Problems in Protective Relay & Circuit Breaker Coordination ML031150149 Person / Time Site:
Beaver Valley , Millstone , Hatch , Monticello , Calvert Cliffs , Dresden , Davis Besse , Peach Bottom , Browns Ferry , Salem , Oconee , Mcguire , Nine Mile Point , Palisades , Palo Verde , Perry , Indian Point , Fermi , Kewaunee , Catawba , Harris , Wolf Creek , Saint Lucie , Point Beach , Oyster Creek , Watts Bar , Hope Creek , Grand Gulf , Cooper , Sequoyah , Byron , Pilgrim , Arkansas Nuclear , Braidwood , Susquehanna , Summer , Prairie Island , Columbia , Seabrook , Brunswick , Surry , Limerick , North Anna , Turkey Point , River Bend , Vermont Yankee , Crystal River , Haddam Neck , Ginna , Diablo Canyon , Callaway , Vogtle , Waterford , Duane Arnold , Farley , Robinson , Clinton , South Texas , San Onofre , Cook , Comanche Peak , Yankee Rowe , Maine Yankee , Quad Cities , Humboldt Bay , La Crosse , Big Rock Point , Rancho Seco , Zion , Midland , Bellefonte , Fort Calhoun , FitzPatrick , McGuire , LaSalle , 05000000 , Zimmer , Fort Saint Vrain , Shoreham , Satsop , Trojan , Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant , Crane Issue date:
07/07/1988 From:
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation To:
References IN-88-045 , NUDOCS 8806300347Download: ML031150149 (7)
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Beaver Valley ,
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McGuire ,
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Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ,
Crane Category:NRC Information Notice
[Table view] The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:Crane]] </code>.
Contents
1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2 July 7, 1988 3 BREAKER COORDINATION 4 Addressees 5 Purpose 6 Description of Circumstances
6.1 Units I and 2 6.2 This fault not only caused 6.3 As a result, the turbine 6.4 July 7, 1988 6.5 The resolution 6.6 In June 1987, at least two operating 6.7 Background 6.8 Charles E. Rossi, Director 6.9 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 6.10 E. N. Fields, NRR 6.11 July 7, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED 6.12 Mechanical Binding of 6.13 Solenoid Valve Problems 6.14 Due to Loose Charging 6.15 Physical Protection 6.16 Developing Operator 6.17 LaSalle Unit 2 Loss of 6.18 Power Oscillation Event 6.19 Trip Attachment on General 6.20 Flow Blockage of Cooling 6.21 Possible Sudden Loss of RCS 6.22 Level Operation 6.23 All holders of OLs 6.24 All holders of OLs 6.25 All holders of OLs 6.26 All holders of OLs 6.27 All holders of OLs 6.28 All holders of OLs 6.29 All holders of OLs 6.30 All holders of OLs 6.31 All holders of OLs 6.32 All holders of OLs 6.33 Vendor Audits 6.34 Charles E. Rossi, Director 6.35 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 6.36 N. K. Trehan, NRR 6.37 E. N. Fields, NRR 6.38 Charles E. Rossi, Director 6.39 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 6.40 Technical Contact: 6.41 N. K. Trehan, NRR 6.42 Charles E. Rossi, Director 6.43 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 6.44 Technical Contact:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON , D.C.
20555
July 7, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-45: PROBLEMS IN PROTECTIVE RELAY AND CIRCUIT
BREAKER COORDINATION Addressees All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to a potentially
significant problem concerning the possible lack of protective relay and cir- cuit breaker coordination. It is expected that recipients will review the
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in
this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances (1) Lack of Circuit Breaker and Protective Relay Coordination at McGuire
Units I and 2 On September 6, 1987, a reactor trip and turbine trip occurred at the
McGuire nuclear station. These trips resulted directly from a lack of
proper circuit breaker coordination on the plant's onsite electrical
distribution system. To facilitate component maintenance, the power
supply to an auxiliary power panel board was shifted to an alternate
source, a 600 V motor control center (MCC ). This MCC also provides
power to a compressor in the plant's Instrument air system. A ground
fault developed in the compressor's motor.
This fault not only caused the compressor motor's feeder breaker to open but also caused the feeder
breaker to the 600 V MCC to open. The interruption of power to the MCC
precipitated the loss of the panel board.
As a result, the turbine control system closed the main turbine throttle, governor, and intercept
valves causing the reactor to trip on high pressurizer pressure-,
(2) Lack of Breaker and Protective Relay Coordination at Salem Units 1 & 2 In October 1987, in response to staff questions raised during a fire
protection audit, the licensee of Salem Units 1 and 2 determined that
the lack of circuit breaker coordination in the plant could compromise
8863047Z
I
IN 88-45
July 7, 1988 Page ? of 3 the protection for redundant equipment and/or associated circuits from
common mode failures. As a result, the licensee voluntarily shut down
Unit 2 which was the only unit operating at the time.
The resolution of this issue contributed significantly to the outage that lasted ap- proximately 7 weeks.
(3) Lack of Coordination of Ground Fault Protective Devices at Monticello
In June 1986, the Monticello licensee installed electrical ground fault
detection devices on circuit breakers throughout the onsite electrical
distribution system. The installation of these devices altered the
coordination between circuit breaker, motor control centers, and con- nected loads so that actuation of protective devices in the proper
sequence was no longer assured.
In June 1987, at least two operating events involving the loss of a train of emergency core cooling resulted
from the lack of coordination between protective devices. These problems
were caused by the June 1986 design change which had not adequately con- sidered coordination of the protective devices in conjunction with the
design modification.
Background Coordination is the selection and/or setting of protective devices so as to
sequentially isolate only that portion of the system where the abnormality
occurs. To achieve this isolation, it is necessary to set protective devices
so that only the device nearest the fault opens and isolates the faulted circuit
from the system.
It is obvious that such selectivity becomes more important
with devices that are closer to the power source, as a greater portion of the
system can be affected.
Backup protective devices are set to operate at some predetermined time interval
after the primary device fails to operate. A backup device is able to withstand
the fault conditions for a longer period than the primary device. If a primary
device fails to clear a fault and the backup device must clear it, then the
design of the protective system becomes suspect.
To optimize the coordination of protective devices, good engineering practice
requires that consideration be given to the following:
(1) available maximum short circuit currents;
(2) time interval between the coordination curves; and
(3) load current.
Discussion:
Other plants may also have problems with relay and breaker coordination.
The
staff relies on the exercise of good engineering practice by the designers of
electrical power systems at nuclear power plants to provide for the proper
functioning of protective devices.
Breaker coordination is a key fire pro- tection feature if cables for redundant trains pass through a fire area.
NRC
IN 88-45 July 7, 1988 Generic Letter (GL) 81-12 , "Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602 , November-19, 1980),"
dated February 20, 1981 required licensees to submit information with regard to
the design description of modifications necessary to meet Section III.G.3 "Fire
Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability," 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, "Fire Protection
Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979."
This
letter set forth general guidelines for protection of safe shutdown capability
from the fire-induced failure of associated circuits.
ANSI/IEEE Standard 24?-1986,
"IEEE Recommended Practices for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and
Commercial Power Systems" provides detailed guidance on achieving proper co- ordination.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR
(301) 492-0807
E. N. Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
-f
Attachment
IN 88-45
July 7, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Tssued to
88-44
88-43
88-42
88-41
88-40
Mechanical Binding of Spring Release Device
in Westinghouse Type
DS-416 Circuit Breakers
Solenoid Valve Problems Circuit Breaker Failures
Due to Loose Charging Spring Motor Mounting Bolts
Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified
Through Regulatory Ef- fectiveness Reviews (RERs)
Examiners' Handbook for
Developing Operator Licensing Examinations
LaSalle Unit 2 Loss of Recirculation Pumps With
Power Oscillation Event Failure of Undervoltage
Trip Attachment on General Electric Circuit Breakers
Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System
Components
Possible Sudden Loss of RCS Inventory During Low Coolant
Level Operation 6/24/88
6/23/88
6/23/88
6/22/88
6/?2/88
6/15/88
6/15/88
6/14/88
6/8/88
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs for BWRs .
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
All holders of OLs or CPs for PWRs .
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
88-39
88-38
88-37
88-36
88-35 Inadequate Licensee Performed 6/3/88
Vendor Audits OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 88-45 July 7, 1988 Generic Letter (GL) 81-12 , "Fire Protection Rule (45 FR 76602 , November 19, 1980),"
dated February 20, 1981 required licensees to submit information with regard to
the design description of modifications necessary to meet Section III.G.3 "Fire
Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability," 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, "Fire Protection
Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979."
This
letter set forth general guidelines for protection of safe shutdown capability
from the fire-induced failure of associated circuits. ANSI/IEEE Standard 242-1986,
"IEEE Recommended Practices for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and
Commercial Power Systems" provides detailed guidance on achieving proper co- ordination.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical Contacts:
N. K. Trehan, NRR (301) 492-0807
E. N. Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE LShao
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IN 88-XX
June xx, 1988 No specific action or written response Is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical Contact: N. K. Trehan, NRR (301) 492-0807 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
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June xx, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
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office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical Contact: N. K.
(301)
Trehan, NRR
492-0807 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
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list Information Notice 1988-01, Safety Injection Pipe Failure 27 January 1988 Topic Unidentified leak Water hammer Information Notice 1988-03, Cracks in Shroud Support Access Hole Cover Welds 2 February 1988 Topic Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking Stolen Information Notice 1988-04, Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals 5 February 1988 Topic Fire Barrier Fire Watch Stolen Information Notice 1988-05, Fire in Annunciator Control Cabinets 12 February 1988 Topic Stolen Information Notice 1988-06, Foreign Objects in Steam Generators 29 February 1988 Topic Eddy Current Testing Stolen Information Notice 1988-07, Inadvertent Transfer of Licensed Material to Uncontrolled Locations 7 March 1988 Topic Stolen Overexposure Information Notice 1988-08, Chemical Reactions with Radioactive Waste Solification Agents 14 March 1988 Topic Process Control Program Stolen Information Notice 1988-09, Reduced Reliability of Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Caused by Instability of Woodward PG-PL Type Governors 18 March 1988 Topic Overspeed trip Overspeed Information Notice 1988-10, Memo of Understanding Between NRC and OSHA Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 FR 43950, October 31, 1988) 23 December 1988 Topic Fatality Overexposure Information Notice 1988-10, Memo of Understanding Between NRC and OSHA Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 Fr 43950, October 31, 1988) 23 December 1988 Topic Fatality Overexposure Information Notice 1988-10, Memorandum of Understanding Between NRC and Osha Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 Fr 43950, October 31, 1988. 23 December 1988 Topic Fatality Overexposure Information Notice 1988-11, Potential Loss of Motor Control Center And/Or Switchboard Function Due to Faulty Tie Bolts 7 April 1988 Information Notice 1988-12, Overgreasing of Electric Motor Bearings 12 April 1988 Topic Hardened grease Information Notice 1988-13, Water Hammer & Possible Piping Damage Caused by Misapplication of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm Globe Valves 18 April 1988 Topic Water hammer Information Notice 1988-14, Potential Problems with Electrical Relays 18 April 1988 Information Notice 1988-15, Availability of Us Food & Drug Administration (FDA) Approved Potassium Iodide for Use in Emergencies Involving Radioactive Iodine 18 April 1988 Topic Water hammer Potassium iodide Information Notice 1988-15, Availability of Us Food & Drug Administration (Fda) Approved Potassium Iodide for Use in Emergencies Involving Radioactive Iodine 18 April 1988 Topic Potassium iodide Information Notice 1988-16, Identify Waste Generators in Shipments of Low-Level Waste to Land Disposal Facilities 22 April 1988 Information Notice 1988-17, Summary of Responses to NRC Bulletin 87-01, Thinning of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power Plants 22 April 1988 Topic Safe Shutdown Weld Overlay Feedwater Heater Through-Wall Leak Water hammer Information Notice 1988-18, Malfunction of Lockbox on Radiography Device 25 April 1988 Topic Overexposure Information Notice 1988-19, Questionable Certification of Class Ie Components 26 April 1988 Topic Water hammer Information Notice 1988-19, Questionable Certification of Class IE Components 26 April 1988 Information Notice 1988-20, Unauthorized Individuals Manipulating Controls and Performing Control Room Activities 5 May 1988 Information Notice 1988-21, Inadvertent Criticality Events at Oskarshamn and at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants 9 May 1988 Topic Shutdown Margin Information Notice 1988-22, Disposal of Sludge from Onsite Sewage Treatment Facilities at Nuclear Power Stations 12 May 1988 Topic Sewage Treatment Plant Information Notice 1988-23, Potential for Gas Binding of High-Pressure Safety Injection Pumps During a Loss-Of-Coolant Accident 12 May 1988 Information Notice 1988-24, Failures of Air-Operated Valves Affecting Safety-Related Systems 13 May 1988 Information Notice 1988-25, Minimum Edge Distance for Expansion Anchor Bolts 16 May 1988 Topic Earthquake Information Notice 1988-26, Falsified Pre-Employment Screening Records 16 May 1988 Information Notice 1988-27, Deficient Electrical Terminations Identified in Safety-Related Components 18 May 1988 Information Notice 1988-28, Potential for Loss of Post-Loca Recirculation Capability Due to Insulation Debris Blockage 19 May 1988 Topic Coatings Information Notice 1988-29, Deficiencies in Primary Containment Low-Voltage Electrical Penetration Assemblies 24 May 1988 Information Notice 1988-30, Target Rock Two-State SRV Setpoint Drift Update 25 May 1988 Information Notice 1988-31, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Deficiency 25 May 1988 Topic Loss of Offsite Power Information Notice 1988-32, Prompt Reporting to NRC of Significant Incidents Involving Radioactive Material 25 May 1988 Topic Overexposure Information Notice 1988-33, Recent Problems Involving the Model Spec 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device 27 May 1988 Topic Depleted uranium Information Notice 1988-34, Nuclear Material Control & Accountability of Non-Fuel Special Nuclear Material at Power Reactors 31 May 1988 Information Notice 1988-36, Possible Sudden Loss of RCS Inventory During Low Coolant Level Operation 8 June 1988 Information Notice 1988-37, Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components 14 June 1988 Topic Ultimate heat sink Information Notice 1988-38, Failure of Undervoltage Trip Attachment of General Electric Circuit Breakers 15 June 1988 Information Notice 1988-39, Loss of Recirculation Pumps with Power Oscillation Event 15 June 1988 Topic Feedwater Heater Information Notice 1988-40, Examiners Handbook for Developing Operator Licensing Examinations 22 June 1988 Information Notice 1988-41, Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (RERs) 22 June 1988 Information Notice 1988-41, Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (Rers) 22 June 1988 Information Notice 1988-42, Circuit Breaker Failures Due to Loose Charging Spring Motor Mounting Bolts 23 June 1988 Topic Locktite Information Notice 1988-43, Solenoid Valve Problems 23 June 1988 Topic Stroke time Information Notice 1988-44, Mechanical Binding of Spring Release Device in Westinghouse Type DS-416 Circuit Breakers 24 June 1988 Information Notice 1988-45, Problems in Protective Relay & Circuit Breaker Coordination 7 July 1988 Topic Safe Shutdown Information Notice 1988-46, Licensee Report of Defective Refurbished Circuit Breakers 8 July 1988 Information Notice 1988-47, Slower-than-Expected Rod-drop Times 14 July 1988 ... further results