Information Notice 1988-41, Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (Rers)

Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (Rers)

ML031150237
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	06/22/1988
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-041, NUDOCS 8806170033
Download: ML031150237 (8)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 22, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-41: PHYSICAL PROTECTION WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED

THROUGH REGULATORY EFFECTIVFNESS REVIEWS

(RERs)

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential

problems resulting from weaknesses that may exist in their physical security

systems and programs. The NRC identified physical security weaknesses during

safeguards regulatory effectiveness reviews (RERs) at a number of plant sites.

It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability

to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar

problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not

constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response

is required.

Description of Weaknesses:

During recent RERs, which assess a licensee's capability to cope with the F!PC's

design-basis threats, the staff identified problems at a number of sites. These

findings involved such areas as intrusion detection systems, vital area barriers, alarm assessment and response, access portal search equipment, and weapons der

ployment and mix.

Some examples of findings identified at various sites that have generic appli- cability are given below.

1. Support posts, junction boxes, and fencing located in close proximity to

perimeter intrusion detection systems have been demonstrated to be poten- tial penetration aids for successfully defeating detection. Some intru- sion detection systems also could be circumvented in certain instances by

crawling. In addition, RER team members have found weaknesses in intru- sion detection coverage on the roofs, ledges, and walls of structures that

make up a portion of the protected area barrier at some sites.

2. Several sites have had difficulty distinguishing between nuisance or false

alarms and alarms activated by a simulated intruder.

8 36703

IN 88-41 June 22, 1988 3. Some vital area barriers were found where ventilation openings and ducting, by

walls, and hatches provided little resistance to undetected penetration

hand tools available within the protected area.

4. Performance problems with X-ray equipment were experienced at a few sites

also

during RERs. Coordination of X-ray and explosive detection techniques

was a weakness at some sites.

of

5. Weaknesses were found in the storage locations and in the accessibility

response weapons and equipment.

6. Detection systems sometimes were not functionally tested following soft- ware changes to the security computer system.

7. Problems were identified with regard to the backup power supply for pro- tected area security lighting.

8. Tactical training exercises have been infrequent or did not cover the range

of potential safeguards contingencies consistent with NRC's design-basis

threat.

Discussion:

To be fully effective, physical protection must be supported by a management

and

commitment to excellence; performance testing of equipment, procedures, personnel functions; and good maintenance. The approaches that some licensees

below.

have employed for dealing with the above-mentioned weaknesses are given may

However, these are not the only acceptable solutions; alternative solutions

exist that are better suited to the conditions of a particular site.

Intrusion Detection:

Reducing the height or changing the configuration of intrusion detection system

support posts and relocating Junction boxes and fencing are means of eliminating ad- these objects from serving as penetration aids. Stacking microwave heads, ding E-field wire or shortening detection zones have been effective against

jumping or crawling. Reconfiguring, replacing, or repairing existing intrusion

some

detection systems or adding additional intrusion detection devices have, in

capability to detect attempted penetration over, around, instances, improved the

or through protected area barrier structures.

Alarm Assessment:

Alarm assessment has been improved in several cases by the addition and/or

scene

enhancement of closed-circuit television cameras; timely and thorough on

to delay a

verification by a security patrol; the addition of a second fence

running adversary; and/or increasing the alarm callup monitor speed.

Vital Area Barriers:

to pro- At a number of sites, material such as welded deck grating has been used

In some cases, intrusion detection systems have been

vide a substantial barrier.

installed to detect any attempted penetration of vital area barriers. Adequacy

IN 88-41 June 22, 1988 of barriers is affected by factors-such as time required to penetrate in relation

to detection and response capability, the amount of normal foot traffic through

the area, and the extent of concealment available to adversaries.

Entry Searches:

Licensees have made modifications to access controls to ensure that all hand- carried items will be subjected to appropriate explosives search. Insensitive

equipment has been upgraded or replaced with new equipment at some facilities.

Response Weapons and Equipment:

Some licensees have stored response weapons in more than one location to faci- litate a timely response to a security contingency and to prevent easy inter- diction of the response force. Ammunition placed in the weapons that are locked

in storage or in load bearing systems (e.g., cartridge case) can also facilitate

rapid deployment.

Computer Software Changes:

In addition to testing those zones affected by software modifications, some

licensees randomly test the remainder of the system to verify that it has not

been adversely affected by the change, either accidentally or deliberately.

Security Lighting:

Uninterruptible power supply systems have been used as the preferred source of

backup power. Station or security generators and station batteries also have

been used.

Tactical Training:

Some licensees are increasing the frequency and thoroughness of tactical training

drills for their security forces. Security training officers have been given

specialized education and training in tactics.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Michael S. Warren, NRR

(301) 492-3211 Attachment: List of Recentlv Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment

IN 88-41 June 22, 1988 Page I of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

88-40 Examiners' Handbook for 6/22/88 All holders of OLs

Developing Operator or CPs for nuclear

Licensing Examinations power reactors.

88-39 LaSalle Unit 2 Loss of 6/15/88 All holders of OLs

Recirculation Pumps With or CPs for BWRs.

Power Oscillation Event

88-38 Failure of Undervoltage 6/15/88 All holders of OLs

Trip Attachment on General or CPs for nuclear

Electric Circuit Breakers power reactors.

88-37 Flow Blockage of Cooling 6/14/88 All holders of OLs

Water to Safety System or CPs for nuclear

Components power reactors.

88-36 Possible Sudden Loss of RCS 6/8/88 All holders of OLs

Inventory During Low Coolant or CPs for PWRs.

Level Operation

88-35 Inadequate Licensee Performed 6/3/88 All holders of OLs

Vendor Audits or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

88-34 Nuclear Material Control 5/31/88 All holders of OLs

and Accountability of or CPs for nuclear

Non-Fuel Special Nuclear power reactors.

Material at Power Reactors

87-61, Failure of Westinghouse 5/31/88 All holders of OLs

Supplement 1 W-2-Type Circuit Breaker or CPs for nuclear

Cell Switches power reactors.

88-33 Recent Problems Involving 5/27/88 All Agreement States

the Model Spec 2-T and NRC licensees

Radiographic Exposure authorized to manu- Device facture, distribute

or operate raeio- graphic exposure

devices and source

changers.

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 88-41 June 22, 1988 of barriers is affected by factors such as time required to penetrate in relation

to detection and response capability, the amount of normal foot traffic through

the area, and the extent of concealment available to adversaries.

Entry Searches:

Licensees have made modifications to access controls to ensure that all hand- carried items will be subjected to appropriate explosives search. Insensitive

equipment has been upgraded or replaced with new equipment at some facilities.

Response Weapons and Equipment:

Some licensees have stored response weapons in more than one location to faci- litate a timely response to a security contingency and to prevent easy inter- diction of the response force. Ammunition placed in the weapons that are locked

in storage or in load bearing systems (e.g., cartridge case) can also facilitate

rapid deployment.

Computer Software Changes:

In addition to testing those zones affected by software modifications, some

licensees randomly test the remainder of the system to verify that it has not

been adversely affected by the change, either accidentally or deliberately.

Security Lighting:

Uninterruptible power supply systems have been used as the preferred source of

backup power. Station or security generators and station batteries also have

been used.

Tactical Training:

Some licensees are increasing the frequency and thoroughness of tactical training

drills for their security forces. Security training officers have been given

specialized education and training in tactics.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Michael S. Warren, NRR

(301) 492-3211 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES _ *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPMB:ARM

CHBerlinger TechEd

06//,7/88 06/15/88 05/27/88

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR *RSGB:DRIS:NRR *RSGB:DRIS:NRR *C/RSGB:DRIS:NRR *AD/DRIS:NRR

NPKadambi MWarren RDube RErickson BGrimes

05/19/88 05/19/88 05/19/88 05/19/88 05/26/88

IN 88-xx

June xx, 1988 in relation to detection and response capability, the amount of normal foot

traffic through the area, and the extent of concealment available to

adversaries.

Entry Searches:

Licensees have made modifications to access controls to ensure that all hand- carried items will be subjected to appropriate explosives search. Insensitive

equipment has been upgraded or replaced with new equipment at some facilities.

Response Weapons and Equipment:

Some licensees have stored response weapons in more than one location to

facilitate a timely response to a security contingency and to prevent easy

interdiction of the response force. Ammunition placed In the weapons that are

locked in storage or in load bearing systems (e.g., cartridge case) can also

facilitate rapid deployment.

Computer Software Changes:

In addition to testing those zones affected by software modifications, some

licensees randomly test the remainder of the system to verify that it has not

been adversely affected by the change, either accidentally or deliberately.

Security Lighting:

Uninterruptible power supply systems have been used as the preferred source of

backup power. Station or security generators and station batteries also have

been used.

Tactical Training:

Some licensees are increasing the frequency and thoroughness of tactical

training drills for their security forces. Security training officers have

been given specialized education and training in tactics.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Michael S. Warren, NRR

(301) 492-3211 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Informat N tices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES D/DOEA:NRR C/OGC :D A:NRR *PPMB:ARM

CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd

06/ /88 06//3788 05/27/88 OGCB:DOEA:NRR *RSGB:DRIS:NRR *RSGB:DRIS:NRR *C/RSGB:DRIS:NRR *AD/DRIS:NRR

NPKadambi ,P f MWarren RDube RErickson BGrimes

05/19/88 L/4% 05/l 9 /88 05/19/88 05/19/88 05/26/88

-4- IN 88x

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the

Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events

Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Michael S. Warren, NRR

(301) 492-3211

• See Previsous Concurrence a

ORC :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :AD tyR :OGCB:NRR :OGCB:NRR

-- - - -- - - __--__________-___-_____

~~~~~~~~-----s--------____

--- _ --

__ - -- - --- --- ---

NAME :MWarren* :RDube* :RErickson*  : eS :NPKadambi* :CHBerlinger

______ _:________- - --------------  :'- -------------  :-------------  :---------

DATE :05/19/88 :05/19/88 :05/19/88 :5,'88 4 df: 05/19/88  : / /88 OFC :DOEA:NRR  : r

CERossi :v  :::

NAME

DATE . / /88 *

-4- No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the

Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events

Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Michael S. Warren, NRR

(301) 492-3211 ORC :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :RSGB R :AD:DRIS:NRR :OGCBZ  ::OGCB:NRR

__---------- ----- - - .............

NAME :MWarren :RDube  ? :REr n :BGrimes :NPKadambi :CHBerlinger

___

____--- :___________

--- -- ----- ------------ -- ---------

DATE : 8 5/l/ 88 5/i /88  : / /88 / /88 OFC :DOEA:NRR  :  :

NAME :CERossi  :

DATE : / /88  :  :  :  :