Information Notice 1988-30, Target Rock Two-State SRV Setpoint Drift Update

Target Rock Two-State SRV Setpoint Drift Update

ML031150142
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	05/25/1988
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-030, NUDOCS 8805200030
Download: ML031150142 (11)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 May 25, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-30: TARGET ROCK TWO-STAGE SRV SETPOINT

DRIFT UPDATE

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert recipients to continuing

problems associated with setpoint drift occurring in Target Rock two-stage

safety/relief valves (SRVs) originally described in Information Notices (INs)

82-41, 83-39, 83-82, and 86-12 (References 1 - 4). It is expected that re- cipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities

and consider actions, if appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC require- ments; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Background:

On July 2, 1982, at Hatch Unit 1, all 11 Target Rock two-stage SRVs failed to

open at their setpoints of 1080 psig, 1090 psig, and 1100 psig. Pressure in

the reactor coolant system (RCS) rose to 1180 psig before three SRVs on one

steamline opened and relieved RCS pressure rapidly. This incident focused

concern on a problem that was beginning to be seen in those SRVs, called

"setpoint drift".

The Georgia Power Company, the General Electric Company (GE), and the Target

Rock Company initiated a study of the cause of the event at Hatch Unit 1.

Other utilities that had installed two-stage Target Rock SRVs Joined Georgia

Power in an owners' group to look into the nature of the problem and its

solutions.

Similar problems had been observed throughout the industry and reports in

dicated that the number of valves affected and the extent of the observed

setpoint drift had been increasing. The problem was ultimately identified

as one or both of two situations: (1) binding in the labyrinth seal area

caused by tolerance buildup during manufacturing or (2) disc-to-seat bonding

caused by oxides of the disc and seat material forming a continuous film and

inhibiting disc movement.

88 030

It

IN 88-30

May 25, 1988 To address these problems, additional maintenance was performed to refurbish

valves and replace parts found to be out of tolerance in the labyrinth

area. This proved to be effective in some cases; however, problems causedseal

disc-to-seat bonding continued. A material, PH13-8Mo, whose oxide would by

form a continuous film with the oxide of the seat material, was chosen for not

discs. A trial test of valve performance after about 50% of the valves new

plant had new discs installed is currently being conducted. on a

Test Results:

Initial results of the test of the new discs were obtained in May of 1987 the Hatch Unit 1 valves were tested. Of the five valves that had new discswhen

installed, four had pilot valves that leaked before the test. Only one of

these four pilot valves did not leak after the test. The valve that did

leak before the steam test had first been tested with nitrogen gas (N ) not

determine if the disc was stuck. It lifted at 5 psig N . The remaining2 to

2 valves lifted within 2% of setpoint. The technical specification (TS) limit four

is

+/- 1% of the setpoint. One of these leaked so much that the bonnet pressure

could not be stabilized and the delay time (time between lift of the pilot

and the lift of the main disc) was excessive. Subsequently, the remaining disc

valves were tested. Test values for all 11 valves are given in Table 1.

Disc numbers 313 and 1186, which are new discs, showed a lighter-color oxide

which was less-adherent and softer in the steam area than was seen on the

discs in previous tests. Also, the seating area was bright and was not bandedold

with the apparent cleft of the corrosion seen on the old discs in previous

tests. Discs 1189 and 1002 showed similar corrosion properties, but were

obviously steam drawn around the entire circumference. Disc 1189 showed

signs

that foreign material had been lodged between the disc and the seat. A stabi- lizer disc (Stellite) from one valve exhibited the same darker, harder, more-adherent corrosion as had been seen previously on the old (Stellite)

discs. The decision was made to turn the new disc over to GE for testing

to replace the new discs with other new discs, but not to replace the old and

discs

at that time.

Brunswick Unit 2 completed Its testing for this cycle in early 1988.

Initial

reports indicate that valves with the PH13-8Mo discs lifted at +1.9%, -O.1%*,

-1.2%, +0.6%, and +4.0% of their setpoint. One valve was not tested. The

old-style valves, with the Stellite 6 discs, lifted at +9.3%, -1.4%, -0.2%,

+0.6%, and +2.6%*. Details are shown in Table 2.

-Hatch Unit 2 test results were also recently received. They show the valves

with PH13-8Mo discs lifted at +2.9%, +1.8%, +0.7%, and -1.1%. The valves

with

the Stellite discs lifted at +1.5%, +0.3%, +4.1%, +0.2%, +2.8%, and +1.6%.

Details are shown in Table 3.

Based on available test results, the valves with new discs appear to

perform

better than valves with old discs, and valves with old discs appear to perform

better than they did in the past.

(*Second lift - the recorder was not running when the disc was first lifted).

IN 88-30

May 25, 1988 If, when the analysis of the data is completed, the cause of the +4.0% drift on

the Brunswick Unit 2 valve and the +2.9% drift on the Hatch Unit 2 valve can be

determined, then PH13-8Mo may be proven to be an acceptable substitute for

Stellite 6. The NRC will continue to follow the testing program.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

CCharles E. Rossi, Directot- Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Mary S. Wegner, AEOD

(301) 492-7818 Attachments:

1. Table 1, 1987 Test Results for Hatch Unit 1 Target Rock SRVs

2. Table 2, 1988 Test Results for Brunswick Unit 2 Target Rock SRVs

3. Table 3, Test Results for Hatch Unit 2 Target Rock SRVs

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

References:

1. Information Notice No. 82-41, "Failure of Safety/Relief Valves to Open at

a BWR."

2. Information Notice No. 83-39, "Failure of Safety/Relief Valves to Open at

BWR - Interim Report."

3. Information Notice No. 83-82, "Failure of Safety/Relief Valves to Open at

BWR - Final Report."

4. Information Notice No. 86-12, "Target Rock Two-Stage SRV Setpoint Drift."

Attachment 1 IN 88-30

May 25, 1988 Page 1 of I

TABLE 1

1987 TEST RESULTS FOR HATCH UNIT 1 TARGET ROCK SRVs

Valve Identifier Setpoint Leak 11 Disc SNT TS -t Fn # ._~~~~ *.. Ws.vl

-"a- ror

IU%04-lug

rs

V v, New 1189 1090 1072 -1.65% Yes Yes

New 313 1080 1096 +1.48% Yes No

New 1002 1080 1101 +1.94% Yes Yes

New 1186 1100 5 (N2) LT 1% No No

New 1190[2] 1100 1083 +1.55% Yes Yes

Old 1006 1090 1093 LT 1% Yes Yes

Old 1187 1090 1076 -1.28% Yes

Old Yes

1011 1080 1146[31 +6.11% No No

Old 1009 1080 1053 -2.50% Yes Yes

Old 1004 1090 1101 +1.01% Yes Yes

Old 1003 1100 1116 +1.45% Yes Yes

SN = Serial Number

TS = Technical Specifications

Notes:

[12 Pilot disc leakage.

[2] Originally mounted on a Hatch body, but was removed due to leakage past

the main disc. Remounted on a slave (Wyle) body. Pilot leakage was so

great that the 30-minute stabilization of the bonnet temperature was

waived.

[3] Failed to lift when tested on 5 psig nitrogen.

Attachment 2 IN 88-30

May 25, 1988 TABLE 2

1988 TEST RESULTS FOR BRUNSWICK UNIT 2 TARGET ROCK SRVs

Valve Identifier Setpoint

Part Number Disc SN SL TS As-hound I Ya-r Leakrll N2 Test

2B21-F013A New 1109 A 1105 1126 +1.9% Yes No

2B21-FO13B Old 1103 A 1125 1230 +9.3% Yes No

2B21-FO13C Old 1099 B 1105 1090 -1.4% No Failed

2B21-FO13D New 1102 B 1115 1114[21 -0.1%

2B21-FO13E Old 1105 B 1115 1113 -0.2% Yes No

2B21-F013F Old 1091 C 1105 1112 +0.6% No Failed

2B21-FO13G New 1106 C 1105 1092 -1.2% Yes No

2B21-FO13H New 1107 D 1115 1122 +0.6% Yes No

2B21-F013J New 1108 D 1125 1170 +4.0% Yes No

2B21-FO13K Old 1101 C 1115 1144[21 +2.6%

2B21-F013L New 1104 B[3]

SN = Serial Number

SL = Steamline

TS = Technical Specifications

Notes:

Pilot disc leakage.

[12 Second lift, valve was inadvertently lifted without recorder running.

Retainer bolts removed, spring preload lost, no as-found test done.

Attachment 3 IN 88-30

May 25, 1988 TABLE 3 TEST RESULTS FOR HATCH UNIT 2 TARGET ROCK SRVs

Valve Identifier Setpoint.

Disc SN To

As--Fondij=-V a rW I aDvri

I

Old 301 '1100 1116 +1.5% Yes

New 302 ' 1100 1132 +2.9% Yes

Old 303 1110 1114 +0.4% Yes

New 306 1110 1130 +1.8% Yes, badly

New 307 1110 1118 +0.7% Yes, badly

New 308 1090 1078 -1.1% Yes

Old 310 1090 1135 - +4.1% No

Old 312 *1090 1092 +0.2% Yes

Old 314 1090 1121 +2.8% Yes

New 315 1100 1109 +0.8% Yes

Old 1001 1100 1118 +1.6% Yes

SN = Serial Number

TS - Technical Specifications

Notes:

[1] Pilot disc leakage.

Attachment 4 IN 88-30

May 25, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

88-29 Deficiencies in Primary 5/24/88 All holders of OLs

Containment Low-Voltage or CPs for nuclear

Electrical Penetration power reactors.

Assemblies

88-28 Potential for Loss of 5/19/88 All holders of OLs

Post-LOCA Recirculation or CPs for nuclear

Capability Due to power reactors.

Insulation Debris Blockage

88-27 Deficient Electrical 5/18/88 All holders of OLs

Terminations Identified or CPs for nuclear

in Safety-Related power reactors.

Components

85-35, Failure of Air Check 5/17/88 All holders of OLs

Supplement 1 Valves to Seat or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

88-26 Falsified Pre-Employment 5/16/88 All holders of OLs

Screening Records or CPs for nuclear

power reactors and

all maJor fuel

facility licensees.

88-25 Minimum Edge Distance for 5/16/88 All holders of OLs

Expansion Anchor Bolts or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

88-24 Failures of Air-Operated 5/13/88 All holders of OLs

Valves Affecting Safety- or CPs for nuclear

Related Systems power reactors.

88-23 Minimum Edge Distance for 5/16/88 All holders of OLs

Expansion Anchor Bolts or CPs for PWRs.

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 88-30

May 25, 1988 If, when the analysis of the data Is completed, the cause of the +4.0% drift on

the Brunswick Unit 2 valve and the +2.9% drift on the Hatch Unit 2 valve can be

determined, then PH13-8Mo may be proven to be an acceptable substitute for

Stellite 6. The NRC will continue to follow the testing program.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Mary S. Wegner, AEOD

(301) 492-7818 Attachments:

1. Table 1, 1987 Test Results for Hatch Unit 1 Target Rock SRVs

2. Table 2, 1988 Test Results for Brunswick Unit 2 Target Rock SRVs

3. Table 3, Test Results for Hatch Unit 2 Target Rock SRVs

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

References:

1. Information Notice No. 82-41, "Faillure of Safety/Relief Valves to Open at

a BWR."

2. Information Notice No. 83-39, "Failure of Safety/Relief Valves to Open at

BWR - Interim Report."

3. Information Notice No. 83-82, "Failure of Safety/Relief Valves to Open at

BWR - Final Report."

4. Information Notice No. 86-12, "Target Rock Two-Stage SRV Setpolnt Drift."

PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

• See previous concurrences

• • Transmitted by memorandum to C. H. Berlinger from J. E. Rosenthal dated

March 16, 1988

• • • Comments received in memorandum to C. H. Berlinger from L. B. Marsh dated

April 18, 1988

• D/D -W

CERossl

4 *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR*PPMB:ARM

CHBerllnger TechEd

• • • C/EMEB:DEST:NRR***EMEB:DEST:NRR

LBMarsh PTKuo

05/20/88 05/09/88 04/15/88 04/ /88 04/ /88

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR **ROAB:DSP:AEOD**ROAB:DSP:AEOD**C/ROAB:DSP:AEOD ***EMEB:DEST:NRR

RJKiessel MSWegner MChirmal JERosenthal CGHammer

04/12/88 03/ /88 03/ /88 03/ /88 04/ /88

IN 88-XX

May xx, 1988 If, when the analysis of the data is completed, the cause of the +4.0% drift on

the Brunswick Unit 2 valve and the +2.9% drift on the Hatch Unit 2 valve can be

determined, then PH13-8Mo may be proven to be an acceptable substitute for

Stellite 6. The NRC will continue to follow the testing program.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Mary S. wegner, AEOD

(301) 492-7818 Attachments:

1. Table 1, 1987 Test Results for Hatch Unit 1 Target Rock SRVs

2. Table 2, 1988 Test Results for Brunswick Unit 2 Target Rock SRVs

3. Table 3, Test Results for Hatch Unit 2 Target Rock SRVs

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

References:

1. Information Notice No. 82-41, "Failure of Safety/Relief Valves to Open at

a BWR."

2. Information Notice No. 83-39, "Failure of Safety/Relief Valves to Open at

BWR - Interim Report."

3. Information Notice No. 83-82, "Failure of Safety/Relief Valves to Open at

BWR - Final Report."

4. Information Notice No. 86-12, "Target Rock Two-Stage SRV Setpoint Drift."

PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

• See previous concurrences

• • Transmitted by memorandum to C. H. Berlinger from J. E. Rosenthal dated

March 16, 1988

• • • Comments received in memorandum to C. H. Berlinger from L. B. Marsh dated

April 18, 1988 D/ R *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR*PPMB:ARM ***C/EMEB:DEST:NRR***EMEB:DEST:NRR

CHBerlinger TechEd LBMarsh PTKuo

05/09/88 04/15/88 04/ /88 04/ /88

• O4B:DOEA:NRR **ROAB:DSP:AEOD**ROAB:DSP:AEOD**C/ROAB:DSP:AEOD ***EMEB:DEST:NRR

RJKiessel MSWegner MChirmal JERosenthal CGHammer

04/12/88 03/ /88 03/ /88 03/ /88 04/ /88

IN 88-XX

April xx, 1988 If, when the analysis of the data is completed, the cause of the +4.0% drift on

the Brunswick Unit 2 valve and the +2.9% drift on the Hatch Unit 2 valve can be

determined, then PH13-8Mo may be proven to be an acceptable substitute for

Stellite 6. The NRC will continue to follow the testing program.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Mary S. Wegner, AEOD

(301) 492-7818 Attachments:

1. Table 1, 1987 Test Results for Hatch Unit 1 Target Rock SRVs

2. Table 2, 1988 Test Results for Brunswick Unit 2 Target Rock SRVs

3. Table 3, Test Results for Hatch Unit 2 Target Rock SRVs

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

• Transmitted by memorandum to C. H. Berlinger from J. E. Rosenthal dated

March 16, 1988

• • Comments received in memorandum to C. H. Berlinger from L. B. Marsh dated

April 18, 1988 A

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB: DOEA:NRR *PPMB:ARM **C/EMEB:DEST:NRR **EMEB:DEST:NRR

CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd LBMarsh PTKuo

04/ /88 q5/cq /88 04/15/88 04/ /88 04/ /88

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR *ROAB:DSP:AEOD *ROAB:DSP:AEOD*C/ROAB:DSP:AEOD **EMEB:DEST:NRR

RJKiessel MSWegner MChirmal JERosenthal CGHammer

04/12/88 03/ /88 03/ /88 03/ /88 04/ /88

IN 88-XX

April xx, 1988 When the analysis of the data is completed, and the cause of the +4.0% drift on

the Brunswick Unit 2 valve and the +2.9% drift on the Hatch Unit 2 valve can be

determined, then PH13-8Mo may be proven to be an acceptable substitute for

Stellite 6. The NRC will continue to follow the testing program.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Mary S. Wegner, NRR

(301) 492-7818 Attachments:

1. Table 1, 1987 Test Results for Hatch Unit 1 Target Rock SRVs

2. Table 2, 1988 Test Results for Brunswick Unit ? Target Rock SRVs

3. Table 3, Test Results for Hatch Unit 2 Target Rock SRVs

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

• Transmitted by memorandum to C. H. Berlinger from J. E. Rosenthal dated

March 16, 1988

• • Comentb received in memorandum to C. H. Berlinger from L. B. Marsh dated

AprilW, 1988 D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR PPMB:ARM **C/EMEB:DEST:NRR **EMEB:DEST:NRR

CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd 8Ž.b LBMarsh PTKuo

04/ /88 04/ /88 04/l&'/88 04/ /88 04/ /88 OGCB:DOEA:NRR *ROAB:DSP:AEOD *ROAB:DSP:AEOD*C/ROAB:DSP:AEOD **EMEB:DEST:NRR

RJKiessel MSWegner MChirmal JERosenthal CGHammer

04/a/a > < 03/ /88 03/ /88 03/ /88 04/ /88