Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration SealsML031150660 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Issue date: |
02/05/1988 |
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From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
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References |
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IN-88-004, NUDOCS 8802020228 |
Download: ML031150660 (9) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 5, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-04: INADEQUATE QUALIFICATION AND DOCUMENTATION
OF FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
This notice is to alert addressees that some installed fire barrier penetration
seal designs may not be adequately qualified for the design rating of the
penetrated fire barriers. It is expected that recipients will review this
information for applicability and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude
a similar problem and correct existing problems at their facilities.
However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute new
NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
The NRC has been reviewing fire barrier penetration seal designs installed in
several nuclear power plants. The reviews focused on whether the installed
configuration was qualified by adequate testing and documentation.
The current NRC review was prompted by reports, inspection findings, allegations, and other information that indicated the possibility that NRC requirements for
fire barrier penetration seals were not being met in all aspects. The review
included: evaluations of fire barrier penetration seal specifications and pro- cedures developed by licensees, licensee agents, and licensee contractors;
evaluations of various fire barrier penetration seal tests and test data; and
inspections of various fire barrier penetration seal designs and installations.
The types of concerns identified to date and mentioned below are related to weak- nesses in the implementation of NRC requirements and guidelines as related to
fire barrier penetration seal design qualification.
The staff identified instances where installed fire barrier penetration seal
designs could not be verified as qualified for the design rating of the pene- trated fire barrier. In some cases,-test qualification documentation was not
8802020228
IN 88-04 -:
February 5, 1988 available. In other cases, qualification test documentation was available but
incomplete or inadequate because all qualification requirements had not been
satisfied or the installed seal design configuration or design parameters were
significantly different from the tested seal.
The NRC review also has identified a current practice that can affect the
qualification status of installed seals. Plant modifications are being made
that require running new cable and conduits through existing penetration seals.
These modifications are generally being made without an associated technical
review to ensure that the resulting penetration seal design configuration or
design parameters are consistent with those validated by initial qualification
tests. Over a period of time, numerous minor modifications to the same area
could cumulatively result in a degraded fire barrier rating.
Discussion:
NRC requirements and guidelines for fire barrier penetration seals are con- tained in various documents, including Appendix R to 10CFR 50, Appendix A
to Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1, "Guidelines for Fire Protec- tion for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976," and NUREG-0800,
Standard Review Plan. The extent to which these requirements or guidelines
are applicable to a specific plant depends on plant age, commitments established
by the licensee in developing the fire protection plan, the staff safety evalua- tion reports (SERs) and supplements, and the license conditions pertaining to
fire protection.
The goal is to provide a fire barrier penetration seal that will remain in
place and retain its integrity when subjected to an exposure fire, and subse- quently, a fire suppressing agent. This will provide reasonable assurance that
the effects of a fire are limited to discrete fire areas and that one division
of safe-shutdown-related systems will remain free of fire damage.
A number of licensees have conducted a comprehensive.assessment of the adequacy
of in-plant fire barrier penetration seals. Their efforts began by determining
which specific NRC guidelines/requirements apply and which specific commitments
were made to respond to those guidelines or requirements. Typically, in-plant
seal assemblies were surveyed to catalogue the various types of existing seal
configurations. Finally, the documentation was analyzed to confirm that
in-plant designs were fully qualified by a fire test and were installed in a
proper manner.
If these efforts revealed instances where seals were not installed where re- quired, were not installed properly, or were not qualified by a standard fire
test, then the licensees have considered the seals degraded and have imple- mented compensatory measures, such as fire watch patrols, per the appropriate
technical specifications or administrative procedures. These measures remain
in force pending final resolution of the issue. Final resolution may include
replacing existing penetration seals with fully qualified seals, qualifying
in-plant seal assemblies by supplemental fire tests, and justifying in-plant
configuration by fire hazards/safe shutdown analysis.
IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 Appendix A contains a summary of various technical considerations that have
been used for evaluating the qualification adequacy of fire barrier penetration
seal designs and installations, associated testing, and test data.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC
regional office.
a~r'es E. Ross ,Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact(s): Dennis Kubicki, NRR
(301) 492-0825 Joseph Petrosino, NRR
(301) 492-0979 Attachments:
1. Appendix A - Summary of Existing Staff
Guidance Related to Fire Barrier
Penetration Seals
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Attachment 1 IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF EXISTING STAFF GUIDANCE RELATED
TO FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS
A. General Considerations Concerninq the Use of Test Results To Qualify Fire
Barrier Penetration Seal Designs
The (fire barrier seal) test specimen shall be truly representative of the
construction for which classification is desired, as to materials, work- manship, and details such as dimensions of parts, and shall be built under
conditions representative of those obtaining as practically applied in
building construction and operation. The physical properties of the
materials and 2 ingredients used in the test specimen shall be determined
and recorded.
B. Seal Acceptance Criteria
1. The fire resistance rating of the penetration seal should bS equiva- lent to the rating of the barrier in which it is installed.
2. The fire resistance rating of the penetration seal should be deter- mined by a4 standard fire test (i.e., ASTM E-814, ASTM E-119 or
IEEE-634).
3. The test should be conducted by an independent, recognized testing
authority. The tested assembly should be representative of in-plant
assemblies. The exposure fire should correspond to at least the time- temperature curve of ASTM E-119. Thermocouples should be positioned
at representative locations on the cold side of the tested assembly
(including the interface of seal material and through penetrations).
The cold-side temperature should not exceed 2500 F above ambient during
the test or 325 0 F maximum, although higher temperatures at through
penetrations are permitted when justified in terms of cable insulation
ignitability. There should be no burn-through of the seal during the
test, nor the passage of hot gases sufficient to ignite cotton waste
material. The assembly should withstand t e effects of a hose stream, as stipulated in the standard test method.
4. The seals should be installed by qualified individuals.6
5. Appropyiate quality assurance/quality control methods should be in
force.
6. Fire barrier penetrations that must maintain environmental isolation
or pressure differentials should be qualified by test to maintain the
barrier integrity under such conditions.
Attachment 1 IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 C. Hose Stream Testing9
1. Hose stream testing is a requirement for all fire barrier penetration
seal qualification testing, regardless of whether the penetration
seal is for a wall or a ceiling or a floor.
2. Hose stream testing should be performed on tested specimens that have
successfully withstood the fire endurance test requirements.
3. The hose stream shall be delivered in one of the following ways:
a 1-1/2-inch nozzle set at a discharge angle of 300 with a nozzle
pressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge of 75 gpm with the tip
of the nozzle a maximum of 5 ft from the exposed face; a 1-1/2-inch
nozzle set at a discharge angle of 150 with a nozzle pressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge of 75 gpm with the tip of the nozzle a
maximum of 10 ft from the exposed face; a 2-1/2-inch national stan- dard playpipe equipped with 1-1/8-inch tip, nozzle pressure of 30 psi, located 20 ft from the exposed face.
4. The duration of the hose stream test should meet the minimum require- ments specified in ASTM E-119 for fire barriers. During hose stream
testing, the fire barrier penetration seal should remain intact and
should not allow a projection of water beyond the unexposed surface.
D. Deviations10
Deviations from NRC requirements or accepted industry standards for fire
barrier penetration seals should be technically substantiated as part of
the review and approval of the fire protection plan or in other separate
formal correspondence. Supplemental guidance is provided in Generic
Letter 86-10.
References
1. "The design of fire barriers for horizontal and vertical cable trays
should, as a minimum, meet the requirements of ASTM E-119, Fire Test
of Building Construction and Materials, including the hose stream test."
[Section D.3.(d) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1].
"Penetration seal designs shall utilize only noncombustible materials and
shall be qualified by tests that are comparable to tests used to rate fire
barriers." (Section III.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50).
"The penetration qualification tests should use the time temperature
exposure curve specified by ASTM E-119." (Section C.5.a. of BTP CMEB
9.5-1).
-Attachment 1 IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 2. ASTM E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials."
3. Section D.3.(d) of Appendix A to BtP APCSB 9.5-1.
4. Section III.M. of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
5. ASTM E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials."
6. Section C of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Section C.4 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
7. Ibidem.
8. Section C.5.a.(3) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
9. Section III.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB
9.5-1.
10. Generic Letter 86-10.
r
A ment 2 I :
February S. 1988 Pige 1 of I
LIST Of RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Lntonuatlol Dats of
Notice No. SubJect Issuance Issued to
88-03 Cracks in Shroud Support 2/2/88 All holders of OLs
Access Hole Cover WVlds or CPs for BWRs.
88.02 Lost or Stolen Gauges, 2/2/88 All NRClicensees
authorized to possess
gauges under a
specific or general
license.
88.01 Safety Injection Pipe 1/27/88 All holders of OLs
Failusror CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
86-81, Broken External Closure 1/11/88 All holders of OMs
Supp. 1 Springs on Atwood & Iorrill or CPs for nuclear
main Steam Isolation Valves power reactors.
87-67 Lessons Learned from 12/31/87 All holders of OLs
Reional Inspections of or CPs for nuclear
Licenses Action$ ia Response power reactors.
to It Bolletin
a0> -
87-65 Inappropriate Application 12/31/87 All holders of OLs
of Cofher1i1-l6rads or CPs for nuclear
Components powr reacton.
87-28, Alp Systems Probie at 12/28/87 All holders of Ms
Supp. 1 U.S. 1ight Water Reactors or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
87-65 Plant Operation Beyond 12/23/87 All holders of OLs
Analyzed Conditions or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
87-64 Conviction for Falsification 12/22/87 All nuclear power
of Security Training Records reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP
and all major fuel
facility licensees.
ON: Operating License
CP
UNITED STATES FIRST CLASS MAIL
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMAISSION POSTAGE 6 FEES PAID
USNRC
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 PERMIT No. 0-E7 OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300
120555026886 1 1CO1CY1FB11S1 US NRC-OARM-IRM
DIV OF INFO SUP SVCS
MICROGRAPHICS SPECIALIST
RECORDS SERVICES BRANCH
042 WASHINGTON DC 20555
IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 Appendix A contains a summary of various technical considerations that have
been used for evaluating the qualification adequacy of fire barrier penetration
seal designs and installations, associated testing, and test data.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC
regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact(s): Dennis Kubicki, NRR
(301) 492-0825 Joseph Petrosino, NRR
(301) 492-0979 Attachments:
1. Appendix A - Summary of Existing Staff
Guidance Related to Fire Barrier
Penetration Seals
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- Transmitted by memo to C. E. Rossi from J. G. Partlow dated 12/21/87 IC " m-a -044 %i'
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES * 4
- PPMB:ARM *C/OGCB:DOEA:NR R R
TechEd CHBerlinger a
01/15/88 01/21/88 0245-/88
- OGCB:DOEA:NRFt *D/DEST:NRR *ADT/DEST:NRR *D/DRIS:NRR *DD/DRIS:NRR
RJKiessel LShao JRichardson JGPartlow BKGrimes
01/14/88 12/17/87 12/16/87 12/16/87 12/16/87
- VIB:DRIS:NRR *ASC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*AC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*ECEB:DEST:NRR*BC/ECEB:DEST:NRR
JPetrosino EBaker JStone DKubicki CMcCracken
12/15/87 12/15/87 12/18/87 12/16/87 12/16/87
IN 88-XX
January XX, 1988 Appendix A contains a summary of various technical considerations that have
been used for evaluating the qualification adequacy of fire barrier penetration
seal designs and installations, associated testing, and test data.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Adminis- trator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact(s): Dennis Kubicki, NRR
(301) 492-9424 Joseph Petrosino, NRR
(301) 492-4316 Attachments:
1. Appendix A - Summary of Existing Staff
Guidance Related to Fire Barrier
Penetration Seals
2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices
- Transmitted by memo to C. E. Rossi from J. G. Partlow dated 12/21/87
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
PPMB:ARM C/OGCB: DOEA:NRR D/DOEA:NRR
TechEdM CHBerlinger CERossi
01/1</88 01/ /88 01/ /88 OGCB:DOEA: V *D/DEST:NRR *ADT/DEST:NRR *D/DRIS:NRR *DD/DRIS:NRR
RJKiessel IjNA LShao JRlchardson JGPartlow BKGrimes
O1/ll/88 12/17/87 12/16/87 12/16/87 12/16/87
- VIB:DRIS:NRR *ASC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*AC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*ECEB:DEST:NRR*BC/ECEB:DEST:NRR
JPetrosino EBaker JStone DKubicki CMcCracken
12/15/87 12/15/87 12/18/87 12/16/87 12/16/87
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list | - Information Notice 1988-01, Safety Injection Pipe Failure (27 January 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-03, Cracks in Shroud Support Access Hole Cover Welds (2 February 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-04, Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals (5 February 1988, Topic: Fire Barrier, Fire Watch, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-05, Fire in Annunciator Control Cabinets (12 February 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-06, Foreign Objects in Steam Generators (29 February 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-07, Inadvertent Transfer of Licensed Material to Uncontrolled Locations (7 March 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-08, Chemical Reactions with Radioactive Waste Solification Agents (14 March 1988, Topic: Process Control Program, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-09, Reduced Reliability of Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Caused by Instability of Woodward PG-PL Type Governors (18 March 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-10, Memo of Understanding Between NRC and OSHA Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 FR 43950, October 31, 1988) (23 December 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-10, Memo of Understanding Between NRC and OSHA Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 Fr 43950, October 31, 1988) (23 December 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-10, Memorandum of Understanding Between NRC and Osha Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 Fr 43950, October 31, 1988. (23 December 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-11, Potential Loss of Motor Control Center And/Or Switchboard Function Due to Faulty Tie Bolts (7 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-12, Overgreasing of Electric Motor Bearings (12 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-13, Water Hammer & Possible Piping Damage Caused by Misapplication of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm Globe Valves (18 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-14, Potential Problems with Electrical Relays (18 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-15, Availability of Us Food & Drug Administration (FDA) Approved Potassium Iodide for Use in Emergencies Involving Radioactive Iodine (18 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-15, Availability of Us Food & Drug Administration (Fda) Approved Potassium Iodide for Use in Emergencies Involving Radioactive Iodine (18 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-16, Identify Waste Generators in Shipments of Low-Level Waste to Land Disposal Facilities (22 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-17, Summary of Responses to NRC Bulletin 87-01, Thinning of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power Plants. (22 April 1988, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Weld Overlay, Through-Wall Leak)
- Information Notice 1988-18, Malfunction of Lockbox on Radiography Device (25 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-19, Questionable Certification of Class Ie Components (26 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-19, Questionable Certification of Class IE Components (26 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-20, Unauthorized Individuals Manipulating Controls and Performing Control Room Activities (5 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-21, Inadvertent Criticality Events at Oskarshamn and at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants (9 May 1988, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1988-22, Disposal of Sludge from Onsite Sewage Treatment Facilities at Nuclear Power Stations (12 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-23, Potential for Gas Binding of High-Pressure Safety Injection Pumps During a Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (12 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-24, Failures of Air-Operated Valves Affecting Safety-Related Systems (13 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-25, Minimum Edge Distance for Expansion Anchor Bolts (16 May 1988, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1988-26, Falsified Pre-Employment Screening Records (16 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-27, Deficient Electrical Terminations Identified in Safety-Related Components (18 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-28, Potential for Loss of Post-Loca Recirculation Capability Due to Insulation Debris Blockage (19 May 1988, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1988-29, Deficiencies in Primary Containment Low-Voltage Electrical Penetration Assemblies (24 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-30, Target Rock Two-State SRV Setpoint Drift Update (25 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-31, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Deficiency (25 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-32, Prompt Reporting to NRC of Significant Incidents Involving Radioactive Material (25 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-33, Recent Problems Involving the Model Spec 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (27 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-34, Nuclear Material Control & Accountability of Non-Fuel Special Nuclear Material at Power Reactors (31 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-36, Possible Sudden Loss of RCS Inventory During Low Coolant Level Operation (8 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-37, Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components (14 June 1988, Topic: Ultimate heat sink)
- Information Notice 1988-38, Failure of Undervoltage Trip Attachment of General Electric Circuit Breakers (15 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-39, Loss of Recirculation Pumps with Power Oscillation Event (15 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-40, Examiners' Handbook for Developing Operator Licensing Examinations (22 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-41, Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (RERs) (22 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-41, Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (Rers) (22 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-42, Circuit Breaker Failures Due to Loose Charging Spring Motor Mounting Bolts (23 June 1988, Topic: Loctite)
- Information Notice 1988-43, Solenoid Valve Problems (23 June 1988, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1988-44, Mechanical Binding of Spring Release Device in Westinghouse Type DS-416 Circuit Breakers (24 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-45, Problems in Protective Relay & Circuit Breaker Coordination (7 July 1988, Topic: Safe Shutdown)
- Information Notice 1988-46, Licensee Report of Defective Refurbished Circuit Breakers (8 July 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-47, Slower-than-Expected Rod-drop Times (14 July 1988)
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