide will be incorporated into the Planning Departments Desk Guide to ensure that work orders are planned to the same standards.

COMMITMENTS This LER contains no commitments.

NRC FORM 366A(1-2001)NRC FORM 366A(1-2001)